1. Introduction

Several years after the erosion of the bipolar postwar international order, no clear picture has emerged about the status and the future prospects of a new pan-European regime for stability and non-conflictual development on the continent.\(^1\) While the predictability and stability of the Cold War were replaced by uncertainties over the nature and direction of future risks and challenges, policy-makers and other analysts were tested to the limit by questions concerning European security. Why is it necessary to have so many institutions to take care of security in Europe? Is it not an obstacle to efficient crisis management in Europe? Does it not produce an unnecessary overlapping and unreliable division of labour?\(^2\) Do institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world? Are institutions likely to lead to more failures in the future?\(^3\)

The various theories offer distinct propositions concerning “the readiness and ability of modern states to subject their relationship to each other as well as their policies to a common procedure and common oversight”.\(^4\) According to Patricia Chilton “multilateralism and defence cooperation are the name of the game, and the trick is organising multilateralism in one’s own interest”.\(^5\)

This report’s approach draws on Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s institutionalist perspective as the context for examining efforts “to turn the potential for mutual institutional reinforcement in the security realm into actual functioning operation”.\(^6\) Here, the principle focus is not on the structure of the international system, or on the interactions between domestic politics and international relations; rather it is on international political processes.\(^7\) As Keohane and Nye suggest there is “variation across time and space in the ability of states to communicate and cooperate with one another, and that increases in the ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for redefining interests and for pursuing different strategies”.\(^8\)

A central assumption of the institutionalist approach is:
that despite the lack of common government in international politics, sustained cooperation is possible under some fairly well defined conditions. These conditions include the existence of mutual interests that make joint (Pareto-improving) gains from cooperation possible; long-term relationships among a relatively small number of actors; and the practice of reciprocity according to agreed-upon standards of appropriate behavior. Such cooperation is not the antithesis of conflict but constitutes a process for the management of conflict. International institutions can facilitate such a process of cooperation by providing opportunities for negotiations, reducing uncertainty about others’ policies, and by affecting leaders’ expectations about the future. Thus, international institutions can affect the strategies states choose and the decisions they make.\textsuperscript{9}

It can be seen that this is by no means a simple-minded realist approach of the kind articulated by John J. Mearsheimer, who predicted that West European states will begin “viewing each other with greater fear and suspicion, as they did for centuries before the onset of the Cold War”, and to worry “about the imbalances in gains as well as the loss of autonomy that results from cooperation”.\textsuperscript{10} Rather it concurs with Brian Urquart’s suggestion that “the first item of a future security agenda must be to preserve, rationalise and strengthen the international and multilateral framework that has been built up over the last fifty years”.\textsuperscript{11} Tellingly, Keohane and Nye note that “international institutions facilitate policy coordination among powerful states and reduce the likelihood of mutually harmful competition among them for spheres of influence; they therefore serve these states’ interests”.\textsuperscript{12}

The importance of this approach to an analysis of change in the European order is plain. Keohane and Nye’s argument that institutions can help promote cooperation is an important contribution to an understanding of the ways in which states from the strongest to the weakest can be seen in the changing European context. As Christoph Bertram opined:

In times of certainty, institutions mirror the realities of power. In times of uncertainty, they can shape the realities of power. If no institutions to
channel change existed, they would have to be invented. European stability is to a very great degree defined by the stability of European institutions.\textsuperscript{13}

The research design of this report is based on an empirical observation and a theoretical claim. The observation is that in Europe institutions have worked. As Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann pointed out: “...how governments reacted to the end of the Cold War was profoundly conditioned by the existence of international institutions. Europe was an institutionally dense environment in which the expectations of states' leaders were shaped by the rules and practices of institutions, and in which they routinely responded to initiatives from international organisations, as well as using those organizations for their own purposes”.\textsuperscript{14} The theoretical claim is that such “interlocking” institutions,\textsuperscript{15} a concept which connotes a web of multilateral organisations, are likely to prove more effective, both for preserving the transatlantic link – by providing rapid and effective consultation on issues of common concern, allowing freedom for prompt political action, and by developing the most effective and legitimising combinations of national military forces – and for ensuring constant stimulus and development in the institutions themselves.\textsuperscript{16} As Stefan Fröjlich underlined: “...despite all its current shortcomings, a model of overlapping institutions, in which the emerging European structures are strengthened within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, is for the time being the only conceivable avenue to the evolution of a functioning European security system”.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, this model of overlapping security institutions is allegedly the most solid ground for asserting the necessity of maintaining an American presence and role in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{18}

While security institutions are clearly undergoing considerable change, although “ever so reluctantly, as they remain the captives of member states who respond to the vagaries of their own national agenda”,\textsuperscript{19} it is the developing relationship between NATO and WEU which is the focus of this report, especially the institutional and practical aspects of the linkages between the two organisations.

Traditionally, WEU has had a special relationship with NATO ever since WEU member states recognised, in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, “the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO” and
agreed to “rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters”. This logic remains relevant but must be understood in the light of NATO’s wish, expressed on several occasions, for the strengthening of “the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union”. The Brussels 1994, the Berlin 1996 and the Madrid 1997 NATO Summits paved the way for close cooperation between WEU and NATO by fully appreciating the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance; making collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance available to the WEU; and by developing the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) – “a bridge linking WEU and NATO” – as a means of facilitating operations under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.

This study’s main concern is not to provide a precise chronological survey of the NATO-WEU relationship, but to consider the nature and prospects of the development of further transatlantic cooperation in the security and defence area in order to maintain, improve or restore security in Europe by reflecting on two factors: (i) the way in which WEU implements its intention of becoming fully operational in the framework of post-1996 IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) defence arrangements in Europe; and (ii) the implementation of the Alliance’s decision to make its collective assets available to WEU and of the CJTF concept.
2. Strengthening WEU’s operational capabilities

Only six months after the Treaty on European Union had been signed, WEU member states adopted the Petersberg Declaration, which can be considered a first attempt to rethink and reformulate WEU’s dual role as the defence component of the European Union and as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. In order to make WEU an effective instrument to cope with the new post-Cold War security challenges, the Petersberg Declaration stated that apart from its traditional collective defence role (Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty), “military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

Although the Petersberg Declaration clearly outlined WEU’s role in the new Europe, it was also acknowledged that WEU would remain a “phantom power with a paper army” if its operational capabilities would not be enhanced significantly. Since Petersberg, WEU has taken a number of steps towards that end. The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the latest endeavours of developing WEU’s military capacity, to act upon request from the European Union or to deal independently with crises involving European interests, including those in the wider framework of cooperation with NATO.

2.1 Planning Cell. The Planning Cell, which was set up on 1 October 1992 and became operational in May 1993, is composed of civilian and military staff and has the following main tasks: “to prepare contingency plans for the deployment of forces under WEU auspices; to prepare recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; to keep an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.”
Meeting in Noordwijk in the Netherlands in November 1994, the WEU Council decided to review the tasks and composition of the Planning Cell to give priority to “the development of appropriate plans and procedures for humanitarian and rescue operations, including evacuation operations”. As a result of that decision, the tasks of the Cell were enlarged to include, in addition to the objectives defined in 1992, the following: “the compilation of an inventory of rules of engagement; the preparation of standard operating procedures for the selected headquarters; the monitoring of the situation in potential trouble spots; the preparation of exercise plans and evaluation of their results for future planning; and finally, a wider reflection on the development of a military capability for WEU. In time of crisis the planning cell would be expected to provide advice to the WEU authorities on the practicability and nature of any WEU involvement; and to co-ordinate the preparation of deployment of forces under WEU auspices until this function is assumed by a designated joint headquarters”.

The Planning Cell has been involved in incorporating into WEU doctrine the lessons learnt from the three WEU operations, all terminated in 1996, in and around former Yugoslavia: the Danube sanctions operation with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania; the joint Adriatic sanctions operation with NATO; and the Mostar police operation in support of the EU Administrator there. Moreover, in the area of exercises and training, the Planning Cell co-led a WEU fact-finding mission on African peacekeeping in August 1996 and tested WEU’s crisis management doctrine in a combined crisis management, command-post and live exercise – CRISEX 95/96.

