

**A TWO-WAY APPROACH TO STABILITY IN THE ARAB SOUTHERN
MEDITERRANEAN COASTAL STATES.**

**Theories on democracy and international cooperation applied to
developments regarding political stability in: Algeria, Egypt,
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.**

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Contents:

Introduction

Theoretical Framework

Turmoil and the democratic process until WWII

The Post-WWII Period. Country Studies:

Egypt

Libya

Morocco

Tunisia

Algeria

Indicators

Conclusions

Bibliography

Notes

Introduction

The MENA region (the Middle East and North Africa) can be seen as a group of countries sharing the common characteristic of being dominated by authoritarian regimes. ¹ The degree of authoritarianism varies from soft-authoritarian to despotic. An open political discourse is hampered in general by the absence of a free press and the lack of a broad range of freely operating civil society institutions. Against this background recent moves towards democracy have been slow. One has also to note that earlier moves towards more democracy have been aborted in the past. A democratic breakthrough has so far been out of reach, though some countries have taken steps on the road of democratisation.

This report focuses only on a part the MENA region, notably North Africa, and to be more precise on Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The question of stability is approached by looking in what way democratisation and international cooperation can add to a stable political environment.

Through political liberalisation, democratisation is directly linked to the question of stability. It is however not possible to declare democratisation and stability as equal. Khadduri (1970) for instance stresses that in traditional societies upheavals and the release of violence are unavoidable. ² An example seems to be Algeria. This country has since the 1980s entered the road to become a multi-party democracy, but at the same time it has also plunged into civil strife. In the Algerian example the democratisation process has evidently not brought stability. This leaves us with the questions how democratisation and stability relate to each other and what strategies in international relations are most appropriate to strengthen the process of political stabilisation. First I shall give a theoretical framework on democratisation and international cooperation. Then I shall discuss, against this background, how the democratisation process in North Africa has developed and how the developments fit in with theories on international

cooperation.

Theoretical Framework

Concerning two central questions, notably 1) do developments show progress towards a stable political environment? and 2) can democratic reform and institutionalization of international cooperation lead to more stability?, a number of conclusions can already be made. For the first question, the answer is a negative one. The second question can be answered positively, though one has to keep in mind that this is a long-term process. If one takes the four theorems: 1) democracy will lead to more political stability; 2) democracy can also lead to political instability; 3) institutionalizing international cooperation may lead to stable structures of international cooperation and interstate relations; 4) partial cooperation can also lead to relative instability, than one has to note that one has to make a difference between static and dynamic processes. This means that there is a difference between democracy and democratisation. The instability factor has more to do with the process of democratisation than with democracy as an institution.

Of course one first has to ask what constitutes a democracy. This is necessary as for instance the systems that were called democracies in 1900 would now be considered oligarchies. Universal suffrage in most Western countries had still to be introduced. Just being democratic in name, like the German Democratic Republic in the more recent past, does not constitute the actual existence of a democracy. Even merely organising elections does not make a country a democracy either.

So how does one describe democracy? Joseph Schumpeter (1957) as one of the proponents of the competitive theory of democracy has defined the democratic process as the "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote".³ In Robert A. Dahl's theory on democracy the

political process is made up of three main dimensions; competition, participation and civil and political liberties. It may therefore come to no surprise that these liberties are prominently present on his list of institutional guarantees for the democratic process. Dahls's list of guarantees can be given as followed:

- 1) freedom to form and join organisations
- 2) freedom of expression
- 3) the right to vote
- 4) eligibility for public office
- 5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and for votes
- 6) alternative sources of information
- 7) free and fair elections
- 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference⁴.

This does not differ much from the International Parliamentary Union's list of prerequisites for free and fair elections⁵. There is also a close resemblance with the OCSE's seven key words central to democratic tradition: universality, equality, fairness, secret ballot, transparency and accountability.⁶ Here democracy can be seen as a guarantee to fundamental freedoms and good governance.

On the question if democracies are peaceful, attention can be given to authors such as Rummel, Singer, Small and Wright. Wright (1942) concluded that peace produces democracy rather than democracy produces peace.⁷ Although there is an inclination that democracies are not more peaceful than other countries, the overall conclusion is that present day democracies are more peaceful. Singer's research on the 1816-1965 period included among others political systems that nowadays would not be recognized as democracies. Besides this, there are also the propositions of Singer and Small that 1) democracies are not more peaceful than non-democratic states as they seem to be equally involved in armed conflict; 2) democratic states do not go to war with each other; and 3) it is far from sure that the increase in the number of democratic states should lead to a

more peaceful global environment. The second and third proposition seem to contradict each other⁸. On a whole it is also evident that democracies are in general peaceful when it comes to the internal political process as changes in government happen through the ballot box and not by violent means. This means that democracies value good human rights records and political freedoms and libertarianism. Rummel's approach, which emphasises libertarianism, can be connected with Dahl's dimensions of the political process and institutional guarantees. The central argument of Rummel's proposition is that the more economic and political freedom citizens of a certain country enjoy, the more it will be likely that this country will abstain from violence in its international policies⁹.

Barrington Moore has seen the development of democratisation as a long-term process or even struggle to have three things implemented: 1) to check arbitrary rulers, 2) to replace arbitrary rules with just and rational ones, and 3) to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of these rules.¹⁰ Democracy is thus founded on institutionalizing checks and balances and the rule of law. This last principle, however, may be redefined as the rule of justice as some laws may from a moral point be highly questionable. An independent legislature and independent judiciary are thus essential.

There is a difference between democracy and democratisation. Where the theories on democracy also deal with stability in the international sphere, the theories on democratisation focus on domestic politics. Based on Dankwart Rustow's "Transition to Democracy" three phases of democratisation may be identified, the preparatory phase, the decision phase and the consolidation phase.¹¹ The preparatory phase coincides primarily with the breakdown of the nondemocratic regime. The decision phase is marked by the beginning of a democratic order being established. The consolidation phase consists of further development of the democratic structure and the integration of democracy in

political culture and civil society. Rustow's theory focuses on the national level, but it is also possible to have a more global approach. Thus looking at global trends, Samuel P. Huntington has introduced waves of democratisation and especially the Third Wave. Huntington's term Third Wave Democracies refers to the more than forty countries in southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe that shifted from authoritarian to democratic systems between 1974 and 1990.¹² This was called a wave because the number of countries moving from non-democratic to democratic regimes significantly outnumbered regimes going in the opposite direction. The first wave encompassed about thirty countries, beginning in the early 19th century and peaking at the end of World War I; the second wave involved about thirty-six countries, starting after World War II and decolonization, then gradually ending in the early 1960s. Both waves have had reversals or reverse waves as some democracies failed to be lasting while their power crumbled and the state apparatus was taken over by authoritarian regimes.

When analysing political processes it is clear that the social-economic dimension should not be ignored. Already in the 1950s Seymour Martin Lipset sought a correlation between economy and politics and concluded that certain socio-economic conditions were favourable to democracy. Huntington also shares this vision. For the existence of a stable democracy there seems to be the necessity of a certain level of GNP. This does not mean that economic growth and prosperity should automatically lead to democracy but rather that with a certain level of welfare countries are less likely to experience a reverse wave of democratisation, meaning falling back to authoritarian rule or chaos. This level of stability would lie approximately above the \$3,000 per capita and would thus apply to high income countries. Countries that have passed through the third wave of democracy have mostly belonged to the category in the range between \$250 and \$3,000 per capita. Especially the middle income countries, between \$1,000 and \$3,000, could be placed in the transition zone

leading to liberalisation and democratisation.¹³ When democracy is the result of the social and organisational changes due to economic growth, the rentier states based on oil revenues are an exception as they have achieved a high per capita income without such changes.¹⁴

Related to the per capita income question is a problem that affects many development countries, including the Middle East and North Africa, notably rapid demographic growth. There can even be a kind of automatic mechanism of demographic factors hindering the democratisation process. According to Ph. Fargues (1996) citizens expect to be taken care of by the government when population growth exceeds economic growth.¹⁵ Here we find a socio-economic cause of political instability as for the state it is not always possible to satisfy such demands. The state fails in its distribution function and social discontent is the result. This can take different forms, e.g. protests against shortage of housing, demands for social benefits or even bread riots. Another demographic factor can be the high percentage of the younger generation in the total population resulting from the population explosion. Unrest is further aggravated as the growing younger generation does not find a productive and satisfactory place in society due to the low absorption of labour which causes both unemployment and a lack of upward social mobility.

