

## THREE NATIONS IN GREAT CIVIL WARS AND AFTER. USA, RUSSIA AND SPAIN: CASES OF DEMOCRATIC RENOVATION

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### 1. Introduction.

A theme was selected because its great scholar interest and practical meaning. Civil Wars in various areas of international community still are a menace or a reality dangerous to own people, security and overall peace. To prevent an internal armed strife it is important to understand clearly its potential causes and roots. If a Civil War has place, extremely important to know the best ways and means to reconcile enemy sides as soon as possible and to eliminate her anti-human heritage conservation of which usually weakens prospects of democratic development and well-being of nation.

Our theme is located on the crossroads of several social disciplines - general history, politics, sociology, psychology, military science. Therefore, part of our analysis is only designated, and description of events and processes is mostly briefed. Surely many aspects of the theme need further study despite a giant volume of literature (see chapter 2).

To clear main trends of nations entry and exit of Civil Wars, we use elsewhere a comparative method of historical study which usually is absent in literature published on three nations selected for exploration.

Figures in brackets mean: first one, a number of publication in bibliographical list; second one, a number of page cited. In some cases we used only first figures.

During fulfilling project, scholar journeys to United Kingdom and Hungary had place. Exchange ideas with colleagues at Oxford, London, Nottingham and Budapest was no less useful for process of work than studies at high-class university libraries and purchase of recent editions not available in Russia.

Elaborating of project has permitted not only collect a solid volume of materials, but to make evaluations, opinions and generalities containing in chapters below.

## 2. Primary sources and literature.

Were used 225 titles in 4 languages (Russian, English, Spanish, French) printed in 8 states – Russia, Spain, US, United Kingdom, France, Mexico, Argentine, Italy.

126 titles were in Russian; 64, in English; 31, in Spanish; 4, in others.

Primary sources used were: 1) documentary publications based on public archives materials (4 titles); 2) diaries and memoirs of participants and spectators of events of Civil War and reconciliation (24 titles); 3) polemic (15 titles); 4) oral histories (2); 5) novels created by writers (11). It gave a rich material for historical reconstruction, a whole spectre of human impressions, opinions, attitudes. Especially of interest appeared to be volumes: 31; 71; 74-5; 88; 110; 148; 158; 178-9; 199-200.

Principal shortcoming of primary sources is frank supremacy of individual or group passions and prejudices over cold reason, rejection in most cases of balanced point of view. Academic perpetually has to separate real facts from exaggregations, rumors, etc. Comparing various sources and searching some common ground for conclusions.

Literature on the theme is enormous (see for example: 190, 138-139; 210; 1009 – 1041). Among 180 volumes selected were: 1) encyclopedias (5 titles); 2) standard historical courses and textbooks (9 titles); 3) philosophical interpretations (3); 4) biographies of political and military leaders (27); 5) outlines of military operations (11); 6) recent monographs containing a complex, interdisciplinary approach (18 titles).

Of monographs we have found most valuable works by Americans Gaines Foster and Bertram Wyatt-Brown who have studied profoundly reconciliatory policies in US (25; 38); by our compatriots Vladimir Buldakov and Sergei Pavluchenkov, who combine successfully historical, psychological and sociological approach (42; 72); by late Pavel Volobyev who invented study of folklore into Russian historiography of Civil War and reconciliation (107); by British Raymond Carr, a brilliant revisionist in exploration of modern Spain (163); by Spaniards Jose Sanchez, Alberto Reig Tapia and Manuel Tunon de Lara trying to present an unbiased analysis of the Civil War and national reconciliation after it (202; 209; 212).

## 3. The roots and trends of pre-war socio-political conflict.

All three states had deep geographic, demographic, political and judicial differences. US, then mostly Protestant country, belongs to North American civilization. Predominantly Catholic Spain is of Western European, Latin civilization. Mainly Orthodox Russia forms unique European-Asiatic civilization.

Nevertheless, they had important similarities. All three states have approached Civil Wars as predominantly rural societies (70- 75% of overall population) experiencing transition to industrial urban society and modern mass democracy. The transition created heavy political tensions and stresses.

The political stresses included deep socio-economic and psychological cleavages – poor vs. rich, illiterate vs. Educated, non-believers vs. Faithful, rural folk vs. City dwellers, periphery vs. Core.

Different social forces have led nations to armed internal strife. If in US initiative in outbreak of hostilities belonged to rightist strata of South, in Russia and Spain both rightists and leftists divide responsibility for Civil War in almost equal degree.

In us only Southern Democrats had supported idea of armed internal strife. When South has seceded federal public service and most part of armed service have remained loyal to constitutional powers.

In Russia in 1917-1918 majority of parties – moderate Socialists, Constitutionalists, Progressives etc., were against armed violence. Only Bolsheviks and Anarchists (as some Monarchists) planned Civil War. But they were on rise having mass sympathies of soldiers and peasants tired by W.W.I. Armed forces friendly neutrality or direct support has permitted to left-wingers to overthrow legal Temporary government. Public service, quite loyal to the government, was smashed by mass layoffs and other reprisals. State machine has crumbled. It was restored by 1919, first on Rebel (Red) territory.

Situation in Spain was even more intricaded. Moderate constitutional powers in 1935-1936 lose ground to Anarchists, militant Socialists and Communists. Rebellion of July 18, 1936 was therefore an unconstitutional initiative of army officers, clergy

and small political party of Falange. And unlike US, Republican armed forces and public service have supported overwhelmingly the rebellion against Republic. Working class in Anarchist traditions has responded by overall strike. (it was neither in US nor in Russia).

Spanish state has crumbled completely. It was restored by 1938, first on Rebel (Nationalist) territory.

Combining in Russia and Spain class, religious, sectional and international war (81, 176; 169,153-154; 190,134-148; 212,82-86) was quite destructive factor that had added severity and cruelty to all sides.

Problem of changing majority in Civil Wars is of great interest and deserves further study. We just note in US Loyalists (Unionists, Northerners) have managed to hold overall majority support during War – indeed, with temporary difficulties (32,284-5; 36,244). In Russia, popular majority was on Rebels side, especially at outbreak of War. In Spain, Loyalists big majority steadily has transformed into Rebels majority.

4. Democratic institutions and rule of law under limitations and stress of Civil Wars.

It is trivial that war measures reject most (but not all) democratic and legal principles. However, civil society usually resists bids to destroy democracy and rule of the law completely. So it is quite interesting to compare experience of the three nations in this field.

Great luck for US appeared to be Lincoln government was fully legal and constitutional. It had got power on regular free election. Results of that election were not disputed anyway. Owing at first small enough armed forces federal government nonetheless enjoyed power and control over 23 of 34 states – that is, 60% of national territory, and 70% of population, lion share of industry and natural resources, most communications. It hold a national capital and diplomatic relations with all powers.

Stable rear, constant superiority in human and material resources gave President and Congress possibilities not to demolish main components of political democracy. War measures acts had full legal force only in narrow front hinterland. Free press has continued to exist, exclusions from the rule were rare and brief (18, 395-401). Lincoln often softened death sentences got by opponents of Union. Most common punishment for criminals continued to be prison terms, fines, expulsion to enemy territory.

Next President and Congress elections and mid-elections have place in proper time indicated by federal Constitution. This very strong inclination of Americans to fulfilling their Constitution surprised foreign spectators and academics (13, 124-127; 22, 45).

Good situation with food in the Union has permitted federal government not to impose food rationing which objectively widens and enshrines state power over civil society. Wages and prices were not frozen. However, labor strikes became illegal. This measure has limited economic rights of no more than 5-6% of population/

Although Lincoln has increased his powers significantly according to war measures acts, he has managed not to abolish powers of Congress, state governors and legislatures. Till 1863 state governors used their right to nominate officers, including generals (3, 24-25, 46).

Planning post-war Southern reconstruction as a democratic policies, President has established in 1864 Rebel states would have right to join Union when 10 per cent of its electorate swear to it. This condition confirms true respect of Lincoln for foundations of political democracy( 28, 676).

In Confederacy it is necessary to note deep respect of Davies government for at least one sufficient component of democracy and rule of law, state rights. All Confederacy armies were formed by various states and subordinated first and foremost to it. War Ministry of Confederacy owned mainly coordination functions. And several states – Georgia, Northern Caroline- waged truly independent financial and tax policy (see 24; 34; 39). Modern explorers often see in such **confederal democracy** a fundamental reason for Southern final defeat (36, ch. 10,17). But we are sure

democracy did maintain spirit and morale of Confederate warriors, especially in defensive battles at Chicamoga, Spottsylvania and Richmond.

During division of country in 1861 both sides treat each another with tolerance produced by democratic traditions. Future rivals usually used right and possibilities to leave North or South, respectively/ Remind fate of R.Lee, who was at federal capital on the eve of War, and of D.Farragut (at Norfolk, respectively). Certainly, it did help to lessen internal political tensions and to diminish scale of war reprisals.

American powers – federal, confederal, state and municipal- used periodically old custom of exchange spies.

Most academics agree American Civil War despite some features of mass modern war- compulsory enlisting, military propaganda, modern weapons like mines, heavy artillery, ironclads, torpedoes, etc was waged predominantly under rule of law and democracy. Maintaining it was later very helpful in withdrawing hostilities.

Spain and Russia present different ways and means.

Indeed Spanish government of 1936 was fully legal and constitutional. It has got a fresh electoral mandate 5 months before July rebellion( 190,101-120). But here similarity ends. In contrast with US, Spain was uncertain democracy without strong historical roots. Republic existed only 5 years, and there was overall distemper situation characterized by escalation of impatience, intolerance and public violence. And Republican parties have got Parliamentary majority obtaining only minority of votes cast (163, 44-62; 168, 317-340;186,7-15). These factors naturally weakened foundations of democracy and rule of law.

Military rebellion of 1936 inevitably and dramatically has worsened prospects of Spanish democracy. Civil War exploded in atmosphere of naked mass violence described in public archives records and in books by foreign spokesmen like E.Hemingway, A.Malraux, H.Matthews, F.Moriac, G.Orwell, A.Saint-Exepury, A.Camus, etc.