Since 1995, the Planning Cell has an Intelligence Section which “monitors and reports on crises designated by the Permanent Council and passively tracks other potential ‘hotspots’ on the basis of information supplied by nations or other organisations”. The Intelligence Section “now receives a periodic and frequent feed from a number of WEU member nations and puts out, to those concerned, a classified weekly intelligence summary, including assessments in the four regions where the Planning Cell is formally tasked by the Permanent Council to monitor and report: Albania; the Great Lakes region in Africa; former Yugoslavia; and Somalia.”
Finally, in WEU’s Ministerial Council in Rhodes, on 12 May 1998, ministers “approved the document on the Terms of Reference of the WEU Planning Cell, which has been elaborated on the basis of the developments in WEU’s operational capabilities, including the decisions taken in Paris and Erfurt on the implementation of the military committee and on the WEU Military Staff. Ministers looked forward to the elaboration of Terms of Reference for a dedicated Planning Cell unit, as part of the implementation of decisions taken at Erfurt on the participation of WEU nations concerned in planning for operations to which they contribute”.33

2.2 Satellite Centre. A WEU Satellite Centre has been established in Torrejón in Spain to train “European experts in the photo-interpretation of satellite-derived data, to compile and process accessible data and to make those data available to member states, particularly within the framework of the verification of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring and environmental monitoring”.34

On 27 April 1993, the Helios Memorandum of Understanding was signed between WEU and the defence ministers of Spain, France and Italy, authorising the Centre to receive images from the only European military optical observation satellite. The first images from the Helios satellite arrived at the Centre on 3 May 1996.35 In 1997, the WEU Council, meeting in Paris, approved the Concept Paper for the WEU Satellite Centre, the implementation of which “should contribute significantly to full use being made of the Centre for the benefit of WEU. In particular, the paper further defines and fixes the priorities for the missions of the Centre in the supply of information resulting from the interpretation of space imagery”.36

The Satellite Centre’s operational mission includes the following, in order of priority:

• General security surveillance: general surveillance of areas declared to be of interest by WEU; assistance in verifying the application of treaties; assistance in controlling armaments and proliferation.
• Support to Petersberg tasks.
• Surveillance in more specific areas: maritime monitoring; environmental monitoring.\textsuperscript{37}

As Bernard Molard, Director of the WEU Satellite Centre, noted:

The images are acquired to answer questions posed by the WEU Council, the Member States, the Associate Members and any other requester authorized by the Council. NATO and the European Union may also take advantage of the Centre’s work...During the Great Lakes crisis, and more recently in Albania, the Centre was able to demonstrate its comprehensive savoir-faire at very short notice. In both cases, the first dossiers were on the Council's table four days after the Planning Cell asked for them. Space imagery covering the whole of Albania was acquired within forty-eight hours. Over fifty dossiers have been prepared to date on the various sites designated by the Planning Cell or the Situation Centre.\textsuperscript{38}

2.3 \textit{FAWEU}.\textsuperscript{39} Forces Answerable to WEU have been defined to be used, apart from contributing to Allied defence, for Petersberg operations. These consist of:

\textit{The European Corps.} At the WEU Council of Ministers in Rome, on 19 May 1993, ministers from France, Germany and Belgium declared the European Corps as Forces Answerable to WEU. The principal document for the European Corps is the \textit{Report of La Rochelle} of May 1992, in which France and Germany laid down the outline principles for a multinational major formation.\textsuperscript{40} On 21 January 1993, the \textit{Report of La Rochelle} was supplemented by the \textit{SACEUR Agreement} signed by the French Admiral Jacques Lanxade, the German General Klaus Naumann and SACEUR General John M. Shalikashvili.\textsuperscript{41}

In 1994 Spain joined the Corps as did Luxembourg in 1995, making a total of five nations. A “Joint Declaration stating the conditions for the use of the European Corps in the framework of the Western European Union” was agreed on 20 September 1993. The Joint Declaration states that the corps could be subordinated, after a decision of the Council for use, to a command designated by WEU, for which the participating states will set up a joint committee for internal coordination. The European Corps can be
deployed for all the tasks specified in the Petersberg declaration and its use by WEU would be based on plans formulated by the operation commander designated by WEU, in cooperation with the WEU Planning Cell.

Since 1995 the European Corps has been operational with its headquarters in Strasbourg. A Belgian Lieutenant General presently commands the Corps. If all possible troops were assigned to the Corps, it would have an overall strength of approximately 60,000. The major components are: 1st Mechanised Division, with its headquarters in Saive in Belgium; 10th Panzerdivision, with its headquarters in Sigmaringen in Germany; part of the 21st Mechanised Division, with its headquarters in Burgos in Spain (the complete Division later in 1998); 1st Armoured Division from France, with its headquarters in Baden-Baden in Germany; and a reconnaissance company from Luxembourg. The staff in the headquarters in Strasbourg includes airforce and navy liaison teams since the Corps may well be involved in joint operations. Although the European Corps has an agreement with NATO, its priority mission is within the framework of WEU.

United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force. At the WEU Council meeting in Rome, the governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands confirmed that they were prepared to make the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force (UK/NL AF) available for military tasks under WEU auspices. The landing force of the UK/NL AF is based on the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines (UK), which is essentially a light infantry brigade whose priority role is amphibious warfare. The main participation from the Netherlands is based on the 1st Bn RNLMC. The landing force is a rapidly deployable and lightly equipped unit that operates independently. The size of the unit is bigger than its army equivalent because the complexity of amphibious warfare demands substantial organic fire support and self defence capabilities, consistent with linkage to amphibious force shipping, the expeditionary nature and the theatre entry demands. In times of peace, the landing force is over 6,000 strong.¹²
**Multinational Division Central (Airmobile).** In Rome, the countries participating in the Multinational Division Central MND(C) – the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany – confirmed that they were prepared to make the Division available for military tasks under WEU auspices. The Division has its headquarters in Monchengladbach in Germany. There are currently four national brigades assigned to the Division. These are: the Belgian Para Commando Brigade, with its headquarters in Leuven; the German 315 Luftlande Brigade, with its headquarters in Oldenburg; the 11th Netherlands Airmobile Brigade, with its headquarters in Arnheim; and the 24th UK Airmobile Brigade located in Colchester. The two first-mentioned brigades are airborne whereas the two latter ones are both airmobile. As a light Division, the MND(C) is strategically more mobile than heavier formations. All together, the Division could muster more than 200 helicopters. MND(C) is primarily a NATO assigned formation, but with an agreement for WEU use.

**EUROFOR-EUROMARFOR.** At the WEU Ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 15 May 1995, France, Italy and Spain declared that the Rapid Deployment Euroforce (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) would be Forces Answerable to WEU and would be used as a priority in this framework. At the same time Portugal formally asked to participate in these forces. In November 1995 the “Joint Declaration by Spain, France, Italy and Portugal on the conditions of employment of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR in the framework of WEU” was approved. According to the Joint Declaration the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR initiatives are meant to contribute to the creation of a military capability for Europe, notably in the field of force projection; create a multinational base structure for member states of WEU that wish to participate in its operations; contribute, while respecting the content of the Petersberg declaration, to initiatives of international organisations, to promote and maintain peace and security.

The EUROFOR has its headquarters in Florence in Italy and is presently commanded by a Spanish Major General. The force will provide a rapid-reaction land capability, equipped with easily deployable light forces with a level of availability adapted to the mission it is to carry out. The size of the force to be used may vary from a small formation to a light division,
using a modular system depending on the mission. EUROFOR headquarters is already declared operational; EUROFOR as a force is expected to be declared operational after the exercise EOLO in Summer 1998.

The Force Commander of EUROMARFOR (COMEUROMARFOR) is assigned for a one-year mandate, on a rotational basis between ALFLOT (Spain), CECMED (France), CINCNAV (Italy) and COMNAV (Portugal). At present, Italy holds the command. The force is a non-standing preconfigured, multinational maritime force having both maritime and amphibious capabilities. Each nation will identify units periodically, in order to allow the commander to carry out any tasks he may be assigned. A typical composition for certain tasks of this force could be: one aircraft carrier, four to six escort units, a landing force of maximum brigade size, amphibious vessels depending on the landing force and one combat resupply vessel. If the nature of the task so requires, maritime patrol aircraft, minesweepers, submarines or other types of vessels will be used.

1st German/Netherlands Corps. On 6 October 1997, the Dutch and the German defence ministers declared their preparedness to offer to WEU the headquarters of the 1(GE/NL) Corps, including appropriate command and control support for operations under WEU auspices. In addition to its NATO roles, the headquarters of the 1(GE/NL) Corps may be employed by WEU for Petersberg tasks. This includes the execution of missions of the Corps headquarters as a multinational headquarters in WEU-led operations. The Corps headquarters offers support in the planning and preparation for WEU operations, in accordance with established procedures. The Corps Commander is a German Lieutenant General and its headquarters is located in Munster, Germany. It consists of the 1st Mechanised Division in Schaarsbergen in the Netherlands and the 1st GE Armoured Division in Hannover, totalling some 40,000 strong. It also consists of the binational Brigade Support Group in Eibergen in the Netherlands. Both divisions have their organic combat, combat support, C2, logistic and medical troops and as such they are self supporting to the greatest possible extent.
Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force. During the meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODs) on 27 and 28 October 1997 in Bonn, it was announced that Italy and Spain had signed an agreement on the concept of a Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) and that it could be placed at the disposal of the WEU. The SIAF does not imply the setting up of a new force, but rather the merging of pre-existing national forces and it does not involve the establishment of a headquarters. It is a pre-structured, non-permanent force, whose national amphibious components will retain their operational and organic chains of command. The only permanent elements will be a small nucleus of officers, which will be part of the General Staff of the force of the other country. Operations conducted by SIAF will be related to Petersberg missions within the European and NATO framework and as a specialised component of already existing European and Allied multinational forces.