In the case of North Africa, democratisation since the 1970s means the transition from authoritarian one-party systems to pluralist multi-party systems. One of the main problems that can arise is that political liberalisation or electoral competition can spark off violence along ethnic or religious cleavages. Such cleavages sometimes also bring up the question of national identity. Here the danger of internationalisation lurks. Limited disputes involving minorities, borders and territorial questions may be presented completely out of proportion. As we have seen in other regions such situations are potentially explosive. The

other side of the scales is in the view of Barrington More that conflicts are less likely to be passionate and bitter to the point of excluding democratic reconciliation, if the lines of social, economic, religious and political cleavages do not coincide too closely.¹⁶

Then there is the relation between democratisation and the future of regimes. Democratisation does not mean ending the presidential system or monarchy. It may however introduce a parliamentary system and increase the powers of the prime minister and ministerial council or cabinet. Contrary to the position of the president the position of ministers and cabinet is dependent on the confidence of the parliament and indirectly the mandate given by the electorate. Although this is largely a constitutional question, the presidents' time in office can in most instances not be altered by the legislature while a cabinet can be sent packing through a vote of no confidence. While presidents in a democracy are elected, this is mostly not the case for prime ministers and other members of the cabinet who tend to be put forward by political parties after the election process.¹⁷

Rulers may see democratisation as a form to increase their legitimacy at home and abroad. Nevertheless, they are at the same time very much aware that fullfledged democracy might not at all increase their political standing. Political liberalisation could unleash developments beyond their control. In the end, democratisation will mean retreating from power. This does not mean that governments are instantly overthrown but more that the executive power has been mandated to govern the society for a constitutionally determined period. Presidents are only in office for a fixed term and cabinets last to the end of their term only depending on their success and ability to cooperate and accommodate views of other social forces. The underlying and maybe unifying factor of democratisation and international cooperation is legitimacy. Democratisation can be

seen as a way of looking for internal legitimation while international cooperation is a form of seeking international legitimacy. The lack of legitimacy could lead to repression in domestic affairs. Already in the 14th century the Maghribi administrator-scholar-jurist Ibn Khaldun considered tyranny, mismanagement and corruption as being among the main reasons for lacking legitimacy and authority. Of course the theory of Montesquieu on the separation of powers rested on the protection of individual liberties against tyranny. The medieval North African scholar promoted the rule of law as a remedy against political instability. As will be discussed later the lack of legitimacy can lead to confrontational politics in international affairs.

This brings us to theories on international cooperation. There is obviously some link between international relations and the domestic political process. In the study of international relations, Dahl's approach can be placed closely to the world law school as it underlines principles as laid down by the UN. The legal framework directly referred to is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly. The right to choose or be elected into government is stated in article 21 of the Declaration. Other directly related principles as stated by Dahl, such as the freedom to join organisations and the freedom of speech, are also derived from the Declaration. The principles are also stated in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

As mentioned earlier, an important factor for stability comes from the proposition that democratic governed states would be less inclined to violence or willing to enter into wars than authoritarian and totalitarian governed states. Elements of this proposition could already be found in Immanuel Kant's idea of pacific union among democracies (Perceptual Peace 1795, Metaphysics of Morals 1797). The fundamental concepts behind his

view may be listed as economic and political freedom, a division of powers (Montesquieu), and the rule of law.¹⁸ Finding peaceful solutions to conflicts is seen as a democratic norm, while peaceful relations among democracies are thus based on a common moral foundation. The idea of economic cooperation among democracies and the coinciding ties of interdependence fit in well with the functionalist and neo-functionalist theories of international relations which stress the importance of functional contacts between countries.¹⁹ On the basis of this, it may also be possible to link the foreign policies of authoritarian regimes to the realist or power politics school. The different schools need some explanation. The functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches are based on the concepts of mutual interest and interdependency. According to these two closely related schools mutual interest and trade liberalisation open the way towards peaceful relations as this means managing multilateral affairs and solving problems together. Mytrany as representative of the functionalist theory regarded interdependence as an autonomous process. His neo-functionalist colleagues stressed institutionalised international cooperation as the driving force towards good neighbourly relations, even including the creation of a central organisation to administer economic relations.²⁰

According to the power politics school as represented by Morgenthau governments pursue their foreign policies purely out of self interest. Zartman and Dawisha have shown that Arab regimes, to which also the ones in our survey belong, use foreign policy as a way to acquire legitimacy. Here we can distinguish a number of options. First there is the solidarity approach in which governments work on the sentiments of pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, non-alignment or common historical heritage. Second there is the option of international cooperation to increase the country's wealth. The third is using antagonisms with a foreign foe in order rally the population behind the country's leader. Especially the countries where the

government expects to have some kind of legitimacy problem are inclined to follow this last option. The same kind of government has mostly imposed a permanent state of emergency and neglects fundamental freedoms and human rights. It is seen as a characteristic feature of Arab regimes to inflate problems or differences with neighbours or third countries and take a radical standpoint in international relations. This has to do with the question of limited legitimacy and the power base of such regimes. In the case of the majority, if not all Arab regimes, foreign policy is the responsibility of the leader.²¹ According to Dawisha foreign policy is thus a means to legitimize the government and especially the power of the leader.

In short, non-democratic states will more likely turn to the power politics of the realist school while democratic states will prefer the functionalist approach of international cooperation. This will lead to closer ties and mutual interest. Because such relationships require rules and because democratic states adhere to the rule of law, only an increase of democratic states can in the long run lead to the implementation of the ideals of the world law school.²²

Following this bird's eye view on theories on democracy and international cooperation, I will follow this exposé by discussing how the political processes in the region have developed.

Turmoil and the democratic process until WWII

The statebuilding experience of all five countries is rather recent. Ottoman rule collapsed in the 19th and early 20th century resulting in a period in which a number of European powers with colonial aspirations gained control in the region. All five countries remained under foreign tutelage until well after WW II. This resulted in an ambivalent situation toward democracy. As Khadduri (1970) remarks: "Under Western guidance,

the countries might have developed their own forms of political democracy to fit their own needs and aspirations. The Arab leaders who cooperated with the European powers never tried to reconcile Western concepts with traditional concepts and vested interests".²³ The point is that both the Western powers and the countries' leaders sought ways to remain in control and not to promote participatory democracy. The situation was such that it is hardly possible to include the different political processes in Rustow's transition phases. Instead of entering Huntington's first wave only a few countries took their first steps within Rustow's preparatory phase, but never managed to go further as the non-democratic regimes did not break down.

During the second half of the 19th century constitutionalism entered the Near Eastern political system, including the interest in some circles for a parliamentary system.²⁴ This fits in with Barrington Moore's observation regarding democratisation in order to check arbitrary rulers. Like on the European continent monarchies were increasingly remembered of their financial and political accountability.

The first step on Egypt's democratisation process dates back to 1866 when the Majlis shura al-nuwab (Consultative Assembly of Deputies) was installed. In a way this can be compared to the recently formed Majlis al-shura in Saudi Arabia.²⁵ In the Egyptian Majlis three political currents - Egyptian officers with a rural background, an islamic current and the constitutionalists - found each other in the liberal and secular Al-hizb al-watani (National Party) demanding the Assembly's right to vote the budget.²⁶ The system was too feeble and not anchored strong enough in society for Egypt to be included in Huntington's first wave. Moreover, a large part of the Assembly's members was appointed. A major set-back to the democratisation process was the suspension of the Assembly in 1879, another was the increase of European control over Egypt's finances. Then there was also the British occupation since 1882. To relate the Assembly to democracy in modern terms is however not possible. Like in many 19th-century European countries the

Assembly only represented the elite while a free press was still largely absent. Moreover, electoral gain was not rewarded with governmental powers. In fact all power was vested in Egypt's ruler, the Khedive (king).

Though Egypt saw its share of revolt and political disturbances, the other countries also knew a turbulent 19th century. Theories on endemic instability have surfaced over the ages. Well-known is the theory of the 14th-century scholar-jurist Ibn Khaldun, describing for the Maghreb region's cyclical changes in government in which urban dynasties would be overthrown by rural revolt. Craig Harris (1986) has made a similar observation for Libya, where the contest for power between townsmen and tribes from the hinterland was an important historical feature²⁷. Even in the 20th century revolt remained one of the main characteristics of Algerian and Libyan politics.

The external factor has left its marks and has until independence been the main trigger of instability. Nationalism in all five countries was born during the colonial period. For instance, as local elites were not adopted into the ranks of the colonial French elite, and thus shut off from integrating into the French system, the middle classes increasingly stressed their Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian identity. This lack of assimilation strengthened the identification with the own region and its history. From WW I onwards this increased the call for selfdetermination.

The Egyptian experience was likewise accompanied by a political struggle, including the antagonism between the executive power and the embryonic democratic institutions. Egypt's renewed steps towards a democratic process were initiated after the 1919 nationalist uprising against the British. As the opposition organised itself in a political party, the Wafd (Delegation), while political upheavals and social unrest went on, the British decided on other action. It was thought that a compromise could bring stability. The Wafd's leaders were allowed to return from exile and the country was offered partial independence as long as Britain could remain in control of the Suez Canal and protect

a number of other strategic interests. Official independence (1922) opened the way to a new constitution (1923) and elections (1924).²⁸ In a way this development seems to resemble Rustow's first phase, but due to the limitations the monarchy put on the parliamentary system and the outcome of elections the conclusion still must be that this phase was never completed.

Table.1.: Egypt, Election majority 1924-1950

	1923/ 1924	1926	1929	1931	1936	1938	1944/ 1945	1950
Majority	Wafd	Wafd	Wafd	pro- monarchy	Wafd	Wafd	pro- monarchy	Wafd
Boycott by				Wafd		pro- monarchy	Wafd	

With the new constitution a renewed political struggle emerged between parliament, especially the nationalist Wafd, and the monarchy. The Wafd was definitely not the only party, but attracted by far the largest support. Other parties were for instance the National Party (1907), the Liberal Constitutional Party (LCP)(1922) and the pro-palace Ittihad (Union) party (1925). King Fuad preferred the Wafd over the LCP, which sought legal arguments to curb his power.

