

**North Atlantic Fellowship Programme
Individual Fellowship Programme
1996 – 1998**

Nationalism in Romania

- Possible ways to decrease the nationalist behaviour
and the public support for nationalist parties -
 - Final report -

Abstract

After over 8 years from the break-down of the communist systems in Europe, Romania seems to be still strongly bounded with its communist past and the political leaders are still in a process of defining their own strategies to address the most controversial problems of the twentieth century: nationalism.

As the nationalism could represent a driving force for economical and social growth, the raising question is if there are possible ways to control it to the level where it could turn to a destructive force versus the protection of other national minority identity.

The research tries to analyse when and how the nationalist feelings moreover political discourse started to be used to win the political power or to consolidate it, and what was or still is the result on the Romanian single voter.

As the first way to win the power in a state is through a political party, the analysis focus on the political life in Romania and started with its very creation in 1918 – 1919 under the Versailles Treaty.

The main identified periods to be analysed are, the first of all, the one of state consolidation between the two world wars, followed by the communist regimes and finally the post Revolutionary period, started in December 1989.

Each period of the Romanian history considered has its own importance and, even one influence and explains the other, they represent different stages into the consolidation of the Romanian nation-state.

The research was completed mostly by gathering direct data on the field, but the analysis couldn't have been possible without the pre-existence of other specific researches and analysis.

The research intended to lead to any possible solution to decrease the too high public support for extreme nationalist political parties in Romania. The taken into consideration of as much factors that could influence the increasing nationalist behaviour led me to a far simple explanation: education and complementary education for adults represent the safest and long-term way to do it. Nationalism is not like a terminal illness; there is a treatment, but it requires long-term commitment, dedication and a strong feeling that it is the only constructive way to do.

Anca Elisabeta Badila

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Anca Elisabeta Badila
Bucharest,
June, 1998

I. Introduction

Looking at the tremendous number of the published books analysing and evaluating its impact, Nationalism seems to be one of the most controversial and difficult to address problems of the twentieth century. Although the hall Europe dialled with the darkness and destructive face of it before and shortly after the Second World War, the former communist Central and Eastern European Countries re-opened in the nineties the Pandora's box in the area of inter-ethnic relations' altogether with the communism's regime collapse.

The break down of the wall between Communist countries and the West of the Europe had an immediate result: the reinforcement of the struggle for national identity of the national and ethnic minorities living in the area. As an immediate result, the

nationalist political parties have been the first and most important beneficiaries of national controversies and the rebirth minority rights claims in the area.

The totalitarian regimes in Europe in the last 50 years destroyed political education and nationalism represented the first and easier choice both for voters and political leaders of the over night new created political parties.

Apart of other many difficulties the ex-communist countries should face, the main difficulty seems to be how to address ethno-politics and to protect minority rights inside a state as a way to avoid the creation of new independent states. The final aim is that to protect the European security and to be a part into the peace building efforts in the area. As one of the priorities from those countries was that to integrate themselves into the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty, minority rights protection and promotion began an important issue to the Central and Eastern European Country's governments.

Western solutions could represent a starting point for this problem, but the already existing education of the people and especially of the political leaders in the region must be considered.

The new comers in "the democratic world" - a world based on democratic involvement of the citizens in the political process and on the powers' differentiation inside the state - have to deal first of all with the great confusion in terms as sovereignty, self-determination and autonomy.

The confusion is mostly based on the communist education in the matter, but also on the break of political and sociological sciences development between the Western and Eastern countries during the last almost 50 years.

The change of the political regimes in the Central and Eastern European Countries destroyed the ideological boundaries and opened "the gates" to the other European

countries. For those countries, sovereignty have been seen for many years only in relation with other state, “merely as a term which designates an aggregate of particular and very extensive claims that states habitually make for themselves in their relations with other states”¹

Sovereignty has also its domestic connotations, expressing the capability of the citizens to decide upon the structure, character and future of their statehood. There are many ways in which sovereignty can be exercised and is more likely to respond to the needs of individuals and groups within each state who are theoretically the repositories of the ultimate sovereign authority.

A solution could be the rule of the majority of the state’s voters, that is not against democratically way to rule a state. But, changes in the international legislation about minority rights had been operated first of all to defend ethnical minorities against the enforcement of the majority’s will. Also territorial artificial partition of a state that provide regions to small to be relevant or to big to ensure an authentic minority voice, could be a democratic way to ruling a state.

Most of the boundaries among ex-Communist countries were drawn after the Versailles Treaty in 1919, which basically intended to solve all the claims for self-determination in Europe. But, in Eastern Europe, minorities continued to represent from roughly 15% to over 50% of the states created after the Versailles Treaty.

After the failure of the Versailles Treaty 1919 to solve all claims for national self-determination - " an expression in succinct form, of the aspiration to rule one's self and not to be ruled by others"² - and so, to eliminate the national minorities in Europe the self-determination principle find out its limits.

"To put it in the simplest possible terms: there is a very large number of potential nations on earth. Our planet contains rooms for a certain number of independent or autonomous political units."³

But the principle itself must be protected and many of the Conveniences adopted by UN, OSCE (former CSCE) and other European bodies highlight the right of self-determination of the people living as a minority group in a state.

The Convenient on Civil and Political Rights (article 27):

"In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their culture, to profess their own religion, or to use their own language."

