

# The Role of the Protest of Non-governmental Organizations in the Regime Change in the German Democratic Republic and in Hungary(1989-1990) and in the Consolidation of the New Democracy(1991-1994)

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### **Preliminary remark:**

The final report is not the final product, but the summary of it.

## **1. Theoretical framework**

I intend to combine different ways of explanation of sociopolitical mobilization and protest of non governmental organizations , taking elements from the following theoretical approaches relevant for the mobilization process in transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.

- *Theories of breakdown of authoritarian regimes and of democratic consolidation* after authoritarian rule(Linz, Huntington, Kaufmann, Schmitter, O'Donnell, Offe, Wiesenthal etc.)

- *Political opportunity structure approach* of protest mobilization(Kitschelt, Kriesi,Rucht, Neidhardt, Gamson, D. Meyer etc.)
- *Resource mobilization theory* of social movements(McCarthy, Zald, Oberschall, Tilly, Gary T. Marx, Donatella della Porta)

The transformation of the authoritarian "state-socialist" systems in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990 produced also experiments with the role of social movements in the process of democratization. Three phases in the activity of the social movements within the process of system transformation are to be distinguished: crisis, transformation, and institutionalization. In Poland, the Solidarnosc Movement, which played a decisive role in a long and intensive mobilization phase, reached a transition through institutionalized compromise, and then tried to uphold its identity towards the necessities of institutional differentiation. In Hungary, less relevant mobilization within social movements took place during the time of crisis than in Poland, and the movements, which played a rather secondary role in the transition, became integrated into or marginalized by the new multi-party system. In Czechoslovakia, there is a repression against social movements in the time of crisis, their predominant mobilization characterizes the breakthrough, and they are differentiated in the framework of the institutionalization phase. The GDR is also a very special case, because one of the most rigid and repressive systems was overrun in a very short and intensive mobilization period by spontaneous social movements. However, through the challenge of the German "reunification", the eminent role of the social movements in the transformation phase was followed by an institutionalization process, which reproduced the models of the FRG, and marginalized the social movements with their institutional experiments. There is a tension in all these countries between the dynamics of social movements and the democratic institutions of the new political systems, a tension that can be manifested by new cycles of protest movements, like the taxi driver blockade in Hungary in the October of 1990.

Social movements have specific mobilization patterns and policy outcomes in authoritarian systems, different ones to the movements of pluralist democracies. Movement dynamics and mobilization as the characteristics of the movements are hampered in an administrative -bureaucratic environment using legal and illegal pressures against social mobilization. As regard the social movements of the former "Eastern bloc", we have to introduce some specific categories: the social mobilizations are stopped and deformed before reaching the phase of fully developed movements, there are movements "initiatives", "quasi" movements which cannot expand their social dynamics because of political pressure. This pressure transforms them into isolated, self-contained subcultures, sects, political-social groups etc. The evolutionary theory of movement development put forward by OTTHEIN RAMMSTEDT<sup>1</sup> identifies this problem by pointing out that movements can fail to become movements at all stages of their "lyfe-cycles". The cycle of social movements under political repression practically meant a still-birth owing to repression. We have to consider these peculiar form of movements as "handicapped movements". Although the social-political problems which they addressed

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<sup>1</sup>Otthein RAMMSTEDT, *Soziale Bewegung*, Frankfurt am Main, 1978. 137-179.

were very relevant and urgent and the social basis was also given, political repression managed to hinder the expansion of the sociopolitical dynamics of these movements.

I do not intend to suggest, that all suppressed social experiments have had a great social and political relevance, but it is an interesting feature, that owing to repression and the "mobilization stop" all of these social movements were accorded high recognition by the public because of their dissident attitudes. However in the period of transition to a new political and economic system, not all of these movements could be revitalized to get widespread socio-political support. The change of the sociopolitical system was a challenge to the former "oppositional" movements too. Their very identity, existence and strategic-ideological character was rooted in the "ancient regime". They had to transform themselves to keep up with the immense and rapid changes of their sociopolitical environments.

Not all oppositional movements of the state socialist past could "survive" the system transformation. New and even old, pre-communist social movements emerged and reemerged, challenging the former "challengers". The free flow of the ideas and opinions defined also marginal positions for some of the movements, which all had to arrange or rearrange themselves with the new political opportunity structure.

In the process of system transformation, political structures has been rapidly changed. At the old system, topical issues and conflicts were tabooed in the official political discourse and banned into the "second publicity". The political institutions were not interested to pick up new sociopolitical issues. The social and political control of this political system was so strong and repressive on the social movements, that the political space for them was extremely restricted. On the one hand, social forces had "unlimited possibilities" for articulating new issues because of the inertia of official politics, but on the other hand, the new political forces were repressed since they were subjects of mobilization stops and control. Being a dissident, being an opponent of the system involved the danger of being dismissed from the job, whereas urgent sociopolitical problems cried out for political representation. The result of this antinomy was the existence of some very limited movements initiatives which articulated these issues. The great public and intellectual significance of these initiatives was disproportionate with the actually small number of supporters. These small groups set an example: they showed how small, powerless groups could become capable of articulating very important, even crucial neglected sociopolitical issues. The disproportionately between resource mobilization capacity and their sociopolitical relevance is quite clear from the political response to them: central political organs (Central Committee, ministers and other leading politicians) dealt with and responded to them.

This situation has totally changed through the transformation which abolished the repressive sociopolitical control, and expanded the political space for movements. Simultaneously, there is an "opening" of the flow of information and a flexible response to social challenge becoming very sensitive due to the new free press, and multiparty system etc. There is consensus among the new political forces that urgent, and formerly neglected social problems have to be efficiently coped with. The movements have to participate and to survive in the decision-making mechanisms of the pluralized system, which is a hard task for them. For being in opposition you no longer get a special reward: movements may mobilize their resources free but there is a "scarcity of support", and a very sharp competition of social and political forces for that limited amount of supporters.

The social movements have undoubtedly benefited a lot from the extension of their mobilization possibilities, but this does not automatically mean a growth in their resource mobilization capacities. On the basis of the "equality of the opportunities", they have to fight for their "real" political space within new political system.

### **1.1. Patterns of Social Movement Mobilization in East Central Europe**

The system transformation and democratization processes in East-Central Europe had a twofold connection with nation and nationalism. First, national problems and grievances as mobilizing issues against communist rule, and problems which divide and unite actors of new political field. Secondly, national unity represented in "umbrella organizations", all-embracing "national fronts", agreements on Round Table talks by all "national" political forces to constitute a new political community, "national institutions" and national leaders, as accepted symbolic and integrative forces of the new political field, claiming the function represent the whole of the political community. The first aspect is rather a problem of policy input and output, of agenda setting, and the second a matter of polity, of institutional setting. The two levels are connected with each other. National issues could integrate political community, but also divide it. National issues appear in the system transformation as unifying and mobilizing forces against the old system, but later they may become the cleavages of new political differentiation. The movement organizations and political leadership of the first protest period cannot sustain the restructuring of political conflicts. Until the communist party maintain political-administrative control, the counter-movements are connected in a national front with national leaders. After the dissolution of the monopoly of power, and establishment of new political opportunity structure national leadership and unity have to fit into pluralistic political field.

Processes of system transformation in East-Central Europe had similar dynamic, but with considerable national differences<sup>2</sup>. There are characteristic steps to identify in this processes. The first step is the time of **crisis**, when the destabilization of the old political institutions and elites, and the emergence of new political forces occur. In this phase, different strategies of elite reactions interact with the dynamics of the protest. Opening up of new political spaces, agreements on framework of transition, division in the old elite on conservatives and reformers are distinctive features of this phase. The elite reaction is constitutive for the differentiation or unity of the new political forces. There is everywhere some kind of cooperation of all new non-communist political directions but the organizational and strategic unity may be temporary or longer-lasting.

The next phase is of the one of the **breakthrough**, the dissolution of the monopoly of the communists on political power and their political-administrative control. This occurred in East-Central Europe on a non-violent way, through bargaining. But there were considerable differences whether mass mobilizations were necessarily to push communists to bargain and accept compromises with new

political forces. Round table talks are typical for this phase, which establish temporary institutions for the task of political change. Until the first free elections axis of political conflicts may emerge among the new political organizations. The former "national unity" against communist rule dissolves, organizations of "national fronts" faster or slower transform to multi-party systems.

**Institutionalization** of a new political system follows similar patterns: constitutional change-free elections-differentiation of the new political forces according to the poles of government-opposition. The distribution of power occurs according to the recently established rules of game in constitutional-liberal democracies. The very end of the process institutionalizing new political systems is still far away: stabilization of new institutions, formulation of new policies, acceptance of rules of game by the political culture is a long-lasting process. During this phase differentiation of original "national" unity is necessary, interest articulation should occur along the lines of political cleavages, political ideologies/programmes and institutionalized political opportunity structures.

During the phases of system transformation, a structural change of the social-political subjects is going on. Social movements mobilized by crisis and protest set up transitory coalitions with temporary organizational consequences. Emergence of party systems is an important step in the institutionalization. With the free elections, distribution of power and formulation of national policy conclude in the set up of new institutional structures, which represent "national" interest within pluralistic, conflict-based modern societies. There is a long way from "national unity" embodied in "umbrella organization", "round tables" to establish public and constitutional institutions, but East Central European societies had to cross it in a short period of time. Fast and conflict-ridden political learning processes marked this development, which was different even among East-Central European countries. But there are some common elements based on common historical and cultural heritage and geographic, economic and social ties to Western Europe in this region, if we compare this dynamic with the post-communist development in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union.

Some of the important distinctive features in East Central Europe are the absence of violent ethnic and territorial conflicts, which follow the dissolution of multi-ethnic federal states, like Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Despite of the fact that territorial based ethnic minorities do exist, they do not provoke violent mobilization of majorities, or do not serve as starting points for such kind of mobilizations. Ethnic violence seems to be under control in this region, where new political institutions, constitutional framework and political parties are used as accepted channels for distribution of power. Whether the political tradition of living together of different ethnic groups and understanding for and experience with ethnic minorities, or a sense for political compromise and the rule of law, is a distinct characteristic of political culture in Central Europe, like Zdenek MLYNAR puts it<sup>3</sup>, or the recent political learning processes from social mobilization to political institutionalization has been successful is not to be discussed here. In the following I will try to compare the democratization processes in East Central European countries to figure out their common and distinct phenomena's and characteristics.

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<sup>2</sup> Máté SZABÓ, Die Rolle von sozialen Bewegungen im Systemwandel in Osteuropa, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 1991/3.

<sup>3</sup> Zdenek MLYNAR, Mitteleuropa in Ost-West Konflikt, in: Sven PAPCKE/Werner WEIDENFELD (ed.), Traumland Mitteleuropa? Darmstadt, 1988. 49.

Students of contention in Western Europe and North America commonly emphasize the significance of the political opportunity structure in determining the forms and incidence of public claim-making<sup>4</sup>. Their arguments equally apply to the political systems of Central and Eastern Europe. The transformation of communist to post-communist regimes in the region has altered political opportunity structures; therefore the character of contention has subsequently been altered too. There are general patterns but there are also some differences from country to country, according to the traditions of the respective political cultures and differences in political opportunity structures.

As a preliminary conclusion to our analysis, the existence of a complex and differentiated sector of new sociopolitical movements within the new political systems is given. This sector contains different or even conflicting socio-political movements, and these play a significant role within political protest. Using Albert O. Hirschmann's famous alternatives on the behavior of members of organizations in crisis<sup>5</sup>, it can be said that "outlawed" movements of communist regimes were forced towards the "exit" options. In post-communist democracies these movements needed to decide whether to opt for a "voice" or an "exit" strategy, or whether to combine them in their own way. The reshaping of the political opportunity structure forces protest movements to alter their "egos" and identities, and to find new issues, strategies, and forms of action and organization.

Research on political protest and social movements was very difficult to conduct under the communist regimes. Lack of empirical research, and the suspicion towards this topic on the part of the ruling elite's hindered the implementation of effective steps in this field for a long period of time<sup>6</sup>. Of course, socio-political mobilizations against communist rule were dealt with in political science, in sociology and in the contemporary history of Western democracies. However, the problem of scarce sources, secret archives, and the systematic manipulation by the communist regimes in order to secure their legitimacy paralyzed research on macro- and micro-mobilization within these systems. These movements were illegal, and they were threatened by heavy political pressure and surveillance. They tried to inform the free press and publicity networks of the Western democracies. However, due to the monopolization of international exchanges and internal discussions by the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the information coming from the opposition movements was limited. Obviously, the lack of proof with regard to the validity of such information set clear-cut limits on what social science could achieve in

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<sup>4</sup> On the concept of political opportunity structure see:

Peter K. Eisinger: "Protest Behaviour", in *Journal of Politics* Vol. 33, 1971, pp.980-1007.

Herbert P. Kitschelt: "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest", in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 16., 1986, No. 1, pp.57-87.

