

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF
POST-WAR TURKEY AND GREECE: 1980-1995

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ABSTRACT

This report attempts to determine the evolution of civil-military relations in Turkey and Greece during the 1980-1995 period through an examination of the role of the military in the political transformation of both countries. Since the mid-1970s and especially after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the struggle for spreading the winds of democracy around the globe has been the goal of all western states and particularly the United States of America. However, taking into consideration the volatility in the Balkans and in Central Asia, the military institution of Turkey and Greece which gave the impression that it withdrew in the barracks after their last intervention in 1980-83 and 1967-74 respectively, could easily be forced or even tempted to assume a greater responsibility in the conduct of each country's domestic and foreign affairs. Only through a better understanding of its role during the 1980-95 period, we would be able to determine the feasibility of such scenarios.

Using a multi-factorial model as a protection from the short-sighted results which the majority of mono-factorial approaches produce, this report starts with the analysis of the distinct role which the Armed Forces of each country have had in the historical evolution of their respective civil-military relations up to 1980 (Part One of Chapters Two and Three). It continues with an examination of the role of the military in the political transformation of both countries during the 1980-95 period (Part Two in Chapters Two and Three) and concludes with an analysis of the factors, both intra-military as well as external to the institution, which contributed in their own way to the development of a specific type of civil-military relations in each country (Part Three of Chapters Two and Three). A summary of all previous evaluations appears in the last pages of this report.

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CHAPTER ONE: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND RELATED THEORIES

The occurrence of military interventions in the political life of a country has not been a feature of this century. From ancient Greece up to the end of the twentieth century, the displacement or the threat for displacement of an elected government by overt military action has been a recurrent theme in academic literature. However, although the earlier analysts tended to look at the military institution as "an alien and demonic" political group incapable of interacting with other social groups but able to act against them, it was only after the end of the Second World War that the political scientists started to develop a different point of view towards it. Hence, whereas Machiavelli would argue that a "military man cannot be a good man", Voltaire would describe them as the "manifestation of brute force in rationalized form",¹ and Samuel Adams would claim that a standing army, however necessary it may be, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people,² several post-war political scientists begun thinking of the military as a legitimate pressure group, capable of playing a positive role in the socio-political transformation of the newly created peripheral states.³ A number of them appeared to agree with Finer's assumption that "in all countries ruled by civilians, the armed forces...are in no better, but certainly no worse a moral position than any [other] departments of civil administration...to persuade the government to their point of view".⁴

Of course, the change in the attitude of the academic world towards the military institution was not due to a chance inspiration.

¹ Quoted from Lyle McAlister, 'Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America', *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, Vol.160, (1965), p86

² H.A. Cushing, (ed) *The writings of Samuel Adams* [New York: Putnam, 1907] p250

³ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964], p101

⁴ Allan Millet, *The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military*

Since the Second World War put an end to the traditional role of the military as an instrument of a state's territorial expansion, its utility as a domestic force was greatly enhanced. As one of the few highly 'westernized' institutions, the military was seen as the single most effective pressure group capable of playing a positive role in a country's attempt to reach a higher level in the ladder of social and political progress.⁵ Since the introduction of liberal, western economic-political institutions in peripheral states had upset the stability of the latter's traditional socio-political structure, the military appeared to be the only group capable of enforcing and preserving political stability and order. Hence, as the duties of the officers had to undergo such a substantial change and the entire institution was asked to play a multi-dimensional domestic role, the western academic world was forced to re-examine its old views on civil-military relations.

As the role of the military institution in the everyday political life of state can extend from minimal influence to direct rule, early post-war writers started to point out the 'advantages' which a modernized an active officer corps could offer to the political life of a peripheral country. Their zeal was such that some even ended up supporting the establishment of "pro-western" military dictatorships and overestimating the capabilities of the military institution. For example, with regard to Southeast Asian countries Pauker argues that a "remedy" for all social and economic problems which these countries were to face in the future, "is more likely to be found in the officer corps than among the politicians". Since "strong leadership backed by organizational structure and by moral authority" was seen as the necessary ingredient for the successful management and future planning of these countries, the only group which could display such qualities was the military, he suggested.⁶ Others, with more moderate outlook like Pye, though in favour of pro-western

[Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1979], p137

⁵ John Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964], p339

⁶ Guy Pauker, 'Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade', *World Politics*,

direct military participation in the political life of the peripheral states, do not neglect to mention that the objective of the type of role assigned to the officer corps was to create stable democratic political institutions and practices.⁷

Some others like Janowitz, however, started to point out that one should not confuse discipline and organizational capacity. Whereas the officers have been trained to operate efficiently when assigned to specific tasks, their effect on the broad economic development of any country would, at best, be minimal due to "limitations inherent in the[ir] profession".⁸ Overall, it was quite difficult for some western academics to justify overt military intervention and rule since, according to the Anglo-American politico-economic model which they were promoting, it is democracy rather than dictatorship the political system which complements the development of economic capitalism.⁹ With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of the ex-communist countries from their totalitarian regimes, democracy seemed as the best alternative political mechanism which the West could offer to these people.¹⁰ Although the process of democratization cannot take place and bring result overnight,¹¹ however, it gives the impression that it constitutes the only viable solution to world peace and security. As President Clinton pointed out in his speech at Georgetown University in 1991, countries with

Vol. 6, (1959), p343

⁷ Lucian Pye, 'Armies in the Process of Political Modernization' in John Johnson, (ed) *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962]

⁸ Janowitz, op.cit., p80

⁹ Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy (eds) *Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East* [London: British Academic Press, 1993] Chapter Three, and Claus Offe, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', *Social Research*, Vol.58, (1991)

¹⁰ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991] and Nancy Bermeo (ed), *Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992]

¹¹ "Democratic governance", Kagan argues, relies mainly on the fact that there is "a body of citizens who possess a good understanding of the principles of democracy or who have developed a character consistent with the democratic way of life". All this takes time-not just years but decades." quoted from Strobe Talbott, 'Democracy and the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.75, November/December 1996, p.62

democratic governments are more likely to be reliable partners in trade and diplomacy and less likely a threat to peace than those with other forms of government.¹²

Although the breakdown of an authoritarian/totalitarian regime constitutes the first step towards any country's democratization process, however, it should not make us think that such an event would automatically lead to the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions and practices. While in the transition period a relatively stable configuration of political institutions with democratic characteristics could be established,¹³ such a regime cannot be regarded as a democratic one.¹⁴ Until there is a full conformity of the people and their political and military leaders with the demands inherent in all democratic regimes, for instance, substantial attitudinal support for and behavioral compliance with the democratic institutions and the rules of the game that they establish, then democracy could be an elusive dream. As Sergei Kovalyov, a Russian human rights activist, has put it, "the quality of democracy depends heavily on the quality of the democrats...without

¹² At the same time, Huntington was confirming Clinton's ideology by pointing out that "From the early nineteenth century down to 1990...democracies did not, with only trivial or formal exceptions, fight other democracies...On the basis of past experience, an overwhelmingly democratic world is likely to be a world relatively free of international violence." in S. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991] p.29

¹³ Dankwart Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.2, (1970) and Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986]

¹⁴ According to Juan Linz, a political system can be regarded as democratic "when it allows the free formulation of political preferences through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule...without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference". Juan Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol.3 [Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1975] p182-83 If the authority of democratically elected leaders is constrained by reserve powers held by any group or institution that is not democratically responsible, then the system should be considered as falling significantly short of the democratic ideal type. Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan and Richard Gunther, 'Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe', in R. Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle (eds), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995]

this, everything will be like now, always in fits and start " .¹⁵

Because of the mounting interest of the academic world in understanding the various types and levels of civil-military relations in each country as well as in interpreting them, a number of writers have come up with certain typologies, in which a number of factors related both to the changing international and domestic environments have been employed. In spite of some weaknesses emerging from the attempt of the political scientists to create a universal theory with regard to the role of the military in all countries, these typologies tend to supplement each other and in the end offer to the reader a better understanding of civil-military relations, in general.

TYPOLOGIES OF CIVIL - MILITARY RELATION

Concentrating on the way in which the military institution can realize its corporate goals, Finer distinguishes four types of civil-military relations. In the first category, he puts all cases whereas the officers exercise their legitimate and constitutional influence on the civilian government, like any other pressure group, to attain goals such as an increase of military budget; in the second, when the officers use the threat of some sanction or blackmail to reach similar ends; in the third, when they displace a civilian regime with another one because the former had failed to perform its duties towards them adequately; and in the fourth category, the officers decide to sweep away the civilian regime and take over the government themselves.¹⁶ A problem with his typology is its heavy reliance on the degree of military intervention. This makes it difficult to draw a distinction between the behavioural and structural similarities of the military institution and regimes in different states, whereas intervention has been pushed to different levels but the role of the military in the society and politics is similar.¹⁷

Huntington, on the other hand, bases his typology of civil-military

¹⁵ Quoted from David Remnick, " Letter from Russia " , *The New Yorker*, 22 July 1996

¹⁶ Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback* [London: Pall Mall, 1962] p3

¹⁷ A.R. Lucham, 'A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations', *Government and Opposition*, Vol.6, (1961), p21

relations on the political objectives of the action taken by the officers. He classifies them into three categories. In the first category, he distinguishes those cases which resemble a palace coup; in the second, those resembling a reform coup; and in the third, those resembling a revolutionary one.¹⁸ A problem with his typology is that his attention is not only subjective but elusive as well. It fails to consider that a military intervention may start as one type of a coup but the military could be forced to undergo certain radical changes.

In an attempt to overcome the limitations of Huntington's model, Janowitz makes a significant step by differentiating civil-military relations in western states from those in the peripheral ones. He classifies civil-military relations in western states into three categories: aristocratic, democratic and totalitarian. With respect to peripheral states, he classifies civil-military relations into five categories: authoritarian-personal, authoritarian-mass, democratic-competitive, civil-military coalition, and military oligarchy.¹⁹ A problem with his typology is that it does not take into account the degree of autonomy which civilian leaders can have from the military. By failing to clarify this, he makes quite difficult the distinction of the role of the officers in a democratic and in an authoritarian system.

Learning from the mistakes of the previous writers, Lucham tries to offer a more complete model. He bases his typology of civil-military relations around three factors: the strength or weakness of civilian institutions; the strength or weakness of the military institution and the coercive, political and organizational resources at its disposal; and the nature of the boundaries between the military establishment and its socio-political environment.²⁰ By examining these three variables, Lucham's typology classifies civil-military relations based on the roles which the military institution plays in a country's political life. He divides them into categories in which the military exercises objective, constabulary, apparatus

¹⁸ Samuel Huntington, 'Patterns of Violence in World Politics' in his (ed), *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, [New York: Glencoe, 1962] pp32-33

¹⁹ Janowitz, op.cit., p2-8

²⁰ Lucham, op.cit., pp9-20

and subjective control as well as in cases of a nation-in-arms from cases in which a praetorian, a garrison or a guardian state has been established or there is political vacuum.²¹ A problem with Lucham's typology is that it neglects the role of the international environment (political, economic, and military) on a country's civil-military relations.

In the same direction as Lucham, but accepting Huntington's definition of "praetorian societies",²² Nordlinger, and Clapham and Phill try to formulate supplementary typologies of civil-military relations. After a careful examination of the three models of civilian control, traditional, liberal and penetration models,²³ Nordlinger argues that there is no single model of civilian control which can be both widely applicable an

²¹ The category Objective Control, describes a situation in which military and civil power are balanced. This often occurs in Western European and North American states. Constabulary Control describes the situation in which the political power of the civil institution exceeds that of the military. Sweden and postwar Japan are examples. In the case of Apparat Control, a ruling party apparatus has emerged and balances the power of the military with the assistance of such tools as ideology, purges, and secret police surveillance. USSR, the East European Countries, Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and Tito's Yugoslavia were examples. In the case of a Nation in Arms, the civilian institutions are more powerful than the military ones, as in Israel, whereas in a Revolutionary Nation in Arms, the military's strategic and political functions are shaped by political imperatives. The cases of Algeria, Vietnam and Cuba during their revolutionary war fit this category. Subjective Control describes a situation in which there is a near-identification of civilian and military power groups. Such is the case of the 19th century *caudillos* and landowners of Latin American countries. In the Garrison State the political power of the military exceeds that of civil institutions, such as in the case of Britain and Germany during the First World War. In the Guardian State the military is relatively free to define its own relations with its environment, whereas in the Post-Colonial Guardian State, the military and other political institutions were the remnants of the colonial era. The Praetorian State describes situations in which sections of the military assist civilian groups which have common interests. As for the case of Political Vacuum, both the civilian and the military institutions are weak. Ibid., pp22-35

²² According to Huntington, "in a Praetorian system there is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining and moderating group political actions. Social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions or professional political leaders are recognized and accepted as legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict." *Political Order in Changing Societies* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968] p196 Whereas Huntington argues that praetorianism is an element which characterizes all peripheral countries, Lucham argues that the peripheral countries are divided into guardian and praetorian types. Thus, he differs from Huntington's definition. Lucham, op.cit., p31

²³ The Traditional Model of civilian control is based on the premise that there is an absence of civilian military differences. The Liberal Model entails the maximum de-politicization of the military. Civilians are responsible for political decision-making and the military accepts a subordinate position. The Penetration Model assumes the penetration of the armed forces with political ideas and political personnel. Eric

effective. Hence, he uses as criteria the extent of governmental power which the officers exercise and the ambitiousness of their objectives. He distinguishes three types of praetorian officers: the moderators, the guardians and the rulers. The first tend to exercise veto power on a variety of governmental decisions without having to assume political power themselves. The second, after overthrowing the civilian government tend to assume political power themselves for a limited time. They aim to prevent the destruction of the status quo and to return political power to the civilians. The last, not only want to control the government but also being quite ambitious aim to transform their society.²⁴

Clapham and Philip argue that they are not interested in how the officers can gain political power but in the ways they use it. As a result, they come to classify four types of military regimes: Veto, Moderator, Factional and Breakthrough.²⁵ As determinants for their classification they use the unity of the military command structure, the level of differentiation of the military from civil society, the level of perceived threat from civil society as well as the level of autonomous political organization.²⁶ Interestingly, they are also concerned with the results of military regimes. They divide them into six categories. The handback, civilian renewal, authoritarian and factional clientelism, military-party state and the case of an impasse.

