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"IMPLICATIONS OF THE PFP PROGRAM AND PERSPECTIVES OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON THE REFORM OF THE MILITARY IN THE CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND IMPACT ON RUSSIAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY"

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“What Central and East European countries really needed was a long period of readjustment: time and money to plan at a measured pace downsizing and restructuring; time to work out new training systems and procurement policies. But in real world, everything has had to be done at once, with no clear vision of the future, and with strictly limited money”.

Chris Donnelly

“For several years, NATO and Russia allowed NATO enlargement to be blown out of proportion. For several years we behaved like that drunken man crawling at night underneath a street lamp and looking for his key, lost elsewhere under that street lamp, just because the light was better there”.

Donald McConnell

Now from the perspective of six years it is possible to make a definite conclusion that the issue of NATO enlargement together with the corresponding initiatives, major of which is Partnership for Peace Program have established the framework and substance of security developments in Europe and simultaneously have significantly effected practically all - internal and foreign policy, social-economic - aspects of transition of former socialist states of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) and postsoviet New Independent States (NIS), including Russia. The main question this work is to investigate and to answer - whether NATO enlargement context and after-Madrid developments endorse transformation of the CEE states and NIS towards democracy and market economy or, to the opposite, hinders it or, again, acts in the first direction in some states while pushing the other countries in the second.

The other problem of no less interest and simultaneously very significant for post-Madrid development is how these initiatives - NATO enlargement and PfP correspond to each other, do they function in a complementary way or, possibly, contradict, at least at certain periods.

**How the decisions were taken**
For now the post-confrontational period in this part of the world can be divided into four periods already in accordance with the development and influence of the NATO-linked institutions:

- 1990-1993 before the decision on PfP or NATO enlargement were taken;

- 1993-1995 after PfP Program has started and decision of NATO expansion was made;

- 1995- July 1997 before in Madrid the official invitation to the first CEE countries is made for NATO membership

- July 1997 - post-Madrid period starts.

Each of the periods created the climate in the CEE countries that reflected both in their internal and foreign policy activities influencing meanwhile the attitude of the West towards the perspective of NATO enlargement. In connection with this attempt of periodization the main lines of problems to tackle with look logical: what were the driving forces behind each period, were the reasons for the developments objective or subjective, what was the reaction towards each phase in different countries of the CEE, Russia and the West and what are the consequences of each stage in the light of the main problem of this research?

The initial stage (1990-1993) was generally marked by the absence of activities and the lack of coherent concepts towards CEE in the West and predominant absorption in the domestic matters in Russia, suffering simultaneously the most difficult pains-taking first transition period of domestic "shock therapy" and sorting out the initial mess after dissolution of the Soviet Union. Apart from the lack of coherence the years 1991-mid 1993 were marked by both sides’ - the West and Russia - predominant good will and illusions. At that stage the lack of contradicting interests seemed a lasting perspective, at least to the Russian political elite.

Though a lot was written on the subject, it should be stressed once more that without understanding of the foreign policy-making atmosphere in Russia in 1991-1993 it is impossible
to comprehend the later changes in Russian foreign policy, the predominant negation and opposition to NATO expansion. It is the feeling of being deceived and of humiliation that lies in the basis of the reaction of Russian political elite towards NATO expansion. Just one quotation of Russian Foreign minister Ye. Primakov to prove this thesis: "When NATO was interested in withdrawal of soviet troops from the GDR and in Russia 'swallowing a pill' of WTO dissolution they told the same: NATO won't move an inch to the East, don't worry, we won't accept to NATO no one of the countries leaving WTO. Then these talks were not fixed in the documents. At that moment practically any agreements could be signed, but these remained only talks...iv

It was not only psycho-political phenomenon, but a basic strategic thinking that added to this attitude. It was in 1992 already when the main threat to Russian security started to be formulated with the word "isolation": "The isolation will deepen in case the western security structures (NATO, WEU) expand to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe excluding Russia", while Russian formal participation, in spite of the declarations that were made from time to time by some Russian officials (former Security Council Secretary I. Rybkin e.g.), was never regarded as a serious option.

Thus from the very start of post-confrontational period the key threat to Russian "wide" - i.e. military, economic, political - security was negatively associated with the CEE states. "Russia basically is not interested in Central European countries membership in any wide security system, excluding Russia".vi In 1995 this threat was formulated more precisely: "The disappearance of the belt of de facto neutral and as a rule weakly armed countries, that had formed in the center of Europe in the result of the WTO dissolution, will deprive Russia of one of the main advantages, achieved by its exit from the cold war"vii. "When NATO, created once to oppose the global threat, covers the former WTO space the geopolitical situation worsens for us", stated Ye. Primakov.viii
These two motivations, with the latter being based mostly on the remnants of the cold war thinking in Russia - though no less spread and still popular in the West and the CEE - established the grounds for Russia's persistent opposition to and suspicion of the NATO expansion or any other initiative, including the PfP program, aimed at involvement of the CEE countries to the western security system.

Meanwhile in 1991-1993 the CEE countries were reforming the political landscape of the region with the main aim of drawing the Western attention and providing for the optimal disposition for their institutionalization in the Western structures. The deviations from independent policy lines to formation of the Visegrad triangle and back, apart from the common "basic instinct" to oppose the "Eastern threat" (traditional and non-traditional) were mainly caused by these reasons.

In January 1990 Polish prime-minister T. Mazovecki in Prague motivated the necessity to more closely cooperate in the CEE by the geography "between the USSR and Germany"\textsuperscript{ix}. At the same time in the Czech leadership the disagreements appeared on this point: while the foreign minister Ju. Dienstbir and prime-minister M. Chalfa expressed concerns, that the creation of any "small Europe" in the CEE region will hinder their entrance into a "big Europe", president V. Havel in political cooperation in the CEE saw additional chances for europeanization. His proposal of the concept to cooperate "to return to Europe", done in Budapest on 26 January 1990, was called "Vaclav Havel initiative". The idea was to create a "special formation, that could go to meet with the rich Western Europe not as a poor relative... We are to wake up those in the West who have slept through our revival".\textsuperscript{x}

Nevertheless there was no clear understanding of what this new formation should be, neither the aims of the countries coincided. For Czechoslovakia (later Czecho-Slovakia, then Czech Republic) the more desirable was the "pentagonale" Danube-
Adriatic cooperation with the participation of Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia, while it regarded Poland as belonging rather to the northern Baltic region, and thus, Czechoslovakia could become the ring launching this chain. This "architecture" did not suit Poland, that wanted to break the traditional USSR-Germany "embrace" and insisted on the CEE cooperation.

As the problems of the WTO and Comecon as well as relations with the USSR remained the main concern for the CEE countries at that time, after the series of consultations they finally agreed on regional cooperation and on 12-15 February 1991 in the small town of Visegrad near Budapest the "Declaration on cooperation between Republic of Poland, Czech and Slovak Federate Republic and Republic of Hungary in the aim for European integration" was signed. Later during the fourth summit in Prague in May 1992 the cooperation was acknowledged as a "new model of relations" in the CEE and simultaneously, motivated by the threats to their security caused by unstable situation in the former USSR and war in Yugoslavia the Visegrad states confirmed, that their final aim is membership in NATO.

Meanwhile the very combination of factors that caused closer cooperation in Visegrad disappeared: WTO, Comecon and the USSR collapsed. To that added division of CzSFR. Thus since the beginning of 1993 the relations within triangle became loose. Czech Republic again returned to its "individualistic" policy. V.Claus declared that "Visegrad doesn't concern us. That was the process absolutely artificially created by the West..., possible by Brussels, but not by us in the Central Europe".Ⅹ V.Claus and other Czech leaders also stressed the difference between Czech Republic, having no common borders with Russia, and other Visegrad states: "/Russian threat/ should not be underestimated. But it should not be divided from the whole complex of problems. Russian threat is not only of the military nature. This is the threat of overcoming - or not overcoming - of the early postcommunist phase... At the same time I admit that Czech Republic has gone further to the West,
than Poland, for example. Poles are more touchy to this problem, than Austrians, for example. And in this respect I would put us closer to Austria, than Poland”. xii

This policy was criticized by the other members of Visegrad, mainly Poland and Hungary. In Hungary Czech "separatism" was explained as follows: "Moscow, thinking further by imperial categories may feel much less concerned about creation of "sanitary cordon" exactly in respect to Czech membership in NATO, than in case of eventual NATO membership of Hungary, Poland or Slovakia... Anyway the approach of NATO towards Czech Republic would hardly differ from one towards Hungary". xiii

Simultaneously from the very start in Visegrad formation all parts felt the Polish ambitions for regional leadership and strongly opposed them.

However serious were the above mentioned reasons the main key to the loss of the momentum in Visegrad was the fact, that the CEE countries stopped to be really concerned with the threat from the East, i.e. Russian threat. Simultaneously, during this first postconfrontational period - 1990-1993 - they got indirect evidences that the joint effort to integrate into the European Union and NATO does not give quick and positive results.

The main evidence to this conclusion for the CEE countries became the Program of Partnership for Peace.