Despite Egypt's multi-party system, instability became part of the political configuration. Parliament tried to curb arbitrary rule by the monarchy and the foreign power while its own powers were under siege. The foreign power tried to convince the Khedive that parliament was unrepresentative as it was mainly seated with landowners. The main problem was who was in control, the government, the British or the legislature? The monarchy had no experiences with checks and balances and tried to appease the British. For these reasons non-Wafd prime ministers were appointed, thus increasing the distance between the government and legislature. A legitimacy crisis for the regime in the form of majority opposition was thus created. This was highly visible as parliament was more than once dissolved by the Khedive. Nevertheless, according to Lenczowski (1980) the Egyptian

ballot's paradox allowed the monarchy to have a mass appeal despite no pro-palace party could get a majority through the electoral process. In the end the monarchy under Fuad managed to establish some form of control through the authoritarian premiership of Sidki (1930-1934). This was no promise to stability as by that time political movements such as the Wafd, the fundamentalist Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun and the ultra-nationalist Misr Al-Fatat had active armed wings which tried to influence the situation by their own rules. The situation was further influenced by rising unemployment due to the international economic crisis and Cairo's massive population growth.²⁹

In many ways the reconstruction period after WW II in North Africa was different from that of Europe. WW II had a strong impact on North African political awareness. All five countries witnessed large scale destruction, but remained outside the neo-functional framework of the Marshall Plan. In economic terms this meant that reconstruction of industries and infrastructure lagged far behind to that of Western Europe. But the main cause for later political instability was that during the war countries with a colonial tradition increased their grip on the region and had difficulty with the political aspirations of the region's inhabitants. Britain and France remained present in the region to protect their interests.

The war period had shown that the impact of the European powers could be large. In 1942 the British armour surrounded the royal Abdin Palace in Cairo and forced King Farouk to appoint the Wafd's leader Nahas Pasha as prime minister. The allied landings in North Africa (Operation Torch) during the same year opened the way for recruitment of North African troops in the Free French army whose main antagonist was Vichy France. Another influence of the war was that anti-democratic currents such as the Free Officers (e.g. Nasser and Sadat) and the Ikhwan Al-Muslimun heralded the German operations in North Africa. Such a political undercurrent led to the assassination of the Sa'dist

premier Ahmad Mahir who had an anti-Axis declaration passed by parliament in order to prepare his country for UN membership.³⁰ His successor Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi followed the same fate.

Constitutionalism was especially part of the Tunisian road to independence. During the French protectorate the Tunisian experience of growing political awareness was fed with nationalist publications like those from Shaykh Thaalbi (La Tunisie Martyre) and social unrest. Discontent was furthermore tunnelled into a legalistic constitutional movement which approached the colonial authorities with legalistic arguments instead of violence. This was mainly symbolised by the 1920 established Al-hizb al-dusturi al-hur al-tunisi (Free Tunisian Constitutional Party) also known as the Destour (Constitution). The main political currents, however, were communist and socialist parties with a predominantly French membership.³¹ Al-hizb al-dusturi's viewpoint can be placed in the World Law school approach as it pointed at the Wilsonian doctrine of right to self-determination. It was at first more reformist than revolutionary and quick to jump on the bandwagon of post-WWI legalism with references to the newly established League of Nations. But more important Al-hizb al-dusturi wanted a new constitution with more political rights for the Tunisians who had only minority representation. Even in the 1922 established Grand Conseil, Tunisian (41 members) and French members (56 members) sat apart in different sections. Only after WWII these sections were allotted equal members.³² But then like in the case of Algeria, equality with the French neighbours had been a problem. The French tried a form of indirect rule through the Bey or local monarch and later also experimented with co-government and local elections. Nationalism meant a struggle along the ethnic line as until independence nationalist and islamist guerillas were active against the authorities and the French colons, who had their own vigilantees organised in La Main Rouge.

Al-hizb al-dusturi was dissolved in 1933, a year in which

Tunisian human rights, such as those of expression, assembly and the press, were curtailed. The next year it surfaced again under the name Neo Destour a more populist party which included the younger generation next to the bourgeoisie. Habib Bourguiba was one of the most outspoken leaders. At that time the use of islamic credentials was important to attract support for populist causes. Bourguiba came to be known as the al-mujahid al-akbar (the supreme Jihad combattant). The tactics had also changed as in 1935 the party moved to mass protests and clandestine action in order to bring dialogue and change. Dialogue was partly achieved, but the relations with the French depended much on which government was in office. In any case the state of siege was declared in 1938 and the situation remained deadlocked until the 1950s.

Though until the 1940s nationalism remained more or less in an embryonical stage in the French dominated parts of North Africa, WW II stirred up nationalist feelings as loyalty to Paris (Vichy France) was morally questionable. Food shortages and the lack of recognition by the French for the North African role in the liberation of France in the form of more autonomy or other political reward such as full French citizenship, fed political resentment against Paris. Bourguiba, for instance, had chosen for the allied cause, but was harassed by the authorities because of his political involvement.

Political repression only increased potential instability. In Algeria V.E. Day saw bloody riots after Muslim nationalists demanded that the prominent political activist Messali Hadj - the driving force behind the 1937 founded Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) - be set free and return from exile. Their demand and call for a free and independent Algeria resulted in tensions along social, religious ethnic cleavages cumulating in clashes between nationalists French settlers who were completely against any form autonomy.³³

In any case, political awareness had become rooted in society.

The Ulama (religious leaders) became a political force and increased the standing of the Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML), while in 1946 another prominent activist Ferhat Abbas founded the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA). With a new constitution the Algerians were granted French citizenship including the right to vote. But when both UDMA and the MTLD were successful in the 1947 municipal elections the authorities intervened by arresting candidates in order to stop them achieving a majority in the second chamber of the Algerian assembly. As the democratic process was halted, forms of political extremism, already witnessed in Egypt, seemed a likely outcome.

A move toward political extremism can be found in the decade following WWII when the MTLD's armed wing the Organisation Spéciale (OS) started to organise underground actions against the French. It is noteworthy that many later FLN leaders found their roots in the OS. As for Egypt, the 1948 lost war against Israel made the Free Officers and the Ikhwan Al-Muslimun more eager to take power.

The Algerian experience has one thing in common with the Egyptian and Tunisian examples, domination by a foreign power. For Algeria and Tunisia it seems that French domination had more or less the same role as the Egyptian monarchy, notably finding it difficult to bend to the results of democratic procedures.

The Post-WWII Period. Country Studies:

Egypt

After WWII Egypt had a wide range of political organisations active in parliamentary en extra-parliamentary activities. The communist party was becoming active in industrial action while the 1929 founded Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun sought power through its armed wing. It was a period of political violence which saw for instance the assassination of two prime ministers and the Ikhwan's leader Hassan Al-Banna. In this unstable situation the freedom of the press, which had been granted after WWI, was

curbed again. As the government could not cope with the instability and urban guerrilla of the islamists, the king decided to succumb to the voter's wishes and install a Wafdist government. Through the 1950 elections the Wafd secured the majority in both chambers of parliament. This would seem an indication that Egypt was again on track where Rustow's phases of democratisation were concerned. However, the Wafd could not handle the instable situation.

Riots broke out in Cairo in 1952 after clashes in Ismailia between British forces and Egyptian nationalists, leading to numerous casualties. For King Farouk this was a sign to replace the Wafdist Nahas Pasha government with a pro-palace cabinet; a return to the pre-war situation. As parliament was dominated by the Wafd the outcome of course resulted in an unworkable situation. In order to hang on to his authority Farouk had the parliament dissolved at the end of March, but this did not end the monarchy's problems.

Chaos opened the door for a military coup by the Free Officers, abdication of the king and the abolition of the 1923 constitution. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), though speaking of a democratic regime, had all political power constitutionally centralised with its chairman. The RCC headed by Nasser -including his modernisation ideology- has been much of an example for other revolutionary regimes in the region. Seeking legitimacy through distributive justice, landreform, industrialisation and a radical foreign policy. Under Nasser, Dahl's list of guarantees was absent from the relationship between rulers and ruled. The National Assembly showed to have turned into a machine for rubber stamping and had neither power nor influence. The only legal party was the 1962 created Arab Socialist Union (ASU). In the end policies of distributive justice were only partly successful as Nasser's policies showed to be detrimental to the Egyptian economy.

For Egypt, the lack of resources and the lack of a reciprocal functionalist approach in international relations by western powers resulted in an aid relationship with the Soviet Union.

Together with the Arab-Israeli conflict this fed Cold War relations in the region. Although the Aswan Dam and the Suez Crisis increased Nasser's popularity at home, his economic policy had meant the amassing foreign debts and stagnation in social development. The regime thus ended up with a severe legitimacy problem. Another lost war against Israel (1967) led Nasser to sending his closest followers to prison as a demonstration to prove his legitimacy.

In the case of his successor the situation is different. Though still ruling through politics of control Sadat liberalised the political system. First through more space for debate in the press and second by creating new parties out of the ASU, notably the Liberal Socialist Party (LSP/Al-Ahrar), the leftist National Progressive Unionist Forum (Tagammu) and the Socialist Labour Party (SLP). The ASU itself was transformed into the National Democratic Party (NDP). These moves were part of a turn to the international community outside the socialist block, including trade liberalisation (infatah) and a change in the aid relationship. The right to form a political party was not given to the islamist opposition. Instead Sadat sought a closer cooperation between the state and religious authorities. American and European efforts since 1974 helped to put the economy on the course of trade liberalisation. Part of this functionalist approach to foreign affairs was also Sadat's peace drive toward Israel. But used to managing politics and economics from above the regime had difficulty in understanding autonomous processes. After the 1977 food riots Sadat chose to curb political liberties, thus limiting his achievements.

If one looks at the referendum results it is clear that Sadat used electoral processes as a means of control. In fact the results do not differ much from those of his predecessor. Of the 16 referenda held between 1952 and 1981 none had a result of less than 90%. This shows that referenda were used for nothing more than rubber stamping. Even Nasser's alleged popularity was based on electoral fraud, control of the press and persecution

of political opponents.