2.4 Situation Centre. The Council meeting in Noordwijk in November 1994, declared that “The Secretariat and Planning Cell need to be complemented by capacities in the area of intelligence and crisis management in order to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Petersberg Declaration: for instance a situation centre and an intelligence section, which are already under study”.

The Situation Centre became operational in June 1996.

The Situation Centre operates under the authority of the Secretary General through the Director of the Planning Cell and on the instructions of the Council and/or the Polita-Military Group (PMG). Its main mission is to monitor crisis areas designated by the Council, as well as the progress of WEU operations. It collects and produces the information required for the PMG’s preparation of Council decisions on crisis management and the politico-military control of operations.

2.5 Military Committee. At its meeting in Paris on 13 May 1997, the WEU Council of Ministers approved the proposal of the Chiefs of Defence Staff to clarify and strengthen their role within WEU and to improve the functioning of the Military Delegates Group (MDG). In accordance with this proposal, the ministers decided to establish, under the Council’s authority, “a military committee consisting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff
represented, in permanent session, by the Military Delegates Group under a permanent Chairman”. They further instructed the Permanent Council to work out the detailed implementation of this decision. They also asked the Permanent Council to study all the ensuing institutional implications and to present proposals to the next Ministerial Council for any further adaptations that might prove necessary, within the current politico-military crisis management arrangements.

At their meeting in Erfurt on 18 November 1997, the WEU ministers welcomed “the progress achieved since their meeting in Paris, in the implementation of their decision to establish a military committee of WEU” and approved “the recommendation of the Permanent Council on the implementation of the military committee and the reorganisation of the military structure at WEU headquarters to coincide with the rotation of the Director of the Planning Cell in 1998”. Moreover, they noted “that the responsibilities of the military committee as regards WEU’s contribution to NATO defence planning will have to be clarified”.47

The Military Committee, which is the senior military authority in WEU, consists of the CHODs of the full member, associate member and observer states, supported by the WEU military staff, but it may meet in other configurations, including associate partners, on a case-by-case basis and may also invite other participants to take part in relevant work.48

The Military Committee will be responsible to the WEU Council for the general conduct of WEU’s military affairs. It will participate in the politico-military decision taking process in WEU by providing advice on military and operational matters to the Council, based, as a rule, on consensus. The main responsibilities of the Military Committee are as follows:

- to recommend to the WEU Council the military measures necessary for the implementation of Petersberg tasks;
- to discuss and develop consolidated views on WEU military issues and advise the WEU Council accordingly;
• to provide military advice as necessary on all matters relating to Forces Answerable to WEU and to NATO assets and capabilities to be transferred to WEU;
• to evaluate plans, such as contingency and operation plans, or subsequent modifications to already approved plans, and provide military advice on plans;
• to assist in the provision of military intelligence to WEU’s relevant bodies where appropriate;
• to exercise the CHODs’ prerogatives defined by agreed documents in regard to the mandate of Eurolongterm, WELG and Eurocom, taking into account the particular status of these groups and WMWG;
• to participate in WEU’s contribution to NATO’s defence planning process and provide military advice to the WEU Council in accordance with modalities to be determined;
• to contribute to strengthening the military cooperation and consultation processes between WEU and NATO, especially when WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities are being considered or implemented;
• to formulate military advice on crisis situations, enabling the WEU Council to take decisions to mount an operation and improve the arrangements for an operation in progress if necessary and to decide when an operation should end;
• to recommend to the WEU Council measures in order to improve the operational development of WEU;
• to task, notwithstanding the WEU Council’s prerogatives, all military components of WEU headquarters through the Director of the Military Structure and to inform the WEU Council accordingly.

As is the present practice the CHODs will continue to meet twice a year, in principle before ministerial meetings of the WEU Council, and whenever necessary. To enable the Military Committee to operate in permanent session with genuine authority to express military advice, each CHOD is to nominate a permanent military delegate to represent him. When the CHODs are not in session, the Military Delegates Committee (MDC) will address military questions on their behalf.

2.6 Reorganisation of the military structure at WEU headquarters.
As a logical consequence of the Council’s decision to establish a Military
Committee the military structure at WEU headquarters had to be reorganised. Decisions to that effect were taken at the WEU Council’s Ministerial meeting at Erfurt with the proviso that this reorganisation should coincide with the rotation of the Director of the Planning Cell in 1998 – effective from 14 May 1998.

Thus, it was decided to set up, under the authority of the WEU Council, a military staff under a three-star general/flag officer in order to ensure greater cohesion and strengthen internal relations between the military components in WEU headquarters. The WEU military staff will consist of the three-star general/flag officer, his supporting staff, the Planning Cell and the Situation Centre.

In his capacity as Director of the WEU military staff, the three-star general/flag officer is answerable to the WEU Council. Among many other things, he is responsible for the implementation of decisions taken and directives issued by the WEU Council and by the Military Committee. The Director will also assist the Secretary General in carrying out WEU Council decisions, plan for WEU operations and exercises and prepare studies and work in the military field.

As regards relations with NATO and the EU, the three-star general/flag officer is responsible for: ensuring interfaces and coordination with NATO’s Military Committee and military command structure, at the appropriate levels; drawing on NATO support as agreed between WEU and NATO; ensuring the exchange of military information and documents as agreed between WEU and NATO; and ensuring the exchange of military information and documents as agreed between WEU and the EU.

In the reorganised military structure, the Planning Cell will continue to be the military planning staff of WEU. It will be headed by a one-star officer as its Director. This post will be a non-quota post given to a representative of the member states and replacing the current Deputy Director of the Planning Cell on the existing strength. The Director of the Planning Cell acts under the authority of the three-star general/flag officer, supports him in his capacities as Director of the WEU military staff and permanent Chairman of the MDC in carrying out his responsibilities vis-
à-vis the WEU Council and the Military Committee and directs the Planning Cell. In the absence of the three-star general/flag officer, he will represent him as the Director of the WEU military staff.

Finally, the Situation Centre, which in the existing structure operates under the authority of the Secretary General, will act under the authority of the three-star general/flag officer. It is stipulated, however, that in the new structure the Secretary General can still avail himself of the Situation Centre.

Overall, the need to provide a more visible capacity for WEU-led operations is now broadly accepted throughout WEU and correctly seen as part of developing over time within the transatlantic framework credible, coherent and robust WEU defence capabilities, security policies and concerted action, including the potential use of force. The WEU has made an admirable attempt to strengthen the European pillar of NATO but the WEU cannot stand alone without the Atlantic link. In this respect NATO’s adaptation process and the evolution of the CJTF concept have provided new political and operational impetus to WEU.
3. Renewing and redefining the Atlantic Alliance

3.1 From NATO’s new Strategic Concept to the Brussels Summit

In November 1991, at the NATO Summit in Rome, the North Atlantic Council adopted a comprehensive blueprint for revising the Alliance’s strategy. Rome reaffirmed the essential purpose of the Alliance: “to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means and to work for the “establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe”. Moreover, the Summit restated NATO’s fundamental operating principle that of “common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members” and the indispensability of the transatlantic link “by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe”.

In order to enable NATO to cope with the post-Cold War “multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional” security challenges and risks, the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept stated that a broad approach to security was required. This was reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allies security policy: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. It was agreed, therefore, “to maintain...an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe...although at a significantly reduced level” and “to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons”. In addition, paragraph 38 of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept stipulated that “the collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements...These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on co-operation and coordination agreements”.

Although the Rome Declaration clearly outlined NATO’s role and missions in the new Europe, it was also acknowledged that “the challenges...cannot
be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America”. NATO placed emphasis on the development of a European security identity and defence role and more important, recognised “the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of the European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance”. 

At the NATO Brussels Summit of 10-11 January 1994, the Alliance gave its full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity and welcomed the evolution of this identity within the European Union, stating its hope that the identity would lead in time to a common defence compatible with the Atlantic Alliance. NATO, in particular, proclaimed that the “emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence”.

One of the innovative features of the Brussels Declaration was NATO’s preparedness “to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy” and the endorsement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means of facilitating contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. With respect to the CJTF concept, the Heads of State and Government “directed the North Atlantic Council...to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council...in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU”.

For its part, the WEU Council of Ministers, shortly after the NATO Brussels Summit, tasked the Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) and the Planning Cell with a study of requirements and of possible approaches to the use of the CJTF concept and of its impact on WEU’s
operational capability. During the ministerial meeting of 9 May in Kirchberg, the Council underlined that “the modalities for making these [assets] available should preserve WEU’s own planning procedures and capabilities”.

