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THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A PROCESS OF ADAPTATION

1. Introduction

The Partnership for Peace has been a puzzling process. It was surrounded initially by a great deal of uncertainty, ambiguity, confusion and hesitancy. Yet, it turned into a major success, going well beyond the original intentions of its architects. The success of PFP was utterly unforeseeable and unexpected in the early stages of the program.

Early on, the Partnership was constantly and consistently portrayed in dualistic terms. It was either a failure to proceed with enlargement or it was a prudential way of proceeding with it. Ken Myers, a key aide of Senator Richard Lugar, one of the most influential proponents of enlarging the Alliance, argued that PFP started out as simply a diplomatic device but was taken in hand by the NATO authorities to become more than initially intended, that is a vehicle for enlargement.\(^1\) In a different analysis, the weakness of PFP resided in that it gave all the countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union the same potential relationship with NATO which is absurd. Thus, the result of

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PFP was to postpone the difficult decisions about the enlargement of the Alliance.² PFP was alternatively portrayed as a platform for platitudes and as possibilities for progress.³ PFP figured in the debate either as a way of ducking decisions rather than making them or as a realistic way of avoiding the isolation of Russia and promoting the adaptation of the Central and East European states aspiring for membership in NATO.⁴ For some analysts, the Partnership was in no way an attempt to go along with the Russian requests that NATO expansion go slowly.⁵ In this view the Partnership would help ensure that an expanded NATO remains as strong as today’s Alliance and it would make it possible to stabilize the relations with Russia by recommitting it to the Partnership. For other analysts, the political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe are unreliable and therefore it would make more sense to improve the Partnership for Peace than to enlarge the Alliance.⁶ A commentator even went as far as to refer to the first military exercise held under PFP as "a hastily convened military kabuki play".⁷

There was also a propensity in many Partner states to conceive of PFP from the perspective of NATO enlargement. The Partnership was considered by many states as an intermediary phase which implies the prospect of a phase beyond PFP. Many states did not hesitate to detect areas of cooperation with NATO pointing beyond PFP and promoting the issue of enlargement. This area beyond PFP was a matter of hope for some while it was a matter of desperation for others. The Russian position was to consistently link cooperation in PFP to a postponement of the enlargement process. The comments made against conceiving of PFP from the perspective of NATO enlargement did not go far enough in assessing the dimensions of PFP. US Defense Secretary William Perry pointed out, for instance, that the discussion on NATO enlargement was somewhat off the point and off the mark. NATO enlargement was not the most important dynamic that was going on in European stability; it was rather the Partnership for Peace. In a similar vein, PFP was not to be considered as a single coherent, monolithic scheme but rather as a framework accommodating several different purposes and flexible enough to further those purposes simultaneously. The Partnership served this way as an intensification of NATO's outreach, as a framework for joint engagement, as a means of NATO membership and as a way of accommodating Russia. These comments did not grasp, for instance, how much the Partnership for Peace was a large-

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scale socialization process. Socialization is, however, a two-way process. In the case of PFP this means that all of the participants, including the wide range of partner states and NATO states engaged in a process of thorough and mutual adaptation.

In this paper, I have three aims. One of them is to demonstrate that the Partnership for Peace has been a puzzling process. The second aim is to demonstrate that the success of PFP has been brought about by a manifold process of adaptation. The third is to demonstrate that the credibility of PFP was crucial in this process of adaptation while the success of PFP added in turn to its credibility. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in the following way. In the section devoted to the success of PFP, the paper will use some of the dimensions of this success to better expose the puzzle of the PFP process. Next, the paper turns to the socialization process that had a major role in the successfulness of PFP. Then, the paper examines the credibility of PFP in order to detect its various elements. The following section focuses on some of the possible problems PFP may meet in the subsequent stages of its course. Finally, in the concluding section, I will sum up some of the proposals that can be made based upon this paper in order to sustain the momentum and further enhance the success of PFP.

II. Success

As I have demonstrated in the introduction, PFP was exposed to a great deal of uncertainty. At the launching of the idea, and even in the initial phases of the program it was totally unforeseeable that it would develop into a major success. Later on, the Partnership proved to be a resounding success.