Hanspeter Kriesi(et. al.): "New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe", in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 22, 1992, pp.219-244.

Michael Lipsky: "Protest as a Political Resource", in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62, 1968, No.4, pp. 1144-1159.

<sup>5</sup> Albert O. Hirschmann: *Exit, Voice, Loyalty*. Harvard U.P. 1970.

analyzing these phenomena<sup>7</sup>. Growing liberalization and international openness in East Central Europe and in the Soviet Union in the eighties and subsequently after 1989 extended the space for the analysis on collective behavior and protest. Poland, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Hungary, GDR, Czechoslovakia and some of the Balkan countries provided rich material for documentation and interpretation based on standard social science methods<sup>8</sup>. The opening up of archives, the possibilities for interviewing and surveying, and the use of research methodologies on collective behavior are now possible in most of the post-communist countries.

## 1.2. Differences in the Political Opportunities for Protest in Communist and Post-Communist Systems

Considerable differences can be noticed in the conditions of social movements before and after the beginning of the process of system transformation<sup>9</sup>. The different communist systems that existed in Eastern Europe had much in common and it is apparent that their current transformations also contain some common patterns. In the following, an attempt will be made to sum up some of the general characteristics of the opportunities for mobilizing protest in the era of political transformation.

The communist systems in their most "classical" forms (i.e. in the forties and the fifties) demanded total conformity and pushed protest movements to the political margins or eliminated them completely<sup>10</sup>. No political tradition was tolerated outside the Bolshevik "Myth of Revolution". Only those groups and organizations which accepted both the ideology and bureaucratic reality of the communist system were accepted by the ruling forces as "administered mass organizations"<sup>11</sup> to mobilize

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<sup>6</sup> Jerry F. Hough: "The Logic of Collective Action and the Pattern of Revolutionary Behavior", in Frederic J. Fluron/Erik P. Hoffmann(eds.) *Post Communist Studies and Political Science*. Boulder:Westview Press, 1993, pp.347-371.

<sup>7</sup> Rudolf L.Tökés (ed.): *Opposition in Eastern Europe*. Oxford: MacMillan, 1979.

Research project "Krisen in den Systemen sowjetischen Typs" -- coordinator Zdenek Mlynar. This is the basis of a series of studies edited in Köln, INDEX Publishing House.

<sup>8</sup> Karl-Werner Brand : "Massendemokratischer Aufbruch im Osten", in *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen*, 1990/2, Vol.3, pp.9-17.

Sidney Tarrow: "Aiming on a Moving Target", in *Political Science & Politics*, Vol. 24, 1991, No. 1, pp.12-20.

<sup>9</sup> On the changes of political opportunity structures in communist systems see:

Ivo Banac(ed.): *Eastern Europe in Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1992.

Stephen White *et.al.*: *Communist and Post-Communist Political Systems*. New York: St Martins Press, 1990.

<sup>10</sup> Robert C. Tucker: *The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1972.

Andrew C. János (ed.): *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe*. Berkeley:University of California P, 1983.

Richard C. Gripp: *The Political System of Communism*. San Diego:California State Univ., 1974.

<sup>11</sup> The term was invented by Gregory J. Kasza in his fascinating analysis on the role of administered mass organizations in Communist and in other types of authoritarian systems:



the forced participation of civil society in the ritualized mass support of the system. The latter included bureaucratic mass organizations for youth, women, or workers in different branches of the economy. Such movements were the only channels of mobilization but participation within them implied total integration into the regime. Outside influences coming from Western movements -- or even from movements further to the East -- were systematically obstructed and controlled by the regime. Mobilization and protest were controlled in a repressive way, and demands articulated outside official channels were not only rejected but sometimes brutally suppressed. The possibilities of resource mobilization within civil society were controlled and restricted through infiltration by state and party controlled security organs, like the famous "Stasi"(Staatssicherheit) in the GDR <sup>12</sup>. Differences of resource mobilization potentials among opposition groups could not be established because of the retarding effects of repression. The political opportunity structure under communist systems provided, on the input side, inflexibility towards social demands and a certain type of closeness; on the output side there was the strong capacity of the state to implement decisions, to control, and to indulge in repression.

Of course, during the period of "Liberalization and Westernization", which began in the sixties, many characteristics of communist systems were put aside or became more flexible. This was especially the case in ECE -- i.e. in Czechoslovakia before 1968;and in Poland, Yugoslavia, GDR and Hungary there were new, more flexible types of control established within civil society<sup>13</sup>. Although certain taboos were maintained, during the eighties in the "reform" countries new political spaces were opened up for mobilization and protest.<sup>14</sup>

The post-communist systems established after 1989 have institutionalized the achievements of liberal democracies -- e.g. free press, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. At present a *social movement sector* is being established within the new democracies, and the former restrictive-rejectory control on civic activism is being put aside. Control on mobilization and protest, however is still present in the form of "selective tolerance"; in other words, certain forms of protest are not accepted but the rejection is based on legal and constitutional rules. The *political opportunity structure* of post-communist democracies can be characterized on the input side by its flexibility and openness towards new demands; and on the output side by a "weak" state which is incapable of implementing decisions and maintaining control over society.

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Kasza, Gregory J.: Parties, Interest Groups, and Administered Mass Organizations, in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26. No. 1. 1993. 81-111.

<sup>12</sup> On social control by state security in the GDR and especially on its infiltration of the opposition see: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte . Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament. B 20. 1996. Special issue on the State Security organs and to their relation of GDR opposition movements esp. 23-36.

<sup>13</sup> Grzegorz Ekiert: "Democratic Processes in East Central Europe", in *The British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1991, pp. 285-315.

Wolf.E. Griffith (ed.): *Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain?* Westview:Boulder,1988.

<sup>14</sup> Sabrina P. Ramet: *Social Currents in Eastern Europe*. Durham/London: Duke U.P., 1991.

Vladimir, Tismaneanu (ed.). *In Search of Civil Society*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

Judith B. Sedaitis/Jim Butterfield (eds.): *Perestroika From Below. Social Movements in the Soviet Union*. Boulder: Westview, 1991.

Conflict and cooperation arise within the new *social movement sector* (SMS) among different *social movement organizations* (SMO) <sup>15</sup>. A strong and wide differentiation of resource mobilization capacities occur among movements because of the considerable differences between SMO's in their opportunities to mobilize support.

In the process of system transformation, political structures have been rapidly changed. Under the old system, topical issues and conflicts were made "taboo" in the official political discourse and thus were forced into the "samizdat". The political institutions were not interested in picking up new socio-political issues. The social and political control of the communist system was so strong and repressive with respect to social movements that their political space was extremely restricted. This situation has been totally changed since the beginning of the systemic transformation. The latter has abolished repressive socio-political control and expanded the political space for movements <sup>16</sup>. Simultaneously, there has been an "opening" of the flow of information within the respective countries and towards the outside environment; moreover, the authorities have a flexible response to social protests and civic demands. The movements have to participate in order to survive in the decision-making mechanisms of a pluralized society. Movements may mobilize their resources freely but there is a "scarcity of support" in a weak civil society, and thus there is sharp competition among the social and political forces for a limited number of supporters.

### **The Role of Social Movements in the Political Opportunity Structures: Before and After 1989**

#### A. Eastern European "Communist" Systems

1/ Exclusion and marginalization or total integration and organization

2/ Imaginary political tradition: myth of the revolutionary and class movement origins of the bureaucratic-authoritarian institutions, movement identity claimed by organizations "pseudo-movements"

3/ International influences: systematically hindered the ones from the West, their acceptance only in a commercial form, on a system-conform way: challenges for subcultural-marginal groups; East-East cooperation is outlawed

4/ Repressive-rejective sociopolitical control

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<sup>15</sup> For more about these concepts:

Mayer N. Zald/John D. McCarthy: *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987, pp.20-22.

<sup>16</sup> Margaret L. Nugent(ed.): *From Leninism to Freedom*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Hanspeter Neuhold/Peter Havlik/Arnold Suppan(eds.): *Political and Economic Transformation in East Central Europe*. Boulder: Westview, 1995.

5/POS: on the input side inflexibility towards social demands, closeness; on the output side a strong capacity to implement decisions, "strong state"

6/The channels for resource mobilization are controlled and restricted: nivellation of the resource mobilization potential

### B/Post-Communist Systems

1/Non-or less institutionalized legal-political environment,"fluid" organizations, missing political stability,SMI-formation

2/Traditions of different protest cycles:pre-communist democratic and authoritarian movements, socialist movements, post-socialist movements; different political subcultures

3/Strong international influences from the West and from other Eastern countries: conflict and cooperation, transfer from resources from the West to weaker Eastern partners

4/Traditions of repressive sociopolitical control still alive:struggling with the past, pictures of enemy, political camps of former "outlawed" and "elite" movements and their stigms in positive and negative sense

5/POS input side flexibility and openness, but with some ambivalence because of traditions of authoritarian political culture;output side "weak" state, incapacity of the implementation of decisions and no resources: probability of strong "reactive" but less "proactive" movements, rather symbolic gains in terms of cooptation and acceptance, but no new benefits

6/Conflict and cooperation within the SMI among the different SMOs:strong differentiation of resource mobilization capacities because of diff. backgrounds in the condition of free mobilization there are great differences among the former subcultural groups. new redistribution of power and resources

### **1.3. Path's of Transition in ECE**

#### **The Solidarity Revolution: Poland**

**Crisis** of communist system in Poland seems to be provoke cycles of social protest in a long term dynamics. Cycles of crisis and protest since 1956 constitute a long learning process of ruling and

oppositional political elites<sup>17</sup>. Characteristic phenomena of a type of social coalition emerged in the civil society during the long-lasting conflicts. Catholic Church as an influential "national institution", oppositional intellectuals and discontented blue collar workers shaped the specific mixture of "Polish national resistance" against the political elite and institutions. National traditions of political culture are "oppositional" against the state as an alienated, foreign power, meanwhile the nation is associated with anti-etatist civil society<sup>18</sup>

Compromise with reformers of the communist elites which secured certain legislature proportion to the communists, made the **breakthrough**, the redistribution of political power of a longer period between 1989-1991, than anywhere else in Central Europe<sup>19</sup>. In this process, former oppositional organization, Solidarity embodied and united functions of social movement, trade union, political party and "represented the nation". Inner fragmentation and differentiation of Solidarity was retarded by lengthened transitory period of dissolution communist power positions<sup>20</sup>. WALESAs leadership represented unity of Polish nation and anti-communist protest, but seeking for national unity slowed process of party formation and resulted in semi-presidential constitutional rules, produced unfavourable atmosphere for political pluralism<sup>21</sup>.

Through **institutionalization** of pluralist democracy, painful and conflict-ridden differentiation processes among Solidarity constituency occurred. National-conservative and liberal directions formulated different political strategies for a social-political reconstruction. Walesa's intermediary role does not hold any more against polarization of nationalist and democratic directions. Severe economic crisis, mobilizing force against communist system, endangers political stability and enhance political polarization in post-communist Poland. Former unifying-integrating national issues now divide former partners in different political camps. Organizational unity of Solidarity, and its multifunctional character are dissolved<sup>22</sup>.

The Polish case is a good example for the strong integrative and disintegrative function of national issues in process of democratization in East Central Europe. Social solidarity, Catholic social and moral values, national traditions and democratic aspirations could establish strong mobilizing forces in Poland through the last decade. Their organizational and symbolic unity in Solidarity and its leader WALESAs could not be preserved in the framework of pluralist democracy. Strong organizational unity even hindered the development and differentiation of a multi party system, which was established by the divisive issues of formulation unpopular government social and economic policies and enhanced by an electoral law with the fragmenting effects of pure proportional representation. In the patterns of institutionalization, some elements of pre-communist interwar Polish political culture reemerged, like the strong national leadership and its extra-constitutional role in permanent political crisis-management.

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<sup>17</sup> Helmut WAGNER, *Die Doppelgesellschaft. Systemwandel in Polen*, Berlin, 1981.

<sup>18</sup> Timothy Garton ASH, *The Polish Revolution. Solidarity*. New York. 1985.

<sup>19</sup> Georg W. STROBEL, Politisches System und Pluralismus in Polen, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 12-13/1990.

<sup>20</sup> Jerzy HOLZER, Polens Weg aus dem Kommunismus, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 12-13/1990.

<sup>21</sup> Woytek ZUBEK, Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition, in: *Problems of Communism* 1/1991.

<sup>22</sup> Jerzy HOLZER, Polen nach dem Kommunismus, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B6/1992.