It is possible that other writers might have come up with new typologies. Based on the known ones, however, one should not look at them as a strict set of categories. These typologies have not been built up out of direct study of civil-military conditions in each country, but rather

Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics* [Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977] pp10-19

²⁴ Ibid., pp21-32

²⁵ The Veto Regime corresponds to Huntington's category; the cases of Chile and Argentina constitute an example. The Moderator Regime corresponds to Huntington's guardian type; Turkey, Brazil (1945-64) and West African states fit this category. The Factional Regime is an outcome of a personal coup by a disgruntled officer. The case of Amin in Uganda and Batista in Cuba are two examples. As for the Breakthrough Regime it is the classic example of a radical reforming military regime. Such cases are that of Libya (1969), Egypt (1952) and Ethiopia (1974). Christopher Clapham and George Philip (eds), *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes* [London: Croom Helm, 1985] pp8-10

from extrapolations of their historical records which heavily rely on socio-structural factors. Even when cultural and ideological factors are included, they are very broadly discussed. Since the elements which characterize civil-military relations in each country emerge out of conditions unique to the country and its institutions, the countries are not and should not to be treated as mere examples of an ideal type. Instead, one has to pay particular attention to their particular characteristics, while at the same time keeping these typologies in perspective.

²⁶ Ibid., pp6-8

A MODEL FOR DETERMINING THE TYPE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ANY COUNTRY

For a better understanding of the type of civil-military relation which dominate a country's political life as well as its level of democratisation, the creation of a multi-factorial model is needed. This model ought to be a composite one and to take into account the following factors: First, the military institution itself. A close observation to the size of the military institution,²⁷ the social background²⁸ and the level of professionalization²⁹ of its members, their political ideology,³⁰ their level of cohesion and unity³¹ as well as that of their desire to protect their corporate interest(s),³² could, as Janowitz argues, offer us a better chance for "comprehend[ing] both the officers, [their] internal capabilities and their tendency to intervene in domestic politics".³³

Second, the model should take into consideration the effect of the domestic social,³⁴ economic³⁵ and the political³⁶ environment in which the

²⁷ Whereas Alexis deTocqueville, *Democracy in America* [New York: Schocken, 1961] p.324 and Stanislaw Andrenski, *Military Organization and Society* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968] p.5 claim that large militaries constitute a great danger to a democratic government, Aristide Zolberg, 'The structure of political conflict in the new states of tropical Africa', *American Political Science Review*, Vol.64, (1970), and Edward Feit, *Armed Bureaucrats* [Boston: Mufflin, 1973] pp6-7, argue that the smaller the size of the military, the greater their propensity to intervene.

²⁸ Manfred Halpern, 'Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class', in Johnson, (1962), op.cit., pp286-7, Eric Nordlinger, 'Soldiers in Mufti', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, (1970), and Jose Nunn, 'The Middle Class Military Coup', in Claudio Veliz (ed), *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* [London: Oxford University Press, 1967]

²⁹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957]; Bengt Abrahamson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972] ; Jacques VanDoorn, *Military Profession and Military Regimes* [The Hague: Mouton, 1969]

³⁰ Morris Janowitz and Jacques VanDoorn (eds), *On Military Ideology* [Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971]

³¹ William Thompson, 'Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.9, (1976) and Clapman and Philip, op.cit., p.6

³² Finer, op.cit., p.41, Nordlinger, (1977), op.cit., p.78 and William Thompson, 'Corporate coup-maker grievances and types of regime targets', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.12, (1980)

³³ Janowitz, (1964), op.cit., p.2

³⁴ Huntington, (1968), op.cit., pp.195-196, Putnam, op.cit., p.96, Andrenski, op.cit., pp.55-99

³⁵ Ergil Fossum, 'Factors influencing the occurrence of military coups in Latin America', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.4, (1967)

military institution lives and functions. Special attention ought to be paid to the political factor since it is this which will greatly determine whether the process of democratization has established strong roots in any country.³⁷ Third, the role of the international factor and more specifically the influence which the major foreign powers exercise upon both the military establishment and the country's domestic forces.³⁸ Last but not least, the past and present role of the military institution in the evolution of civil-military relations in each country must be examined.

A small rider should be added here regarding the last factor. Most studies of civil-military relations are greatly concerned with the 'military factor' only after an intervention occurs. The role of the same institution in domestic policy-making process in situations where the military does not rule is often neglected or underestimated. Although writers emphasize the immediate factors leading to the military intervention, they forget that the military organization as "a system of continuous purposive activity of specified kind"³⁹ functions within the society long before the pre-intervention stage. As Johnson points out, "the direct control of government by high ranking officers or military juntas is only a crude indication of the role that the armed forces may be playing at a given moment, for men in uniform have sundry ways of making their will felt".⁴⁰ As a result, patron-client relations not only inside the military establishment but also between its members and the civilian government ought not to be overlooked.⁴¹ Additionally, the planned and smooth, or violent,

³⁶ Huntington, (1968), op.cit., pp193-194 and Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986]

³⁷ Thomas Bruneau and Alex MacLeod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy* [Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986], Felipe Aguero, *The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Context: Spain in Comparative Perspective* [Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Duke University, 1991] and Geoffrey Prindham, 'Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe', *West European Politics*, Vol.13, (1990)

³⁸ Geoffrey Prindham (ed), *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe* [New York: St. Martin's, 1991], Kenneth Maxwell (ed), *Democracy and Foreign Policy* [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992]

³⁹ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations* (edit) Talcott Parsons [New York: Free Press, 1964], p151

⁴⁰ Johnson, (1964), op.cit., p7

⁴¹ Harold Grouch, 'Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia', *World Politics*,

transition from military rule to another form of government, (mainly democratic), in peripheral countries, and its effect on the evolution of civilian rule in them, deserves attention.⁴² Since the role of the military in decision-making processes often exceeds its immediate sphere of occupational reference, its changing role in a transformed society must be scrutinized.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE

The development of civil-military relations in Turkey and Greece during the period 1980-1995 will be used as examples for testing the validity of this model. This choice of these two countries has been made with the aim of achieving a better understanding of the post-war political developments in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Since the end of Cold War period assisted in the creation of volatile and dangerous developments in the Balkan Peninsula, the military institution of both countries could easily be triggered to assume a major role in domestic as well as in foreign affairs. Hence, a close examination of the post-war political role of the military institution in Greece and Turkey is as important to the academic world as to the policy makers. The 1980-95 period is quite significant for determining the level of each country's democratic consolidation as well as their particular type of civil-military relations, since in the early post-war period the military institution of both Turkey and Greece gave the impression that it constituted an important if not the most important factor of their political, economic and social development.

Vol.31, (1979), pp577-578

⁴² Henri Barkey, 'Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.16, (1990) and Linz, Stepan and Gunther, op.cit.

CHAPTER TWO: THE CASE OF TURKEY

Part One: A short description of the evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey from the Ottoman period to 1980

If there is one element on which all researchers of Ottoman and Turkish history seem to agree, this is the assumption that the military institution has been the most important force behind the evolution of social, economic and political structure of the Turkish state. "It was the military corps that named and the military prestige that sustained the leader—once a Sultan Caliph, now a President", argue Lerner and Robinson about the role of the military institution in the political development of the Ottoman and the Turkish states.⁴³ Hence, any attempt to define the type of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey would be incomplete without observing and understanding the role of the military during the earlier periods.

The settlement of Turkish nomadic populations in Anatolia in the eight-ninth century A.D., the formation of their first states and the expansion of their territorial borders over neighbouring lands had a profound effect on their political organization. Two broadly defined socio-political groups dominated the political life of the Ottoman state: the *askeri* or ruling class, composed of the Sultan, the higher ranks of the military and the bureaucracy and the *ulema*, and the *reaya*, composed by the Muslim and non-Muslim population which resided inside the state and had no direct role in government.⁴⁴ The dominant role which the military institution played in the formation and preservation of the Ottoman Empire has been emphatically pointed out by Lybyer. According to him, "the Ottoman government had been an Army before

⁴³ Daniel Lerner and Richard Robinson, 'Swords and Ploughshares: the Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force', *World Policy*, Vol.13, (1960), p.19

⁴⁴ Halil Inalcik, 'The Nature of Traditional Society', in Richard Ward and Dankwart Rustow (eds), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964] p.44

it was anything else...in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men".⁴⁵ The expansion of the Empire into three continents and its subsequent disintegration, led to an increase to the level of contest for political power among the members of the ruling group. The result of these contests had had a serious effect on the foundations of the modern Turkish state.

As the Empire expanded, the attempts of the Sultans to maintain political control over the cavalry corps, the *Sipahis*,⁴⁶ led gradually to the formation of a salaried infantry corps under their direct command, the *Janissaries*.⁴⁷ Due time, however, and with the appearance of weak Sultans, the *Janissaries* started to realise their corporate strength and begun to play a more direct role in the political affairs of the Empire.⁴⁸ In an attempt to save the Empire from internal disintegration and restore it as well as their political position to its previous glory, some Sultans tried to create a modern, western educated and trained, military and civil bureaucracy.⁴⁹ Although, initially, the new military and civil bureaucratic corps succeeded in re-establishing the imperial authority to its former powerful position, however, the new ideas which had been circulating among its members were bound to lead to the redistribution of political power in the ruling group.

⁴⁵ Albert Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of the Suleiman the Magnificent* [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1913] pp.90-91

⁴⁶ V.J. Parry, 'Elite Elements in the Ottoman Empire', in Rupert Wilkinson (ed) *Governing Elites: Studies in their training and selection* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1969], p.55

⁴⁷ With the *devsirme* system, young boys were taken away from their non-Muslim families, brought to the capital and were forced to embrace Islam. The most intelligent were trained in the art of administration while the rest had to undergo military training to join the *Janissary* corps. Since the *Janissaries* were theoretically dependent on the Sultan for their income and social status, they contributed to the augmentation of the latter's political power. Godfrey Goodwin, *The Janissaries* [London: Saqi, 1994]

⁴⁸ Sir Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen (eds), *Islamic Society and the West* [London: Oxford University Press, 1950] Vol.I, pp-180-182 and Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* [London: Oxford University Press, 1961] pp.23-24

⁴⁹ Kemal Karpat, 'The transformation of the Ottoman state, 1789-1908', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.3, (1972) and Avigdor Levy, 'The Ottoman Corps in Sultan Mahmud II New Ottoman Army', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.1, (1971)

Indeed, the exposure of the high ranking members of the military and civil bureaucracy to western political ideas and ideal⁵⁰ in conjunction with the increasing intervention of the state in the everyday life of the Ottoman subjects and the inability of the central government to improve the financial and military strength of the Empire, led to the identification of the Sultan as the figure responsible for all the misfortunes which had befallen on the Empire. In the beginning, the western-oriented officers succeeded in limiting the absolute political power of the Sultan by forcing him to introduce, in 1876, the first constitution and establish the first Parliament in the country's political life. However, the power struggle between these two groups could not be resolved with these changes. The disastrous results which had brought upon the Empire its continuous involvement in wars with the other Balkan states and the Great Powers, the poor performance of its economy and the spreading of instability in its social structure, offered a unique chance to the military institution to increase its corporate autonomy from the Sultan and become the political leader of the movement which was fighting for the preservation of the Ottoman-Turkish state.⁵¹

The Greeks, the initiators of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, were ironically those who involuntarily contributed to the establishment of the Turkish state and the ascendance of the military institution to the highest position in its political structure. The landing of Greek forces in Izmir in 1919 and their subsequent advance into the interior of Anatolia gave an opportunity to the then discredited pro-Union officers to lead the resistance movement.⁵² With the defeat of the Greeks, the Turkish military-bureaucratic class became the most powerful political

⁵⁰ Bernard Lewis, 'The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey', *Journal of World Politics*, (1953)

⁵¹ B. Lewis, (1969), op.cit., Sina Aksin, *31 Mart Olayi* [Ankara: A.U.S.B.F., 1970], Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969], Liman Von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey* [Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1972] and Eric Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor* [Leiden: Brill, 1984]

⁵² The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War had led to the loss of its Arab territories, to a financial disaster and under the Armistice of Mudros its independent political status was threatened.

group in the new state. Since the largest part of the Ottoman office corps became the nucleus of the Turkish Armed Forces,⁵³ the tradition, knowledge and experiences from past domestic and external struggle had passed on to the army of the Republic. The latter showed a strong intention of making the best use of these qualities.

The desire of the architect of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to create a strong state, based on western ideas and ideals, seemed to be not an easy task. The extermination of the Armenians and the forced exodus of the Greek populations had deprived the new state from the most western-oriented and financially powerful social groups. The only other group which revealed strong pro-western feelings was the military. It was the members of this group to whom Atatürk entrusted the realization of his goals. As a wise statesman, he took all the necessary measures which could guarantee that the "Army...[was going to be] loyal to him and the Republic".⁵⁴ Furthermore, he made certain that most political and state institutions were infiltrated with personnel who had a military background.⁵⁵ However, Atatürk was very careful on the construction of the legacy he would leave as a bequest to the office corps. Having learned a hard lesson from the Young Turk period, he raised legal barriers to the direct involvement of active officers in the country's everyday political life.⁵⁶ With this measure, he tried to protect the military

⁵³ Dankward Rustow, 'The Military: Turkey', in Ward and Rustow, op.cit., p.388

⁵⁴ George Harris, 'The role of the Military in Turkish Politics', *Middle East Journal*, (1965), p.56

⁵⁵ "Though [the RPP regime was] technically civilian," Frey observes, "persons conditioned by military experience, accessible to military contacts and trusted by military personnel were at the mainspring of power". Frederick Frey, 'The Army in Turkish Politics', *Land Reborn*, (1966), pp.7-8 Also, Ozbugun points out that in the early years of the Republic, "the separation of military from politics was not complete. The civilian regime depended on the support of the army for maintaining its power and implementing its reforms...the contentment of the armed forces with the non-political roles that they had been assigned may have been due to the fact that their ex-commanders were the leaders of the new regime and they were carrying out the social revolution which the army desired". Ergun Ozbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics* [Harvard, Mass: C.I.A., 1966] p.8

⁵⁶ Article 148 of the Military Penal Code prohibited "any member of the armed forces to join a political party, hold or participate in political meetings, give a political speech in public, or prepare, sign or send to the press any declaration of a political character". quoted from Frederick Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* [Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1965] p.61

institution from the dangers which emanate from such adventures. At the same time, he made no attempts to hide his warm feelings toward the military personnel. It was the latter rather than the civilians (politicians, merchants, etc) who Attaturk trusted for the accomplishment of the goal he had set for the Turkish Republic .⁵⁷

For as long as Ataturk and his successor, Ismet Inonu, were ruling the country, the officer corps appeared to have assumed a lesser yet still important role in the evolution of Turkish politics.⁵⁸ However, the rise of the Democratic Party to power in 1950 and the new economic and social policies that it introduced, seemed to upset the officer corps, especially the middle and low-ranking ones. Although the DP did not try to introduce any legal radical changes in the country's civil-military relations, its politico-economic policies caused considerable decline to the social status and the political power of the military personnel.⁵⁹ As a result, a coup was staged in the Spring of 1960 and members of the DP were punished for their past behavior.⁶⁰ Even though the high-ranking officers

⁵⁷ "Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to stride towards the heights," Ataturk argued, "it has always seen its army...as the permanent leader in the forefront of this march...In times to come, also, its heroic sons will march in the vanguard of the sublime ideals of the Turkish nation". quoted from William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* [London: Routledge, 1994], p.87

⁵⁸ Even though Inonu tried to reduce the political power of the officers with the introduction of personnel and institutional changes in it, such as the retirement of Marshal Fevzi Cakmak, long-time Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces and the making the Chief of the General Staff directly responsible to the Ministry of Defense rather than the office of the President, [Hale, op.cit., pp. 82-83] however, the presence of the military continued to be a strong one. For instance, military interests "dictated" the building of roads, railroad and the location of factories, [Harris, op.cit., p.60] military commanders in the frontier provinces combined their military and civilian duties for prolonged periods of time, [Rustow, op.cit., pp.549-550] and military personnel were instrumental in the spread of Kemalist ideas to the people [Clifton Fox, 'Turkish Army's Role in Nationbuilding', *Military Review*, Vol.67, (1967)].