What can be done to protect their ethnicity

There are enough reasons to affirm that how to address ethno-politics in these countries which started the process of democratisation after 1989 is a big issue for Europe, as a whole, according with its need for stability and security. Ethno-politics - a constructive way to answer to the minorities claims, based on the recognition of the ethnic differences of some of the members of the society and the right to protect it - is a new issue for the ex-communist countries, unprepared to face it.

The principle of equal access to public administration may be insufficient to guarantee an effective minority voice. Even the protection of purely cultural attributes might no become an issues, simply because the minority groups seem to be concerned about their political marginalisation and about economic disadvantages.

Inside a state where political power concentrated itself in a large centralised state government, regular democratic elections could be seen by the individual voter as one largely gesture among millions. There is no direct power to influence your own life

and that of your community in a real way, to see the difference and to feel as a member of your community.

In this situation, the only realistic solution for protecting ethnicity and to respond at the claims for self-determination seems to be to return the power to the local or regional level, as a way of increasing real perceived participation in the political process.

Finding ways to promote and protect minority rights, there are problems that Europe as a hall has to deal with since the beginning of the industrial society. The most important way was to re-define terms as sovereignty, self-determination and autonomy, according with the permanent changes of needs and relationship between nations and states.

Each Central and Eastern European country had to define its own problems and to structure its own strategy to address the nationalist mentalities as a pre-condition to promote and protect minority right.

In Romania, where for a long period the state policy was merely to eliminate the ethnic differences by a strong nationalist policy, it increased a strong demand for creating a real partnership between the political power and the minority groups. The nationalist policy was and is connected with a strong centralised political system. That is to create a very dangerous feeling of disappointment among not only the minority groups, but also among people belonging to the Romanian majority.

The egalitarian policy and the centralisation of the political power provided also a great decrease of the communitarian conscience and practically dissolved the civil society during the communist regime.

What is the present situation in Romania?

When the people were still celebrating on the streets the great victory against the communist regime, the many problems the new democratic state had to face started to show up. Rethinking the entirely new state bureaucracy, modifying the propriety ownership structure – almost owned by the state, organising the pluralist political life and free general elections were only a slide part of these problems.

When the echoes of the great victory against the communist regime were still on the air, a new problem came out on the working table of the Government: the policy on minorities living in Romania, especially the Hungarian one.

The first Government established after December 1989 was took by surprise by the minorities' demands and things evolved to bloody street confrontation, the most important ones being in Targu Mures.

What is going on, what can we do, what had actually been done to come back to normal?

The Hungarian minority demands, on one hand, and the international community pressure on the other hand obliged the Romanian ethnical majority to look itself into a mirror unknown till that moment. On started to talk about nationalism, ultra-nationalism, irredentism – terms almost new for the majority of the Romanian citizens.

Who are we, why everything could happened, how it ended with bloody confrontation between people who peacefully coexisted for so many years?

These are only a few question the Romanian politicians, historians, sociologists, human rights activists tried to answer to.

The official statements at that time and also for a long period after were that the main responsibility belongs to obscure forces hostile to the democracy process from

Romania, forces whiling to put Romania out of the European integration process and being co-ordinated from outside the country. For a long time the majority of the Romanian population actually believed that explanation mainly because it suited with all they learned through the educational system not only during the communist period, also between the two world wars. Moreover, the inhabitants from Transylvania still remembered the horrors of the Second World War and the terror installed by the Hungarian troops. Unfortunately or maybe fortunately also the Hungarian, German and Gypsy minorities started to remember the horrors under the legionary regime, or the newer ones, under the communist regime.

It can't be truth, what they say it can be done by the Romanians, what if that actually happened?

Questions with no answers and talks with no ends. Nothing in the government policy changed, and all the things done between 1990 and 1994 had only the meaning to show the benevolence of the majority not the sincere desire to solve the problem. The '90s also signified the rebirth of the Romanian civil society. Facing a government with every day less interest in minority rights protection and promotion – moreover an ultra-nationalist increasing behaviour-, the NGOs took a leading role in promoting the international conveniences on Minority rights and exposing minority rights violations all over the country

As the largest ethnic minority, the Hungarians living in Romania organised themselves in 1990 as a Democratic Union of the Hungarians from Romania (UDMR). Starting with June 1990's general elections UDMR won constantly about 8% of Parliamentarian sites. According with the Romanian Constitution, the other ethnic minorities are represented by one MP (17 officially recognised national minorities living in Romania), altogether less than 1% of the parliament members.

The more significant representation put the Hungarian minority into a leading position of minority rights protection demands.

The Hungarian minority strong representation in the Romanian Parliament generated all the sudden an ultra-nationalist reaction for political parties with no other political ideology than to preserve and promote the Romanian national integrity of culture and territory. Started with 1990, their political actions and reactions were closely linked with the minorities' demands, especially the Hungarian one. There is the case of the Great Romania Party (PRM), Romanians' National Unity Party (PUNR) and, since 1992, the Democratic Salvation Front's branch leaded by the former President of Romania – Ion Iliescu – (Social Democracy's Party of Romania – PDSR-).