## The Negotiated Revolution: Hungary

Compared with Poland, since 1956 there is considerable political stability in Hungary. Kádárist policy opened up possibilities for entrepreneurship in the second economy, and formation of civil society on the level of economics<sup>23</sup>. Much less politicized civil society emerged this way, than in Poland, and there are no cycles of **crisis** and protest before 1988. Hungarian opposition was rather an intellectual subculture, without social-political ties to the Churches and to wider strata's of blue collar workers. Fragmentation and differentiation of oppositional intellectual groups and circles developed already before the system transformation, and their possibilities for political bargaining with reformers of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party were bigger, than in Poland. No recent repressions like "marshal law" in Poland lasted on the relations of state and society since 1956. Thus, no "umbrella organization" representing national solidarity could be established, only temporary unity of oppositional groups for bargaining with communists existed<sup>24</sup>.

Despite of absence of strong national unity organization against communist rule, national issues were quite important in Hungarian transformation to democracy. Biggest popular mobilization in 1988-1989 occurred on the occasions of remembering Hungarian revolution of 1956, reinterrence of its leader Imre NAGY, anti-Ceaucescu protest-demonstration, anniversary of Hungarian national and democratic revolution of 1848<sup>25</sup>. During **breakthrough** phase, joint action of relevant oppositional groups could be established, and the division among more nationalistic or democratic directions were overshadowed by common cause of anti-communist conflict. But during the Round Table talks in the Summer of 1989, unity of oppositional groups has been dissolved. As first divisive issue, acceptance and rejection of a strong presidential leadership according Polish patterns emerged. Radical liberal democrats organized a successful plebiscite against the bargain of populists and reform communists on a strong and directly elected presidency.

The differentiation of Hungarian oppositional movements was **institutionalized** in a fragmented party system<sup>26</sup>. Electoral campaign was going on already during the conflicts about the presidency, and adversarial political behaviour emerged among the nationalist, liberal and socialist political camps, all divided or fragmented in a plurality of political parties. There were rather symbolic and cultural oriented divisive issues among the parties, meanwhile consent on market economy, Western orientation in foreign relations and political pluralism dominated. Hungarian electoral law oriented on West German patterns could select the six main political forces into the national parliament in the elections of Spring 1990, and the representation of fragmented splinter parties, or the misleading national coalitions could be avoided. Thus, neither governability nor later party desintegrations and intraparlimentary reorganization of political groups occurred. Hungarian party system is an adequate and stable representation of plurality within civil society. The rather weak presidency has not the

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<sup>23</sup> Janina FRENTZEL-ZAGORSKA, Civil Society in Poland and Hungary, Soviet Studies 1990/4.

<sup>24</sup> András KÖRÖSÉNYI, The Decay of the Communist Rule in Hungary, in: SLOVO 1991/1.

<sup>25</sup> Joshua MURAVCHIK(ed.), Democratic Transformation in Hungary, World Affairs 1990/4.

<sup>26</sup> András KÖRÖSÉNYI, Revival of the Past or a New Beginning? The Nature of Post-Communist Politics, Political Quarterly 1991/1.

national integrative character of a HAVEL or WALESKA. There are neither national unity organs on the level of party system, nor influential national leaders in Hungary.<sup>27</sup>

### **The Revolution with Candles: German Democratic Republic**

In the case of former GDR we are confronted with a very special situation. Division of a nation state into two parts, where relatively autonomous social and economic development occurred has been motivated by the conflicts of Cold War and problems resulting of second World War. Issues of unity and reunification were tabooed in former GDR. Mobilization of oppositional groups after the 1953 workers protest were hindered by strict administrative-political control, and reduced on intellectual subcultures<sup>28</sup>. Political spaces for counter cultures in the eighties were provided by Lutheran Church. New social movements of the GDR were connected with youth subcultures oriented on the models of FRG, like peace, ecology or feminist/gay groups. Discussions on national unity or reunification were not present in their political universe, rather democratization, non-violence, and ideas of an "alternative", Third Way for the GDR. Communist elite was much less responsive and open to social-national demands, than in Poland or Hungary, and oppositional counter-cultures had hard task to survive<sup>29</sup>.

Rigid and rejecting political course of official GDR towards opening up and reform in Soviet Union and other former socialist countries suppressed signs of **crisis** and denied social and political tensions. Destabilization occurred through the well-known migration of GDR citizens via Hungary and other countries to the FRG, in the Summer of 1989. The migrants destabilized the political system of the GDR by the mass exodus, and through their "exit" also supported the possibility of "voice" option, the political change, and manifested the weakness of "loyalty" to the old system<sup>30</sup>.

The rapid opening up of political space in the GDR were directly or indirectly contributed by other former socialist countries, like Soviet Union and Hungary too. The first wave of protest in Autumn 1989 occurred by the avant-garde of Church based alternative subcultures and reform-oriented intellectual elites. The political objectives of "civic movements"(Bürgerbewegungen) were directed towards democratization and modernization of the GDR and the normalization and opening up to the FRG, but not on a short term reunification of the two German states.<sup>31</sup>

Mass mobilization of wider social strata's through the protest movements, and the continuity of migration after the opening up of German border modified the political scene, and set reorganization of nation state on the agenda. The process of German reunification is connected with decisive factors beyond the borders of the GDR, which related to the internal dynamic of democratization on a specific way. We have to notice the decisive shift in the political issues through the mobilization of the protest, which led to reconstruction of political scene from the dominance of the "civic movements" to the reestablishment of political parties connected with their Western counterparts. The civic movements

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<sup>27</sup> op.cit.

<sup>28</sup> Karl W. FRICKE, Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR, Köln, 1984.

<sup>29</sup> Ralf RYTLEWSKI, Politische Kultur und Generationswechsel in der DDR, in: B. CLAUBEN(ed.), Politische Sozialisation Jugendlicher in Ost und West, Bonn, 1989, 209-225.

<sup>30</sup> Albert O. HIRSCHMANN, Exit, Voice, Loyalty, Cambridge Mass. 1970.

<sup>31</sup> Hubertus KNABE(ed.), Aufbruch in eine andere DDR, Hamburg, 1989.

without strong Western supporters could be the avant-garde of the **breakthrough**, dissolution of communist rule, but they played rather marginal role in the institutionalization processes<sup>32</sup>. The early initiative and mobilizing role of umbrella organizations diminished in the process of **institutionalization** of new political system. No national leader from the GDR emerged, the integrative political personalities of the reunification came from the Western politics, like Chancellor KOHL, or former Chancellor Willy BRANDT. Connections of Eastern and Western political parties played an important role in the reestablishment of national political community. Thus, the differentiation of West German party system was directly "mirrored" in Eastern Germany. The dynamics of the institutionalization in the GDR is highly intertwined with the West German political scene, which decisively contributed to the establishment of international conditions of German reunification. Round Table talks and first free elections in Spring of 1990 were overshadowed by the trend-setter of reunification<sup>33</sup>. The national issue was clearly connected with modernization, democratization, economic development and European option. East Germans accepted directly constitutional structures and socioeconomic institutions of a highly modernized Western country. Dissolution of GDR directly confronted less developed civil society and civic culture with the realm of pluralist democracies, which will produce tensions and conflicts on national issues, like riots against refugees in the Summer of 1991.

### **The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia**

**Crisis** period in Czechoslovakia was even shorter than in the GDR. Historical background is the since 1968 introduced "normalization" process, with a strong backing from post-Stalinist Soviet leadership. All reform communist were excluded from the Czech-Slovak Communist Party, and even Soviet reforms of the eighties were neglected by the communist elites, like in the GDR. The oppositional groups developed in an intellectual subculture against the old system, and strict and rigid political-administrative control forced them to be united. Strong repression and rigidity of the communist rulers helped to get national and democratic issues together in the oppositional discussions. Political solidarity from non-conventional artistic groups to former reform communists emerged in the form of Charter 77<sup>34</sup>.

Breaking barriers in other Eastern countries in 1989 led to mobilization of Czech and Slovak society. Cycles of protest demonstrations were met by violent administrative-political rejection, which helped to establish national unity and solidarity against the ancient regime. Escalation of conflict and international processes (breakthrough in Hungary, GDR etc.) supported the success of social mobilization and the **breakthrough** in Autumn 1989. The triggering factor had a national symbolic character; on a memorial protest march at Prague on the memory of a student killed by Germans in the occupation times, police brutality and rumour about student victim of this violence provoked and

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<sup>32</sup> H. MÜLLER-ENBERGS/M.SCHULZ/J. WIEGHOLS(ed.), Von der Illegalität ins Parlament, Berlin, 1991.

<sup>33</sup> Uwe THAYSEN, Der Runde Tisch II. in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 1990/2.

Matthias JUNG, Parteiensystem und Wahlen in der DDR, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 27/1990.

<sup>34</sup> Vladimír V. KUSIN, Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, MacMillan, 1972.

Vladimír V. KUSIN, Challenge to Normalcy: Political Opposition in Czechoslovakia, 1968-1977, in: R.L.TOKÉS(ed.), Opposition in Eastern Europe, MacMillan, 1974, 26-60.

mobilized the public. National unity developed mobilizing both blue collar workers and intellectuals for political change. Czech and Slovak "umbrella organizations", Civic Forum and Public Against Violence were set up, and constitutional arrangements for peaceful changes and new elections has been agreed by Round Table talks. National and democratic issues were connected, broad umbrella organizations for national mobilization emerged and national leadership of HAVEL and DUBCEK were widely acknowledged and institutionalized by presidency and parliament.

Through electoral campaign and formulation of governmental policies in the phase of **institutionalization** this national unity and the connection of national and democratic issues has been dissolved. Traditions of the only one really functioning multy party system of the interwar period reemerged, but at the same time unresolved problems of nation-building and conflicts in Czech and Slovak relations too. Different political cultures of two parts of Czech-Slovakia were mirrored in the electoral results of 1990. The elections were held in a period of lasting political dominance of umbrella organizations of the protest and mobilization, but they could not preserve their unity confronted with the polarizing issues of economic-social reforms and state building. Differentiation of liberal and democratic directions within Civic Forum, and the issue of Slovak autonomy or even secession in the parties of Slovakia divided the former Forum-parties, and reshaped parliamentary representation. In Slovakia, even the change of governmental coalition occurred. National leadership of president HAVEL and DUBCEK were processed by Czech-Slovak dispute and anti-communist purges.<sup>35</sup> The characteristics of institutionalization and differentiation processes are connected in Czechoslovakia with the reemergence of the issues and cleavages of nation-building and state-building<sup>36</sup>

To sum up, analyzing East Central European democratization processes, transitory character of national mobilization and leadership was figured out. Institutionalization of pluralist democracy and dissolution of communist power monopoly led to differentiation of political scene, with conflicts and tensions of national and democratic directions. Issues of nation- and state-building are involved especially in the democratization process of Czechoslovakia and former GDR. A general problem seems to be the institutionalization of political representation of social movements of the crisis and the breakthrough in the new party systems, and providing political space for them in new democracies. The establishment of new constitutional structures have to met demands for pluralisation and democratization in a situation of economic-social crisis, which may result in ethnic based or nationalist social-political mobilization. There are considerable differences in the condition of social movements before and after the breakthrough within the process of system transformation. During suppression and anti-communist upheaval, political unity and solidarity is to preserve, meanwhile in the new democracy political concurrence among social movements is going on for political positions, which produce a strong necessity of institutionalization and bureaucratization. Organizational and strategic skills are different in an underground movement and in an established political party. To manage the immense change from subpolitics to parliamentary or even governmental roles is a great challenge which is to be met in an

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<sup>35</sup> Pavel SMUTNY, Die Tschechoslowakei-eine Rückkehr zu sich selbst, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B6/1992.

<sup>36</sup> Miroslav KUSY, Civil and National Content of the Czechoslovak "Gentle Revolution", in: D. HERZOG/A. PRADETTO/H. WAGNER (ed.), Revolution und Rekonstruktion: der Aufbau freiheitlicher Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa, FU Berlin, 1991. 35-40.



extremely short period of time. There are severe doubts, as far as the political culture of the former oppositional groups is able to compensate weakness of organizational and administrative capacities.

## **2. Methodology and resources**

The database and the material is complex and differentiated and it will be analyzed with multiple methods. We will concentrate on a research project carried out with the same methodology in the GDR and in Hungary on protest events 1989-1994, but in the interpretation other types of sources based on other types of social science methodologies will be referred to, as follows:

- *Goals and framing.* Programmes, self-reflecting documents and interviews with activists were collected and documented by many scholars and institutions in the two countries on establishment of new civic groups, their goals, strategies, and the identity of activists. Goals, their interpretations, values documented this way could be object of rather content analysis type quantitative and of qualitative comparison concentrated on specific types of civic movements, as environmentalists, antiracists etc.
- *Reports of repressive organs and of the external observers.* There were in both countries state security organs of the Communist state oriented to document the activities of older and new civic groups. In Germany there is a huge institute and archive work started on this material, in Hungary we have just some small number of publications. Especially for the GDR to reconstruct the protest culture before 1989 this material should be analyzed. For the pre-1989 Hungary, foreign news agencies reports or of the Radio Free Europe, and the samizdat documents itself could be basis of a historical reconstruction. For the protest traditions before 1989 historical studies can be used to for both countries. The pre-1989 similarities and differences are important to document and compare in the explanatory model.
- *Social science staff.* There were a plenty of scholarly analyses published on the role of the protest of civic movements and other organizations in the regime change of the two countries, in Hungarian, German, French and English I could look for. In political science, history, sociology a steadily growing and impressive body of literature is emerging. It was not my intention to make a comprehensive overview of all that, I will just select the material as far as it is relevant for my concept, and do not make a review on the literature.