The successfulness of PFP has not gone unnoticed. In the view of an observer, the Partnership for Peace has gotten off to a highly successful start after initial hesitations. While in 1994 only four PFP military exercises were organized, in 1995 eight exercises took place (four in Partner nations and four in NATO states), in 1996 fourteen exercises were held, and in 1997 twenty-four exercises have been scheduled.¹² But PFP is not made up only of exercises. The program will extend to at least 1,000 activities in 1996-97 according to the Secretary General of NATO.¹³ These activities include, beyond PFP exercises proper, exercises "in the spirit of" PFP, educational exchanges and seminars on a wide range of issues.

These seminars are not supposed to deal merely with military matters. The NATO scientific conference organized in Szeged (Hungary) in March 1996 was an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that PFP goes beyond narrowly

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military matters. This particular seminar brought together 120 scholars from 19 European and overseas countries. The conference was organized at the joint initiative of the University of Szeged and the Syracuse University, while NATO’s center assisting civilian research supported financially the conference which addressed high-tech research.  

PFP proved successful not only in terms of the wide range of activities and topics it has covered but also in terms of going well beyond the original intentions of its initiators. Indeed, the original intentions were rather uncertain, confuse, and unstructured. The initial thrust behind PFP was not so much to provide an initiative which would address specific problems and promise specific solutions but rather to correct the insufficient eastern policies of the Alliance. A major insufficiency of these eastern policies was that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was lacking a defense-ministerial component and this way an operational dimension. The restricted initial scope of PFP is well demonstrated by the idea that the "Partnership" was to be conceived of as the peacekeeping dimension of NACC. PFP was originally proposed at SHAPE as a "Partnership for Peacekeeping" under the military to military contacts portion of NACC.

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16. ibid, p. 27.
The initial scope of PFP was restricted because the initial intentions related to PFP were limited and unstructured themselves. These intentions, if put together, do not make up a very consistent set. An observer came up with the following set of intentions: following a flexible policy course; avoidance of drawing new lines of division; maintaining the military efficacy of NATO; promoting democratic reform in the region; influencing Russia in its military dealings with former Soviet republics.\textsuperscript{17} This somewhat unstructured set of intentions was hardly enough to provide a well structured guidance for the development of PFP.

The initially vague idea of PFP gave rise to a wide array of possible interpretations. The list of partially conflicting interpretations can be outlined as follows: a smokescreen to cover the issue of NATO enlargement, yet give the CEE states something to do; a "hedge" or compromise which will occupy the CEE states while NATO states come to terms with each other over the reform of the Alliance; a cover to an expansion eventually decided on a strategic basis, offering the opportunity to sidestep a possible Russian veto; a possibility for Partner states to not only get familiarized with the Alliance but also to cooperate with it and to raise their levels of interoperability, enhancing their chances of accession.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} Charles Kupchan, "Strategic Visions" World Policy Journal (Fall 1994).
Given the ambiguities of the original intentions and the ambiguities surrounding PFP itself, it was far from obvious that there was to be a transition from the more restrictive interpretations of PFP to the broader and bolder interpretations. After all, well sounding statements and program points are not enough of a guarantee to bring about such a transition. The Partnership for Peace Framework Document cites five common objectives for Allies and Partners: 1) facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; 2) ensuring democratic control of defense forces; 3) maintainance of capability and readiness of Partners to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN or the responsibility of the CSCE; 4) development of cooperative military relations between Partners and Allies in support of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and other operations as may be subsequently agreed; 5) development among Partners of forces that are better able to operate alongside those of NATO. As far as a well sounding statement is concerned, American administration officials asserted that the Alliance would not differentiate among the states of Europe but would allow for differentiation to occur. That is, differentiation can happen at the pace set by the peace-partners themselves. According to another commentary, PFP is not only about peacekeeping. It offers possibilities for cooperation in the fields of defense planning, budgeting, doctrine development, the organization

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of ministries and the general staff, information sharing in procurement, command and control, communication, air defense, logistics, and crisis-management - that is in fields that go far beyond peacekeeping.  

At the declaratory level, there was a possibility for transition from more restrictive to broader interpretations of the Partnership. Because of the major ambiguities of the intentions and of the Partnership itself, however, this transition was far from obvious. Early on, there was a demand from at least some of the partners to extend cooperation into broader areas. The Czechs suggested, for instance, that they attach military liaison officers to NATO's major subordinate commands. The Poles noted their desire to expand their military cooperation from peacekeeping to include their general defense forces. These demands were not met at the time, however. Similarly, the Hungarian Presentation Document proposed that a Hungarian representative participate in meetings of the permanent representatives of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Individual Partnership Program (IPP), however, does not mention Hungarian participation at the NAC. PFP also failed to meet the commitment to transparency: only a fraction of the Partners made public their IPPs (or PDs).