The initial NATO structure established for cooperation with the CEE postsocialist countries was North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) formed in December 1991 in order to promote "dialogue, cooperation and partnership" between the East and the West after the end of the cold war. In the beginning for many former Warsaw Pact countries that joined the NACC in 1991 and 1992, the association with NATO represented a highly symbolic break with the past. Membership in NACC asserted their independence and showed their ambition to fully integrate into Western structures. xiv Anyway in a short while the main asset of the
NACC - the concept of equality - started to be regarded by the CEE countries as its main drawback, it did not satisfy their ambitions to get a special regard of the West as to the "pioneers" of the velvet revolutions in the CEE. The NACC made no concessions to the countries who expressed a definite desire to become NATO members. As Nick Williams correctly concludes, "the concept of equality within the NACC reflects the optimism of the period in which it was founded: that all former communist countries were equally committed and in principle capable of democratization and integrating into a common, cooperative security system". xv

The PfP program was introduced as a step forward in comparison with the NACC concept: "This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership".xvi Anyway, in spite of significant differences, and first of all the Individual Partnership Programs, the PfP did not change the equality concept adopted in the NACC. And particularly due to this reason the PfP, especially in the initial period got rather skeptical reaction in the CEE. Regarding the general political context of the second half of 1993, the PfP was regarded even with disappointment and as a concession of the West to Russia.

The events started to develop with the increasing pace since August 1993, when President Yeltsyn in time of his visit to Warsaw expressed in public "don't object" to membership of Poland in NATO, accepted with a high enthusiasm in all Visegrad capitals. Anyway in the next two months this declaration of the president "was clarified" and "got elaboration" in several documents and publications. The letter was sent by diplomatic channels to the leaders of the Western states accentuating definitely negative approach of Russia towards the plans of NATO expansion. And when in Autumn 1993 the concept of Partnership was presented for the first time the "big diplomatic rivalry" between the Visegrad countries and Russia started.

It was the period of rivalry between the Visegrad countries as well: the initiative to express the negative reaction to president
Yeltsyn's letter to the Western leaders was taken by Polish president L.Valesa and that caused suspicion in Prague. Even the presentation of the PfP to Visegrad leaders in Prague on 12 January 1994 by president B.Clinton the Czech leaders tried unsuccessfully to present as an event of bilateral Czech-American relations. After this last Visegrad summit president V.Havel commented, that the joint efforts were needed when the CEE countries fought for the dissolution of the WTO and Comecon, but "now each of us should draw his own string". 

There were three basic reason for disillusion and dissatisfaction with the PfP Program in the Visegrad countries:

- first, it did not meet high expectations of soon NATO membership in these states. The Program was perceived as a signal that the next step - the membership - is delayed for indefinite future. The then foreign minister of Poland A.Olechowski put it as a "insufficient step in the right direction";

- second, in all the CEE countries the Program was perceived as a manifestation of the predominant role that Russia played in the formulation of the Western policy. As L.Valesa commented in one of his interviews at that time, 'we should talk about our membership in NATO not with the West, but with president Yeltsyn'. The PfP was a clear signal to the Visegrad countries, that they are still dependent not only on the West, but on Russia as well;

- third, and that was connected to the first two points, the PfP did not introduce the differentiation between the first candidates to NATO membership and the rest postsocialist CEE countries and the NIS. The former Polish deputy national security minister P.Grudzinski formulated it, as follows: "Poland and other Visegrad states were reduced to a common denominator with the other countries of the former soviet block to which we wanted to say final farewell". He also said that Brussels did not take into account the differences in the security interests of the small and medium countries of the CEE, on the one hand, and Russia,
building its own security system in the CIS, on the other. The
nationalist forces in Poland reacted to the PfP as a clear signal,
that Poland should build its defense itself, because nobody is ready
to provide for its security.

There were two other remarkable phenomena and reactions
at that time, that deserve special attention from the point of view of
the task of this research - the implications of NATO enlargement
and the PfP on the domestic and foreign policy decision-making in
the CEE. On the one hand, the observers noted the further rise of
anti-Russian moods among Polish political elite in the beginning of
1994. Of special concern to Poland at that time was whether
Russia manages to get a special status within this program. And
after it failed Polish newspapers on the first lines published the
comments titled "Russia will not put forward any conditions" or
"Russia remained without special status".

On the other, the stream of the publications of that period
shows, that the Visegrad countries kept firmly to the notion of the
'cold war NATO'. As the Czech newspaper "Mlada Fronta Dnes"
 wrote, 'having lost the enemy in the face of the 'evil empire', NATO
is going through significant changes and aims rather to cooperate
with Russia, than to deter it. The countries of Central and Eastern
Europe do not share these views and in fact grieve for old NATO'.

To the opposite, those CEE countries who did not expect soon
NATO membership, Bulgaria or Romania for example, reacted to the
PfP program rather positively.

At the same time in the initial phase of the PfP the number of
politicians and observers in Russia perceived the program as a sort
of the substitute to NATO expansion, or at least delaying this process
to indefinite future, and thus reacted to it with a reserved optimism.
Now it can be concluded that these illusions added to the general
rise of disappointment in the Russian-Western cooperation,
deepened the misperceptions and misunderstanding on both sides.

Simultaneously this initial phase of the PfP program, firstly,
aggravated further the climate of relations between Russia and its
former partners in the CEE, and secondly, put the beginning to the division between A and B league countries in the vast region, that by many Western and Russian observers is regarded as a main problem for the post-Madrid period. Just due to the lack of a single scheme, due to a certain ambiguity, the PfP comprised, at least three groups with different purposes and aims in this program, establishing in a way the framework for new rivalry and competition among the CEE states:

- those whose chief objective is to join NATO quickly (Central Europeans), and those whose chief objective is to prevent it (Russia)
- those who wish to associate closely with the Alliance, and those who traditionally have tried to keep their distance from the military blocs (the former "neutrals")
- those who wish to act within NATO, and those who merely want to learn from it (the Central Asian republics).

The main objectives that the PfP put forward, (more transparent defense planning and budget; civil control of the military; contribution to the UN and OSCE peace-keeping; military cooperation with NATO; reform of the armed forces to facilitate the military cooperation with NATO) were accepted by the participants of the Program, but some of them appeared rather controversial or non-valid from the point of view of the main purpose of the CEE countries - NATO membership.

The main controversy concerns the third objective - the contribution of the PfP participants to the UN and OSCE peace-keeping missions. It deepened with simultaneous weakening of the UN peace-keeping potential (the OSCE has in fact never possessed it) and the shift of peace-making responsibilities to NATO, in connection with its mission in former Yugoslavia.

This new leading role of NATO in peace-making in Bosnia proved effective, also from the point of view of cooperation of NATO and non-NATO countries, including Russia. But this effective NATO peace-making - though indirectly - has preconditioned the failure of
any attempts to create the new all-European or Euro-atlantic security architecture, based on the complementary interlocking institutions. The common pessimism towards any existing institutions, but NATO, which is popular in Russia as well (it is officially declared by Russian leaders, that they are interested in keeping NATO strong; and for this reason - to remain the military effective structure - it should not expand)\textsuperscript{xxi}, may cause the failure to cope with the crises or conflicts that NATO won’t be ready to manage or settle, while the other institutions, even including the UN will be too weak or unable to take this responsibility.

More, NATO operations in Bosnia and readiness to solve the Iraq crises in winter 1998 by military means have created a certain pattern in policy thinking and decision-making mostly in the United States, which main feature is readiness to act without UN Security Council resolutions, if necessary. As contradictions between the strategic interests of Russia and the USA in certain regions became more and more evident, and as Russian foreign policy became less and less dependent on Washington (especially after A.Kozyrev left the Foreign Affairs Ministry), the possibility of the return to the Cold War practice of decision-making - the well known so-called “Chapter 6 and 1/2” model - on peace-keeping grew stronger. Most evidently this controversy revealed in connection with the conflict in Kosovo in June 1998. The main question of its regulation was whether the UN Security Council resolution was at all necessary to start the NATO operation there, while it was mostly obvious, that Russia would rather oppose the decision in the SC.

The detrimental effect of the new European system on the conflict-regulation capabilities has been stressed as well by American observers. They consider\textsuperscript{xxii} that after Madrid summit Europe turned into multilevel system: first - 14 NATO members; second - 3 newly invited countries; third - those (Romania and Slovene) hoping to get invitation in the next round of enlargement. At the same time in NATO communiqué on enlargement three
Baltic countries were mentioned as potential members in future. Fourth - those countries, that either are not eager (Austria, Finland), or cannot obtain the necessary defense criteria (former WTO countries and NIS) for NATO membership. All of them participate in the PfP and EAPC. Russia and Ukraine are regarded as special cases: both have signed special documents with NATO giving them most similar rights. The basic difference noted by observers was that Russia-NATO agreement was elaborated and signed on Brussels’ initiative, while the engine of Ukraine-NATO document was in Kiev. The observers come to the conclusion, that while in peace time this system may function somehow, it is hardly imaginable that it can work to regulate a conflict in case it starts in Europe.