### **2.1. Protest event analysis**

Our main source is a project based upon newspaper records on protest events based upon the database of the project "Strategies of Collective Protest in Democratizing Societies, Poland, GDR, Hungary, Slovakia 1989-1994", Harvard University, Center for European Studies. The GDR part was carried out

by Christiane Lemke, the Hungarian part by myself. These databases and the preliminary country studies in preparation under common scheme are fitting well for quantitative comparisons on types, frequencies and dynamics of protests during 1989-1990 launched by non/governmental organizations.

Protest has its space within political processes. Protest can be conceived as a power resource, as a form of communication between ruler and ruled, and as a form of mostly unconventional and non-institutionalized political participation. Protest events are part of the broader context of protest waves. Protest waves may be interpreted as parts of protest cycles, in the same way as Hirschmann outlined in his thesis on «shifting involvements».The later were based on generational change and differences in socialization patterns.<sup>37</sup>As latter Tarrow pointed out analyzing protest politics in postwar Italy<sup>38</sup>,there are different waves of protest, periods when more protest events occur with more radical or disruptive character, and there also occur times when there are quantitatively less protest events, with less radicalism and disruption. Tarrow talks about groups of "early risers" bringing in new issues and forms of protest. These may be spread throughout society, based upon decreased risks and the probability that the authorities use violent or other "ugly" sanctions. The existence of waves of protest can be documented and interpreted on different levels:

- cross-cultural or national, in global or regional trends,
- on the level of national political systems --"societies",and
- in sub-national areas of communities, networks, areas, and institutional and policy sets(e.g. students in higher education systems).

In East Central European Post Communist Countries, we are witnessing the emergence of a new political opportunity structure and of a new protest culture in the process of regime transformation and democratic stabilization. Developing multyorganizational field is a condition for the emergence of forms of protest, and the actors access to institutionalized political participation relates to their activity on the market of protests.Politics may be seen as an interrelation of different competitions and coalitions, of exchanges , as "markets" of political actors and institutions for goods like power, support, resources. The markets of parties,the elections, of trade unions and other "corporative' organs, the bargaining power procedures, and of civic organizations public access channels containing political protest as one of these channels is emerging parallel and intertwined in the post-communist realm . The barriers and frontiers of the different "markets" are not hermetically closed in the established democracies,but these are even more flexible and volatile in the new democracies. Issues, cleavages, alliances cross cutting the boarders of different political"sub-markets" are there, providing connections between different organizational and goal settings.Electoral power, bargaining power and capacities to raise public attendance and mobilize support,mobilizing power are interconnected but separate entities. To transform one of the powers into another, specific rules,forms and practices of the different political subfields have to be used and appropriated to by the actors.

Electoral power,bargaining power and mobilization power are combined on a specific way in case of parties, unions and other professional organs and of civic organizations. The combination depends upon the structure of political opportunities institutionalized and informal ones of the political systems. Electoral campaigns may strengthen the role of electoral power in organizations, not only in parties but

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<sup>37</sup> Abert O. Hirschmann: Shifting Involvements. Private Interest and Public Action. Princeton: Princeton U.P. 1982.

within unions and civic organizations acting in the context of electoral campaigns too. Within legislature periods, unions and civic organizations and also political parties may strengthen their bargaining and mobilizing power, in absence of direct electoral confrontation. Actors may switch and transfer their resources from one market to another, especially in flexible and volatile political markets of recently emerging democracies. Rules, borders, frontiers are much more stabilized and institutionalized between political markets of established democracies. But even in this type of political systems there are longer term restructurations in their relations to be documented to, like the emergence of mobilizing power of New Social Movements of the eighties in the Western Democracies, challenging the boundaries of institutionalized electoral markets in forms of new issues, even 'cleavages' and of new type of political parties. This challenge effected some longer term restructurations of electoral and corporate markets in some of the Western democracies.

Mobilizing powers of parties and trade unions are used from time to time in Western democracies too. Mobilizing, new issues, conflicts, strikes, national, regional and international crises never allow to any of the political organization to be acting silently in its own market exclusively. Protest is raised and used also by parties and corporate organs in established democracies. Some of the political organizations, the differentiated and wide range of civic organizations do not have institutionalised electoral or bargaining powers, so they build most of their political existence on gaining and mobilizing public political and social support. Resource mobilization concepts on social movements /McCarthy, Zald, Tilly, Oberschall, Gamson, McAdam/ put this orientation in the centre of their focussing on political involvements of social movements. Resource mobilization approach used and applied experiences of formal organizations to understand protest politics. On the other way around mobilizing practices of movements and of other civic organizations are relevant to protesting parties, unions etc. too. One of the main insights of resource mobilization and of political opportunity approach is the unity of political process, containing political opportunity structures and political processes of electoral competition, bargaining and mobilization.

Mobilization of political protest should be understood and interpreted to in a comprehensive model of political process /McAdam/, based upon the interplay of economic, social and cultural structures, conditioning and defining political opportunities, organizational power of actors and rules of political mobilization in the contexts of multyorganizational field.

Protest is one of the forms of political mobilization. Mobilization of power and resources is a general phenomena of social and political live. Specific character of protest mobilization, the rules of specific markets of political protest are bound to general characteristics of political opportunities and processes of distinct but connected systems of political markets. On the protest market, parties, unions and civic organizations are acting together in one continuum based upon cleavages, alliances and integrative norms and values called the protest culture. Protest market is a not fully institutionalized market. There are general legal and political rules and institutions acting and regulating, but most of its activities are bound by informal rules and cultural values of a protest culture.

Protest culture is a neglected aspect of political culture in modern societies. The relations of state and citizens, rulers and ruled were understood by the founders of political culture theory mainly focussed on

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<sup>38</sup> Tarrow, Sidney: Democracy and Disorder. Oxford: Oxford U.P. 1989.

the institutions, especially on the state. Latter development stressed the role of different subcultures and informal structures and rules, but it was also bound to the dominant political markets of electoral and bargaining power. Mobilizing powers and their markets have somewhat different cultural context applied on their specific activities of raising and developing protest campaigns and actions. Specific types of bargaining, communication, sharing power and resources, articulating and managing conflicts are developed in the field of protest culture, related to the rules and values of political culture generally, but with specific emphases on the own field. Protest culture is a continuum of protest actors, their conflicts and integrations, mechanisms to build consent, values, formal and informal rules, which may be understood like the political culture as a complex web of different groups and institutions or process based functional-subcultural aspect of the general political culture. It is also differentiated like a protest culture of blue collar workers, or of established unions, or a culture of mobilizing protest campaigns./

The concept of a "protest market" and "protest culture" is useful to synthesize otherwise differentiated segments of problems related to all actors participating in mobilizing protests on national and international political markets. Meanwhile electoral market and power is highly nation state bound, being kept in the framework of electoral systems, bargaining powers as well as into the national economy- some regionalization tendencies like European unification try transcend both to regional levels- mobilizing capacities and powers have no clear-cut national boundaries. The concept of an international or regional protest organization, as the mostly well known example nowadays the Greenpeace, in the 19th century may be the Socialist International is much more acceptable for the present day political cultures, than an international party or trade union. Trends of protest could be international, global and regional, with rather direct linkages between protest organizations beyond states. Cross national party and union boundaries are also there, but their markets and market based powers are much more bound to national politics and economy than protest movements or other challenging groups.

Flexibility of protest mobilization is opening up opportunities for internationalization for protest campaigns, especially for their Europeanization, in East Central Europe, where lively interests of all governments and most of the actors of civil society is oriented towards the Europeanization process, - the way what the GDR has done by the reunification, on especial and unique way, - the mobilization of conflict on the European level has already started in this region. Western parties, churches, unions, NGOs act with and react on their possible cooperation and conflict partners in former Communist countries, giving help, know how for them, and looking for constituencies and new fields of activities, and there is a feedback from former Communist countries actors too. Eastern countries are nowadays embedded into the West-European hemisphere. Globalization going through regionalization happens via Europeanization in East Central Europe, and this effects protest politics already now, and it will affect more and more in the future.

In the context of our survey we understand **collective action**<sup>39</sup> as an action undertaken at least by three people. Extreme acts of self-immolation, hunger strikes, or acts of terror carried out by

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<sup>39</sup> These analytical concepts have been worked out in the instructions by Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik for the project "Strategies of Collective Protest in Democratizing Societies", This was a survey carried out through 1989-1994 (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, German Democratic Republic) based upon three dailies

individuals as a form of political protest, have also been counted as "collective acts" because of their rarity and political consequences.

A **collective public event** is an act of protest undertaken in order to articulate certain specific demands and which is not a routine or legally prescribed form of behavior whose form deviates from the routinely accepted way of voicing demands. Certain kinds of action, which are constitutionally or legally guaranteed -- such as strikes, rallies or demonstrations -- will be considered as protest actions because of their radical and disruptive nature.

**Demands** are articulated when the participants turn to institutions, organizations and enterprises, both public and private, in order to realize their demands. Protest groups mobilize resources in different and differentiated organizational forms.

Protest events may be formed in different ways and in this respect a typology can be constructed. A **single protest event** may include the activity of several separate groups or organizations. A **protest campaign** is a series of events which are planned in advance and organized by one coordinating body. A **series of protests** comprises a number of different protests which articulate the same or similar demands and take place more or less simultaneously in different places. Forms of protest can be differentiated according to thresholds which can be measured: **violent-non-violent; disruptive to public order and not disruptive to public order; legal and illegal**. **Protest culture** is a specific aspect of political culture related to forms, issues and contexts of political protest which may be identified as attributes of the protest actions of a collective actor. A protest culture may be analyzed on respective national, supranational and subnational levels, or in a combination of the three. Thus we may look for "Central European", and "Hungarian" protest cultures, or for "elite", "urban", or "white collar" protest cultures in the context of a national protest culture. In this study individual protests and mobilizations, as well as their contextual interpretation, have been carried out at the level of national political systems. This has been combined with the assumption that there are some regional characteristics which are common to all the post-communist democracies of ECE.

The new characteristics of political protest under post-communism are that public mobilization and protest are legally and constitutionally regulated and accepted by the new elites and the civil society. Beyond the framework of legal protests, demands for civil disobedience have been articulated by different protest groups. Violent and illegal forms of political protest are rare in ECE and violent conflicts with the police during demonstrations have been marginal.

For the purpose of this research, forms of protest were coded according to the following scheme, and the main thresholds have been distinguished as follows<sup>40</sup>; violent / non-violent action, and disruption or non-disruption of public order, legal or illegal protests. We assume, in case of post communist democracies, on the one hand, that the occurrence of violent and disruptive protests are indicators for a radical protest culture in a society or in a group, and it is less conducive for a consolidated democracy. On the other hand, the dominance of non-violence and non-disruptiveness, the

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and two weeklies. I used the questionnaire and the instructions of this project to cover PE in Hungary and Christiane Lemke for the GDR, searching on weekly and daily newspapers.

<sup>40</sup> The typology is based on the questionnaire worked out by Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik for the East Central European survey on protest politics mentioned above.

"institutionalized" character of the protest actions in a society or group can be seen as part of a reformist strategy with an institutional orientation, supporting democratic consolidation in ECE countries.

## 2.2. Sources of analysis

The empirical study of collective protest was based upon newspaper records in Hungary between 1th of January 1989 and 1th of July 1994. The time span of the research was set according the criteria of the free press, and of the governmental period of the first free elected government(1990-1994 July). The research on the German Democratic Republic was working with the same questionnaire as the Hungarian, with some modifications, and in the same period of time 1989-1994. Two West German daily newspapers Berliner Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung and two West German weekly magazines, Der Spiegel und die Wochenpost were used. For the special year 1989 Umweltblätter, a bulletin of the environmental and citizen's movements in East –Berlin, and the Tageszeitung a daily published in West Berlin were used<sup>41</sup>. The East German database consists of 1435 protest events, the Hungarian 743 from 1989-1994. Press organs in Hungary were three national daily newspapers(Népszabadság, Magyar Nemzet, Magyar Hirlap) and two weeklies(Heti Világgazdaság, 168 óra)<sup>42</sup>. The selection of the newspaper used is based upon their "nationwide" distribution and reporting, their relevance on the press market, and the political orientation which should cover the main "camps" of the emerging political field. Special problems in Hungary are to be mentioned related to the centralized character of Hungarian news agency and press structure, oriented toward the huge capital of the small country, Budapest, with approx. two million of the ten million inhabitants of the country. Local papers are mainly using material of the Budapest based Hungarian News Agency, and do not provide their own news network. Local press is still in the shadow of the Budapest centred national one, which is based on the centralized economic, social and cultural structure of the country. Nowadays, local supplements are included by some of the national dailies.