⁵⁹ An officer interviewed by Karpas after the 1960 coup argued that during the DP regime, "the prestige of the army was declining. Money seemed to have become everything. An officer no longer had status in the society. It hurt...to see officers...wear civilian clothes and feel proud in them". Kemal Karpas, 'The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: a socio-cultural analysis of a revolution', *American Historical Review*, Vol.75, (1970), p.1665. Also, George Harris, 'The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.24, (1970)

⁶⁰ Over 20,000 members of the DP lost their political rights while three members of the administration, Prime Minister Menderes, Minister for Foreign Affairs Zorlu and Interior Minister Polatkan were hanged. The punishment of DP founders and associates can be seen as a message from the military to future political leaders that the latter

did not desire the return of the country to a monoparty political system or the establishment of a military regime, they were determined to avoid the occurrence of another Menderes-style political regime. Hence, they introduced a new set of rules to the political game in Turkey. The creation of a new, liberal Constitution, the formation of a second political institution, the Senate and the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers on issues of national security, were measures which intended to reduce the political power of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) and party leaders while at the same time legalising the intervention of the military in the country' political and economic affairs.⁶¹

While the military institution played a dominant role in the formation of the coalition governments in the period 1961 to 1965 as well as to the ascendance of the Justice Party to power from 1965 to 1971,⁶² the level of unity inside the officer corps was quite low. The increasing politicization of the military and the existence of groups of officers who opposed the practices of the civilian government⁶³ inevitably led to another coup. The 1971 coup through "memorandum" was a last-minute attempt by some of high ranking officers to prevent a group of 'radical' officers from gaining political power and maintain the unity and discipline of the military. During the 1971-73 period, the Turkish Armed Forces appeared in control of all political developments inside it,⁶⁴ as well as capable of

should think twice before attempting to violate the limits of political behavior that the Turkish Armed Forces have set.

⁶¹ Roger Nye, *The Military in Turkish Politics, 1960-73* [Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Washington University, 1974]

⁶² Clement Dodd, *Politics and Government in Turkey* [Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1969] and Umit Cizre-Sakallioğlu, *AP-Ordu İlişkileri* [Istanbul: İletişim, 1993]

⁶³ Karpaz, (1970), *op.cit.*, pp.1675-1676, Nye, *op.cit.*, Chapter 6, Muhsin Batur, *Anılar ve Görüşler* [Istanbul: Milliyet, 1985] p.146, p177 and p.184, Celil Gurkan, *12 Mart'a Bes Kala* [Istanbul: Tekin, 1986] pp.216-218 and 230-249

⁶⁴ As Turan argues, all parties formed after the coup "required [the] acceptance [of the] military leadership. Part of the cabinet's responsibility was to translate into policy those objectives deemed desirable by the commanders, then to mobilize support for their acceptance by the legislature". The threat of a higher degree of intervention was often employed to stop members of the GNA from obstructing the policies of military-backed coalition cabinets. İlter Turan, *Military Influence and Coalition Governments as Inputs into Ministerial Attributes, Attitudes and Job Risks:*

augmenting their power in the country's political structure.⁶⁵ Hence, when the military allowed the political parties to return to power, it appeared that not only it had solved the basic organizational problems which had forced it to stage the coup in the first place,⁶⁶ but had also emerged politically stronger.

The continuous interventions of the officer corps in the political life of the country and their attempt to create a system that would not allow the formation of a government similar to the DP one, encouraged the development of small parties and the formation of coalition governments. Indeed, the characteristic of the period 1973 to 1980 was the absence of one-party regimes. However, the fragile unity of the coalition governments and the desire of the smaller parties to make the most of their collaboration with the larger ones, had turned the attention of political elites to partisan gains rather than to the treatment of the severe socio-economic problems which the country was facing. Naturally, there was an unprecedented explosion of social violence.⁶⁷ In conjunction with the deterioration of the economy in the late 1970s, these developments had a negative effect on the officers and the people about their politicians. Since the civilians had been unable to curtail the institutional autonomy and the political power of the military,⁶⁸ the latter, having taken all necessary precautions⁶⁹ staged another coup in 1980. Unlike the

Turkey, 1961-1972 [Istanbul: Istanbul University, 1977] p.51

⁶⁵ For instance, the declaration of martial law and its extension up to 1973, permitted the local commanders to concentrate the judicial, legislative and executive powers in their own hands. These commanders were answerable for their actions to military not to civilian authorities. Furthermore, all amendments which were passed to the 1961 Constitution had as a goal to increase the level of autonomy as well as the political power of the military institution over the civilians. Nursen Mazici, *Turkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Sivil Rejime Etkileri* [Istanbul: Gur, 1989] pp.114-116

⁶⁶ Lucille Pavsner, *Turkey's Political Crisis* [New York: Praeger, 1984] p.51

⁶⁷ The number of political murders increased rapidly year after year and intraethnic and intersectarian cleavages were aroused. National Security Council, *12 September in Turkey: Before and After* [Ankara: Kardesler, 1982] pp.159-199

⁶⁸ Semih Vaner, 'The Army', in Irvin Schick and Erdugul Tonak (ed), *Turkey in Transition* [London: Oxford, 1987]

⁶⁹ For example, in the autumn of 1978, the military leadership established a team "commissioned to prepare the following questions: *Is an intervention from the armed forces required at this stage? If so, what should be the basis of such an intervention?*". Furthermore, the Chief of the General Staff, General Kenan Evren and his fellow commanders were making frequent tours of inspection throughout the

previous times, the co-operation of the existing political leaders was not regarded as an essential element to the remodelling of the country' political and economic structure. The military leadership was in control of the developments inside Turkey.

country in order to make certain that the activities of the younger officers were under the control of the military leadership. Also, the military commanders, by appearing as the only group which can bring political order and stability to Turkey, had won the support of the Americans and the international financial organizations for their action. Mehmet Ali Birand, *The General's Coup in Turkey* [London: Brassey's, 1987] pp.25, 39, 61-62, 65

Part Two: The evolution of Civil-Military relations in Turkey from 1980 to 1995

I. From 1980 to 1983

The birth of the new regime occurred on the 12 September 1980 and lasted until the 6 December of 1983. Invoking the power granted to them by the Internal Service Code and using as example the deteriorating social, political and economic conditions that the country was facing, the leaders of the Turkish Armed Forces staged a coup, dissolved the Parliament and the government, arrested all political and union leaders and installed themselves in power.⁷⁰ Thus, for the next three years, the military institution became legally the sole political ruler of Turkey.

The first issue which the coup leaders had to face was the expansion and consolidation of their power over the country's political life. This proved to be not an easy task. Although in the beginning, the military leadership entertained the idea of appointing a civilian cabinet which could carry on the day-to-day affairs of the country under its instructions, the unwillingness of the politicians to become part of such a plan led to the formation of Uluşu's cabinet on 21 September 1983.⁷¹ Bulent Uluşu, a retired navy commander who had been closely involved in the coup preparations, was seen by Evren and his fellow commanders as a figure who could gain the respect of both the military and the people. But Uluşu was not the only military figure of his 21-man cabinet; five of his ministers were also retired military officers while the rest were non-party technocrats. In addition to the formation of Uluşu's cabinet, hundreds of retired officers were appointed to jobs previously performed by political bureaucrats, such as under secretaries, deputy under secretaries, directors general of various ministries and public enterprises.⁷² This measure was considered necessary for the implementation of the

⁷⁰ Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* [Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990] Vol.I, pp.546-547

⁷¹ Birand, 1987, op.cit., pp.200-202

⁷² *The New York Times*, March 16, 1981

work of military rulers through the state administration. Furthermore, by amending the Martial Law Act, the military regime enhanced the political powers of martial law commanders and courts,⁷³ thus, increasing the control of the central government at the local level. After accomplishing its first task, the military leadership felt obliged to prepare the ground for the period which would follow its withdrawal from the political scene.

Aware of the negative effects which their lengthy staying in power could have on the military institution itself as well as on Turkey's international relations,⁷⁴ and worried that the politicians might destroy their work when in power, the leaders of the military regime were determined to lay down the new rules and limitations for the conduct of political life in the country during the post-junta period. Hence, the introduction of a new constitution and its 'acceptance' by the people,⁷⁵ indicated that the process of reconstructing the country's major political institutions was irreversible. The new constitution, abolished the Senate, reduced the membership to the Grand National Assembly (GNA) to 400 with an increased term of five years and enlarged the political power of the President of the Republic.⁷⁶ Interestingly enough, for the first seven year-

⁷³ Martial law commanders had been given "the right to ban strikes, public meetings, demonstrations, suspend newspapers and other publications, and to dismiss local and central government staff whose employment was deemed undesirable without right of appeal. Martial law courts were given the right to try ideological offenses laid down in Sections 141 and 142 of the Penal Code and arrangements were made to speed up trials under martial law." Hale, (1994), op.cit., p.251

⁷⁴ *The Washington Post*, May 29, 1981

⁷⁵ According to the official results of the referendum that was held on 7 November 1982, 91.4% of the voters in a 91.3% turnout said "yes" to its implementation. In addition to valid objections one can have about the final outcome of any type of elections conducted under a martial law government, it is interesting to point out that the Turkish people did not have much of a choice. As the then Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu had pointed out on 14 July 1982, if the people vote "no" in the referendum, then the military would not return to the barracks but remain in power. General Kenan Evren seemed to share the same view with Ulusu. Hasan Cemal, *Tank Sesiyle Uyanmak* [Ankara: Bilgi, 1986] p. 550 In other words, the people had to choose between a Constitution proposed by the military or the continuation of the military dictatorship.

⁷⁶ With regard to his executive function, the President's powers were: appointing the Prime Minister and accepting his resignation, presiding over the meetings of the Council of Ministers whenever he deems it necessary, calling a meeting of the NSC and presiding over it, proclaiming martial law or a state of emergency in collaboration with the Council of Ministers, appointing the chairman and members of the State Supervisory Council as well as the members of the Board of Higher

term, the new President was granted the right to veto any constitutional amendments that the government would propose (Article 175).

Of course, the military hierarchy could not hide its concern over the type of political parties and political leaders it would like to see guiding the country's post-junta political, economic and social life. Dissatisfied with the performance of the old parties and their leaders during the pre-1980 period and disillusioned with their behaviour since the September coup, the military regime decided with some delay, on 16 October 1981, to legally dissolve the existing political parties, and, on October of 1982, to ban the chairmen, general secretaries and other senior office holders from any kind of relations with future political parties during the next ten years (Provisional Article 4). The generals believed that the old politician would try to undermine their work when the country would return to parliamentary politics and decided that Turkey needed "a clean break with the past".⁷⁷ Thus, on 24 April 1983, the Political Parties Law was passed which imposed certain bureaucratic restrictions to the formation of new parties.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the new electoral law which was issued in June

Education, appointing the Chief of the General Staff, and appointing university rectors. His powers pertaining to the judicial function were: appointing the members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the members of the Council of State, the members of the High Military Administrative Court, the Military Court of Cassation as well as those of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Ergun Ozbudun, 'The status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982', in Metin Heper and Ahmed Evin (eds), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988] p.39

⁷⁷ Evren, op.cit., Vol.2, p.411-416

⁷⁸ According to Articles 4,5,8 of the Political Parties Law No.2820, to gain legal existence, political parties had to have at least thirty founder members, who had to submit to the Ministry of the Interior a formal statement of the name and address of the party, the party rule book and program, their own names and personal details and a mass of personal documentation. Furthermore, the parties ought to be attached to the principles and reforms of Ataturk and should not adopt any of the aims deemed inadmissible under Article 14 of the constitution. In other words, "the by-laws and programs of the parties may not be in conflict with the principle of national unity and territorial integrity of the state, human rights, national sovereignty, and the democratic and the secular character of the Republic". Also, "no parties advocating domination of society by a group and the establishment of a dictatorship may be founded". Moreover, Articles 78-90 of the Political Parties Law pointed out that "communist parties and parties oriented toward ethnic separatism, religious distinctions and racial differences" were not going to be allowed to appear. Article 96 specified that the new parties could not use the names and symbols of the pre-1980 parties and Article 97 barred political parties from criticizing or opposing the decisions and policies pursued by the NSC. Ilter Turan, 'Political

1983 reduced the chances of small parties to send their representatives to the Parliament⁷⁹ and made the process of forming and maintaining stable majority government easier.