Practically all other PfP objectives, aimed predominantly at democratization and gradual reform of the military (more transparent defense planning and budget; civil control of the military; reform of the armed forces to facilitate the military cooperation with NATO) did not prove themselves fully as the main criteria for NATO membership, though many things changed in the defense sphere in Poland, Hungary or Czech Republic. What was really given attention to in these countries was political cooperation with NATO, further pressure on the leading western powers for NATO enlargement.

During this period another progressing tendency revealed - the Visegrad countries, Poland first and foremost, started to put special emphasis towards relations with Germany, which was commonly acknowledged as a 'locomotive' that will bring these countries to NATO and EU.

The emphasis of the PfP on self-differentiation of the participants revealed at most in the period when the "Study on NATO Enlargement" was finished and the decision on NATO expansion was finally taken in the end of 1995. With this decision the role of the PfP for the first wave candidates became purely instrumental, while for the outsiders or those belonging to the second
and third groups did not significantly change with one very important exception: the role of the PfP, designed initially as one more (after NACC) step to manage with the newly sovereign postsocialist countries and with the final aim to incorporate them in this or that form into Western institutions, has drastically diminished after the decision on NATO enlargement was taken.

This conclusion is even more justified, taking into consideration the approach of the CEE countries, but first and most Poland and Czech Republic, towards NATO membership as a political step and decision. It cannot be excluded, anyway that in the post-Madrid period the role of the PfP may change. In case Russian-NATO cooperation will develop the PfP may become a framework for it.

**The implications of the PfP program and perspectives of NATO enlargement on the reform of the military in the Central Eastern European States.**

The implications of the policy aimed at NATO membership in the CEE countries cannot be regarded as a single phenomenon. There are at least three aspects that should be analyzed:

- the internal, domestic developments in the CEE states, first and foremost in the defense and civil-military spheres;
- the bilateral relations between the "first-wave" candidates and between them and outsiders in the CEE;
- the relations between the CEE states and Russia and the implications of NATO enlargement on Russian domestic and foreign policy.

The main problem for all postsocialist countries in the national security sphere is to find the optimal balance between the necessity for economic development and defense needs. As one of the highest authorities on these issues Chris Donnelly puts it, "the basis of national security is a sound economy, and an army should
be as small a drain on that economy as is consistent with national
security". In fact the super-purpose of NATO enlargement, i.e. the projection of stability, cannot be reached without providing for a stable economic development of the CEE countries. Thus the defense budget in the CEE countries cannot amount for more than normal for the developed industrial democracies 2-5 per cent of GDP. Simultaneously, even when reduced the armed forces are to be effective.

Two main tasks that the CEE countries had to solve were
- the redefinition of their national security concepts in order to get the understanding of - putting it blankly - what is sufficient for their security and
- the rebuilding of the armed forces and defense industries in accordance with the needs of the new national security doctrines.

Anyway the implementation of these tasks is far from being completed.

There are several reasons for it. One of them has been the unclear future of NATO membership for the CEE countries. They were hesitating whether they can afford less numerous forces to defend their territories without external help. Thus Poland, for example, has adopted in 1992 only the "Main Provisions of the Defense Doctrine" which were still actual in 1997. In the same 1992 another document "The Security Policy and the Defense Strategy of the RP" has been prepared by the Defense Committee of the country, while the National Security Bureau came out with the "Principles of Polish Security Policy". The documents were criticized in Poland for the "inner circle" manner of decision-making, i.e. the lack of professional discussion and normal democratic consensus of different political forces on these vital issues. Simultaneously they were criticized for the incoherent strategic thinking leading to the waste of resources: it was envisaged in the documents, that "the armed forces are evenly deployed on the territory of the country to resist a possible offense from any side". The critics called this plan the "hedgehog strategy", that instead of
modernization of weapons and equipment and re-training of the cadre presupposed building of new garrisons.\textsuperscript{xxv}

The other reason for delay was the open or hidden opposition of the high officers, especially in the initial period, towards reconstruction of the armed forces, far from perfect state of civil-military relations and the political struggle within the countries itself. Not mentioning Russia, where the process of the military reform came to a stalemate without even being started, Poland in 1995 lived through a "Drawska" scandal, in which as parts to the political conflict the General Staff, the Defense Ministry and president Walesa himself were involved. The controversies were not finally overcome with the next Polish president. In Spring 1996 Polish General Staff was still opposing the plans of the MoD restructuring, that were prepared by the team headed by first vice-minister civil A.Karkoszka.\textsuperscript{xxvi}

Next comes the deficit of financial resources that any real reduction of armed forces needs for pensions, re-training for new employment, creation of new jobs and housing for the redundant military. At the same time practically in all countries-'first wave' candidates there have been high expectations concerning Western support for restructuring of their armed forces. Hungarian top military officers, for example, conceded it would take several years and a major infusion of western cash to bring their deteriorating armed forces up to NATO's minimum standards.

What Chris Donnelly called 'an illogical situation', could even be defined as 'an absurd situation': "What Central and East European countries really needed was a long period of readjustment; time and money to plan at a measures pace downsizing and restructuring; time to work out new training systems and procurement policies. But in real world, everything has had to be done at once, with no clear vision of the future, and with strictly limited money".\textsuperscript{xxvii} In the new geopolitical situation the CEE countries turned to NATO for security guarantees and help,
forcing it to the soonest possible enlargement and thus themselves shortened the time necessary for restructuring.

But worse, trying to prove their readiness for NATO membership some of them pretended to fulfill the necessary changes, judging again by the national political criteria. Thus, during one of the seminars held in Moscow in 1995, one of Czech officials (in presence of Chris Donnelly) tried to convince the audience of the fact that Czech Republic has fully changed the high officers' staff leaving no one from the old 'communist equip' (Czech Republic was the only CEE country that has realized 'lustration'). This statement could not be interpreted other, but only in two ways: either that was not true and thus was an attempt to mislead in order to show that Czech is best ready for NATO membership, or Czech high ranking military staff consists of yesterday lieutenants! At the same time it is accepted even by Poles, that Czech Republic went most far in restructuring of its armed forces from divisions to brigades, according to NATO standards and with special accent on rapid reaction forces.xxviii

Along the same line, but to the contrary, comes the justification of the democratization processes in Romanian armed forces. According to the Chief of Romanian MoD, the Ministry does not take into account, whether the officers got education in Moscow (the USSR), or not.xxx

Another example of the 'theater of absurd' was described by "The Wall Street Journal": when William Perry first came to visit the Hungarian side of the base /Taszar - an old Warsaw pact air base near the Croatian border; since late 1995 the US has leased part of the base as a staging area for thousands of American troops moving in and out of Bosnia/ commanders were so embarrassed they had all buildings on his route either repainted or draped with camouflage netting. They didn't want him to see what NATO would be getting. "Hungary's political and economic credentials for NATO membership are far more persuasive than its military ones", concludes the correspondence.xxx
The financial shortages for defense needs caused more sporadic than carefully planned and not always transparent nature of the budgets in the CEE states. Thus to the end of 1996 Polish officials admitted that though the government had taken political decision of "strategic importance" to further take part in NATO operation in Bosnia, it did not give funds for it. Still the already prepared five-year defense budget was not accepted, though only on its basis the investments strategy and not sporadic coverage of the costs of "repair and other urgent needs" could be realized. The lack of perspective concerned the defense industries as well: though financing of the "Huzar" fighter program was one of the rare definite articles of the budget, it was not clear whether the armed forces would buy them, etc. At the same time counting on the NATO membership Polish President A.Kwasniewski regarded, that Polish armed forces were to be re-equipped and get additional weaponry and equipment by the year 2000 and the costs of these modernization would be about $2,7 bln. (8 bln. zloty). Meanwhile about 3,25 (according to the rate of May-June 1997) 9,79 bln zl. was planned for the whole defense budget for 1997.

Though even these figures are hardly imaginable for Poland, because most (at least 80 per cent) of the budget covers other than modernization costs, the more real - and higher figures were put forward by Polish economists. According to their estimations full modernization of Polish armed forces would cost about 150 bln.zl., or (according to May-June 1997 rate) $45-46 bln.

Polish assessments of the modernization - i.e. in fact format and scale of NATO membership - presupposed three options: maximum, middle and minimal. First option, which is defined as optimistic, presupposes building of NATO infrastructure and presence of NATO contingents on the territories of the countries-new members which will go together with the credits for modernization of Polish, Czech and Hungarian armed forces. And in this case the West will pay less than the US Congressional Budget Office estimated ($124 bln.) but closer to RAND Corp.
estimates ($60-80 bln.). The realistic scenario - that one of Rand corp. - of "power projection" will mean only construction of bases and logistics for NATO forces and limited NATO contingents deployment, and it will cost $50 bln. for 10 years. But the third option, that is defined by Polish experts (going after some Western politicians) as 'finlandization' of the CEE, which in fact means that NATO will not expand in practical terms and "new democracies will remain neutral", but having obligations as well. And along these obligations Poland and other Visegrad countries should modernize their forces to the level, that will make these countries able of self-defense.\textsuperscript{xxiv}

Such an attitude reveals at least two strong controversies. One, can be formulated as one more asymmetry between high expectations and reality: Poland hopes to get really modernized armed forces mostly at Western costs, while the financial aspect is regarded by the majority of Western politicians as the most difficult issue of NATO expansion. Second controversy concerns the widening gap between the approach towards European security of the Visegrad countries and Russia. It is the 'optimistic' and even 'realistic' (for Poland) scenarios of enlargement that are regarded by Russia as most detrimental to its national security interests. And it is this dilemma that NATO faced first in the post-Madrid period.

