

MASS PUBLIC OPINION IN UKRAINE ABOUT NATO AND NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONSHIPS

ANALYTICAL REPORT

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The purpose of this analytical report is to characterise the prevailing public opinion about NATO as an organisation, NATO expansion, and the NATO-Ukraine relationships in the spring of 1998. The method of public opinion survey was used in order to collect information on attitudes towards different aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships and on other issues. The technical details of this survey are given in Appendix 1.

It is important to know public opinion about important issues such as NATO expansion and NATO-Ukraine relationships. In the time when NATO is re-establishing its role in the new world order, each country that was an 'enemy' of NATO is called to define and re-define its relationships with NATO. These relationships are not only the state affairs, but also a matter of personal opinion of individual Ukrainian citizens. The very word NATO carries a very strong connotation and provides a point of reference for Ukrainians trying to overcome the idea of 'power balance' that had been deeply engraved in mass consciousness. This is why knowing what ordinary people of Ukraine think about NATO, a former adversary, is vital for both Ukrainian politicians and NATO strategists. While the former must take into account the prevailing opinion about NATO if their policies were to receive public support, the later should at least be able to foresee the likely reaction to the planned development within NATO.

The survey addressed great variety issues, not only the issue of the NATO-Ukraine relationships, and therefore is limited in its capacity to investigate the whole complexity of these relationships. However, there is a good reason to believe that the most important features of these relationships have indeed received sufficient coverage. The full list of questions asked in the survey is given in Appendix 2.

Looking at the recent developments in Yugoslavia, and NATO bombing campaign, the data reported here may now not reflect correctly the prevailing public opinion that has changed dramatically since the bombing began. However, these data can be used as a benchmark for monitoring the direction and extend of changes in public opinion about NATO in Ukraine. The follow-up research will undoubtedly benefit from the availability of these data with which new findings can be compared and trends established.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Report Objectives	p. 1
Summary of Main Findings	p. 3
The Perception of the External Military Threat to Ukraine	p. 7
Perception of Possible Russian Reactions to Ukraine Officially Announcing its Intention to Join NATO	p. 12
The Silence of the NATO-Ukraine Relationships	p. 14
Various opinions about the NATO-Ukraine relationships	p. 23
Age differential in the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships	p. 31
The effects of Party Political Orientation on perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships	p. 33
Support for a presidential candidate and perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships	p. 42
Regional differential in the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships	p. 43
Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within educational groups	p. 45
Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within ethno-linguistic groups	p. 46
Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships by supporters and opponents of the Ukrainian independence	p. 47

SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS

The Perception of the External Military Threat to Ukraine

According to the poll, one in six respondents believed in the existence of external military threat to Ukraine. One in three believers in the existence of military threat to Ukraine think that this threat is coming from Russia. Russia emerges as the prime source of the military threat, followed by the USA, Western Europe and finally Eastern Europe.

However, these results should not be taken simplistically.

The belief in the external military threat to Ukraine is related to a process of Ukrainian identity formation and to attitudes towards Ukrainian independence. Therefore, the external military threat to Ukraine is a political and cultural issue as much as a military one.

Russia remains the most important source of a 'negative' identification for many Ukrainians who has developed a strong Ukrainian identity and attitude towards the Ukrainian independent state. Russia is a source of the negative identification for many Ukrainians who perceive Russia as a source of military threat.

Perception of Possible Russian Reactions to Ukraine Officially Announcing its Intention to Join NATO

Ukrainians tend to see both Russia not objecting to, and Russia mounting military pressure against, Ukraine's intention to join NATO as unlikely developments. There is a widespread public belief that while Russia will probably voice out a strong objection to the Ukraine's intention to join NATO, it will probably never resort to the military force in order to stop Ukraine from joining NATO if NATO accepts Ukraine. In line with this finding, the data suggest that the Ukrainians allow for the possibility of economic sanctions and political pressure imposed on them by Russia but not for the possibility of the Russian military marching into their country.

The Silence of the NATO-Ukraine Relationships

Apparently, one in three respondents was not concerned with the status of the relationships between NATO and Ukraine, which suggests that – bearing in mind that 42 percent failed to give any definite answer – the Ukrainians are not preoccupied with the NATO question in March 1998.

The first explanation of the relative unimportance of this issue involves age effect as the likely determinant of the level of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. This approach draws on the difference in formative experience between those respondents who grew up in the cold war period and those respondents whose adolescence coincided with the change in the diplomatic climate culminating in the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.

The second explanation draws on a resource-based model of political involvement. According to this model, the better educated are more likely to be politically involved as they possess skills to deal with complex political information, including the information about the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Contrary to the expectation that the generations of the Second World War and the Cold War would be more interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the younger generation, the data show no generation-related differences. Controlling for the effects of generation, education had most profound effect on the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The better-educated respondents were more interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the worse educated respondents. The data also showed that there is a weak generation effect. In each educational sub-group, there is more or less the same proportion of the respondents who resort to the answer 'difficult to say' to the respondents who gave a concrete answer. As a rule the former respondents belong to the older generation.

Various opinions about the NATO-Ukraine relationships

The survey asked the respondents to agree or disagree with 14 statements about some key elements of the NATO-Ukraine relationships and some central characteristics of NATO organisation.

The overall conclusion is that, allowing for relatively low interest in the NATO issue in Ukraine, the idea of Ukraine's joining NATO is not very popular with the Ukrainians.

First of all the respondents were worried about deterioration in the relationships between Russia and Ukraine. The respondents felt the membership in NATO would put extra burden on the fledging Ukraine's economy, because purchasing of new military equipment and weaponry from NATO countries would be required. Another important concern was the possible restriction on travel between Ukraine and Russia. Finally, the respondents did not believe that military capacity of Ukraine would increase as the result of the country's membership in NATO. However, one in three respondents thought that the membership in NATO would elevate international standing of their country.

The remainder of the list dealt with some key features of NATO as an organisation, with Eastern and Central European countries' intention to join NATO and with possible Russia's reaction to the Ukraine' seeking to join NATO.

The respondents were asked to nominate an agency that in their opinion has legitimate right to decide about the Ukraine deciding to take steps towards joining NATO. The majority of 42% of the respondents opted for the National Referendum. The Parliament and the Department of National Security came the second and the third, respectively, and the President and the Defence Minister were the least trusted to take such an important decision.

Based on the individual items, three composite measures (scales) were constructed. The first scale included most items and encompassed various opinions about military and organisational aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships (the Scale of Perception of Military and Organisational Aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships). The second scale comprised opinions that related to possible Russian reaction if Ukraine joins NATO (the Scale of Perception of Russian Reaction). Finally, the third component includes opinions about

political and international aspects of the NATO expansion (the Scale of Perception of Political/International Aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships). The scales' statistics show that, overall, the Ukrainians have coherent and neutral opinion about the NATO-Ukrainian relationships.

At the consequent stages of analysis, the differences and similarities in the perception of the three aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships among important subgroups of the population were investigated. We also looked at political implications of differences in opinion about NATO and the NATO-Ukraine relationships. Finally we investigated whether NATO and the NATO-Ukraine relationships had been issues during the last parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

Age differential in the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

Therefore, in contrast to the no-generation effects on the level of interest to and knowledge about the NATO-Ukraine relationships, there are the generation effects of an intermediate magnitude on the perception of the Military and Organisational aspects of these relationships. The respondents who belong to the Second War and Cold War generation are significantly less in favour of the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships in military and organisational sphere that are the respondents who belong to the Post-Cold War generation. There are no generation effects on perception of other aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships as they were researched in our survey.

The effects of Party Political Orientation on perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

The respondents with the Right party political orientation perceive the Military and organisational aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships significantly more favourable than the respondents with the Left party political orientation. The party political orientation affects perception of the Political aspect of the NATO-Ukraine relationships to a lesser degree. However, the respondents on the political Left were more likely to think that Russia would retaliate if Ukraine joins NATO than the respondents on the political Right. Finally, the perception of the political aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships seemed to be not affected by the party political orientation.

Support for a presidential candidate and perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

It is not clear why supporters of Viktor Yuschenko, head of the National Bank of Ukraine, perceive the NATO-Ukraine relationships more positively than do supporters of the incumbent president Leonid Kuchma or the former president Leonid Kravchuk. Further research is needed in order to arrive at any substantiated conclusion. However, a slightly negative opinion about the NATO-Ukraine relationships found among the supporters of Moroz's candidacy is in line with the policy of the objection to NATO enlargement advocated by political centre-left of which Alexandr Moroz, the parliamentary speaker, is a prominent representative.

Regional differential in the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

The public opinion in western and northern regions of Ukraine and Kiev was significantly much more in favour of developing the NATO-Ukraine relationships (especially in the Military and Organisational areas) than was public opinion in southern and eastern regions and Crimea. Concerning other aspects of the relationships, the picture was somewhat unclear. In general, the majority of respondents who support the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships is located in the north-west of Ukraine and in Kiev, and the strongest opposition to that comes from the south-eastern regions of the country.

Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within educational groups

There was no conclusive evidence found in our data to establish a direction and strength of the association between the respondents' education and their perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. In general, it is possible to conclude that an individual's educational attainment does not influence an individual's perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within ethno-linguistic groups

The respondents who spoke Ukrainian at home had more favourable opinion about the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the respondents who spoke Russian at home irrespective of their ethnic identity. This can, to a great extent, be explained by referring to a well-documented fact that speaking Ukrainian has been not only cultural and linguistic characteristic but also a political statement of support to independence of Ukraine. Consequently, the independence of Ukraine meant predominantly and first of all independence from the Russian political if not economic dominance. Thus, the Ukrainophones' support to the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships is, by and large, a reaction against Russia.

Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships by supporters and opponents of the Ukrainian independence

Our data clearly indicate that perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationship is affected by the respondents' stance on the independence of Ukraine: the more independence-minded were respondents the more in favour of NATO were their opinions.

MAIN RESULTS IN DETAIL

External Military threat to Ukraine

The respondents were asked if they believed in any external military threat to Ukraine. In response, more than 17 percent of the respondents said that there was a military threat to Ukraine, about 20 percent were not sure, and more than 60 percent did not see any such threat (Table 1).

Table 1. Does the External Military Threat to Ukraine exist?

	External Military Threat	
	Count	%
Exist	258	10.32
Rather exist than not	172	6.88
Do not know	536	21.44
Rather do not exist	239	9.56
Do not exist	1295	51.8
Total	2500	100

The empirical fact that about one in six respondent believed in the existence of external military threat to Ukraine should not be taken simplistically. In the absence of territorial or any other claim laid to Ukraine by any state, this belief would have been a worrying sign of mass paranoia had it been found uniform across different sections of the Ukrainian society. In other words, if the respondents who believed in the existence of external military threat to Ukraine were spread equally across different sections of Ukrainian society, this would indicate that external military threat was a reality that could be seen and felt by everyone and everywhere in Ukraine. However, our data show that while some subgroups of the respondents believed in external military threat, other subgroups did not. This indicates that the belief in external military threat is a manifestation of other beliefs. These beliefs are linked to contemporary military situation, on one hand and to characteristics of particular subgroups of population in Ukraine, on the other hand.

The remainder of this section will show that the belief in external military threat to Ukraine is related to a process of Ukrainian identity formation and to attitudes towards Ukrainian independence. Therefore, external military threat to Ukraine is a political and cultural issue as much as a military one. Consequently, believing in the existence of external military threat is not only a result of perception of the actual military situation in Ukraine but also part of Ukrainian identity formation and attitudes towards Ukrainian independence.

While investigating differences and similarities in the perception of military threat to Ukraine among important subgroups of the population it was found that the most important differentiating factors were region, linguistic-ethnic group, and independence attitudes. For instance, there were significantly more respondents who believed in the existence of the external military threat who lived in the Western region of Ukraine than in any other part of the country. Similarly, more Ukrainian language speaking Ukrainians felt the threat than any other linguistic-ethnic group. Finally, the respondents who have supported the Independence of Ukraine were more likely to perceive the military threat existent compared to that among the respondents who are not ardent supporters of the Ukrainian independence.

The following Table 2 contains data that show how different sections of the Ukrainian society perceive the existence of external military threat to their country.

Table 2. The perception of External Military Threat to Ukraine within various sections of the Ukrainian population.

	External Military Threat					Total
	Exist	Rather exist than not	Rather do not exist	Do not exist	Do not know	Row %
	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %	
Regions						
Western	12.3	9.8	7.0	45.9	25.0	100
Kyiv	13.5	5.8	17.3	46.8	16.7	100
Northern	6.6	3.9	4.9	63.5	21.1	100
Central	11.0	9.3	14.2	49.1	16.3	100
Southern	8.9	3.9	7.1	56.1	23.9	100
Eastern	10.5	6.4	10.4	51.9	20.8	100
Crimea	7.1	6.3	8.9	50.9	26.8	100
Total	10.3	6.9	9.6	51.8	21.4	100
Linguistic-ethnic group						
Ukrainophones	11.2	8.2	10.0	47.9	22.8	100
Rusophones	9.7	5.6	9.1	56.2	19.4	100
Others	1.9	1.9	9.3	57.4	29.6	100
Total	10.3	6.9	9.6	51.8	21.4	100
Independence support						
Support	11.4	8.7	9.1	54.2	16.6	100
Swing: support-oppose	10.8	4.3	10.5	52.7	21.8	100
Swing: oppose-support	7.1	7.1		78.6	7.1	100
Oppose	12.2	8.2	8.2	50.6	20.8	100
No answer	8.8	3.4	11.3	45.8	30.7	100
Total	10.9	6.8	9.6	52.1	20.7	100

Note: Regions of Ukraine: Kyiv (Kyiv), North (Zhytomyrska, Kyivska, Chernihivska), Central (Vinnytska, Kirovohradska, Poltavska, Cherkaska), Western (Volynska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Rivnenska, Ternopilska, Khmelnytska, Chernivetska), Eastern (Dnipropetrovska, Donetska, Zaporizka, Luhanska, Sumska, Kharkivska), Southern (Mykolajivska, Odeska, Khersonska), Crimea (Republic Crimea);

Linguistic-ethnic group: Ukrainophones (speak Ukrainian at home, identify themselves with any ethnic group); Rusophones (speak Russian at home, identify themselves with any ethnic group);

Independence support: this is a combined variable that takes into account how the respondents voted during the Independence referendum and how they would vote if there were another Independence referendum tomorrow.