Despite all these precautionary measures, the military leaders did not forget to take certain steps that would ensure the continuing presence and influence of their institution at the highest level of political decision making. For instance, Provisional Article 1 of the 1982 Constitution stated that with its approval the leader of the military regime, General Kenan Evren, would automatically occupy the position of the President of the Republic for the next seven years. Moreover, Provisional Article 2 made clear that the other five members of the junta were to form the Presidential Council for the next six years. Furthermore, Provisional Article 15 provided with immunity all members of the NSC which exercise legislative and executive power on behalf of the people from 1980 to 1983. Most of all, the political power of the National Security Council in which the military retained its majority representation, was enhanced. According to Constitutional Article 118, the NSC would submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary co-ordination on issues regarding the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of the society. The latter was obliged "to give priority consideration" to the decisions of the NSC. Hence, the NSC, although not responsible to the GNA, had become, almost, the "highest, non-elected, decision making body of the [Turkish] state".⁸⁰

In 1983, the military leaders, satisfied with their accomplishment such as the suppression of social violence, the termination of political instability, the return of national economy on the right track and the reconstruction of Turkey's political institutions, felt that they were ready to

Parties and the Party System in post-1983 Turkey', in Heper and Evin (eds), *op.cit.*, p.69 and p.74

⁷⁹ According to Articles 33,34 of the Law on the Election of Deputies No.2839, all parties needed to win at least 10% of the national vote to qualify for parliamentary seats. Apart from it, the new law set a local quota which parties had to exceed to gain any seats in the constituency. Hale, *op.cit.*, p.259 and Turan, *ibid.*, p.71

allow the transition of the country to competitive politics. However, moved by their genuine distrust towards the politicians and a strong desire to protect their work, the military leaders felt obliged to control the kind of political leadership and parties that would emerge, at least, during the early post-junta period.⁸¹ Provisional Article 4 gave the right to the NSC to review, and if it deemed appropriate, disqualify founders of political parties. If that was not enough, in July of 1983 the NSC empowered itself with the right to veto the candidates the parties put up. Thus, while several political parties were formed after the announcement for a return to parliamentary politics, only three of them were permitted by the NSC to take part in the 1983 elections. The participation of the Nationalist Democracy Party and the Populist Party was expected since both had been formed with the direct encouragement of the military leadership. As for the third, the Motherland Party, although it kept some distance from the military regime, it seemed to be the one that had benefited most from the policies of the junta and could, in the long run, support their implementation. The other parties, such as the Great Turkey Party, led behind the scenes by ex-Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel, the Social Democracy Party, led by Erdal Inonu, the pro-islamic Welfare Party and some minor ones, were seen as possible threats to the workability of the new system and the NSC blocked their participation in the elections.⁸²

ii. From 1984 to 1995

In the post-junta period, civil-military relations in Turkey passed through three distinct stages. The first, when Kenan Evren was the President and Turgut Ozal the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic (1983-89), the second, when Ozal occupied the seat of the President (1989-93), and the third, the post-Ozal period (1993-95). A short but descriptive

⁸⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 January 1989

⁸¹ A prominent Turkish politician talking to David Tonge of the Financial Times before the 1983 elections, argued that "we [the political leaders] don't need to panic. In two years at most, the generals' creations will begin to unravel". With regard to the junta, Tonge pointed out that "the military's hope appears to be that once new politicians are in the saddle, they will refuse to dismount for their former leaders". *Financial Times*, 17 May 1983

⁸² Hale, *op.cit.*, p.262-265, Turan, *op.cit.*, pp.74-75

analysis of each of them is necessary for a better understanding of the role of the military in recent political life of Turkey.

The type and the diversity which characterized the social groups that supported the Motherland Party⁸³ did not contribute to making it the best desirable partner of the officer corps for running the country. Since the wilful exit from the government had assisted the military institution to retain its integrity, autonomy as well as a large proportion of its political power,⁸⁴ the lifetime of the new regime depended on the division of responsibilities between the MP and the military. Hence, during the first years of the Ozal administration, the military, through the constitutional powers of President Kenan Evren and the NSC, retained responsibility over all matters relating to Turkey's internal and external security, foreign affairs and higher education-matters. The civilian cabinet became responsible, mainly, for all issues relating to the economy.⁸⁵ Although Prime Minister Ozal made some attempts to extend its cabinet influence in various areas, among them and the civil bureaucracy,⁸⁶ up to 1987, the military continued to dictate the evolution of events.⁸⁷

In due time, however, a number of events forced Ozal to take certain political steps that were bound to challenge the traditional role of

⁸³ " Ozal's MP as a centre-right, moderate force has served to draw back into the mainstream supporters of those pre-1980 parties of the right (NSP, NAP) who were formerly engaged in anti-system protest. The statistical analysis indicated that MP had created a new cleavage in Turkish politics which had cut across the old cleavages of the right and perhaps extending into the centre-left". Ustun Erguder and Richard Hofferbert, 'Restoration of democracy in Turkey? Political reforms and the elections of 1983', in Linda Lane (ed), *Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends* [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987] p.37

⁸⁴ Barkey, op.cit, pp.171-173, Claude Welch Jr, *No Farewell to Arms* [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987]

⁸⁵ Metin Heper, 'The executive in the Third Turkish Republic', *Governance*, No.3, (1990), pp.299-319 and Ustun Erguder, 'The Motherland Party, 1983-89', in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* [London: I.B. Tauris, 1991]

⁸⁶ Metin Heper, 'The State and Debureaucratization: The case of Turkey', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.42, (1990), p.611

⁸⁷ For instance, the military returned to the barracks according to its own timetable. Despite the gradual lifting of martial law, its presence in public life remained a strong one since those indicted under martial law continued to be prosecuted in military courts and the evolution of events in the southeast region raised a lot of questions as to whether the military would completely forego its policing duties. *Cumhuriyet*, 11 January 1986 and 28 April 1986; *Nokta*, 16 August 1987

the officer corps in Turkish politics. Such events were the climbing rate of inflation and the criticism it raised about the economic policy of his administration,⁸⁸ the increasing pressure which the pre-1980 party leaders gradually put upon the government⁸⁹ with their potential return to active political life, the demilitarization attitude of the Press and the intellectual⁹⁰ and most of all, the conciliatory attitude which the major representative of the military institution developed towards the Prime Minister. On the one side, Ozal tried to curtail the influence of the military on public policy. For instance, he let the people decide (through a national referendum about the status of Provisional Article 4 which forbade the leaders of the pre-1980 parties to establish, join or have any relations with any political party until 1992,⁹¹ lifted the restrictions on forming new political parties and ignored those which the 1982 constitution had put on the movement of parliamentary deputies from one party to another. He passed new law which allowed, to a certain degree, public meetings and demonstrations, the right to form associations and to make collective petitions, issues that had been illegal after the 1980 coup. Also, he replaced the military liaison appointees in each ministry with civilian administrators, reduced the maximum period of detention of suspects prior to arraignment from 90 to 15 days and allowed all but one of the labour unions to operate. Furthermore, he attempted to extend the authority of his cabinet to the area of internal security either by creating regional governorships with extraordinary political powers or by giving the Prime Minister unprecedented powers over the recruitment and personnel policies of

⁸⁸ Erguder in Heper and Landau, *op.cit.*, p.157

⁸⁹ The democratic legitimacy of the 1983 elections was put to the test both in the 1984 local elections in which the MP gained 41.5% of the vote, to be followed by the SDP with 23.4% and the True Path Party (TPP) with 13.5% and in the 1986 by-elections in which the MP received only 32% of the votes whereas the TPP received 23.5% and the Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP) 22.8%.

⁹⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 15 April 1986 and 16 January 1987, Yalcin Dogan, *Dar Sokakta Siyaset: 1980-83* [Istanbul: Takin, 1985]; Turker Alkan, *12 Eylul ve Demokrasi* [Istanbul: Kaynak, 1986]; Yavuz Donat, *Buyruklu Demokrasi, 1980-83* [Ankara: Bilgi, 1987]

⁹¹ The result was in favor of amending it (50.2% voted "yes" and 49.8% "no"). The outcome benefited Ozal since on the one side he eliminated the accusation that his party dominance was hiding behind undemocratic restrictions imposed by the military. Also, by campaigning in favor for the "no" vote, Ozal could claim that the

the National Intelligence Agency (MIT).⁹²

On the other, Ozal tried to interfere with matters related to military autonomy⁹³ and establish political authority over it. Hence, in the summer of 1987, overruled the recommendation of the senior military command for appointing General Necdet Ozturun to the position of the Chief of the General Staff and instead put in office the candidate he seemed to prefer, General Necip Torumtay.⁹⁴ At the same time, Ozal decided to break old taboo subjects and brought into public discussion the issue of defense funds. Few months later, his cabinet declared that it planned to make the Chief of the General Staff to report to the defense minister, characteristic of all western democratic governments.⁹⁵ If that was not enough, he ordered a halt to air-force training exercises over the Aegean, due to an agreement he had reached with the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu, without informing first or consulting with the military chiefs.

The mild reaction of the military institution to Ozal's actions,⁹⁶ his elevation to the office of the President of the Turkish Republic in 1989 and the favourable international conditions appeared to give Ozal the green

majority of the 49.8% were MP supporters.

⁹² Ahmed Evin, 'Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime', in Metin Heper and Ahmed Evin (eds), *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994] pp.35-38

⁹³ For instance, there was no attempt to amend Article 16 of the 1982 Constitution which pointed out that the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are outside the scope of judicial review.

⁹⁴ *The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 July 1987 and Ken Mackenzie, "Turkey: Ozal vs the Generals", *Middle East International*, 11 July 1987

⁹⁵ Except for the period 1949 to 1960 in which the Ministry of Defense had the responsibility to manage the armed forces and make the appointments, all other times it was entrusted with the minor role of the orderly recruitment of soldiers and procurement of supplies. Hikmet Ozdemir, *Rejim ve Asker* [Istanbul: Iz Yayınevi, 1989], pp.252-263

⁹⁶ Although the appointment of General Torumtay to the position of the Chief of the General Staff shocked some senior officers and raised a number of verbal complaints [Gunes Taner, former MP cabinet minister, argued that the incident could have led to a coup, *Hurriyet*, 14 July 1995] no action was taken against Prime Minister Ozal and his cabinet. Furthermore, a remark made by President Evren in April 1988 that the Armed Forces would intervene and save the country from anarchy and terrorism, even though it was interpreted as a warning against the civilian government, it was met with a hail of criticism from government and opposition forces alike. But as analysts pointed out, the time was not ripe for the military to take such action. *The Financial Times*, 23 May 1988

light to continue his policy of intruding into the hitherto untouched domain of the officer corps and attempt to curtail their political power. As the holder of the office of the President and supervisor of events inside the ruling party he had founded, Ozal became the undisputed political leader of Turkey during the period 1989 to 1991.⁹⁷ The developments in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and his determination to build a new foreign policy,⁹⁸ inevitably led him into a clash with at least some sections of the military institution. Ozal's tendency to assign to military chiefs and his cabinet a subsidiary or advisory role in the unfolding of events, forced the Chief of the General Staff, General Torumtay, who seemed to disagree with the way the President was handling the issue of the country's security,⁹⁹ to announce his resignation before his four-year term expired. This appeared to be an extraordinary development for Turkey's civil-military relations since both domestic and foreign observers were accustomed to see the civilian rather than the military officer to leave his post (voluntarily or by the use or threat to use force) when the two of them strongly disagreed on a specific subject. The fact that Torumtay's successor, General Dogan Gures, appeared to accept the existing situation, indicated that the all-powerful President was in charge of Turkey's political life.

The formation of a Demirel-Inonu coalition government following the November 1991 elections, however, was bound to reduce drastically the intervention of the President into the affairs of the cabinet. Demirel and Ozal hated each other. But, the ever present threat from the military that the latter would intervene in a case there existed a breakdown of government, had forced them to find a way to co-exist. The threat for a

⁹⁷ Ozal " urged the party to elect his newly appointed prime minister [Yildirim Akbulut] as party chairman at the next convention...he [continued to pay] special attention to the management of the economy, quickly forging independent links with key ministers and bureaucrats...[and] was fairly active in dealing with problems of law and order...Inonu complained that the new president was abusing his office acting as 'the de facto leader of the governing party' ". Metin Heper, 'Consolidating Turkish Democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.3, (1992), p.111

⁹⁸ *Milliyet*, 7 December 1990

⁹⁹ *Turkey Confidential*, January 1991, pp.4-5

coup was not a fictitious one. As Hale has pointed out, despite the changes that took place in the country's civil-military relations, one cannot suggest "that, by 1992, the civil power had yet established the full degree of control over the military which is the norm in most democratic systems".¹⁰⁰ The continuous involvement of the military in large scale campaigns in the south-eastern provinces against the Kurdistan Worker' Party (PKK) had permitted it, among other things, to retain a large part of its internal autonomy intact.¹⁰¹ The military campaign in the Southeast had an enormous negative effect not only in the country's economic performance but also in his relationship with the European Union and the U.S.A., countries traditionally sensitive on the issue of violation of human rights.¹⁰²

The sudden death of Ozal in April of 1993,¹⁰³ the election of

¹⁰⁰ Hale, op.cit., p.294

¹⁰¹ According to a Financial Times report, the Demirel-Inonu coalition government under pressure from the military not only excluded Kurdish areas from coming under the umbrella of a proposed human rights legislation but also gave to the military a *carte blanche* in the fight against the PKK. Demirel was quoted to explain his decision on the basis that the security forces would be left with no authority if that type of legislation was implemented in a region whereas the fight against terrorism was going on [*The Financial Times*, 2 October 1992]. However, it was the same person, Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel who in December 1991 urged the people of Turkey "to recognize the Kurdish reality" and had promised in his election campaign to withdraw the emergency regime from the southeastern provinces [*Milliyet*, 9 December 1991].

¹⁰² *The Guardian*, 24 November 1994

¹⁰³ It is interesting to notice that the 'sudden' death of Ozal occurred at a period that the President of the Republic had started, once more, to seriously challenge the political power of the military institution. For instance, Ozal became actively involved in the Kurdish issue and proposed to end the emergency rule which "never yielded positive results" and suggested that the Turkish government ought to do "some kind of 'goodwill gestures' [in order] to ease tensions in southeast Anatolia and create a true atmosphere of rapprochement between the people of the area and the state". He even started contacts with the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, inviting him to Ankara to discuss the conditions of a cease fire, without informing the MIT or the country's military intelligence. [*Turkish Daily News*, 31 March 1993]. Knowing that the military was against any diplomatic solution to the Kurdish issue, [*Turkish Daily News*, 15 March 1993], the initiatives of President Ozal, naturally, upset the majority of the officer corps. [*Hurriyet*, 8 January 1995] In fact, some circles started to think of "President Ozal as Apo's mentor". [*Turkish Daily News*, 1 April 1993]. Also, Ozal challenged the political power of the armed forces by calling for a military intervention in Armenia in the wake of the Armenian attacks against Azerbaijan, although he knew that the Turkish military leaders were reluctant to get engaged in a highly risky adventure. [*Turkish Daily News*, 5 March 1993, *Milliyet*, 5 April 1993] Ozal's death few days before submitting a major proposal for "Kurdish reforms" to NSC raised a lot of questions.

Suleiman Demirel to the seat of the President and his replacement in the leadership of the TPP and the government by Tansu Ciller, the first female Prime Minister of Turkey, seems to have contributed to an increase of the political power of the military institution. The unfriendly relations between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic, the continuation of military campaigns in the Southeast,¹⁰⁴ the direct and indirect pressure that the military leadership started to exercise upon the government,¹⁰⁵ the rapidly unfolding events in the ex-Soviet Union Muslim territories and the need for the Turkish government to act fast in conjunction with the failure of the Ciller administration to alleviate the economy of its ills, had forced the Prime Minister to rely on the support of the military for keeping herself in power.¹⁰⁶ As an English reporter pointed out in March 1994, "traditionally, the armed forces have stepped in to clear such [economic] messes. But few Turks believe a new coup is in the works. The armed forces already do almost what they want".¹⁰⁷ Almost a year later, retired Air Force General Sadi Erguvenc would argue that "civil authorities [are] not in command of [the] military".¹⁰⁸

Part Three: An examination of various factors contributing to the development of civil-military relations in Turkey during the 1980-95 period

A. Intra-Military Factors

Despite the limited amount of information that can be available to

¹⁰⁴ Whereas "Ozal had closed the doors to the military...in the Kurdish dispute...[using] this policy to restore 'civilian' democracy in Turkey...Demirel opened the door for the military in fear of losing his own authority if he limited the authority of the commanders...Ciller allowed the military to walk through the door opened by Demirel and has given 'full authority' to the military". *Turkish Daily News*, 24 March 1994. Also, *The Observer*, 26 March 1995.