To the middle of 1998 some evidences revealed, that it is rather the first "optimistic"scenario that is going to be realized in the first enlargement wave.

In October 1997 the MoD chiefs of three would-be new NATO members met with their NATO colleges in Maastricht. During the two days of informal consultations Polish, Hungarian and Czech MoD heads tried to reassure the NATO members, that they are ready to take the necessary portion of expenses on NATO enlargement and fulfill all the obligations connected with their membership in the alliance. (In general this meeting was much more elucidating than the December 16, 1997 ministerial meeting in Brussels, when the Protocols of accession for these three
countries were signed). Summarizing the meeting NATO Secretary General J. Solana and Pentagon chief W. Cohen stressed - and that was a significant change in rhetoric compared to pre-Madrid period - that the price of NATO eastward expansion is an important, but not the key element. It was estimated as acceptable on the premises that in any case providing security in NATO framework would be cheaper, than doing it alone.

Thus, this new political-economic criteria or standard was introduced in the post-Madrid period. And obviously it had to address two audiences - public opinion and legislatures both of the countries-candidates and NATO members. The main aim was to facilitate in the first case the authorization of higher military budgets, while in the second - the ratification of the protocols, first and foremost in the US Senate.

Simultaneously NATO members called the candidates to strengthen their efforts and to prove to the West that they are not going to be ‘boarders’. In the same line went the recommendation to reinforce NATO propaganda in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, to prepare the population and form adequate public opinion.

In Maastricht the defense ministers of CzR and Hungary promised to increase their national military budgets yearly at 0,1% of the GNP (and Poland - increase of the military budget even forestalling the growth of the GDP) in spite of economic difficulties, paying according to NATO recommendations special attention to teaching the military personnel English language, improvement of technical education, modernization of the air defense systems, communications and logistics.

Simultaneously to push forward the first “optimistic” scenario Polish, Czech and Hungarian ministers of defense insisted at the same meeting on full membership in the new NATO military structure in the sense, that their countries were not excluded from the plans of deployment of the foreign troops. Poland also called to stationing of the subregional staff on its territory and informed
about readiness to give part of its Armed Forces already fitting to NATO criteria into alliance disposition.

Polish officials (A.Towpic, Ambassador to NATO Headquarters in Brussels) stressed many times that the ratification of the Washington Treaty won’t demand any amendments to Polish constitution, comprising the clause to support the allies when they are under threat. A.Towpic stated also that Poland is ready to ratify the London Convention of 1951 on the status of the allied troops, and Ottawa Convention of 1951 on the status of NATO diplomats. It was repeated once more that if necessary Poland can provide its territory for NATO nuclear weapons deployment.xxxv

The longing for fastest possible full membership in NATO, its military machine, caused that in Spring 1998 the preparation started to form the joint German-Polish-Danish Army corps of 70 thousand man (in Autumn 1997 the figure of 10 thousand man was mentioned) and 700 units of armed vehicles and helicopters with the headquarters in Szczecin started. This new Army corps compared to German-French one has to comprise three divisions (German on the territory of the former GDR, Polish in Szczecin and Danish) and as experts stressed its mission, judging by its size, has little or nothing to do with peace-keeping, on which NATO military doctrine has recently focused. Even in Bosnia NATO forces are twice smaller. Taking into account that nobody regards the Baltic region as a conflict-potential part of Europe, Russian commentators came to the conclusion that the new Army corps is to balance Russian forces in Kaliningrad region.xxxvi

This information caused, reportedly, “reserved negative” reaction in Moscow. Reserved - because these plans are far from realization, and negative, as to every step in NATO enlargement eastward. Simultaneously Foreign Affairs Ministry regards that the Founding Act Russia-NATO contains indirect guarantees against NATO military infrastructure expansion to the East.

The misreading, or different interpretation of the document can be partly illustrated by the comments of General Klaus
Naumann, Chairman of the Military Committee on the NATO’s new military command structure. An abbreviated Russian version of his text contains the sentence: “NATO does not plan to allocate the command structure headquarters on the territories of its three new members”. In the full English version of this text K.Naumann writes: “The new structure also had to incorporate ESDI and Combined Joint Task Forces requirements. The minimum baseline for Alliance planning was the principle that at least two CJTF Headquarters be able to undertake large-scale operations. This should be complemented by the ability to form a number of land-based and sea-based smaller-scale CJTF Hqs, able to command land forces of brigade or division size with comparably sized maritime and air force components. Recognizing that the CJTF trials are not yet complete, the proposed structure had to be able to meet CJTF HQ nuclei requirements and provide the requisite CJTF HQ staff generation for both NATO and WEU-led operations. The new structure also had to have growth potential and the flexibility to accommodate new member nations on a case-by-case basis, without the need for major restructuring, as well as providing for appropriate involvement. In this context, it was determined that the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would not require any additional NATO headquarters”.

Whether an obvious controversy of the information about joint German-Polish-Danish Army corps and declaration of the high NATO military official demonstrates different understanding of what “military infrastructure” means, or rather the last is aimed to calm down Russian suspicions, still remains an open question. It is evident, anyway, that Poland tries to use every possibility to fully “anchor” NATO on its territory.

Preparing for NATO membership negotiations in Autumn 1997 Poland first of three candidates elaborated 15 year plan of national AF modernization “Army - 2014”. Its cost is estimated as 40 bln zl. or about $12 bln. It presupposes further reductions from 220 to 180 thousand to 2004 and partial (60%) transition to the
professional army. The plan presupposes restructuring of the military command: instead of four, in two years there will be only two, northern and southern military districts. Nevertheless no detailed information concerning which garrisons are planned to be closed in the next few years was delivered to the public. In the early Autumn of 1997 the absence of this information was motivated by the forthcoming parliamentary elections, because local communities are naturally interested in garrisons, stimulating economic life in small Polish towns.

The renovation of the arsenal is planned to be accomplished with a maximum (80% of the orders) involvement of the national defense industries. Simultaneously the experts mark out, that the new program does not reveal the widely discussed purchases of several weapon systems, including aircraft.

This tendency towards “nationalization” of defense modernization is rather new and may signify several points of high military-economic-political importance. Firstly, this step is likely to neutralize or compensate negative financial effects of NATO membership by supporting national DIC, that suffered deep crises. Secondly, “nationalization” of the military modernization may reduce the expectations of the Western defense producers concerning the CEE market, and cause along with the competition their reorientation towards other markets, and thus, thirdly, further increase the competition between them and Russian producers.

Much more active and loyal to NATO after Madrid summit also became Czech position. Though earlier CzR planned to let only one rapid reaction brigade and one helicopter squadron, in October 1997 in Maastricht Czech defense minister Miloslav Vyborny stated, that Prague is ready to let 90% of its Armed Forces under NATO command.

Such a readiness could be explained by a strong criticism expressed by the United States concerning, firstly, an insufficient defense expenses of CzR, secondly, unsatisfactory or even critical state of military training and low prestige of the military in Czech
society and, thirdly, low support of CzR integration into NATO by Czech public opinion. Czech media even expressed apprehensions, that due to all these difficulties CzR could be excluded from the first group of the candidates.

Meanwhile, the statements of Czech defense minister about delivery of 90% of the Armed Forces for NATO command were strongly criticized by Czech governmental opposition. The leaders of communists and republicans in the parliament declared, that in such circumstances Czech would lose its defense capabilities. Strong criticism forced M.Vyborny to comment on his words. He said, that the figure mentioned could concern only the situations, when the sovereignty of the country would be endangered.

In general, the military in the CEE countries were surprisingly loyal to the reformist governments and in spite of all the difficulties did not turn into a significant political force there. Nevertheless some politicians make attempts 'to draw' the military on their side to strengthen their positions. And, to the contrary, some military are accused by politicians for being loyal to the former leader. Thus A.Kwasnewski press-secretary D.Vanek accused in public the Chief of Polish General Staff Gen. T.Wilecki for being too 'engaged' with former president L.Walesa. (In 1998 Gen. Wilecki was dismissed from his post).

Simultaneously in Poland or in Czech Republic the loyalty to NATO membership became a sort of professional qualification or criteria to the military. The first (1991) civilian Chief of the Polish MoD Jan Parys' famous line to military commanders was: "Those against integration with NATO, may now leave". The criteria NATO-anti-NATO is used as the main criteria for the politicians and the military in Poland by some experts: "When in the fall of 1993 the anti-NATO forces won the elections and the former admiral Kolodziejczyk was reintroduced as the Minister of Defense... the General Staff co-operated vigorously with Walesa's Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski to transform the Partnership for Peace
initiative from a US-Russian strategic partnership into the Polish Road to NATO”.