Rebel National government was quite illegal and unconstitutional. Even Rebels failed to select one temporary capital. Theirs supreme bodies were diffused at

Salamanca, Burgos and Valladolid. Only in 1938 Rebels Caudillo F.Franco enshrined Burgos as temporary capital of new state.

On Nationalist territory constitutional guarantees immediately have ceased to exist. Rebels imposed martial law, replaced ordinary courts by military tribunals, prohibited all labor strikes, disbanded virtually all voluntary unions, closed frontiers, established preliminary censorship. It was true military rule officially called crusade (142, 59-60, 65-90; 163, 209-213; 212, 428-429).

On Republican territory constitutional **democracy of all classes** existed till Spring of 1939. There was no martial law until January 1939, sea frontiers remained open. All citizens were under jurisdiction of ordinary courts that rarely used death penalty. And in 1938 Republic officially has abolished death penalty replaced by terms in prison. Until mid-1938, working class enjoyed social progressive innovations, including 8-hour labor day. Here were no legal sanctions against shirkers. All meeting took place during labor time. Trade unions whose rights were expanded, flourished. Republican and Socialist opponents of governmental policies – J.Besteiro, L.Caballero, I.Prieto – were even not arrested (168, 322; 222, 120-126).

In the same time, even in Republic owning sympathies of international left-wing forces, democracy and rule of law turned out under stress.

Parliament, President and Cabinet of ministers were step by step abolished its constitutional prerogatives (168, 339). In 1937 –1939 Prime Minister, left-wing Socialist J.Negrin made decisions individually. He ruled by his own decrees (like Franco), that was unconstitutional in parliamentary republic. Parliament was called only three times during the War, and sessions were quite brief and rather formal. Proclaimed by Constitution Constitutional Court never met in 1936-1939. In other words, Republic perpetually violated its own Constitution.

In Republic, belonging to any right-wing association or even sympathy to any of it was a crime against state. Antidemocratic and unconstitutional undercover was established over Caballero and Prieto, they were deposed as heads of Socialist papers **Claridad** and **El Socialista**. Very small numbers of official death penalties was more than compounded by non-formal and non-judicial, secret executions of Spanish and

foreign citizens. (Usually human persons **disappear**). Then and now, it is hard task to identify in what degree actions of **uncontrolled elements** were mask of state police or secret political bodies of Anarchists and Communists (90,172; 168, 324,341; 171, 130-147, 226-7; 175, 133).

Numerous unlawful actions took place inside Republic undermine the same fibre of political democracy. Some people from Andalusia and Aragon secretly crossed front line preferring life under Nationalist martial law.

Paradoxically true democracy existed in armed forces. Republic under mass Anarchist pressure transplanted democratic liberties and guarantees into army and navy: freedom of opinions and meetings, absence of uniform and obligatory greetings, strict limits of disciplinary powers of commanders, parties jurisdiction over many detachments. In result, Republican armed forces too often reminded highly ideologized dilettantes of Paris Commune (with some sizable exclusions). (See: 133; 137; 149). Perhaps here is a big cause explaining why Republic owning at first weeks of War enormous numerical supremacy over enemy in combattants – 6 to 1, in air and on sea, in industrial and financial resources (solid gold reserves – up to \$ 800 million) and will to win, could non defeat disciplined, led by professionals small National armies.

So, experiment with **pure democracy** in army (and in work place) has caused disaster in military sense. But politically and psychologically it has helped soldiers to preserve and develop human dignity. A gap between private and officer was lessened. In retrospect, it has made impact into democratization of Spanish army towards end of 20<sup>th</sup> century (163,307-308).

Republican army and navy were not a blind instrument of state bodies. When physical resources of civil society were spent because of starvation and military defeats ( 167, 49-51; 169, 356; 212, 253-4), army leaders like M.Buisa, S.Casado, G.Matallana has refused to continue uphill struggle, and most soldiers and marines were not against them. It has became end of Civil War. Indeed, Republic collapsed. But devastation of Spain and the people was ceased in March – April 1939.



Russia could not be evaluated democracy until March 1917. Even more than Spaniards, Russian were famous for psychological tolerance, but lacked heritage of political tolerance. Fall of traditional monarchy has produced at first euphoria if very high expectations (42,59-67; 74, 563-573), then exceptionally deep social and political turmoil. Legality of republican Temporary government was dubious, it was not fruit of any election. However, it was at least recognized by international community. Red government which took power in October 1917 (first under **temporary** banner too) has not even it. But, in contrast with Franco, it inherited both official capital – Peterburg and historic capital – Moscow, ministries, gold and brilliant reserves of Russia. First it had loyalty of newly-created municipalities – Soviets. It gave to Lenin government some features of legality.

Newly-created White governments were response of army and Cossacks to Red coup. Like Franco in Spain, they were illegal. Above it, they were isolated each from other : M.Alexeev, L.Kornilov (later replaced by A.Denikin and P.Vrangel) took power in South, Chaikovski and Miller in North, Kolchak in East, etc. Whites tried to unify efforts and to restore state machine destroyed in 1917-1918. Admiral A.Kolchak has claimed himself a Supreme ruler and established temporary capital at Omsk, Siberia. Denikin, Chaikovsky and Miller voluntarily has subordinated to him, as Nationalist chiefs has made towards Franco. But mentioned obstacles, mainly giant Russian distances and absence of long-range radio and telephone (unlike Spanish War) were too strong.

Of great historic paradox is a fact of wide enough political tolerance on White territories where military powers prevailed. Red and White sources do coincide in following: under Whites all conservative and moderate parties existed legally. (It was as if in Nationalist Spain Republicans, Socialists and local Nationalists were not prohibited). On Red territory there were such liberties since late 1918 when non-Communist press was forbidden, non-Communist caucuses in municipalities disbanded, Constitutionalist party was claimed a collective enemy of state, moderate Socialists put into prison without trial. Whites generally lived and fought under rule of law despite unsuitable conditions of Civil War (57, 76,188-189; 105, 120,209-

241,288). It gives us foundation to conclude that under Whites driving forces of young Russian democracy had more room for development (free press, multi-party municipal elections).

For another side, this factor was in military sense a fundamental weakness of Whites. Drastic antidemocratic steps of Reds were their trump card securing creation of colossal, armed forces – up to 5 million in 1920; concentration at governmental hands all available provision and financial resources; neutralization of exodus of war deserters, etc.

Non-democratic , autocrat rulers (Nationalists, Reds) have won two Civil Wars of three. More democratic and tolerable Spanish Republicans and Whites have lost it.

US is unique case: to remember Union had an enormous material superiority which Russian Whites so lacked.

In turn, Union developed democracy did help to Lincoln and Congress to discover and use for victory additional sources of mass support. Famous Homestead Act of 1862 was product not only of managerial act of federal administration, but a fruit of open grass-roots pressure. This act has satisfied popular majority, improved spirit of federal troops and increased influx of immigrants to the country. For such policies Russian and Spanish democratic leaders lacked imagination and decisiveness, not only time or space to enshrine and consolidate new regime.

Weakness of democratic heritage in Russia has caused mass war reprisals and atrocities --per capita, more heavy than even in Spain, where up to 200.000 human persons were killed in the rear or died in gaols and during forced labor. It gives us 0,8% entire pre-war population. In Russia, modern estimates contain data on up 4.000.000 human lives lost not in battles, not from diseases or starvation (107, 203-210). These persons were mainly killed during riots and rebellions in the rear – either Red or White or executed by various reasons or died under tortures.

Because pre-Civil War Russia had in 1917 up to 140 million population , we may conclude that the country has lost around 3% of it killed in the rear by all available methods.

To dry statistics it is necessary to add several human details.

In Civil War Russia has lost:

High school graduates – up 80%;

Former army and navy officers – up 90%;

Ex- generals and admirals – up 90%;

Ex-merchants – up 95%;

Higher clergy – up 97%;

Ex-diplomats - up 99%;

( 94, 225).

Of course when we reach stage of breaking the figures into losses on Red and White territories, we find serious differences in accordance with ideological positions of authors. We do not see a necessity to enter in these debates knowing that in Spain also there are similar differences; correlation of various accounts even based on archives materials may be around 1:3 and 1:4 (see: 90, 172; 163, 93, 105: 198, 193-234; especially 209, 207-8). It is important for us to emphasize the following.

In Red Russia enquiry, arrest, trial and execution were under jurisdiction of one governmental body – powerful CHEKA having powers of separate ministry and not subordinating to justice bodies, but only to Lenin. And CHEKA reported about any affair only when the affair was closed.

In White Russia where was clear-cut division of jurisdiction over life and death of human person between counter-intelligence service (inquiry, arrest), justice department(trial)and war department (execution). Apart of it, there were prosecutors abolished on Red territory.

Simple comparison of these judicial aspects of problem ( 57, 9 –20, 66 – 72; 86, 294, 308, 338, 456) in our view explain a lot.

5. Correlation between democratic development and military strategy. Quality of cadres and leadership level.

American Civil War give us a remarkable example of deeply dialectic influence of democracy over strategy. Nominations of mass of **political captains** probably has postponed war victories of Union. Of special harm to Union military strategy was appointment to mighty Potomac army activist of Democratic party general J.McClellan, who might be best at War ministry. No better were generals A.Burnside, or H.Fremont, or G.Meade, or J.Butler. Virtually all of them usually managed to miss victories save for Meade in 1863.

Democracy and rule of law were obstacles to punishment dishonest army suppliers. Publication of strategic plans in daily papers also produced significant loss to Union. (However, this loss has brought a political benefit to federal administration-average citizen felt himself a true participant of state affairs).

Abundance of human, natural and financial resources, Lincoln skillful political and managerial leadership have saved Union democracy from the worst (19, 440).

President brilliantly has evaluated connection of politics, economics and war. After Gettysburg, where talented and energetic Lee could not defeat average political captain Meade, Lincoln has coined famous phrase about invincibility of people government.

Of six enemy sides in mentioned wars four - Unionists, Reds, Whites, Republicans - felt sharp shortage of military cadres. They implemented some ways and means to fill the gap.