¹⁰⁵ Few months after the formation of the new post-Ozal government, in July of 1993, rumors of an imminent military takeover started to circulate in Ankara. The issue of military intervention was back in the agenda in February of 1994 and in January of 1995. It is interesting to note that even though in 1990, Demirel, while in opposition, declared that there was an urgent need for restructuring civil-military relations in Turkey starting with "the position of the Chief of the General Staff [that] should be under the Minister of Defense" [*Milliyet*, 28 May 1990], when he became the new Prime Minister, he made certain that a bill which was presented in the Parliament ready to pass these changes, was defeated by his own party votes on 14 May 1992.

¹⁰⁶ *Milliyet*, 26 May 1994.

¹⁰⁷ *The Independent*, 23 March 1994.

¹⁰⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, 14 March 1995.

us, since the military is still regarded as a taboo subject in Turkey, there are certain elements that characterise its behaviour and assist it in retaining its institutional autonomy as well as its superior position over the politicians. These are:

i). The ability of the "military class" to reproduce itself and its values and regard its members as the only legitimate guardians of the Kemalist ideology. Commenting about the Turkish military, Orhan Erkanli argue that "in Turkey there is a military class, just as there is a workers and peasants' class, and the officer corps constitute the backbone of this class".¹⁰⁹ Indeed, the careful process of selection of the future corps, the early age of their entrance to military schools and their indoctrination in Kemalist principles and ideal¹¹⁰ aims to breed members of an educated, statist elite capable of both defending Turkey's borders and the ideas of Ataturk as well as concerned with the country's domestic problems.¹¹¹ The ability of the military class of Turkey to reproduce itself¹¹² and its values,¹¹³ with minimum if any interference from the civilians,¹¹⁴ helps us in understanding how the officers can perpetuate their superiority over the politicians.

As far as the Kemalist values of secularism, republicanism,

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in William Hale, 'The Turkish Army in Politics', in Andrew Finkel and Nukhet Sirman (eds), *Turkish State, Turkish Society* [London: Routledge, 1990]

¹¹⁰ Regardless of the social background of the cadet, Birand notes that "once the ceremonies are over, a gigantic piece of machinery goes into action...and transforms him [the cadet] into a totally different person". Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: an anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces* [London: Tauris, 1991], p.26

¹¹¹ *Le Figaro*, 2 July 1997

¹¹² According to Brown's survey, 22.2 percent of the military cadets were sons of officers while 22.4 percent were sons of civil servants. "The recruitment of the officer corps," Brown points out, "primarily [from] 'sons of military' and civil servants, suggests a perpetuation of kinship and personal ties to Ataturk and the Revolution he wrought". James Brown, 'The Military and Society: the Turkish case', *Middle Eastern Affairs*, (1989), p.399 and p.400

¹¹³ "Always bear in mind," says an instructor of the Military Academy to the cadets, "that you are superior to everyone and everything, and that you are trained here to have superior knowledge and superior qualities...As an officer of the Turkish Army...you are different from your friends in city street". Quoted in Hale, (1994), op.cit., p.321

¹¹⁴ If there is a case of civilian interference in the military schools or in the officer corps, the high ranking officers quite often expel undesired cadets and officers from the military. The expelled are not able of taking their case to court since the 1982 Constitution stipulates that decisions of the Supreme Military Council cannot be

nationalism, populism, etatism and revolutionism¹¹⁵ is concerned, they were supposed to be the guidelines necessary for Turkey's attainment of political, economic and cultural level similar to that of contemporary western states. However, although Kemalism "clearly and convincingly told the society what its goals were and [had] furnished guidelines for achieving them...[it] pertained primarily to the first stage-the stage of elite modernization. It clearly had very little to say about the second stage-that of bringing mass elements into active participation".¹¹⁶ The lack of specific guidelines regarding the latter stage of political transformation in Turkey and the way the people's political demands were articulated by party leaders often appeared as a threat to the political position of the so-called protectors of Kemalist principles, the officer corps.¹¹⁷

ii) The huge size of the military establishment and the preservation of high level of unity and cohesion in the officer corps. The presence of the second largest military force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Turkey has officially been justified on the necessity to secure the country's borders from threats imposed by external and internal enemies.¹¹⁸ Located in a highly volatile area and taking advantage of it

contested judicially.

¹¹⁵ Suna Kili, 'Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey', *International Political Science Review*, Vol.1, (1980)

¹¹⁶ Frederick Frey, 'Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey', in George Lenczowski (ed), *Political Elites in the Middle East* [Washington: A.R.E., 1975], p.70

¹¹⁷ "We are the army of the [Kemalist] regime. It is our duty... to keep the state sound and the regime secure", says an officer to Birand. Another claims that "politicians [give] priority to his [sic] own re-election...[and] are not concerned 'for the state' as much as we are". Birand, op.cit., p.22. As for the former Chiefs of General Staff, Generals Kenan Evren, Necip Torumtay and Dogan Gures, they all seem to share similar views. Evren argues that it is the party leaders who tend to deviate from the Kemalist principles, the latter deriving their authority from the people. [Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anilari*, (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990), Vol.II, p.185] He believes that the military acts the way it does towards the civilian government because it has the support of the people. [Ibid.,p.363] Torumtay argues that Ataturk entrusted them the norms on which the republic rested and his perception of the military's display of professional traits and civilian's lack of them lead to the conclusion that the former should have as much autonomy as possible from the civilian authority. [Org. Necip Torumtay, *Orgeneral Torumtay'in Anilari* (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1994) p.36 and p.90] Also, Gures points out that the military, the guardian of Ataturk's ideas and ideals is directly responsible to the people from whom it derives its authority rather than the civilian government. [*Milliyet*, 19 March 1991 and 6 June 1992]

¹¹⁸ Ihsan Gurkan, *NATO, Turkey and the Southern Flank* [New York: N.S.I.C., 1980]

geo-strategic importance for the west, the high ranking officers have always been in favour of maintaining a large military establishment. The huge size of the armed forces constitute such source of political power that party leaders cannot just ignore it. Any attempt of a civilian government to reduce either the financial and social status of the officer corps or the amount of military expenditures can easily result in its overthrow from power.¹¹⁹

Furthermore, the size of the military organization seems to contribute to the maintenance of unity and cohesion in the officer corps, as no attempt of any group of officers to intervene in the country's political life can be met with success unless it has the support of the military leadership and especially that of the Land Forces. Even though members of the Turkish military often brag about the high level of discipline and obedience to the orders from the top in their organization,¹²⁰ there are certain examples that put into question the validity of those statements.¹²¹ However, one must admit that irrespective of the unfolding of events and the emergence of some difficult moment in the officer corps during the 1980-95 period,¹²² the Turkish Armed Force

(Agenda Paper No.10) pp.17-18 and NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS, *Defence Industry Policy of Turkey* [Ankara, Special Edition, 1989], p.10

¹¹⁹ It is interesting that although the outlawed PKK offered a "cease-fire" to the Turkish civilian governments, with the exception of Ozal, no other party leader attempted to deviate from the directives of the military. Inur Cevik, commenting on the Ciller government's decision to freeze all army discharges in a move towards a national mobilization, points out that "we know well how the decision making mechanisms work in Turkey. Ciller is there to oblige the military and the name of the game is civilian rule". *Turkish Daily News*, 11 January 1994

¹²⁰ *Le Figaro*, 2 July 1997 and Birand, op.cit., p.41

¹²¹ The 1960 coup is an exception to the rule, since it occurred outside the military hierarchy. However, it must be pointed out that the military leadership proved capable of gaining control of the movement soon after it took place.

¹²² The military junta of 1980-83 did not appear to be facing any threat from middle-ranking and junior officers due to the maintenance of the hierarchy within the armed forces, the climate of co-operation between the military rulers and the active commanders and the precautionary measures taken by the military hierarchy. [Hale, (1994), op.cit., pp.248-250] Difficult moments for Turkish politics can be considered the decision of Ozal to overrule the recommendation of the senior military command and appoint his own candidate, General Necip Torumtay instead of General Necdet Ozturun; the resignation of General Torumtay, Chief of the General Staff, in 1993 over his dispute with Ozal regarding the foreign policy of Turkey during the Second Gulf War and the frustration of General Muhittin Fisunoglu (Commander of the Land Forces) for being forced to retire after the tenure of the Chief of General

appeared capable of maintaining a high level of unity and cohesion and preventing the party leaders from becoming heavily involved in military affairs.

iii) The growth of the independent economic power of the military. In their attempt to safeguard the officers from the vagaries of the crisis-prone Turkish economy and to increase the military's financial autonomy from the civilian administration, the Turkish Armed Forces started, from 1960 on, to create a number of militarily-controlled financial groups that gave the officer corps a large stake in Turkey's corporate economy. For instance, the Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK) which was established in 1961 (Law 205) with the aim of providing social security to military personnel has become one of the largest financial conglomerates of Turkey.¹²³ But OYAK is not the only militarily-controlled conglomerate. Three similar foundations, the Naval, Air-Force and Land Force Foundations "also have shares in a variety of civilian public sector enterprise".¹²⁴ Furthermore, the military leadership has been actively involved in the development of a domestic defense industry.¹²⁵ As Ahmad

Staff, General Dogan Gures, was extended by decree in 1993. In none of these incidents, however, the military establishment tried to create conditions that would cause division in its ranks and lead the country into a political crisis.

¹²³ OYAK derived its income from the obligatory contribution of all active and reserve officers as well as civilian employees of the Ministry of National Defense, deducting ten percent from their monthly salary, and from its financial investments in various sectors (in the Automotive Industry with OYAK-Renault, Motorlu Acilar Imal ve Satis and Goodyear, in the Cement Industry through Cukorova Cimento, Unye Cimento, Mardin Cimento, Bolu Cimento and YASAS, in the Electronic Industry through ASELSAN, in the Service Industry through OYAK Sigorta, OYAK Menkul Kiy and OYTAS Ic ve Dis Tic., in the Construction Industry through OYAK Insaat A.S., OYAK-Kutlutas konut, OYAK-Kutlutas Paz, OYAK-Kutlutas In. and OYAK-Kutlutas Ist.Prf., in the Food Industry through Tam Gida, Tukas, Entas Tavuk, Pinar Et and Eti Pazarlama, in the Agricultural Industry through Hektas, in the Petroleum Industry through Turkiye Petrolleri A.O., Petro-Kimya A. O. and Seylak, in the Travel Industry through OYTUR and in the Stock Exchange Industry through AXA). Serdar Sen, *Silahli Kuvvetler ve Modernizm* [Istanbul: Sarmal, 1996] pp.148-162

¹²⁴ Omer Karasapan, 'Turkey's Armaments Industries', *Middle East Report*, No.144, Jan-Feb 1987

¹²⁵ Some of the companies involved in the domestic defense industry are: the Military Electronic Industries Inc. (ASELSAN), the Military Battery Industry (ASPILSAN), the PETLAS Tire Co., the Electric Industry (ISBIR), the Sivas Textile Industry (SIDAS), the Machinery and Chemical Industries Establishment (MKE), the Turkish Aircraft Industries (TUSAS), the Turkish Engine Industries (TEI), the Turkish Airspace Industries (TAI), the Turkish Electronics Industry and Trade Corporation (TESTAS), the Taskizak and the Golcuk shipyards, the Heavy Maintenance Factories located in Kayseri and Arifiye,

points out, with their economic activities, the Turkish Armed Forces have been so intertwined with capitalism that “no longer can afford to be neutral or above politics”.¹²⁶ Their economic activities have assisted not only in the increase of the degree of the political and financial autonomy of the officer corps from the civilian government but also in the development of closer, direct ties between the military establishment and leading industrialists both in Turkey (e.g. Koc, Eczacıbaşı and Sabancı Holdings)¹²⁷ as well as abroad (e.g. American, German, French, Israeli and Russian military and high-tech companies).

B. EXTERNAL FACTORS

i) The inability of party leaders to impose their political supremacy over the military. Commenting on the Turkish political system, in 1948, Nadir Nadi argued that the source of all problems in Turkey emanate from the fact that the western political institutions which were implanted in the country in the 1920s, resembled their European models only in appearance; their way of operating was “oriental”.¹²⁸ Indeed, since the ottoman times, state dominance has been the most salient feature of the Turkish political system.¹²⁹ The fact that even today the state is referred as a father figure, *Devlet Baba*, is an example of its influence on the country’

AirForce complexes in Kayseri and Eskişehir and others. Ibid., pp.29-30 Although the Turkish military leadership argues that the development of the domestic defense industry “will result in accelerated growth of the Turkish economy, creation of new employment potential, and increase of the general welfare” [NATO’S SIXTEEN NATIONS, op.cit., p.38], Ball points out that the development of a domestic industry in developing countries “does not provide an answer to either the problem of unemployment/underemployment or that of human-capital formation”. In addition, “far from reducing the foreign exchange requirements of the defense sector, domestic production of arms may actually increase them, particularly in the short-to-medium term” [Nicolle Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.382-385].

¹²⁶ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* [Boulder: Westview, 1977], p.281

¹²⁷ Barkey argues that due to pressure exercised by the Sabancı and Koc families on the military, in 1982, Özal was forced to resign from his position as Minister of Finance. [Henry Barkey, *The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990) p.184]. Also, the 1980 coup seems to have come as a relief to the industrial elite of Turkey [*Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 1980] as well as the labor laws that it imposed [1982 Constitution, Articles 51-55].

¹²⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 27 July 1948

¹²⁹ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* [Washington: Eothen, 1985] and Serif Mardin, ‘Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire’, *Comparative*

political structure.