These findings are further supported when comparing two extreme groups: the respondents who firmly believe in the existence of the military threat with the respondents who do not. For instance, the Russian language speakers¹, the respondents who did not support the

¹ It has been found that language spoken (Russian or Ukrainian) provides more durable and important identity than ethnicity (Russian or Ukrainian) for people living in Ukraine. Many ethnic Ukrainians living in the Eastern Ukraine speak Russian and identify themselves with Russian-language culture rather than with the Ukrainian-language culture. The linguistic composition does not go along the ethnic line. According to the 1989 Census, the ratio of ethnic Ukrainians was 2.6 to 1, and Ukrainian was given as mother tongue with ratio 1.7 to 1 in Ukraine as a whole. In other words, each third was not ethnic Ukrainian and each second did not speak Ukrainian in the country. (see: Bremmer, J., "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine", *Europe-*

Independence of Ukraine as much as the rest and the inhabitants of the south-eastern² Ukraine are among the least worried about any military threat. On the other hand, there were 11.2 % of the Ukrainian language speaking Ukrainians; 12.3 % of the respondents living in the Western regions and 11.4% of the independence-minded respondents among the believers in the military threat. These differences in perception of the threat are illustrated in the charts, which also show that more Ukrainians (those who speak Ukrainian as their first language), more people living in the Western Ukraine and more the independence minded respondents perceive the external threat to Ukraine than the rest. Chart 1 illustrates these findings.

All these subgroups of the population have developed a very strong sense of the Ukrainian national identity. The definition of the Ukrainian national identity includes both internal and external elements, the latter being more pronounced than the former. The external, negative definition of the Ukrainian identity is deeply rooted in the history of the Ukrainian people. Until recently, the Ukrainians had been stateless and their culture had been reduced to secondary, peasant culture compared to the high culture of the metropolis (e.g. Austro-Hungarian, Polish, and Russian). Thus although the Ukrainians have always had their territory, they had no jurisdiction over it nor had they any strong institution of national culture. The absence of any state had prevented the forming of a national identity. A small number of underdeveloped and retroactive cultural institutions had inevitably failed to turn the parochial cultures into the Ukrainian cultural identity. The assimilation had been not uncommon process especially among aspiring Ukrainians who wanted to advance in the current regime, be it Hungarian, Polish or Russian.

Therefore when the Ukrainian state and the cultural institutions were finally firmly established in 1991, the task of the forging of the Ukrainian national identity presented itself as both creating the Ukrainian identity and distancing it from other identities. In other words, the transitional definition of the Ukrainian identity included not only positive statements about the Ukrainians but also negative statements about others and their respective states. One of such devices was the victimisation of the Ukrainian identity. The mass public has been fed with countless 'revelations' that portrayed the Ukrainians as the victims of cultural genocide by the Russians, of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster inflicted by the Russians, of territorial claims and economic blackmail by the Russians and finally but not lastly, of the Russian military pressure. It is therefore quite plausible that the perception of external military threat is still functioning as a part of the national identity in Ukraine. Consequently, any political decisions concerning a perceived military threat is and will be made for internal consumption with hardly any influence on Ukraine's foreign policy.

Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1994: 261-283. Khmel'ko, V. E., 'Dvi movy - dvi natsii', *Politychna Dumka*, N. 2, 1996, pp. 12-23.)

² Regionalism is a prominent feature of Ukrainian society. Not only cultural identity has a strong regional rooting but also politics reflect a sharp regional divide. The conjunction of ethnicity and language is region contingent. In Western Ukraine the ratio of ethnic Ukrainians was 8.2 to 1; and Ukrainian was given as mother tongue with ratio 8.2:1 in the 1989 Census. The corresponding ratios for other regions were: 'Right-Bank' Centre (or Centre-West): 8:1 and 7.7:1; 'Left-Bank' Centre (East-Centre): 6.8:1 and 5:1; East: 1.4:5 and 1:1.3; South: 1.1:1 and 1:1.4; and Kiev: 2.6:1 and 1.3:1. The odds for Ukraine as the whole were as follows: 2.6:1 and 1.7:1, accordingly. This determined the two-faced policy of nation-state building in Ukraine. While ethno-cultural factor (language, state symbolism, territoriality, etc.) was crucial for the regions that had a strong Ukrainian element, in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, it was socio-economic factor (personal well-being, social security benefits, etc.) which determined people's judgement on their prospects in the independent Ukraine. The national movement pressed ahead with propagating the nation revival in the west of Kiev and the economic and social growth in the east and south of Kiev that will follow if Ukraine becomes an independent nation-state (see: Krawchenko, B., *Ukraine: the politics of independence* - in Bremmer, I. and Taras, R. *Nations and Politics in Soviet Successor States*, Oxford University Press, 1993: pp. 75-97).

Further evidence that belief in external military threat to Ukraine has a cultural and political rooting comes from the data on the likely source of external military threat. One would imagine that, if our treatment of the data on belief in external military threat to Ukraine were correct, the majority of respondents would select Russia as the most likely source of external military threat. Moreover, the respondents with characteristics conducive to a firm Ukrainian identity (Ukrainophones, living in western Ukraine) will be more likely to perceive Russia as the source of external military threat to Ukraine than the respondents with characteristics conducive to a weak Ukrainian identity (Russophones, living in eastern Ukraine).

The respondents who believed in the existence of the external military threat to Ukraine were asked to select country or countries from a list of which they thought as a source or sources of that threat. Not surprisingly, Russia comes up as the most likely country that, in the respondents' perception, poses external military threat to Ukraine. The following Table 3 presents the perception of the likely sources of the external military threat to Ukraine.

Table 3. From which countries does the military threat to Ukraine come?


	Russia	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	USA	Other	Total
Regions						
Western	61	12	11	9	7	100
Kyiv	46	17	15	11	10	100
Central	34	18	17	26	4	100
North	29	22	16	24	10	100
Crimea	18	23	18	32	9	100
Southern	17	28	12	40	3	100
Eastern	15	25	16	34	10	100
Linguistic-ethnic group						
Ukrophones	41	17	14	21	6	100
Rusophones	20	24	16	31	9	100
Total	33	20	15	25	8	100

This table shows that one in three of those respondents who believe that the military threat to Ukraine exists think that it is coming from Russia. Russia emerges as the prime source of the military threat, followed by the USA, Western Europe and finally Eastern Europe.

However, as Table 3 suggests, Russia was not perceived as the prime source of external military threat to Ukraine in every subgroup of the respondents. Moreover, the USA was not always the second choice either. As expected, the respondents in western Ukraine were more likely to choose Russia as the prime source of external military threat to Ukraine, while the USA was the likely choice for the respondents in southern and eastern Ukraine. The same was true concerning choices made by the Ukrainophones and Russophones respectively.

Therefore, Russia remains the most important source of a 'negative' identification for many Ukrainians who has developed a strong Ukrainian identity and attitude towards the Ukrainian independent state. Russia is a source of the negative identification because it is looked at as a source of military threat. On the other hand, as long as Russia is perceived as a source of military threat, it will provide a powerful impetus for the Ukrainians to distance themselves from the Russian identity and define their own, a distinct Ukrainian national identity. Thus the perception of external military threat to Ukraine is rooted in a political and cultural issues as much as in military ones.

Chart 1. The perception of the Military Threat to Ukraine within sections of the Ukrainian population.



Perception of Possible Russian Reaction to Ukraine Officially Announcing its Intention to Join NATO

Russia has undoubtedly been as a non-friendly state by a sizeable minority of the respondents. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the perception of possible Russian reaction to Ukraine officially announcing its intention to join NATO. The following questions were asked:

Please give your best estimation of the probability of the following actions from Russia in response to Ukraine officially announcing its intention to join NATO.

The following four possible scenarios were put to the respondents for the assessment:

- Economics sanctions against Ukraine (breaking contracts, trade war, suspension of gas and oil supply, etc.)
- No objections to Ukraine intending to join NATO
- Political pressure on the Ukrainian government (through international bodies, trying to destabilise government process, etc.)
- Military pressure (deployment of troops to the Russia-Ukraine borders, renewed claims to Sevastopol, etc.)


The respondents were asked to estimate the probability of the above-listed reactions on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100% of probability. The scale had decimal divisions to help the respondents to complete the task.

It emerged, as the following Chart 2 and Table 4 demonstrate, that the respondents estimated all four scenarios as rather improbable than probable. The least probable, in the respondents' opinion, was that Russia will not object to Ukraine's intention to join NATO (19% of respondents assessed the probability of that reaction as being more than 50%) and that Russia will mount military pressure (23% of the respondents estimated the probability of that reaction as being more than 50%). On the other hand, one-third of the respondents thought that there was more than 50% of probability that Russia will use economic sanctions and political pressure to discourage Ukraine from intending to join NATO.

Chart 2 gives a more detailed picture. One can clearly see that the distribution of the respondents on the scale is fairly even (around 7% in each cell) except for the 50% probability mark – for the reactions 'Political pressure' and 'Economic sanction'. In fact, about one-quarter of the respondents thought that the chances of these reactions to materialise were 'fifty-fifty'. On the other hand, there were the number of respondents (approx. 20%) who thought that the reactions 'No objection' and 'Military pressure' were virtually impossible, almost equal to the number of respondents who estimated the chances of these reactions as being 'fifty-fifty'.

Therefore, the data suggest that Ukrainians tend to see both Russia not objecting to, and Russia mounting military pressure against, Ukraine's intention to join NATO as unlikely developments. This points out a widespread public belief that while Russia will probably voice a strong objection to the Ukraine's intention to join NATO, it will probably never resort to military force in order to stop Ukraine from joining NATO if NATO accepts Ukraine. In line with this finding, the data suggest that Ukrainians allow for the possibility of economic sanctions and political pressure imposed on them by Russia but not for the possibility of the Russian military marching into their country.

Chart 2. Perceived Probability of Different Russia's Reactions to Ukraine Officially Announcing its Intention to Join NATO.



Note: Axis Y displays levels of probability (in percentage points) and axis X shows percentage of respondents who perceive the probability of an event as being at a certain level.

Table 5a. Perceived Probability of Different Russia's Reactions to Ukraine Officially Announcing its Intention to Join NATO (Summary).

Possible Russia's Reaction		Perceived Probability			Total
		Less than 50%	50%	More than 50%	
Economic sanctions	Count	931	517	710	2,158
	%	43	24	33	100
Positive Reaction	Count	1,276	452	417	2,145
	%	59	21	19	100
Political pressure	Count	953	460	715	2,128
	%	45	22	34	100
Military pressure	Count	1,234	412	499	2,145
	%	58	19	23	100

The Silence Of The NATO-Ukraine Relationships

The respondents were asked how well they were informed about the status of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. It turned out that only about 7 percent of the pooled claimed a fair degree of knowledge of- and interest in the relationships between NATO and Ukraine. On the other hand, these relationships were not an issue for about 39 percent of the respondents, some 42 percent claimed a very basic knowledge of the matter and further 11 percent found it difficult to answer to the question. The following Table 3 has the data.

Table 3. How interested are Ukrainians in the Ukraine-NATO relationships?

	Count	%
Expert view	18	0.72
Follow major developments	175	7
Know on the whole	1060	42.4
Not interested	962	38.48
Difficult to say	285	11.4
Total	2500	100

Apparently one in three respondents was not concerned with the status of the relationships between NATO and Ukraine, which suggests that – bearing in mind that 42 percent failed to give any definite answer – the Ukrainians are not preoccupied with the NATO question. There are at least three two explanations to that.

The first explanation involves age effect as the likely determinant of the level of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. This approach draws on the difference in formative experience between those respondents who grew up in the cold war period and those respondents whose adolescence coincided with the change in the diplomatic climate culminating in the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. The reason behind this explanation is that the respondents who grew under the ideological pressure to perceive NATO as enemy would show greater interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the respondents who grew in the spirit of re-positioning of word military priorities. In the absence of any ideological pressure, the younger generation is much freer to miss any NATO-Ukraine rhetoric than the older one, which had been made to listen to propaganda messages.

We divide our respondents into three groups to reflect major differences in formative experiences as follows:

1. The Second World War and Cold War Generation – the respondents who fought the war or had become young adults during the war years or in 5 years after the war and the respondents who were born after the war and whose formative experience is that of the cold war (aged 25 and older)
2. The Post-Cold War Generation – the respondents with formative experience of normalisation in the relationships between the West and the then Soviet Union (aged 24 and younger).

This ‘generation effects’ explanation is sustained if the levels of the interest differ across the age groups and it is the younger that are less interested than the older. Consequently, this explanation fails if the levels of interest remain relatively the same across the age groups.


The following Table 4 presents the data.

Table 4. The interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships within age groups.

			Informed on NATO-Ukraine			Total
			Informed/interested	Difficult to say	Not informed/interested	
Age	16-24	Count	140	29	125	294
		% within Age	48	10	43	100
	25+	Count	1,113	256	837	2,206
		% within Age	50	12	38	100
Total		Count	1,253	285	962	2,500
		% within Age	50	11	38	100

Table 4 shows that there was no significant difference in the degree of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships between the two age groups. Pearson Chi-Square value was 2.5 with $df=2$, indicated that the nil-hypothesis cannot be rejected. The nil-hypothesis assumes that the distribution of the respondents into 'interested/informed' – 'difficult to say' – 'not informed/interested' is similar in two age groups. However, the observed data provided little evidence that the 'not informed/interested' respondents tended to concentrate in the 'Post-Cold War' generation (the respondents aged 24 and younger) rather than in the generation of the respondents whose formative experience was that of the confrontation (the respondents aged 25 and older). The following Chart 1 illustrates this trend.

Chart 1. The observed levels of the information/interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships within age groups



Further support to the hypothesis of the no-age differences in the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships comes from calculating odds and odds ratios. The following Table 5 presents the data.

Table 5. The observed odds and ratios of observed odds, involving age and the interest.