Table.2.: Egypt, Referendum results 1956-1981

1956	99.84 %	constitution and presidency of Nasser
1958	99.99 %	unity with Syria
1965	99.999%	reelection of Nasser's presidency
1968	99.989%	on Nasser's statement
1970	90.04 %	presidency of Sadat
1971	99.9 %	Arab Union between Egypt, Syria and Libya
1971	99.98 %	constitution
1974	99.95 %	October Paper
1976	99.93 %	reelection of Sadat's presidency
1977	99.42 %	national unity law
1978	98.49 %	interior affairs law
1979	99.90 %	peace treaty
1980	98.96 %	on modifying the constitution
1981	99.45 %	national unity
1981	98.46%	election Mubarak as president

Source: M. At-Tawil, Li I'btida Al-U'mam Wa As-Sadat 1988.

The islamist opposition at the end of the 1970s tried to destabilize the country through fomenting violence along the christian-muslim division in Egyptian society. In their attempt to trigger off a revolution members of the Islamic Jihad assassinated President Sadat, but their awaited large-scale islamist uprising never materialized.

Though the 1980s had started with a confrontation between the state and islamic movement, this decade witnessed a relatively free press. Nonetheless under Mubarak the executive had a tighter grip on parliament in comparison to Sadat. According to Springborg (1989) Mubarak used the electoral process to cut the opposition down in size.³⁴ State power and the opportunity to control the dissemination of information added to the NDP's electoral successes. Though not recognized as an official party the Ikhwan could run for parliament as independent candidates. During the 1980s official opposition parties as the Wafd, Al-Ahrar and the SLP linked up with the Ikhwan for longer or shorter periods. Al-Ahrar, the SLP and the Ikhwan even formed an electoral alliance in 1987. Under Mubarak some new parties were admitted to the political arena since 1990, notably: Misr al-fatat (Young Egypt) (originaly founded in 1933), a Nasserist

Party and the Green Party (Al-Akhdar).

That the electoral process is subject to control mechanisms, is clear when one looks at the election results. In 1995 the NDP obtained 94% of the seats in parliament. This included independent candidates which joined up with the NDP. At the 1990 ballot the NDP gained 79% when the election process was boycotted by the main opposition parties.³⁵ It has become difficult to relate Dahl's guarantees to the electoral process as election rigging and harassment of candidates seem to have increased. The watchdog is the judiciary, but the NDP dominated parliament has not taken attention of its recommendations³⁶.

Table.3.: Egypt: Election results for Majlis as-Sha'b (parliament)

	1976	1979	1984	1987	1990	1995
Party	seats	seats	seats	seats	seats	seats
Egypt's Arab Socialist Forum	280					
National Democratic Party		330	390	308	348	316
Liberal Socialist Forum	12					
Liberal Socialist Party		3				
Socialist Labour Party		29				
SLP Alliance				56		1
National Progressive Unionist Forum	2	0				
National Progressive Unionist Party				0	6	5
New Wafd Party			58	36		6
Independents	48			48	83	115
Nasserist Party						1
Total elected seats	342	372	448	448	437	444

Source: A.M.S. Aly., A. Abdalla. The Middle East and North Africa 1992 and 1998

Kienle (1998) suggests that Egypt has entered a phase of political deliberalization or what could be called a backslide in authoritarianism. This consists of an erosion of political participation and liberties and more repressive penalties. Examples of this are the 1992 provisions against strikes and demonstrations and the 1995 press law. As a result the press has had much to endure.³⁷

The deliberalization is partly due to a rise in armed opposition by the Jama'at al-islammiy ya but also resulting from the regime's inability to value the role of opposition and the need

to facilitate the implementation of economic reforms. This process can also be related to the fact that from the middle of the 1980s until the middle of the 1990s population growth has exceeded economic growth, resulting in a drop of GNP per capita. Besides, during the same period real wages also dropped and unemployment has risen.³⁸

Libya

As a young state which had declared its independence in 1951, Libya saw its first steps toward democratisation as the constitution provided for a bicameral system. But already from the start this was checked by the powers allotted to the constitutional monarchy. The result of the power struggle between the country's institutions and the king's constitutional competences soon led to a situation in which the monarchy achieved near absolute powers. Though limited in their influence the institutions remained intact and even elections for the federal Chamber of Deputies were held in 1952. Nonetheless, the democratic process was by then already undermined as the king had decided to abolish the country's political parties. Therefore the 1960 elections were on a personal and not on a partisan basis. It is certainly not possible to refer to the Chamber as an institution of checks and balances regarding government affairs. As in Farouk's Egypt or Algeria under the French the executive sought ways to check parliament. Kedourie (1992) points out that constitutional government was bankrupt, but one has to notice that it was not given a fair chance.³⁹ For the parliamentary election in 1964 suffrage had been extended to women, suggesting that the monarchy had become less conservative. In the end it proved to be no more than an experiment as due to alleged irregularities in the election procedures King Idris dissolved parliament. Idris may have muted an institutionalised opposition in this way, he did not increase his support nor legitimacy. His rule could hardly be called stable as Libya's pre-war regional and tribal divisions remained. On top of this, different groups,

including senior officers, people from the commercial community and elements of the royal entourage, were planning to overthrow him.⁴⁰ With Nasser's coup as the example the so-called "Free Unionist Officers" under leadership of Qadhafi staged a coup in September 1969 when the king was receiving medical aid in Turkey. Idris was accused of not having supported Nasser enough during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Anti-monarchal tendencies were as strong in Libya as in Egypt. In North Africa only Morocco's monarchy for some reason managed to keep clear from a military take-over. In fact resentment against Idris came to a climax because of Libya's economic crisis due to its unilateral oil boycott against the West in support of Arab nationalism and Nasser's war effort. Here the relation between political stability and the state of the country's economy is clear as a self-imposed boycott against the West resulted in a 80% drop of oil revenues leading to economic hardship and from there to social and political tensions, herewith showing the vulnerability of Luciani's rentier state.

Following the coup all constitutional offices were replaced by the so-called Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This meant the end to parliament, grassroots civil society organisations, a free press, democratic structures, political parties and the monarchy. Besides the military RCC a civilian council of ministers had also been established. Its composition changed at a rapid pace while Qadhafi seemed to be the only permanent member. From 1969 well into 1975 plots and alleged plots against Qadhafi were uncovered leading to numerous trials against military personnel, royalists, government ministers and even one of the RCC members.

As for human rights and Dahl's guarantees for a democratic system, they were completely ignored. During the first years of the RCC's rule journalists and former politicians were put on trial, political parties, women's groups, the lawyers' association and trade unions disbanded. Society was brought into conformity with the regime's wishes. Student protests and dock

workers' industrial action had no effect on the RCC's policies at all. Instead all public demonstrations against the regime were forbidden and student hangings became a symbol of repression. Islamic opposition was appeased by a ban on alcoholic drinks and the closure of non-Muslim religious institutions and also by imposing Islam and the primacy of the Shari'a over other legal practice.⁴¹ Qadhafi also took on socialist credentials following examples like Nasser, Bourguiba or the FLN. For instance, in Qadhafi's Green Book socialism prevails and he does not mention Islam. The main topics are: 1) solution of the problem of democracy and the authority of the people; 2) solution of the economic problem and 3) the social basis. One of the conclusions taken from these topics is that democracy is seen as a problem. Qadhafi fits in well with the characteristics attributed by Zartman and Dawisha to Arab Leaders. Like Nasser he tried to create a popular image of himself and even threatened with resignation in order to have the public ask or even beg him to stay on. With his "Third International Theory" he paid lipservice to the authority of the people and participation in politics by promising to introduce new institutions by taking away power from the bureaucracy and opportunists and deliver it to the people instead through participation in so-called people's committees. The result was completely different as the implementation of these ideas was accompanied by large-scale arrests of people thought to oppose the regime. Also the judiciary as an independent institution was taken over by the executive in a way that revolutionary committees were taking up functions of local courts and described by one author as "democracy of the gallows".⁴²

Not only is an independent judiciary absent, since the early 1980s lawyers have become justice department employees, thus closing the door for any form of free trial and independent judiciary. Qadhafi's slogans of power to the people have shown to be empty. The people's committees have undermined the so-called people's congresses (local government) considerably. Qadhafi's relation with the islamic movement has also cooled as

since 1978 the authorities have turned on the religious establishment. Islamic groups have thus found reason to oppose the regime.

So far Libya as a rentier state has largely been able to accommodate the public and buy off public dissent. In the light of lack of representation, legitimacy was bought in a manner typical for so-called rentier states, notably through free medical care, free education, a fairly equal distribution of income and subsidised primary food requirements. A big difference with Nasser's Egypt was that Qadhafi could afford this for a considerable period whereas the Egyptians could not. Though Qadhafi may not be as popular as he was in the past, the distributive task of the state has softened the risk of political upheavals to a large extent.