In 1994, under the international pressure and recognising the need for external economic help to cover the national budget deficit and to restructure the entirely economic system, the Government (a political coalition of PRM, PUNR and PDSR) changed its attitude at least regarding the Hungarian minority. They accepted some amendments to the Romanian – Hungarian bilateral treaty regarding the Hungarian minority protection, enough to be signed in September 1996. But the nationalistic statements of representatives from governmental coalition (PDSR, PUNR, and PRM) continued even more during the general election campaign in 1996's autumn. Even the European Campaign to struggle against intolerance, xenophobia, racism and anti-Semitism to be run in all the European countries and started in 1994 had been confiscated by the state's structures. It has been soon enough transformed into a travelling campaign for the most loyal officials from the parties in power. It was really bizarre to see how much sudden interest official loyal to Great Romania Party (PRM) or Romanians National Union Party (PUNR) – the most nationalist political

parties in Romania – could show to a goal completely opposed to their political platform.

Although declared as modern European parties and the most democratic ones, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Christian – Democrat Party (PNTCD), the leading members of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) as a political coalition, embraced a nationalistic speech to present their political platform during the 1996 general electing campaigning.

Despite the nationalistic discourse, the November 1996 general elections changed not only the coalition in power but also the perception on the minority rights and their need to be promoted. The new coalition in power consisting in CDR (Democratic Convention of Romania) and USD (Social Democratic Union) invited also the UDMR to be a part of it. That was not only to politically support the Parliamentarian activity, but also to play an active role into the Government

Politically, that was a public recognition of the multiethnic structure of the Romanian society and an underling of the serious future preoccupation of the Government to bring to life the international covenants on minority rights ratified by the Romanian State. Moreover, the new elected President of Romania, Emil Constantinescu, also the Prime Minister, Victor Ciorbea invited the civil society to co-operate to find and promote practical solutions to the issue. They also recognised that the state structures and public workers are not prepared to the change their attitude over night. There is a strong need for assistance and training for the public administration representatives and any kind of help is more then welcome.

During his first official visit in Covasna (92% Hungarian inhabitants) on Eastern Holidays, the new appointed in march 1998 Prime Minister, Radu Vasile, reinstated the Government concern to promote minority rights.

The Prime Minister Radu Vasile also declared in April 1998 at the European Union General Assembly session that the Rroma community's problems must be a first priority in 1998 if Romania wishes to be a full member of the European Union.

The change of attitudes show up that, even the political will is essential, it is not enough to solve the many related problems to minority rights promotion and protection.

Through the Department for protection of national minorities (leaded at the moment by an UDMR's representative) the government tried to evaluate the real situation and possible ways to protect minority rights in Romania. If the evaluation proved to be somehow possible to be completed in 2 or 3 years (special difficulties came out concerning the Rroma minority), the practical solutions are more difficult to imagine, not to mention to put in practice.

The government wishes to initiate and adopt a long-term strategy on minority rights protection. But, in order not to be influenced by the political changes of the coalition in power, this strategy must be elaborated and adopted through a more public procedure. As the Government is confronting with many economic and financial problems and even at the Government level there are not enough specialists in ethnic policy, the NGOs support is very important.

An even more difficult problem is that to ensure a public support for that new policy on minority rights promotion and protection through a sustainable educational process. To change an entirely educational system from a strong nationalistic one to a tolerant, open to differences one is not an easy thing to do and the effort must be politically supported on a long-term base.

II. The contemporary history of the Romanian nationalism

1. The 1918 – 1946 period

Known into the historical studies and students' classes also as the Great Romania (to compare it with the present Romania's boundaries), the first Romanian State had been created after the First World War as a direct consequence of the Versailles Treaty undersigned by the European countries in 1919.

Ethnical identity of the population in the region had been of great importance at the time. As the declared Romanian population represented more than 2/3 of the inhabitants, it seems that the new boundaries put the Romanians and a very few other ethnical minority populations into a strong national state.

According with the *Statistic Annual of Romania for 1937 and 1938* (about 20 years after the creation of the state), the Great Romania's population had a very heterogeneous distribution of the ethnical vu, also religious one. The Romanian population represented 71,9% and lived mostly on the old Romanian territories, namely the Old Kingdom.⁴ Through the unification process under the Versailles Treaty, the Romanian population suddenly became not only ethnically "diminished", but the urban – rural equilibrium balanced in favour of the rural Romanian population. The ethnic Romanian population represented only 58,6% of the urban population.⁵ Inside the Old Kingdom three quarters of the urban population were Romanians, but only one quarter of them were ethnical Romanians in the new provinces.

Together with the historical and cultural background differences of the population living in Romania at the time, that rural predominate component indicate a great need for a vast, well structured and strongly supported by the Government educational programme. The process of the new national state creation and consolidation included not only the external recognition and capacity to enter into relationship with

other state as an equal partner, but also the internal need for a cultural common identity.

Strongly affected by the war, the Romanian economy had to face extremely difficult problems and to rediscover its potential to grow. As the emergence of the nation-states was that to create “smaller more manageable units”⁶ and to address the question of the economical growth at the beginning of the industrial age, nationalism seemed to be the tool to do it in a shorter possible time. The nationalist model analysed by Ernst Gellner “was generated by the introduction of three factors that alone really matter: power, education, and shared culture, in the senses intended”⁷.

The political life of the Great Romania was dominated by the same political parties, moreover public personalities who actively fight for the creation of the state and had been involved into the Romanian nationalistic movements before the war. In the Old Kingdom, two political parties dominated the political life: the Conservative Party and the National Liberal one. The newly created Peasant Party was merely a way to divide the social democratic movement and to offer an alternative for the rural population.