Age		Informed/interested vs. Not informed/interested	Informed/interested vs. Difficult to say	Not informed/interested vs. Difficult to say
16-24	Odds	1.1	4.8	4.3
25+	Odds	1.3	4.3	3.3
16-24 vs. 25+		Odds Ratios	0.8	1.1
				1.3

One can clearly see that there were hardly any age-related differences in the observed odds of being informed/interested rather than not informed/interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The age-related differences remain small in the odds of being informed/interested vs. giving ‘difficult to say’ answer, and in the odds of being not interested/informed vs. giving ‘difficult to say’ answer. The odds of being informed/interested rather than not informed/interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships were 1.1 for the respondents aged up to 24 as compared with 1.3 for the respondents aged 25 and older. The odds of being informed/interested vs. giving ‘difficult to say’ answer were 4.8 for the younger respondents as compared with 4.3 for the older respondents. The odds of being not informed/interested vs. giving ‘difficult to say’ answer were 4.3 for the younger respondents as compared with 3.3 for the older respondents. The only noticeable difference in the odds occurred in the last case indicating that the younger respondents were more specific in their answers than the older respondents. In general, however, the same odds were similar for the different age groups, which indicated that, for instance, the chances of the younger respondents being informed/interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships were not much different from the same chances of the older respondents.

Finally, one can look at the odds ratios. The ratio of the observed odds of being informed/interested rather than not informed/interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships within the younger respondents to the same odds within the older respondents was 0.8. The ratio of the observed odds of being informed/interested vs. giving ‘difficult to say’ answer for the same combination of the age groups was 1.1, whereas the similar ratio involving the observed odds of being not informed/interested vs. giving ‘difficult to say’ answer was 1.3. Clearly, the last figure is slightly different from the first one, which indicates that age-related differences in being informed/interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships are, by and large, due to larger number of the older respondents who gave uncertain answer compared to that in the group of the younger respondents. In general, however, odds ratios oscillated around 1, indicating that being in either of the age group is not related to being either informed/interested or not informed/interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

It follows, that our data lend support, albeit tentative, to the first explanation of the low level of the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

The second explanation draws on a resource-based model of political involvement. According to this model, the better educated are more likely to be politically involved as they possess skills to deal with complex political information. These skills are also believed to be essential for understanding complex issues and developing personal opinion. In fact, the most commonly documented finding regarding socio-demographic antecedents of political and social knowledge concerns their relationship to education. Many studies have shown that comparatively well-educated people are more likely to be well informed about complex

political and social issues and more likely to have a strong personal opinion than people who are less educated³.

Thus, our data will lend a tentative support to the second explanation if the better-educated can be found to be more informed about and interested in the status of the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the rest. For the purpose of our analysis, the respondents were divided into three groups according the highest level of education received, as follows:

1. Unfinished high education
2. High education
3. Higher education

We test the validity of the ‘education effects’ explanation in the same way as we tested the validity of the ‘generation effects’ explanation. First, a simple cross-tabulation of the levels of the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships by the levels of education is analysed. The following Table 6 has the data.


Table 6. The interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships within education groups

		Informed on NATO-Ukraine			Total
Education		Informed/interested	Difficult to say	Not informed/interested	
Unfinished high	Count	204	96	328	628
	% within Education	32	15	52	100
High	Count	687	157	537	1,381
	% within Education	50	11	39	100
Higher	Count	362	32	97	491
	% within Education	74	7	20	100
Total	Count	1,253	285	962	2,500
	% within Education	50	11	38	100

It is clear that the observed data on the distribution of the respondents with the different level of the interest across the educational groups show a strong support to the ‘educational effects’ explanation. The respondents with a relatively higher level of education tended to be more knowledgeable about and interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the rest. For instance, 74 percent of the respondents with higher education said that they were informed about and interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. By contrast, 52 percent of the respondents with unfinished high education said that they were not informed about and not interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. One can easily discern a pattern in the relationship between education and the interest, as follows: the better the education the higher the interest. The following Chart 2 illustrates this trend.

³Hayes, B. C., Bean, C. S. “Political efficacy: A comparative study of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and Australia”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 1993, 23, pp. 261-280; Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. *Political Participation and Democracy in Britain*. Cambridge University Press: 1992; Conradt, D. P. "Changing German Political Culture", in G. Almond and S. Verba (eds.) *The Civic Culture Revisited*, London: Sge, 1989, pp. 212-272; Steinberger, P. J. "Social context and political efficacy", *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 65, 1981, pp. 129-141; Verba, S., Nie, N. M., Kim, J. -O. *Participation and Political Inequality: A seven-national comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978; Marullo, S. "Gender Differences in Peace Movement Participation", *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*; 1991, 13, pp. 135-152.

Chart 2. The observed levels of the information/interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships within educational categories



The Chi-square value is 187.84 for $df=4$ which allows to reject the nil-hypothesis that the distribution of the respondents by the interest is the same in each educational category. Therefore, the observed data suggest the existence of strong linear effects of education on the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

If the data presented in the terms of odds and odds ratios, the above outlined effects become even more evident. The following table 7 has the data.

Table 7. The observed odds and ratios of observed odds, involving education and the interest.

		Informed on NATO-Ukraine		
Education		Informed/interested vs. Not informed/interested	Informed/interested vs. Difficult to say	Not informed/interested vs. Difficult to say
Unfinished High	Odds	0.62	2.13	3.42
High	Odds	1.28	4.38	3.42
Higher	Odds	3.73	11.31	3.03
Higher vs. Unfinished High	Odds ratio	6.00	5.32	0.89
Higher vs. High	Odds ratio	2.92	2.59	0.89
High vs. Unfinished High	Odds ratio	2.06	2.06	1.00

The data demonstrate that there were strong educational differences in the observed odds of being informed/interested rather than not informed/interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The education-related differences are especially large in the odds of being informed/interested vs. giving 'difficult to say' answer, and in the odds of being interested/informed vs. not interested/informed. One can see a clear tendency here in that the

increase in the level of education is followed by the increase in the odds. However, the education-related differences in the odds of being not informed/interested vs. giving ‘difficult to say’ answer were small. While the absolute number of the ‘not informed/interested’ respondents and the ‘difficult to say’ respondents decreases with the increase in the level of education, the proportion of the ‘not informed/interested’ respondents to the ‘difficult to say’ respondents remains relatively the same in each educational group. This indicates that the increase in education is likely to increase number of the informed/interested respondents by decreasing the number of the respondents in both the ‘not informed/interested’ and ‘difficult to say’ categories at the same rate. In other words, the education has uniform and cross-sectional effects on the level of processed information about and interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

When presented in terms of odds ratios, the data allow to locate the educational effect more precisely. Three different effects can be distinguished. The strongest educational effect is found for the observed odds of being informed/interested vs. not informed/interested and being informed/interested vs. ‘difficult to say’ involving the combination of ‘higher’ vs. ‘unfinished high’ education. The second strongest educational effect is found for the observed odds of being informed/interested vs. not informed/interested and being informed/interested vs. ‘difficult to say’ involving the combinations of ‘higher’ vs. ‘high’ and ‘high’ vs. ‘unfinished high’ education. Finally, there was no educational effect for the observed odds of being not informed/interested vs. ‘difficult to say’ involving any combination of educational groups. This means that, predictably, the educational effect is the strongest when the levels of information about and interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships are compared across the groups of the respondents with higher and unfinished high education. In general, the analysis of the observed odds and odds ratios confirmed that the sharpest increase in the level of information about and interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships occurs in the group of respondents with higher education. Moreover, the educational effects are not uniform across both the different levels of information about and interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships and the different educational groups.


The lack of the uniformity in educational effects can be attributed to the slight generation effects. It is a well-known fact that although the older generations are relatively worse educated than the younger generations there is no linear relationships between age and educational attainment. Our data confirm that tendency, as the following Table 8 demonstrates.

Table 8. Education attainment within generations.

		Education						Total	
		Unfinished high		High		Higher		Count	Row %
		Count	Row %	Count	Row %	Count	Row %		
Age	16-24	58	19.73	207	70.41	29	9.86	294	100
	25+	570	25.84	1174	53.22	462	20.94	2206	100

As the above table show there is a relationship between generation and education (Chi-square=33.95 for 2 df) however it is not a linear one. While the percentage of the 25+ year-old respondents with unfinished high education exceeds that for the 16-24 year old respondents, and there are more respondents with high education among the younger respondents than the older ones, the situation is reversed as far as the higher education is concerned. The following chart illustrates the non-linearity of the generation-education relationship.

Chart 3. The non-linearity in the relationship between generation and education



This non-linearity in the relationship between age and education can hold an explanation to the non-linearity of educational effects on the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. In order to check validity of this explanation, the interaction between age and education in affecting the interest should be excluded. To put it differently the validity of the ‘education vs. generation effects’ explanation should now be tested controlling for the association between generation and the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

We shall test validity of the ‘education vs. generation effects’ explanation, by the means of log-linear analysis. This analysis allows for testing the hypothesis that the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships does not depend on age but does depend on education. In terms of the log-linear modelling, the hypothesis of the education related interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationship presumes that there should be the interactions between the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships and education, between education and age, and no interactions between the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships and age. This model will test the proposition that while the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships differ between levels of education, this interest is the same for different age groups within each level of education. In other words, people in Ukraine differ in the degree of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships because their level of education rather than in their age. Consequently, if the hypothesis is supported by the data, the second explanation of the low level of the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships receives empirical backing. This means that the low level of the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationship is due to educational structure of the Ukrainian population rather than to the success of the official policy on the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

The following Table 9 reports the results of the Loglinear modelling.

Table 9: Loglinear Analysis Of The Relationships Between Age, Education and the Interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Model	df	Chi-Square	Sig.	rChi-Square	rChi-Square for 1 df
1. E+A+I	12	233.55	.000	-	-
2. E+A+I+E*A	10	197.11	.000	36.44	18.22
3. E+A+I+E*A+E*I	6	2.91	.819	194.2	48.55
4. E+A+I+E*A+E*I+A*I	4	1.14	.887	1.77	.88

Note: E – Education of respondent ('not finished high', 'high', and 'higher');
 A – Age of respondent ('24 and younger', '25 and older');
 I – Interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships ('Not informed/interested', 'Difficult to say', and 'Informed/interested').

The first – baseline - model (E+A+I) implies that there were no associations among the three characteristics (Education, Age, and Interest), meaning that neither age nor education is related to the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. It also implies that age and education are not related either. This model fits the data very poorly (Chi-square=233.55, df=12) and has to be rejected.

The second model (E+A+I+E*A) includes an interaction term (E*A). This term implies a relationship between education and age so that age groups differ in education and, on the other hand, the respondents who have achieved different levels of education differ in age. No relationships between either age or education and the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships are included in the model. This model does not fit the data (Chi-square=197.11, df=10), however it improves the baseline model significantly (rChi-square=18.22 for the loss of 2 degrees of freedom). This model has to be rejected.

The third model includes an extra interaction term (E*I). This term implies that the level of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships is constant within each level of education but differ across the levels of education. Equally, this term implies that the respondents with the same level of education have similar interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. This model fits the data very well (Chi-square=2.91, df=6, $\alpha=.819$), and the reduction of more than 98% of the Chi-square for the baseline independence model is achieved. The improvement in fit of the model is Chi-square=194.8 for 4 degrees of freedom lost. Therefore, this model is accepted.

The question remains, though, what will happen after the inclusion of the third two-way interaction term (A*I). This term implies that the interest in the NATO-Ukrainian relationships is constant within each age group but differ across the groups. Equally, it implies that the respondents with the same level of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships come from the same broadly defined age group. The fourth model estimates the changes that the interaction between age and interest makes to the previous model. One can clearly see that also the fourth model fits the data very well, the improvement in the fit is not significant (rChi-square=1.77 for df=2). Therefore the fourth model is redundant as it fails to improve the fit of the previous (third) model⁴.

⁴ An alternative sequence of models (E+A+I, E+A+I+E*A, E+A+I+E*A+A*I, E+A+I+E*A+A*I+E*I) demonstrates that the model which uses an interaction term (A*I) fits the data badly compared to that of the model which uses an interaction term (E*I). This confirms that also education and age are related to each other it is education rather than age that affects the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. For instance, the third model of the alternative sequence had the following fit: Chi-square=194.60, df=8. Consequently, the fourth model was needed that improved fit dramatically (see Table 5)

Finally, as the model with two-ways interaction terms fits the data very well, there is no need for a model with a three-way interaction term (E*A*I).

We can see clearly from the table that the best-fitted model is the model 3. It does not allow for the association between age and interest, thus implying that there was no age effect on the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. This model, however, does contain the following two-way interaction terms, as follows: age by education (A*E), and education by interest (E*I). The first two-way interaction term models the stability of age-education relationships across the levels of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships and the second one models the changes in the interest across the levels of education over time. This model fits the data very well and therefore supports the explanation that it was education that affected the level of information and degree of interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

To summarise, contrary to an expectation that the generation of the Second World War and the Cold War would be more interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the younger generation, the data show that there is no generation-related differences in that. It was education that affected the interest in the NATO-Ukraine relationships, controlling for the effects of generation. As with any socio-political issue, the better-educated respondents were more interested in the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the worse-educated respondents. The data also showed that there is a weak generation effect in that in each educational there is more or the same proportion of the respondents who cannot give any definite answer ('difficult to say') to the respondents who are not informed/interested. As a rule these respondents belong to the older generation.

Various opinions about the NATO-Ukraine relationships

The survey asked the respondents to agree or disagree with 14 statements about some key elements of the NATO-Ukraine relationships and some central characteristics of NATO organisation. These statements were collected from various sources of mass media. These statements were worded in such a way so they read as public opinion statements. Thus, by agreeing or disagreeing with a particular statement a respondent subscribe to a particular opinion. Consequently, the percentage of the respondents who subscribed to a particular public opinion reflected the spread of this opinion in the mass public. To say it differently, by analysing the responses to these items, it is possible to measure the popularity of particular policy directions in the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Table 6 below presents the data on the Ukrainian public perception of some key aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships and, broadly, of some characteristics of NATO itself.