Promotion of masters like U.Grant and W.Sherman took place despite alcoholism of the first and bad character of the second. Nomination of Farragut too has demanded civil courage - brave sea captain was a Southerner with connections in three slave states, two of them rebel ones (17, 5 - 26; 29, 171 - 175). Lucky too was promotion of fine field commanders like Custer, Sheridan, Turchin (Turchaninov). Generally speaking, Lincoln, his War minister Stenton and Congress have managed human capital quite well. New, non-party commanders have won Vicksburg, New Orleans, Mobil Bay, Atlanta and Appomattox battles.

For other side, we have a foundation to reproach to Union leaders dubious stalemates at Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. In the light of excellently-led by Naval ministry sea blockade of South we see these land battles as unnecessary ones. Perhaps it was one of few serious mistakes of trio Lincoln – Stenton – Grant.

Not so good was cadres selection by Reds, Whites and Republicans.

Reds have forced to service more than one-third of former Emperor Russian army. Among them was lion share of General Staff and War Ministry highest personnel. There was general A.Brussilov, a victor over Austrian-Hungarian army in 1914 and 1916. It was enough human capital to select scrupulously high-calibre captains. Instead, Reds preferred to promote only Party members or persons who voluntarily offered themselves to new rulers. In result, by 1919 important military posts were filled by: 1) Bolsheviks never enlisted before (contrast even with American party captains who at least had a record in militia) – L.Trotsky, M.Frunze, K.Voroshilov, I.Stalin; ex- private and corporals – S.Budionny, V.Blucher, N.Dybenko, F.Mironov, S.Timoshenko, G.Kulik;3) former junior army officers up to lieutenant – R.Eideman, A.Kork, V.Putna, M.Tuchachevski, I.Uborevich.

In sum, no less than 40.000 professional officers enlisted Red army, just a few persons have occupied important military posts giving disciplinary power over detachments.They were ex-colonels A.Egorov, M.Muraviov, I.Vatsetis. And Muraviov, who was compared with Italian hero Garibaldi and German war chieftain Wallenstein (94, 159: 120, 56- 57;) was killed as early in mid-1918.

Red commanders and military leaders were in mass young and full of energy and courage, but desperately lacked experience and competence. Therefore Red armies, with all their numerical and (often) technical supremacy, usually quickly passed from retreat to offensive and from big successes to panic and defeats. Too often Red leaders could not guess enemy plans and because of it perpetually got sudden and strong blows (92, 245- 259).

Contrary to Reds, White governments had enough able and experienced front commanders who led regiments, divisions and corps in World War I against Germans, Austrians-Hungarians or Turks. They were: generals and colonels A.Denikin,

V.Kappel, L.Kornilov, P.Krasnov, V.Mamontov, S.Markov, Y.Slashyov, P.Vrangel, to name a few. Virtually all heroes of \* Brussilov breakthrough\* were with Whites (except for Brussilov himself, who was detained by Reds). Anyone mentioned above was at worst, on the level of American Unionists Sheridan and Caster and Confederates Johnston, \* Stonewall\* Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart.

But Whites were constantly in need for good staff and supply persjnnel at divisions, corps and fronts.

White military masters very often discovered in proper time intentions of enemy. That permitted to them to be tactically winning side with small or moderate losses. They were true masters of sudden, surprise blows by small forces. Sometimes small White detachment made miracles, as Reds recognize ( 100, 380 – 385 ). In the same time it was very hard for them to transform bright tactical achievements into decisive victories of strategic scale and meaning. Whites might fill the gap through mandatory enlisting retired army professionals (up to other one-third of the contingent). However, it was Red way, not a White one. Minimal tolerance, from which democracy grows, elementary respect for individual choice and way of life were stronger under White rule.

Spanish Nationalists, like American Confederates, had a necessary contingent of military cadres. More than two-thirds war professionals have joined July rebellion. Vast majority of young officers and all corporals were on Franco side.

As in Russia, there was a clear-cut age cleavage – more than half of Spanish generals hold loyalties to Republic. Rebellion was in many ways rebellion of youth ( 210, 328 ). With Franco were first mostly young colonels and generals - F.Aranda, A.Kindelan, E.Mola, J.Moscardo, J. Varela, J.Yague, although some older military men participated too- V.Cabanellas, G.Queipo de Llano.

Abundance of reliable military and administrative cadres and confidence in final victory that Reds in Russia lacked permitted Franco to promote his officers only one time during crusade – on the day of joining it. It gave his armed forces proper stability and working spirit.

Republic, like Red Russia tried to use old cadres mainly as consultantants, intendants and staff personnel. And unlike Red Russia and National Spain, promotion way was retained for them. Particularly, majors S.Casado, I.Hidalgo de Cisneros and G. Matallana were promoted during the War until rank of general. General J. Miaja even was made a generalissimus (186, 148) – that is, rank reached by Franco only after winning war.

Front vacancies were filled mainly: 1) by **party captains** (even more openly than in US and Red Russia) and 2) by foreign volunteers – officers of International Brigades. Among first we may see Anarchists ( B.Durruti, C. Mera ), moderate Republicans (A.Prada, V.Menendes), but mainly Communists – V. Gonzales, E. Lister, J. Modesto, J. Taguena. Several old, professional generals – A. Escobar, L. Encomienda, J.Miaja, F.Posas, too, played a distinguished role in military affairs.

Among second were: 1) international revolutionaries, mostly obtaining Soviet citizenship like M. Stern ( Kleber), 2) Red army commanders and staff personnel like G.Kulik (see above), V.Gorev, K.Swerchevski, enc.; 3) students and intellectuals from Europe and America, 4) non-party veterans of World War I, whom sometimes they evaluate as mercenaries. (Some of them went to Nationalists, but changed plans during journey and arrived to Republicans – 222, 242).

Opinions on military cadres of Spanish war and its impact still differ dramatically, and we shall try to analyze problem in short.

Outstanding Nationalist general Emilio Mola combined front experience with administrative skills and theoretical studies. Before the War Mola has printed a small book proposing to cancel expensive, very bureaucratized army based on mandatory enlisting and to pass to small well-equipped volunteer army. It was close to then ideas of colonel de Gaulle in France , Fuller and Liddell Hart in United Kingdom and Guderian in Germany (221, 115- 129). Ideologically Mola was a Republican and was ready to retain Republic after war on terms of lessen suffrage abolishing it for illiterate and former criminals. In 1936 he has fulfilled most technical preparations to rebellion. Then , with very scarce war equipment and without any aid from South, he has conquered in two days dominant part of Northern Spain with Pamplona,

Salamanca and Burgos. Later, in the midst of War, he proposed to limit war reprisals revising his own uncompromising approach of first days of **crusade** ( 171, 180 – 181). His death in air crash was met with sorrow by staunch Monarchists of Navarre and Castille.

Mola shortcomings were that he was outspoken and impulsive and had no strategic gifts. He might win operations, but not a war ( 210, 424 ). For another side, he had some political instincts and gifts of a manager.

Queipo de Llano was Republican too, decisive field commander and able orator. His courage and elan have become main reason of small Rebel forces win in working-class, Anarchist-dominated Seville area of Southern Spain. During **crusade** de Llano was de facto a dictator of Andalusia and, like Mola, a rival of Franco. But during election of Caudillo Queipo, in contrast with two other **Republican Rebels** – Mola and Cabanellas, voluntarily has voted for Franco.

In his late 60-s and early 70-s, de Llano was very active person. Before Goebbels and Roosevelt he has become a master of radio war (1936 – 1938). His absolutely vulgar and offensive, but picturesque addresses had brought to him nicknames of **Seville joker** and **radio general**, but secured to him a mass of listeners on both sides of front divided Spain. Fearing ambitions of popular de Llano Franco has prohibited his speeches on the third year of the War. However, it was one more cause for it – probably his air threats strengthened Republican resistance.

Very cruel, almost sadistic, de Llano happened to be a good administrator. He elaborated and concluded economic agreements with foreign businessmen. He has forced local landlords to pass part of lands free of charge to peasants to prevent their mass struggle on Republican side. In interests of tenants farmers Queipo has introduced a moratorium on mortgage payments (210, 754 ). He was able to overrule traditional legal norms and cliché. In this field he has moved further than Denikin or Kolchak in White Russia and may be compared with flexible administrator, last White Commander-in-Chief Vrangel.

The best field commander of Nationalists was J.Yague – classical **africanista** (veteran of colonial wars). Already in 1934 he has earned a reputation of



exceptionally cruel person crushing without mercy working-class revolutionary riot in Asturia. In Civil War Eague Foreign Legion usually has not tjjk prisoners. Differing Mola and Queipo, Yague played vital role in the biggest operations – Madrid, Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia. His good terms with Falange aroused suspicions of Caudillo. In the midst of **crusade** Yague turned to be the only Nationalist of high status publicly called to national reconciliation (speech at Burgos printed by Falangists at Valladolid). Its text was prohibited by Franco, Yague detained, bun soon released after protests of Falange.

**Yague affair** seems no surprise to us. Its causes are clear – tiredness from devastating war, Latin temperament, respect of field commander to brave enemy, influence of Falange ideology with its cult of eternal Spain.

Yague is comparable with White general Slashyov, who , under leadership of Denikin and Vrangel, was a ruthless fighter and later, in 1921, voluntarily has returned to Red Russia and called emigrants to follow.

A colourful figure also was Nationalist E. Varela. Raised in humble family of army sergeant, he might, sociologically speaking, became a defender of Republic. Instead, antimilitarist, pacifist spirit of Republic has made Varela a staunch Monarchist. Under Republic outspoken colonel Varela elaborated first plans of military coup and spent half a year in a prison for plotting. July rebellion has given him back a freedom and an army post. Never a strategist, he was a gallant commander a la Yague.

Varela has played a considerable role in Madrid and Brunete bannles and Valencia campaign of 1938. He divided responsibility with Franco and Mola for fast marsh from Seville to Central Spain, for long stalemate around Madrid and for limited success in Levante. In contrast with mentioned Nationalist chieftains Varela holding his Monarchist views never quarrelled with Caudillo and has got his political spurs in 1939 – War Ministry.