Since the new constitutional arrangements in 1864, the National Party represented the Romanian population from Transylvania. Most of its members came from a cultural movement, “Scoala Ardeleana”, the main aim being that to promote a national Romanian conscience among the ethnical Romanians living in Transylvania.

After 1919, the National Party from Transylvania had to redefine its aims and continued to formally exist till 1926. Although in 1921 – 1922 some of its members joined the Conservative or the National Liberal Party, the official unification was that in 1926 with the Peasant Party

As a direct consequence of their external pro – Germanic policy, the popularity and also the public support for the Conservative Party continued to decease in the ’20s.

The electoral and land-ownership reforms gave a final stroke to the Conservative Party and put it into a difficult political position. In 1921 and 1922 they managed to absorb a part of the National Party from Transylvania's members and regain some electoral support in that region. The new created political party, the People's Party, won the elections in 1920 with 209 sites of 369, but only 11 sites in the Parliament in the 1922's general elections under the new electoral regulation, against the 260 sites obtained by the National Liberal Party.

Also popular among the big landowners, the National Liberal Party gain more popularity after the First World War through the results of the Versailles Treaty in favour of the new created state, the Great Romania. Its leader, Ion I.C.Bratianu was highly recognised as a big political personality and a fighter for the Romanian territory unification. The political Programme launched by the liberals in 1920 and, shortly after, the Romanian Constitution adopted in 1923 was criticised in the new provinces. The two documents had been seen as against the new existing minorities and in favour of a far more centralisation of the power at the state level then the Proclamation from Alba Iulia declared in 1918.

“Unification and centralisation were in favour of the Old Kingdom and opposed to the provinces, of Romanians versus the minorities and of liberal party versus all the others”.⁸

The popularity of the National Liberal Party was therefore not that big inside Transylvania and the other new provinces, during the ‘20s. Therefore, the Party's leaders explored the possibility to get some more public support in the region through new members coming from the National Party from Transylvania. Although negotiated and desired, the unification between the two political parties wasn't

possible. The Transylvanians, through their leader Iuliu Maniu, preferred a less important party, the Peasant Party, but easier to determine its policy and platform

In 1926 the political parties joined and founded the National Peasant Party.

The general election in 1928 represented a big victory for the new created political party and even a bigger failure for their political opposition, the National Liberals. To win the general elections in 1928 turned to be the easier part for the National Peasant Party. Romania's big economical problems inherited from the First World War altogether with the world economical crash represented a far to difficult task for the Government. The elections from 1932 represented a new victory for the liberals, perceived as the only solution for Romania at the time.

The Versailles Treaty and the birth of the Great Romania as a state had an important impact not only on the demographic, social and territorial aspects, but influenced in a very drastically way also the political life.

No political party was prepared in 1919 – 1920 to assume an immediate national role. Their background and former activity created competence and competitiveness only at the level of their original region. The political culture differed and the internal structure of the political parties was more informal and based on public leaders known mostly at that level. The victory of the National Peasant Party in 1928 was also a result of divided task strategy between the two leaders, Iuliu Maniu (in Transylvania) and Ion Mihalache (in the Old Kingdom). They campaigned in 1928 in the region where they were well known, Iuliu Maniu in Transylvania and Ion Mihalache in the Old Kingdom. At that time, all political parties had a highly centralised internal structure and way of taking decisions. Both liberals and peasants were represented and co-ordinated by a leader with strong, almost dictatorial powers, inside the organisation. Even more, the National Liberal Party was perceived as the Bratianu

Family's political party. The first non- Bratianu leader was I.G.Duca at the ends of the 30's, but that was because he has been specially nominated by the Bratianu family. The new comer into the political life, the National Peasant Party combined the Old Kingdom "tradition" that to "ownership" the political party with the more democratic one developed in Transylvania by the National Party. As the representation as a single voice in the Transylvania's Parliament (Dieta from Cluj) was of big importance for the promotion and protection of ethnical Romanian population, the political leaders developed a pattern of cohabitation. The president of the National Party had also a strong decision power, but there were enough other leading personalities to prefer a more democratic decision -making system.

Their system influenced also the liberals and the democratisation of the party became a necessity to preserve the public image and to increase the popularity of the liberals outside the Old Kingdom territories.

The King Carol I had a very important role in the political life developed system in the Old Kingdom territory. He always preferred to deal first of all with politicians and secondly with political parties. For him, the political parties represented only the support group for a politician and never looked at them as structures to develop and put in practice political strategies.

After 1916, King Ferdinand didn't practise the old Carol strategy to deal with the power and be that much involved into the political life of Romania. A considerable influence on him had his wife, Queen Maria coming from the Great Britain Royal House with far more democratic traditions of a political life.

The two factors had an important influence to the gradual change of the political parties after 1920 - 1926, not only from regional to national, but also from pseudo - democratic internal power structure to an increasingly democratic one.

The immediate result was the growing fractionalism of the political parties and, accordingly, an unstable political life also governments, at least cabinets.

In 1930 the National Peasant Party managed to re-nominate Carol the second as King of Romania. Son of King Ferdinand and having a tumultuous personal life, Carol the second had been forced by the liberals to give up his right to the kingdom in 1927 and to exile himself outside Romania.