At a glance, a majority of the respondents appear to have no clear idea about many of these aspects. The combined percentage of the respondents who ‘neither agree nor disagree’ with a statement and the respondents who ‘do not know’ what to say ranges from 41.1% (*Ukraine must try to enter in a military union with Russia and other CIS countries, but not with NATO*) to 63.3% (*Central and Eastern European countries want to join NATO because they want to be admitted to European and international organisations. This is nothing to do with national security concerns*). Therefore, about half of the respondents have not developed opinion about key elements of the NATO-Ukraine relationships and some central characteristics of NATO organisation. This figure is higher among the worse educated respondents and lower among the better-educated ones, which complies with the findings outlined in the preceding section. For instance, the combined percentage of the respondents with unfinished high education who gave ‘neither agree nor disagree’ or ‘do not know’ answers ranges from 51.1% (*Ukraine must try to enter in a military union with Russia and other CIS countries, but not with NATO*) to 77.2% (*Central and Eastern European countries want to join NATO because they want to be admitted to European and international organisations. This is nothing to do with national security concerns*). Among the respondents with high education, this range stretched from 39.5% (*Ukraine must try to enter in a military union with Russia and other CIS countries, but not with NATO*) to 63.4% (*Central and Eastern European countries want to join NATO because they want to be admitted to European and international organisations. This is nothing to do with national security concerns*). Finally, the same figures for the respondents with higher education were (accordingly) 29.5% (*Ukraine's joining NATO will worsen Ukrainian-Russian relationships*) and 52.3% (*NATO will never take Ukraine in because Russia will always oppose this*). It appears then that the most firmly formed opinion was about the alternative military union with Russia rather than with NATO. Consequently, the least firmly formed opinion was about the Eastern and Central European states wanting to join NATO as a vehicle for joining European Union and other European and World institutions.

One can read the table to gage the Ukrainian public opinion about particular issues of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. Most important of them deserve individual attention. The respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following four scenarios:

1. Ukraine should try to join NATO as soon as possible
2. Ukraine should try to enter into a military union with Russia and other CIS countries, but not with NATO
3. Ukraine must remain a neutral country in the foreseeing future, and

4. The 'Partnership for Peace' is the best framework of the co-operation between NATO and Ukraine

The overall conclusion is that, allowing for relatively low interest in the NATO issue in Ukraine⁵, the idea of Ukraine's joining NATO is not very popular with the Ukrainians. About as twice as much Ukrainians prefer to see their country neutral for some length of time rather than joining NATO as soon as possible. It must be said however, that none of the options won a classified majority of the respondents. Thus, only about 22% of the respondents agreed that Ukraine should try to join NATO as soon as possible with about 30% who disagreed. On the other hand, about 34% of the respondents agreed and about 24% of the respondents disagreed that Ukraine should try to enter in a military union with Russia instead. Ukraine as a neutral country was the most appealing option (agreed 41% and disagreed 16%) followed by the 'Partnership for Peace' option (agreed 35% and disagreed 9%).

The list of statements can broadly be divided into three groups. The first group included statement about some most commonly mentioned positive outcomes of the Ukraine's joining NATO. The second group consists of the statements about the some most commonly cited negative outcomes of that. Finally, the third group included statements of a more general nature that outlined some features of NATO and the relationships between NATO and Eastern and Central European states. As far as possible negative consequences of Ukraine joining NATO are concerned, the respondents agreed that this would result in the following:

- The Ukraine-Russia relationships will deteriorate (47% agreed and 9% disagreed)
- Ukraine's economic situation will get worse (40% agreed and 12% disagreed)
- The closure of Ukrainian-Russian borders, which will restrict travel for millions of people on the both sides (29% agreed and 17% disagreed)
- Ukraine will not strengthen its national security (agreed 28% and disagreed 23%)

The opinion about the possible positive consequences of Ukraine joining NATO was as follows:

- Enhance Ukraine's international standing (agreed 31% and disagreed 17%)
- Ukraine's army fighting strength will increase (agreed 28% and disagreed 22%)

Therefore, the public opinion was not very supportive of Ukraine joining NATO. First of all the respondents were worried about deterioration in the relationships between Russia and Ukraine. The respondents felt the membership in NATO would put extra burden on fledging Ukraine's economy, as the purchasing of new military equipment and weaponry from NATO countries would be required. Another important concern was the possible restriction on travel between Ukraine and Russia. Finally, the respondents did not believe that military capacity of Ukraine would increase as the result of the country's membership in NATO. However, one in

⁵ The calculating of percentages on the base that excludes the respondents that 'do not know' what to say does not alter the overall picture significantly. We shall call this base the qualified respondents to highlight the fact that none of them 'do not know' what to say. The data show that only 34% of the qualified respondents agreed that Ukraine should seek to join NATO as soon as possible (45% disagreed). On the other hand 48% of the qualified respondents agreed that Ukraine should try to join a military union with Russia and other CIS countries (34% disagreed). What appeared to be different was that relatively more qualified respondents agreed that the Partnership for Peace is the best framework for the co-operation between NATO and Ukraine (agreed 63% and disagreed 16%) and that Ukraine should remain a neutral country for the foreseeable future (agreed 57% and disagreed 23%).

three respondents thought that the membership in NATO would elevate international standing of their country.

The reminder of the list dealt with some key features of NATO as an organisation, with Eastern and Central European countries' intention to join NATO and with possible Russia's reaction to the Ukraine' seeking to join NATO. The data showed that only 22% of the respondents believed that NATO is a defence union and 30% of the respondents did not. The data show that 29% of the respondents agreed and 7% of the respondent disagreed (with 50% of the respondents who did not know what to say) that Eastern and Central European countries to join NATO in order to be admitted to other European and World institutions. Contrary to the mass media propaganda, only 14% of the respondents agreed and 23% disagreed that Russia would make it impossible for NATO to grant Ukraine membership. Finally, almost half of the respondents did not see any unity in the Ukrainian politicians' opinions regarding the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

The respondents were asked to nominate an agency that in their opinion has legitimate right to decide about the Ukraine deciding to take steps towards joining NATO. Several agencies were listed as the likely candidates, namely the National Referendum, the Parliament, the National Security Service (SBU), the President, and the Defence Minister. The majority of 42% of the respondents opted for the National Referendum. The Parliament and SBU came the second and the third, respectively, and the President and the Defence Minister were the least trusted to take such an important decision. However, about one in three respondents failed to make a choice and gave the 'difficult to say' response. The following Table 10 has the data.

Table 10. Who in Ukraine should decide whether or not Ukraine should attempt joining NATO.

Who decides on attempting to join NATO		
	Count	%
The Referendum	1057	42
Parliament	301	12
SBU	288	12
President	99	4
Minister of defence	79	3
Difficult to say	676	27
Total	2500	100

On the one hand these data indicate that the Ukrainians realise the importance of the decision of the Ukraine pursuing the entry into NATO as they thought that the National Referendum was the most appropriate and the only fully legitimate agency to decide upon such a step. On the other hand these data show a profound popular distrust to and suspicion of the highest executive office, the President, concerning the NATO question. Moreover, it appears that the Ukrainians do not look at the NATO-Ukrainian relationships in military terms only. The fact that the Defence Minister is not trusted to decide upon the Ukraine's application for the entry into NATO indicates that the respondents understand the complexity of implications – far beyond the military ones – of the NATO member state's status.

However interested and informative is the analysis of the respondents' opinion about individual features and elements of the NATO-Ukraine relationships and policy directions, it is analysis of underlying dimensions in public opinion about the NATO-Ukraine relationships

that sheds light on the situation. In order to classify or group the individual items so they indicate underlying dimension (based on similarity in subject) the factor analysis technique was used. Table 10 shows the result of factor analysis.

Table 11. Factors of public opinion about the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Rotated Component Matrix^a			
	Component		
	1	2	3
E12l NATO/strengthens Ukraine international standing**	.784		
E12a aim at joining NATO soon**	.762		
E12l NATO/strengthen Ukrainian army**	.755		
E12n NATO-Ukraine within Partnership**	.661		
E12b NATO/defence union**	.572		
E12d aim at military union with Russia**	.559		
E12c NATO/Ukraine will not strengthen**	.519		
E12h NATO/worsen economic situation**	.485	.440	
E12k NATO/Russia will block**		.744	
E12m NATO/closure of borders**		.711	
E12j NATO/worsen Ukraine-Russia relations**		.692	
E12f NATO/no unity among Ukrainian politicians**			.702
E12g NATO=EU for Eastern Europe**			.644
E12e Ukraine/neutral**			.490

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
 a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

Table 10 demonstrates that there are three components or factors of public opinion regarding these particular elements and policies in the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The first component includes most items and encompasses various opinions about military and organisational aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The second component comprises opinions that relate to possible Russian reaction if Ukraine joins NATO. Finally, the third component includes opinions about political and international aspects of the NATO expansion. The advantage of being able to extract classifying components lies in the possibility of composing Likert-type scales that allow operating with the components

themselves as they represent each individual item. While developing these scales the ideas were used about the dimensionality of attitudinal structure⁶, and the statistical procedures were applied which are standard for the developing of scales for measuring attitudinal structure⁷.

Table 12 presents the three components and its constituent items as scales and the following table 13 has statistics for the scales.

Table 12a. The Scale of Perception of Military and Organisational Aspects

Ukraine must attempt to join NATO as soon as possible
NATO is a defence union
Joining NATO, Ukraine will not strengthen its national security
Ukraine must try to enter in a military union with Russia and the other CIS countries, but not with NATO
Joining NATO will worsen the economic situation in Ukraine because a lot of money will be spent buying military equipment from NATO countries
Joining NATO will increase fighting strength of the Ukrainian army
Ukraine's joining NATO will elevate the country's international standing
The 'Partnership For Peace' is the best framework of the co-operation for both Ukraine and NATO

Table 12b. The Scale of Perception of Russian Reaction

NATO will never take Ukraine in because Russia will always oppose this
Ukraine's joining NATO will worsen Ukrainian-Russian relationships
Ukraine's joining NATO will lead to the closure of Ukrainian-Russian borders, which makes life of millions ordinary people more difficult

Table 12c. The Scale of Perception of Political/International Aspects

In the nearest future, Ukraine must remain a neutral country
Ukrainian politicians do not have unity in opinion about the way Ukraine ought to develop its relationships with NATO
Central and Eastern European countries want to join NATO because they want to be admitted to European and international organisations. This is nothing to do with national security concerns

Table 13. Statistics for the Scales

Scales	N	Range	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation	N items	Alpha
Perception of Military and Organisational Aspects	2500	4	1	5	3.0	0.7	8	.83
Perception of Russian Reaction	2500	4	1	5	2.8	0.7	3	.64
Perception of Political/International	2500	3.7	1	4.7	2.5	0.6	3	.35

⁶See Fleishman, J.A. "Attitude Organisation in the General Public: Evidence for a bi-dimensional Structure" *Social Forces* 67(1):159-184 (1988); Flangan, S "Value Change in Industrial Societies" *American Political Science Review* 81(4):1289-1319 (1987); Huber, J.D. "Values and partisanship in left-right orientations: measuring ideology" *European Journal of Political Research* 17:599-621 (1989); Heath, A. F., Evans, G.A., Lalljee, M., Martin, J. and Witherspoon, S. "The Measurement of Core Beliefs and Values" Joint Unit for the Study of Social trends, Working Paper no.2 (Nuffield College, 1991); Weakliem, D. L. and Heath, A. F. "Rational Choice and Class Voting" Joint Unit for the Study of Social trends, Working Paper no. 18 (Nuffield College, 1993); McCregor, J.P. "Value Structure in a Developed Socialist System. The Case of Czechoslovakia", *Comparative Politics*, January 1991:189-199.

⁷Hayes, B.C and Bean, C.S. "Political efficacy: a comparative study of the United States, West Germany, Great Britain and Australia" *European Journal of Political Research* 23: 261-280, 1993; Heath, A., Evans, G. and J.Martin "The measurement of Core Beliefs and Values: The Development of Balanced Socialist/Laissez Faire and Libertarian/Authoritarian Scales" *The British Journal of Political Science*: 1993: 24: 73-90.

Aspects								
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Note: The Scales are constructed in such way that the increase in scores reflects the increase in favourable opinion about NATO and about Ukraine's attempting to join NATO.

The most reliable of the three scales is the Scale of Perception of Military and Organisational Aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The reliability of this scale is high as Cronbach's Alpha indicates (Alpha=.83 for a scale of 8 items). The other two scales are less reliable, especially the Scale of Perception of Political/International Aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships (Alpha=.35 for a scale of 3 items)⁸. The Scale of Perception of Military and Organisational Aspects is more informative than the rest, as it consists of a larger number of items than the other two scales. Therefore the following analysis will concentrate predominantly on this scale, and the other two scales will be used for illustration only.

In the following analysis, the three scales will be used as variables that reflect the respondents' opinion about the respective aspects of the NATO-Ukrainian relationships and NATO as an organisation.

First, a conclusion can be drawn based on the scales' statistics that, as a whole, the respondent's opinion was neither positive nor negative about all three aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The mean score was 3.0 for the Scale of the Perception of Military and Organisational Aspects, 2.8 for the Scale of the Perception of Russian Reaction, and 2.5 for the Scale of the Perception of Political/International Aspects. Taking into account that these scales' range from 1 to 5, these means indicate that a majority of respondents have neutral opinion about the NATO-Ukraine relationships. Moreover, the values of standard deviation are relatively small (.7 for the Scale of the Perception of Military and Organisational Aspects, .7 for the Scale of the Perception of Russian Reaction, and .6 for the Scale of the Perception of Political/International Aspects). This indicates coherence in the public opinion about these aspects. In other words, the scales' statistics show that, overall, the Ukrainians have coherent and neutral opinion about the NATO-Ukrainian relationships.