**Caudillo** Franco was not surely a brilliant military and political leader as his leaders put (see: 153; 155; 160; 180; 186). However, even his critics admit he was a methodical and cool-minded officer and administrator (142, 33,46). He was neither

Monarchist or Republican ideologically. , therefore he was a suitable chief for majority of Nationalists. What Franco did brilliantly was making counterweights. He moved skillfully between Monarchists ( Kindelan, Varela ), Falangists (Yague) and conservative Republicans (Mola, de Llano) and finally managed to neutralize all them. He had no pets. It is a truth he appointed his close relatives (Serrano Suner, etc) as high state officials, but after two or three years dropped them forever.

Rarity among Spaniards, Franco never knew euphoria which owned very often his allies and enemies. (Queipo de Llano : **The Republic will be finished in 36 hours\***; Varela: **Madrid is already taken de facto** ). Various analysts agree that he waged Civil War scrupulously and patiently ( 196, 309, 350. 411; 210, 514, 642,915).Under all changes of military fortune he was taken by surprise only once – at Brunete where Republicans initiated a big blow having solid numerical and technical supremacy.

Having no qualities of a genius, Franco nevertheless was usually well-informed and therefore had not so narrow spiritual horizon. Planning a rebellion he has studied lessons not only of Spanish and Latin American coups, but also of Russian Civil War. He understood well a possibility of transforming of an average **pronunciamiento** into a long and hard war as in Russia. Do you know why you lost? – he has answered White emigrants who arrived to fight on his side. – You could not handle your rear. Our way will be different. Visitors of National Spain noted its market processes were under firm governmental control (while private property remained untouchable), wages and prices frozen, card distribution imposed . Compare it with freedom of business on White territories in Russia.

There were no strolling army officers at Burgos and Salamanca in 1936 – 1939. Front officers had three days to settle their matters in the rear. And Franco headquarters had a very small staff ( 144, 192 – 199).

Unlike White leaders, Franco well understood importance of war propaganda. If White propaganda was non-existent or badly-managed, scarcely financed and rudely negative (76, 285; 120, 210 – 211), Nationalists systematically tried to develop flamboyant and chiefly positive slogans . Along with usual military cliché

like **Spain, one, free and independent** (in White Russia it read **Russia one and indivisible**), there were a lot of others. Some were long - **No Spaniard without bread, no home without fire, Four columns are with me, and the fifth will blow inside Madrid** ( Mola). Others were short and dynamic like American posters of 1861 – 1865. Realism was mixed with doses of mysticism. They read **Homeland, justice, bread, Spain is immortal, Facing the Sun** (Falange). Numerous signs **Franco, Franco, Franco** , professionally fulfilled posters presenting warriors, peasants , workers and historic heroes like Columbus around Caudillo produced some sort of spiritual connection between Nationalist state and civil society.

Using intellectual and organizational aid of Falangists, Franco has developed political instincts. In this respect he may be compared with Vrangel in Russia, Difference is that Franco has become a leader in first months of War , while Vrangel only in the end of it – too late to defeat victorious although exhausted Reds.

However, Franco needed no politicians, only military men and administrators. Perhaps he had some in common with Lenin and Trotsky in Russia. Lenin, himself a civil person, after gaining power steadily depolitized Russian society and state. But he at least has not prohibited party politics officially. Franco never belonging to any party, has severely limited rights and functions of his only political ally, Falange. He was even more resolute in this sense, than Lenin. In midst of War he has no doubts to arrest Falange head, independent-minded Hedilla, and to put him before a military tribunal (Hedilla was released from a prison only in 1941 and never recovered as a politician). Orthodox Falangists spoke later that Falange was killed by Francoist as early as in 1937. **You cannot revive a corpse.**

The final win of Franco does not mean Republic inherited a bad military personnel, as Hemingway believed ( 136, 187; 163, 118, 126, 134; 190, 145). On Republican side we have to note several outstanding personalities.

Vicente Rojo. Professional officer, major before July 1936, Rojo has become a confidant of leading Socialist politicians I.Prieto and J.Negrin, won confidence of Russian military mission and was promoted up general in 1938. Clever and hard-working staff worker with strategic gifts, he was a distinguished participant of defense

of Madrid, victory at Guadalajara and Ebro battle where Republic hit Nationalist the strongest blow (222, 480 – 481). His plans of big offensives in Extremadura in 1937 and Andalusia in 1938 unfulfilled by some reasons, also may be evaluated as profound and decisive. Among his errors was not to counterattack in Aragon in Spring 1938; that has helped Nationalists to divide Republic into two. It is necessary to add Rojo too believed in Socialist slogan \*To resist is to win\*.

In 1939 during debacle in Catalonia battle Rojo honestly reported to Prime Minister war is lost and it is a time to seek peace. He has refused to come back to Republic and in emigration never denounced neither Socialists, Communists or Soviet Union. Rojo was one of quite a few Republican emigrants voluntarily returned to National Spain to die in 50-s (162, 300 – 305; 210, 950).

Juan Modesto. Ex-carpenter commissioned as colonel later has become a general. Brutal, ever despotic no less than Franco or Varela, Modesto, although a Communist, had no political instincts. He was a true military commander like Budionny or Chapaev in Russian Civil War. Unlike to other party captains Modesto always was well-disciplined and loyal to government and War Ministry in particular. His troops have made a solid impact in Madrid, Teruel and Catalonia battles. He divided glory of Madrid and Ebro where several Nationalist divisions were routed in several hours, with E.Lister and Rojo.

Enrique Lister. A Galician (Celtic), ex-query worker, staunch Communist who lived in USSR before 1936, is characterized by Western historiography as heavy-handed Stalinist. In the same time it reports Lister was a talented speaker, friendly, tolerable to mistakes of subordinates and ... undisciplined officer. **True feudal chieftain**, - spoke on him a Soviet commander K.Swerchevski.

Lister first won popularity during overall chaotic retreat in Castille when he has managed to stop running militia by only his oratory. He has become a hero of Guadalajara victory over Italian divisions. Lister has played at least dubious role at Zaragoza and Teruel - his troops were under offences in anti-Anarchist violence; also he refused to assist to other party formations who were in desperate situation.

But in hardest and bloodiest battles of War - Aragon, Ebro, Catalonia – Lister once more turned a hero. Nationalist spokesmen wrote his division fought brilliantly. It held its own under fiery artillery fire theoretically impossible to temper. Praise by enemy is worth a lot.

It seems to us professional and brave actions of Lister and Modesto have moved Yague to pronounce his reconciliatory Burgos address.

After debacle in Catalonia, where Lister and Modesto soldiers several times saved front making impossible, both, unlike Rojo, have returned to Madrid **to the bitter end**. During Republican collapse both have managed to emigrate and after participation in WWII have settled in France.

Note abilities of several professional high officers of Republic. Old-aged general Escobar maintained by very small forces a long Extremadura front, repulsed most Queipo offensives and twice, in 1938 and 1939, when resources of Republic were spent, advanced not without success (175, 194 – 197).

Admiral F. Buisa was almost only highest naval officer who retained loyalty to Republic. Usually he is criticized as Commander –in-Chief of Republican Navy for passivity (210, 549, 892). Still, under his leadership the Navy despite constant shortage of fuel and trained commanders has attacked enemy bravely and has won Palos battle in March 1938. New heavy Nationalist cruiser of Washington class was sunk and his sistership was out of service for months while Republicans had no losses (212, 256 – 57). Buisa with his old ships and very undisciplined sailors has cleaned Mediterranean sea from modern Nationalist cruisers for a half a year, although they had a support of Italian Navy and German aviation. It was the biggest naval battle and biggest victory at sea between World Wars.

What was impact of foreign volunteers serving to Republic, mainly in International and mixed brigades? We shall observe briefly several officers of rank no less than colonel.

The most famous of them were probably generals Kleber (Manfred Stern) and Lukach (Mate Zalka Kemeni). Both were Communists and revolutionary wars veterans – they have fought in Russia, Turkey, China. They had bravery, gift of

tactician, were popular because of generosity and charm. Both helped to hold Madrid against Yague and Varela and later fought in Aragon, where Lukach was killed and Kleber after setback at Zaragoza dismissed and disappeared (Soviet sources say he has died in GULAG as late as in 1954). Both have never been strategists .

The third one deserved to study was general Walter (Carol Swerchevski), a Polish who after fight in Russian Civil War spent many years in Red Army ranks. In contrast with most Soviet personnel, Walter has served to Spanish Republic for a solid time (1936 – 1938) and as a full-time commander of a brigade, then of a division on different fronts (Andalusia, Castille, Aragon ). Newspapermen wrote on him Walter personally led soldiers into bayonettes( it might be a legend). Hemingway has described him under pseudonym of **Goltz** in For Whom Bell Tolls.

Possible later his personality was mixed with another Polish-Russian Soviet captain - K. Rokossovsky, a field marshal of WW II. Hence mentioning Rokossovsky in Western literature on Soviet Russia involvement into Spanish War ( 169, 197, 387; 210, 446 – 447, 759 ).

Stern, strict and extremely demanding, Walter was a true Stalinist. For other side, he was ardent follower of law and order. He managed to put before a trial an English volunteer who has threatened by weapons to Spanish soldier (\*Spanish comrade has forgiven Englishman and I have not\*). He defended reputation of English-speaking volunteers when other Internationalists reported they complained too much (\* In theirs regiments all people are healthy, have enough food and wear suitable shoes. And what about you?\*).

If Walter wrote reports about somebody shortcomings, he always wrote about his own mistakes too (see: 137, 128 – 129).

Quite different person was French Communist of Catalan origin , veteran of WW I Andre Marty, who was a chief comissar of International Brigades in 1936 – 1938. His rank was equalled to general. He mixed hopelessly a vigilance with total sycophancy and secret reprisals. If Qieipo de Llano was called in Republic **an Andalusian hangman**, Marty nickname was \* a butcher\*, Fulfilling instructions from Moscow, Marty along with other emissaries of Comintern intervned into

political affairs of Republic. According to Republican and Francoist sources, ex-seaman Marty understood nothing in land and air warfare and made Republic only a damage ( 171, 152 – 159; 181, 82).