A result of the state tradition in the Empire's and the Republic' political structure has been the development of uneasy relations between the "cente " and the " periphery" .¹³⁰ The augmentation of the political power of peripheral groups with the entrance of the country to multi-party politics, appeared, in the eyes of the statist-kemalist elite as a threat to the national unity and territorial integrity of Turkey. As Gole argues, " the military interventions of 1960-1961, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983 can in fact be perceived as state reactions against the 'unhealthy' autonomization and differentiation of economic, political and cultural groups " .¹³¹

The tradition which sees the statist-military elite as the one dictating the evolution of political life in Turkey, continued with some minor interruptions during the post-1983 period. Indeed, it was the statist elite with the military as their leader, which through the Constitution of 1982 imposed on party leaders the new rules and limitations of the political game in Turkey. Especially Article 6 deprived political parties and their leaders of the freedom of adjusting the existing institutional arrangement in accordance with their own views as well as societal needs, stating clearly that " the Turkish Nation shall exercise its sovereignty through the authorised organs as prescribed by the principles laid down in the Constitution " .¹³²

Studies in Society and History, Vol.12, (1969)

¹³⁰ Serif Mardin, 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics', *Deadalus*, Vol.103, (1973). Mehmet Altan was pointing out in 1994 that "we have never managed to become a truly 'democratic republic'. When the republic was founded in 1923, the army shaped it according to its own model, putting the 'will of the military bureaucrat' before the 'popular will'...the 'First Republic' set up a state...which told them [its citizens] how to behave, how to dress, how to think, and what to eat. These rules were drawn up according to the army's concept of 'modernism'. The 'army modernism' has been, as in totalitarian countries, the sole 'compass' for the country. The agenda determined by the 'army modernism' did not include such items as how to stop being peasants, how to expand the meagre social provisions...Those who were promoting the 'official ideology, official culture and official history' sided with the state, and the nation wailed about its fate". *Sabah*, 9 May 1994

¹³¹ Nilufer Gole, 'Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey', in Heper and Avin, (1994), op.cit.

¹³² Compared to 1924 Constitution which simply stated that the Turkish Nation would exercise its sovereignty through the Grand National Assembly, the 1982 one clearly indicated the strong desire of the statist elites to regulate the evolution of political

With the exception of the 1987-93 period in which Turgut Ozal tried and partially succeeded in imposing his political superiority over the military in foreign policy and security issues, the latter maintained control over party leaders and political development in the country.¹³³ The relative absence of "civil society" in Turkey's political structure¹³⁴ and the augmented suspicion of the centre elites towards intermediary groups and institutions, permitted the political exploitation of the masses by local notables and religious leaders through the extensive use of patron-client relations¹³⁵ and prevented the creation of strong, autonomous, corporate social institutions.¹³⁶ The politicians, influenced by the non-democratic political culture which they inherited¹³⁷ and looking at the outcome of the elections as a "zero-sum game", appeared to give greater priority in building their image and increasing their own power¹³⁸ rather than

game in Turkey.

¹³³ Metin Heper, 'State and Society in Turkish Political Experience', Ilter Turan, 'Political Parties and the Party System in post-1983 Turkey', in Heper and Evin, (1988), op.cit., Ahmed Evin, 'Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime' and Ergun Ozbudun, 'Democratization of the Constitutional and Legal Framework', in Heper and Evin, (1994), op.cit.

¹³⁴ Frey, (1965), op.cit., p.391

¹³⁵ Engin Akarli and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds), *Political Participation in Turkey* [Istanbul: Bogazici, 1975]

¹³⁶ Commenting on the functioning of non-traditional organizations in Turkey, Bianchi argues that even "the emergence of class-based associations among workers, employers and professionals is generally inhibited by the organization of primordial solidarities based on religion, ethnicity and localism". Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984]

¹³⁷ The notion of authoritarianism in Turkish society has often been emphasized by various writers. For instance, Tamkoc argues that Turkey's "social as well as political structure is autocratic in character and functions from top down, each stratum exercising domineering power and influence backed by coercive sanctions over inferior ones". Metin Tamkoc, *The Warrior Diplomats* [Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976] Ozbudun points out that "Turkish political culture attributes primacy not to the individual but to the collectivity...most social institutions (families, schools, trade unions, communities) display authoritarian patterns in their authority relations". Ergun Ozbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Re-equilibrations" in L. Diamond, J. Linz and S. Lipset (eds), *Politics in Developing Countries* [Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990] p.201. Also, in the 19th Economists' Week which was held in Istanbul in Spring of 1994, Ismail Cem (CHP's Deputy Chairman) pointed out that the political problems that Turkey was facing had their source in the absence of democratic tradition in Turkey's history, Ercan Karakas (SHP's Deputy) argued that Turkey needed to apply democracy at home, in the workplace, in school in associations and in political parties and bring it into being part of everyday life. *Turkish Daily News*, 23 April 1994

¹³⁸ Cengiz Candar points out that the Grand National Assembly is composed "of deputies without ideas or principles and whose only goal was to enter the

concentrating their efforts in finding a solution to the country's major economic, political and social problems.¹³⁹ The closure of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) in the Summer of 1994 was a clear manifestation of the inability of politicians to stand against the military. As Hasan Yalcin argues, "the Parliament has been relegated to the status of a yes-man that approves decisions taken by the National Security Council".¹⁴⁰ Only the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUCIAD) appeared to be a growing political force in the country, capable, in the long run, of challenging the political supremacy of the military

ii) The capability of Turkish elite to withstand pressures from foreign powers on the conduct of its domestic political life. Although Turkey has been one of the major beneficiaries of American military assistance, most non-leftist, non-Islamic studies tend to emphasize the minimum influence the West and especially the US government exercise on the unfolding of its domestic affairs. This observation seems to contradict the view which sees foreign aid as a tool of the donor government designed to serve its political, strategic, and/or economic self-interest.¹⁴¹

As the offspring of the ruling civil-military bureaucratic class of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish statist elite carried both the experiences and historical lessons of its predecessor.¹⁴² The military modernization and the westernization of political institutions which the Ottoman and the Kemalist regimes had initiated, were regarded as essential measures of self-defense against foreign intervention.¹⁴³ As Ismet Inonu had pointed out,

Parliament. Deputies of this type elected from the ranks of various parties become 'individualized' once they find themselves in Parliament... These 'individualized' deputies have lots of room for maneuvering against their leaders with whom they do not share any ideology or principle...Anything can be expected of such a Parliament". *Sabah*, 1 December 1995

¹³⁹ Ergun Ozbudun, 'Turkey: How Far from Consolidation', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.7, (1996)

¹⁴⁰ *Aydinlik*, 9 October 1993. Hikmet Ozdemir also argued that "the government has no other function than to implement the policies determined by the NSC". *Turkish Daily News*, 1 July 1994..

¹⁴¹ Michael Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World* [New York: Longman, 1981], p.411

¹⁴² Selim Deringil, 'Aspects of continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdulhamid II and Ismet Inonu', *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol.4, (1987), p.40

¹⁴³ Arnold Toynbee, *Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time* [London: Oxford

"our watchword in foreign policy towards any state which we had contact was to be fully conscious of our own complete independence and our own interests".¹⁴⁴ Hence, despite the benefits that Turkey receive from its entrance into the western camp during the post-war period,¹⁴⁵ a realisation of the ruling elite's long-time dream, did not mean that the country's political life became a toy in the hands of foreign powers. In contrast, the Turkish elite made certain that it maintained control over its domestic affairs.¹⁴⁶

Taking advantage of the geo-strategic importance of their country for the Western Alliance during the 1980-1995 period,¹⁴⁷ the ruling elite was able of overcoming the mild external pressures on Turkey's poor human rights record, the extensive use of state violence in its south-eastern provinces, the persecution of Members of the Parliament who support the Kurdish issue as well as that of journalists who championed the application of democratic principles. Surprisingly, the political leaders helped with their actions the military establishment by having very carefully refrained from encouraging foreign governments and international organizations to intervene in the domestic affairs of Turkey.¹⁴⁸

University Press, 1966], p.154 and James Piscatory, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], p.52

¹⁴⁴ Deringil, op.cit., p.53

¹⁴⁵ "Thanks to it [NATO]", Kunalalp, a retired diplomat, argues, "not only our military strength but also our civilian potential increased. With NATO money, airfields, communication facilities, fuel pipe-lines and other things were build in our country. These were a permanent addition to our national wealth, an addition we could not have achieved alone...We [for our part] assigned to it our whole army, we tied ourselves closely to it...[But] the balance sheet was in Turkey's favor". Zeki Kunalalp, *Sadece Diplomat* [Istanbul: Hatirat, 1981], pp.96-97 But as General Gurkan points out, Turks are "very sensitive toward all alliances and international agreements...the United States and NATO will be expected not to jeopardize the security of Turkey in the course of superpower rivalry". Gurkan, op.cit., p.36

¹⁴⁶ For instance, it was the Turkish ruling elite which decided to transform the regime toward a multi-party system. Ferenc Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971], p.64 Also, the restructuring of the Turkish political system by the military, in the postwar period, (1960, 1971, 1980), appears to have been a pure domestic affair. Gerassimos Karabelias, *O Rolos ton Enoplon Dynameon sten Politike Zoe tes Tourkias kai tes Ellados* [Athens, 1998] Chapter Four

¹⁴⁷ Graham Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union* [Santa Monica,CA: RAND, 1992] and Ian Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War* [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992]

¹⁴⁸ It is interesting that Suleiman Demirel when he was still not allowed to participate

Irrespective of the real motives behind this type of behaviour of party leaders and civilian authorities,¹⁴⁹ the ruling elite appeared strong enough to withstand the mild pressures from foreign states and international organizations and preserve its autonomous political position in the country.

in the country's political life told the journalists that "there is no need for the West to defend democracy in Turkey...They should not applaud or criticize us. They should just let us do things our own way. Turkey is able to solve its own problems". *Turkish Daily News*, 24 March 1985

¹⁴⁹ According to an evaluation of Turkish political behavior, "the extreme touchiness of the general public in this country and the pronounced inferiority complex so deep-rooted in its intellectual circles, do not qualify Turkey [to serve] as a convenient vessel for imbibing the spiritual and cultural treasures of another country. An instructive, if primitive, illustration is the response of local spectators when a foreign sports team is gaining the upper hand. A setback on the sportsfield is perceived as a national calamity of enormous dimensions". Meroz to Foreign Ministry, 17 July 1952, Israel State Archives, 2536/12/A quoted from Amikam Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the Mediterranean* [London: Frank Cass, 1987], p.58

CHAPTER THREE: THE CASE OF GREECE

Part One: A short description of the evolution of Civil-Military relations in Modern Greece from the early nineteenth century to 1980

In contrast with Turkey in which the military institution played a dominant role in the evolution of its country's political, economic and social life, in the case of Modern Greece it was the politicians, powerful local landowners, rich merchants and members of the Greek Diaspora, as well as the influential foreign powers which forced the officer corps into secondary political role. It is mainly due to this characteristic that whenever a military intervention occurred, the officers sought the co-operation of political leaders in ruling the country. The case of the 1967-74 junta was an exception.

The extermination of the Byzantine aristocracy and the implementation of the Ottoman religious-communal, socio-political system of the *millet*, enhanced the emergence of a large number, locally powerful, political and military leaders and prevented the birth of national leader, be it a man or a group.¹⁵⁰ The inability of the small armed units to build up an effective central organization in conjunction with the fact that their limited financial resources were not sufficient for sustaining their struggle against the Ottoman regime, made the military leaders vulnerable to the power of political leaders and foreign governments.¹⁵¹ The liberation of Greece from the Great Powers rather than its own force signalled the inauguration of both the continuous and bold involvement of European Powers in Greek political life¹⁵² and the subjugation of the

¹⁵⁰ Due to the absence of a nationally accepted military leader, a large number of Greek armed units had been formed and operated at a local level. They could be distinguished as: *Klepths*, *Armatoloi* and *Kapoi*. "The vested interests they [the leaders] had in the particular regime and the net work of social relationships...prevented them from rising to national leadership". John Koliopoulos, *Brigands With a Cause* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1987], p.35

¹⁵¹ John Petropulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968]

¹⁵² Theodore Couloumbis, John Petropulos and Harry Psomiades, *Foreign Interference*

military to civilian leadership.

Both Kapodistrias's and King Otto's policies had as a goal the creation of an efficient, centralized bureaucracy and a well-organized national army. With regard to the officer corps, however, the two leaders tried to turn it into a client of the head of the state rather than help it develop into an autonomous political institution.¹⁵³ As a result, strong patron-client relations had developed between political and military leaders contributing to the preservation of the supremacy of the former over the latter. The situation remained unaltered during King George I's reign. The only difference was that as Commander-in-Chief and Inspector General of the Armed Forces, Prince Constantine had the advantage of appointing people of his own liking into the highest military positions. Thus, he succeeded in dividing the officer corps into two major groups: his clients and the rest.¹⁵⁴

The defeat of the Armed Forces in the 1897 war against the Ottoman Empire, the lack of impartiality by Prince Constantine, the professional frustration of junior officers and the developments inside the Ottoman Empire (the emergence of the Young Turks to power) led the Military League, an association of low ranking officers, to instigate a coup, in 1909.¹⁵⁵ Although, the 1909 intervention differed from those of 1843 and 1862 in that it had been carried out without the alliance of the civilian forces, the officers felt unable to rule the country. It was natural, therefore, to see Eleftherios Venizelos, the Cretan political leader whom the Military League invited to lead the country, to take all the necessary moves that could guarantee him the return of the military institution to civilian control.¹⁵⁶ With the advent of the Balkan Wars and the liberation of Greek lands from the Ottoman yoke, the borders of the Greek state were

in Greek Politics: A Historical Perspective [New York: Pella, 1976]

¹⁵³ Stefanos Papageorgiou, *He Stratiotike Politike tou Kapodistria* [Athens: Estia, 1986] and Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923* [London: Ernest Benn, 1972]

¹⁵⁴ Thanos Veremis, *Oi Epemvaseis tou Stratou sten Ellenike Politike, 1916-1936* [Athens: Odysseas, 1983] p.17

¹⁵⁵ Victor Papakosma, *The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d'Etat* [Kent: Ohio State University, 1977], pp.41-47

¹⁵⁶ Veremis, op.cit., p.23, p.37

expanded and the majority of the officers seemed professionally satisfied.

The personal dispute between Prime Minister Venizelos and King Constantine I over the stance of Greece in the First World War, divided the officer corps into two groups, Venizelists and Monarchists, based on the civilian figure they supported.¹⁵⁷ The mistreatment and punishment of the officers who claimed allegiance to the political opposition of the government, led to the Asia Minor disaster of 1922 and to termination of the military's interest in expanding the state's borders. As the professional insecurity of the officers increased,¹⁵⁸ the inability of political leaders to offer viable alternative solutions to social and economic problems that the country was facing, made the former extremely sensitive to internal social and political developments. Hence, during the period 1922 to 1936, the officer corps (especially those who supported Venizelos) made habit of staging interventions in the country's political life every time they felt uncomfortable with the decisions of the civilian government. However, with the exception of the Pangalos coup in 1926, the officers did not try to rule the country by themselves but invited political leaders of their own liking to form a government.