At the consequent stages of analysis, we will investigate differences and similarities in the perception of the three groups of aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships among important subgroups of the population. We will also look at political implications of differences in opinion about NATO and the NATO-Ukraine relationships by comparing scales' scores of the respondent who support different political parties and policies. Finally we will investigate whether NATO and the NATO-Ukraine relationships had been issues during the last parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

⁸ It should be taken into account that these scales are *post ante* scales. The survey that included questions about NATO and the NATO-Ukraine relationships was not designed to address the NATO issues. Therefore only a limited number questions was allowed which then were used to construct scales. Inevitably, this made some questions impossible to include with any of *post ante* scales.

Table 14. Various opinions about Ukraine-NATO relationships.


Ukraine must attempt to join NATO as soon as possible (Óéðàèíà àíëæíà ñòðàìèòóñý è ñèíðàéøàìò àñðóíèèáìèð à ÍÀÕÍ)	N %
NATO is a defence union (ÍÀÕÍ- ýðì ñóóóáì íáíðííèòàèüíüé àíáííüé ñìðç)	N %
Joining NATO, Ukraine will not strenghten its national security (Âñðóíèèà à ÍÀÕÍ, Óéðàèíà íà ñàìíì ààèà íà óéðàèèò ñàìð íàèèííàèüíóð áàçííàñííñðó)	N %
Ukraine must try to enter in a military union with Russia and other CIS countries, but not with NATO (Óéðàèíà àíëæíà ñòðàìèòóñý àñðóíèòó à áíáííüé ñìðç ñ ðíññèàé è äðóàèèè àíñóààðñòààìè ÑÍÃ, à íà à ÍÀÕÍ)	N %
In the nearest future, Ukraine must remain a neutral country (Â íáíçðèììì áóáóúàì Óéðàèíà àíëæíà íñòàòóñý íàèððàèüííé, áíááèíèíáíé ñòðàìíé)	N %
Ukrainian politicians do not have unity in opinion about the way Ukraine ought to develop its relationships with NATO (Íà ñóàñòàóáð áàèííáì ííáíèý ñòààè óéðàèíèèò ííèèòèèíà í òíì, èàè Óéðàèíà àíëæíà ñòðíèòó ñàíè íðííøáíèý ñ ÍÀÕÍ)	N %
Central and Eastern European countries want to join NATO because they want to be admitted to European and international organisations. This is nothing to do with national security concerns. (Ñòðàìèèàíèà Áíñðí+íí-áàðííàèñèèò ñòðàì àñðóíèòó à ÍÀÕÍ íðíàèèòíááíì èð æàèàíèàì áóðó íðèíýòóì à Áàðííàèñèèà è íàæáóíàðíáííá íðàáíèçàèèè, ñííáðàæáíèý íàèèííàèüííé áàçííàñííñðó çàññü íà íðè +àì)	N %
Joining NATO will worsen the economic situation in Ukraina because a lot of money will be spent buying military equipment from NATO countries. (Âñðóíèèàíèà Óéðàèíü à ÍÀÕÍ íðèàáááð è óóóáøáíèð ýéíííèè+àñèíé ñèòóàèèè, òàè èàè áóáóð çàðòà+áíü çíà+èòàèüííá íàðàðèèèííá ñòààñòàà íà çàèóíèó áííðóæáíèý à ñòðàíàò ÍÀÕÍ)	N %
Joining NATO will increase fighting strength of Ukrainian army. (Âñðóíèèàíèà Óéðàèíü à ÍÀÕÍ ííáññèò áíáñíííáííñðó óéðàèíèíèé àðíèè)	N %
Ukraine's joining NATO will worsen Ukrainian-Russian relationships. (Âñðóíèèàíèà Óéðàèíü à ÍÀÕÍ ñíðíáíèèòóáð óóóáøáíèà íðííøáíèé íàæáó Óéðàèííé è ðíññèàé)	N %
NATO will never take Ukraine in because Russia will always oppose this. (ÍÀÕÍ íèèíááà íà íðèíàð Óéðàèíó à ñàíè ñíñòàà, òàè èàè ýòííó àñáááà áóááð íðáíýðñòáíáàòó ðíññèý)	N %
Ukraine's joining NATO will elevate the country's international standing. (Âñðóíèèàíèà Óéðàèíü à ÍÀÕÍ óéðàèèò íàæáóíàðíáííóð ííçèèèè Óéðàèíü)	N %
Ukraine's joining NATO will lead to the closure of Ukrainian-Russian borders, which makes life of millions ordinary people more difficult. (Âñðóíèèàíèà Óéðàèíü à ÍÀÕÍ íðèàáááð è çàèðóðèè óéðàèíí-ðíññèèèíèíèé àðáíèòó, +òí íñèíæíèò æèçíü íèèèèííá íðíñòóð èðááé)	N %
The 'Partnership For Peace' is the best framework of the co-operation for both Ukraine and NATO. (Ñíððóáíèè+àñòáì Óéðàèíü è ÍÀÕÍ à òàíèàò íðíáðáííü "Íàððóíàðñòáì òààè íèòà"-ýðì íàèèò+øàý òíðíà ñíððóáíèè+àñòàà èàè àèý Óéðàèíü, òàè è àèý ÍÀÕÍ)	N %

Age differential in the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

Age is a strong predictor of conservatism in opinions. Therefore, one should expect that the older the respondents are the less they will be willing to accept easily such a drastic change as changes in the relationships between NATO and Ukraine. Consequently, in our data, the older respondents should be less positive about every aspect of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

The following Table 14 presents results that suggest that the older groups in our sample have less favourable opinion about all three aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Table 14. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within Age Groups



Earlier in the test, we tested the hypothesis about the generation effects on the interest to and knowledge about the NATO-Ukraine relationships. We found that differences in the formative experiences between the younger respondent who belong to the Post-Cold War generation and the older respondents who belong to the Second World War and Cold-War generation does not affect the interest to and knowledge about the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

The question is now whether it would affect the perception of the aspects of the NATO-Ukrainian relationships. Following numerous studies of generation effects, one can conclude that, by and large, a negative experience (strict ideological control, enmity, uncertainty, etc.) makes people less tolerant of social and political changes. On the other hand, a generation whose formative experience has been that of relaxation in international tensions and

multifaceted ideological regime, etc. would be more tolerant social and political changes. Therefore, one can put forward a hypothesis that the Second World War and Cold War generations will have less favourable opinion about all aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the Post-Cold War generations. Again the Second World War and Cold War generations would carry on with the propaganda enemy images of the NATO countries, which does not help developing a favourable opinion about the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The following table 15 has data on generation differential in perception of the aspect of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Table 15. The generation effect on perception of the aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Panel A

	Age	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Military/Org. Aspects	16-24	294	3.17	0.56	0.03
	25+	2206	3.01	0.61	0.01
Russian Reaction	16-24	294	2.71	0.99	0.06
	25+	2206	2.65	1.03	0.02
Political Aspects	16-24	294	2.49	1.05	0.06
	25+	2206	2.48	1.05	0.02

Panel B

	t-test for Equality of Means				
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
Military/Org. Aspects	4.05	2,498.00	0.00	0.15	0.04
Russian Reaction	0.88	2,498.00	0.38	0.06	0.06
Political Aspects	0.12	2,498.00	0.91	0.01	0.07

Table 15 shows that, the two age groups (generations) differed only in the perception of the Military and Organisational Aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. However small that difference is significant (see Panel B of Table 14). The Second World War and Cold War generations perceive the Military and Organisational Aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships slightly but significantly less favourably than the Post-Cold War generations. This indicates that most sensitive questions that divided generations were the questions whether Ukraine should seek to join NATO as soon as possible or Russia in a new military union; whether joining NATO would further damage Ukrainian economy; whether it would strengthen the Ukrainian army, etc. It does make sense that the older generations that learnt to see enemy in the Western military organisation would be less willing to accept the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships in military and organisational field. On the other hand, there were no generation effects on the other two aspects, namely the perception of Russian Reaction and the perception of Political Aspects. However, it should be reminded that these two measures are not as reliable as the measure of perception of the Military and Organisational Aspects.

Therefore, in contrast to the no-generation effects on the level of interest to and knowledge about the NATO-Ukraine relationships, there are the generation effects of an intermediate magnitude on the perception of the Military and Organisational aspects of these relationships. The respondents who belong to the Second War and Cold War generation are significantly less in favour of the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships in military and organisational sphere than are the respondents who belong to the Post-Cold War generation. There are no generation effects on perception of other aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships as they were researched in our survey.

The effects of Party Political Orientation on perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

Ukrainian political parties are numerous and hardly populous. There are about 30 political parties in Ukraine. Most of the thirty parties registered for the elections were rather anaemic, characterised by weak organisational bases and a lack of coherent platforms. Virtually every party focused on socio-economic issues and claimed it would reverse the dismal economic situation, eliminating wage and pension arrears and addressing the issue of corruption. Only the Communist Party, and to a lesser extent, the Socialists and Rukh, could rely on a broad network of party organisations. Others were hastily convened blocs and lobbies for various interest groups -- or, perhaps more succinctly, political clans vying for power and control of the wealth. Many parties were personality, rather than platform-driven, adding prominent Ukrainians from the cultural, entertainment and sports worlds to shore up support.

Taking into account the weakness of the existing party political system and shortcomings of the then electoral law, a new electoral law was designed to encourage greater party role in the Rada, the Ukrainian parliament. The Ukrainian parliament approved a new election law in September 1997 after months of debate and controversy, and opposition from President Kuchma. President Kuchma signed the law on October 22, 1997. Under the new law, a mixed voting system combines proportional party-list voting with direct district races. Half of the legislature's 450 seats are decided on an individual basis in single mandate majoritarian districts, with the remaining 225 seats determined on the basis of nation-wide party lists in proportion to the number of votes their party receives. A four-percent threshold is required for a party or electoral bloc to gain parliamentary representation. Under the previous 1993 law, all deputies were elected in single-mandate constituencies, resulting in local figures, many with no party affiliation, winning seats, and a weak party role in the Rada.

Proponents of the mixed system argued that it would strengthen the development of political parties and their organisation. Parties will presumably be encouraged to develop real platforms. Over time, this system may encourage the development of greater levels of professionalism and accountability of the parliament and may make individual deputies more accountable to their constituencies and to party discipline. Also, a four percent threshold helped weed out many of the smaller parties.

President Kuchma opposed a mixed electoral system because he felt it would favour highly organised parties, especially the Communist Party. The law tends to reduce the power of local officials - Kuchma's power base - but he signed the law, despite what he considered to be its shortcomings.

Among the more significant features of the law is the change in what determines a valid election. No longer is a minimum turnout of 50 percent of eligible voters required. Also, the requirement that the winning candidate receive over 50 percent of the votes cast is replaced with a first-past-the-post system. These changes reduce the likelihood of a lengthy election cycle with numerous repeat elections and runoffs. The electoral process begun in 1994 was not completed for two years.

The political party structure is a complex and unstable one. It lacks clarity and its dimensions are not only political and socio-economic (as one would expect it to be in a mature market democracy) but also ethnic-linguistic one. Out of the thirty political parties, eight parties passed the four percent threshold required for entry into the parliament, namely Communist

Party of Ukraine (CPU), Socialist and Peasants Party, Rukh, Green Party, People's Democratic Party, Progressive Socialist Party, Hromada, Social-Democratic Party (United). Furthermore, the three parties, namely The Communist Party of Ukraine, People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) and Electoral Bloc of Socialist and Peasants Party had captured about 43% of party votes during the last Parliamentary elections in March 1998. Moreover, as our survey indicates, about one in five voters did not vote for any of these 30 parties.

Table 16. Party vote during (Parliamentary Elections, March 1998 and survey data)

Party	Elections Results †			Survey Data		
	Votes «For»	%	Seats	N	%	Valid %
Communist Party of Ukraine	6550353	24.65%	84	577	23.1	29.1
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)	2498262	9.40%	32	180	7.2	9.1
Electoral Bloc of Socialist and Peasants Party	2273788	8.56%	29	76	3.0	3.8
Green Party of Ukraine	1444264	5.44%	19	145	5.8	7.3
People's Democratic Party	1331460	5.01%	17	78	3.1	3.9
All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada"	1242235	4.68%	16	80	3.2	4.0
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)	1075118	4.05%	14	76	3.0	3.8
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1066113	4.01%	14	79	3.2	4.0
Agrarian Party of Ukraine	974758	3.68%		50	2.0	2.5
Party "Reforms and Order"	831517	3.13%		48	1.9	2.4
Electoral Bloc "Labour Ukraine"	815272	3.06%		46	1.8	2.3
Electoral Bloc of Parties "National Front"	720921	2.72%		54	2.2	2.7
Electoral Bloc "Party of Labour and Liberal party - Together"	503200	1.89%		53	2.1	2.7
Electoral Bloc of Parties "Forward Ukraine!"	461512	1.74%		25	1.0	1.3
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine	352218	1.30%		16	0.6	0.8
Electoral Bloc of Parties "Bloc of Democratic Parties - NEP"	326413	1.23%		24	1.0	1.2
Party of National- Economic Development of Ukraine	253075	0.94%		9	0.4	0.5
Electoral Bloc of Parties "SLOn-Social-Liberal Association"	241401	0.91%		16	0.6	0.8
Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine	241144	0.91%		17	0.7	0.9
Party "Union"	186176	0.70%		20	0.8	1.0
All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives	155780	0.58%		7	0.3	0.4
Republican Christian Party	146715	0.54%		7	0.3	0.4
Ukrainian National Assembly	105829	0.40%		9	0.4	0.5
All-Ukrainian Party of Workers	99179	0.79%		11	0.4	0.6
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine	84846	0.32%		21	0.8	1.1
Party of Fatherland Defenders	81717	0.31%		6	0.2	0.3
Party of Spiritual, Economic and Social Progress	53599	0.20%				
Muslims Party of Ukraine	52574	0.20%				
Electoral Bloc "Less Words"	45403	0.17%		5	0.2	0.3
Electoral Bloc of Parties "European Choice of Ukraine"	37057	0.14%				
(Don't remember)				248	9.9	12.5
Total	24251899		225	1983	79.3	100.0
System missing				517	20.7	
Sample Total				2500	100.0	

† Source: IFES Ukraine (<http://ifes.ipri.kiev.ua/Elections98/index.phtml?1234568+parties.phtml>)

All together, 30 political parties attract about 30% of intended vote, i.e. only about 30% of respondents say that they would vote for any of the parties if the election were tomorrow. Therefore it is necessary to collapse parties into analytically sound categories.