The only strategist among foreign advisers was perhaps Red Army major V.Gorev, military attache of Soviet embassy in Spain in first half of the War. As true professional he never spoke about his hate to Nationalists. His good relations with Rojo helped to raise a standard of staff work at Republican army. Gorev constantly reminded to Republican leadership an elementary thing – that chief task of General Staff is not reaction on changing tactical situations, but planning and management of the war as a whole. He has demanded and prepared advances in Andalusia and Castille, permanently demanded aid to isolated Northern front explaining in the North might be a key to victory ( 137, 150 – 152).

Better prepared and trained than Rojo or Franco German military advisers – Shperrle, Richtgoffen, Folkmann - Gorev, however was on bad terms with Marty. And his relations with another influential Russian in Spain, general Grishin (J.Berzin) are not clear still. Grishin was less competent in warfare than Gorev, but had a senior army rank and , more importantly, represented Soviet military intelligence. Transfer of Gorev to Santander after Brunete setback was a mistake of Soviet leadership, in the best case - Republican North by August 1937 already was in a state of agony. Gorev has narrowly escaped from isolated crumbling Northern front to be soon arrested in homeland.

Like Kleber and a group of Soviet air advisers, both Gorev and Grishin were dismissed and executed in Moscow in the midst of War,

Of other Soviet advisers note general Cooper (G,Kulik), victor at Tsaritsin battles of 1918 with Voroshilov and one time close to Stalin. A capable artillery specialist, he was non-competent in another military matters and has not wanted to study Spanish. Spaniards called him **general Comida** (a dinner) – it was only Spanish word he pronounced. Quite rude person, Cooper liked to whip Spaniards to attack by his stock (\* it is always useful to go to attack\* ), so his subordinate Walter once had to stop his efforts. He and mentally close to him tank adviser colonel D.Pavlov

disliked a spirit of Republican democracy. He spoke: \* they do not to make war. They want several Soviet divisions arrive and smash Franco, and they would run along and would shout hurrah \*.

Spaniards did not see black genius in Cooper evaluating his courage under fire and his honesty and straightforwardness . Cooper never wrote secret denunciations and never initiated reprisals . But his presence in Spain were little of help to Republic. Proposed by him Brunete advance turned no be a serious setback (see: 139; 140). And probably it was his report to Stalin in 1937 that has become a reason for the latter to diminish overall aid to Republic.

**There were in the North Modesto, Mera, Lister, Lukach and Kleber, and the North collapsed**, - Francoist spokesman writes ( 186, 272; see also: 181, 90 – 91). It let us hesitate to those who evaluate Republican captains arrogantly.

Mentioned material permits to make some observations.

Big Civil War promotes a big number of hidden talents vegetating in daily life. In US such talents appeared to be Lincoln as politician and administrator, Grant and Sherman, Sheridan, Caster and Stuart as military men, Lafayette baker as master of intelligence and counter-intelligence.

In Russia and Spain , where collapse of state apparatus took place in 1917 and 1936, objective necessity in hidden talents was even stronger.

In Russia we see skillful administrators Krasnov and Vrangal (an army captain in 1914 , colonel in 1918 and Commander-in-Chief in 1920); Slashyov, a wonderful front leader at his 33, who later became a lecturer and a theorist; Denisov called by colleagues and opponents **Bonaparte of Don area**; fiery cavalry cheftain Budionny – new Miurat and second Mackenzen, ex-sergeant; a guerilla leader and administrator Makhno - ex-schoolteacher, whose experience Spanish anarchists studied and implemented in 20-s and 30-s ( 171, 147 ); Boldyryov - ex-blacksmith turned White general; Pepelyaev – former poet and one more general; Kotovsky – former highway robber, virtually only gentle and generous Red commander after death of Myraviov, so respected by Whites; Voroshilov – ex-metalcraftsman; Trotsky – ex-journalist. Mironov a Red Cossack division commander, who has cjourageously



threatened to Lenin and Trotsky to open front for a national reconciliation in 1919 (Casado has made it in Spain in 1939). And the last but not least – Frunze, a figure beyond any qualification, able party war captain, flexible politician (not Leninist, not Stalinist, not Trotskyist) combining cruelty with humanity (86, 192, 438).

Every Civil War was accompanied by foreign influence or a threat of losing national independence. Because of shortage of cadres and sharp inter-party strife even true American patriot Lincoln proposed one of American armies to international revolutionary G.Garibaldi, while Confederates despite their sectional pride, has accepted a few European Monarchist volunteers (including one Bonaparte and one Bourbon) and dreamed about intervention of United Kingdom, Second Empire, Austrian Empire and even Belgium (13, 166; 25, 12 – 13; 29, 265 – 266). Detachments of German-Americans formed a very notable part of Union army, and Germany-born generals like Rosencrans, Wedemeyer, Shurtz, Ziegel, etc. Composed unproportionally high per cent of Union field commanders.

The same may be said about Latvians in Russian War. In its first phase Latvian detachments composed 25 per cent of overall strength of Red Army. Its first Commander-in-Chief was a Latvian Vatssetsis. (Meanwhile Latvia already ceased to be a part of Russia). Moreover, there were other **national** formations in Red Army - German, Austrian, Hungarian, Chinese, Finnish, Serbian (71, 22 – 31; 120, 66, 89). White armies also had Czech, Serbian, Polish, German units. Indeed, foreign regular forces also were presented on Russian territory – up to 700.000 persons altogether. Lion share have formed Poles, no less than 500. 000, and Japans – up to 120. 000 persons.

In Spain we see some specific forms of foreign participation and intervention. Nominally, most states permitted to go to Spain only volunteers. (Portugal ignored this condition, while Italy have overruled it). Republic has admitted existence of International Brigades that formed a sort of state within state with political centre at Albacete and Marty as a leader de facto, if not de jure. Only in August 1937 Socialist minister Prieto has managed to put Brigades under jurisdiction of War Ministry. But

to this time golden days of Brigades already were back, its contingent was sharply lessened by huge losses.

Altogether in Brigades were involved : by Soviet estimates – up to 50.000 persons, according to Nationalist literature – up to 125. 000 persons . Compared with it, Soviet presence in Spain was not very significant – up to 5.000 persons for 32 months ( 132, 75). The same conclusion may be received by comparing the latter figure with estimates of German combattants involved - from 14.000 to 26.000 and Italians ones – from 40.000 to 72.000 during the War (171, 198; 181, 88 – 90; 210, 980 – 984).

Nominally recognizing sovereignty of Spain, foreign allies of both sides sometimes acted without consent and sanction of Spanish power bodies. Mussolini in 1938 has launched a massive 48-hour air attack on Barcelona quite independently from Nationalists putting Franco in front of fait accompli. The devastating raid was stopped when Republicans threatened in turn to launch a naval attack over Genoa. German and Russian pilots bombed historic sites of Spain not always asking Spanish command for permission. German vessels have bombarded open city of Almeria after being severely damaging by Soviet pilots near Balearic Islands. Foreign Communist advisers - Argentinian Codovilla, French Marty, Italian Togliatti etc. outnumbered and overwhelmed Spanish Communists at Politburo meeting , and result was a decision to oust Prime Minister Largo Caballero (called **Spanish Lenin**, but opponent of Soviet influence over internal matters) and to promote Finance Minister Negrin, who was not. Hitler government demanded (and finally got) rights of control over Spanish mining industry and planned to preserve established military presence at Canary Islands. Mussolini had similar plans towards Balearic Islands and already arranged here a naval and air bases.

Events had worst character in Russia. Several foreign powers - Poland, Romania, Japan, Turkey have moved demands for significant territories (Belorussia, half of Ukraine, Smolensk area, Southern Armenia, Northern Sakhalin, Bessarabia). . Part of lands mentioned Red Russia had to concede in 1918 – 1921 (all except for Southern Armenia was later returned by Soviet Union).

In the same time foreign intervention has produced a strong wave of patriotism. In US a menace of British and French invasion has strengthened Union and its will to win, Lincoln administration launched a diplomatic offensive at London and Paris, flexibly combining threats of retaliation with politeness. In Russia, Polish invasions to Ukraine and White Russia, Romanian occupation of Bessarabia, Japan occupation Far East from Vladivostok to Baikal Lake had helped Reds to absorb part of White movement, including many Cossacks, Brussilov, Slashyov, and part of Greens. In Spain Nationalists, despite all military dependence from Third Reich, stubbornly resisted to Germany-made **Montana plan** for two years. (\* We shall better retreat to hills and become guerillas\*). Evidences exist a lot of Nationalists, including Queipo de Llano and Franco, were frankly glad after Italian Expeditionary Corps defeat at Guadalajara. And Caudillo constantly tried to prevent capturing Republican capital by foreign troops ( 163, 215; 186, 210; 222, 68, 305).

First thing Franco made after victory over Republic was to get rid of foreign volunteers. Pressing Germany and Italy by prospects of patriotic Republican rebellion Caudillo has managed to evacuate all foreign troops by June 1939. Collapse of Third Reich in 1945 has let Franco to abolish **Montana plan** and fully restore sovereignty of Spanish state.

## 6. Withdrawing from the War and democratic renovation.

On April 9- 12, 1865 general Grant Union army has captured general Lee army at Appomatox. Confederates surrendered on honor terms, were released and supplied by food rations. Parade of victory took place on May 24 at Washington.

On November 11 – 16, 1920 three Red armies of Frunze partly captured in Crimea army of general Vrangel. There was no official capitulation. (Frunze proposed

surrender with honour by radio, but Vrangel did not answered). A parade was on November 16 at Moscow; Lenin claimed a victory.

On March 29 – 31, 1939 Nationalist armies of Franco captured Republican armies of general Matallana. Victory parades took place at Madrid on May 19, Seville, Leon, Zaragoza.

Three nations gave us mainly the same type of official cessation of hostilities. Its pure and gentle way is American one. A way to national reconciliation and democratic renovation was much longer and morbid.

Note nucleus of future national reconciliation usually grow during the war. A further success in reconciliation of victors and vanquished depends in a large scope from time, force and speed of mentioned process. The success is more quick and full-scale one if (and when) this process is strengthening by deliberate and purposeful governmental policies.