The rise of the Monarchy and Ioannis Metaxas to power, in 1936, resulted, naturally, to the purge of all republican officers from the military.¹⁵⁹ But, the eruption of the Second World War and the occupation of Greece by the Axis Powers offered a unique chance to opposition forces to re-emerge in the political scene. The development of two, ideologically distinct, armed forces, in mainland and abroad,¹⁶⁰ led, at the

¹⁵⁷ The active participation of the military in the schism was a direct outcome of the strong clientelistic relations that had been developed between officers and politicians. Thanos Veremis, 'The Officer Corps in Greece (1912-36)', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, Vol.2, (1976)

¹⁵⁸ "As the schism became more clear, each turn of fortune temporarily destroyed the professional positions of an increasing number of families...the existence of duplicate officer corps and civil services itself made difficult the prospect of reconciliation". John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, *Modern Greece* [New York: Praeger, 1968], p.122.

¹⁵⁹ Veremis, op.cit., p.259

¹⁶⁰ Evangelos Spyropoulos, *The Greek Military (1909-1941) and the Greek Mutinies in the Middle East (1941-1944)* [Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Columbia University, 1993], Solon Gregoriades, *Sunoptike Istorias tes Ethnikes Antistases, 1941-45* [Athens:

end of the war and with the assistance of foreign powers,¹⁶¹ to their subsequent military clash over control of the country. The victory of the right-wing forces gave the impression that the pre-war political and social order had been re-established. A closer look, however, would reveal that the military was no longer the puppet of the monarchy and the politicians. The unfolding of events in the Middle East as well as during the Civil War had assisted a number of junior officers in seeing themselves as independent protagonists of Greek politics rather than as a supporting staff to the civilian leaders.¹⁶²

Since the attempt of political leaders to improve Greece's economic performance led to an unprecedented movement of population from the rural areas to the urban ones,¹⁶³ but was not followed with the democratization of the political conditions,¹⁶⁴ it seemed almost inevitable that this situation would put the country into troubled waters. Indeed, the continuous involvement of Monarchy in the formation of government, especially during the 1963-67 period,¹⁶⁵ and the inability of political leaders to work towards the reduction of the political power of non-elected institutions, such as the military, led the country into political instability. A group of middle-ranking officers, feeling that their professional and political rights were threatened,¹⁶⁶ staged a coup, on 21

Kapopoulos, 1975], Andre Gerolymatos, 'The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in the Resistance', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol.11, (1984)

¹⁶¹ George Alexander, *The Prelude to Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-47* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1982], Laurence Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-49* [New York: Columbia, 1982]

¹⁶² Nicos Alivizatos, 'The Greek Army in the late Forties: Toward an Institutional Autonomy', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol.5, (1978)

¹⁶³ George Jouganatos, *The Development of the Greek Economy, 1950-1991* [Westpoint: Greenwood, 1994] and William McNeil, *The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1978]

¹⁶⁴ Demetres Charalambes, *Stratos kai Politike Exousia* [Athens: Exantas, 1985], pp.82-138 and Alexis Papahelas, *O Viasmos tes Ellenikes Demokratias* [Athens: Estia, 1997]

¹⁶⁵ Nicos Alivizatos, *Oi Politikoi Thesmoi se Krise, 1922-1974* [Athens: Themelio, 1983], pp.242-246 and Jean Meynaud, *Oi Politikes Dynameis sten Ellada: Meros B. H Vasilike Ektrope apo ton Koinovouleutismo toy Iouliou tou 1965* [Athens: Bayron, 1974]

¹⁶⁶ George Kouvertaris, 'Professional Self-Images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military', *American Sociological Review*, Vol.36, (1971), George Zaharopoulos, 'Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece' in R. Clogg and G. Yiannopoulos, *Greece Under Military Rule* [London: Secker and Warburg, 1972] and Nicos Pantelakis, *L'Armee Dans la Societe Grecque Contemporaine* [Doctoral Thesis, Universite Rene

April 1967 and abolished all parliamentary processes. Greece was going to live under a military regime for the next seven years.¹⁶⁷

The inability of the military regime to restructure the country's political, social and economic life, the augmentation of the difference which separated the political and ideological orientation of the members of the junta¹⁶⁸ in conjunction with international pressure had forced George Papadopoulos, their leader, to attempt, in 1973, to install a puppet civilian government in power. His aim was to ease the internal and external criticism on his regime while at the same time preserving the autonomy and superiority of the military over the politicians, a change which he had brought into force.¹⁶⁹ The unwillingness of the hard-liners to follow his plan, led to the 25 November 1973 coup by Demetrios Ioannides. The latter's attempt to overthrow President Makarios and install a regime of his own liking in the island of Cyprus, in the summer of 1974, proved to be a fatal mistake for the military regime, for Cyprus and for Greece. The Turks intervened militarily in the island, occupied 28% of its territory and divided Cyprus ethnically, politically and geographically. Defying repeatedly all UN resolutions and using forceful means, the Turks continue to keep the island divided.

The return to parliamentary government seemed as the only step that could save the country from further unwanted developments.¹⁷⁰ Constantinos Karamanlis, the ex-Prime Minister of Greece, was considered the best candidate for leading the country during the early post-junta period.¹⁷¹ Indeed, Karamanlis took all those measures necessary for the re-establishment of the superiority of the political leaders over the military

Descartes, Paris V, 1980]

¹⁶⁷ Solon Gregoriades, *Istoria tes Diktatorias* [Athens: Kapopoulos, 1975] Vol.1,2,3 and Chris Woodhouse, *The Rise and the Fall of the Greek Colonels* [London: Granada, 1985]

¹⁶⁸ Woodhouse, *op.cit.*, pp.119-122 and Nikos Kakaounakis, *2650 Meronyhta Synomosias* [Athens: Papazisis, 1976] Vol.A, pp.319-325

¹⁶⁹ Alivizatos, (1983), *op.cit.*, pp.303-308

¹⁷⁰ For developments inside the military institution following the Cyprus disaster, Gregoriades, *op.cit.*, Vol.3, pp.260-262

¹⁷¹ P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, 'Transition to, and Consolidation of, Democratic Politics in Greece, 1974-1983: A Tentative Assessment', *West European Politics*, Vol.32, (1984),

without creating professional anxieties to the majority of the office corps.¹⁷² Furthermore, the Cyprus disaster, the memories of the seven-year military regime and the bold political decisions of the Prime Minister which contributed to the elimination of the sources of future instability in the country,¹⁷³ were bound to re-orient the interest of the officers towards the external threats of the Greek state rather than its internal security.

Part Two: The evolution of Civil-Military relations in Greece from 1980 to 1995

The rise of the Socialist Party (PASOK) to power, in the Fall of 1981, and the dominant role which it played in the Greek political scene during the next fifteen years offered a unique opportunity to the country to test the quality of its civil-military relations as well as its level of democratic consolidation. While the augmentation of the political power of Andreas Papandreou in the mid-1960s had upset the Colonels and contributed to the staging of their intervention in 1967, his ascendance to the Prime Ministry in 1981 and his almost unchallenged ruling of the country up to 1995, with the exception of the 1990-93 period, gave the impression that the military establishment had reached the point of considering Papandreou and his acts a natural phenomenon of Greek political life.

During the 1981-1990 period, Andreas Papandreou tried to make

p.55

¹⁷² First, he moved away from the capital an important number of military units that constituted a source of possible threat to the elected government. Second, he did not try to persecute the officers, with the exception of the leaders of the junta, leaving this task to Greek citizens. Thus, he succeeded in making the government the arbiter not the opponent. Furthermore, he permitted the military institution to maintain its own radio station and control one of the country's two T.V. channels. Third, he increased the defense expenditures, in order to boost the morale of the officers and gain their support. Fourth, he brought back to the military almost 100 high-ranking officers that the junta had forced them to resign, limiting thus the chances of junta sympathizers to take control, once more, over the military. Fifth, he punished hard the officers who were caught in making plans to overthrow the government (24 February 1975). Finally, he dissolved most Laws concerning civil-military relations and passed the Act 660 of 1977 which re-instated the civilian superiority. George Kremmydas, *Oi Anthropoi tes Juntas Meta ten Diktatoria* [Athens: Exantas, 1984] pp.27-37

¹⁷³ He called the people to decide through a referendum over the issue of Monarchy, legalized the Communist Party, took the country out of the military wing of NATO and worked hard for the entrance of the country into the European Community.

certain that those steps which would guarantee him the elimination of the interventionist behaviour of the officer corps were taken without, however, attempting to challenge the corporate interests of the military. For example, although claiming that his party represented a large part of anti-establishment political forces,¹⁷⁴ Papandreou appeared to have adopted a more moderate stance towards the military, compared to the one he had shown during the 1963-67 period,. By arguing that the seven-year dictatorship had been a product of only " a small minority which trapped the majority of the officer corps" ,¹⁷⁵ the leader of PASOK was trying to eliminate the anxieties that officers might have felt about their professional career after the change of political leadership. Furthermore, by praising their total devotion to military duties such as the preservation of national independence and the protection of the country' democratic institutions,¹⁷⁶ Papandreou was attempting to underline the importance of the officers' role towards the development of the post-junta Greek state. Hence, even though on the one side he accepted that the officers like all Greek citizens had the right to have their personal political opinion, on the other he argued that the only mission of the armed forces was the defence of the nation. Any involvement of the military into politics could lead the country into an undesired catastrophic path.¹⁷⁷

Following the example of Constantinos Karamanlis, Andreas Papandreou maintained a carrot and stick approach towards the military establishment, emphasizing both continuity and change. First of all, he did not attempt to introduce any revolutionary changes on the existing form of civil-military relations in order to avoid making the military personnel feel uncomfortable with his administration. Thus, he preserved Act 660 of 1977 which determined the duties and rights of the civilian an

¹⁷⁴ Christos Lyrintzis, 'The Rise of PASOK: The Greek Election of 1981', *West European Politics*, No.5, (1982)

¹⁷⁵ *Diakryxe Kyvernetikes Politikes-Symvolaio me to Lao* [Athens: Panellenio Socialistiko Kinema, 1981] p.46

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Washington Post*, 7 November 1981

military authorities, implemented by his predecessors. Although this Act seemed to put the officer corps under the control of the elected civilian government, however, it has been argued that it was instrumental in allowing the military leadership to retain such powers that permitted it to develop into a semi-autonomous organization.¹⁷⁸ In addition, Papandreou gave the impression to the officer corps that the socialist government had established friendly relations with the leading right-wing figure, President Constantinos Karamanlis. As Danopoulos argues, during the 1980-85 period, "Papandreou asked President Karamanlis-the constitutional commander-in-chief-to take a more visible role in military-related matters" and the latter who enjoyed the support of the military "responded favorably to the government's call".¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Papandreou did not attempt to realise his anti-American, anti-Western slogans and deconstruct the close relations that had been developed between the Greek military and the western ones. Despite his anti-Atlantic rhetoric, he kept the country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, certain that such a move would not only fail to meet Greece's security considerations but could also arouse strong opposition from the pro-NATO Greek military personnel.¹⁸⁰ Most of all, the Prime Minister paid special attention to the issue of satisfying the military's corporate interests. He consistently devoted nearly 20 percent of total

¹⁷⁸ According to Loukakos and Alivizatos interpretations of Act 660/1977, although the civilian government was made responsible for determining the country's defense policy as well as the appointment of military leadership through the Governmental Council for Foreign and Defense Policies (KYSEA), it was the military leaders who were responsible for the implementation of all decisions. In cases of emergency, the military could assume direct responsibility in defense policy making. Panos Loukakos, 'O Eleghos tes Politikes Exousias pano stis Enoples Dynameis', *Synchrone Themata*, October 1980 and Nikos Alivizatos, *E Syntagmatike These ton Enoplon Dynameon: E Arche tou Politikou Eleghou* [[Athens: Sakkoulas, 1987] Act 660/1977 was finally replaced in 1995 with Act 2292/1995.

¹⁷⁹ Constantine Danopoulos, 'From Balkonies to Tanks: post-junta civil-military relations in Greece', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol.13, (1985), p.93. It has been reported that Karamanlis paid a visit to the Greek Pentagon in November of 1981, almost a month after PASOK's electoral victory, to preside over a meeting with the chiefs of staff who had refused to attend when it was initially called by Deputy Minister Yeorgios Petsos.

¹⁸⁰ Heinz-Jurgen Axt, 'On the Way to Socialist Self-Reliance? PASOK's Government Policy in Greece', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, No.2, (1984),

government spending to defense expenditures,¹⁸¹ offered generous retirement allowances, medical care and housing to the officer corps and made certain that the promotion of younger and the retirement of senior officers was taking place annually. The latter was used as a weapon for increasing the appeal of the Prime Minister to younger and ambitious officers¹⁸² and avoiding the creation of possible bottlenecks in the middle of the organizational hierarchy, a common characteristic of most post-war military interventions.