Following conventional dimensions of political space⁹, one should group parties along the line of the 'left-right' divide. However, in Ukraine, the political space has always included the national-state building axis as well. The combination of the old 'bread-and-butter' definition of the left-right continuum and the ideology of national-state building yields the following two-dimensional political space: 'social-democrat/communist' (centre-left), 'pragmatic' (centre), and 'national-democrat/radical' (centre-right)¹⁰. The left-centre-right vector is the sum of the 'nationalism' and 'economic radicalism' vectors, which are not orthogonal. Although there are other ways of establishing the ideological and, therefore, party space in Ukraine¹¹, the most common way of grouping parties is as in the following Table 16. Table 16 is the re-arranged Table 16, and it informs how well these party groupings fared during the last parliamentary elections and how our respondents recall their votes. It is clear that the Left has secured the majority of 127 seats, followed by the Centre-Right with 98 seats, the two groupings taking together all 225 party seats. In terms of share in the electorate who cast party vote, the Left and Centre-Right are almost equal (38.71% to 37.52% accordingly).

In our survey data, the picture only slightly differ from the actual results, giving 38.5% vote share to the Left and 36.1% vote share to the Centre-Right. The rest of the groupings' shares in the actual vote and remembered vote match each other well too (Centre-Left: 10.99% of actual vote and 9.1% of the remembered vote; Right: 3.66% and 3.6% respectively; Other: 0.78% and 0.4% respectively). Therefore, as far as the political party groupings are concerned, the survey data do not significantly deviate from the actual elections' results. This indicates that the respondents' recollection about how they voted can be taken as an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the actual party vote distribution during the last parliamentary election. This also indicates that the survey data provide sufficient and accurate information for the exploration of the effects of party political orientation on the perception of NATO-Ukraine relationships.

⁹ Laponce, J. A. *Left and Right. The Topography of Political Perceptions*. University of Toronto Press, 1981.

¹⁰ Klyamkin wrote: "Ukraine was the only one of four largest states of the CIS, of which establishment had been preconditioned by more or less influential national movement 'Rukh' (Movement). In Russia, the democratic movement was not a national one, but an anti-communist one, and it was only in this capacity that the Russian democratic movement was an anti-imperial one" (Klyamkin, I. M. "Narod I Politika" (People and Politics). *Polis*, No 2 (14), 1993, pp. 6 - 25); also see: Tolpygo, A. K. "Ukrainskie Politicheskie Ideologii" (Ukrainian Political Ideologies), *Polis*, No. 1 (15) 1994.

¹¹ Wilson, A., Bilous, A., "Political Parties in Ukraine", *Europe Asia Studies*, Vol. 45., No. 4, 1993: 693-703.

Table 17. Political Party Groupings

Party	Elections Results †			Survey Data		
	Votes «For»	%	Seats	N	%	Valid %
Left						
Communist Party of Ukraine	6550353	24.65%	84	577	23.1	29.1
Electoral Bloc of Socialist and Peasants Party	2273788	8.56%	29	76	3.0	3.8
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1066113	4.01%	14	79	3.2	4.0
Party "Union"	186176	0.70%		20	0.8	1.0
All-Ukrainian Party of Workers	99179	0.79%		11	0.4	0.6
Left Total	10175609	38.71%	127	763	30.5	38.5
Centre-Left						
Agrarian Party of Ukraine	974758	3.68%		50	2.0	2.5
Electoral Bloc "Labour Ukraine"	815272	3.06%		46	1.8	2.3
Electoral Bloc "Party of Labour and Liberal party - Together"	503200	1.89%		53	2.1	2.7
Party of National- Economic Development of Ukraine	253075	0.94%		9	0.4	0.5
Electoral Bloc of Parties "SLOn-Social-Liberal Association"	241401	0.91%		16	0.6	0.8
Party of Fatherland Defenders	81717	0.31%		6	0.2	0.3
Party of Spiritual, Economic and Social Progress	53599	0.20%				
Centre-Left Total	2923022	10.99%	0	180	7.1	9.1
Centre-Right						
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)	2498262	9.40%	32	180	7.2	9.1
Green Party of Ukraine	1444264	5.44%	19	145	5.8	7.3
People's Democratic Party	1331460	5.01%	17	78	3.1	3.9
All-Ukrainian Association "Hromada"	1242235	4.68%	16	80	3.2	4.0
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)	1075118	4.05%	14	76	3.0	3.8
Party "Reforms and Order"	831517	3.13%		48	1.9	2.4
Electoral Bloc of Parties "Forward Ukraine!"	461512	1.74%		25	1.0	1.3
Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine	352218	1.30%		16	0.6	0.8
Electoral Bloc of Parties "Bloc of Democratic Parties - NEP"	326413	1.23%		24	1.0	1.2
Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine	241144	0.91%		17	0.7	0.9
Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine	84846	0.32%		21	0.8	1.1
Electoral Bloc "Less Words"	45403	0.17%		5	0.2	0.3
Electoral Bloc of Parties "European Choice of Ukraine"	37057	0.14%				
Centre-Right Total	9971449	37.52%	98	715	28.5	36.1
Right						
Electoral Bloc of Parties "National Front"	720921	2.72%		54	2.2	2.7
Republican Christian Party	146715	0.54%		7	0.3	0.4
Ukrainian National Assembly	105829	0.40%		9	0.4	0.5
Right Total	973465	3.66%	0	70	2.9	3.6
Other						
All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives	155780	0.58%		7	0.3	0.4
Muslims Party of Ukraine	52574	0.20%				
Other Total	208354	0.78	0	7	0.3	0.4
(Don't remember)				248	9.9	12.5
Total	24251899		225	1983	79.3	100.0
System missing				517	20.7	
Sample Total				2500	100.0	

† Source: IFES Ukraine (<http://ifes.ipri.kiev.ua/Elections98/index.phtml?1234568+parties.phtml>)

Another clarification is needed here, though. Our aim is to investigate the effects of party political orientation on the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. Therefore we will be using data on political party support instead of data on political party vote. The reasons for that are as follows.

- First, although voting behaviour serves as more robust indication of party political orientation than verbal support for a particular party or parties at the point of elections, one cannot guarantee that party support will not change after the elections. The respondents may have changed their political orientations in a couple of weeks between the elections and survey. This is not unusual for a very weak party political system and therefore weak party identification.
- Second, the respondents were asked about the NATO-Ukraine relationships at the time of the survey. Therefore, it seems quite reasonable to use information about what the respondents say about their actual political orientation rather than their recollection about how they voted for the purposes of investigating the effects of the respondents' political orientations on the respondents' perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.
- Third, the comparison between the reported party votes and the actual votes showed that our sample data reflect the reality of party political system quite well. Therefore, any changes in political party support should reflect dynamics of political orientations.

Finally, the ultimate choice of the indicator of political orientation depends on whether there were any significant differences between reported party vote during the last parliamentary elections and political party support at the time of the survey. If there is no such changes, the party vote during the last elections will be used as more robust and reliable measure of political orientation than verbal statement about political party support. The following Table 18 has the data. Table 18 contains two charts of comparable form. On the left, there is a bar chart that illustrates the distribution of the respondents' party vote. The chart on the right illustrates the distribution of the respondents' party support.

Table 18. Differences in the proportions between party vote and support

	Party vote		Party support		Z	Significant at \square
	N	%	N	%		
Left	763	44	698	48	2.34	.05
Centre-Left	180	10	137	9	0.88	-
Centre-Right	715	41	568	39	1.18	-
Right	70	4	42	3	1.74	-
Total	1728	100	1445	100		

Party Vote		Party Support	

This table suggests that there were no significant changes in political orientations during the period between the last elections and the time of survey regarding all parties but those on the Left. Although there were some changes in support to other parties these changes were not significant statistically. It appears that the Left has slightly but significantly gained in support during few weeks between the elections and the survey. According to our data the Left has increased its share in political party support by 4 percent in just three to four weeks.

Our data allow to track where additional support to the Left came from. The following Table 19 has the data.

Table 19. Changes in political orientations between the parliamentary elections in March 1999 (party vote) and the survey in April 1999 (party support)

Left-Right Party Orientation	Party support				
	Left	Centre-Left	Centre-Right	Right	Total
Party vote	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %
Left	95	1	4		100
Centre-Left	19	64	16	1	100
Centre-Right	14	4	80	1	100
Right			22	78	100
Total	48	9	39	3	100

As one can clearly see, the major boost in support to the Left came from the Centre-Left political orientation. Thus, about one in five respondents who voted for the Centre-Left parties claimed support for the Left parties at the time of the survey. On the other hand, one in six respondents who voted for the Centre-left parties claimed support for the Centre-Right parties at the time of the survey. In total, about one in three voters for the Centre-Left parties had supported parties of another political orientation by the time of the survey. The largest single swing occurred among the supporters of the Right parties. About twenty two percent of the respondents who voted the Right-wing parties declared their support to the Centre-Right parties. In general, political orientations have moved from the Right towards Centre and Left since the elections.

To summarise the methodological discussion, while exploring effects of political orientation on the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships, the declared political party support will be used as a proxy for political orientation. Therefore the following data will be used to measure the direction (Left-Right party support) and intensity (proportion of supporters of the Left-Right parties) of political orientations.

Table 20. Political Party Support

	Left-Right Party Orientation: party support	
	Count	%
Left	698	48
Centre-Left	137	9
Centre-Right	568	39
Right	42	3
Total	1445	100

Note: The same list of political parties was used to measure the direction and intensity of both party vote and party support. Therefore, the actual party names are omitted in the above table.

The following set of three charts in Table 21 show effects of the Left-Right political orientation on the perception of the aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

One can clearly see that the respondents with the Right party political orientation perceive the Military and organisational aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships significantly more favourable than the respondents with the Left party political orientation. Moreover, the respondents with the Centre-Right party political orientation are more supportive of the strengthening of the Military and Organisational aspects of the relationships than the respondents with the Centre-left party political orientations. It appears that there is a strong linear relationship between the measures of party political orientations and perception of the Military and Organisational Aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The more to the political Left is a respondent the less favourable he or she perceives the Military and Organisational aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

The party political orientation affects perception of the Political aspect of the NATO-Ukraine relationships to a lesser degree. However, as the chart below shows, there is a moderate effect of the party political orientation on the perception of the Russian reaction. In general the more on the political Left were the respondent the more they were inclined to perceive the likely Russian reaction to the Ukraine joining NATO in negative terms. In other words, the respondents on the political Left were more likely to think that Russia would retaliate if Ukraine joins NATO than the respondents on the political Right.

Finally, the perception of the political aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships seemed to be not affected by the party political orientation. However strange this may look, an explanation on offer is that the integrity and reliability of our measure of perception of the Political aspects is the lowest among the three scales. This alone could be the reason for the effects difficult to be established on this scale. The scale is not sensitive enough to capture the relationships between perception and political orientation. One can accept this explanation if the similar picture can be found for effects of other factors.

Tables 22a to 22c have the mean values for the perception of the three aspects within different party political orientations. These tables demonstrate in figures what the charts depict in images. For instance, as Table 22a shows that the mean value of perception of the Military and Organisational aspects within the group of respondents who support parties on the Right is 35% higher than the mean value of that within the group of respondents who support parties on the Left. Overall, the mean value of perception of these aspects increases with the increment of about 9% from the group of the Left parties' supporters to the Right parties' supporters¹². Similarly, as Table 22b shows, there is steady growth in the mean value of perception of the Russian reaction from the group of the Left parties' supporters to the Right parties' supporters¹³. Finally, as Table 22c shows, there is no discernible pattern in the mean values of perception of the Political aspects among respondents with different party political orientations¹⁴.

¹² Increase in the mean value of perception of the Military and Organisational aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships indicates that the perception becomes more favourable in that the respondents believe that the Ukraine joining NATO will benefit Ukraine structurally (economically, institutionally, etc.) and militarily.

¹³ Increase in the mean value of perception of the Russian reaction to Ukraine joining NATO indicates increase in the perceived likelihood that Russia will not retaliate.

¹⁴ Increase in the mean value of perception of the Political aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships indicates that the perception becomes more favourably in that the Ukraine joining NATO will benefit Ukraine politically and enhance Ukraine's international standing.

Table 21. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within Party Political Orientations (“Left-Right”)




Table 22a. Perception of Military/Organisational Aspects within Party Political Orientations

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Minimum	Maximum
Left	763	2.68	0.65	0.02	1.00	4.75
Centre-Left	180	2.95	0.65	0.05	1.25	5.00
Centre-Right	715	3.27	0.68	0.03	1.38	5.00
Right	70	3.63	0.77	0.09	1.38	5.00
Total	1728	3.13	0.71	0.02	1.00	5.00

Table 22b. Perception of Russian Reaction within Party Political Orientations

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Minimum	Maximum
Left	763	2.61	0.72	0.03	1.00	5.00
Centre-Left	180	2.70	0.76	0.06	1.00	5.00
Centre-Right	715	2.87	0.72	0.03	1.00	5.00
Right	70	2.83	0.62	0.07	1.33	4.67
Total	1728	2.75	0.72	0.02	1.00	5.00

Table 22c. Perception of Political Aspects within Party Political Orientations

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Minimum	Maximum
Left	763	2.54	0.60	0.02	1.00	4.33
Centre-Left	180	2.41	0.63	0.05	1.00	3.67
Centre-Right	715	2.51	0.64	0.02	1.00	4.33
Right	70	2.56	0.60	0.07	1.00	3.67
Total	1728	2.51	0.61	0.01	1.00	4.33

The above outlined relationships between the Left-Right political party orientations and perception of aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships reflect political parties' stance on NATO. Although only three out of thirty parties and election blocs (People's Democratic Party, All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives, and Party of Spiritual, Economic, and Social Progress) spelled out their position¹⁵ on the NATO-Ukraine relationships in pre-election programmes, other parties' stances were assessed on the basis on party literature as follows. According to a Pre-Election Report¹⁶ by The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs published 28 October 1996, parties on the Left opposed the strengthening of NATO-Ukrainian relationships and called to unite with Russia and other CIS countries in a new military union. The Centre parties have adopted more pro-NATO attitude, however they would like to see NATO transformed into a system of collective security rather than remain a military bloc. Finally, parties on the Right stated that they would pursue policy of integrating Ukraine into international security system, including NATO.