Though such a wording (addressed rather to NATO audience again) is probably too simplified, the essence of it over-politicizing the issue of NATO membership together with strong anti-Russian accent, turning it into the matter of domestic political struggle is very characteristic for Polish publicists.

At the same time in Ukraine in order to make the armed forces more reliable or even more Ukrainian (in early 1992 up to 90 per cent of senior officers and 70 per cent of general officers were non-Ukrainians, most of them Russians) a special policy was introduced. “The task of building a genuine 'patriotism' was entrusted to the first Ukrainian defense minister, General Morozov. Though an ethnic Russian himself, Morozov took a hard-nosed nationalist line, making membership in the radicalized Union of Ukrainian Officers (UUO) a precondition of any promotion... Discontinuing the patriotic line Shmarov /the next MoD chief - I.K./ insisted on a depoliticization of the army... Still, he was careful not to offer the nationalists any serious provocation, and of six colonels promoted to general rank in 1995 five were ethnic Ukrainians”.

Simultaneously, the Ukrainian armed forces following the general political pattern in the country are deeply divided along regional lines.

It is necessary as well to tackle with one more very important aspect of NATO enlargement in the CEE countries - and that is the reaction of public opinion towards this issue. Until recently the polls, held regularly in Visegrad countries, showed that in case their governments decided to held a referendum about NATO membership, the positive majority support could be expected only in Poland, while in Hungary or Czech Republic less than 50% of respondents would answer positively to this option. Nevertheless, even in Poland the question “will you agree to NATO membership if that means the deployment of nuclear weapons?” was answered positively only by 12 per cent of respondents, while 61 per cent
answered negatively. Also 49 per cent supported NATO membership on the condition of the deployment of foreign troops in Poland, while 23 per cent did not agree with this option.\textsuperscript{xlv}

To get positive results at the referendum on NATO membership held in Hungary in Autumn 1997 the authorities had to undertake a large-scale campaign in mass-media, including TV. It was mentioned already, that this referendum draw special attention in NATO and NATO officials recommended to strengthen the propaganda. The campaign succeeded - about 80 % (in contrast to 40 % few months earlier!) supported membership of Hungary in NATO.

Of special political attention, disregarding the pragmatic needs of the armed forces, became the military-technical ties of former WTO members with Russia.\textsuperscript{xlv} Rather elucidating look the comments that followed the visit of Polish MoD Chief Stanislaw Dobrzanski to Moscow in April 1996. During his consultations with P.Grachev they talked about possible cooperation in this field and creation of the joint peace-keeping battalion (Poland and Ukraine have one). Grachev reportedly mentioned that S. Dobrzanski was interested in spare parts to MiG-29 and MiG-21. Gazeta Wyborcza added that Dobrzanski also proposed establishing repair and production Polish-Russian joint ventures.

These talks were strongly criticized by Polish politicians. In opinion of the member of the Defense Commission former vice-defense minister B.Komorowski, the problem was that Poland should not take risky obligations. Technical cooperation is necessary as Polish army has Russian equipment and Polish defense industry is mostly producing weapons that in this or that measure were constructed in Russia. Thus, Poles cannot resign from technical cooperation. But they should try their best to replace cooperation of the defense industries and import of the spare parts by the same from the other postcommunist countries, for instance Ukraine or Slovak. Strengthening of the cooperation with Russia is insecure. Before there were signals that there exist
common interests and intentions between lobbies supporting some branches of Polish defense industry and the people, that are interested in the development of Russian-Polish economic relations. There existed plans for instance to produce MiG-29 in Poland, that had to "engage", to "involve" Poles into technological and even political cooperation with Russia, regarded B.Komorowski. Meanwhile from the point of view of the role in Europe and NATO Poland’s main partner should be the United States.

There was information that Polish minister of defense proposed also the exchange between Poland and Kaliningrad region. Poland had to provide the region with the agricultural food products for market prices while getting spare parts. The technical-scientific cooperation was discussed as well: Poland was eager to buy spare parts, to repair aircraft engines and Russian vessels built at Polish shipyards and to modernize some types of weapons and establishing joint ventures for these purposes. That from the point of view of some Polish experts would make the task easier, as Poland will use Russian R&D results. As 'Rzeczpospolita' stressed, the state officials preferred to omit the question of joint ventures in the field in the discussions with mass media. They consider and reiterate that technical cooperation is necessary as long as Poland uses Russian equipment (about 80% of the whole). Meanwhile they reject that such a cooperation may prolongate this period, as it depends on the exploitation term. For some types of equipment it has already expired, for the aircraft it is estimated to finish in 2000-2005. In general the Chief of the Staff and military experts considered the agreements reached as corresponding to Polish interests.

Practically nothing of these talks and agreements was realized. Polish military officials characterized Russian-Polish military-technical cooperation as on extremely low level. They stressed that the needs for cooperation were much higher than its volume. They regarded that this cooperation did not contradict
neither to Polish plans of NATO membership, nor to Russian security interests. Polish MoD made about 20-40 proposals to its Russian vis-à-vis annually. Anyway Russian MoD evaded widening bilateral military cooperation, sometimes explaining it by financial problems. Meanwhile the real problem for Russia in this cooperation was Poland's accent on getting licenses for future sales.

Thus the NATO expansion issue became the main controversy in this sphere of Polish-Russian relations, that, firstly, additionally spoiled bilateral relations and, secondly, hindered from keeping Polish armed forces effective and defense industry afloat at least unless their modernization has not started. The side effect of this reality was, that NATO got as its first new members the countries, that could have been at least to some extent more effective militarily, than they are at present.

Though the thesis, often used by Russian experts and politicians, that one of the main driving forces of NATO expansion are the biggest defense producers in the West, should not be exaggerated, it is the fact of life, that rather small markets of Visegrad countries have already become the field of rivalry of the leading Western producers of arms. And Russia's chances on these markets, partially due to political reasons mentioned above, are very low. Simultaneously, being persistently criticized by the West for cooperation in arms trade with 'wrong' partners, Russia started competing not only with the West, but with the former partners in this field.

Of certain interest was the information, that Poland gets help from the United States to promote its arms. Thus, relying on Zagreb weekly "National", Polish press published sensational information, that it was planned, that the US would buy Polish tanks T-72 produced for Iran (only 10 of 100 were sent there) and send them to Bosnia. This information was denied by Polish officials in words: “Polish MoD did not sell or served as a mediator for the sale of tanks - as the Americans wanted - from Polish army.”
But we do not have any influence on possible sale of tanks by industry, we know nothing about it. This transaction could have rather significant impact on the balance of arms in former Yugoslavia with all the consequences. And in 1995 Poland rejected American proposal to sell 45 tanks arguing, that this would contradict to the EU decision not to sell arms to the parts of the conflict in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, after Madrid summit certain symptoms of more close cooperation between former “Visegrad” partners became evident. Just after unofficial meeting in the beginning of October in Maastricht there was a meeting of the defense ministers of three candidates to NATO in Prague. More, new Polish Defense minister Ja.Onyszkiewicz declared, that Polish “attitude to Slovakia is as to the country with aspirations for NATO membership”. He also expressed an opinion that the four-lateral cooperation in the framework of the Visegrad Group will be reanimated, starting on the level of vice-defense ministers. Simultaneously Slovak Defense minister Jan Sitek in his interview to Polish newspaper underscored, that Slovakia aims at military-technical compatibility with NATO and does not buy weapons or equipment in Russia, apart from the necessary spare parts, stressing that Slovakia gets them as a cover of Russian debt to it. New plans to strengthen military-technical cooperation between Poland and Slovakia were underlined by the military officials.

In the sphere of bilateral relations between the CEE countries it cannot be denied, that such issues as border problems and situation of ethnic minorities have been settled mostly due to the conditions, put forward by NATO to its future members. Among the latest examples, practically on the eve of NATO summit in Madrid, the border controversies were settled by two countries that had special interests concerning the meeting: Romania, supported by France, still hoped it could be included in the first wave of enlargement, while Ukraine wanted to get the same special
partnership status with NATO, that Russia signed in Paris on 27 May.

Though these improvements made the CEE region much more stable, Hungary and Romania or Hungary and Slovakia need at least one generation time to get to real stability and overcome former controversies and hostilities.

Simultaneously the rivalry for sooner integration into Western institutions, and first and foremost NATO, between the countries of region continued during the whole period since 1991.

Though the CEE experts do not argue with the conclusion of the American expert J. Simon, that if four conditions concerning civil-military relations are respected by NATO as necessary, most CEE countries would not meet these standards, they try to show, anyway, that Visegrad countries have gone much further on this road and have 'unambiguous advantage' in comparison with the rest of the region.iii

This problem - the relations between 'first wave' countries and outsiders - together with the future of Russia-NATO relations in 1996-1997 was defined by many analysts as a key to the post-Madrid landscape in the Central Eastern Europe and to the implications of the PfP Program and NATO enlargement for the CEE countries.