Since his return in 1930, Carol the Second gradually reduced the power of the political parties and the Parliament till 1938 when his dissolved both the Parliament and the political parties and denied any other political power then his. The decision was also motivated by the growing public support for the nationalist parties, especially for the Legionary Party – as the ultimate expression of nationalism. The Legionary Party had been strongly supported by an initially cultural, latter para-military movement, *Garda De Fier* (Iron Guard). The Iron Guard had also an external support coming from the National – Socialist Party from Germany

It was more a preliminary influence on the internal political life in Romania, coming from Hitler's camarilla.

The unification process and the creation of the integrated national Romanian State claimed also “the unification of educational system organisational structure into a single type of Unitarian school”.⁹

The unification process wasn't an easy one. There were 4 major types of educational structures developed in different circumstances under different cultural influences.

“The unification took place on a great degree under the direct order and terms imposed by the Old Kingdom which institutions played a disproportionate great role into the growth boundaries State”¹⁰

The change into the educational system had been a great opportunity to reduce the minorities' liberties and to promote an increasing nationalist movement among the new generation. “In Romania, we should look for the origins of the fascism among the nationalist students’ movement – the 1922 generation.”¹¹

Started by all the traditionally political parties in the ‘20s as a necessity for national unitarian system of government, the integration of the other national minorities created its own monsters – the ultra-nationalist political parties. The victory of the National Peasant Party in 1928 based on a very nationalistic discourse and the treat for the new and unstable state, generated year after year more nationalistic political discourses, demand for national homogeneity and denied of minority rights.

During the Second World War, Maresal Antonescu, in the same time commander of the national Romanian army and chief of the government, dominated the political life. There is no way to dissolve patriotism from nationalism under those circumstances and the Maresal Antonescu continues to be a very controversial personality.

His supporters remember only the good nationalist, patriotic speeches, while his contestants remember more the force camps for Jewish and Gypsy population. In a way, the Maresal Antonescu governance put to an end the “educational” and “cultural” reforms, aiming to create a new kind of culture, the Romanian one, to be shared by all the inhabitants of the state.

23rd August 1944 is identified in the Romanian history as the turnover moment during the war. The Romanian Army breaks the coalition with the Germans and integrates itself into anti-German offensive. It also signifies the came back to a regular political life, as the political parties were again aloud to exist and to organise general elections. The 1923 Constitution was again in place and, in 1946, after the end of the war, there've been organised general elections.

Seemed like everything was in place again, but the Soviet Union's Army played an important role influencing or even worst mystifying the results of the elections. It was only to cover under a democratic system the enforcement of the communist regime.

II. The communist period (1946 – 1989)

As a concession to the “help” of putting to an end the war against the allied army, the Soviet Union ‘s Army demanded a legal status for the Romanian Communist Party declared illegal in 1923. The new Romanian Communist Party tried to get together the social democrats and the communists under the name of Romanian Labour Socialist Party (PSMR).

In 1946, through general elections, the PSMR (supported by other non-political movements controlled by the communists) came into power. The new political party in power was completely controlled by the Comintern, namely by the Russian communists. It was the starting point o a long communist governance till December 1989. No other political party coexisted after 1947 with the Romanian Communist Party’s dictatorial regime.

“While it has been suggested that the communist states do not recognise any legal limits on state sovereignty, a leading Soviet writer (G.I.Tunkin) does affirm the principles of non-interference in internal affairs and equality of states and peoples, although these socialist principles supposedly “differ fundamentally from the corresponding principles of general international law””¹²

A new kind of nationalist had been developed under the first years of communist regime. It supposed that the national differences came after the more important issue of class differentiation. There is only a working class and the people must be united

“without national, religious and race differences”. It was more likely that the result of that policy will be a forced assimilation of all the national minorities. As about the religious differences, religion suddenly became “a tool used by the bourgeoisie to dominate the labours and the peasants and to maintain a perpetual Dark Age for the regular people”. For many years these sentences were always present in any official discourse or document of the communist party.

The occupation Soviet army forces dictated also the political strategy and conduct of the Romanian Governments for more than a decade. As the first liberal government in the ‘20s, they started with the rethinking of the educational system and ideological purification of scholarly manuals. Willingness to show up as protectors for the Jewish population and opposing the fascists conduct against ethnical minorities, gave an unconditionally credit to any Jewish person and “protected” the Germans through forced mass dislocations from their original places to unbelievable difficult to live regions, as the Baragan.

The denationalisation process directly co-ordinated by Moscow officially stopped at the beginning of the ‘60s and another, more subtle way to assimilate the minority group populations had been developed.

“After a short period of domestic liberalisation in the 1960s, Ceausescu initiated a ruthless anti-minority campaign under the heading of “homogenisation”, an euphemism for assimilation”.¹³

Step by step, Ceausescu developed a strange kind of personality cult around his leader position. It has been glorified and compared with the greatest personalities from the Romanian history as Michel de Brave or Stefan the Great. All his speeches must be considered as “ideological thesis” and reproduced entirely on all publications, journals, even on the cover page of scholar books.

His discourse followed somehow the same themes that had dominated the Romanian political discourses between 1919 and 1946 – “the country historic glory, the origins of Romanian ethnicity, the nature of the “national essence”, and, perhaps most vociferously, the preservation of national unity.”¹⁴

The assimilation policy of Ceausescu’s regime evolved into a tyranny through the new developed in the ‘80s “systematisation policy”. Motivated by the big earthquake dramatic consequences in 1978 in Bucharest and by the distractions provoked by the overflows in the ‘70s, the new policy intended to destroy all cultural heritage of the national and religious minorities, but also of the Romanian population cultural, moreover regional, heritage.