It follows then that political parties have been able to communicate their position on NATO to electorate. Tables 21 and 22a-c indicate that, by and large, the respondents followed their respective parties in the opinions about the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

To summarise this section, the support for the development and strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships comes from political Right, both in terms of individual attitudes and political party programmes.

¹⁵ **People's Democratic Party:** 'We shall carry out foreign policy only on the basis of national interests of Ukraine. We shall support its diversity, focusing on maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring states, especially with CIS countries, on gradual integration of Ukraine into European and world communities, into international and regional organisations, on active participation in preventing military conflicts, in supporting transformation of NATO into the system of collective security'.

All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiatives: 'Modern world is constructed in way that Ukraine's development is closely related to its profound integration into international community. By declaring foreign policy course based on Ukraine's national interests and creation of favourable environment for economic and political development of Ukraine, Party upholds the course on ensuring international integration and strengthening of international authority of State, and its national security. This will be made possible in the event of: [...] promotion of transformation of NATO into a system of collective security'.

Party of Spiritual, Economic, and Social Progress (PSESP): 'PSESP considers that in the field of international relations the Ukrainian state should lead a more active course towards mutually beneficial co-operation, improvement of the international authority of Ukraine, non-joining military blocs, and on development of economic and political relations with world countries, giving top priority to relationships with Russia and Belarus'. Party stands up against the NATO expansion to the East, and against Ukraine joining the NATO.

¹⁶ <http://www.ndi.org/ukrrpt.htm>

Support for a presidential candidate and perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

In the wake of the presidential elections due in October 1999, it is a matter of considerable interest to look if the respondents who support different presidential candidates (for the elections in October 1999) hold different opinions about the NATO-Ukrainian relationships.

Table 23. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships among supporters of different presidential candidates




Table 24. Perception of NATO-Ukraine relationship by supporters of presidential candidates


Future Presidential Vote	Military/Org. Aspects	Russian Reaction	Political Aspects
Viktor Yuschenko	3.36	2.81	2.43
Leonid Kuchma	3.26	2.87	2.50
Leonid Kravchuk	3.24	2.76	2.57
Yevgenii Marchuk	3.20	2.71	2.44
Pavel Lasarenko	3.07	2.77	2.53
Alexander Moroz	2.67	2.58	2.46

It is not clear why supporters of Viktor Yuschenko, head of the National Bank of Ukraine, perceive the NATO-Ukraine relationships more positively than do supporters of the incumbent president Leonid Kuchma or the former president Leonid Kravchuk. Further research is needed in order to arrive at any substantiated conclusion. However, a slightly negative opinion about the NATO-Ukraine relationships found among the supporters of Moroz's candidacy is in line with the policy of the objection to NATO enlargement advocated by political centre-left of which Alexandr Moroz, the parliamentary speaker, is a prominent representative.

Regional differential in the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships

Ukrainian social, cultural, political and, to a large extent, economic life is regionalised. Broadly, western and northern regions of Ukraine differ from eastern and southern regions in many aspects, including public opinion about various political issues¹⁷. The relationship between NATO and Ukraine is one of such issues. Therefore one should expect the public opinion to vary across regions of Ukraine. As we found earlier in the text, the public opinion in the broadly defined western and northern regions of Ukraine is more anti-Russian, pro-independence and pro-western than in the rest of Ukraine. The following Tables 25 and 26 have the data.

Table 25. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within regions of Ukraine



¹⁷ See: Salabaj N.V., Yaremenko A. A. 'The Social-Political Attitudes of the Ukraine Population: February 1996'; <http://www.unich.edu/~iinet/crees>

Table 26. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within regions of Ukraine (means)

	Military/Org. Aspects	Russian Reaction	Political Aspects
Western	3.39	2.88	2.55
Kyiv	3.30	2.92	2.47
Northern	3.08	2.81	2.62
Central	2.93	2.79	2.54
Southern	2.82	2.57	2.59
Eastern	2.81	2.75	2.51
Crimea	2.59	2.60	2.61

Table 54 contains graphs that depict the relationships between a variable 'Region' and our scales. Table 26 has mean scores of perception of different aspect of the NATO-Ukraine relationships as measured by our scales.

Tables 25 and 26 demonstrate that public opinion in western and northern regions of Ukraine and Kiev was significantly much more in favour of developing the NATO-Ukraine relationships (especially in the Military and Organisational areas) than was public opinion in southern and eastern regions and Crimea. Concerning other aspects of the relationships, the picture was somewhat unclear.

In general, the majority of respondents who support the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships is located in the north-west of Ukraine and in Kiev, and the strongest opposition to that comes from the south-eastern regions of the country.

Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within educational groups

Following our finding that the respondents' interest to-and knowledge about the NATO-Ukraine relationship is very much affected by their educational level, it was logical to assume that the same educational effects would be found on the perception of the aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

However, as the data presented in Tables 27 and 28 suggest, education does not affect perception in any way. In other words, there was no conclusive evidence found in our data to establish a direction and strength of the association between the respondents' education and their perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Table 27. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within educational groups




Table 28. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within educational groups (means)

	Military/Org. Aspects	Russian Reaction	Political Aspects
High	3.02	2.78	2.56
Higher	3.00	2.72	2.39
Unfinished high	2.97	2.80	2.65

In general, it is possible to conclude that an individual's educational attainment does not influence an individual's perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships.

Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within ethno-linguistic groups

It has been pointer out earlier in the text that ethno-linguistic (cultural) cleavages are as important as territorial (region) and socio-economic (class) ones in shaping public opinion in Ukraine. Once again, these cleavages clearly transpired in perception of the aspects of the NATO-Ukraine relationships. The following Tables 28 and 29 have the data.

Table 28. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within ethno-linguistic groups (means)




Table 29. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships within ethno-linguistic groups (means)

	Military/Org. Aspects	Russian Reaction	Political Aspects
Ukrophones	3.12	2.79	2.55
Rusophones	2.85	2.75	2.54
Others	3.06	2.88	2.59

As the above tables suggest, the respondents who spoke Ukrainian at home had more favourable opinion about the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships than the respondents who spoke Russian at home irrespective of their ethnic identity. This can, to a great extent, be explained by referring to a well-documented fact that speaking Ukrainian has been not only cultural and linguistic characteristic but also a political statement of support to independence of Ukraine. Consequently, the independence of Ukraine meant predominantly and first of all independence from the Russian political if not economic dominance. Thus, the Ukraino-phones' support to the strengthening of the NATO-Ukraine relationships is, by and large, a reaction against Russia.

Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships by supporters and opponents of the Ukrainian independence

Our data clearly indicate that perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationship is affected by the respondents' stance on the independence of Ukraine. As Tables 30 and 31 demonstrate, the more independence-minded were respondents the more in favour of NATO were their opinions.

Table 30. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships by supporters and opponents of the Ukrainian independence




Table 31. Perception of Ukraine-NATO Relationships by supporters and opponents of the Ukrainian independence

	Military/Org. Aspects	Russian Reaction	Political Aspects
Support	3.27	2.81	2.47
Swing: support-oppose	2.81	2.70	2.57
Swing: oppose-support	2.88	2.50	2.43
Oppose	2.57	2.58	2.50

One can extend the explanation of the ethno-linguistic influence on the perception of the NATO-Ukraine relationships to the influence of attitudes towards independence on that. Moreover, as it has been found elsewhere, support for independence and ethno-linguistic groups coincide in Ukraine. Our data are not an exception in that respect, as the following Table 32 demonstrates.

Table 32. Support to the Ukrainian independence within ethno-linguistic groups

Linguistic-ethnic group	Independence Support			
	Support	Swing: support-oppose	Swing: oppose-support	Oppose
Panel A	Column %			
Ukrophones	71	51	36	33
Rusophones	27	47	57	65
Others	2	2	7	2
Total	100	100	100	100
Panel B	Row %			
				Total
Ukrophones	68	22	1	10
Rusophones	39	30	1	29
Others	46	32	4	18

As the data suggest, in statistical terms, the nil hypothesis can be rejected that there is no relationship between ethno-linguistic group of a respondent and his or her attitude towards independence of Ukraine (Chi-square=140.88, df=6, p =.000).

Clearly, there is an overwhelming majority of 71% of Ukraino-phones who offer persistent support to the independence of Ukraine. On the other hand the majority of the respondents who persistently oppose the Ukrainian independence are Russo-phones (65%). Therefore, there exists a strong relationship between the respondents' ethno-linguistic group and their attitudes towards the independence of Ukraine. This relationship is also evident when the data are rearranged to allow comparison between ethno-linguistic groups in their attitudes towards the independence of Ukraine (Table 32, panel B).

APPENDIX 1

**TECHNICAL REPORT
ON ORGANISATION AND CONDUCTING
THE SURVEY**

DECEMBER 1998

1. SAMPLING PROCEDURES AND STAGES, THE SAMPLING POINTS USED, AND THE NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED AROUND EACH ONE

The national representative sample used by SOCIS in this survey was a multi stage random sample.

The first stage of sampling design was the grouping of the oblasts, which are the main units of territorial and administrative division of Ukraine, into regions. The grouping was done on the basis of more than 150 characteristics and indicators of economic, social and cultural development by the methods of factor analysis and cluster analysis applied in sequence.

The social statistics data (POPULATION CENSUS, 1989) were used to calculate the percentage of urban and rural population in each region.

**TABLE 1.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION 16+ PER REGION**

REGION	TOTAL (thousands)	TOTAL %	URBAN %	RURAL %
UKRAINE	39,759	100.	67	33
Kiev	2,003	5.03	100	-
Northern	3,792	9.54	52	48
Central	5,045	12.68	51	49
North-Western	2,819	7.09	47	53
Western	4,024	10.12	51	49
South-Western	1,610	4.05	42	58
North-Eastern	3,620	9.10	73	27
Eastern	6,373	16.03	89	11
South-Eastern	4,622	11.63	81	19
Southern	3,969	9.98	65	35
Crimea	1,883	4.75	70	30

The second stage of the sampling design was the selection of urban and rural settlements. All cities and towns of Ukraine were divided into groups depending on their population as follows

**TABLE 2.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF URBAN SETTLEMENTS**

Type	Number of cities	Size of population	% to total
KIEV	1	2,815	9.22
500,000 and more	9	8,765	28.70
100-499 000	40	8,876	29.06
50-99 000	55	3,785	12.40
less than 49 000	329	6,300	20.62
TOTAL	434	30,541	100.00

The task of the second stage was to select 35 urban settlements to represent on the one hand the structure of the urban settlements of Ukraine and, on the other hand, to represent each of the 10 regions singled out at the first stage of sampling design. For this, within each region cities and towns belonging to the same group (see TABLE 2) were ordered alphabetically and selected at random.

The table below shows the locations of interviewing and the number of interviews in each location in this survey.

TABLE 3 SURVEY sample

REGION	CITIES IN REGION	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS IN CITIES	TOTAL NUMBER OF URBAN INTERVIEWS	TOTAL NUMBER OF RURAL INTERVIEWS	TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS IN REGION
Kiev		100	100		100
Northern			100	92	192
	Zhitomir	36			
	Korostyshev	29			
	Chernigiv	35			
Central			132	124	256
	Vinitsa	45			
	Kalinovka	12			
	Cherkassy	45			
	Uman'	30			
Eastern			282	35	317
	Donetsk	57			
	Gorlovka	40			
	Khartsizsk	40			
	Volnovaha	33			
	Acdeevka	34			
	Lugansk	45			
	Lutugino	33			
South-Eastern			211	46	257
	Dnipropetrovs'k	70			
	Novomoskovsk	44			
	Tokmak	37			
	Zaporizh'ya	60			
North-Eastern			122	52	174
	Kharkiv	70			
	Sumy	30			
	Konotop	22			
North-Western			64	75	139
	K.-Podol'sky	40			
	Dunaevtsy	24			
Western			100	99	199
	Lviv	50			
	Stryi	30			
	Terebovla	20			
South-Western			32	46	78
	' Chernivtsi	32			
Southern			129	68	197
	Mykolayv	50			
	Odesa	50			
	Snigirevka	29			
Crimea			64	27	91
	Simferopil'	40			
	Bahchisarai	24			
TOTAL	33 cities		1336	664	2000

Rural settlements were selected randomly from the list of the rural settlements of the oblast whose cities had been selected for the survey. It is necessary to mention here, that there were still some obstacles for conducting the interviews in some rural settlements (lack of regular transport, seasonal inaccessibility etc.).

The last stage of sampling was the selection of the respondents. Random route method was used in this survey. The selection of street was also random. To select the respondent, the 'first future birthday' technique was used in this survey.

	Universe*
SEX	
Male	44.1%
Female	55.9%
<i>Total</i>	100.0%
AGE	
Under 20	7.1%
20-29	18.2%
30-39	19.6%
40-54	24.2%
55-59	7.4%
60 +	23.5%
<i>Total</i>	100.0%
EDUCATION	
Primary/ Secondary uncompl.	38.6%
Secondary grad./ Second special.	49.6%
Higher uncompl./ Higher	11.8%
<i>Total</i>	100.0%

* All data on the universe are taken from the ALL-UNION CENSUS OF POPULATION, 1989.

2. FIELDFORCE DETAILS, RECRUITING, TRAINING ETC.

Interviewers were chosen from the inhabitants of settlements according to the sample model. They were selected from librarians, employees of statistical services, clerks, students, etc. Women were in a majority among interviewers.

The interviewers had a special base training for 4-5 days according to international standards. Interviewers were introduced to the sample problems, confidentiality of opinion polls, performance requirements (clothes, accessories); special attention was paid to skills necessary to achieve a contact with a respondent. Interviewers were taught to carry out the standardised interview (to ask questions of different types, use show-cards; the problems of pace of speech, diction, etc. were also considered). They completed probation interviews of different types; they also familiarised themselves with the rules of selection of respondents according to the different methods. Interviewers were taught to fill in the accompanying documents. After training each interviewer received an "Instruction to the interviewer".