But, the events and developments of 1997-1998 demonstrated, that apart from this problem two other main European phenomena interfered significantly into the course of domestic and foreign policy making in the Central European states and Russia: namely,

- the actualization of the “double enlargement” (NATO and EU) process and

- activation of Russian European foreign policy and lasting domestic turmoil, the “Russian factor”.
The Double Enlargement

Madrid summit put if not a full stop, but stop and comma in an intrigue over NATO enlargement and pushed up to the first priorities of the agenda the problems of European Union enlargement.

Firstly, this process acquired a strong additional momentum due to the pressure of the CEE countries, for whom EU membership means at least not less than membership in NATO for getting their final European identity and is of vital significance for the development of economic reforms.

Secondly, the EU expansion, especially after decision on NATO enlargement once more proved and demonstrated the formation of the monopolar - US - system, became one of the most strong means to re-establish European identity for EU leading members, France and Germany in the first row, suffering as well from the loss of self-identification after the end of the Cold War. “Like no other continent, Europe is obsessed with its own meaning and direction. Idealistic and teleological vision of Europe at once inform, legitimate, and are themselves informed and legitimated by the political development of something now called the European Union. The name “European Union” is itself a product of this approach, for a union is what the EU meant to be, not what it is”, wrote one of the political philosophers of the present T.G.Ash.

Thirdly, deepening of the EU integration, introduction of euro “is the price paid for German unification... This is a price that Kohl wants to pay ... to see the newly united Germany bound firmly and ... “irreversibly” into Europe. Even more than his hero Adenauer, he believes that it is dangerous for Germany, with its erratic history and critical size - “too big for Europe, too small for the world” as Henry Kissinger once pithily observed - to stand alone in the center of Europe...” It is superfluous to repeat, that
these concerns absolutely coincide with and actions are wholeheartedly supported by mini-European giant, namely, Poland. Naturally, in case monetary unification succeeds and EU starts expansion eastward and to the South, the European center of power (according to the geopolitical terminology, becoming more and more popular) will prevent the final establishment of a monopolar system. It is mainly this factor, together with more distant and dim perspectives of the EU enlargement process that defines present Russian approach to it.

Finally, simultaneously the EU enlargement coincides partly with a growing tendency in the United States towards “europeanization” of the Central Eastern Europe integration into the Western world and structures.

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana suggested that the period after Madrid summit opened a new post-post Cold war era in the history: “I would argue that this transition is now coming to an end. Today we are witnessing the end of the post-Cold era. What we have put in its place is a new strategic consensus..., a new transatlantic bargain between Europe and North America. .... If the transatlantic relationship is to remain health in the longer term, a new bargain must include a Europe willing and able to shoulder more responsibility. ... Clearly, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, not the global Partner the US seeks. But these shortcomings do not result from “too much United States”, as some still claim, but from “too little Europe”. That is why the European integration process is not only relevant for Europe’s own identity, but for a new transatlantic relationship as well”. And if to further integrate the new partners to the enhanced Partnership for Peace Program the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was added, to reinforce the European pillar of ‘the bargain’ “the real operational future of a European Security and Defence Identity is now taking shape. With a new command structure, Combined Joint Task Forces, and stronger relations
between NATO and WEU, the stage is set for Europe to play a security role more in line with its economic strength”.\textsuperscript{vii}

In Madrid three components of institutional cooperation of NATO were given special emphasis - WEU (integrated within the EU); ESDI within NATO and OSCE as a regional organisation, “a primary instrument for preventing conflict, enhancing cooperative security and advancing democracy and human rights”.\textsuperscript{viii} The strengthening role of the OSCE is supported by a number of non-NATO states. This component is given also a special attention by Russia, regarding it as a possible alternative to NATO. “The issue of reforming the NATO military-political bloc is coming to the fore in the context of the new political situation in Europe. In our view, NATO must be transformed into a political organisation which would comprise one of the components of European security in the 21st century. This security architecture should be based on the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only international organisation on the continent that fully reflects the interests of all participating states in its activities and ensures that all have equal rights, irrespective of their membership of various unions and alliances”, - sounds the official position, articulated by Marshal Igor Sergeyev, Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{lix}

Analysing the differences and similarities of the two enlargement processes, the outstanding expert Director of SIPRI prof. A.D.Rotfeld underscored, that, on the one hand, their nature and aims are different, and on the other, both institutions have acquired “a new function in the shaping of European security. NATO - along with the PfP, the EAPC and its bilateral security arrangements with Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states - has become more than just a defence alliance: it is now the centre of gravity in the search for a new security order in Europe. The European Union is facing new capabilities within the framework of the CFSP and in close cooperation with the WEU to move beyond rhetoric and declaratory policies and to give a genuine meaning to
the vision of a European Security and Defence Identity”. The researcher stresses, that in the case of NATO the decision about the accession of new members is motivated by the new security environment and is dependent on the decisions of the big powers in the alliance, while the EU is based on consensus. “The NATO enlargement decisions are expressions of arbitrary political will, while the EU requires its new members to undergo much more complex adjustment processes”. (As Keresci Chaba, one of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Ministry high official stressed, NATO compared to the EU is perceived by CEE states as the organisation or integration where sovereignty is not lost partly or completely). Finally, regards A.D.Rotfeld, enlargement of NATO concerns as well the interests of countries remaining outside the alliance, and for this rationale NATO particularly defined its new relations with Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. “The implications of EU enlargement are of a different nature and call for different solutions. Suffice it to say that Russia, which sees new threats in NATO’s eastward enlargement, has not voiced fears concerning EU enlargement and has officially declared its interest in promoting it”.

As many economic and political observers in the West stress, so far Russia has not paid much attention to the EU enlargement and problems that it may pose to Russian-Western relations. “Russia may stub its toes much more painfully on an encroaching EU than on an encroaching NATO. The countries of CEE, and Cyprus, have so far remained fairly open to Russia since the collapse of communism... But as those countries prepare to join the European Union, Russians will find it harder and harder to penetrate the new visa regimes, customs regulations and banking laws. Windows on the West will seem to slam shut again. That may mean trade tensions, especially if Russia sees prospective markets lost. It may mean diplomatic tensions, if Russia sees itself in a contest for influence over other European countries still outside the EU”.
On March 30, 1998 the process of EU enlargement for 10 countries with the associated status started in Brussels. Before at London European Conference EU 15 members and those aspiring for it initiated contacts concerning joint foreign policy, justice and struggle with crime. There the “Partnership for Membership” program was introduced. It was adopted at the ministerial meeting of 15 just before inauguration of the process of EU enlargement. These documents contain concrete tasks to be completed by each of the candidates (but Cyprus) during 3 years. The PfM can be regarded as a “train schedule of reforms for the coming years”, said Piotr Nowina-Konopka, the secretary of European Integration Committee in Poland. And depending on there completion the candidates would get further financial aid from EU (for Poland in 1999 it equals 250 mln euro, and from 2000 - 600 mln euro). For all projects for 10 candidates to EU the European Commission, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and European Investment Bank (apart from independent European Commission injections of 3 bln euro a year starting from 2000) are ready to give preferential credits of 3,5 bln euro. All these, as Polish experts count, will cover 90% of the necessary investments. The 10 candidates in 2000-2006 will get about 75 bln euro as financial aid.

Starting from January 1 1998 Poland has already introduced the visa regime for Russia and Bielorussia, argumenting this measure by the unwillingness of the RF to admit the rules of readmission. This last one presupposes the obligation to readmit not only Russian citizens, that violated the law there, illegally living in Poland, but the citizens of other Eastern countries, that illegally got to Poland. And even most pro-Western Polish experts confess in private, that Russia should not concede to this condition.

Meanwhile Polish leaders promised that the introduction of visa regime towards Ukraine will be delayed for as long as possible. Taking into account, that “Partnership for Membership” program in
its last version (of 25.03.98) doesn’t envisage the introduction of visa regime towards Russia, Bielorussia and Ukraine for 3 years, the hastiness of this action towards Russia and, to the contrary, delay towards Ukraine is undoubtedly politically motivated.

It fact the meeting of the 26 countries (15 + Poland, Czech, Hungary, Slovene, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovak, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus) on March 30, 1998 in Brussels meant, as Polish observers commented, defining the future eastern border of the united Europe.

The main danger that the “double enlargement” contains is, that it may deepen the new division line between the CEE and Russia, as a result of the special mentality and intentions of the CEE countries imposed on their Western EU partners, the mentality, that revealed during the first stage of the process of NATO enlargement. And so far, as the facts mentioned above show, the tendency towards further alienation from the Eastern neighbour prevails in Polish policy, in spite of the significant economic losses (according to some estimations about $3 bln.) from the abrupt cut of the large-scale semi-legal trade, that served the main source of living and income for thousands of Poles.

It is true, that for now Russian approach towards EU enlargement has been mostly positive. Firstly, because, following the inertia of the beginning and first half of the decade it is predominantly perceived as an alternative to NATO enlargement. Secondly, as was mentioned before, the strengthening and enlargement of the EU is comprehended as a possibility to prevent the US monopolar system development. Anyway, facing the new problems, some of which resemble or are of the same nature as those, and mainly the problem of division line, with which Russia had to tackle in connection with NATO expansion, Russia may start revision of its policy towards EU.