22  "NATO in the 1990s”, Strategic Forum, No. 12 (November 1994).
23  "Partnership for Peace: Drifting into Secracy”, Basic Paper No. 11 (June 7, 1995).
24  ibid.
In spite of the possibility for transition at a declaratory level, this possibility was less than obvious when it came to implementation. And still, the passage from restrictive interpretations to broader ones, from limited intentions to bolder ones, from uncertainties and ambiguities to success proved to be feasible. In the view of an observer, PFP has been remarkably successful and developed far beyond its architects’ expectations.\(^{25}\) In the following section I will examine how this transition was brought about.

III. Socialization

The passage from uncertainty to success could only be secured by a manifold process of socialization. Socialization in this context means that the various participants in PFP engaged in a process of thorough and mutual adaptation. The process of adaptation was manifold because it involved all of the partners concerned in PFP. The important point in this respect is that it was not only the "Eastern" countries which adapted to "NATO" requirements but NATO states also adapted to the needs and concerns of the former. Besides, the Partnership broke the usual pattern of East-West cooperation by involving in the process the neutral states. The neutral states were faced with the opportunity of participating in PFP because the concept of neutrality came under challenge in the post-Cold War era; on the other hand, their participation in PFP was itself a

\(^{25}\) Jeoffrey Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success", Strategic Forum No. 44
challenge to neutrality. In this section, I will address the manifold process of adaptation by turning first to NATO states, then to "Eastern" Partner states, and finally to neutral states.

1. NATO states

PFP could turn out to be a success partly because NATO states themselves engaged in a major process of adaptation. This process involved the commitment of energy and efforts as well as the commitment of resources to PFP. This process also meant that NATO states got to know more about the needs and concerns of Partner states.

PFP could not have gotten off the ground without significant financial resources committed to it by NATO states. A part of these financial resources served the purpose of supporting the participation of the financially less well off Partner states. Danmark, for instance, has rapidly increased its financial support for PFP. While Danmark’s defense budget is fixed at about 16 bn Danish kroner (or approximately 2.4 bn US dollars) per year until 2000, support for PFP rose from 35 million kroner in 1995 to 50 million in 1996 and to 70 million in 1997.\textsuperscript{26} The State Department of the United States also seeks to increase its support for the Partnership for Peace from the level of 60 million dollars in 1997 to the level of 70 million dollars

in 1998. The State Department support is divided between the International Military Education and Training and the Foreign Military Financing programs. Some PFP exercises could not have been held without the financial support given to partner states. "Peace Shield 96" field exercises from June 1 to 11, bringing together 1,200 troops from the US, Russia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, was financed by the United States.

PFP does not require NATO states simply to devote funds to the program. It also requires them to devote a lot of effort to it. These efforts include the hosting of exercises and involving the Partners into the process of consultation, planification and review. And it is not only the larger NATO states which undertake a share of the burden but smaller NATO states as well. Greece, for instance, hosted an eight-nation, four-day crisis-containment exercise, code-named "Athena 96" in 1996. Hosting exercises "in the spirit of" PFP also required an adaptation of the legal regulations in Germany. The tri-national "Spessart 95" exercise held in Germany between December 8 and 15, 1995 was the first exercise to be held in the spirit of PFP on German soil. It was made possible by the entry into force of the Visiting

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29. UPI, May 7, 1996.
Forces Act which details the legal requirements governing temporary stays by Partner state forces in Germany.  

The adaptation process of NATO states is not restricted to individual states only but it extends to Alliance structures as well. A major structural adjustment related to PFP was the establishment of the Partnership Coordination Cell. The PCC is composed of liaison teams delegated by NATO and Partner states and it is "collocated" with SHAPE. The tasks of the PCC include: military planning necessary to implement the partnership programs; dealing with IPPs; coordination of contributions and requests in a cost-effective manner; coordinating, monitoring and reporting on the training activities, exercises and other military activities under the Partnership Work Program, analyzing and assessing PFP training and exercise activities; contributing to the development of a PWP and the PFP force planning and review process.  