Nevertheless, like Nasser he has not been able to fulfil his promises and utopian ideas about society. His provocative policies and desire for confrontation fit Dawisha and Zartman's role of an Arab leader seeking legitimacy at home. Qadhafi's personal ambitions and need for recognition seem to be following Nasser as a champion of Arab nationalism. This includes regular initiatives on regional unification. Egypt and Libya have a record failed unification attempts with other Arab League members. The confrontationalist profile led to deteriorating relations and border disputes with Tunisia and Egypt in the 1970s and mid-1980s. Moreover, Qadhafi's quest for prestige led to a lost war with Chad and a conflict with the US over international maritime space. Adventurism has in the end not given the regime the internal prestige it wanted. The involvement in the 1988 bombing of an airliner above Lockerbie has confronted Libya with international sanctions (UNSC resolution 748, 1992) including a technology and aviation embargo, which has added to the increasing economic problems. As for the democratic ambitions of the regime, it is obvious that the much used term "popular democracy" is in many ways a euphemism like the earlier mentioned former German Democratic Republic. Qadhafi's regime has become more repressive and has

increased its authoritarianism over time. Qadhafi himself has introduced the term "guided democracy".⁴³ Political activity is only legal when it is aimed at supporting government policies. This is anyway what one can expect from a despot who has declared that political parties and parliament are undemocratic. The experiment with people' congresses has not fared much better. The 1977 Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority was said to give way to direct rule of the masses while the RCC members became advisers to the General People's Congress Secretariat. In fact the power remains in the hands of one person alone. Another step to strengthen the dictatorship was the 1977 ban on all political parties including the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Though the regime has taken steps in putting people's committees in charge of administrative matters, the democratic basis of the institutions, which range from local government to the national level, is limited as their membership is by approval of the state and selection is done by the revolutionary committees. Ever since the General Peoples Congress in 1984 rejected a number of Qadhafi's ideas such as the abolishment elementary schools, the regime has sought to further curb the influence peoples congresses.

Like in Algeria the drop in oil prices has undermined the regime's power base. With the distribution of oil wealth coming to an end, it has become difficult to mute dissent under the population, even by the use of force. Dissatisfaction because of corruption and the acquired wealth by the state elite has become more visible. Though Libya may still have a relatively high level of GDP per head, its economic development is retarding mainly due to an inefficient sector of state-led enterprises. Bias against a growing independent middle class and restrictions on free enterprise and private property have also undermined economic activity. The merchant class is under pressure because of repressive activities by revolutionary committees' vigilantes -Qadhafi has more than once said he wanted the "parasitic middle class annihilated" - and of course

because of the country's bad economic performance due to the drop in oil prices.

As long as oil-wealth flowed in, the imbalances resulting from the bad economic structure remained underneath the surface. Together with political repression this deterred people from involving themselves in private initiatives in the social domain. The Libyan rentier state did not result in the growth of a liberal middle class. Instead it created a nomenclatura and a heavy bureaucracy.

Despite the presence of a number of security organisations, there is growing popular disappointment. Coercion has not led to a stable situation. There is opposition to the regime as the 1984 coup attempt by the Libyan National Salvation Front (LNSF) has shown. Attempts from within the military establishment to oust Qadhafi have been quite numerous, but the main opposition seems to be the combination of dissatisfied youths and conservative clergy, united in Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun. Clashes in 1995 saw the arrest of some 2000 members of the Ikhwan and other organisations after severe rioting in the Bengazi area.⁴⁴ Other opposition groups such as the Libyan Liberation Organisation (LLO) and the Libyan National Democratic Grouping (LNDG) operate in exile.

In the meanwhile Qadhafi's power base is declining as his family and tribe (Al-Qadhafa) benefit most from the patron-client relationship with the regime. Because of this there is probably reason to introduce Ibn Khaldun's ideas.

Morocco

Morocco is the only monarchy left in North Africa. The Egyptian and Libyan monarchies were overthrown by the army while the relationship between King Hassan II and the Moroccan armed forces (Forces armées royales) has also shown its period of crises. Conspiracies by the army against the monarchy were uncovered in 1971 and 1972.

Morocco's allegiance with the monarchy does not come from

control alone. As the monarchy was not on good terms with the colonial powers the return of Sultan Mohammed V from exile in 1956 symbolised Morocco's sovereignty.⁴⁵ This symbolism preempted the formation a secular republic. The relationship with religion is also much different than in the other North African countries as the monarch plays a role as religious leader. Therefore Islam is a part of the system and not in opposition to it. ⁴⁶ As the king presents himself as the Commander of the Faithful he has been able to foster his islamic credentials. His legitimacy is further strengthened by his chairmanship of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference's Jerusalem Committee. The monarchy has also had a stabilizing effect on the rise of political Islam in the country, though fundamentalist opposition is not absent.

There are also many similarities with the other regimes. Like the presidential system in the other North African countries the head of state has a large influence on the Ministries of the Interior and Defence. Like the other regimes the Moroccan government also uses politics of control. The use of security issues as a means to boost political legitimacy is just as present. Here the question of the Western Sahara is of crucial importance.

In the process leading to independence both the Istiqlal (Independence) party and the monarchy played a role. Like in Egypt with the Wafd the monarchy practised politics of exclusion. Under Muhammed V the Istiqlal with its workers and middle class constituency was kept out of office. The king rather cooperated with landlords and the urban bourgeoisie. The original Istiqlal broke up over the position of the monarchy in 1959 and was renamed UNFP, while the pro-monarchy faction retained the original name.

Like in the other countries the use of referenda has been a means to officially demonstrate the people's support for the regime. Hassan II had, for instance, the 1962 constitution approved through a referendum, therewith legitimizing his own

position. Another means of seeking support from the public has been the Green March (1975) in which 350.000 citizens participated, underlining the regime's claim on the Western Sahara. The Western Sahara is an issue in which the monarchy is supported by the army. Also in the War of the Sands with Algeria during the early 1960s the army and the monarchy strengthened their ties. A reason for this is that the confrontation with Algeria was more than a border dispute. For the Algerian regime the idea to topple the Moroccan monarchy fitted perfectly in the ideology of Arab socialism. The army still has a role to play in Moroccan politics, despite de plots of the early 1970s. When the Western Sahara issue is resolved one may expect the influence of the armed forces to diminish. In order to balance the budget and to check political aspirations of the officers' corps the monarchy knows the armed forces need to be downsized.

Like Egypt since the 1970s Morocco's political arena can be described as authoritarian pluralism.⁴⁷ A number of political parties are allowed and compete for political power. Local and national elections were held in 1976 and 1977. With the pro-monarchy parties winning the ballot and opposition parties attaining influence especially in local government, room for a certain level of political dialogue was introduced.

A few reasons can be given to predict a further development towards pluralism. The Moroccan political system has experienced the building of coalitions as there is no majority ruling party. This also means that parties have to look for compromise. Furthermore, opposite to the Egyptian and Algerian examples the Istiqlal has kept much of its islamic credentials and therefore linked religion much more to the state affairs over a long period. Then the system has also allowed the USFP and trade unions to stand up for rights of disadvantaged groups in society.

According to Daoud (1997) one has to go back to 1989 in order to find the origins of the present electoral developments⁴⁸. At that stage king Hassan II had organised a referendum as to decide on

the prolongation of the legislative council, which originally had to be reelected in 1990. With a 99,83% turnout and 99,89% of the votes in favour the king could also count on enough support to press for economic reform. Support was needed against a background of profound social and economic changes.

The implementation of austerity measures and the privatisation of public enterprises has had an affect on Morocco's internal affairs. When 1990 was a year of social conflict, as exemplified by a general strike organised by the workers' unions and riots in Fez, 1991 was a year of rapprochement between the monarchy and the various opposition parties.

At the same time, the different political parties, especially on the left, started to cooperate closer with each other. The result was the formation of a united front between the Istiqlal, the USFP (Union socialiste des forces populaires), the PPS (Parti du progrès et du socialisme) and the OADP (Organisation de l'action démocratique et populaire)⁴⁹.

The united front led to the foundation of the Koutlah Dimocratya (democratic bloc) consisting of the USFP, Istiqlal, OADP, PRP and supported by trade unions.

Another indication that the Moroccan political system is opening up is the appointment of socialist opposition leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi as prime minister in February 1998.

In fact this can be seen as the result of the Koutlah 1997 victory in the parliamentary elections.

Table.4.: Morocco, Elections 1989-1997

December	01 1989	Referendum
September	04 1992	Referendum
October	16 1992	Communal
June	25 1993	Parliament (direct election)
September	17 1993	Parliament (indirect election)
June	13 1997	Communal and municipal
July	15 1997	Provincial
July	25 1997	Professional Chambers
October	24 1997	Regional councils
November	13 1997	Legislative
December	05 1997	Council of (conseillers)

Youssoufi's political career shows much of Morocco's political history. He started with the Istiqlal, became one of the

founders of the UNFP and remained in exile between 1965 and 1980. After returning to Morocco in 1980 he switched to the USFP which had split off from the UNFP and chose to go in exile again from 1993 to 1995 in order to protest against alleged manipulation of the 1993 parliamentary elections.⁵⁰ The Koutlah government faces the difficult task of economic reform and especially to cut government expenditure through limiting subsidies on food without sparking off bread riots. The question is also if the Koutlah can strengthen the democratisation process through the political institutions.

Table.5.: Morocco, Election Results, Majlis An-Nuwab

	1993	1997
Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP)	56	57
Union constitutionnelle (UC)	54	50
Istiqlal (PI)	52	32
MDS		32
Mouvement populaire (MP)	51	40
Rassemblement national des indépendants (RNI)	41	46
Mouvement national populaire (MNP)	25	19
Parti national démocrate (PND)	24	10
Parti du progrès et du socialisme (PPS)	10	
(PPS changed into PRP in 1994)		
Parti du renouveau et du progrès (PRP)		9
Parti démocratique pour l'indépendance (PDI)	9	1
Union Marocain du travaille (UMT)	3	
Organisation de l'action démocratique et populaire (OADP)	2	4
Parti de l'action (PA)	2	2
Independents	4	
MPCD		9
FFD		9
PSD		5
Total	333	325

Sources: L'opinion, The Middle East and North Africa 1998, Daoud 1997.