Already before secession in 1861, which was a split of Union, there were bids for a compromise which would closed a path to fratricidal conflict. (In North, a moderate and cautious approach of Lincoln, who was opposed to any war initiatives till Fort Samter. In South, protests against secession at all state conventions of 1861 except for South Caroline - 13, 138; 29, 183; 38, 184 – 208). After secession both Unionists and Confederates managed to expel, not to punish, political opponents. Slave states Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee have voted democratically to stay within Union; Maryland has claimed neutrality – these factors also may be seen as bids for reconciliation, at least objectively.

Average citizens of Union and Confederacy managed to maintain a minimum of human relations. Warriors of both sides greeted each other in morning, exchanged tobacco, newspapers, letters to home. Prohibited by law trade with enemy never ceased to exist in remote areas (3, 162; 13, 150 – 152; 22, 44 – 45). Of serious influence over attitudes of both sides was Lincoln proclamation of 1863 promising recognition of Southern states power bodies when 10 per cent of voters swear allegiance to federal Constitution (28, 676). So was designed a legal and democratic outcome from the War. Immediately after Appomatox President planned to

recognize and respect all constitutional rights of legislature in Virginia just conquered by Union armies, while Confederates resistance in Louisiane and North Caroline still held place. Because of his compromise approach, especially in last days of life, Lincoln then was called **only defender of South**(22, 132 – 133).

The reconciliatory trend rooting in mass pragmatic mentality contradicted to: 1) ideological intolerance of anti-slavers and 2) mercenary interests of Northern bankers and industrialists who planned to exploit South. The result was a serious political and judicial strife for years.

Clash of two trends has produced **phenomenon of Andrew Johnson**. A loyal Republican, enemy of secessionists, legitimate successor to killed Lincoln, Johnson has changed his mind after victory. New President has appointed in 1865 – 1866 Confederate notables as temporary governors and has pardoned officially most secessionists. He has not imposed restrictions upon new Southern Constitutions. When Congress has legalized military occupation of Southern states, Johnson have ordered to army generals to tract theirs duties maximally narrowly. He has categorically refused to interfere into conflict over electoral rights of former slaves. Twice – in 1866 and 1868 – Johnson has proclaimed the War over. The latter proclamation gave former Rebels an amnesty with minor reservations – federal citizenship of them was not restored.

While former Rebels met Johnson policy with admiration and joy, it was resolutely disputed by Congress, Supreme Court, some federal ministers (Stenton) and most daily papers. Congress has used a right of impeachment.,; vast majority of Senators were opposed to President. After stormy sittings Johnson was saved - Senator Ross of Kansas changed his position , and President was found not guilty . (Ross lost his party nomination and for long time was a target for ardent critic in his own state ).

Opponents of Johnson explained his actions by his Southern roots and his vanity. President admirers give different explanations emphasizing his respect for state rights guarded by constitutional norms, his intention to reach quick national

reconciliation ( 15, 251 – 264; 21, 103 – 105; 28, 179; 32, 292 – 295). As it seems now, the latter point is closer to historic truth.

Next President Grant step by step softened military occupation of South, Federal troops have not waged serious struggle against Ku-Klux-Klan. Southern states were adopted back to Union. Former Confederacy President Davis was released on bail without a trial, and refugees from South legally returned home from Central American states, Brazilia and Canada. Grant has initiated in 1872 a law on amnesty entrenching Johnson legal acts in this field. By separate act Congress under Grant presidency has restored federal citizenship rights of Robert Lee (posthumously).

What caused concern and distemper under Southerner Johnson, was let make to Northerner – Westerner Grant, hero of Union military triumph. Instead of impeachment process, Grant has got voter confidence for two terms and despite weak administrative qualities held respect in US and abroad. We understand such outcome as one more evidence of right way of early democratic reconciliation designated and developed by Lincoln and Johnson ( 18, 414 – 429; 25, 15 – 17; 28, 468 – 9; 29, 298).

Later, local reconciliatory initiatives and governmental policies mixed, nourishing each other. Since 1882 war veterans of both sides had joint meetings at Gettysberg, Richmond, New Orleans. City of Richmond women, a lot of widows among them, called all veterans to follow practice **to foster sentiments of brotherly love**. Through grass-roots imagination by 1880 a new holiday Day of Confederacy emerged. First it was purely Southern event. But after some Confederate warriors were reburied at Arlington in 1900, the Day gradually became some sort of national holiday.

Of federal reconciliation policy note actions under Presidents Cleveland, McKinley and T.Roosevelt. First tried to return Confederacy flags to Southern states (Congress declined it). Second publicly has claimed any soldiers cemetery of Civil War **a tribute to American valor. Nation likes all her children everywhere the same.**( address at Atlanta). Third, after Congress approval, has returned Southerners theirs military banners in 1905.

Strong popular inclination to democratic reconciliation and renovation had fruits in external policy too. Some argue Spanish and Vietnamese wars were in significant degree an instrument to appease Southerners and to unite former victors and vanquished (25, 50 – 68, 145 – 159, 186; 38, 218 – 221 ; 42, 403).

As emblems of full democratic reconciliation in US we also have to evaluate:

- balanced accounts on the War in standard school and university textbooks;
- monuments to victors and vanquished (Washington, Richmond, New Orleans, etc);
- naming military vehicles after Civil War heroes; note especially tank Grant-Lee.

National reconciliation was made in US in proper time. It has helped Americans to fight and win WW I and II. It has become a reality through political (but not ideologized) democracy, by determination and civic courage of Lincoln, Lee, Grant, Johnson, Ross and T.Roosevelt.

In Spain, we hardly discover a nucleus of reconciliation till 1938. On eve of War and in first half of it only few voices were in favour of humanity and clemency : Azana and Prieto in Republic, several Catholic priests on Rebel side (171, 147, 179; 209, 131 – 5, 140 –5). Therefore **Burgos address** of Yague had a profound resonance. He told: **Now I defend persons persecuted for Marxism...for my former enemies... They are born on Holy land. They are Spaniards too, so they are brave. Arriba Espana** (167, 45 – 6; 210, 819). Appeal was nominally answered by other side - Republic twice, on May 1, 1938 and February 2, 1939 has proposed a compromise peace to Nationalists.

Franco suppressed dissidents and waged hostilities until full collapse of Republic. Later, in Nationalist Spain for 20 years was a cult of of victory and victors. Civil war was officially called **crusade** with mandatory resume **Spain has won – anti-Spain is lost**. Vanquished became subjects of persecution under draconian Law on political responsibility( 1939) and victims of mass reprisals. Number of death sentences in 1939 – 1941 was so large that Italian Fascist general Gambara protested to limit it. Also there were numerous imprisonments, internal exiles, abolishing political and even civil rights, forced labor. Once more were forbidden languages of minorities, theirs flags and emblems destroyed . Viscaya was claimed **traitor province**.

**Humiliation of losers was an immeasurable** (162, 743; 166, 112, 229 – 233; 187, 157 –256; 211, 78-82).

In memory of 1939 victory were erected Franco monuments, triumph arches, renamed central streets and squares. Cities and towns stood Republican siege – Avila, Huesca, Oviedo, Zaragoza, Toledo have got a status of **city martyrs**.

Nationalists have imposed by decrees new holidays – Victory day, Day of Faith, Sorrow day, Day of Fallen,. And July 18 was claimed a Day of Courage.(161, 260).

Loyal to Nationalists from first hour Navarre province has received a collective decoration a Cross of St.Ferdinand (181, 69).

20.000 prisoners of War built atCastille mountains a huge complex planned to be devoted to all Nationalists fallen in **crusade**,

Then first symptoms of new approach have appeared during WWII and after entrenching very slowly and with great difficulties. In 1941-1945 were freed those prisoners who got up to six years. In 1945 was issued Charter of Spaniards granting civil and political rights to supporters of existing order. But no less than 26.000 political prisoners remained in gaols, physical tortures continued. And more than half of political emigrants had no legal right to come back.

Guerilla warfare of former Republican warriors in 1944 – 1951, diplomatic boycott of Spain by democratic powers and USSR helped nationalists to freeze overall politics of revenge.

After lifting external sanctions and Spain admission to United Nations in 1955 Nationalist powers began to give tourist visas to children of Republican emigrants. Several aged Republican veterans – Casado, Rojo – have returned legally to homeland. Memoirs of Republicans, first of all Prieto, were legally published in Madrid.

A slow trend to reconciliation was stimulated by absence of party dogma in Nationalist Spain. Falange has not seized a monopoly over political and spiritual life (164, 16 – 25), and Caudillo owned qualities of a pragmatist.

New steps towards political tolerance were made between 20<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> anniversaries of Nationalist victory, that was 1959 – 1969. In 1959, Valley of Fallen was opened devoting to **all Spaniards died in 1936 – 1939**. Several thousands of former enemy



warriors were reburied here. Criminal persecution of vanquished was ceased in 1966, political one in 1969. After 1963, death penalty was implemented only to Basque terrorists. However, there was not an overall amnesty.

A door to democratic reconciliation was finally opened only after Caudillo death in 1975. In his testament he, unlike Hitler or Mussolini, has forgave his enemies and himself asked for theirs pardon. This act has facilitated for sure subsequent actions of transitional (1976 – 1982) and democratic post-Franco governments.

In 1976 Spanish government has granted an overall amnesty to all former Republicans., they have got a legal way to repatriate as equal citizens. Most part of survived veterans and part of theirs children have used this opportunity.

In 1976 – 1977 Supreme Court and transitional government have legalized gradually all prohibited parties except for terrorist groups. Parade of Victory was transformed into Armed Forces day, Day of Fallen was made a Unity day (188, 38 – 87; 212, 430-433).

First for 42 years free election of 1978 has produced a multiparty Parliament. Among MPs were several Nationalists stalwarts along with Republican veterans S.Carrillo, R.Alberti and D.Ibarruri. And heirs of two former enemy sides this time have found reason and tolerance enough for compromise and cooperation, particularly during Constitutional reform of 1978. A lot of former Nationalists has agreed with principles of **democratic secular state**, while Socialists and Communists has recognized and supported Monarchy restored by Franco in 1947-1969 (168, 390-2; 189, 18-19; 193, 197). It is important to emphasize both sides has rejected idea of a revenge. There was no violence against survived hangmen of

Civil War. People speak about them bitterly and angrily, that is all (167, 42-43).