Another major institutional adjustment was the establishment of the PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP). PARP relies heavily on the tools used in NATO’s Defense Review Process. PARP aims at specifying forces to be provided for PFP and at improving interoperability as well as at providing planning goals to Partners in the frame of a few years. PARP has revealed, for instance, that

30. "First exercise in the spirit of Partnership for Peace (PFP) is held in Germany", NATO Review (March 1996).
interoperability is most pressing in the field of communications, equipment standards, operating procedures and linguistic skills. In the end, it is not only Partners who become more knowledgeable about NATO procedures and practices but the Allies themselves end up having a better understanding of the commitments brought by Partners as well as of the concerns and problems they face.32

NATO has also strengthened its information and education programs for Partners including courses at the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau.33 After the adoption of the Partnership for Peace initiative, the Defense College refocused its attention and invited Partner states to participate in the full range of its academic program. It opened, among other things, its full 5-months Senior Officers course - the mainstay of the College - to Partner states.34 In a related development, the US administration and the German government opened the George C. Marshall Center in June 1993. Although the Center is not a NATO initiative proper, it is fully in line with PFP. The Center has an overwhelmingly civilian vocation: it focuses on the role of an apolitical military under civilian oversight and the defense priorities necessary for the maintenance of a stable government.35

33. Marco Carnovale, "NATO partners and allies: Civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces", NATO Review (March 1997), pp. 32-35.
The Partnership for Peace is an important process of adaptation also because NATO states get to know more about the needs, concerns and problems of Partner states. PFP also provides a forum for addressing these concerns. Ukraine has, for instance, been concerned about Russia, Russian relations with NATO and the danger of its falling into neglect vis-a-vis Russia. PFP is certainly not the only means to address these concerns but it is at least one of the means. PFP is a suitable means for NATO states to demonstrate that they take the concerns of Ukraine seriously as well as to demonstrate that they do not seek confrontation with Russia. Just two days after the Russian-American summit in Helsinki, ships from NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean paid a visit to the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa. Ukraine will also host in August 1997 the exercise “Operation Sea Breeze” on the Crimean coast with Ukrainian, Turkish, Bulgarian, Greek, American and other ships. Ukraine will stage some other major PFP exercises on its territory in 1997 and it will make an effort to coordinate defense planning with NATO’s planning cycles.\textsuperscript{36} The Partnership is therefore a suitable framework for paying heightened attention to the problems of Ukraine.

Cooperation with the Baltic states is another outstanding example of addressing the problems of a specific

region. It is common wisdom that an enlargement of NATO to the Baltic states would be a very sensitive issue. Nevertheless, Baltic concerns also have to be taken into account seriously. The Partnership for Peace has turned out to be a suitable forum for addressing these concerns. The cooperation in the framework and "in the spirit" of Partnership for Peace goes well beyond simple preparation and training for peacekeeping. PFP gave, for instance, the Nordic states the opportunity to assist the Baltic states in their efforts to set up a Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT). The Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) agreed in 1993 to set up a joint peacekeeping battalion. Norway, Sweden, Finland and Danmark as well as the UK have ever since given them major assistance for establishing and maintaining the battalion. PFP is an excellent opportunity for the Nordic states (two of whom are not members of NATO - Sweden and Finland) to cooperate in a single framework with the Baltic states. The Baltic states are offered peacekeeping training and advice on administrative and legislative issues, donations of military and office equipment, as well as language training. Beyond that, Danmark offers tri-service exercises to technical training in air-surveillance as well as equipment donations. Danmark is also committed to an enhanced exchange of intelligence and strategic information. Norway focuses on donating equipment, training and advice. Finland delivers know-how in the defense field, from basic doctrine to the choice of equipment. Sweden has supplied the Baltics with anti-tank rocket launchers and maritime surveillance radar and ten coast-guard vessels among other
things. Baltic troops are deployed and trained with Nordic forces on real missions: with the Swedish and Danish contingents in Bosnia, and with a Norwegian contingent in Lebanon. The establishment of a unified airspace control system in the Baltic area ("Baltnet") is also in the plans. Not only Nordic countries provide assistance in promoting the defense capabilities of the Baltic states, however. The United States, France, Germany and the Netherlands also support them with donations of equipment, light weapons, uniforms, radios, light vehicles, rifles and ammunition. In short, the case of the Baltic states demonstrates that the regional cooperation in the framework of the Partnership for Peace between Baltic states and NATO as well as non-NATO Nordic states goes well beyond preparations for peacekeeping. PFP is a framework of adaptation for NATO (and other Nordic) states as well in the sense that they come to a deeper knowledge of the needs and concerns of their partners, and this way they can better address these problems.