Tunisia

Tunisia has been ruled by Habib Bourguiba, one of the founders of the 1934 Neo Destour party, from independence in 1956 until 1981. The Neo Destour played an important role in achieving the country's independence. In Tunisia broad alliances were formed which could not be ignored by the authorities. Already in 1945 the Comité des Soixante national front consisting of political

and religious leaders demanded full independence. The demand was given weight when the Neo Destour allied itself with the new Tunisian labour federation Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) and religious students, leading to strikes and student demonstrations. Just before independence the Bey (1955) issued a decree stating that the national constituent assembly was to be elected by universal and secret suffrage. His role was finished as the assembly later unanimously voted to establish a republic and instate Bourguiba as president.⁵¹ After independence was obtained in 1956 work on a constitution lasted until 1959. In terms of democracy this document was problematic as the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative assembly were vague. The same year Bourguiba -the single candidate- had himself elected as president with a 99.8% result. In the 1960s the Neo Destour was renamed in Parti Socialist Destourien (PSD) which, as can be expected from Zartman and Dawisha's description of Arab politics, monopolised the political arena.

Also Bourguiba's conduct to have the constitution changed in (1975) in order to appoint himself president for life fits their analysis.⁵²

Tunisia's socialist experiment was abandoned in 1970, thus around the same time as Sadat changed the idea of Arab socialism for his Infitah or open door policy. It may be clear that this kind of policy met with resistance from certain groups in society, especially from representatives of the old system and from workers who feared their jobs were at stake.

Opposition came mainly from the UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail). Especially at the end of the 1970s the confrontation between the working classes and the regime became tense leading to a general strike in January 1978 accompanied by riots and the ransacking of shops. Under such pressure the regime gave way to reasonably free elections in 1981.

Nevertheless, Bourguiba refused to implement democratic reforms and to increase political liberalisation. This led to a boycott of the 1985 and 1986 elections by the opposition parties. The

1980s witnessed a growing islamic opposition organised in the Mouvement de tendance islamique (MTI), which was renamed the Hizb an-Nahda (the Party of the Renaissance) in the run up to the 1989 elections.

Table.6.: North African Regimes

	Terms in Office of Heads of State		Independence	System of government
Algeria	Ben Bella	3 (1962-1965)	1962	Republic
	Boumedienne	13 (1965-1978)		
	Chadli Ben Gedid	13 (1979-1992)		
	Boudiaf	- (1992-1992)		
	Z�roual	4 (since 1994)		
Egypt	Neguib	2 (1952-1954)	1922	Republic
	Nasser	16 (1954-1970)		
	Sadat	11 (1970-1981)		
	Mubarak	17 (since 1981)		
Libya	King Idris	18 (1951-1969)	1951	Republic
	Qadhafi	29 (since 1969)		
Morocco	Muhammad V	5 (1956-1961)	1956	Monarchy
	Hassan II	38 (since 1961)		
Tunisia	Bourguiba	31 (1956-1987)	1956	Republic
	Ben Ali	11 (since 1987)		

With Bourguiba's health deteriorating political stability seemed to be severely undermined. Rumours that he had already died and a plot involving to oust the president was unveiled surfaced. In the meanwhile a reshuffle of the cabinet took place. Ben Ali became prime minister and also took on the function of PSD Secretary-General. After examination of the Constitution Ben Ali and members of the cabinet removed (November 1987) Bourguiba from office by having him declared unfit to govern on medical grounds. It has often been suggested that the main reason for Ben Ali and his cabinet to take such action lied in Bourguiba's idea of having a number of islamist militants, including the leaders of the MIT retried in order to change their prison sentences into the death penalty.

Ben Ali wanted to restore or create a national consensus.⁵³ Of course this would stabilize his legitimacy. For a while it seemed if Tunisia was going to be included in a process of political liberalisation. Press freedom, including opposition papers, was largely restored. Likewise Ben Ali promised the

implementation of political and democratic reform. According to some, Tunisia would take the lead in "a wave of democratic transitions in the region".⁵⁴ During the first year of his reign he indeed reformed the PSD into the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD) and eased restrictions on the formation of political associations and parties. Within the new political atmosphere no room was reserved for the main opponent, the Hizb an-Nahda, in the run up to the 1989 elections. For the regime strong opposition must have been a reason to take new measures in order to keep a grip on society.

Table.7.: Tunisia, Elections under Ben Ali

			turnout%	result %
1989	April	National Assembly		
1989	April	Presidential		
1990	June	Municipal		
1991	March	National Assembly by-elections		
1994	March 20	Presidential	94.89	99.91
1994	March 20	National Assembly		

The 1989 and 1994 election results show that the electoral system remained based on politics of control rather than the outcome of political dialogue and competition. The question is if such a way of dealing with the electoral process leads to more stability. As already proven in the case of the pre-revolutionary phase it does not. Like other heads of government Ben Ali was elected unopposed, which erased Dahl's and Schumpeter's competition element.

Almost a decade later little is left of Ben Ali's initial policy of national reconciliation. Tunisia still has a strong presidential system. Press freedom has been curtailed and the opposition is only allotted seats which are reserved.

Table.8.: Tunisia: elections, Majlis An-Nuwaab

	1989				1994
	%	%	%	%	seats
	vote				
RCD	80	100	97.73	100	
Islamic independent candidates	13	-			

Others	7	-	
Opposition			2.27 reserved
<hr/>			
Total seats			144
Extra reserved seats for opposition			19
Division extra seats:			
Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes (MDS)			10
Mouvement de la Rénovation (MR)			4
Union Démocratique Unioniste (UDU)			3
Parti de l'Unité Populaire (PUP)			2
<hr/>			
Total			163
<hr/>			

Algeria

Algeria has by far been confronted with the most tragic post-WWII experience. As a result of the large discontent with French rule the civil war started in 1954 leading to half a million casualties or more until independence was achieved in 1962. The 1954 uprising had found a strong ally in Nasser and his Free Officers' government in Egypt and also political support from solidarity organisations as the Arab League, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

The FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) and its armed wing the ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) called upon all Algerians to fight for their freedom. The other side of the Algerian revolution was that it was not only a drive for independence, but just as much a struggle for political power. Apart from the French colonial authorities the revolution was also directed against local democratic institutions, landlords and business communities. In the name of Third Worldism, Arab socialism and Algerian nationalism the FLN succeeded in transforming discontent into political support. Before the civil war erupted, Algerians could participate in elections for the French national and Algerian provincial assemblies; though it is not possible to label them free and fair. Candidates and political leaders were for instance regularly arrested. On the other side, pro-French politicians were nicknamed "Beni Oui Oui" by the nationalists and were threatened to alter their allegiance.

The right to vote became one of the first victims of the revolution. When looking at the present wave of political

violence and utter brutality, the comparison with the 1950s shows a similar pattern. The method by which the FLN and ALN succeeded in having the elections for the Algerian assembly postponed was a combination of the use and the threat of violence. If the elections would be held a campaign of terror would commence. Candidates would be executed and the throats of all individuals involved in the elections would be cut. ⁵⁵

Another similarity with the present situation is that the armed struggle was partly carried out from the countryside. Also the strong nationalist muslim opposition shows a resemblance. The FLN and ALN may have been the main political and military forces during the civil war, the "maquis" had a strong islamic backing. In Nasser's Egypt the islamic movement, as represented by the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn), was stronger organised but just as well kept out of office, which was also true for representative political parties. The democratic deficit in Algeria was comparable to for instance the Egyptian or Soviet examples. The political arena in the North African countries was just as much based on the politics of exclusion as during the colonial period. After independence the FLN became the only legal political party.

Instead of bringing stability, independence increased the social and political rifts in Algerian society. After the FLN dominated Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) negotiated the retreat of French forces, violence erupted once again and with extreme verosity, again along the ethnic and religious cleavage. Between the March 1962 armistice and the departure of French troops in July of the same year, another violent episode of Algerian history broke out leading to some 100.000 victims.

During the period following independence the FLN blatantly misused democratic procedures like elections and plebiscites for almost three decades. If the FLN was characterised by superficial unity during the war, disunity surfaced more visibly after independence when a power struggle between the members of the GPRA, district commanders and ALN officers emerged. This

episode was closed after Ahmed Ben Bella came in office with the help the ALN commander Boumedienne and the FLN assembly chose Ben Bella to become the country's premier. Ben Bella surrounded himself with loyal followers in order to establish an unopposed control on government a society, while Boumedienne was installed as Minister of Defence. The regime was like many other Third World post-colonial governments both socialist and authoritarian. Despite the orchestrated election of Ben Bella, the regime faced a serious legitimacy problem as a number movements such as Berber activists, students and the FLN-affiliated trade union UGTA, opposed the regime. This type opposition and also FLN members demanding a more liberal political system were silenced within months.⁵⁶ Ben Bella also bestowed himself with dictatorial powers by becoming FLN Secretary-General and having this rubber stamped through a referendum.

When Boumedienne took power in 1965, Ben Bella was ousted from office and imprisoned. The country's new leader imposed an even more rigid form of state socialism than his predecessor had done. If there was opposition against Boumedienne it came from the FLN's left wing complaining about the lack of participation in public policy. During his rule elections were misused, as seen also in other Arab and socialist countries. To strengthen his position Boumedienne organised parliamentary and presidential elections in 1975. The next year he had his National Charter adopted by referendum; officially as much as 98.51% of the votes casted showed to be in favour. Of course this was merely window-dressing for a deep-rooted legitimacy problem. The figure can be compared with the Egyptian referenda results under Nasser and Sadat. On the basis of the National Charter a new constitution was promulgated with Islam as the state religion. This coincided with a growing interest in islamic values in society and politics in other regions of the Middle East and North Africa. In Libya colonel Qaddafi invented islamic socialism and in Egypt president Sadat gave Islam a more central role in society. Through single candidate presidential elections Boumedienne extended his time in office. Again the

election result of 99% was obviously prefabricated.