Despite of their shrinking production of copies, a general trend over all newspapers in Hungary, the three dailies may be called as the "national", or "prestige" papers. "Népszabadság", the newspaper with the most of the copies sold is the former daily of the Communist party. It was privatized, and this way separated from the Socialist Party, but still following its Social-Democratic, Social-Liberal orientation.

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<sup>41</sup> Christiane Lemke wrote many unpublished reports and documents for the research, some of them I will refer too. Published reports on the East German part of the project:

Christiane Lemke: Nachholende Mobilisierung. Demokratisierung und politischer Protest in postkommunistischen Gesellschaften, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B5/97. 29-37.

Christiane Lemke: Protestverhalten in Transformationsgesellschaften, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1997/1. Vol.38. 50-79. Further references on East German data goes to these publications and papers.

<sup>42</sup> I published some results of the Hungarian part of the project, and wrote many unpublished papers about references on Hungarian PE data relate to these publications and data further:

Máté Szabó: Politischer Protest im postkommunistischen Ungarn 1989-1994, in: Berliner Journal für Soziologie 4/1996 Vol. 6. 501-517; Máté Szabó: Parteien und Organisationen als Trägergruppen politischer Proteste, in: Anton Sterbling/Heinz Zipprian(Hrsg.): Max Weber und Osteuropa, Krämer Verlag, Hamburg. 1997.243-267; Máté Szabó: Political Protest in Hungary, in: Samo Koprivnik/Igor Luksic/Drago zajc(eds.): Conflicts and Consensus: Pluralism and Neocorporatism in the New and Old democracies. Ljubljana: SPSA.1997.55-77.; Máté Szabó: Was there a Change in the Protest Culture? In: Új rendészeti tanulmányok 1996/2. 231-252. Reports of the participants in the Hungarian research and the full text of the questionnaire used in

"Magyar Hírlap" was established in the process of emerging reform of Hungarian Communism to be the separate daily of the government, and this way institutionalizing the autonomy of the government towards the Communist party. The daily which had a rather "neutral" character during the Communist times became a critical Liberal and Socialist coloured daily in the process of regime change. It was privatized and sold to Maxwell, and now owned by a Swiss proprietor.

"Magyar Hírlap" is ranked as first in reporting protest events in the investigated period, followed by "Népszabadság". "Magyar Nemzet" was during the Communist time the daily which preserved reminiscences of "civil" and "national" character due to its traditions being an organ of the Anti-Fascist "People's front" in the forties. The national and conservative tradition emerged as a boundary to the in 1990 Christian-Democratic, by Prime Minister József Antall-led government, so the former, in the Communist time mostly independent and "semi"-critical daily became a partisan of the first government, and lost its critical attitude towards it. This happened through a drastic fall of its number of copies sold and with harsh internal conflicts becoming even subjects of pamphlets and books on the crisis of the former prestigious newspaper.

The criteria of being published constantly during the whole period excluded many shorter living or recently established political dailies from the Christian or National camps being included in the survey. However, the main political camps, or "pillars" of post-communist Hungary the Social-democrats, or Socialists, the Christian-Democrats, and the Liberals are represented by the three dailies.

The case of weeklies is more complicated. In Hungary, no trade union or peasants organization has a politically coloured weekly paper on the quality level to be included in our study. Unlike other post-communist countries, they are either very internally oriented, or totally dependent on the central news agency with a low profile of journalism.

There were some interesting weeklies established in the times of regime change, but rather culturally oriented, and not published throughout the whole period. The chosen "Heti Világgazdaság", HVG is founded related to the economic reforms of the sixties and seventies in Hungary and it is focussing on rather "neutral" economic information. During the period of change it broadened the spectrum of objects including culture and politics, but preserving the dominance of economic and fiscal fields. The layout and editing is following the pattern of the German "Spiegel", but with clear-cut economic profile. Political neutrality is strived for, it gives rather background information to domestic and international events, than news of its own.

"168 óra" has a quite peculiar character bound to the conflicts on the public law character of Hungarian mass media. The title "168 hours" relate to a popular "public" programme of the Hungarian broadcast giving more or less critical analysis of the political processes within the limits of Communist censorship. Since democratic transformation, the programme became one of the focal points of public discourse, and the editorial team decided to publish the materials, interviews, reports, etc. of the popular broadcasting programme as a weekly journal with the same title. The weekly journal became a flourishing enterprise, but in the process of "media war", the Christian democratic government pushed the Hungarian Broadcast to close or transform the critical programme. First the publication of the broadcasted programmes were prohibited by law, then the editorial team pushed out from the broadcast,

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Hungary are to be found in: Új rendészeti tanulmányok 1996/2. Special Issue: Mobilization and Policing of Protest

and the title of programme changed. So the weekly had to publish materials different from the broadcasted programme. This way one of the pioneering organ of the democratization become under the pressure of the first free elected government because of its according government "one sided" - meaning Social and Liberal- criticism ,but survived as an independent weekly edited separately from the dissolved broadcasted programme and further edited by the original broadcasting team.

The weekly journals , did not contributed much to our analysis. In the first period , in 1989 they brought sometimes real "news" , so protests were reported almost as in the dailies, latter there were only rather background materials, especially interviews with protesters published.

The purpose of this study was to register information reported in the public record about collective protest events which took place in Hungary and in East Germany ,to record frequency of protest, methods of protest actions and the organizations mobilizing them. Protest events are coded as such, if carried out at least three persons, publicly, and at least one of the following is available from the sources;

- the date the protest began or ended
- the form of protest(i.e.strike,demonstration)
- organizers and/or participants of protest
- demands and /or postulates put forth by the protesters.

To analyze political protest based on the press records,of course is only one of the possible methodological options to the research. It is useful for identifying general trends of protest behaviour, frequencies of forms of action,and reconstructing cycles of protest .But other aspects of protest are not treated adequately by press : the outcomes of the protest,preparation for the action, strategic and organizational realm of protest groups. Of course, press is oriented towards news value, and do not intend to give a comprehensive view on political protests and social movements.Lot of events and processes, irrelevant for the press may be highly relevant for our research interests.

In what extent are newspaper data useful to draw upon trends and profiles of the collective protest in post-communist societies?We may not consider , that all type of protests gets its press documentation. And if yes, we would not be able to produce a full sample of all relevant press reports,only in case of narrower space and time limits . But longer time series and cross sectional analyses of protest what we intend to do in the period of five and a half a year, must be based necessary on limited sources, even in case of such small country, as Hungary. Analysis of political protest based on newspaper record is one of the many sources and methods to be used in the research. But this is a new field in Hungary and in all of the post-communist countries, because it is conditioned by the existence of a free press, and a press market based on news values. These conditions started in former Communist countries with 1989, but up till now, we may not consider East European press likely to the one of the Western democracies.Traditions of state owned monopoly, political manipulation, and the generations of journalists socialized under these conditions still in job, plus new conflicts on the control of mass media,



which dominated the time of post-communism in Hungary have its effects on the newspaper records as source of analysis.

**a./Centralized press versus local protest event.** First, how far the investigated central, nationwide newspapers are adequate sources for events and happenings outside the capital, Budapest and Berlin especially if they are not having a national political relevance? We collected in Hungary the protest related to Miskolc, the third biggest town of Hungary with lot of industrial and ethnic conflicts because of the heavy industry and mining in crisis, and the high percent of Roma population, and the analysis of national press gave us no more than 14 PE, about 1,6-2% of the protests in each particular year. Being a visiting professor in the Miskolc University, Department of Political Science, I let my students working the relevant volumes of the local newspapers through and in the time span of 1989-1994 first semester about 200 PE has been documented, which include more than hundred for the town Miskolc and the remains for territory of the Borsod county governed from there<sup>43</sup>. This local newspaper data is not yet systematically interpreted, so I can not tell you in the moment exactly the difference of the number of protests between local and national press, but I estimate about 140 PE happening in the town itself, so cca. ten times as much protests was found in the local papers compared to the national ones. But even if the difference will be turn out smaller under a more careful look, there will be a substantial loss in reporting "local"- the third biggest town of the country- protest events in the highly centralized Hungarian press. Meaning that the difference will be the same or even bigger for smaller local towns and regions, we may assume that the bulk of local protest is not included in our sample, except if they have some message and meaning for general, nation-wide or central processes and discourses. But even in case that there is a nation-wide campaign, the number of localities participating we will never find out from the central news organs, which are preoccupied with happenings in the capital, and do not list similar local tendencies. So relevant aspects of the local protests, and generally of sociogeographical distribution could have been drawn only upon the research of local newspapers.

**b./Organizational versus public records.** There are different "sectors" of the protest where the existence of relevant public or private archives may be assumed. Trade-unions, parties, interest organizations, or ministries, police, self-governments or other state organs may collect informations on protest events relevant from the point of view of their interests and functions. The multiplicity of all these sources will be never catch by a sole project. In my case, I have been working with the Robert Schumann Centre, Florence/Italy on a project on "Policing Mass Demonstrations in Europe" in 1995 and I got the chance to compare the results of our research in Hungary on the number of demonstrations, and police interventions, e. g. sanctions used by the police related to demonstrations with the archive data of Hungarian Police. If we compare both of the number of demonstrations and of the actions, like arrests

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<sup>43</sup> Publications on the Borsod county-Miskolc town PE research in Hungarian: Szabó Máté: Védekező helyi társadalom, in: Jel-Kép 1997/3. 57-79. Kárpáti Zoltán(szerk.): Társadalmi és területi folyamatok az 1990-es évek Magyarországon, MTA TKKK: Budapest. 1997. 245-273. Similar results on local PE media coverage are interpreted in the studies of Fillieule on Marseille and Paris, and of Hocke on German localities referred latter.

etc. carried out at demonstrations, than the picture drawn by the research in France<sup>44</sup> and Germany<sup>45</sup> is valid in Hungary too<sup>46</sup>; a substantial circle of police actions will be never reported in the press, because not having news value for the public, but it is carefully documented by the police because of their in Hungary rather strict rules of reporting. The quality of the action can not be grasped based upon the police reports using the neutral- administrative language of reporting on "police action"(intézkedés) which may be a warning or a use of penalty too. Generally, the multiplicity of such organizational data sets should be used as complementary to the newspaper records, to be able to document the quantities and profiles of public collective actions. Newspapers based upon the news markets demands are not invented for the purpose of recording on public protest, so we should only depend on them as one of the sources of our investigations.

What newspaper records are then for? - may we ask looking upon all this missing data, and in some respect richer complementary data sets. Why do we spent so much time with this project at all, if we knew that the "reality" of the protest culture will be never captured by three or more national newspapers? My answer is based upon the same character of the press which I have got criticized and to be supplemented to. Newspapers have a homogeneity in their perspective, which is based upon their projected customers, of the "public" view. Political relevance, relevance for the general social, political discourses are looked for reporting on protest events. Does it help a lot, if we knew how many demonstrations have happened in the "reality" of let say 1990 Hungary and in the German Democratic Republic in all localities with or without police presence? The relevance of the event is made by the press, reality is constructed by sociopolitical institutions and discourses. Especially for the reasons of international comparisons, the perspective of the national press organs selected upon the same principles and investigated with more or less the same questionnaire have a great relevance. We should not hunt the "myth of the complete picture" what we never get, but looking upon the political reality constructed by the news media, which is the reality shared by the relevant internal and external political actors. Limitations of our sources, the selectivity of the newspapers while reporting on protests provide us with the homogeneous perspective of perception from the point of view of the relevant public. Newspapers are important but incomplete sources of study, and we have to search to find complementary and supplementary sources of analysis beyond the press to document and interpret the protest culture of a political community in a period of time.

### **2.3. Trends of Protest in Hungary and in the GDR**

The regime transformation in Hungary went on through bargaining of the old and new elites, by their agreements at the round table upon the rules of the power shifts, and this process occur under a challenge and pressure of popular protest upon the bargaining. The further mobilization dynamics of the changes were not fastened and sharpened by state-building, eg. separation from a federation like in

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<sup>44</sup> Fillieule, Olivier: Policing Demonstrations in France, in: Új Rendészeti Tanulmányok 1996/2. 16-43.

<sup>45</sup> Hocke Peter: Massenmedien und lokaler Protest, in: Forschungsjournal neue Soziale Bewegungen 1996/1. Vol.9.91-94.

Slovakia, or reunification as in the GDR. The gradual economic restructuring and the absence of industrial conflicts in the Communist time plus the early institutionalization of tripartism, of corporate bargaining between employees, employer and the state resulted in -compared to Poland but to the GDR too -lower level of strike activism. However, civic activism was and is an important element of the new political culture, and without popular mobilizations the changes could have bear different profile .