The case of Hungary also provides an example of how NATO states themselves engage in a process of adaptation in view of the needs of Partner states. The Presentation Document of Hungary as well as the Individual Partnership Program revealed a great concern about air-defense, air-

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control, air-traffic management. Going beyond but still linked to PFP, the US Department of Defense initiated a Regional Airspace Initiative at least partly in response to these concerns. By 1996, the US DoD set aside 25 million US dollars to be split equally among the Partner countries involved. The aim of the initiative is to help these states to cover the cost of reforming their airspace structures, training personnel and purchasing basic equipment. The assistance is directed to promote an integrated airspace management system under civilian jurisdiction that is compatible with NATO systems. The US is accordingly trying to help Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia to integrate air-control in a system under which there is full civil-military cooperation. Although the amount of money involved in the initiative is modest, it nevertheless demonstrates a certain accommodation on the part of NATO states to the needs of Partner states and among them Hungary. In a different but related move, Hungary cohosted together with Germany a workshop on Air-Defense Training and Exercise Planning under the aegis of NATO’s Air-Defense Committee. The workshop addressed a wide range of issues essential to proceed in the development of harmonized training and exercising for air-defense operations. NATO and other Partner states also participated in a major military exercise held in Hungary in July 1996 and focused

specifically on coordinating multinational air-operations. In short, with accommodating assistance and cooperation programs to the needs and concerns of partner states, NATO states already engage in a process of adaptation.

2. Partner states in the "East"

The Partnership for Peace engaged the Partner states as well in a process of deep adaptation. This process involves a lot of commitment on their part both in terms of devoting funds and of devoting efforts to cooperative programs. The Partners also engage in cooperation with each other. Not least, the Partners get familiarized with standards and procedures in the Alliance.

The process of adaptation inherent in PFP involves, first, significant commitments by Partners to PFP. The importance of these commitments is that they play a role in turning PFP from a simple outreach program into a program of mutual adaptation. By undertaking commitments and making contributions to PFP, Partner states can put forward their own expectations in regard to it from a better position. The level of commitments and contributions varies widely along the range of Partner states, but in many cases they are very significant. Romania, for instance, increased its spending for PFP from 10 bn lei in 1995 to 14 bn lei in 1996. Beside that, some other expenditures are also related to PFP. These expenditures include the repair of barracks, the repair of

41. "NATO PFP Exercise With 17 Countries", MTI Econews, April 2, 1996.
an airbase, the buying of equipment for transmissions and communications, all parts of the modernization of the army.\textsuperscript{42}

To take another example, Slovakia increased its spending for PFP fourfold from 129 million Slovak crowns in 1995 to 500 million crowns in 1996.\textsuperscript{43}

Partner states do not simply devote funds to PFP but a lot of efforts and organizing as well. The Czech Republic hosted a series of exercises in the past few years. It hosted, for instance, "Cooperative Challenge 95" peacekeeping exercise which focused on how commanders from different countries coordinate during deployment of a multinational brigade to a fictitious trouble spot.\textsuperscript{44} In 1996, the Czech Republic hosted some further exercises: "Crown 96", "Success 96", "Garda 96", "Charme 96", "Lust 96".\textsuperscript{45} The complete inventory of the exercises hosted by all the Partner states and the exercises of which they are participants and not hosts would make up a very long list. The important point here is that without the committed efforts of the Partner states, PFP would be a much lower profile program and its impetus would be very hard to maintain.

In the long list of exercises I would, however, single out one because it marked a number of "firsts" both for PFP

\textsuperscript{42} "Romanian Spending on Partnership for Peace", Rompress News Agency quoted by BBC, April 10, 1996.

\textsuperscript{43} Brooks Tigner, "Slovakia Spends With Eye on NATO", Defense News, April 8, 1996.