If at the beginning the course of national independence won Ceausescu’s the Romanian population’s sincere admiration, destroying of churches, century old buildings both belonging to the majority or minority historical heritage, and finally the destruction of entire villages put to end the admiration and started to grow the anger.

When the revolution started in December 1989 in Timisoara, Ceausescu gave an ultimate example of how the nationalist discourse can be used to cover the reality. “From what are Romanians “defending” the “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of their “ancestors’ land”, if not from Magyar irredentism or Soviet domination?”¹⁵

The last nationalistic statements of Ceausescu as President of Romania also of the Communist Party were reproduced for years into political documents almost with the same connotation and in very similar situations by the new democratic post-revolutionary regime and its leaders. That shows up a strong nationalist education and the lack of knowledge of what is about a multiethnic society/ state.

3. Romania in the ‘90s. Post- revolutionary period.

In December 1989, the National Salvation Front – a political platform to rule the country till the first free general elections to be organised in 1990 - adopted a series of urgent juridical regulation packages to start the democratisation process. One of them was the Law-Decree nr.8/ December 1989 to give the right to the Romanian citizens to create political parties and to be involved into the political life.

The historical National Liberal Party, the Christian Peasant National Party and the Social Democrat Party took immediately this opportunity and registered themselves as juridical entities early January 1990.

The educational communist background altogether with the mystified history learned in schools for decades reduced the public support for these political parties and generated a dangerous tendency to create new, obscure political parties. More than 200 political parties have been registered by May 1990 when the first general free elections have been organised. Adopted as an extreme urgency, the law had no specific demands for the political programmes and platforms. Moreover, the lawyers fund themselves completely unprepared to sustain, explain or judge decisions based on legal regulation adopted before the communist regime.

By a series of fortunate contexts, some and basic regulation previous the communist regime were still active and the communist regime not even intended to modify or to annulled them through a special law. There was accordingly no real control registration of a political party and some extremist political parties appeared covered by the general enthusiasm.

To increase the general confusion, the President of the National Salvation Front – Ion Iliescu – declared initially that the political parties must operate only at the regional

level (judet). That could have been a solution to preserve a more important role for the National Salvation Front as the national level needed platform to rule the country

In Transylvania both Romanians and Hungarian started to look at an ethnica representation. It has been created the Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania, but also the Romanians National Unity's Party (PUNR) to be supported by the ethnical Romanians from Transylvania, and not only.

To increase the public support for the PUNR, a “cultural” extreme nationalist movement was created namele *Vatra Romaneasca*.

“The establishment of Vatra Romaneasca as a nationalist cultural association was a very cleaver, Mafia-style solution for those people who were banned from public political life, but who wanted to organise themselves,” explains Smaranda Enache, a former dissident from Targu -Mures and today one of the Romania’s most respected leader of the non-political life.

Shortly after the Romanian revolution, the former communist Nomenclatura had an extremely delicate position on public opinion. There were since December 1989 a lot of discussions about the right of the former Nomenclatura’s members to participate or not into the public, especially political life. As the situation was unstable and a general opinion wasn’t expressed as a strong demand in favour or against, to create a cultural association represented the best possible solution. More then that, behind the public cultural personalities, Vatra Romaneasca’s majority members were represented by former Securitate workers. They were highly trained to deal with ethnical treats and fears to maintain a permanent anxiety at the mass level as a part of “homogenisation” process. For them, wining sites in the Romanian Parliament int the coming elections was of exceptional importance to protect their future.

The electoral campaign in favour of PUNR started through Vatra Romaneasca cultural events were party's leaders participate as good Romanians concerned of the ethnical identity not to mention security of their co-nationals. Time started to run and the other historical political parties seemed to increase their electoral support in Transylvania simply because especially the old population remained them before the Second World War.

Step by step hostile reactions to UDMR initiatives surface in the press and Romanian television broadcasting. To any Hungarian initiative, statement or demonstration, there was immediately organised other Romanian counter-demonstration or public declarations. More and more claims for language and cultural protection for the Hungarian minority came into the public discussion. In March 1990 a Hungarian demonstration followed by a Romanian counter – demonstration turned into a baldly street confrontation. Radu Ciontea, recently named President of Vatra Romaneasca cultural movement, explained into an intervention at the Romanian Television, reproduced after that by the press:

“After almost a thousand years of foreign domination in Transylvania, it is difficult for the Hungarians to forget their behaviour as rulers. These absurd claims ...are designed to give them not only the rights that they had in the past, that they have now, and that they will have in the future – maintained in line with the Romania’s new democratic status – but also “special” rights that are not specific to minorities.... Romania is not a multinational state but a national unitary state in which different percentages of minorities live. And no minority is permitted favours just because its ancestors were oppressors for centuries!”

A very ambiguous statement declaimed with a baritone voice by a person looking as a typical Transylvanian priest. Fears, negative expectations, religious impact to justify

the injustice, altogether created a strong impact and PUNR won parliamentarian sites for more than 6 years only on that subject. Manipulation of the public opinion was too obvious to claim for spontaneity and deep routed Romanian national feelings.