On 28 June 1994, the WEU Council adopted a document prepared by the PMWG on “The criteria and modalities for the effective use by WEU of CJTFs”, which was presented to NATO during the fourth joint session of the WEU and NATO Councils on 29 June. Meanwhile, the Planning Cell strengthened its relations with the NATO planning structures.

In its Noordwijk Declaration of 14 November 1994, the WEU Council of Ministers called for the development of “closer working relations between the two Organisations on the basis of transparency and complementarity” and the implementation of the CJTF concept “to the full satisfaction of all Allies”. Furthermore, on 28 February 1995, the Council called for regular joint meetings of the WEU and NATO Councils to be held towards the end of each quarter and for extraordinary meetings to be convened by common agreement in the event of an emergency. The WEU Security Agreement was signed on 28 March 1995, with a view to strengthening the Organisation’s security procedures. As regards the CJTF, the PMWG, in conjunction with the Planning Cell, submitted two documents to the WEU Council entitled “The Mechanisms and Procedures for WEU use of Alliance assets and capabilities” and “The Assets and Capabilities required for WEU Operations” and initiated a study of the financial implications of WEU’s use of NATO assets and capabilities.

Finally, in the document “European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU countries” WEU member states stressed “the urgent need to finalize work on the CJTF concept…to make a vital contribution to providing WEU with an operational multinational command capability”. Pending a response from NATO to WEU’s proposals on CJTF, the Council continued strengthening WEU’s operational structures by adopting a document on the “Creation and assembly of forces for WEU operations”, which defined the mechanisms and procedures for mobilising WEU forces in crisis situations for Petersberg missions.
3.2 The French saga

As asked whether the CJTF concept was a “device” for accommodating a stronger defence identity for post-Maastricht Europe without at the same time undermining the American commitment to NATO, former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes argued the American case:

the strengthening of the WEU will put our transatlantic relationship on a new foundation, one based on the premise that Europeans will assume more responsibility in security affairs. NATO wishes to contribute to this effort by lending its resources to WEU, in implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept... The European defence identity cannot replace the Alliance because only NATO gives us the transatlantic link that guarantees the maintenance of the political and military contribution of our North American allies to European security.67

Stephen Oxman, US Assistant Secretary of State, concurs with this opinion:

Our European allies have already shown their willingness to take on a greater security burden, including through their efforts in the former Yugoslavia. NATO will now help them do so, by providing command and control and logistic support for European military operations...[The CJTF] initiative will create tools for a much more flexible NATO: HQ units which can assemble rapidly ad hoc military formations to conduct specific missions short of the defence of NATO territory itself.68

The acceptance by Americans of a military role for Europeans implied more pragmatic and flexible European positions, the best example of which was a growing warmth in relations between France and NATO.69 Since the mid-Sixties, French statesmen have wrestled with an uncomfortable dilemma: the need to reconcile the idea of an “embryonic action centre” of a unified future Western European great power with the straightened circumstances that accompany medium-sized power status. As Peter Schmidt argued:
this explains the traditional...contradiction of French policies towards NATO since the Sixties. On the one hand, France emphasised that NATO's collective defence function was the alliance’s decisive and central task, but refused to take part in its military integration, even though the latter was an important means of fulfilling this task. On the other hand, it was fully involved in the political activities of the alliance, but its aim was to, as far as possible, limit or diminish its political role.\textsuperscript{70}

The combined weight, however, of the pressures that had come to bear on French security and defence policy induced some policy adaptation by Chirac, characterised primarily by a substantive improvement in relations between France and NATO as a means of pursuing France's diplomatic and military interests.\textsuperscript{71} Critical to this assessment, according to Wyn Rees, was the “French experience of rapprochement with NATO over policy in Bosnia and their direct participation in Operation Deliberate Force and IFOR”.\textsuperscript{72} France's moves towards developing a more constructive and open relationship with NATO were also closely linked to major military reforms announced in February 1996. France's armed forces were to be reduced from 500,000 men to 350,000\textsuperscript{73} and restructured, particularly by ending conscription early in the next century, in order “to give France a more efficient, more modern and less costly army which would be projected outwards”.\textsuperscript{74}

In this respect, President Chirac took the most decisive steps for a French reintegration in NATO's command structure as a way to undertake eventual military operations without the US but with NATO assets. To this extent, on December 5, 1995 during the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, the French government announced a partial return to NATO's “military bodies which do not encroach on her [France's] sovereignty”.\textsuperscript{75} As French foreign minister, Hervé de Charette declared:

France believes that the time has come to reinvigorate the reformist spirit of the 1994 Alliance summit...The example of the CJTF should encourage us to pursue further reforms in this direction. The process of adaptation must be more profound. To this end, the President of the Republic has decided to
adapt a number of measures intended to enable us to work together more efficiently.\textsuperscript{76}

As a result the French foreign minister announced the “regular” participation of the French defence minister in Alliance meetings “alongside his colleagues” and indicated that France was prepared to take its seat “on the Military Committee, and in the bodies answerable to it, by extending the practice adopted since the start of the Yugoslav crisis”. Moreover, France would participate in the NATO Defence College, the Oberammergau School and the NATO Situation Centre. Finally, de Charette stated that France is going to set in train a process intended to improve its working relations with the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).\textsuperscript{77} However, France remained outside NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and Defence Planning Committee. According to the French President:

\begin{quote}
Today, as yesterday, the world needs the United States…[Your] political commitment to Europe and military presence on European soil remain an essential factor in the stability and security of the continent…France is ready to take part fully in this process of renovation [of NATO] as witnessed by the announcement a few weeks ago of its rapprochement with the military structures of the organisation.\textsuperscript{78}
\end{quote}

As Ronald Tiersky opined:

\begin{quote}
In arguing the US back into European security, Jacques Chirac evidently believes that France’s future European security mission, whatever the British and German connections in a Europeans-only security structure, is to wield a power of energy and provocation, mainly of Washington.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

While “the January 1994 acceptance of a NATO scheme which enshrined Council control over WEU use of NATO forces signalled a shift in the insistence of Paris on the creation of a truly autonomous European defence identity”\textsuperscript{80} significant differences emerged between the United States and France concerning the lack of autonomy from NATO of the proposed CJTF. André Dumoulin, presenting GRIP’s (Institute for Research and Information on Peace and Security) “Defence and Disarmament Memorandum 1994/1995”, summarised “the difficulties surrounding the
passage of NATO forces to strictly European control, outside the SACEUR command and thus outside of American control” in the following way:

The debate on the CJTF contains, just beneath the surface, NATO’s future control over WEU and the degree of autonomy of the European defence organisation regarding the Alliance’s operational tools in general and those of the United States in particular. NATO logistics support or information could culminate in practice in a right of veto, a right to inspect, and indirect NATO control over WEU actions.81

The French government’s view was that “command roles and staffing for a non-Article 5 military operation must largely be a function of the countries that are participating in the operation rather than of a pre-set, integrated command arrangement”.82 On another level, France sought to increase political control over CJTF operations.83 As Rob de Wijk pointed out: “In France this control is traditionally stronger than in the US where commanders have a greater freedom concerning the way, in which political objectives should be achieved”.84 According to Willy Claes:

Other than technical difficulties, the political question is that some allies have the feeling that, by creating such forces, an attempt is being made at bringing them back into an integrated military structure, and other allies have the feeling that, by doing this, two different divisions are being created within NATO, one responsible for collective defence, and the other for new missions, peacekeeping etc. I am not pessimistic. I simply ask Paris and Washington to show a little more flexibility.85

Against this background, the Berlin meeting of NATO foreign ministers took place, early in June 1996.

3.3 The Berlin Summit

In Berlin, further progress was made in strengthening the links between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. A first step had already been taken with the signing of the WEU-NATO Security Agreement on 6 May 1996, which contained procedures to protect and safeguard classified information and
material provided by either organisation. The PMWG was tasked to prepare recommendations on WEU aspects of the implementation of the CJTF concept and on the modalities for the provision of NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. On 13 June 1996, for the first time, the Secretary General of WEU attended a meeting of NATO defence ministers.

Paragraph 7 of the June 1996 Berlin Declaration sets out the three “fundamental objectives” underpinning NATO’s adaptation process: to ensure the Alliance’s military effectiveness so that it is able to perform its traditional mission of collective defence and through flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances; to preserve the transatlantic link; and to develop the ESDI within the Alliance.

The ESDI would be grounded “on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU”. The European Security and Defence Identity would be based on an “elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations”. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Forces, assets and headquarters would be identified which could be used for WEU-led operations, subject to various conditions: any forces so identified would be “separable but not separate”, their availability would be “subject to decision by the NAC” and their use would be monitored and kept under review by the NAC. In conjunction with the development of the CJTF concept, NATO’s command structure would be further adapted.