### The Number and Incidence of Protest Actions

In the Hungarian case mobilization dynamics got its peak in the beginning of democratization 1989, and in 1993 with a relatively higher number , and then a diminishing trend is stated in the first semester of 1994, approaching the campaign of the second national elections in Hungary. In the GDR , where in 1989 there is quite harsh repression, and the mass emigrations forced the Communist government with the homegrown protest to concessions, the 1989 protest dynamics is much lower than the Hungarian one, where in 1989 already clearly regulated relationships of police and demonstrators werer established through the 1989 laws for association and assembling freedoms. In 1990, the dynamics of GDR protests is going on, meanwhile in Hungary the focus is on the first free elections in the Spring time, so a lower level of protest is to be documented based upon newspaper event analysis. The coming of first free elections in 1990 show themselves in a diminishing trend of protest in the Spring and Summer of 1990 in Hungary . The establishment of the new government , and the biggest protest event of Hungary , a very successful taxi driver blockade in Autumn 1990 support the upward protest dynamics of 1992-93 . In 1992-1993, the conflict upon the public control of mass media support an upward dynamics in the number of protests again, when the Christian-democratic government and the parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition fight their battles both in and outside the parliament. The first semester of 1994 is dominated by the coming of the second elections, and protest diminish because of the slow "delegitimation" of the main target, of the former government.

Figure 1.

Especially the changing of the political opportunities, the institutionalization of democratic power structures and human rights, and the crucially important parliamentary and self-government elections-held in Hungary in the same semester by law-influence the dynamics of protest considerably. Special conflicts, especially if they crystallize among institutionalized actors like government and parliamentary/extraparliamentary opposition may play a dynamic and for the whole of the protest culture initiating role, as the effects of so called "media war" between government and opposition in 1993 has shown. In the GDR after the dissolution of the repressive Communist regime in Autumn 1989, the dynamics of protest is raising higher, than in Hungary, probably partly due to the „protest culture» of the Federal Republic, which is known to the East Germans by newspaper and media, and the other hand by the many sociocultural ties are bound now between east and West Germans on a rapid way. Among them there are relevant ties established between parties, trade unions and NGO's as well, which help to

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<sup>46</sup> Máté Szabó: Police Interventions at Protest Events in the Press in Hungary, in: Új rendészeti tanulmányok

establish by personal and material resources and know how their own eastern partners. So a relatively „low profile», suppressed protest culture of the GDR expand higher after the repression is away and Western aid to the development of the civil society will be available. Conflicts of reunification and its economic and social consequences as mass unemployment supported the high waves of protests in 1992-93 in the GDR.

#### Was There a Protest Cycle?

The classical study of Sidney Tarrow (1989) on the protest cycle in Italy in the sixties and the seventies assume the existence of bigger protest cycles , when political opportunities expand, new forms of protest appear, new groups enter the protest politics, more disruptive, or violent forms of protests may emerge and dispersed. In East Central Europe because the polity was just established, everything recently institutionalized, there are no stable opportunities, and the whole of the protest culture is an innovation as such. In the post-communist situation of institutionalization, especially of state-building and democratization/consolidation we may not identify the protest cycle with the characteristics given by Tarrow . Instead of, a relative stability of protest forms and a changing , but slowly more and more established circle of protest organizers may be found in Hungary and in East Germany as well.

Table 1.

On the level of the distribution in strategies of protest there is a low level of violence found, somewhat higher in Germany East as in Hungary. The reason may be in the above mentioned „transfer» of West German protest culture which included also the extension or the revitalization of such violent subcultures as skinheads, anarchists, radical ecologists, and of squatters, Hausbesetzer. The violent trends of some of the Western new social movements reached former GDR by proliferation persons and organizations. In Hungary and in other former Communist countries, such proliferation was not possible at all, or not very likely to happen. East and West Berlin subcultures had a spacial and by social milieus connected communication which not to be imaged between let say Vienna or Budapest subcultures. Another reason may be seen in the problem of the high expectations East Germans have had about the reunification process, which have had to lead to an disillusion. According most of the public opinion polls, Hungarians were the outmost pessimistic nation on the results of the transformation in East Central Europe, so they did not bear high expectations which may have had disillusioned, and frustrated so violence triggering. We may assume, that violent forms deserve the attention of the media, and they come into the newspapers because of their rarity and public relevance if they occur. So the data on the violent protests seems to be quite reliable to me.

Table 2-4.

Except the higher level of violence in Hungary occurring in 1990 due to some incidents related to the first free elections and to the protests and counterprotests related of the huge taxi driver blockade , violent protest are marginal in the examined period. Frequency of non-violent disruption of public order is higher , and the most frequent forms used , the bulk of protest are the ones without disturbing the public order at all. Understanding the absence of the violent protest in Hungary we should consider the absence of bigger, territorial and culturally bound ethnic and marginalized groups , who may have been influenced by the dissolution of a federal state, like in the Soviet Union and in former Yugoslavia. As Samuel P. Huntington stated, the third wave of democratization is less violent than the former ones. The case of Hungary does fit in this interpretation very well.

### The Repertoires of Contentious Action

The number of strikes is higher in the GDR and lower in Hungary . Conversely, the use of strike alert and the threat to carry out strike is higher in Hungary than in the GDR. In order the protesters may calculate in a more stabilized and institutionalized environment with the effects of their demands, and the authorities and management are able to calculate with the "veto power" or "mobilizing power" of the more and more established trade unions and other interest organizations. The diminishing share of strikes to strike alerts show the institutionalization of corporate bargaining in Hungary . Open letters, petitions and other forms of "written" activism, where the protesters do not disturb public order is one of the dominating forms in Hungary but much less present in the GDR . The most frequent violent forms in Hungary , the marginal cases of occupation of public buildings, and the use of violence against management or authorities occur in the beginning of the institutionalization of the democratic rules and norms, between 1989-1991. Latter this forms were not reported by the press, which means a growing institutionalization of the protest and its likelihood being coopted and integrated into a stabilizing, or consolidating democratic order.

Table 2-4.

The role of the demonstration, of the most frequently used non violent, disruptive form in Hungary as well as in the GDR deserve a special look. Their dominance in the Hungarian and German post-communist protest culture may be interpreted based upon the traditions of the Antistalinist uprisings 1953 and of 1956, and due to the relatively high ratio of parties and other political organizations as organizers of protests. Does the demonstration, which "disturb" public order in a way, blocking public space or traffic have a "disruptive" potential, threatening democratic stability in Hungary ? We looked upon the cases of demonstrations, whether police interventions has happened, and in what form, using force, or not. Although we have seen, that police archives are richer in cases, than press organs in Hungary ,but we assume, that a "fat" police action using force has such a news value, and it is so relevant to the press , which is looking upon the political realm to find "cases" to be presented to the public, that it will be reported in one of the press organs studied. Post-communist public is very sensible towards police violence and especially in cases of demonstrations, which have been target of state violence during the times of Communist regimes . The police interventions occur in less than 5% of the

demos, and in 1,48 % was there violence used by police . The distribution of police interventions with and without force by years shows , that in the years 1990 with the taxi driver blockade, and in 1992-1993 with the less spectacular, but intensive "media war" occurred most of the police interventions in the period investigated.

Demonstrations are potentially disruptive forms of protests, but this potential does not actualize in Hungary. However ,in cases of protests and counterprotests occurring in the same place and time, there is a higher probability of clashes among protesters, so police try to avoid them with preventive interventions. From 29 cases of counterprotests from the total sample in 5 cases, 22,7% of all counterprotests were police interventions recorded. Meanwhile only in 3,74% of all protest forms police intervention was found, in cases of violent forms it is 44,4%, at the category of the disruptive forms 5,5% and only 1,7% at the category of events based upon non-disruptive protest forms. The bulk of police interventions is oriented towards the whatever , but violent forms, not very numerous cases, as shown, and the disruptive and non-disruptive forms does not challenge police intervention very much in Hungary. The same trends can be found, if we study the correlation of legality and illegality and the occurrence of police interventions at protests. There is police intervention in 1,4% of the legal protest forms, but we found police intervention into 15,3% of illegal protests. So police intervention is oriented towards violent and illegal protests, and even more frequently, if counterprotests occur in the same place and time. In cases of the disruptive, but legal and non-violent demonstrations police forces may be present, which is not reported as such in the newspapers, but they did not act a way which is perceived by the newspapers as having "news value" for the public . So demonstrations may be frequent in Hungary, than in other countries of the sample, but it does not support the level of the violence by the protesters and the authorities.

Our findings on the relation of the character of protest and of police intervention may be interpreted that way, that Hungarian police seems to be fit into the framework of a neutral peace and order maintaining function at the public space. This is an important achievement in a post-communist country, where police forces in 1988 still dissolved opposition gatherings on the street if they lacked the consent of the party elite, and used force even against leading figures of the "opposition". Hungarian police had no proper legal control on its activities before the regime changed, and it was an obedient tool of the party state, so from whatever reason, but its functioning as an important institution maintaining democratic law and order is as basic for a democratic protest culture as the relative non-violence and non-disruptiveness of the protests. Imagine, if we would find a low level of violence of the protesters but in the same time a higher percentage of authorities intervention , and especially if this does not occur exactly in cases of violent and illegal protests - its meaning would be certainly overshadow the findings on non-violent protesting in Hungary . So far low level of "civic" violence and disruptiveness is parallel with a low level of authorities interventions, which are mainly directed towards violent and illegal protests, a considerable level of tolerance and consent among rulers and ruled may be assumed to be present in the protest culture. As far non-violent protest do not provoke authorities violent or other type of interventions, as our research findings has been shown,there will be no reason, to fear from the "vicious circle" of violence and aggression subsequent present even in the protest cultures of some of the leading Western democracies.

Table 5.

The legal protest forms used is constantly making the bulk of the protest in Hungary in the investigated period. Illegality peaks about 10 % of the protests in the particular years in 1989 and 1991, when rules were still in making e.g. in the second case the number of protests raised dramatically. The percentage of illegality dropped dramatically with the stabilization of the legal frames and political opportunities from 1992 on. The calculability of legal and political environment and of political reaction probably is making the "testing" of breaking the rules less promising for the protesters, and on the other hand the authorities strategy as found in case of the Hungarian police was to be developed towards a more flexible type, tolerating lesser violation of norms on demonstrations and in other protests without using the possibilities of sanctioning to avoid bigger conflicts with protesters. The cases where "unclear" legal situation occurred vary from 1,6% in 1991 to 5,4% in 1993 of the protest events by year, so their amount may be seen as marginal. The data on legality show that the processes of consolidating the new norms and institutions reached the point of a satisfactory regulation for the most cases of the contention and conflict, and there was a maximum 10% of illegal protest stabilized per year.

East German data based upon the same methodology are not available from the same period of time, but I assume that the percentage of legal protests in Hungary should be same or even higher compared to them, not having "homegrown" terrorism as in most of the Western democracies, at least in certain periods, and the absence of the protest potential of "aggressive" new social movements, anarchists, autonomous, squatters, radical environmentalists, feminists and other radicals is minor compared to the Western welfare societies where waves of aggressive mobilizations occur with some frequencies since the sixties.

Table 6. Figure 2.

Not to build a "rosy" picture on the legality, and non-violence of Hungarian society, we should mention three groups of aggressive, disruptive and sometimes violent actions provoking police intervention too, which are present both in East Germany and in Hungary. The first element is the racist street fighting of the skinheads against Roma, or against foreign people with "different skin colours". There are many cases reported by police and human rights organizations especially from the years 1991-1993 both in Hungary and in East Germany as well. But if these clashes are not bound with publicly articulated demands, then we do not code them as protests. Skinhead demonstrations and rallies are coded, if there are organizers known and demands articulated.

Secondly, the absence of "homegrown" political violence in Hungary, is in our global world system no security against presumably "imported" terrorist actions which were carried out also in Hungary for example by presumably Islam organizations, and groups against Jewish migrants or clerks of Jewish institutions. Third, foreigners of other states, residing temporarily in Hungary as visitors or guest workers, or sometimes even without identity cards captured in special refugee stations, or being "victims" of Hungarian custom or border control are likely to commit hunger strikes, demolish property, refusing carrying out authorities orders, building up blockades or using violence against Hungarian authorities. We do not code these cases as protests. From the point of view of keeping public order they

are relevant cases, always involving police or special forces. Their number may have slightly grown recently in the reunified Germany too, but because they are committed by "tourists", or "refugees" or in cases of terrorist acts by subjects not identified, and publicly relevant demands were not articulated, we do not include them in the survey. However, if internationalization of conflicts is looked upon, and the challenge to the authorities keeping public order, these cases, carried out on German or on Hungarian territory or on the border, are practically parts of the subsequent protest culture continuum. Not to be misunderstood, protest events with identified foreign, e. g. non-Hungarian citizen actors, like of an organization of Palestinian students or of the association of foreign students in Budapest, the Martin Luther King association were coded and included in the sample as far as publicly articulated demands were involved. In these cases of "established foreigners" or established skinheads there were no higher level of violence. The unorganized, spontaneous protest of refugees, or foreign truck drivers not involving public goals, but simply rejecting orders of Hungarian authorities, and the secretly committed terrorist actions, where no organizer or demand were articulated were not coded in the survey, neither simple racist street fighting. All these phenomena's are extremely important for a comprehensive study of political and/or criminal violence in Hungary and in Germany, but they do not belong into the category of protest defined by our research project.