Profound changes in mass mentality were demonstrated during military riot in 1981 organized by small group of former Nationalists. Rebels have found themselves in a vacuum; vast majority of army and state apparatus held loyalty to constitutional bodies. The 1981 coup was liquidated practically without armed fight, without any casualty (132, 242-7, 297-314; 168,406 – 7; 205,168-174). Mass repugnance to public violence has become a massive obstacle to new July 18.

Now all participants of Civil War officially called **national catastrophe** are treated in Spain equally( equal rights for pensions, for carrying any war distinctions and insignia, etc). Monuments to Franco not demolished, but moved from central avenues . Madrid, Valencia, Caralonia, Viscaya have now monuments to Republicans – Caballero, Prieto, Companys, Nin. Some municipalities –Caseres, El Ferrol,Salamanca – do held streets names honoring Franco and Mola.Victors and vanquished became integral part of national history. In the same time we see now trend to critical approach to victors whose win in 1939 seems more and more formal (167, 55-6; 168, 346-7; 193, 27-30).

A new reconciliatory official act has followed in 1996- King Juan Carlos has granted Spanish citizenship to survived foreign participants of the War.

Generally speaking, well-prepared, careful but determinated policy of democratic reconciliation has a success. Some academics write on **Spanish Miracle** – transition to democracy and reconciliation without foreign interference, without traumas and shocks might be produced by Latin temperament(188, 85).

A path to reconciliation was the longest and hardest in Russia.

First Red victors , at least some of them, were in favor of soon reconciliation. Frunze promised Vrangal an amnesty and Whites officially have not declined a promise. In 1921 highest official body of Reds even has issued amnesty to emigrants who would return and take part in **homeland restoration**(Around 10 percent of emigrants, mainly Cossacks and some army officers has used the amnesty).

But non-confidence and violence developed during the War already became a some sort of material force. (It is characteristically the end of hostilities was not accompanied by sporadic fraternization as in Spain (16p, 245; 169, 378). Vast majority of Red elite was resolutely against clemency and reconciliation. Frunze in 1920 was not supported by Trotsky and immediately rebuked by Lenin (86, 438 –9; see also: 97,410-24). Scope of amnesty was strictly limited it has not guaranteed life to Whites who still was in Russia.

In direct contradiction with a spirit of amnesty was expelling without trial almost 200 intellectuals never enlisted White armies(1922). And since mid- 20-s punishment Whites once more prevailed – for a long time. Many former Whites were detained

without publicity, mostly they died in gaols or were secretly executed. General Slashyov who taught military tactics to Red commanders was killed in 1929 under dark circumstances.

1921 amnesty was de facto annulled on political trials of 1928 –9, where main accusations were **plotting vs. Soviet power** and **connections with White emigrants**. Just born Soviet fine arts specialized on exposing Whites and desperate praising Reds. See in this respect classical movies **October**, 1927 and **Chapaev**, 1934, numerous plays like **Put pobedy**, 1938.

Spanish Civil War, where Soviet citizens and White emigrants fought on various sides, has promoted additional intolerance to Whites play and movie **Paren is nashego goroda**, 1940).

WW II has opened door to elementary understanding between former Reds and Whites. If in Spain some common ground was created by Franco non-participation (181, 268), in Russia such ground emerged because of Nazi aggression vs. Red Russia. Most emigrants categorically rejected collaboration with Germany or Japan and expressed sympathies and admiration for USSR, including Denikin (see: 48;60;62;87;104). Soviet propaganda against Whites was in turn seriously softened and lessened. And around of victory over Nazis, in 1944-1946, USSR gave generously Soviet citizenship to emigrants living in Europe., a minor part of them came back to homeland. Cold War has defeated soon this trend to national reconciliation. Later, images of gallant Reds and bad Whites were officially adopted in USSR till late 80-s. Changes in a policy of hate and revenge were extremely slow and carefully dosed. Only in 1957 an article on punishment for **counterrevolution** was dropped from Criminal Code; it was equal to recognition Red revolution is over. Power bodies even not informed public about rare facts of repatriation until 70-s. The whole theme of White emigration continued to be mostly prohibited for average academic studies. Power bodies refused to permit placing portraits of White leaders in textbooks, encyclopedias and monographs, Such conditions formed a contrast with Nationalist Spain of 50-s and especially 60-s.

New, third wave of reconciliation was a product of civil society, not a state policy. It developed spontaneously in intellectuals mentality and gradually penetrated into literature and arts. (While publishing houses, printing offices, theatres, TV, etc. Were wholly in state sector, arts obtained some degree of autonomy). In this field note plays and movies **Odnashdy v 1920**, 1966 and **Dni Turbinyh**, 1976.

Centre of public interest and solidarity step by step moved from victors to vanquished. Whites image in books, films and plays obtained living and positive features, while Reds became more and more dull, one-dimensional types (122, 112 – 123).

In 70-s and early 80-s, sign of era became admiration of Soviet urban youth anonymous songs and romances glorifying uphill struggle of Whites - and Greens. Praising Reds already was a bad taste. Public widely bought discs of repatriants like Vertinsky connecting Soviet people with White mentality (see: 104) connecting Soviet people with White mentality.

By mid-80-s, still before perestroika, results of spontaneous reconciliation ideas were clear. Reds has won the War, have lost struggle for next generations. Grandchildren of victors mostly repulsed Red heritage – one-party system, Marxism, giant state sector, etc. This was imperceptible, but a solid factor in Gorbachev-Eltsin reforms.

In 90-s, civil society and renovated state have came jointly to bitter conclusions concerning costs of Civil War. Romantic and optimistic myths are gone. Non-ideological approach to the War as a catastrophe, sorrow over both sides fate and dead bodies are in: 58; 86; 90;94; 97; 113. In sum, there were no victors in War. Whites were punished by military defeat, losing property and homeland, while Reds have lost a dominant part of society intellectual capital and have obtained extreme intolerance in civil society and state policies.

Public respect now own historical figures who resolutely tried to diminish number of tortures and executions risking own head (Voloshin); who was not soiled cruelty over unarmed and helpless persons (Kotovskiy); who at least repented of deaths produced by himself (Slashyov); who accepted death with dignity (Gumiliov, Kolchak).

By 2000, former cult of Reds is replaced by more balanced attitudes and opinions, although with favor to Whites and Greens. Positive role play currently public reconciliatory acts and ceremonies like rehabilitation of Kronstadt rebels of 1921 (Peterburg, 1994); erecting memorials of victims of Civil War – at Moscow suburbs and Ekaterinburg of Emperor Nicholas II, at Onsk and Irkutsk – of Kolchak, at Gulai Pole – to Makno, etc.; printing recollections of Whites and Greens and their biographies (see: 40; 44; 62; 66; 73; 76; 88; 91; 97; 102).

Division of Russia on victors and defeated now is eliminated – politically and morally. But reconciliation policy lacks a proper legal basis. There was no official amnesty to Whites and Greens; its surviving members has no legal rights for a pension in Russia. Still there are no single common burials of former enemies. There are significant gaps in mass mentality producing vandalism in mass behavior - to now, two Civil War memorials are destroyed by explosions. These gaps cultivated by whole era of lying and hate are closely interconnected with lack of rule of law and of democratic habits.

Contrasting with Spain, Russia has too young and uncertain democracy. Therefore she has not saved from Civil War dangerous heritage. At a time of writing, a historic task of national reconciliation is not completed.

#### 7. Costs of the wars.

USA (pop. 30.000.000) has lost in a result of the Civil War around 600.000 human lives, or 2 per cent of total, Russia (pop. 138.000.000) , around 16.000.000 lives, while Spain (pop. 24.000.000) have lost around 1.200.000 lives (42, 244; 103, 112-113, 360; 107, 203).

The figures need comments. In US, as much as 60-65 per cent of overall number formed deaths from diseases and starvation. In Russia, this estimate plus losses from war reprisals are much bigger - up to 90 per cent of total. In Spain, the estimate is considerably lower, around 30 – 35 per cent of total. The latter fact is

explained by successes of medicine (antiseptics, transfuse blood) and abundance of food resources in Spain stopping mass starvation .

In US, killed in action formed a very high percent of total – around 40 as opposed to around 26 per cent in Spain and around 6 per cent in Russia. In the same time US society have suffered very slightly from war reprisals (less than 1 percent of all losses). In two other countries this figure is much higher, close to 20 per cent of total.

For other side, US had a big proportion died at concentration camps for prisoners of war – around 10 per cent of total. Meanwhile Russia practically has not lost lives at such camps : war prisoners in Russian Civil War usually were forced to fight on side of victors.

Overall picture of losses in per cent - US - 2 per cent of pre-war population, Spain , 5 per cent, Russia, around 11 per cent.

Supremacy in losses per capita of small and less-populated Spain over US is explained by development of modern arms and weapons and by much less gentle character of total war in 20 age.

Emigration losses were not familiar to American society. Part of Rebels have emigrated to Central American republics, Canada, British Isles, but virtually everybody has returned towards 1870-s. Andrew Johnson amnesty has justified itself.

Russia had a colossal emigration , mainly aristocratic and intellectual. It embraced, according to various estimates, between 2 and 10 million (60, 36-37) diffused first at many countries of Europe, Asia and Africa. Later most emigrants concentrated in France, Balkan states and, to a lesser degree, in China and some Latin American states (Argentine, Paraguay). **Other Russia** formed in these areas with Paris, Bekgrade, Sofia and Shanghai as its unofficial capitals. Up to 80-s, no more than 15 per cent of total number came back to homeland.

Spanish emigration was huge too embracing up to 500 –600.000 persons mostly working-class, craftsmen and intellectuals. **Other Spain** formed in France and Latin America with Paris, Toulouse, Mexico and Buenos Aires as its capitals.