As a result of the publicity around PUNR especially in 1990, the party won about 8% of the sites in 1992 (the same percentage as UDMR), but only 3% in 1996 for the upper Camera (the Senate) of the Parliament. For the Deputy Chamber PUNR didn't manage to won any site (not enough to pass the electoral minimum required entering percentage for the Deputy Chamber).

The public support for PUNR was and still is strong in Transylvania, but the Ol Kingdom area “needed” a more closely related and easier to see on place nationalis party. More than that, other ethnic minority could represent a good focusing issue. There is the case of the Jewish minority. The Jewish community had a similar bu some how different history in Romania. Representing a strong and economically powerful minority before the creation of the Romanian State under the Versailles Treaty from 1919, it had been a subject of mass genocide under the Maresal Antonescu's regime during the Second World War. Ceausescu developed a special strategy to solve the problems coming from this practical impossible to assimilate minority. Practically he developed a selling strategy for the ethnic Jewish populati on a good price to their more wealthy relatives from United States or Israel. For the rebirth nationalism and its new leaders, the Jewish minority could represent in 1990 a good, rich subject of nationalist propaganda.

Moreover, there were a lot of inspiring material from the Legionary Party and it support para-military organisation, the Iron Guard.

In June 1990 a new strange weekly newspaper started to be published in Bucharest. Fourth months after its first number, *Romania Mare* circulation jumped to 600,000,

the largest of all of the Romanian weeklies. In May 1991, the leading personality of the “cultural” magazine – Carnelius Vadim Tudor – becomes the president in charge of the newly created *Romania Mare Party*. The political platform and had the same unclear and paranoid languages and strongly support the idea of a police state as logical solution to all the problems for which only the democratic system is to blame. The permanent anti-Semite campaign and looking after Jewish – Hungarian disguised spies, The Romania Mare Party (PRM) won between 4% and 7% of electoral options in 1992, 1996 and is in the same position today on the periodic public poles. The biggest percentage of voters had been constantly obtained in Bucharest and around the city. That explained the more and more obvious tendency of PRM to “address” the gypsy minority problem, the stronger ethnical minority in the region.

Incapable to lunch a clear political platform based on a clear political doctrine; PDSR (lead by Ion Iliescu and growth from the deceased National Salvation Front) used constantly the same nationalist discourse. PDSR’s leaders nationalist discourse legitimated the two previously described party, and the PUNR and PRM statements and actions sustained the moderate nationalist public image of PDSR and Ion Iliescu. As a result, PDSR was and still is the strongest public supported political party in Romania by 24 to 30% of the expressed votes.

During the 1996 general electoral campaign, the Democratic Convention (National Liberal Party – PNL- and Christian Peasant National Party – PNTCD) suddenly started to use an increasing nationalist discourse. Moreover, Radu Ciontea became member of the National Liberal Party in November 1995 and had been appointed as first candidate of the party in Targu Mures. Only the last minute decision prevented him to become an MP again, this time on the other side of the table. After a close look

and analysis, it was more about a devious strategy to cut the head of the most regional political powerful party, PUNR.

Apart from adapting their strategy to the existing level of declared or potential support for the nationalist political party, the democratic parties – PNL and PNTCD – didn't do anything concrete to decrease the level of nationalist public support for the ultra-nationalist parties.

The only public personality with a constant moderate and European discourse was and is the Romanian President Emil Constantinescu. He also strongly supported UDMR to be and stay a part of the governmental coalition together with CDR and USD (the Union of Social – Democrats).

As for the 1990 to 1996 period more or less the government was appointed by the same formal or informal coalition (PDSR, PUNR and PRM) and promoted a constant policy of denying Minority Rights, after November 1996 the situation changed.

On one hand the UDMR participation into the government coalition implies some concrete actions to improve the minority rights situation in Romania, as more local autonomy through local financial strategies and the right to use the minority's languages in public circumstances (local administration, court, etc.). Till 1996 the only dialogue of the government with the national minorities was through the Council of National Minorities, an informal body consisting of representatives of the national minorities represented in the Romanian Parliament (under Constitutionally special arrangements). In March 1997 the government created a permanent formal structure to address the minority rights problems. There is the case of The Department for the Protection of the National Minorities. A Minister directly subordinated to the Prime Minister leads the Department. The other structure, the Council continues to exist as a practical way to sustain a permanent dialogue with minorities' representative. Also

the Government is allocating annually a budget to some support of the cultural and operational activities of the organisations representing each minority.

On the other hand, the extreme nationalist political parties – PRM and PUNR – constantly try to blame UMDR participation into the government for all the economic problems, national currency depreciation related to the US Dollar, coalition misunderstandings and frictions, the low speed of privatisation process and hard to take decisions which leads to the increasing number of unemployment.

That is merely a way to retain their public image and public attention on their parties.

Other usual practices are those to publicly expose government members as former members of the Securitate or informers for the communist Securitate. When no other public event came to the public attention, especially PRM is creating ones by denouncing secret convenience with the Hungarian irredentism for Hungary or from the United States of America, or making public supposed documents from the former Securitate. The gain is almost the same, but it kept the public attention at the same supporting level.