#### **2.4. Organizing for Protest**

The long term tendency of protest in postcommunist Hungary is the growth of organized PE percentage. The unorganized events proportion is almost constantly diminishing. This shows the consolidation of the democratic institutions, the development towards a rather stabilized and differentiated political field, where parties, unions, and civic organizations find their constituencies and political space. Within the organized PE, the share of political parties is diminishing from 1989 to 1993 in Hungary, and in the first semester of 1994, approaching the second electoral campaign, there is a revitalization tendency of party-organized PE. The preparation of the elections generally slows down the protest, but the remaining protest is more politicized, than in the previous years. Unions and other employer-employee organizations have a rather stable and growing position at the post-communist protest market of the GDR and of Hungary about 20%. The share of movements and other civic organizations - understood here as all type of organizations beyond parties and unions-on the protest market is constantly growing and it reached a higher level in the GDR than in Hungary.

Table 7-8.

So the general trends are the ;

- the rather stable number of PE diminishing before elections,
- growing organized protest,
- a "protest market" dominated by unions and civic organizations,
- a diminishing share of parties in parliament in the protest market, somewhat growing before elections.



The participation of peasants organization is higher in the GDR, but generally, the marginal role of peasants organizations have to be emphasized here, under 5% in both countries despite of the rural-agrarian tradition in Hungary which seems to be broken by the "socialist" industrialization and collectivization. In Hungary and in the GDR, unlike Poland, the agrarian property has been collectivized in large extent, peasants were forced in Hungary after 1956 again in the collective cooperative farms, they could just held a small amount of soil for their own production. This makes a difference to Poland, where private farming was tolerated by Communism so peasant are above 5% with their prganizational presence in Polish protest. If we consider it together with the very marginal role of the Catholic or other Church in organizing protest events in Hungary - altogether 22 PE in the whole period investigated, 5 from the Catholic all other from other churches-, we do not find here the according the literature on Polands social mobilizations so very crucial role of the Catholic Church. Catholic Church and private farmers as basics for independent resources against the Communist system were not present in Hungary (Misztal/Jenkins). In the GDR we do not have exact data, but qualitative literature and testimonies all document an important role of the Lutheran reformed Church in the beginning of the protest in 1989, which latter diminished, as protest become legalized and ritualized form of political action.

In Hungary, the role of the political parties and of other political organizations may be scored relatively higher than in the GDR, and trade unions and interest organizations are also somewhat more important compared to that country. The specific protest method of the trade unions and other interest organizations to articulate their economic and social demands is the strike, is institutionalized by law in Hungary and latter in the GDR too. Since then, trade unions and strike committees dominate the strike field, and chambers, other professional organizations play some, but rather marginal role in organizing strikes.

The role of the "other civic organizations", social movements, associations and churches is very important in the protest culture of both countries. They give the main bulk of protest organizers in the GDR. They are mushrooming in the period after the Communist collapse. In case of parties, the "Gründungsfieber" (the fever to establishing, a German formula) is there only just before the first elections. The establishment of new organizations is also a steady trend in the investigated period 1989-1990.

We use as an external source the one of the Statistical Office to illustrate the tendencies of organizational dynamics in Hungary. The trend of the growing number of the subjects in the infrastructure, webs, networks of civic organizations seems to be constant and overwhelming in the period, and this fact is reflected in the high number of protest organizers from this growing civic organizations sphere.

Table 9. Fig. 3.

If we put extraparliamentary parties, churches, associations, foundations, all type of union and interest representation organs into the category of civic organization, and look upon their role in protest as participant and initiator, then this aggregated data of all civic, extraparliamentary organizations

participation within protest is much bigger than of the one of the within the parliament represented political parties in both countries. This would not change, even if the extraparliamentary parties protest participation is added to the parliamentary parties. Looking upon the initiative of civic organizations and parties initiating protest events in Hungary the picture is more balanced, which imply that it is quite typical that parties and other, civic organizations participate together in protest events indicated by one of the categories. Similar trends were stressed by Christiane Lemke on East Germany about the bigger mobilization campaign periods.

Within this broad category of civic organizations we may differentiate some typical roles, with different intensities of interest in protest organization and participation. Unions and other interest organs looked upon above have a regular, institutionalized and ritualized form of protest activity, mainly in the legalized form of strike embedded in the process of bargaining for social and economic issues. Formal, but not union-like organizations with social and political goals may depend on mobilization of protest more than unions and other corporate organs, because they do not have a legally secured role in tripartism and strikes, so they may depend upon to maintain and articulating the interest of their constituencies in differentiated and loosely institutionalized, sometimes even not fully legalized protest forms.

Our first thesis is about the likeliness of the organizers, that as far an actor do not bear institutionalized and legalized role in the decision-making processes, and a more or less clear-cut profile of constituency supporting it, the more it has to be dependent on the processes of mobilizing protest from flexible and changing constituencies, the public. So informal groups, less formalized and coopted actors of different associations or other organizations will be more dependent on and active in the protest than formalized, powerful actors. However, there is a counterbalancing tendency to the relevance of this thesis, - which should be more carefully tested in our databasis, - namely, that the less formalized actors may be more dependent on the resource of protest, but even because of their scarce resources they are less stable actors, than the established powerholders. This imply, that longer established actors, being less dependent on protest will be found to be more frequently recorded, because they maintain their limited, but existing interest in protest politics for a longer period of time, than the actors with less stable resources of power, who may have interested in the white hot mobilization of protest to collect power by the resource mobilization process, but because their failure, they are not stable, so become marginalized or disappear even from the protest politics. This latter trend may be even strengthened by the newspapers and the mass media type of perception on the organizers. They have a tendency to focus on the known and stable, powerful actors, and to neglect the least stable, and less powerful challengers. But there is a contrary trend to, in terms of news values sometimes newcomers have some benefits, especially marginalized, and interesting types, like homosexuals, feminists, foreigners, poor people, so they come in the news despite of their powerlessness.

In case of post communist politics we are not having longer term trends for anything yet, but we are already able to identifying some tendencies of stabilization and consolidation or of destabilization and delegitimation in the organizational field of politics. So in case of Hungary and the former GDR, the share of all civic, extraparliamentary actors as a sector of civic organizations become stabilized on the protest market, where the trade unions and corporate organs have a limited but quite established role, churches a marginal one, because of their rather stable position, and all other formal and informal

organizations give the colourful bulk and basis of protest politics, without established monopolists or oligopolists on the field. The share of social movements generally is not easy to be defined to, being institutionalized in so many ways as associations, foundations, initiatives, umbrella organizations. However, new social movements alike phenomena's as environmentalists, feminists, peace activists play a certain role which should be analyzed , but its role seems to be in any case more modest in Hungarian protest politics, than in the former GDR, where more radical and spontaneous social movements are mobilized with the support of the West German „scene».

## **2.5 Cleavages - interpretative frames for the issues of protest?**

S.M.Lipset and S. Rokkan outlined their theory of "cleavages" in context of modernization process of Western societies and its linkages to the development of party systems . New developments of cleavages and party system has been described and conceptualized latter by Arend Lijphart and Ronald Inglehart. Recently there are discussions about, how to analyze post-communist party systems and their specific cleavages based upon the theories of Western scholarship.

We try to make use the conceptualization of cleavages by Lipset/Rokkan and their successors at the following,to analyze and classify underlying conflicts of mobilization for political protest in post-communist Hungary and the GDR, based upon the date about the mobilized social groups and the types of demands.

### Employer-employee cleavage

This is frequently present in socioeconomic protests, in strikes, strike alerts etc. Based upon the still etatist and centralized character of post-communist economy-largely diminished during the years since 1989, but still dominant-the employer in many cases is still directly the state, or governmental agencies.So in many time direct action is oriented against specific management, but ultimate goal of the protesters is to influence governmental policies.State sector and the service are the dominant positions among the professional background of protesters, especially in Hungary.Privatization and restitution went on in the GDR faster, than in Hungary, so the mobilization within the state sector was reduced drastically in scope by this fast process.

Table 10-11.

### Cleavage between state and church,secularized versus religious subcultures,different religious subcultures

Churches has been marginally involved in direct protest actions in Hungary . The frequency was low in the years of study/1989,2 PE;1990,2 PE;1991,2 PE, 992 7PE, 1993 8PE, 1994 1PE/. But the qualitative relevance,the public transparency and the magnitude of these type of protest has been higher in 1992/7 PE/-1993/8 PE/, when Christian government marginalized some of the new churches looked upon by the

Christian parties as "extreme" religious groups (like Krishna and scientology), and provoked their protests with demonstrations, gatherings, petitions, legal acts and symbolic actions against the policy of the government. In 1994 with the change of the government and its rather secularized policy this protest potential seems to be diminished. But the cleavage has been embedded in the conflicts on mass media, public education, and restitution of church propriety and these issues will remain on the public discourse agenda, shifting the bulk of religious protesters to the established churches. In the GDR Church participation in protest from Lutheran church was very high, than diminished and stabilized. Lutheran Church played a role of umbrella for GDR protest against the Communist state which is over in the period of institutionalization.

#### State-building majority-"periphery" of ethnic and local minorities, ethnic cleavage

The relatively homogeneous ethnic composition of postwar Hungary and of Eastern Germany do not facilitate this cleavage as main mobilizing force comparing these countries with East Central European nations with large, territorial based ethnic groupings. There has been longer lasting legal and political disputes and protests in Hungary were related to the law on minorities, which has been settled in 1993, and implemented in 1995 by the election of minority self-governments. These developments institutionalized the conflict and protest, and as on the general political scene, elections channelled political activity most of the minorities.

But of course, the cleavage did not diminish totally. Peak point of protests in Hungary was based on it has been the demonstration of Gipsy and Roma organizations and groups against racist motivated violence, which happened in 1993, and 1994 too. The demonstrations are part of a minor, but politically not unimportant series this kind of protest events in the last years. They have their counterpart in the racist skinhead violence, which does not always fits in our concept of protest lacking of public character and demand, so not included in the sample, but being important; according the Martin Luther King association there were 120 racist attacks in 1991-1992, 13 in 1993, 16 in 1994. (see Table 6. Fig. 2.)

Demands related to Hungarian minorities abroad plays a stable role in protest politics in Hungary. These demands are mainly addressed towards the government or elite of countries like Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia and Ukraine, where problems with the self-government, autonomy and rights of Hungarian minorities occur, according the perception of Hungarian public, or of relevant parts of it, especially within the Christian democratic camp. This linkage or cleavage opens the Hungarian protest culture up to the neighbouring states, as the conflict on the Danube dam with Czechoslovakia and latter with Slovakia, where the protest actions are addressed outward, since the Hungarian government suspended the project in 1989.

Table 12-14.

In the GDR the reunification is an important state building- cleavage, and plays an important role in the years 1989-1990 but disappear latter. On the contrary, after reunification when the problem of asylum-seekers comes from the West Germany to the East, where people are less accommodated with the presence of the mass of asylum-seekers from Eastern Europe and from non-European cultures, and a

strong East European migration start, the issue is one of the most important in the protest dynamics 1992-1994. East Germany does not have bigger territorial based minorities, but a big , or growing and multicultural asylum population, which provoke sometimes strongly violent and aggressive protest from 1990-1994 with growing presence. On the other hand, civil right devoted anti-racist counterprotest is very strong too against racism is a rising field within East German protest culture. State building and minorities are addressed in the East German protest culture much stronger, than in the Hungarian one.

#### Urban/industrial-rural/agrarian cleavage

The mass demonstrations and rallies of agrarian interest groups have their traditions in the protest culture of the postcommunist Hungarian democracy . But in this years after 1989 , farmers, or agrarian employees had just some rather smaller scale,local, or regional, and only 2-3 bigger, national protest actions.May be the activity of some "agrarian" oriented political groupings in the parliament -with humble success the "Agrarian Alliance";, but with some better performance of the Torgyan led Smallholders -raised higher thresholds for protests of "agrarian" interests . In East Germany agrarian protest did not raise much except the year 1990. (see Tables 10-11.)

#### Industrial-post-industrial cleavage

Two categories are to be identified by the tendencies of this years as sources for most of the protests of its specific cleavage in Hungary and in the GDR . These are by the so called "socialist industrialization" overdeveloped heavy industry and mining at the subsequent regions of the two countries, and the employees of the by "socialist centralization and interventionism" extended public sectors(social, educational, health,cultural state functions).The protests on these fields were present during the years in all of the categories of employee organizations, as unions, chambers, associations, and non formalized groups too.Their protests are there in all semesters, so their mobilizations dynamics is not influenced by the electoral politics.Most transparent mobilizations have been strikes, demonstrations, petitioning and threats with this types of protest actions articulated against the Christian governments.