As regards the overall politico-military framework for the CJTF concept a document was drawn up concentrating on CJTF’s higher organisation, headquarters structure and employment parameters. For Marc Bentinck “this framework document not only represents an important milestone on the road towards actual CJTF implementation, but also a considerable conceptual investment in the future military operations of the Alliance.”
On the subject of CJTF’s conceptualisation, the document stated that a CJTF headquarters should be defined as a deployable, multinational, multiservice Alliance headquarters of variable size, formed from dual-hatted personnel to command and control combined joint task forces for contingency operations including peacekeeping. The military significance of the CJTF concept was stressed by Charles Barry when he wrote:

What is unique about NATO's CJTF initiative – and unprecedented in military doctrine – is that it will permanently institutionalise the multinational task-force concept, which has always been a temporary command-and-control arrangement employed by ad hoc coalitions. In fact, deploying CJTFs will, for the first time, become the primary modus operandi of a standing alliance in peacetime...[CJTF] is a unique tool for both NATO and the WEU in that it addresses all three missions: managing crises, reaching out beyond our borders and embracing ESDI.

Furthermore, as Paul Cornish suggested:

...CJTF is consistent with the drive for cost-effectiveness in defence planning. NATO’s goal to be both a crisis manager and a defensive alliance must be squared with the financial constraints being experienced in ministries of defence, particularly for those EU governments keenest to meet the criteria for economic and monetary union. The consequences of reduced defence expenditure and force cutbacks across the alliance in recent years are that national capabilities have diminished and that the need for precisely applied, multiple-rolled multinational cooperation has apparently increased.

For all NATO operations, a CJTF headquarters would be formed around a nucleus based in a NATO headquarters and could include support and augmentation modules drawn from other NATO headquarters and nations. The missions of CJTF headquarters will include command and control of contingency operations in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions or a mandate by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including WEU operations.
According to the document, for WEU operations, agreement will be required on the mission of a CJTF headquarters, the length of time for which it is to be provided, the mechanisms and timing for returning Alliance collective assets to Alliance control in the event of higher priority requirements. During the preparation and conduct of a WEU operation there would be consultation between the North Atlantic Council and the WEU Council (and their supporting committees) on developments. In those circumstances where a CJTF headquarters or other NATO collective assets were provided to the WEU, the appropriate NATO military command would function as a supporting commander.  

Responsibility for CJTF operations would reside with the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the Military Committee on military issues and supported by the Alliance’s appropriate bodies including the Policy Coordination Group. Finally, centralised CJTF headquarters planning will be conducted in a Combined Joint Planning Staff at the Major NATO Commanders level. A Capabilities Coordination Cell will assist the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the Major NATO Commanders and related advice to the North Atlantic Council.

As former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, declared “there is real substance in today's decision...This provides for stronger NATO, a more flexible NATO, and allows our European allies to take more responsibility”. It was a view also expressed by Robert Hunter, the US ambassador to NATO: “the Europeans can now assume more responsibility, which help us maintain US support for the alliance that we all need for global stability”. As the then President of the WEU Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith, also underlined “the CJTF concept approved by the NATO Council in Berlin will enable the WEU to reach adulthood”. For as José Cutileiro, WEU Secretary General, suggested “without the Combined Joint Task Forces, WEU would be reduced for a long time to very modest activities”.

However, according to NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, a clear message had to be sent:
the establishment of CJTFs should not be seen as the naive desire to replace the US in its key role within NATO. The US keeps a place that is unique in its kind through the magnitude of its politico-military action and through the effectiveness with which it helps to form coalitions. While the US better measures the price of internationalism, the old division of labour, in which NATO ensured European security while the European institutions were mainly interested in economic integration, no longer reflects trans-Atlantic realities. The existence of a Europe better able to act is an essential condition of the Alliance’s long-term vitality.100

From the French perspective, a reformed NATO was “a first step towards fulfilment of France’s ambition to equip Europe with the capacity to project military power and mount a wide range of operations by 2000101…France is satisfied because for the first time in alliance history, Europe will really be able to express its personality. For the first time we have gone from words to deeds”102. As Hervé de Charette put it:

If this process is completed, France regards with interest this new alliance and declares itself ready to participate fully according to a new status.103

However, according to then French prime minister, Alain Juppé, “France’s commitment to this renewed NATO will depend on the responsibility the Europeans will be able to exercise in the spirit of the new transatlantic partnership”.104 Consistent with France’s objective of developing a European defence, Paris was pressing for an independent European leadership in cases where the US was not an active participant and where an operation was purportedly conducted by WEU. As de Charette stated, in an interview with the Le Figaro on 10 June 1996:

Do we need agreement from the Americans, a positive Council decision, to make the NATO means available to WEU? The answer is yes. In the same way, the Americans cannot commit the Alliance without agreement from the Europeans. Should the United States and the Atlantic Council then keep a droit de regard on the operation that the WEU is to conduct with NATO means? In Berlin, the Allies replied: no. On the other hand, it is legitimate that they be kept informed of the use that the WEU makes with the means placed at its disposal.105
These French ideas on strengthening European responsibilities and identity within NATO were very much in line with French thinking on the nationality of the Naples-based NATO commander responsible for Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). For France it was critical that he was European – ideally French – to ensure that the European allies were given more power and responsibility within the Alliance.\textsuperscript{106} Despite French proposals,\textsuperscript{107} the US refused to grant this concession to France due to both the increasing strategic importance of the Mediterranean region and NATO’s Southern flank as well as concern that relinquishing AFSOUTH would undermine public and congressional support for a US military presence in Europe. As an American official put it: “It’s hard to imagine that we ever would have sent troops to Bosnia – however late we were – if an American admiral had not been commanding them”.\textsuperscript{108} America’s refusal to compromise over Naples meant that France remained aloof from NATO’s integrated military structure.\textsuperscript{109}

While France was considering moving back into the NATO fold, work continued at the political level to prepare a joint WEU position on the political control and strategic direction of WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, with a view to a later decision within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance consultation process. In the field of coordinated military planning between the two organisations, the Permanent Council, meeting on 24 September 1996, adopted a document describing six possible scenarios for Petersberg missions. In parallel, the Planning Cell established close working relations with the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) of NATO.

At its meeting in Ostend in Belgium on 19 November 1996, the Council took note of the progress made on defining the modalities for activating the CJTF, stressing that “WEU procedures and methods should be fully compatible with those in application in the Alliance”.\textsuperscript{110} Furthermore, WEU ministers reaffirmed their desire to strengthen cooperation with NATO and tasked the Permanent Council “to elaborate, as a matter of priority and in cooperation with NATO: in the perspective of possible cooperations and in addition to existing arrangements, a consultation mechanism between the two Permanent Councils and between their appropriate subordinate bodies; a Framework Agreement on modalities
for the transfer of NATO assets and capabilities for use by WEU; an Agreement on the modalities for cooperation between WEU and NATO, for the latter to conduct at the request of, and in coordination with WEU, military planning for illustrative WEU missions identified by WEU”.111

On 15 April 1997, the Permanent Council reached agreement on the participation of associate members in WEU operations using NATO assets and capabilities and in their planning and preparation. It also reached agreement on the participation of Observer states. Furthermore, on 29 April 1997, it approved a document on the political control and strategic direction by WEU of WEU-led operations involving the CJTF, according to which both functions were to be performed by the Council. On 6 May, a document was adopted on the parameters and principles of a WEU-NATO framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities made available for a WEU-led operation.

Three days later, on 9 May, the Permanent Council, followed by the Paris Ministerial Council, adopted a WEU contribution to the NATO Ministerial Guidance on defence planning. The document defines the missions for which WEU may call upon NATO assets and capabilities, as well as the WEU approach to questions such as the type of participation and nature of the required forces and capabilities. The Permanent Council also adopted a document on the modalities for WEU participation in NATO planning.

At its meeting on 13 May in Paris, the WEU Council of Ministers welcomed the progress that had been made regarding WEU-NATO cooperation and tasked the Permanent Council “to pursue, as a matter of priority and in cooperation with NATO, its work on: the Framework Agreement on modalities for the transfer of NATO assets and capabilities; in the perspective of possible operations and in addition to existing arrangements, a consultation mechanism between the two Permanent Councils and between their appropriate subordinate bodies; an Agreement on the modalities for cooperation between WEU and NATO, for the latter to conduct at the request of and in coordination with WEU, military planning for illustrative WEU missions identified by WEU; the modalities for cooperation between WEU and NATO on exercises for WEU-led
operations; WEU’s contribution to the Alliance’s defence planning process; and to address in consultation with NATO further relevant subjects to be dealt with in implementing the NATO Ministerial decisions of Berlin and Brussels”.  