\textsuperscript{44} "Brigade Level Peacekeepers Exercise in the Czech Republic", Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 1, 1996.

and NATO. This exercise is "Cooperative Chance" hosted in Hungary in July 1996. The exercise aimed at combining humanitarian aid, disaster relief and air-policing in a single air operation, coordinated by a deployed AIRCENT-led multinational air headquarters under a NATO-led multinational joint task force. The exercising of a NATO/PFP command and control interface model for humanitarian aid missions, and the training and exercising of a NATO/PFP multinational air headquarters (MNAHQ) also figured among the main purposes of the exercise. As far as the "firsts" are concerned, "Cooperative Chance" was the first NATO/PFP live-flying air exercise held in a PFP country. The exercise also featured the first MNAHQ to incorporate PFP personnel which was working at all levels. It was also the first NATO exercise coordinating search and rescue (SAR) and transport aircraft. It was also the first comprehensive multinational air effort involving both civilian and military organizations and the widest possible variety of resources within a humanitarian aid scenario. In terms of using NATO, PFP and NGO air assets in an SAR operation and using transport, medical evacuation and fighter aircrafts in non-combat roles, and studying NATO/PFP logistics and communications interoperability, "Cooperative Chance" was the first time NATO got to learn something itself militarily from a PFP exercise. \(^{46}\) In many respects, therefore, this exercise was exceptional. This exceptionality demonstrates well enough that PFP is not only a challenge for Partner

\(^{46}\) Joris Janssen Lok, "Hungary set to host "Cooperative Chance"", Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 1, 1996.
states but that it can be a challenge for NATO states as well.

Partner states are engaged in adaptation not only in terms of exercises, however. Their efforts also include the setting up of training facilities and programs. Bulgaria has, for instance, organized an international course titled "Military policy and European security on the threshold of the 21st century" with the assistance of the British ministry of defense. Bulgaria, to take another example, set up a Hungarian PFP Language Training Center, a facility open to Partner and NATO states as well. The Center has been expanded to include courses for both military officers and civilians in arms control expertise and the practice of the democratic control of armed forces. A Peacekeeping Forces Training Center was also established in Budapest. The Center is open to Hungarian citizens for the moment as a means to increase Hungarian ability to contribute to peacekeeping efforts.

PFP has also seen the emergence of regional cooperation between Partner states. With this development, the process of adaptation in the framework of PFP has obtained a new dimension. In this dimension, Partner states try to adapt to each others concerns and problems in the overall framework of PFP and in line with the processes of adaptation between

Partner and NATO states. In 1995, a Romanian infantry platoon and a tank company trained with their Hungarian counterparts in Hungary, and vica versa. A Hungarian platoon participated in the exercise "Cooperative Determination" organized by NATO and hosted by Romania while eight Romanian staff officers participated in the exercise "Cooperative Light" organized by NATO and hosted by Hungary.\textsuperscript{49} Poland and Ukraine went as far as to establish a joint Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion which, however, will only be formed for training and when needed for UN or other peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{50}

Not least, PFP is a framework in which partners get familiarized with NATO standards and procedures even beyond the scope of peacekeeping. Hungary has, for instance, begun to produce maps according to NATO standards. Hungary also staged the first military exercise on its own (with its own forces and equipments) in line with NATO procedures and standards in June 1997. The exercise involved 800 pieces of military equipment and three thousand troops. All of the Hungarian troops proposed for cooperation with NATO participated in the exercise which aimed at demonstrating that Hungary is capable of interoperability with NATO.\textsuperscript{51} The forces assigned for cooperation with NATO are only a small part of the armed forces but the underlying aim is that the rest of the armed forces will follow these selected forces.

\textsuperscript{49} "Romanian Position Regarding the Partnership for Peace" (the name of the author unavailable), paper presented at the NDU/ISDS conference in Budapest, June 13, 1995.

\textsuperscript{50} "Polish-Ukrainian exercise", Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 8, 1996.

\textsuperscript{51} "Elkezdôdött a Delta 97", Népszabadság, June 5, 1997.
in obtaining a capability of interoperability sooner rather than later.

In short, Partner states are involved in a manifold process of adaptation in the Partnership for Peace. By making use of the opportunities provided by and in the framework of PFP, Partner states are not simply in a process of adaptation but they also urge NATO states into further adaptation.