At the same time, Andreas Papandreou took some careful political steps which were bound to break some old-fashioned traditions of the military institution and change its character. For instance, he upgraded all military academies and brought them to an academic level equal to that of Public Universities, making thus the entrance of new cadets to be based on their own exceptional abilities rather than on the power of their patron(s); reformed the curricula of the service academies removing stringent anti-Communist propaganda and promoting the values of pluralism and ideological diversity; improved the communication networks within the military and submitted legislation which stripped the armed forces' control of mass communication networks. In addition, he tried to alter the internal power structure of the armed forces by breaking the army's first-among-equals role. The tendency of appointing Naval and Air-Force Generals to the position of the Chairman of the General Staff, an exclusive domain of army generals since the end of the Second World War, was a clear indication that the new government favoured the development of three services, equal with one another and each one independent from the other two. With this policy, Papandreou thought that he could limit the chances of dissatisfied officers with interventionist motives to receive the support of the other two services.¹⁸³

Although the media reported that there were two instances in

¹⁸¹ *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986* [Washington, DC:US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1987]

¹⁸² *The Washington Post*, 23 December 1984

¹⁸³ Danopoulos, op.cit., p.93

which pro-junta officers within the armed forces 'moved' to stage a coup against the PASOK government in the early 1980s, in May of 1982 and in March of 1983, there is no clear evidence that such acts took place. A retired admiral Engolfopoulos and retired General Opropoulos point out, the conditions for staging a military intervention or even thinking about it did not exist in Greece from 1974 and after.¹⁸⁴ Indeed, the entire Greek officer corps behaved in such a manner throughout the 1980-1995 period that passed on the impression that they were willing to either obey the commands of the elected lawful government or avoid reacting violently in cases of strong disagreement. For instance, the military personnel did not react like "in the good old time" but accepted calmly the decision of Andreas Papandreou to support the candidacy of Christos Sartzetakis for the Presidency, in 1985, instead of Constantinos Karamanlis, a figure whom a large proportion of the officer corps held in great esteem. Also, the officers did not protest against the amendments to the Constitution which the PASOK administration passed and had as a goal the substantial reduction of the authority of the President and the increase of the power of the Prime Minister and the Parliament. Most of all, it was the non-interventionist behaviour which the military personnel displayed towards the undesired policy of the Mitsotakis administration in 1990 and the Papandreou one in 1993 to return to active duty retired officers and appoint them to leadership positions which revealed how strong were the roots of democratic consolidation in post-junta Greece.¹⁸⁵

Part Three: An examination of various factors contributing to the development of civil-military relations in Greece during the 1980-95 period

A. INTRA-MILITARY FACTORS

l) The changing socio-economic background of the officer corps. In contrast with the pre-junta period in which the self-recruitment of the

¹⁸⁴ *Eleftherotypia*, 2 March 1983

¹⁸⁵ The disagreement of certain members of the active military personnel with the policy which each elected administration chose to follow over the Greek Armed Forces led to the resignation of the officers rather than to speculation about staging of a coup. *Kathimerini*, 23 December 1993, 8 and 15 January 1994, 25 February 1994, 25 June 1995, and *Eleftherotypia*, 18 and 22 December 1993.

officer corps was in low levels,¹⁸⁶ Mavris argues that during the years 1982-92 almost one out of three cadets of the Military Academy was a son of an officer.¹⁸⁷ This development has been quite important for the country since it indicates the emergence of a historical tradition among military cadets and strengthens their views and ideas regarding their position in internal political and social affairs. As the experiences and the lessons of the recent past had been implanted in the hearts of most cadets by their families and friends, the unwillingness of the latter to move against the structure of post-junta civil-military relations even in cases of personal dissatisfaction with the policies of the civilian regime seemed quite natural. In addition, the reduction of the percentage of officers with rural background known for their "fundamentalist orientation and lack of integration with other elites, especially political elite"¹⁸⁸ and the augmentation of the percentage of officers from the urban areas (mainly the Athens Metropolitan Area and Macedonia)¹⁸⁹ revealed that there was an increase in the level of social integration of the military personnel. The attempts of all civilian governments to satisfy the corporate interests of the officer corps¹⁹⁰ and the upgrading of the social standing of the military institution¹⁹¹ contributed even further to the strengthening of the latter's non-interventionist attitude.

ii) The new ideological orientation of the officers. Although the Greek military had failed to develop an overall ideological commitment

¹⁸⁶ In the early 1970s, Brown revealed that only 11 percent of army and 23.9 percent of navy officers were sons of an officer. James Brown, 'The Military and Society in Greece', *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol.15, (1974), p.254 In a similar study conducted in the late 1970s, these figures fell to 7.67 percent for the army and 16.69 percent for the navy. James Brown, 'Greek Civil-Military Relations: A Different Pattern', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.6, (1980), p.403

¹⁸⁷ *Kathimerini*, 22 August 1993

¹⁸⁸ Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coersion in Developing Nations* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977], p.134

¹⁸⁹ *Kathimerini*, 22 August 1993

¹⁹⁰ Constantine Danopoulos, 'Farewell to man on horseback: intervention and civilian supremacy in modern Greece', in his (ed) *From Civilian to Military Rule* [London: Routledge, 1991] p.51

¹⁹¹ From a nation-wide research conducted by ALCO between 19 and 27 of January 1995, the majority believed that the officers were capable leaders (65.8%), well trained (60.2%), honest (56.2%), supported the country's democratic government (56.1%) and would like their offspring to join the Greek Armed Forces (53.7%).

similar to the Atatürkist principles which characterizes the Turkish Armed Forces, the bitter experiences of its participation in the Civil-War during the early post-war years appeared to have helped the officers to adopt coherent political ideology. By viewing the communist rebellion as a negation of Greek nationhood and a threat to the country's territorial integrity, the military had adopted a militant, uncompromising attitude towards the communists and their sympathisers. It was the seven-year dictatorship and the Cyprus tragedy that revealed how mistaken the officers had been. The primary threat to Greek security did not come from NATO's main adversary, the Soviet Union, but from Turkey, a state supposed to be its ally in the Atlantic Alliance. Realising that the threat against the Greek state was not coming from inside the country or from its northern borders but from the east, and having learned their lesson from the outcomes of the 1967-74 regime, the officer corps turned their attention to increasing their professional capabilities in order to protect the country from outside encroachments. As the foreign policy of the civilian government¹⁹² coincided with the post-junta ideological orientation of the officers, it became a major tool towards the country's democratic consolidation.

B. EXTERNAL FACTORS

1) The ability of political parties and their leaders to impose the supremacy of parliamentary politics over Greek society and the military. Since the traditionally weak and suppressed civil society appeared unable to articulate any strategy for transition 'from below',¹⁹³ the post-junta party leaders knew that the process for the country's democratic transition and consolidation had to rest on the shoulders of the parties. A

¹⁹² Thanos Veremis, 'Defence and Security Policies under Pasok' and Vangelis Koufoudakis, 'PASOK and Greek-Turkish Relations' in R. Clogg (ed), *Greece, 1981-89: The Populist Decade* [London: MacMillan, 1993]. Also, Dimitrios Smokovitis, 'Greece' in Charles Moskos and Frank Wood (eds), *The Military: More than just a Job?* [New York: Pergamon-Brassey's I.D.Publishers, 1988]

¹⁹³ George Mavrogordatos, 'Interest groups in contemporary Greece: the twin issues of legitimacy and autonomy' (from a workshop on "Corporatism in Mediterranean Europe", Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Barcelona, 25-30 March 1985).

Constantinos Karamanlis argued, "it is the political parties rather than governments to which people attach themselves and a regime's fortune is more affected by the number and behaviour of [its] political parties than by [the rest of] its formal framework".¹⁹⁴ The bitter experiences of the country's political evolution during the pre-dictatorship period became the compass of party leaders for the construction of a new political system.

The intention of major party leaders was twofold: on the one side, they tried to establish the basic foundations of political democracy "which would be both in tune with the structural changes in Greek society and economy over the preceding quarter century and capable of accommodating new entrants into the political system".¹⁹⁵ On the other, they wanted to retain control over both the timetable and the change involved in the country's democratization process. Hence, as a first step, the old orientation of the Greek political arena around anti-Communism and the politics of exclusion¹⁹⁶ was eliminated and all political parties were permitted to compete for a seat in the Parliament and/or for the formation of a government. Although this step has often been strongly criticized for the de-politicising and the de-ideologising of Greek citizens, one cannot overlook the fact that it was instrumental for defining democracy in terms of parliamentary procedures and assist in its consolidation. In addition, the elimination of such overtones was bound to lead to the foundation of political competition on a more technical, economic framework which naturally reduces the chances for political

¹⁹⁴ Quoted by Michalis Spourdalakis, 'Securing Democracy in post-authoritarian Greece', in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis (eds), *Stabilising Fragile Democracies* [London: Routledge, 1996], p.169

¹⁹⁵ P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, 'Politics and Constitutionalism in Greece: The 1975 Constitution in Historical Perspective', in Houchang Chehabi and Alfred Stepan (eds), *Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies: Essays in Honor of Juan Linz* [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995], Vol. III, p.289

¹⁹⁶ For a legal analysis of the division of Greeks into first-and-second-class citizens by the 1952 Constitution, see Aristovoulos Manassis, 'L' evolution des institutions politiques de la Grece: a la recherche d'une legitimisation difficile', *Les Temps Modernes*, No.41, (1985)

turbulence.¹⁹⁷

Despite the implementation of democratic changes, the desire of major party leaders to control the evolution of political life in the country and prevent the emergence of any undesired developments in it, led to adoption of measures which supported the existence of an all-powerful state executive and the strengthening of party structures. It is not known whether the overwhelming entrance of new faces in the country's political arena during the early post-junta years¹⁹⁸ appeared as a potential threat in the eyes of traditional internal and external political forces. What is certain is that both the New Democracy and PASOK leaders showed an unwillingness to develop their parties as well as Greek politics into the image of Western European ones. Andreas Papandreu and Constantinos Mitsotakis not only preserved the system of patron-client relations inside their own parties and while in power but also, with the extensive implementation of bureaucratic clientelism¹⁹⁹ succeeded in enhancing their political power at the expense of the influence of local patrons. Since the dominance of the executive had been established with the 1975 Constitution and the 1986 Amendments,²⁰⁰ the continuing omnipotence of the state over the country's economy and social welfare²⁰¹ had offered a unique opportunity to party leaders to strengthen their position both in the party and the government. It has been argued that their rotation in power in the 1990s and their application of bureaucratic clientelism " had a great integrative effect on society an

¹⁹⁷ Diamandouros, (1995), op.cit., p.290

¹⁹⁸ A.I. Metaxas, 'Viokoinonike kai Politismike Chartographia tes Voules, 1964-1974-1977', *Politike*, Vol.1, (1981)

¹⁹⁹ 'Bureaucratic Clientelism' has been defined as 'a distinct form of clientelism [that] consists of systematic infiltration of the state machine by party devotees and the allocation of favours through it'. Christos Lyrintzis, 'Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of " Bureaucratic Clientelism" ', *West European Politics*, Vol.7, No.2, (1987), p.103

²⁰⁰ Nicos Alivizatos, 'The Presidency, Parliament and the Courts in the 1980s', in Clogg, (1993), op.cit., pp.65-73

²⁰¹ Dimitri Sotiropoulos, 'A Colossus with Feet of Clay: The State in Post-Authoritarian Greece', in Harry Psomiades and Stavros Thomadakis (eds), *Greece and the New Europe and the Changing International Environment* [New York: Pella Publications, 1993]

contributed decisively to the consolidation process".²⁰²

ii) Greece's entrance into the European Community. Although the history of Modern Greece is full of undesired foreign interventions in its political affairs,²⁰³ party leaders came to view Greece's accession to EC as a *conditio sine qua non* for the functioning of democracy in its domestic political scene, the improvement of its economy, the enhancement of its security as well as a powerful spur in support of much-needed structural changes. Since entry into the EC conferred upon Greece the privileged status of membership of the exclusive "club" of "developed" and "advanced" western countries, it was seen as the best shield against any attempts which intended to undermine the country's process towards democratic consolidation. As Karamanlis had characteristically pointed out, the accession of Greece into the EC would not only secure its national independence but also its democratic institutions.²⁰⁴

Despite the early systemic objections of PASOK to the Community, the need of the party leadership to sustain a nationalistic approach to foreign policy issues in conjunction with the need to retain its western orientation led gradually to its greater financial, political and diplomatic attachment to the EC. For instance, the massive inflow of Community funds in the country throughout the 1980-95 period appeared to benefit significant parts of the social strata, among them and staunch opponent of its accession.²⁰⁵ Furthermore, the adaptation of governmental and administrative structures to regular procedures at the European level, the involvement of a wide range of ministries and officials in the everyday form of EC's diplomacy, the intense effort, political statecraft and

²⁰² Spourdalakis, op.cit., p.176

²⁰³ Theodore Couloumbis, John Petropoulos and Harry Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics* [New York: Pella, 1976] and Peter Murtagh, *The Rape of Greece* [London: Simon and Schuster, 1994]

²⁰⁴ Spourdalakis, op.cit., p.169

²⁰⁵ Dimitri Sotiropoulos, 'Kratike Grafeiokratia kai Laikistiko Komma: He Periptose tou PASOK, 1981-1989', *Synchrone Themata*, No.49, (1993); Loukas Tsoukalis, *He Hellada sten Europaike Koinoteta: He proklesse tes prosarmoges* [Athens: Papazeses, 1993] and *Financial Times*, 22 August 1990

administrative flexibility which demands the EC presidency (Greece had assumed that responsibility in 1983,1988 and 1994 all three under a PASOK administration) contributed in transforming the public officials into fierce supporters of the EC and introduce them to a different level of politics. In addition, the expediency of certain measures required by the EC have allowed the governments to impose unpopular measures and the democratic institutions to continue their functioning. Hence, it can be argued that the accession of the country to the EC contributed, if nothing else, in keeping its newly born democracy on track towards achieving consolidation.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ Susannah Verney, 'To Be or Not to Be in the European Community: The Party Debate and Democratic Consolidation in Greece', in Geoffrey Prindham (ed), *Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* [London: Routledge, 1990] and Basilios E. Tsingos, *Underwriting Democracy, Not Exporting It: The European Community and Greece* [Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford University, 1994]

CONCLUSION

Apart from the fact that both Turkey and Greece are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and are located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, they differ in almost anything else; from their size, population, religion, culture to the performance of their economy, their geo-strategic importance for the west and most of all in the evolution of their respective civil-military relations. Whereas in the case of Turkey it was the dominating military-bureaucratic elite which dictated the parameters of the country's political, economic and cultural development following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, in the case of Modern Greece it was the alliance of local political leaders with major foreign powers which performed that role. Up to the year 1967, the Greek officer corps was forced to play a secondary political role.

In accordance with its traditional belief that it constitutes the sole protector of the Kemalist orientation of the Turkish state, the military staged the 1980 intervention aiming at the elimination of societal violence and anarchy which had plagued the country during the late 1970s and the construction of a new political structure which could guarantee social order and economic prosperity. In spite of its intentions, the military leadership did not attempt to discuss this subject with the old and new party leaders, although it was the latter who were to be appointed by the people to work under the new guidelines. Naturally, the analysis of the evolution of Turkish politics during the 1983-95 period reveals that the country was far from having achieved a consolidation of its democracy. The political power of the military continued to reign supreme and politicians appeared satisfied with a role of a lesser importance. The only exception to this rule was the 1987-93 period during which the leader of ANAP, Turgut Ozal, taking advantage of the favorable internal and external climate in Turkey made some bold steps towards the augmentation of the political power of party leaders. However, the inability/ unwillingness of the other political leaders to offer their service

towards the accomplishment of such a goal and the sudden death of Ozal removed from the political scene a major threat to military' institutional autonomy as well as to its augmented political power.

The situation was somewhat different in the case of Greece. The bitter experiences of the seven-year dictatorship for both military leaders and politicians seem to have had an enormous impact on the evolution of the country's political life during the post-junta period. The former, interested in establishing and preserving hierarchical discipline and unity inside the military institution as well as in transforming the ideological orientation of the officers with regards to Turkey, made certain that the habit of intervening in politics became a feature of the past. As for the latter, having learned their lesson, used skilfully a carrot-and-stick approach towards the imposition of civilian supremacy over the military. Free from the pressure exercised by non-elected institutions and capable of increasing considerably their power inside the party mechanism both Karamanlis and Papandreou worked for the consolidation of democracy in Greece. In their attempt, they received considerable assistance from the European Community in the political, economic and cultural fields.

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