After Boumedienne's death in 1978 and an interim-period under Rabah Ribat, Colonel Chadli Ben Jedid was sworn in as president in Februari 1979. His election with a 94% result did not differ significantly from that of his predecessor. But with Chadli a process of economic liberalisation, including the encouragement of private enterprise, commenced. Political liberalisation, however had to wait. Chadli increased presidential control over the party and the state. At the same time he tried to put extra limitations on existing and emerging unofficial political parties. One of the measures imposed was the stipulation that all UGTA officials should hold FLN membership. The 1982 legislative elections showed a 72.7% victory for the FLN, with the rest of the votes going to independent candidates. Chadli himself was re-elected president in 1984 with a 95.4% result. During his term in office a new national charter was adopted, including a state ideology based on a combination of Islam and socialism, with 98.4% of the voters casting their ballot in favour. With the 87.9% of the vote the FLN attracted in the 1987 elections one would suppose widespread support for the regime. But like all the results before, the figure was a measurement for nothing. As a result a political dialogue with oppositional forces in society was absent. Though social discontent was already brewing the authorities allowed the formation of local organisations without prior approval and by doing so a process of political liberalisation was set in.

Arabisation and islamisation of society during the FLN's rule was not only left to national charters, but was also implemented in educational policies. Since 1979, coincidental the year of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, students were demanding a swifter replacement of French by Arabic as the language of instruction, a policy completely abhorred by the large Berber community whose native language had already come under pressure. For the younger generation which faced a high percentage of unemployment despite a relatively high level of education,

islamisation of society did not go fast enough. On the flow of the social discontent which emerged in 1980s and especially after the steep drop in energy prices in 1985, religion became a political outlet for the generation born during the post-independence period; a trend noticeable also in the rest of the MENA region.

In contrast to Egypt, where late president Sadat during the second half of the 1970s started a process of political liberalisation and democratisation from above, the Algerian experience was initially a democratisation process from below. Following a period of social dislocation due to the oil slump resulting the drastic cut in oil prices since 1985 socio-political pressures built up in Algerian society. Lower middle class and workers' communities were feeling the brunt of cuts in subsidies on daily food and fuel requirements. At the same time workers' remittances from Algerians in other oil-producing countries became less. As in other socialist countries during the 1980s it also became clear that the government could not fulfil promises of job security and full employment. The October 1988 riots which resulted from the worsening social and economic situation were the catalyst for constitutional reform. Chadli, re-elected president with a 81% result, also commenced with laying the constitutional foundations for a multi-party system. Out of the 1988 riots had also risen a new political force, notably FIS (Front Islamique du Salut or jabha al-islamiyya al-inqadh) an islamist party with widespread support from the lower and middle classes. As a former member of the PPA and the FLN its leader Abbasi Madani was a veteran in Algerian politics. Though nicknamed "Fils du FLN", FIS showed to be an independent political force to reckon with. It remarkably won the 1990 elections for local government with a landslide victory and almost repeated this during the first round of the 1991 parliamentary elections. FIS won control of 853 of the 1,541 local councils and 32 of the 48 provincial councils (wilayat). But was this as remarkable as it seemed? From an theoretical point of view it was not. Because of the long-term FLN

domination of the political arena it was logical that a grudge was felt against the regime. As many of the secular parties were led by people with a FLN past, such as Ben Bella, their lack of attracting voters' support can be explained from the fact that they did not form an alternative to the FLN.

Confident about victory, the FIS leaders were all but unified about how to handle power after coming in office. The Madani faction seemed to stick to the democratic framework, but other leaders propagated forms of islamic dictatorship. When FIS seemed to be winning the December 1991 parliamentary elections, the military stepped in, annulled the election results and scrapped the second round of elections to be held in January 1992. The authorities started to disband the local councils and elected FIS councillors were replaced by government appointees. As the party was outlawed and its leaders arrested the country slid into an increasingly violent crisis.

Instability in Algeria is characterized by terrorism on a large scale. Already during the 1980s islamist groups became more militant as exemplified by an operation in 1985 during which weapons and ammunition were stolen from the military. Although the culprits were killed two years later by the security forces, their action in a sense formed the prologue to armed insurrection in the 1990s.

There is no doubt the cancellation of the 1991 election results increased the conflict between the government and the islamic opposition. The new phase of violence in Algerian history included a combination of measures taken by the security forces under emergency rule and political violence or terrorism committed especially by the islamists. The latter forms the basis for the emergency regulations and with it the security forces' conduct of "eradication" of muslim militants.

The FIS set up a military wing Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) in 1994 in order to keep its credibility. In the same year the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), a group rejecting any dialogue, surfaced. For years the Algerian authorities have declared to have gained control and stabilised the situation. In fact this

does not seem the case as the number of casualties has risen considerably and there are no reasons to believe the violence will end. GIA has grown from a band of brigands into a professional and well-entrenched movement. From the name it seems highly possible that GIA has been influenced by armed cells of the Egyptian Jama'at al-islammiyya (Islamic Group). In Arabic the names of the armed branch of the Egyptian organisation and GIA are identical; al-jama'at al-islammiyya al-mutasaliha (the Armed Islamic Group).

GIA may be a fundamentalist movement, its members' practices differ considerably from conservative Islam. In fact GIA seems to follow the (al-taqfir wa'l-hidjra) pattern; a strong parallel with islamic terrorist groups in Egypt. Self-declared shaykhs follow their own interpretation of Islam and seem to have chosen banditry over a political agenda. They may want to take over society, but in fact their conduct could be motivated to compensate for lack of income and social status. Some GIA leaders have turned to warlordism and amassed wealth from their activities. GIA has declared (September 1997) that the killings of civilians are conducted with a blessing from God. This declaration and the brutality of the murders have resulted in other groups turning their military activity against GIA strongholds. Since October 1997 infighting between the different islamic movements has intensified. The death toll of the civil war, raging since 1992, reached about 65.000 at the end of 1997. Some human rights organisations even give a figure of more than 100.000 casualties.

Apart from Algeria and Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and even Libya face resistance from radical muslim groups. Morocco has problems with the Islamic Jihad Group (GIC) which is close to GIA.

Table.9.: North Africa,
Main armed opposition groups

Algeria	GIA AIS
Egypt	Force Islamique de Djihad Armé (FIDA) Islamic Jihad Al-Taqfir wa'l-hidjra Jama'at al-islammiyya

Libya	Thawrat Misr (Nasserist) Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun Dissatisfied army officers National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL)
Morocco	Islamic Jihad Group
Tunisia	Islamic Jihad

Against the background of the army's clampdown on FIS, Chadli was forced to resign and was replaced by a five-member High Security Council chaired by Muhammad Boudiaf, who had been in exile since his discord with the Ben Bella regime. Boudiaf's assassination in June 1992 has until the present given ground for speculation as for who was behind his killing. The main difference with Sadat's assassination in Egypt is that the Islamic Jihad's planned uprising was limited to a number of local pocket whereas the armed insurgency of FIS, GIA and other movements swept over a whole country.

With President Liamine Zérroual coming in office in January 1994 a new series of elections was organised. Zérroual's victory (1995) in Algeria's first multi-party presidential election was hailed as a step toward a renewal of democratic institutions and a step towards more political stability. FIS had of course called for a boycott of these elections.

Table.10.: Algeria,
Elections (1990-1997)

June	12	1990	Local\provincial
December	26	1991	Parliamentary
November	16	1995	Presidential
November		1996	New constitution
June	5	1997	Parliamentary
October	23	1997	Local\provincial
December	25	1997	Upper House

Table.11.: Algeria, Results 1995
presidential election

Liamine Zérroual	(RND)	61,3 %
Mahfoud Nahnah	(Hamas\HMI)	25,4 %
Said Saadi	(RCD)	9,3 %
Noureddine Boukrouh	(PRA)	3,8 %

Source: Pierre and Quant

With the election for parliament, local and provincial assemblies and the upper house (Conseil de la Nation) Zéroual's party, the Rassemblement Nationale Démocratique has anchored itself in the country's institutions. A new approach to politics is the formation of a coalition government, notably the RND with the FLN and the moderate islamist HMI (Harakat Moushtama Issilm). In the June 1997 elections for the 380-seat parliament 39 parties participated and 37 in the October 1997 local elections.⁵⁷

A problem with the election process has been the presentation of the turnout figures. After the November 1996 referendum on a new constitution observers thought that the central government published a too high a figure concerning the voters' turnout in the referendum on the new constitution. Opposition parties and especially the HMI have challenged the results of the June and October 1997 elections while pointing at inflated turnout figures. For instance, at the October 1997 elections, more than 66% of the electorate turned out and 45% in Algiers according to official spokesmen of the Ministry of the Interior, while observers declared people were all but enthusiastic to vote.⁵⁸ Complaints about massive fraud have been numerous. This has brought legal opposition parties together in organising protest marches, strikes and rallies against alleged election rigging. Though some of these rallies attracted thousands of protesters, calls to go on strike were almost ignored.

Table.12.: Algerian election results 1990-1997

	June 90	December 91	October 97	Seats in Parliament June 97	Seats in Upper House December 97
FIS	57%	48%	illegal	illegal	illegal
FLN	29%	23%	20 %	64	10
RND			50 %	155	80
FFS	boycott	7%		19	4
Hamas\HMI\MPS			10 %	69	2
Ennahda				34	-
RCD				19	-
PRP				3	-
PT				4	-
Others	14%	22%	20 %	13	48 appointed
			1,541 municipal 48 regional	Total seats in Parliament	Total seats in Upper House

Sources: Pierre and Quant 1996. The Middle East and North Africa 1998. Al-Arab.