3. Neutral states

A major innovation of the Partnership for Peace has been the involvement of neutral states. With the involvement of the neutral states, PFP has become a much more inclusive framework of security policy in which the principle of solidarity has become an outstanding issue. In the case of the participation of the neutral states, one can observe a double folded process of adaptation: on the one hand, neutral states engage in a process of adaptation to NATO procedures and standards; on the other hand, they incite their partners to take the principle of solidarity more seriously.

The latest neutral adherent to PFP was Switzerland. Switzerland signed the PFP framework document on December 11, 1996. The country decided to participate in PFP because they came to the conclusion that neutrality does not mean in any way an absence from the international scene or
abstention when solidarity is on the agenda. PFP is an appropriate framework for Switzerland to assume international responsibilities although it does not want to join the Alliance as a member or cooperate with it in the defense dimension. However, the strengthening of the democratic control of the armed forces, the protection of international human rights, the training of officers and diplomats in security policy, the search and rescue and humanitarian missions as well as the logistic support of international peacekeeping operations and of arms control measures are fields which are consistent with participation in PFP and which are also of interest for Switzerland. In the words of defense minister Adolf Ogi, participation in PFP is a way for Switzerland to demonstrate that solidarity is important to it and that it cannot stay away when it can make a contribution to finding a solution to some pressing problem in the world. If, therefore, Switzerland does not want to stay away and wants to offer its help, PFP is the way to do so. The advantages for Switzerland of participation in PFP are accordingly the following: permanent representation at NATO Headquarters in Brussels; observation of military manoeuvres and participation in exercises related to peacekeeping; deeper cooperation in the field of arms control, verification and non-proliferation.

53. "L’adhésion de la Suisse au Partenariat pour la Paix est pratiquement certaine”, AFP, October 11, 1996.
Adherence was not a tough decision for Austria either. After all, with the changes in Europe and the end of the Cold War, Austria’s neutrality has lost its original function "since neutrality does not make sense any more in a Europe of collective security". Aside that, Austria’s neutrality has always been of a military nature, and neither of a political nor of an ideological one - neutrality has always been a means to maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity; it has never been an end in itself. This way, Austria’s participation in PFP is fully compatible with the current interpretation of its neutrality.\textsuperscript{54} For Austria, participation in PFP is a matter of solidarity. Solidarity, however, can only prevail if it is based on reciprocity. Reciprocity means a preparedness and ability to contribute to joint efforts to deal with challenges. Solidarity therefore includes a military dimension. It is unproblematic for Austria to cooperate with NATO and other Partner states in the fields of peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and search and rescue missions. However, cooperation in these fields means in the end a higher level of interoperability and even the standardization of military forces. This will amount in turn to another challenge to neutrality and, accordingly, Austria will once again have to come to grips with the problem of neutrality and even with the problem of doing away with neutrality. Accession to PFP, as a first step, is in Austria’s interest because it can contribute to the establishment of a close network of

\textsuperscript{54} "Austria and the Partnership for Peace Initiative" (the name of the author unavailable), paper presented at the ISDS/NDU conference, Budapest, June 12, 1995.
cooperative relations among states in Europe and later even to a common security architecture and perhaps to a future system.\textsuperscript{55}

The first neutral adherents to PFP were Sweden and Finland. Sweden and Finland joined PFP together (on May 9, 1994) in a move to demonstrate a new Nordic approach to security in Europe.\textsuperscript{56} For Finland, this new approach means a triangular strategy the elements of which are EU membership, independent defense, military non-alignment. Military non-alignment is already a reduced interpretation of traditional Finnish neutrality. This reduced version of neutrality made it possible for Finland to have no reservations concerning the aims of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to support the development of CFSP as well as to join PFP. In joining PFP, Finland had two main motives: to contribute to the stability of Europe and to enhance its role in peacekeeping. Indeed, peacekeeping seems to be the most suitable role for (former) neutral states from a NATO point of view as well.\textsuperscript{57}

Sweden is also interested in making an increased contribution to security as well as to strengthen its status as a leading figure of peacekeeping. Sweden’s defense will be much more internationally-oriented than previously and it is intended to increase its role in the peacekeeping

\textsuperscript{55} ibid.
business. Accordingly, Sweden has committed itself to supporting the new UN SHIRBRIG brigade and it promotes a more open attitude to multinational humanitarian aid and search and rescue operations.\textsuperscript{58} Joining PFP serves these purposes well. PFP is useful also in an operational sense in achieving interoperability with NATO for peacekeeping missions. Indeed, one of the main lessons of PFP for Sweden was that nothing in the Swedish defense structure - from its command and control network down to staff guidelines - is compatible with that of NATO.\textsuperscript{59}