Before the beginning of the fieldwork special briefings were conducted by supervisors. Interviewers were instructed about the terms of conducting this survey. Special attention during the briefing was given to the accuracy of their job and the validity of data gathered as well as to their responsibility in the cases of falsifications.

3. NUMBER OF REFUSALS, NON-RESPONSE

Registered contacts	2972
Refusals.....	2901
Interviews.....	2000
Response rate.....	40.8%
Inaccessibility.....	1035

Reasons for refusals

State of health.....	82
Lack of time	314
Unwillingness to open the door	810
No reason	1243
Distrust to interview.....	296
Criminal situation, fear of criminals.....	126
Othe.....	30
Total	2901

Reasons for inaccessibility

There was nobody at home/flat (after 3 visits).....	636
Respondent was not to be at home/flat (during the field work)	118
Respondent was not to be at home/flat in those time	82
Respondent had no time	56
The respondent was not unable	31
There was nobody to fall short	112
Other.....	--
Total	1035

4. DATES OF THE FIELDWORK

The survey was fielded from 02/12/98 to 16/12/98.

APPENDIX 2: THE QUESTIONNAIRE (ONLY “NATO QUESTIONS” ARE LISTED)

Ά10.

α) ΕΑΕ ΑΥ ΑΟΙΑΑΟΑ, ΝΟΥΑΝΟΑΟΑ ΕΕ ΝΑΕ×ΑΝ ΑΙΑΪΙΑΒ ΟΑΔΙÇA ΙΑΟΕΪΙΑΕΥΪΕ ΑΑÇΙΑΝ ΪΪΝΟΕ ΟΕΔΑΕΪΪ?

- Νουάνοαοάο..... 1
- Νείθαά νουάνοαοάο, ÷-αι ίά νουάνοαοάο..... 2
- Νείθαά ίά νουάνοαοάο, ÷-αι νουάνοαοάο..... 3
- Ϊά νουάνοαοάο..... 4
- Çaððáíÿþñü îðáððèðü /íá çíàþ (ΪΑ ÇΑ×ΕΘΨΑΑΘΨ)..... 8

β) ΑΑ Ϊ ΕΑΕΑΟΝΒ, ×ΟΪ ΟΑΔΙÇA ΝΟΨΑΝΟΑΟΑ, ΪΟΝΟΥ ΑΑΕΑ ΪΑÇΙΑ×ΕΘΑΕΥΪΑΒ. ΪΟ ΕΑΕΕΘ ΝΟΔΑΪ ΪΙΑ ΕΝΟΪΑΕΟ? (ΕΪΟΑΔΑΨΡΑΔΟ: ñîðîñè ðá ÿ èàæäíè ñððíèá)

	Αα	Ϊάð	Ϊά çíàþ (ΪΑ ÇΑ×.)
b) Δίνñè	1	2	8
c) ΝοδαΪ ÇαΪαάΪΪέ ΑάδΪΪΪ	1	2	8
d) ΝοδαΪ ΑΪñðí-ΪΪέ ΑάδΪΪΪ	1	2	8
e) ΝΘΑ	1	2	8
f) Αδóαεð ñððáΪ (ÇΑ ΪΕ ΘΕΘΑ)	1	2	8

Α11. ΕΑΕ ΑΥ ΑΥ ΪΟΑΔΑΕΟΑΔΕÇΙΑΑΕΕ ΝΟΑΪΑ ΪΪ ΝΑΪΑΕ ΪΝΑΑΑΪ ΪΕΑ ΪΪΪΝΟΕ Ϊ ΝΪΝΟΪΒΪΕΕ ΪΟΪΪ ΘΑΪΕΕ ΪΑΕΑΟ ΟΕΔΑΕΪΪΕ Ε ΪΑΟΪ?

- ΪñáááΪΪεáΪ ΪΪέΪñðüþ, ñ-èðàþ ñááÿ ýèñΪáððíΪ á ÿðíè ίáèáñðè..... 1
-
- Β á èððñá ññΪΪáΪΪΪ ñΪáΪΪðèè è ðáøáΪέ..... 2
- Β çíàþ ίá ÿòΪΪ á ñáΪΪΪ ίáΪΪáΪ ΪèáΪá..... 3
- Ϊ è-ááΪ ΪΪ ñòðè ίá çíàþ áà è ίá èΪοάðáñðñü ÿðèΪ..... 4
- Çaððáíÿþñü îðáððèðü (ΪΑ ÇΑ×ΕΘΨΑΑΘΨ)..... 8

Α12. ΝΪΑΕΑΝΪΪ ΕΕ ΑΥ ΝΪ ΝΕΑΑΟΡΨΕ ΪΕ ΟΟΑΑΔΕΑΑΪΕΒ ΪΕ?

	ΝΪáεáñáΪ ΪΪέΪñðü þ	ΝΪáεáñ áΪ	ΪáñèΪèüè Ϊ ñΪáεáñáΪ, ίáñðíèüèΪ è ίáð	Ϊá ñΪáεáñá ί	Ϊá ñΪáεáñáΪ ΪΪέΪñðü þ	Ϊá çíàþ (ΪΑ ÇΑ×.)
a) Οέðáèía áΪèæía ñððáΪèðüñÿ è ñèΪðáèøáΪó áñðóΪéáΪèþ á ΪΑΟΪ	1	2	3	4	5	6
b) ΪΑΟΪ- ÿðí ñóáóáΪ ίáΪðΪΪèðáèüΪΪέ áΪáΪΪΪέ ñΪþç	1	2	3	4	5	6
c) ΑñðóΪéá á ΪΑΟΪ, Οέðáèía ίá ñáΪΪΪ ááèá ίá οέðáΪèð ñáΪþ ίáøèΪΪáèüΪóþ ááçΪΪáñΪñðü	1	2	3	4	5	6
d) Οέðáèía áΪèæía ñððáΪèðüñÿ áñðóΪèðü á áΪáΪΪΪέ ñΪþç ñ ΔΪññèáè è áðóáèΪè áññóáðñðááΪè ΝΪΑ, á ίá á ΪΑΟΪ	1	2	3	4	5	6
e) Α ίáΪçðèΪΪΪ áóáóáΪáΪ Οέðáèía áΪèæía Ϊñðáðüñÿ ίáèððáèüΪΪέ, áΪááèΪèΪáΪέ ñððáΪΪέ	1	2	3	4	5	6
f) Ϊá ñóúáñðáóáð ááèΪΪáΪ ΪΪáΪέÿ ñðááè οέðáèΪñèèð ΪΪèèðèΪá Ϊ óΪΪ, èáè Οέðáèía áΪèæía ñððΪèðü ñáΪè ΪðΪΪøáΪέÿ ñ ΪΑΟΪ	1	2	3	4	5	6
g) ΝοδαΪéáΪéá ΑΪñðí-ΪΪ-ááδΪΪáèñèèð ñððáΪ áñðóΪèðü á ΪΑΟΪ ΪðΪáèèðΪááΪΪ èð æáèáΪéáΪ áΪúü ΪðèΪÿðüΪ á ΑάδΪΪáèñèèá è	1	2	3	4	5	6

<p>ιάæάοιάδίαίύά ίδääíεçäöèè, ñíáðäæáíεý íäöèí íäëüííé άάçííñííñðè çääñü íá íðè ÷áì</p>						
<p>h) Άñðóíεάíεά Óεðäεíú á ÍÄÖÍ íðεääääò è óðóá øáíεþ ýéííí ì è-áñéíé ñεðóáöèè, ðäè èäè άóáóð çäððä÷áíú çíá÷εðäëüíúá ì ääððεäëüíúá ñðääñðää íá çäεóíεó áñðóæáíεý á ñððáíäö ÍÄÖÍ</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<p>i) Άñðóíεάíεά Óεðäεíú á ÍÄÖÍ íí á ùñεð áíáñííñíáííñðü óεðäεíñéíé äðíεè</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<p>j) Άñðóíεάíεά Óεðäεíú á ÍÄÖÍ ñíðíáííðεððáð óðóá øáíεά íðíí øáíéé íäæάó Óεðäεííé è Ðíññεάé</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<p>k) ÍÄÖÍ íεéíäää íá íðεíäð Óεðäεíó á ñáíé ñíñðää, ðäè èäè ýðíí ó áñääáá áóääò íðáíýðñðáííäðü Ðíññεý</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<p>l) Άñðóíεάíεά Óεðäεíú á ÍÄÖÍ óεðäíεð íäæάοιάδίαίόþ ííçεðèþ Óεðäεíú</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<p>m) Άñðóíεάíεά Óεðäεíú á ÍÄÖÍ íðεääääò è çäεðüðèþ óεðäεíí- ðíññεéñéíé äðáíεðü, ÷ðí íñéíáíεð æεçíú íεèèèííá íðíñðüò εþááé</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6
<p>n) Ñíððóáíε÷-áñðáí Óεðäεíú è ÍÄÖÍ á ðáíεäò íðáðáííú “Íäððíäðñðáí ääè íεðä”-ýðí íäεéð÷øáý óíðíä ñíððóáíε÷-áñðää èäè äëý Óεðäεíú, ðäè è äëý ÍÄÖÍ</p>	1	2	3	4	5	6

Á13. ΙΟΑΙΕΟΑ, ΙΙÆΑΕΟΕΝΟΑ, ΑΑΔΙΒΟΙΙΝΟΥ ΙΕÆΑΙΑΔΑ×ΕΝΕΑΙÍÛΟ ΔΑΑΕΟΕΕ ΔΙΝΝΕΕ, ΑΝΕΕ ΟΕΔΑΕΙΑ ΙΟΕΟΕΑΕÜÍÍ ÇΑΒΑΕΟ Í ΝΑΙΑ Í ÆΑΕΑΙΕΕ ΑΝΟΟΙΕΟΥ Α ΙΑΟÍ. *Íäääèè ðä ñíí ðääðñðáðþùð þèððó íä øéää íð 100% äí 0% ääðýð ð íñðè)*

a) ΔΙΝΝΕΒ ΑΑΑΑΑΟ ΥΕÍÍÍ Ì È×ΑΝΕΕΑ ΝΑΙΕÖÈÈ (ΔΑÇΔÛΑ È ÍÍΟΔΑΕΟΙΑ, ΟΙΔΑΙΑΑΒ ΑÍÉΙΑ, ΙΔΑΕΔΑÛΑÍΕΑ Í ÍΝΟΑΑÍÈ ΑΑÇÀ È ÍÄÖÖÈ, È Õ.Α.)- ΑΑΔΙΒΟΙΙΝΟΥ

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
100%	90%	80%	70%	60%	50%	40%	30%	20%	10%	0%

b) ΔΙΝΝΕΒ ΙΑ ΑΟΑΑΟ ΙΔΑΙΒΟΝΟΑΙΑΑΟΥ ΑΝΟΟΙΕΑÍ È Þ ÓΕΔΑΕÍÛ Α ΙΑΟÍ- ΑΑΔΙΒΟΙΙΝΟΥ:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
100%	90%	80%	70%	60%	50%	40%	30%	20%	10%	0%

c) ΔΙΝΝΕΒ ΙΕΑÆΑΟ ΙΙΕΕÖÈ×ΑΝΕΕΕ ΙΑÆÈÍ ΙΑ ΙΔΑΑΕΟΑΕÛΝΟΑÍ ÓΕΔΑΕÍÛ (×ΑΔΑÇ ΙΑÆΑΟΙΑΔΙΑÍÛΑ ΙΔΑΑΙΕÇΑÖÈÈ, ΙΙÍÛΟΑΑΟΝΒ ΑΑΝΟΑΑΕΕΕÇΕΔΙΑΑΟΥ ΔΑΑÍΟÓ ΙΑΔΕΑ ΙΑ ΙΟΑ, ΙÍÍÛΟΑΑΟΝΒ ΝÍÇΑΑΟΥ ΑÍΟÈ ΙΑΟΙΑΝÈΙΑ ΑΑÈÆΑÍΕΑ Α ÓΕΔΑΕΙΑ È Õ.Α.)- ΑΑΔΙΒΟΙΙΝΟΥ:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
100%	90%	80%	70%	60%	50%	40%	30%	20%	10%	0%

d) ΔΙΝΝΕΒ ΙΕΑÆΑΟ ΑΙΑÍÍΙΑ ΑΑΑΕΑÍΕΑ ΙΑ ÓΕΔΑΕÍÓ (ΟΝΕΕΑÍΕΑ ΑΙΑÍÍΙΑÍ ΙΔΕΝΟΟΝΟΑΕΒ ΔΙΝΝΕΕ ΙΑ ΑΔΑΙΕÖΑ Ν ÓΕΔΑΕÍÍÈ, ΙΑ ÍΝΟΔΑÍΕΑ ΝΕΟΟΑÖÈÈ Α ΝΑΑΑΝΟÍÍÍÈ È Õ.Α.)-ΑΑΔΙΒΟΙΙΝΟΥ:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
100%	90%	80%	70%	60%	50%	40%	30%	20%	10%	0%

E14. ÈÀÈ ÁÛ ÄÓÌÀÄÒÀ, ÈÀÈ ÄÏÈÆÁÍ ÐÀØÀÒÛÑß ÄÏÏÐÏÑ Ì ÒÌÌ, ÑÈÄÄÓÀÒ ÈÈ ÓÈÐÀÈÌÁ Ì ÛÒÀÒÛÑß ÄÑÒÓÌÈÒÛ Ä ÌÀÒÌ?

Ìà ìáùáíáøèíáèüíí ðáðáðáíáíá.....	1
Ìà çàñáààíèè Ñíááðà Ááçííáñííðè Óèðàèíó.....	2
Ä ìàðèàìáíðá.....	3
Èè-íí ìðáçèääíðì.....	4
Ìèíèðððí ìáíðííó.....	5
Çàððáíýþñü ìðáàðèèü (<i>ÌÁ ÇÀ×ÈÒÛÄÀÒÛ</i>).....	8