Finally, whereas on 13 June 1997, the defence ministers of NATO approved WEU’s contribution to their 1997 Guidance on defence planning, WEU ministers in Erfurt reaffirmed the need “for a WEU/NATO consultation mechanism in the perspective of future WEU operations” and welcomed “the substantial work carried out on this matter during the past months within WEU, in particular the work on a practical model for linking the decision-making processes of both organisations in WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities. They considered that this work constitutes an important element for an agreed WEU/NATO consultation mechanism and looked forward to its early conclusion”.  

To conclude, the June 1996 NATO Berlin Summit marked a useful attempt to address some of the issues associated with the European pillar of NATO. Two years of tortuous negotiations illustrated that despite the clear desire amongst some of the EU member states to overcome European dependence on NATO for many military tasks, the fact remains that “European military capabilities are so limited that WEU would only be capable of undertaking military operations of a certain magnitude if it could rely on NATO assets and capabilities”. The WEU is far from having command structures or military capabilities comparable to NATO’s, which would allow it to intervene either in a common defence role in Europe, or as a reliably effective force-projection instrument further afield. There is no escaping the fact that, for the time being, NATO will be the key provider of the military wherewithal of any possible WEU external interventions through the CJTF concept. However, as Gordon Wilson noted:

Appropriate circumstances in which to use CJTFs will not present themselves that frequently, and so Europe in general, and the WEU in particular, should be ready to react. If the CJTF concept is ever to be more than just a grand idea, the political, organizational and structural issues will have to be addressed by Europeans as a matter of some urgency.
4. The NATO-WEU relationship after Madrid and Amsterdam

4.1 The Madrid and Amsterdam Summits

In Madrid the Heads of State and Government of the member states of NATO affirmed their “full support for the development of the European Security and Defence Identity by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations”. In this context the North Atlantic Council endorsed “the decisions taken with regard to European command arrangements within NATO to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities (including provisional terms of reference for Deputy SACEUR covering his ESDI-related responsibilities both permanent and during crises and operations), the arrangements for the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations, and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations”. As General Manuel Oliver, First Deputy to the Commander, European Corps, pointed out:

[The Deputy SACEUR] has been identified as the principal point of contact between the strategic commands and the WEU, and at the same time, as responsible for co-ordination of NATO planning for the WEU utilising the Combined Joint Planning Staff. He will be a key figure in preparing the transfer of NATO assets and capabilities and he has to be prepared to act as Operations Commander for a WEU led operation. In this case he would receive guidance and orders from the WEU Council and the Military Committee, and he would transmit those to his subordinate Force Commander.

In addition, provision was made for supporting within the Alliance all European Allies in planning for the conduct of WEU-led operations on the basis, inter alia, of illustrative mission profiles provided by the WEU. There has also been considerable progress with respect to developing practical arrangements both for the release, monitoring and return of
Alliance assets and capabilities and for the exchange of information between NATO and WEU, within the framework of the NATO-WEU Security Agreement, for the conduct of WEU-led operations.

Moreover, Madrid reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment “to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including as necessary through joint consultations on how to address contingencies” and welcomed the fact that the WEU undertook “to improve its capacity to plan and conduct crisis management and peacekeeping operations (the Petersberg tasks), including through setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support of NATO assets and capabilities, and accepted the Alliance’s invitation to contribute to NATO’s Ministerial Guidance for defence planning”. As Lluis Maria de Puig, President of the WEU Assembly, wrote:

The above decisions at the Madrid summit were a great leap forward for Europe...Madrid was to all intents and purposes a point of no return...NATO has not only strengthened WEU but is also bringing a new dimension to European defence; it can even be argued that is resolving WEU’s dilemma, at least for the time being: since there is not going to be a merger between the European Union and WEU or even an integration process over the medium term, WEU today stands as the only reference point in terms of a European defence, and can now draw on NATO assets for certain operations. Its prospects are better now than they have ever been.

The linkage to other events in Europe is important. One cannot address, therefore, the WEU-NATO relationship without also considering the moves to give more substance to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the Amsterdam Summit. Thus, the revisions to the Treaty on European Union made by the Treaty of Amsterdam intend to clarify the process of framing, within the context of CFSP, the Union’s common defence policy, and, taken together with the WEU’s Declaration of 22 July 1997, provide a framework for taking work forward in a way which will achieve concrete results in strengthening European security.

The Amsterdam Treaty clearly states that the Union shall define and implement a CFSP covering all areas of foreign and security policy, which
member states shall support actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. In addition, it confirms that the European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for CFSP, including for matters with defence implications, as well as decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common.

Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty provides that the framing of a common defence policy will be progressive, thus recognising that the common defence policy will need to be developed over time. The Amsterdam Treaty also reinforces the Union’s commitment to strengthen its security – and international security – through more effective crisis management. This is underlined by the incorporation of the WEU’s Petersberg tasks in the Treaty and by the provisions strengthening the relationship between the EU and the WEU which provides the Union with access to an operational military crisis management capability.

Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty acknowledges that the progressive framing of a common defence policy might lead to a common defence. But it specifies that this would require a separate decision by the European Council and adoption of such a decision by member states in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The Treaty also confirms that the Union’s policy shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states and shall respect the obligations of certain member states which see their common defence realised in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

At the same time as the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, the WEU Council of Ministers adopted, on 22 July 1997, a “Declaration of Western European Union on the role of the Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance” which endorses the results of the Treaty of Amsterdam regarding WEU and contains instructions for the further development of WEU’s cooperation with the EU and NATO and for the continued development of WEU’s operational role. According to the WEU Declaration attached to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference the WEU “is an essential element
of the development of the European security and defence identity within 
the Atlantic Alliance and will accordingly continue its efforts to strengthen 
institutional and practical cooperation with NATO”. To this end, WEU 
will develop its cooperation with NATO in the following fields:

- mechanisms for consultation between WEU and NATO in the context of 
a crisis;
- WEU’s active involvement in the NATO defence planning process;
- operational links between WEU and NATO for the planning, preparation 
and conduct of operations using NATO assets and capabilities under the 
political control and strategic direction of WEU, including: military 
planning, conducted by NATO in coordination with WEU, and exercises; a 
framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO 
assets and capabilities; liaison between WEU and NATO in the context of 
European command arrangements”.

4.2 Outstanding issues

In the few months since Amsterdam and Madrid considerable progress 
has been made in the direction of strengthening cooperation between WEU 
and NATO in accordance with the principles of complementarity and 
transparency. For example, NATO and the WEU have gone a long way 
together in closing the military planning gap. According to General Sir 
Jeremy MacKenzie, Deputy SACEUR:

the robust Terms of Reference for the DSACEUR together with an effective 
planning staff, both of which have a responsibility for planning and force 
generation in NATO and the WEU can only mean that there is less 
duplication of effort and planning, and the data bank of plans and forces 
which may be used in those operations resides in a single planning staff, 
which can only speed up the process and produce a more efficient result.”

However, much remains to be done. This concerns, for instance, WEU’s 
participation in the NATO defence planning process. On 13 June 1996, in 
Brussels, the NATO defence ministers, tasked their Permanent 
Representatives “with advice from the NATO Military Authorities, and
with participation of all Allies, to review the defence planning process to ensure that it continues to develop the forces and capabilities needed to conduct the full range of Alliance missions and in addition is able to support within the Alliance all European Allies in planning for the conduct of WEU-led operations”. At Ostend, WEU ministers agreed that “it would be valuable for WEU to become actively involved in the Alliance’s defence planning process in order to make use of this important tool for improving operational effectiveness”. In this context, WEU needs to provide relevant indications and considerations which will enable force planners to contribute to the feasibility of WEU non-Article V missions by taking fully into account WEU’s requirements related to Petersberg tasks. A particular issue which remains to be clarified is the participation of non-NATO WEU Observer states – Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden. In Rhodes, WEU ministers welcomed the working agreement reached with NATO “on modalities which will be applied during the current defence planning cycle for WEU’s participation in the NATO defence planning process, including practical arrangements for the involvement of non-allied WEU Observer States in force planning activities necessary to identify and assess the possible contributions of forces and capabilities of those countries in view of their potential contribution to Petersberg operations”. As Alyson Bailes observed:

The answer is likely to be found principally, but not exclusively, in the adaptation of the planning and review processes (PARP) applied to three of these countries through their participation in Partnership for Peace. If it succeeds, not only will WEU’s own efforts for the operational integration of these nations be furthered, but a new link will have been created between NATO’s “outreach” mechanisms and the logic of ESDI.