In line with this direction of Russian activities lie enhanced efforts towards formation of special ties with two European superpowers - Germany and France, and in general a special
attention put to the development of bilateral ties with European states (Italy, for example). It is no chance that even before Madrid summit many Polish experts and politicians, contemplating on the perspectives of ratification of the Madrid protocols in the national parliaments, said, that the possible problems that may appear they connected mostly with Russian activities to prevent NATO enlargement by means of bilateral diplomacy.

The formation of so-called “troyka” caused a wave of comments, among others in the CEE countries. For instance, commenting the unofficial summit of Yeltsyn, Chirac and Kohl in Moscow in March 1998 Polish mass media stressed, that in Moscow Chirac hinted on special position of France against accepting three Baltic states to NATO and simultaneously proved, that the summit was aimed at increasing the role of Russia in Europe. Chirac considered, that Russia and EU will be important pillars of political, cultural and economic development of the multipolar world in future. Meanwhile special attention of Polish press draw the statements of Kohl, who said, that “European trojka” is not a closed formula, it can be widened by other countries. The new communications lines were mentioned in this connection, Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow (probably, Kijev).³⁷

The impact of the PfP program and perspectives of NATO enlargement on the reform of the military and Russian domestic and foreign policy.

The overwhelming concentration on the NATO enlargement process and efforts to prevent it by all means in 1993-1997 caused long-perspective changes in Russian domestic and foreign policy with, eventually, the consequences of much more significance than the process of alliance expansion itself:

- the hot discussions over NATO expansion in mass media, in which one of the constantly repeated motives was the unfairness of the West to Russia, which by good will withdrew its forces from the
Warsaw Treaty countries and Baltic republics; braking of the agreements on non-NATO expansion eastward achieved during Germany unification - all this enhanced, on the one hand, the feeling of national humiliation, that appeared after dissolution of the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, preconditioned the shift of the public opinion, especially of Russian elite, from strongly pro-Western moods in the beginning of the decade to moderately or strongly anti-Western towards the second half of the 90-s. It is no chance, that anti-NATO expansion approach, as well as foreign policy programs in general, were common for the left and right political parties and forces during the parliamentary elections in 1995 and presidential election of 1996: it was openly admitted by the communists;

- though indirectly, these tendencies in public moods enhances the nationalist tendencies in Russia, that strengthened to the end of the 90-s to the extent, that many politologists and sociologists regard them as a serious threat to Russian democratic development;

- anti-Western and anti-NATO moods dominating in Russian State Duma (lower chamber of the Parliament) precondition the opposition to the ratification of the basic arms control agreements and treaties, first and foremost START-2, hindering the progress in this field in general;

- overconcentration on NATO expansion that enhanced overconcentration on the West, mostly the United States, in Russian foreign policy, distorted partly the balance in its foreign policy agenda, drawing away the attention from what was called at that time "near abroad", i.e. the CIS, added to the semi-neglect of its regional directions (Middle East, Persian Gulf etc.), further spoiled the relations with the CEE countries. Simultaneously, the issue provided additional grounds and bargaining cards for irritating Russia to its neighbours, first and foremost Ukraine and the Baltic countries. The situation aggravated seriously when some
of the former Soviet republics were declared as of strategic interests to the United States (mostly for geo-economic reasons);

- NATO expansion preconditioned to a great extent the return to a geopolitical thinking, to an approach in terms of spheres of influence, that replaced the concepts of all-European home etc. As a result, some steps of Russian foreign policy in certain regions, relations with some states (Iran, Iraq, China) are regarded and interpreted in mass media not in their own value, but in context with that same process of NATO expansion, thus giving these relations an additional compensatory function and in this way causing further deterioration of the understanding with the West;

- the participation in the PfP program and good relations with Brussels and Washington recently became the instrument of the political pressure for one of parts to the conflicts in the CIS, where Russia realises peace-keeping functions, first and foremost in Abchazia.

Unfortunately the articulation of the significance of Russia’s participation in all security endeavours and initiatives of the West started too late to prevent all these negative developments.

All positive aspects of NATO transformation and enlargement “would not amount to much if we would neglect cooperation with the major great power to our East - Russia. Indeed, how Russia settles herself within the new Europe is perhaps the most important single factor that will determine the quality of European security in the years ahead”, stressed NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs D.McConnell in the beginning of 1998. If these words were repeated in 1993-1995 it would be possible to avoid at least some of the problems that Russia and the West face at present.

Though the Founding Act caused hot discussions and was regarded as a significant step in the development of Russian-NATO relations, and NATO officials usually present the new cooperation in the Permanent Joint Council as a sort of a breakthrough, in Russia dominates the view, that it did not change the essence or
mechanism of these relations substantially. As many Russian observers note\textsuperscript{lxv}, most proposals, agreed upon in Paris, on practical military cooperation remain on paper, while the activities of Russian military representative group in NATO headquarters is evaluated as very limited due to an insufficient, low level of its leaders. It allows only for decision-making concerning the organisational and functional issues of this group itself in the NATO HQ. It is stressed, that still BiG remains the only real testground for Russian-NATO interaction, and this one does not provide for operational-tactical and operational compatibility. Thus practically a year later some new attempts to “elaborate a new special program of involvement of Russia into North-Atlantic alliance”\textsuperscript{lxvi} were undertaken.

Nevertheless, though there remains an anti-NATO expansion posture and the attitude towards the PfP participation remains pessimistic, it is commonly accepted, that there doesn’t exist any real threat to Russian security from the Western flank.

According to the plans of the military reform, based on the premises that in foreseeable future there does not exist any substantial outward threat to Russian security, Russian land forces should be not only reduced, but reorganised as well. 8 of present military districts will get the higher status of operational-strategic and operational-territorial commands, subordinated directly to the General Staff and Ministry of Defence. 5 operational-strategic districts will comprise one or two divisions fully manned and staffed to be ready in one day time to “cover” a dangerous part of the state border, while the operational-territorial commands (Volga, Urals and Siberian) will provide for mobilisation of reserve. As military experts stress, such a reorganisation is not something absolutely new and partly corresponds to the former Soviet structure.

Anyway, there is a new element, concerning an unprecedented operational, coordinating control - even in piece
time - of the chiefs of the operational-strategic commands over all the military and armed units of other institutions and special services, including border, interior, railway troops and Federal agency of governmental communication and information (FAGCI). Apart from the military sensibility\textsuperscript{lvii}, many Russian observers doubt whether such wide prerogatives and power won't convert into a sort of General-Governor power: in the end of the 19th century during the military reform of D.Milutin the commanders of the districts were usually simultaneously the general-governors, concentrating in this way the military and civil powers in one person's hands, fulfilling the military-command and administrative functions.\textsuperscript{lviii} In such a scenario the civil control of the military turns to its opposite

There are no valid grounds for early conclusions. Yet it could not be denied, that at present in Russia the generals acquire a growing attractiveness for the Russian electorate, which establishes an obvious and paradoxical controversy to the rapidly decaying prestige of the military in the society, and is preconditioned by the general fatigue with the governmental policy, frustration and longing for an “order”. Former generals A.Rutskoy and A.Lebed, colonel Alexey Lebed (the brother of Alexander) - using exactly their “general” image - were already elected as governors of three Russian regions - Kursk, Krasnojarsk and Chakassija. Whether the combination of such a wide scale of prerogatives and control in the hands of chiefs of the OSC won't add to the possibility of a shift to the general-governorship and in this way further delay the introduction of the civil control over the military in Russia remains an open question.

The military reform itself caused an additional round of political tension. In many cases, it is not that much a military expediency of the reductions, or to the contrary, of preservation of the types of Armed Forces, that counts, but political and personal ambitions of the military commanders that really matter. Thus, the liquidation of the Air Forces as an independent force and their
integration with the Strategic Task Missile Forces is interpreted by many Russian observers as a matter of personal preferences of the present Minister of Defence.

Of no less importance is the aspect of the military reform that concerns a significant portion of Russian population and industries, namely the military building. The crisis of the military-industrial complex led to the situation, that now in Russia the state order for the new weapons systems has drastically diminished, while the arms export remains practically the only means of keeping the MIC afloat. Some sources\textsuperscript{[lxix]} say, that more than 70% of the MIC financing in 1995-1997 was provided due to the MTC. Some of the most advanced systems, like C-300, diesel submarines and others were produced only for exports. (As the new head of the “Rosvooruzhenije” company Ye.Ananiev stressed in the interview to TV on April 28, 1998, Russia has no means for production of the C-300 systems without contracts. Thus they are constructed only after the contract is signed). It is from the export revenues that the military R&D is financed. To the contrary, the critics of Russian arms exporters say that in practice Russian producers get minimum from the arms sales, while the major part of the revenues is taken by exporters, mainly “Rosvooruzhenije” due to the lack of the control.

During the last 6 years the value of the defence industries decreased 11 times, while the export of the high-tech production decreased to the level of 1% of the whole production value. The expenses for perspective scientific research fell 15 times. The federal program on conversion of the defence industries in 1995 was financed only for 15%, while in 1997 for 0%.