How to interpret the persistence and magnitude of these types of protests?

a./The cleavages of former industrial centres and of public service are are deeply embedded in the restructuration process of the post-communist economy and society. The former privileged strata's and institutions,factories etc. are victims of marketization, privatisation and rationalization processes going on with the sociocultural transformations.The personal of these areas and branches is a structural "looser" of transformations, who can not be fully and collectively compensated by public expenditures.

b./But there are other "losers" of transformation, who do not appear as frequently at the protest records with their voice. Why exactly the workers of the industrial sites and the broad category of civil servants do protest most likely? Among these protesting groups, we may identify "**catnet**" categories/Charles Tilly/,who belong to the same social **category** or strata and have the same time dense social

,communicative **networks**,by local community(small industry town) or by high level of cultural and communicative capital or competence(employees of public sectors in culture, social, health services).

c./Beyond the mobilization capacities, in case of public servants we may record their relatively high "**veto power**"; protests of firemen, police,army or transport branches are sensible issues for any government.Their successes may influence the organized labour of other public sector branches,who are well organized and their **mobilizing capacity** considerable.Social and political conflicts in declining industrial sites have different type of policy sensitivity because of **density** and **transparency** of problems(at the „looser» area, branch,periphery and sometimes ethnic **issue** with the Gipsy population **overlapping**) and the transparent "**injustice**" **frame** in the related discourse; these industrial sites are products of "Socialist industrialization" of past decades,and people had been pushed there by rapid and planned urbanization of these areas, so they are framing their situation, as "innocent" victims of the industrialization policy of the Socialist past .

#### Material versus post-material

Ecology, peace issue, alternative life styles and unconventional youth protests are there in Hungary and in the GDR since the mid eighties, as marginal and subcultural phenomenas.We find these type of protests in the different categories of non formal organizations, associations,environmentalists and **international campaigns** too.Latter seems to have an importance on this field;Earth Day,Hiroshima Memorial Day or World Aids Day are all recorded with differentiated activities on the Hungarian and in the former GDR protest scene.The relatively weak East German or especially Hungarian initiatives enjoy the support of more developed and materially richer West European NGOs in form of "software" and "hardware" support g. e. data bases,infrastructure,seminars, material help, joint actions. Environmentalism is one of the most stable issues in protest politics of both countries about 10% stable presence. Peace activism is much higher in East Germany than in Hungary, which can be explained by the Church and non-violent background of East German opposition, to the bigger international military especially NATO involvement of Germany and of course in the military German past.Feminism has also a mor stable and growing presence in East Germany, than in Hungary. Strength of post-material protest in Eastern Germany generally could be looked upon in the context of German reunification and of West German presence of New Social Movements , and the higher material and technological level the GDR reached much faster than Hungary and other Eastern countries(see table 12-13.).

#### Post-communist cleavages

There are discussions on the temporary or more established existence of post-Communism specific cleavages within the literature on new party systems. Certainly, there are specific conflicts like the one on the relation to **Communist Legacy** dividing parties and protest movements, like the issues related to the 1956 Hungarian revolution or to the Stasi-legacy in East Germany making a stable agenda out of the problem to punish „dirty Communists», or memorial protests for the Opposition and the Revolution, and to upheld its "messages" within the new public life . The biggest and most spectacular events

happened in 1989, in Hungary with the reinterrence of Imre Nagy and other leaders of Revolution executed by the Communist regime, in Germany with the occupation of Stasi archives, and rehabilitation of the victims of Stasi and of former frontiers guards of the GDR.

During the first years of transition supporters of anti-communists purges organized a series of unconventional protests against persons, or institutions stigmatized to be "still Communist" like being former Stasi informants who become politicians after 1989, or frontiers guard did not punished, Workers Guard(Hungary) did not punished . On the other side, Communists in the Hungary and in the GDR provide memorial protests for the Communist regime too , and against Christian governments policies. Both type **of the anti-Communist and Communist protest was** frequent in the GDR and in Hungary in th e investigated period. The occurrence of the issue of recall, or punish leading persons having Communist past is diminishing from 1989 until 1994 in the whole period (See Tables 12- 14).

**Media conflict** is an issue specific to post-Communism in Hungary, which was present on the protest scene in all semesters of 1989-1994( see Table 13.). The conflict was about how to shift the by the Communists directly as propaganda tool manipulated mass media into institutions of the private and public sectors , and how in the latter equal, or at least justified and open access for relevant political camps should be institutionalized. Not going into depth in the crucial, and even in constitutional conflicts and crises rich development , we just sum up the contribution to the protest scene very briefly. In the beginning , Christian Democrats and right wing activists protested against according them the "still Communist" or Liberal media presidents. The Christian government appointed vice-presidents and fired the controversial presidents latter, so now the Liberal and Socialist minded mass demonstrations , petitions and other forms of protests were oriented against the control or intervention of Christian government. After the 1994 elections, bringing Social-liberal government in power, the groups of Christian right protest against the media policy of the Social-liberal government again, organizing counter-institutions /newspapers, associations, networks/ of the partisans of the former Christian-Democratic regime in the mass media, mainly excluded from top positions by the new government. A perfect change of roles has been done twice in this issue, and the escalation dynamics preserved until passing the law on media and finding consent of all parliamentary parties in the rules of appointment of presidents and boards for controlling the public broadcast and TV by the political parties in 1995-1996.

### **3. Conclusions**

Summing up the discussion of political opportunities of political protest based upon our data 1989-1994 Hungary and the GDR , we may conclude in some hypotheses for further elaboration and discussion about post- communist democratic consolidation, and the role of protest mobilization within generally and on the comparison Hungary –GDR especially .

#### **3.1. Mobilization and protest culture 1989-1990**

The role of the protest of civic groups within democratic transformations is highly dependent on the fastly changing political opportunity structure on the one hand and on the own resource mobilization capacities on the other hand. The opportunities and the mobilization capacities are

connected on many ways with each other. The third important element is the tradition of the pre-1989 protest culture influencing the perception of the opportunities and the resource mobilization capacities by the participant. The perception of both elements is constructed and reconstructed in a constant discourse within an outside the civic groups, and it is influenced by mass media. The 1989 democratization processes are "media events" and patterns are exported and imported in a "diffusion process" through media coverage. The protest tradition will be selectively perceived by the new generations of activists. Former anti-communist fights 1953(GDR) and 1956(Hungary) are "reframed" as guiding patterns for the mobilization. There will be a new protest culture developed in 1989-1990 based upon the active and mass participation in protest without or with diminishing repression and with the institutionalized human rights and free mass media presence and coverage. The emerging protest culture include new methods and goals of the protest and a perception of the civic protest as a "normal" phenomena, a "rational" option to loyalty and exit, without fear of government repression, not pushed in the "underground" and being part of the general publicity and covered by mass media. The specific problem with the policy impact of social movements in Eastern Europe is due to some fundamental differences to Western democracies. First these new political systems are very recently established, and the new political parties are still "mobilizing parties" which grew from mass mobilizations against communist system. Secondly, neither the political actors, nor analyzers have access to long term experiences with electoral effects of policy reactions towards sociopolitical protest movements in the new democracies. The intermediary system of Western democracies with experiences of policy reactions on social protest and the public feedback by electoral success is still in making in Eastern Europe. Thus the institutional-administrative environment of social movements is not stabilized yet in Eastern Europe, and this results in a tendency toward accepting transitory, extra-institutional forms of bargaining and crisis management. The political cultural background of new institutions is also in the making; neither political institutions, nor political culture are stable and experienced in conflict managements in 1989-1990.

### **3.2. Results of the Hungary -GDR comparison**

Dynamics, character and efficiency of civic protests were shaped by the following basic differences of political opportunities and of protest cultures based upon pre-1989 traditions and experiences during the breakdowns of authoritarian regimes and in the transition to democracy in the GDR and in Hungary 1989-1990 according my comparative study.

#### *State building process*

Transformation process in the GDR was highly intertwined with the dissolution of the East German state and the "reunification" of the two German states. Nor state dissolution neither new state building took place in Hungary in 1989-1990. These basic differences has far reaching consequences on the mobilized groups, their goals, and their efficiency in the respective political opportunity structure.

#### *"Hardliners" versus "softliners" within Communist party*



East German Communist elite was resistant towards the popular demands. Till the end of 1989 there was no opening up of the old system. In Hungary, the reform oriented wing of the Communist made basic concessions towards the civic movements at the very beginning of 1989, and withdrew the strategy of administrative rejection and repression. Dynamics of protest was effected by the different elite strategies on many ways.

#### *Strategies and hardship of Communist repression*

Repression toward dissidents was higher in the GDR than in Hungary from the sixties. Many generations of East German dissidents were pushed to the FRG. In Hungary, more continuity of experiences and more freedom were provided for the tiny group of pre-1989 dissidents. Political opportunities of protest were different before and in 1989 based upon that differences of the two regimes.

#### *The role of the Church in the Protest*

Church, especially the Lutheran church provided opposition groups in the framework of a church-state compromise in the GDR some freedom of organizing and articulation. This influenced the social composition as well the symbolic of the latter protests. These component did not play an active role in Hungary, this is a difference in the pre 1989 and in the 1989 protest culture.

#### *Decentral versus centralized mobilization structures*

In East Germany dissident networks and the focussing points of the protest were multiply according federal traditions and differentiated urban structures. In Hungary, the huge capital Budapest concentrate dissident networks and organization of protests, and there are some traits of protest mobilization in bigger cities with universities as Szeged or Pécs, but their relevance for the democratization processes was different than of the parallel developments in North- Rostock-and South-East Germany(Leipzig) to the happenings in Berlin.

#### *Institutionalization patterns*

Institutionalization dynamics of civic groups have different patterns in East Germany and Hungary. Meanwhile in the period of power shift, when old regime lost its legitimacy and the new institutions were not yet established, in the time of "round tables" there were basic similarities, but after clearcut differences appear. In Hungary, some of the civic groups establish political parties gaining important role in the first elections in 1990 in parliament and the government. East German civic groups are not successful in establishing their own successor parties, but latter develop a type of joint structure with the former West German Green party, and maintain some parliamentary presence, but much less relevant than the successors of Hungarian citizen groups.

### *Goal attainment and efficiency*

Although it is not easy to interpret, but in both countries the civic protest contributed to the way how the old regime was dissolved. Much less success is there in influencing the new economic, social and political order. However, meanwhile West German structures were copied in Eastern Germany, and the goals of the civic movements unfulfilled and they themselves marginalized, some of the political parties of the new Hungarian parliament and government coming from the civic protest culture, could exert an influence on the consolidation process of the new order some extent.

### **3.3. Consolidation of Democracy and Protest Culture 1991-1994**

1./ The assumption that protest politics is eliminated and irrelevant after democratic transformation, in the period of stabilization and institutionalization, has to be reconsidered. Political and social protests are important elements of democratic consolidation, as one possible form of interest articulation a part of democratic processes. Bargaining, articulation, mobilization are relevant phenomena's also for political culture generally as well for political institutions, of both of the state and of the civil society. The reorganization of civil society is not to be expected to without the reemergence of protest culture and a sector of social movements and protesting organizations like parties, trade unions, associations etc.

2. The character and quality of the protest culture is highly intertwined with the structures of political opportunities based upon political culture and political institutions. The non violent pattern of conflict solving is not only a leading institutional principle and rule, and "idee directrice" of democratic institutions, but it has to be also based upon the protest culture as one of the important, but in the previous research neglected part of the political culture. Not the existence or the absence, the minimum or maximum size of the protest is a destabilizing characteristics of the consolidation period, as has been assumed in the mainstream literature on transitions, but the qualitative differences of the protest cultures based upon the past and the present of political opportunities, like the disruptiveness, confrontative character, the relation of legality-illegality as dominant patterns of the protest. A great and extensive, rich protest culture may be built upon democratic principles, and it may be a stabilizing factor combined with other characteristics of sociopolitical system, and small protest groups using violent and disruptive forms, disregarding legality and provoking authorities intervention may destabilize democratic institutions.

3./ As a preliminary conclusion of our analysis, the existence of a complex and differentiated sector of new civic sector within the the political system of post-communist democracy has been stated. This sector contains different or even conflicting sociopolitical movements and organizations, which play a significant role within the political protest. Trends in the sociopolitical environment of social movements and protest, external factors of their development, and internal transformations are

connected. Using Albert O. Hirschmann's famous alternatives on the behaviour of members in the organizations in crisis, "outlawed" movements of Communist regimes were forced to the "exit" options. In post-communist democracies decision between "voice" and "exit" strategies has to be taken by the movements or by other challenging groups, and they may combine this option on their own way.

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