Finally, other essential issues that need to be addressed concern the identification of general elements for a framework agreement between NATO and WEU setting out principles and modalities for the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities and the conclusion of a document setting out the general mechanisms for consultation and institutional interaction in the context of a WEU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities.
5. Conclusions

A number of leading officials and scholars have recommended new roles for NATO – a transformation into a “globalised” Alliance, abandoning Article V guarantees, a EuroNATO – and have proposed several alternative conceptual approaches for bringing policymakers closer together. Malcolm Rifkind, for example, has suggested developing an Atlantic Community resting on four pillars:

- of our shared destiny and not on NATO alone. The first pillar is our shared belief in the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. The second is liberal capitalism and free trade which has given all our peoples unprecedented prosperity. The third is the shared European cultural heritage emanating from classical Greece and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared values, beliefs and civilization of our own century. The fourth pillar must be defence and security as represented by the NATO Alliance.

Others – such as Gunther Hellmann, Christoph Bertram and Klaus Kinkel – have made similar proposals.

The logic behind these ideas is no doubt sound, but one wonders whether in the absence of a common will or perceived common interests, analysts and diplomats should be reviving proposals for the enhancement of the Atlantic Community that failed to gain support when circumstances were more propitious twenty or thirty years ago. Instead of “Atlantic Contracts or Understandings”, “Atlantic Charters”, or a “Transatlantic friendship and cooperation treaty”, the Allies might simply make more of an effort to act like Allies. On this general ground alone, it is in NATO’s – and in the broader US-European – interest that a European security and defence entity, set firmly in an Atlantic context than in competition with it, is not only tolerated but actively fostered by the United States. In other words, Washington must come to accept that “NATO’s ability to support the emergence of a genuine European security structure is a measure of its successful reform and a precondition for its own survival as an effective and relevant institution in the future”.

As Richard Holbrooke noted:
It would be self-defeating for the WEU to create military structures to duplicate the successful European integration already achieved in NATO. But a stronger European pillar of the alliance can be an important contribution to European stability and transatlantic burden-sharing, provided it does not dilute NATO. The WEU establishes a new premise of collective defence: the United States should not be the only NATO member that can protect vital common interests outside Europe.\textsuperscript{135}

However, in a powerful dissenting opinion, one of Britain’s most respected strategic theorists, Colin Gray, argued eloquently and not unpersuasively, as one would expect of a scholar with Gray’s gifts, to the effect that a “European pillar” within NATO cannot work to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{136} In weighing the evidence quite differently than did the majority Professor Gray opined that “a new Europeanised NATO will work neither in its European dimension nor with reference to a practicable new transAtlantic bargain”.\textsuperscript{137} As he puts it: “…the delusion that a coherent and cohesive European pillar could function within NATO will destroy the NATO we have that does work well enough”.\textsuperscript{138} In this vein he wrote:

Not to mince words, it is a plausible fallacy to believe that the path of sensible NATO reform to the conditions of a new era entails the creation and maturing of a distinctly “European” security personality within NATO…the CJTF concept, if truly it is a “Europeanisation” of NATO policy is a cul de sac…The idea that NATO is reforming itself in part by providing for its more flexible military Europeanisation, is a potentially dangerous illusion.\textsuperscript{139}

Gray later concluded:

Lest I be misunderstood, my argument has three explicit prongs. First, a cohesive European pillar in NATO is not practicable. Second, even if practicable such a European pillar would be incompatible with NATO functioning as a collective defence organisation. Third, even if a cohesive European pillar of security could function well, albeit at the expense of the NATO that we have known, it would offer an inferior quality of security to that which could have been sustainable through traditional-NATO.\textsuperscript{140}
Gray is entirely correct in the emphasis that he places under NATO’s superiority “as an organisation able to deliver the public good of collective defence at costs tolerable to all”.\(^{141}\) In addition, he is right to mention that “NATO-Europeans…cannot function as part-time allies of the United States in a process of selective Alliance Europeanisation”.\(^{142}\) The answer, though, is not to duplicate or replace NATO capabilities. As Jacques Delors pointed out: “like it or not, the Western European Union in its new role will have to rely on the infrastructure mentioned earlier (i.e. of the Atlantic Alliance) for a long time to come”.\(^{143}\) Rather the answer lies in elaborating and defining a European political and military structure within NATO while at the same time paying particular attention “to the need for transatlantic reassurance so as not to throw Atlantic security out with the European bath-water”.\(^{144}\) As Jürgen Schwarz observed:

> It is only within the framework of NATO that adequate political and organizational prerequisites exist for facilitating an “out-of-area” employment of Western European armed forces or their employment within the framework of the UN. When organizing such employments within the framework of the WEU, however apart from NATO, another separate military organization would emerge, which would possible compete with the Alliance...In the long run, this would not promote the European identity in the Alliance (in the sense of a “European pillar”), but it would accelerate the dissolution of NATO, starting with the gradual dissociation of the United States.\(^{145}\)

With this premise in mind, WEU occupies a pivotal position between the EU and NATO. It has become the interface between these two organisations in the field of defence. Any expansion, however, in the WEU’s military apparatus must avoid pointless duplication with NATO’s existing infrastructures and resources, so as not to unnecessarily increase the burden of military expenditure. Given these considerations, WEU is well placed to continue as the political and military platform for the further development of ESDI. This will be a gradual process, requiring political will, resources and consultations. Indivisibility of security, transatlantic solidarity and European convergence to common security and defence interests should guide Allied efforts.
In the period of change and reform that Europe is experiencing at present, there still remain different perceptions of risks and security challenges. The character of these risks and challenges is such that no organisation can cope alone with the elements of early warning, preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The aim should be to enhance and maximise the degree and extent of cooperation, coordination and complementarity among overlapping and interlocking security-oriented organisations. This will ensure that the comparative advantages of each organisation can be combined and fully exploited in the pursuit of peace and stability. As the great architect of European unity, Jean Monnet, insightfully noted: “Nothing is possible without men, but nothing is lasting without institutions”.

2 See Danish and European Security, The Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, Copenhagen 1995.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, pp.4-5.
12 Keohane and Nye, op. cit., p.7.
18 According to a RAND note the advantages to the US of the overlapping institutions model are the following: “[This model] preserves a political and military role for the United States; creates alternative
links for US involvement in Europe beyond NATO; demonstrates US willingness to adapt to a stronger European role in security arrangements; and maintains flexibility to move to a number of different security models”, see Nanette Gantz, James B. Steinberg, *Five Models for European Security: Implications for the United States*, RAND NOTE N-3446-A, 1992.


20 Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence, signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as amended by the “Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty”, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.


22 Lieutenant General Carlo Jean, “Changing Interstate and Inter-institutional Relations in Europe and NATO” in Foster and Wilson (eds), op. cit., p.40.

23 WEU Ministerial Council, 19 June in Petersberg (Bonn), *Europe Documents*, No 1787.

24 Title of an article by Ian Mather in the *European*, 26 November-2 December 1993.

25 As Brigadier G. G. Messervy-Whiting, Deputy Director and Chief of Staff of the WEU’s Planning Cell, pointed out: “The Cell is now 55 strong, some 40 of whom are navy, army, airforce and civilian officers, mostly of lieutenant colonel or equivalent rank and above…The Planning Cell can also be reinforced by experts from nations, when necessary for a specific task”, Brigadier G. G. Messervy-Whiting, “The refinement of WEU’s operational capability”, *NATO’s Sixteen Nations*, Special Supplement 1998, p.9.

26 *Europe Documents*, No 1787, op. cit.


30 Ibid, pp.13-14. CRISEX 95/96 was designed to test the capabilities of the WEU countries in mounting a forward command and post for a task force sent to administer humanitarian aid in a fictitious country facing civil war. Some 200 personnel, under the command of a Spanish general, were flown in December 1996 onto the Spanish island of Lanzarote where the third and final stage of the exercise took place. One hundred and fifty came from Eurocorps and fifty from the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Greece. CRISEX 95/96 had started a year earlier with a simulated consultation between WEU’s headquarters in Brussels and governments of member states where the decision was taken to intervene in the supposed crisis, Jane’s Military Exercise & Training Monitor, Fourth quarter 1996, quoted in *Statewatch*, January/February 1997, p.15.

31 Second part of the 41st annual report of the WEU Council to the Assembly (1 July-31 December 1995), Assembly Document 1528, 28 May 1995, quoted in *Western European Union*, op. cit., p.77.

32 Messervy-Whiting, op. cit., p.11.

33 Paragraph 30, Rhodos Declaration, WEU Council of Ministers, 12 May 1998.

34 Quoted in *Western European Union*, op. cit., p.78.

35 “The Helios 1 was launched into orbit on 7 July 1995 from the European Space Agency site in French Guiana. It was financed mainly by France (80 per cent), with Italy funding 14 per cent and Spain seven per cent of the £1.25 billion cost. It is able to send back images identifying individual tanks and small-scale troop movements during daylight and in clear weather”, *Guardian*, 7 July 1995, and “The Helios 2 Spy Satellite: Peeking Through the Clouds”, *RUSI Newsbrief*, Vol 15, No 12, December 1995, pp.93-94.