The figures presented by the new head of “Rosvooruzhenije” cannot be accepted as the “last truth” exactly for the same reason of the personal political ambitions that was mentioned in connection with the reform of the military, reconstruction of Armed Forces: the struggle for the leading posts in the company is severe and Ye.Ananiev used traditional tactics\textsuperscript{[lxx]} of blaming his
predecessors (A.Kotelkin) for the difficulties of the corporation and re-addressing to them the accusations in ineffectiveness and financial machinations. The “last truth” is hardly to be discovered also due to the specific nature of this branch, as well as corruption in Russian high bureaucratic circles. Nevertheless all that does not change the general dramatic picture of Russian defence industries.

The situation of high independence and weak control over the sphere of arms exports led to the devaluation of the national political component in this sphere and as a result to the situation, when the interests of the arms exporters and foreign policy makers have not been closely coordinated. In future that may lead to the distortions in the foreign policy. Several deals of Russian arms exporters (with China, Cyprus) have already caused negative reaction of NATO countries. In fact the situation with arms sales to China seemed to enhance the motivation of Russian-Chinese rapprochement in Russian foreign policy as a reaction to NATO expansion eastward, though two - western and eastern - directions in Russian foreign policy have sufficiently strong independent motivations.

Among positive effects of internationalisation of Russian activities in the military field the special training and creation of a legal framework, corresponding to the international norms and standards, for peace-keeping should be mentioned. If at the initial stage of peace-making in Abchazia, for example, the activities of Russia there were mostly interpreted and in fact did not correspond to the principle of impartiality, the military were not adequately trained and provided with a coherent mandate, now, to the contrary, they are often blamed by parts to the conflict for not crossing and strictly keeping to their mandate, not fulfilling the police forces tasks.

Though very slowly and on a very low scale Russian military have started to participate in the PfP Program exercises. The news on joint PfP exercises in Denmark with participation of Russian unit, held in Spring 1998, were covered by all Russian TV
channels. Anyway, for financial reasons and, more significant, for the lack of political will, the activization of Russian participation in the PfP Program is hardly expectable. Simultaneously, for the reasons described above, Russia nervously reacts to the PfP exercises held with the participation and on the territories of the CIS countries, especially in Ukraine.

**Conclusion**

Short, but extremely intensive the last decade of the millennium brought revolutionary dramatic changes into the geopolitical map of the world. The dissolution of the Eastern block structures and institutions, WTO and Comecon, the collapse of the Soviet empire ruined the basis of the bipolar world, its logic and deprived the Western block structures and institutions, first and foremost NATO of their grounds. As revolution, fortunately, did not cause the wars or international conflicts, there were no conditions for the establishment of the new solid framework that could provide for the obvious and clear shape of the new world structure. As many political thinkers in the mid-90-s observed, the long period of the Cold War confrontation did not get the traditional peaceful resolution, and that caused a serious trouble - politicians in the West, but mostly in the Central Eastern Europe longed for the full stop, the clear-cut line between the past and the future.

The concept of enlargement of NATO, the only politically and militarily valid institution that remained in the transatlantic space, providing for the anchoring of the unified Germany and simultaneously for American presence in Europe, and - most important - for the keeping of the border between the West and the East, or in other dimension - between the future and the past, became the straw, that the new democracies in the CEE region grasped. In this way the framework of the past was inserted into the new reality, drawing, thus, this last to the past. The PfP Program was established as a sort of a remedy to reconcile these
two incompatible dimensions, as an attempt not to alienate the countries remaining on the other side of the new border. The mistake with the PfP was that it was wrongly interpreted by Russia as an alternative to NATO enlargement. When the error became evident the disillusion in the belief of the “true” partnership with the West became even more bitter.

Thus, the implications of the NATO enlargement and the PfP program in the CEE countries and in Russia were different, drawing the first, though with serious deviations, into the new future, while pushing the latter into the opposite direction.

As a result the West and Russia meet the third millennium in a new geopolitical configuration, with the new challenges and deadly threats (the most vivid example of them gave the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan), that need a joint effort to overcome, but with the old thinking patterns, that survived to a significant extent due to the concept and practice of NATO enlargement and present the most serious obstacle to the joint search of the new solutions.

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3 The concept of Central Eastern Europe has drastically changed in 1989-1991 due to the dramatic changes in the region. The historical notion of Central European region comprised the countries according to their geographical position, which predominantly lacked political sovereignty belonging to imperial or quasi-imperial formations in this part of the world. On the brink of the 90-is and later due to political changes in Europe not only political landscape in Central Europe (which after 1945 due to soviet dominance acquired the definition of Eastern Europe, thus signaling mostly of the nature of political regimes in the countries) but its very geography changed: now under Central Eastern European region the politicians and political scientists mostly understand former Comecon and WTO states and European NIS - three Baltic countries, Belorussia and Ukraine. In details see: Bernard von Plate. Crises in Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe: A Challenge to the European Institutions, in: The Political and Strategic Implications of the State Crises in Central and Eastern Europe. ed. by Armand Clesse and Andrei Kortunov. Luxembourg, 1993; Naumann Fr. Das Mitteleuropa. Berlin, 1915; A.Miller. On the history of the concept of "Central Europe" - in Central Europe as a historical region". Moscow 1996, pp.4-23 (in Russian); Kloczkowski J. Europa Środkowowschodnia w historiografii krajow regionu. Lublin, 1993. ss.7-19. Halecki O. East Central Europe in the Postwar Organization. The Historical Role of Central-Eastern Europe. - The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science. July 1943, March 1944. Ash T.G. Mitteleuropa? -

"Interview of Ye.Primakov to "Obschaja gazeta", No.37, 21-27 September 1996 (in Russian)


"Russia and NATO. Theses of the Council on foreign and defense policy. - "Nezavisimaya gazeta", 21 June 1995 (in Russian)

"Obschaja gazeta", op.cit.


Ibid. 27-28.01.1990.

Quoted by "Gazeta Wyborcza", 9-10.01.1993.

Interview to "Lidove Noviny", 8.01.1994.

Hungarian "Nepszabatsag" quoted by ITAR-TASS. 6.01.1994.


NATO Press Communiqué, M-1 (94)2, Brussels, 10 January 1994.


Quoted by ITAR-TASS, 3.04.94.


This argument is popular not only in Russia but has proponents in the West as well. Thus one of the most tough anti-Soviet American analysts E.Luttwak considers, that as soon as Poland enters NATO the institutions will stop being effective and will turn into one more talking shop like the UN. All the alliances, that Poland has ever entered, collapsed, concludes E.Luttwak his article "Add Poland, No Security". - "Moscow Times", 15 April 1997.


Polska Agencja Prasowa (PAP) 10.11.1992

"Gazeta Wyborcza", 13.11.1992

"Rzeczpospolita", 24.04.1996


"Rzeczpospolita", 3.04.94.

"Rzeczpospolita", 6.03.1996

ITAR-TASS, 31.05.1996


"Rzeczpospolita" 29.11.1996

Ibidem.


Ibidem.

"Rzeczpospolita", 17.09.1997

"Segodnia", 14.04.1998

"Perestroika voennogo komandovaniya: vazhnaja zadacha menialjushcheiasia NATO".

"Novosti NATO", February-March 1998.


“Mlada Fronta Dnes”, 8.10.1997

“Rzeczpospolita 24.04.1996


Unofficial surveys confirmed that the majority of officers would not fight in a conflict if the enemy was Russia. - Zerkalo Nedeli, no.17, April-6 May 1996. Quoted by: Tor Bukkvoll. Ukraine and European Security. Chattam House Papers. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1997, p. 22


“Rzeczpospolita”, 23.05.1996.

Russian-Polish cooperation in the military field is based on five agreements achieved and signed by the MoDs of the states in July 1993 valid for five years and in case there are no objections are automatically prolonged for the next five years.

According to Polish expert A.Ananicz there are no obstacles for purchases of certain types of arms in Russia if they correspond to that of NATO members and make possible cooperation with NATO. At the same time these arms are to be compatible in the world arms markets and Poland should get consent for sales of the purchased arms or spare parts that are produced in cooperation with other partners. Getting the licenses that put limits on Poland is not in Polish interests.

“Rzeczpospolita”, 30.10.1996.

“Rzeczpospolita”, 3.04.1998

ibidem.


Ibid, p.58

“The End of the Post-Cold War Era”. Speech by the Secretary General at the XXXIV Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 7th/8th Feb.1998.

Ibidem.

Ibidem.


We are not adversaries, we are partners”. -“NATO Review”. Spring 1998.


Interview to Kazakhstan Pravda, • 202, 1997

“Economist”, May 9th 1998

“Rzeczpospolita”. 27.03.98


“Nezavisimaja gazeta”, 23.04.98

“Nezavisimaja gazeta”, 23.04.98

The doubts mainly concern the sufficiency of the forces after reduction (from 1200 to 350 thousand people) on the Central Chinese and Baikal strategic directions.

“Moscow news”, No.11, 1998

Business in Russia, • 87, March 1998, p.48

“Commerzent-Daily”, 15.05.98