Among Russian and Spanish emigrants were military chiefs - Denikin, Vrangel, Krasnov, Kutepov, Miller, Lister, Miaja, Rojo, Buisa, politicians Martov, Struve, Miliukov, Azana, Caballero, Prieto, Negrin, Gil Robles, philosophers Berdyaev, Fedorov, Sorokin, Madariaga, Ortega-i-Gasset, writers Bunin, Nabokov, Zamyatin, Alberti, artists Shalyapin, Pavlova, Vertinsky. Their abilities were absorbed by foreign states. But a tiny minority preferred to return home, mostly philosophers and artists.

Destructions and devastations. In US almost all Rebel states and several loyal ones (Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky) were affected by hostilities. Cities of Atlanta, Richmond, Vicksburg, Columbia were severely damaged. But all metropolitan centres were not destroyed.

Devastations in Russian cities and countryside were limited by small number of modern arms involved. There were not very many sieges. Therefore few cities and towns besieged – Grozny, Kiev, Kronstadt, Tzaritsin, - or retaken several times – Harkov, Oryol, Rostov, Sevastopol – have not suffered a lot. Some damages were hit to historic sites in Petrograd and Moscow Kremlin.

Modern weapons were widely employed in Spanish War. Destructions were increased by abundance of sieges. Nationalists besieged Madrid, Badajoz and Bilbao, Republicans Zaragoza, Huesca, Belchite, Oviedo, Cordoba, Granada, Toledo. Both sides besieged in various times Segovia, Siguenza, Teruel. Big cities were severely hit by air raids, especially Barcelona. Some towns like Durango, Figueras, Guernica, Guadalajara were destroyed by aviation; some by artillery –Almeria, Belchite, Toledo, or by both – Bilbao, Huesca, Madrid, Teruel.

Industry and agriculture, however, was made no much harm. Most suffered sectors were communications, churches (like in Russia) and shelters. After War, Nationalists was forced to restore 153 towns on governmental money.

Other consequences. Outcome of American Civil War has strengthened rule of law, Granting electoral rights to Negroes has widened basis of political democracy. But tiredness from war, a legal possibility to get a soil according to Homestead Act have led to lowering democratic activity and to triumph of well-oiled party machines

in many states, Economic rise also has slowed down because of losses in workforce and temporary increase in tax burden.

Two more results were 15-year federal dominance of Republican party and long rule of ex-military. From Grant to Garfield Presidents were senior veterans of the War including former operational Commander-in-Chief of Grand Union Army.

Nation occupation with various aspects of post-war reconciliation has limited US international activity until mid-90-s.

In Russia, rule of law, democracy and economic well-being all were stopped in the tracks during Civil War. Heals of economy were closed only in mid-30-s. But ideological imperatives and state regulation were firmly put above market conditions and rule of law. Antidemocratic, military-style leadership on all levels has triumphed until 60-s and even later. And personnel raised in Red cavalry in 1918-1920 led Soviet war ministry till 1976.

In international arena Russia has lost a great power status not recovered until 1934 (entry to League of Nations). It was restored fully only during WW II.

Mass direct and non-direct reprisals of 30-s (1929-1933, 1937-1938) often – and rightfully – evaluate as prolongation of Civil Wars, as its new waves. We add these waves were predicted by some spectators of 1917 revolution as early as in 1919 (see: 71, 74).

Shattered by Civil War, Russian public mood and national psyche produced quite different, in big extent surprise fruits. Debacle of urban culture in the War, degradation of spiritual life have led to simplicity and rudeness in human relations, ruralization\* of the social fabric. In the same time, overall attitude towards children has improved dramatically what contradicted to Slavic village traditions. As a reaction on huge losses of child lives during starvation of 1920-22, children were made by civil society and state **only privileged class** of Red Russia and preserved this status until 40-s. Such features whimsically combined with more natural consequences of Civil war – mutual suspicions, secret unsigned denunciations, etc.

In Spain, results were very mixed too. Demolition of political democracy was a fact. Economy has spent 15 years to recover. But rule of law was restored by



antidemocratic Nationalists ( 90.288; 167,54; 168, 339,398). And economy was not nationalized.

Like Red Russia, Nationalist Spain imposed a lot of state programs in social insurance, medical aid, housing policy. Unlike Russia, Franco abandoned imperial foreign policy. Although always admired it. In 50-s he has recognized Moroccan independence in time, without colonial war.

Once more unlike USSR Franco as early as in 60-s has opened borders, let to millions Spaniards earn money abroad, weakened control over foreign capital. He has cancelled preliminary censorship replacing it by trials. It meant that in many spheres Nationalists passed ahead Reds in eliminating heritage of Civil War.

#### 8. Civil Wars in national memory.

War, folklore and memoirs. Folklore and memoirs organically soak war attitudes , including high emotions, offences, nicknames like **gold-Shoulders** and **red-bellies** (Russia), **rebels** and **Reds** (Spain), **foreign agents** (Russia – Spain), **cowards** and traitors\* (elsewhere). In the same time folklore and memoirs contain doses of respect to enemy courage or stubbornness. Various elements of it therefore may act as in favor of reconciliation as against it.

Often it mirrors war suffering in a funny way.

Wake up, you damned city dweller,

Go to village for a bread,

Take off your last clothes

By your own free hand. (Southern Russia, 1920).

In folklore defeated may laugh at victors.

Reds have promised heaven to us,

Freedom, and soil, and bread.

Instead gave us firing squads,

Commune and Red dominance. (Ural, 1919).

People praised **third way** –a moderate one.

Neither Slashyov for us,

Neither Budionnys.

We are not those or that,

We are Green ones. (Ukraine, 1920).

People memory conserved personal features of defeated.

Ahh you good Kolchak,

Your eyes so bright,

You retreat now fast –

Reds move to us. (Siberia, 1919).

Mass memory forever rage of people deceived by victors.

For defending Soviets

By machine-guns,

Now turned to be

Idiots all us. (Volga, 1921).

(107, 90 – 93).

Or Spanish example: Buddy, if you are not a priest, a Falangist or a speculator,  
you are welcomed this winter at a cemetery (142, 88).

Of numerous memoirs we must note:

In Russia Red view is contained in: 41;63; 64; 81;100.

White view is expressed in: 47; 66; 88; 91; 102.

\*Neutral \* opinion may be found in: 74, 104.

In Spain, Nationalist view is in: 158; 160; 180; 181; 184.

Republican view is in: 133; 147; 148; 182; 195; 197; 201; 215.

**Neutral** opinion is in: 158, 178, 179, 199.

Memoirs written 20-30 years after events often contain softened and balanced  
view at former enemies (171, 14-19, 267).

School and university textbooks of mentioned countries now treat the Wars as great damage to state and civil society. See examples in: 58, 211-217, 234; 113, 120, 125, 141).

As it was shown above on Russian material, arts have made a solid impact into national democratic reconciliation. We remind only several facts – three classic novels translated in dozens of languages, that is Doctor Zhivago (Russia), Gone by the Wind (USA) and For Whom Bell Tolls (Spain); three classical movies, Chapaev (Russia), Gettysburg and Gone by the Wind (USA).

Books by less famous writers - Russian(41; 53; 69; 74; 84; 94; 98; 109), American ( 18; 35; 137), English ones (110) let readers to understand deeply a nature and fruits of such phenomenon as Civil War.

#### Conclusion.

A Civil War and its heritage own origins, substance and consequences of true dialectical, highly controversial character.

Substantially, Civil War is a product of main processes occurring inside of civil society – and, to a lesser degree, inside of state power bodies. Big, sometimes decisive role in the events may belong not only to economic relations and economic interests, but also to specifics of class, group and individual mentality, to opinions, prejudices, attitudes not always being pure product of economic contradictions.

Three explored Civil Wars has fulfilled some historically necessary functions. Slavery in US, feudal rudiments in Russia were destroyed. National unity was restored in US. In Spain outcome of war meant a historical debacle of Anarchism who perpetually menaced to public order and security. Also, it was an end of militant anti-church left Republicans and politicized trade movement.

In these respects, Civil wars appeared to be an instrument of historical progress.

However, as was demonstrated above, this instrument had too much of barbarous, anti-human and anti-democratic content. Civil Wars have left to next

generations poisoned heritage of mutual hostility, cleavage of society, demoralised and corrupted state apparatus, legal discrimination and daily humiliation of the vanquished, mass human exodus abroad from Russia and Spain.

The materials of the study confirm old truth that hostility cannot continue forever. Gradually society, for the sake of internal peace and well-being, finds ways and means eliminating hostility based mostly on hate, lie and narrow economic interests. Nation instinctively seeking way to survival spontaneously educates and promotes Social mediators, conciliators capable to stand above fight and strong passions produced by its outcome.

Civil society makes reconciliatory impulses that grow stronger. Great honor belongs to the leaders who, by quite various reasons, are able to bring, adapt and implement such impulses, born inside the national mentality. In the study, we have found the conciliators in so different personalities of Ab Lincoln and Andrew Johnson in US, Indalecio Prieto and Juan Carlos in Spain. (Although their efforts might be spent without less famous people – Elmer Ross, Ulyssis Grant, Theodore Hays, Dionisio Ridruejo, Santiago Carrillo...) . A question about conciliatory qualities and policies of Stalin in Russia and Franco in Spain demands further studies.

But the instrument was barbarical in his anti-human content of hate and lie. Wars has left a poisoned heritage of internal hostility, of political and daily discrimination of defeated.

As may be seen from the study, such heritage in Russia and Spain have obtained a long-lasting inertia.

But hostilities cannot continue forever. Gradually society for sake of internal peace and security finds ways and means eliminating hostility. Impulses of civil society may be bring and adapt by some holders of state power. Nation instinctively seeks ways to survival and educates and promoters reconciliators. Great honor belongs to leaders who manage to understand reconciliatory social impulses and to transform it into state policies.

In our study we have found such conciliators in so differing personalities of Lincoln and Johnson in US, Prieto and Juan Carlos in Spain. A question about

conciliatory qualities and policies of Stalin and Franco demands further study. Civil War is a product of processes inside of society, a fruit of predominant ideas, opinions, attitudes, prejudices. Hostility cannot continue forever. Later society for the sake of internal peace and well-being elaborate ways and means eliminating hostility. Great honor belong to leaders who bring, adapt and realize reconciliatory impulses born inside nation instinctively seeking paths to survival.

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