The reaction from the democratic parties is very thin and most there are concentrated to solve problems and not to educate the electors. Moreover, when it turns to nation, national and nationalism not all the coalition members are speaking the same language. The older part of the PNL and PNTCD are still strongly related with the concepts inherited from their parents, relatives or simply political model from inside their political parties. As the period between the two world wars was a strongly nationalist one and the political discourse and programme of each party was designed to respond to the related period trends, needs, fears and expectations, that lead to an incoherent present political discourse of PNL and PNTCD leaders.

The recent pole conducted by Curs reviled than about 49% of the Romania's citizens couldn't say for what political party they would vote and the trust into the political system and parties reached only a level of 14%.

III. Conclusions

After the successful Romanian Revolution in December 1989 there were two kind of democratic model on most of the people's mind: the liberalisation period at the beginning of the '60s during the communist regime, and the democratic period of the Great Romania between the two world wars.

The first option was generated by the recalling of the economic growth related to that period when for the first time after the Second World War the distractions weren't at place and the Russian occupation Army get back to the Soviet Union. As most of the Romania's population wasn't born or they were too young to understand the regimes before the communist one, this is the better period the population could remember.

The second option belongs to the elder population or those with dramatic consequences for their life under the communist regime.

The only part of the Romania's population with no better or ideal image about a certain period since the creation of the state are the national minorities. There are no other memories than the promises of the Alba Iulia's Proclamation from 1918.

Analysing the half nationalist history of the Romanian State as it was created under the Versailles treaty in 1919, we must reconsider the two-idealistic image of the "Romanian democracy". There are no reasons to strongly affirm that Romania experienced democracy other than the pluralistic political life. The restricted vote to men with a certain financial situation, the lack of political rights for women, the

violations of minority rights and not to speak about the assimilation policy put in practice by the communist regime, especially under Ceausescu's regime, qualified Romania for a new emerge democracy.

Seen that way, there are more understandable the incapacity of the most democratic political parties to elaborate and put in practises a coherent strategy to protect minority rights. The inconsistency and incoherent political discourse of those parties qualified and legitimate the nationalist and ultra-nationalist parties. The educational system based on highly nationalistic values qualified and ensures the public support for those parties.

As the first demand at the beginning of the '20s was that to create the nation-state as an articulate unit capable to respond to economic needs and necessity for economic growth, the '90s claim the need for mutual respect and understanding between nations. The international community evolved and developed new concepts based on mostly extremely displeased experiences, as the former Yugoslavia example.

A growing culture of peace and peace building strategies and tools conducted the international bodies like UN, OSCE or European Council to adopt specific regulations. To become a member of the international community is not enough to undersign them, but each state needs to develop internal system to promote and put them into practice.

Due to the potential of instability and violence that ethnic conflicts contain, also due to the fact that these conflicts usually have transitional components, complains related to, and claims for minority rights should be considered seriously by any responsive government. Claims for various forms of autonomy and self-determination, even the most questionable ones, cannot be simply rejected or ignored; neither the policy of

closed eyes, nor the coercive approach can help anymore the government to establish and maintain the social peace.

When conflicts are ethnic in character, negotiation and comprise from both sides are the only constructive solutions that can prevent violence and war. Although minorities might have their own contribution to the escalation of ethnic conflicts, the state remains the main responsible for whatever destructive outcomes may generate such conflicts; the state has the legitimacy and the tools, necessary to ensure equality, non-discrimination and a climate of co-operation among various communities; it has not only the power, but the responsibility to ensure equal chances for all its citizens, not only for the numerically dominant majority.

Although the former communist states may have in common the heritage of centralised power and nationalist discourse, although inter-ethnic relations in these countries have similar causes and features, each one is, however a particular case. The reasons of the failures of these countries in tackling ethnic conflicts are various: economic difficulties, deep-rooted prejudices, political instability or paradoxical combination of strength and weakness of the state fundamental institutions. For the Romanian case, some reasons are of particular importance: the lack of political culture, the immaturity of the new political class and the lack of political well-defined will. In a period in which the new political regime has the challenging task to empower new concepts and policies, a political class created on the run often fails in dealing with complex and sensitive issues, such as the ethnic one. Romanian public officials found themselves in the situation to run the country without having, in most cases, the basic knowledge of the philosophical background of democracy, rule of law and Human Rights. They had got involved in a challenging process of learning by doing, a process that did not always generate constructive outcomes.

If the above mentioned realities may be justified to some extent, a still serious problem is that part of the Romanian politicians still ignore the importance of a basic political culture, necessary for a realistic evaluation and decision-making. One concrete example is the above-discussed concept of autonomy, which generated serious misunderstandings for both minorities and majority. Each party tackle this principle from different perspectives: the state seems to accept only autonomy as a result of the administrative decentralisation while minorities, especially the Hungarian one, claim for an autonomy to self-determination and federalism.

The Romanian government, sometimes voluntarily, sometimes under the international pressure, committed itself to protect the rights of individuals belonging to national minorities, but the ways and means of exercising these rights are still controversial subjects. Following both legal norms and political discourse, one can say that the government considers the international Human Rights, while minorities rights take them only as a minimum and insufficient basis for the preservation of their ethnic identity. However, claims for collective rights, positive discrimination and self-governance are considered unjustified and are rejected by the Romanian majority.

The permanent constructive dialogue between the two parties is of essential importance, and the present openness must be maintained as much as possible. The two parties needs to growth together and the better understand their own needs, expectations and mostly what they can offer to help the other party.

Is not an easy process and the results are difficult to predict.

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