Still, for Arab countries Algeria has a remarkably free political system. The general conclusion is nonetheless that changes in the extent of political liberalisation and political participation have been introduced at a too late a date to guarantee political stability in the short-run. It is also clear that the Algerian constituency has accepted the importance of democratic political institutions. Although President Zéroual seems to be in favour of a dialogue with the moderate islamists the government's approach to political opposition remains ambivalent. In the meanwhile the security situation worsens by the month as is highly visible from the indiscriminate violence committed by GIA and other armed parties in the civil war. As long as instability, extreme politically inspired violence and emergency measures reign, it will not be possible to include Algeria in the so-called third wave democracies.⁵⁹ Porteous has been proven right when predicting in 1991 that a victory for the Islamic political would not be applauded by the other countries in the region.⁶⁰ Even in Egypt, a country with a reasonable free press, the media remained remarkably silent. But in Egypt the democratic tide seems to be slowly rolling back.

Indicators

Having established how the democratisation process in the five countries has developed, attention is now paid on stability indicators. It is clear that all North African countries, except for Libya, have some sort of democratic institutions. It is safe to say that Libya because of its rentier economy and its revolutionary leadership has refrained from a parliamentary system. Semi-rentier states as Tunisia and Algeria have nevertheless introduced the framework for a multi-party system, though with limitations. The same can be said for Morocco and Egypt. If one looks at the GNP per capita level, one would

assume all five countries to have entered Huntington's third wave at one stage or another. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria would be at the beginning of the so-called transition zone. As shown in the country studies these three countries and Egypt have indeed not proceeded further than only a start of a transition to democracy. Libya with its high GNP per capita should in theory have reached a stable level of democracy, but because of its rentier economy its social development has lagged behind and its regime has stuck authoritarianism.

Unemployment has remained high in North Africa during the 1990s. Besides the problem of insufficiencies in the economy due to too much state intervention and the protection of public enterprises, another reason for the high unemployment figures can be found in the high birth rates during the 1970s and 1980s. The result has been difficult access to jobs for youths in the 1990s. This is a problem which will remain well into the first decade of the 21st century. Unemployment in turn is also a source for political disaffection and political upheaval. Nonetheless, on the basis of the figures it is possible to predict less problems concerning employment within two decades. Birth rates are dropping fast. Egypt's birth rate has gone down from 33.4 in 1987 to 29.7 in 1994. Morocco's birth rate has come down from 35.2 in the first half of the 1980s to 29.1 in the first half of the 1990s. During that same period Algeria's experience was the most spectacular with a fall from 40.6 to 29.1. Whereas Algeria's figures may be due to the instable situation, Tunisia's relatively low birth rate (27.7 in 1988 and 20.8 in 1995) can be explained from its economic development.⁶¹ To a combination of Libya's faltering oil-economy and its enormous birth rate of 45 at the beginning of the 1990s predicts that unemployment and social upheaval will add to Qadhafi's legitimacy problem. A high rate unemployment remains a problem for the other countries as well. In Egypt unemployment was 11% in 1994. In Tunisia it reached 14% in 1993 while Algeria's unemployment rate has even been as high as 22% in 1995. The economic problems have more than once led to bread riots.

Looking at the arguments of Ph. Fargues it makes sense that these social-economic factors add to political instability and hinder the democratisation process.

Table.13.: North Africa, Indicators Political Situation

	democratic institutions	GNP per capita 1990	GNP per capita 1993	(Semi) Rentier State	Bread Riots	Year
Algeria	yes		US\$ 1,780	yes	1988	
Egypt	yes		US\$ 660	no	1977 1986	by security forces
Libya	no	US\$ 5,310		yes	1996	Ikhwan
Morocco	yes		US\$ 1,040	no	1981 1984 1991	
Tunisia	yes		US\$ 1,720	yes	1978 1983 1984	

International cooperation

In the sphere of international cooperation it is clear that over the last decade the security environment has become more stable. One can however only speak of partial cooperation in the international sphere. A functional framework like that of the European cooperation experience only exists in embryonical form. Morocco and Tunisia may have had reasons to believe Libya was trying to press for regional domination, but confronted with an economic backlash, they also had to conclude that they could gain from the 1987 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) project.

As Libya has no democratic institutions and is internationally the most confrontational of the five countries, its example fits the proposition that non-democracies are less peaceful than democracies. In fact the power politics approach has not added to Qadhafi's legitimacy. Libya's military adventurism and a confrontational course against the West have not increased internal support for the regime. Instead of glory the campaign in Chad resulted in more opposition as many young Libyans were killed in action. Economic problems, partly due to the 1992 UN

imposed sanctions, have brought Libya closer to its neighbours. The AMU, Arab League and OAU have for instance asked for a flexible application of the sanctions.

In general, power politics seem to be fading away. Instead of politics of confrontation there seems to arise a general understanding of solving problems together. The two examples of this are the creation of the AMU and the signature of the 1995 Barcelona document on European-Mediterranean relations.

Moreover, despite the problems with Libya the European Union, North Africa's main trading partner, has welcomed the neo-functional approach of regional cooperation in the AMU.⁶² The AMU is a functional form of pan-Maghribism that puts attention to sub-regional problems instead of lofty ideas of direct unification. The question in the international arena has therewith changed to how to solve a problem instead of how to obtain regional supremacy.

There are a number of examples that answer the question if functionalism works. The prospect of American and European aid packages to Egypt lowered the threshold for president Sadat to enter in a peace process with Israel. Then there is the example of what may happen in the absence of functionalism. Middle East and North African history could have taken a completely different turn if the offer of Western aid for Egypt's Aswan Dam would not have been withdrawn in 1956. Thus instead of helping Egypt with its hydro-electricity supply, Western countries saw the Soviet Union taking up this project and also the entrance of Cold War relations in the area as a whole.⁶³ For Qadhafi Libya's oil-wealth meant that he did not worry about interdependent economic relations making his foreign policy outlook immune for any functionalist cooperation. The absence of such external balances opened the way for adventurism in international relations.

Table.14.: North Africa, Foreign Relations

Recipient of foreign aid	Member of:			Arab League	EU-Mediterranean cooperation	AMU
	OAU	OIC				

Algeria	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Egypt	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Libya	no	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
Morocco	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Tunisia	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

International cooperation, even in regional structures, has its limitations in the case of territorial disputes. During the War of the Sands between Algeria and Morocco (1963), Rabat rejected mediation by the Arab League because it was thought to be prejudiced against the Moroccan monarchy. Therefore the parties turned to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which indeed showed to be successful in its mediation attempt. Rabat turned its back to Pan-Africanism and the OAU when this continent-wide organisation promised accession to the Western Sahara.⁶⁴ If and when a settlement of the Western Sahara issue will be reached remains an open question. Morocco and Algeria have had different views on the Western Sahara. Nonetheless, countries in the region try to solve the problem, e.g.: talks in Algiers and Tunisian participation in the UN peacekeeping mission MINURSO. Another regional question is the situation in Algeria. The AMU has been influenced by rise of the islamic opposition in Algeria. Since the opening of the political system at the end of the 1980s neighbouring countries have felt uneasy with the tolerance of opposition parties, and especially of FIS. Such was declared at the 1990 Arab Maghreb Union meeting in Tunis. GIA activities have even cooled Algerian-Moroccan relations. The result has been that the economic integration and political cooperation processes with the AMU have been stalled. Despite international concern, foreign mediation in the Algerian conflict has not been welcomed. For instance in February 1995 the Algerian government rejected the French President Mitterand's plan to organize a peace conference. Morocco's king Hassan II got a similar reply when he also proposed a peace conference a month later. International concern about the human rights situation has as well been dismissed. This brings up the question human rights and democracy. According to the UN Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson

human rights are not confined by borders and therefore could not be ignored as an internal affair. This idea has also surfaced in the case of democratisation. The democratisation debate has entered the agenda of solidarity organisations. Both the OAU (1990) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (1991) have made references on the need to adopt multi-party systems.⁶⁵ As important as the inter-Maghreb relations has been regional cooperation in the sphere of trans-Mediterranean contacts or agreements with the European Union and especially the Barcelona document in which the European and Mediterranean states declare to foster human rights and democracy.

Conclusions

North Africa has been an unstable region. On the basis of the idea that solid democracies are needed for stability, the conclusion can be drawn that there is still a long way to go. In any case, it may be concluded from the theoretical survey that democracies are beneficial to peaceful relations. All countries in the region have a strong state-oriented ideology. This general belief in a strong central state does not give much space for dynamic forces. In fact civil society and politics of control do not mix. Whereas in the pre-WWII period democratisation was overshadowed by nationalism, the democratic process more recently is hindered by radicalism in the form of Islamic fundamentalist armed opposition. Both the pre-WWII period and the post-WWII period have also witnessed politics of exclusion which resulted in alienation from government and radicalisation. The problem is that dynamism is taken out of the political process. From the stability indicators it is clear that there remain difficulties facing democratisation during a period of economic hardship. The countries in the region have in the past not linked up with the first and second waves of democratisation, the question remains if they will continue the

democratisation process and finally catch up with the third wave. For Libya the lack of democratic participation and decreasing social-economic conditions do not guarantee any stability.

International cooperation on the functional level has clear benefits for stability and one can conclude that a neo-functional approach to stability will in the end bear fruit. Because it adds to economic and social stability it can also have a positive effect on the democratisation process.

The absence of such an approach could trigger off regional instability as leaders would see no benefit in cooperation, or indeed fall back to adventurism as a means of acquiring regime legitimacy at home. Agreements on democratic values within the neo-functional cooperation schemes can be advantageous for the democratisation process.

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