Lieutenant General Helmut Willman, “The European Corps – Political Dimension and Military Aims”, RUSI Journal, August 1994, p.29. According to the Report the mission of the European Corps is: collective defence of the allies within the framework of WEU/NATO; maintaining and restoring peace; humanitarian missions, ibid. On the Corps’ genesis in the Kohl-Mitterrand proposal of October 1991 – Franco-German military cooperation will be strengthened beyond the existing brigade. The strengthened Franco-German units could thus become the nucleus of a European Corps capable of including the forces of other member states of the WEU. This new structure could equally become the model of a closer military cooperation among the member states of the WEU – see Daniel Vernet, “The dilemma of French foreign policy”, International Affairs, Vol 68, No 4, 1992, pp.655-664.


42 Belgium signed the SACEUR agreements on 12 October 1993. According to this agreement, the corps may be used by NATO either as a main defence force in Central Europe or as a rapid reaction peacekeeping or peacemaking force in the European theatre, covered by NATO’, De Decker, op. cit.

43 On 6 April 1995, the UK and the Netherlands signed an exchange of letters regarding common interests in the area of maritime defence and a reaffirmation and strengthening of cooperation between the two navies in such areas as logistics, personnel, training, research and development, information, hydrography and oceanography.

44 Paragraph 38, Noordwijk Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, Europe Documents, No 1910.


46 Unless otherwise stated this section draws heavily on The WEU Military Committee, Rapporteur Giannattasio, WEU Assembly, Document 1591, December 1997.


48 The CHODs will be represented in permanent session by the Military Delegates Committee (MDC) under a permanent chairman (the three-star general/flag officer), The WEU Military Committee, op. cit., paragraph 68.

49 Eurolongterm is a sub-group of the Eurogroup with the task of developing long-term operational doctrines and drawing up specifications for armaments and equipment. The Western European Logistics Group (WELG) is concerned with logistic support for WEU operations. At Erfurt, the Council approved a Joint Logistic Support Concept for WEU which had been prepared by the WELG. Eurocom is a sub-group of the Eurogroup with the task of ensuring that the various national communications systems of WEU nations meet previously fixed technical and operational requirements allowing interoperability of the various equipment in service. WMWG stands for Western European Union Mobility Working Group.

50 The CHODs meeting is prepared and chaired by the CHOD of the member state holding the Presidency. He acts as spokesman for the Military Committee on all formal occasions. He conveys, when appropriate, the harmonised advice of the Military Committee. The standing chairman of the MDC will participate in these meetings, The WEU Military Committee, op. cit., paragraph 69.

51 Unless otherwise stated this section draws heavily on The WEU Military Committee, op. cit.


54 Paragraphs 17 and 18, ibid.

55 Paragraph 25, ibid.

56 Paragraphs 39 and 40, ibid.


58 Paragraph 7, ibid.


Paragraphs 6 and 9, ibid. As Charles Barry noted: “…the United States proposed the CJTF concept at NATO’s Defence Planning Committee meeting at Traveumünde, Germany, in late 1993, and, at their summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994…NATO leaders directed that it be developed”, Charles Barry, “NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice”, Survival, Vol 36, No 1, Spring 1996, p.83.

Paragraph 9, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, op. cit.

Kirchberg Declaration, 9 May 1994, Europe Documents, No 1884.

The first joint session of the two Councils took place in 1992. See also José Cutileiro, “WEU’s operational development and its relationship to NATO”, NATO Review, September 1995, pp.8-11.

Europe Documents, No 1910, op. cit.


Quoted in Europe, No 6395, 11 January 1995, p.4.


As an American official put it: “We don’t want CJTFs to become a way of France creeping back in while we creep out”, The Economist, 24 September 1994.


As David Buchan suggested: “The force cuts…will be the biggest since the end of the Algerian war, when French forces shrank from 1.16m to 667,000 between 1962 and 1964. They will involve combat regiments being cut from 129 to 85, and the reforming of much of the army into four elite units (heavy armour, light armour, mechanised, and assault infantry) of 15,000 men each”, Financial Times, 26 February 1996.

Independent, 23 February 1996. As President Chirac put it: “My plan is for France in six years’ time, to be capable of deploying 50-60,000 men rapidly. During the Gulf war we had trouble sending 10,000 men. Like the best armies in the world, like the British, it will be able to deploy quickly and efficiently. We are currently a long way from the quality of the British army. In six years’ time we will have an army which is at least as capable as the British”, Guardian, 23 February 1996.


Quoted in NATO Review, January 1996, p.16.

Ibid.

Quoted in The Economist, 10 February 1996, p.37.


Quoted in Europe, No 6454, 3-4 April 1995, p.4.

Grant, op. cit., p.67.


Speech by Rob de Wijk at the NATO-WEU Colloquy on “The European Security and Defence Identity”, Madrid, 5 May 1998.

Quoted in “Structure and functions: European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)”. Rapporteur Rafael Estrella, North Atlantic Assembly, October 1995.


Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Review, July 1996.

Marc Bentinck, “NATO’s structural reform and the ESDI” in Foster and Wilson (eds), op. cit., p.80.


Barry, op. cit., p.82.


According to a NATO official: “An augmentation module is an additional staff element provided by a NATO or other multinational headquarters or by nations, or formed from individual staff members from these sources. A support module is an organisational unit provided by a NATO or other multinational headquarters or by nations to form a specialised support element for a CJTF HQ as required by the size and type of operation or exercises”.


Bentinck, op. cit., p.81.

96 International Herald Tribune, 4 June 1996.

97 International Herald Tribune, 4 June 1996.

98 Financial Times, 4 June 1996.

99 Financial Times, 4 June 1996.

100 International Herald Tribune, 4 June 1996. According to French armed forces chief-of-staff Gen. Jean-Philippe Douin Europe requires three necessary capabilities if a future European defence pillar is to acquire the “strategic independence needed to manage a crisis without the help of American resources…The first prerequisite is an independent intelligence-gathering capability which could be achieved by pushing ahead with space programmes initiated with Helios 1…Next was a planning and command capability…Lastly, Europe would have to greatly built up its force-projection capacity by assigning specific roles to each country”, Intelligence Newsletter, Indigo Publications, 7 December 1995.

101 Guardian, 4 June 1996.

102 European, No 6692, 21 March 1996.

103 European, No 6745, 10-11 June 1996.

104 According to French defence minister, Charles Millon: “throughout the NATO chain of command, from top to bottom, European components must be identified…The issue of renewing NATO will only be resolved when the conditions laid out by the president [of France] have been taken into account”, Financial Times, 25 September 1996 and Financial Times, 26 September 1996.

105 One of the several compromises that were put forward by the French suggested that an American would be responsible for the Sixth Fleet, for the Middle East, for collective defence and any peacekeeping that involved American troops; a European would be responsible for peacekeeping that involved Europeans only, The Economist, 21 June 1997.

106 The Economist, 30 November 1996.

107 According to June’s Defence Weekly, de Charette was claimed to have privately said he would be “massacred” in the National Assembly if France gave up on this symbolic issue, quoted in Statewatch, November-December 1996, p.9.


109 Paragraph 17, ibid.

110 Paragraph 18, WEU Council of Ministers, Paris Declaration, 13 May 1997, Europe Documents, No 2036.


112 Address of José Cutileiro, WEU Secretary General, to the WEU Assembly on 2 June 1997, quoted in WEU after Amsterdam: the European security and defence identity and the application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the annual report to the Council, WEU Assembly, Document 1584, paragraph 78, 19 November 1997.


115 Paragraph 18, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 8th July 1997.

116 Ibid.
Speech by General Manuel Oliver at the NATO-WEU Colloquy on “The European Security and Defence Identity”, Madrid, 5 May 1998.

Paragraph 20, Madrid Declaration, op. cit.

Lluis Maria de Puig, “NATO takes the plunge on Europe”, Letter from the Assembly, No 26, September 1997, p.2.

Paragraph 9, Declaration of Western European Union on the role of the Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, WEU Assembly, Document 1582, 28 November 1997.

Paragraph 12, ibid.


Paragraph 15, Europe Documents, No 2013, op. cit.

Paragraph 14, Rhodes Declaration, op. cit.


With respect to the first point, a WEU Assembly Document stated that “While a majority of the European members of the Alliance would like to see this settled by means of a binding framework agreement, the United States has so far refused to let any automatic mechanism govern recourse to its national assets”, Paragraph 53, Security in a wider Europe – reply to the annual report of the Council, WEU Assembly, Document 1602, 28 April 1998.


Ibid, p.81.

Ibid.

Ibid, pp. 54 & 50.

Ibid, p.82.


Gray, op. cit., p.83.


Quoted in Holbrooke, op. cit., p.51.