In sum, the accession of the various neutral states to PFP had two common elements. One of them is a commitment to undertake greater international responsibilities and the other is a determination to maintain and even enhance their position as major players in the field of peacekeeping. PFP offered them the best available opportunity to meet these two purposes. PFP was a good opportunity for the neutral states because after the Cold War they had to reconsider their neutrality anyhow without necessarily giving it up. On the other hand, PFP itself is somewhat of a challenge to traditional neutrality. However, participation in PFP does not compromise the neutrality of the neutrals. The appeal of PFP for neutral states resides precisely in that it is entirely compatible with their foreign policy traditions while at the same time it is fully compatible with their

\textsuperscript{58} Joris Janssen Lok, “Interview with Sweden’s Supreme Commander Owe Wiktorin”, Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 8, 1997.

commitment to an enhanced international role as well as with their determination to keep up and even strengthen their leadership in peacekeeping. Indeed, non-participation would have jeopardized their ambitions in many respects. In one word, the issue of participation in PFP emerged for the neutral countries in terms of undertaking and enhancing international solidarity. They have, this way, managed to put the principle of solidarity higher on the international agenda. They are very well placed to do so considering their long traditions in peacekeeping: it would be almost inconceivable to set up an international peacekeeping operation without their participation. After all, NATO and Partner states challenged the neutrals into participation in PFP while neutrals on the other hand challenged the former through PFP to take their international role even more seriously.

IV. Credibility

In the preceding chapter I have demonstrated how through a process of manifold adaptation the Partnership for Peace passed from the phase of a low profile initiative to the phase of success. This process of adaptation was essential for the success of PFP but PFP itself had to prove to be a credible initiative in order to sustain the momentum of mutual adaptation. Credibility in this context means that PFP has been a means to tackle problems of common concern rather than a way to avoid addressing them. In this section, I will examine various elements of the credibility of PFP.
As it is very difficult to provide proofs concerning these elements of credibility, I will have to rely on hypotheses. However, I believe that these hypotheses come very close to the point.

1. Enlargement

It has been a stated aim of PFP to avoid the drawing of new lines of division in Europe. Most recently, Madeleine Albright, US State Secretary stated this aim eloquently before the (US Congress) House International Relations Committee. In her words, PFP aims at making sure that no new lines are drawn across Europe. However, such an aim would remain only an empty slogan if it was not backed up by the enlargement of the Alliance. After all, not enlarging the Alliance would not solve the issue of dividing lines but it would cast in doubt the determination of the members of NATO to do so. Partners could still benefit from PFP without enlargement but enlargement most likely raises the incentives for both prospective new members and those states staying out to take their participation more seriously. In short, PFP is an integral part of the process of enlargement; this latter, on the other hand, contributes to the credibility of the former.

2. Russia

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61. ibid.
Russian politicians stated several times that PFP was not a sufficient framework for NATO-Russia relations. In the words of former Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev, Russia wanted a full strategic partnership and PFP had a role in that. However, "PFP is not a comprehensive answer to the realities of this new period" and therefore Russia is interested in a "broader cooperation than PFP that is equal to its weight". Accordingly, upon the signing by Russian foreign minister Kozyrev of the PFP Framework Document, a summary of discussions between the North Atlantic Council and Mr. Kozyrev was issued. The summary stated that the NATO-Russia relationship will be developed both inside and outside PFP in accordance with Russia’s unique and important position and with its weight and responsibility as a major European, international and nuclear power. It was also clear at the time that even such a declaration would not be sufficient for Russia. Russia, therefore, kept insisting on some more ambitious arrangement. This Russian insistence was just strengthened by plans to enlarge NATO. In the end, NATO and Russia came to adopt a charter, the so called Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. Among other things, this charter set up a mechanism for consultation and cooperation with the NATO-Russia permanent joint council at its center. With this charter and the consultation and cooperation mechanism set up by it, the bulk of NATO-Russia relations

was placed outside the framework of PFP. This is important for the credibility of PFP in two respects. First, it has demonstrated that the members of the Alliance take Russia seriously and are sensitive to its concerns. Second, it relieves PFP of the burden of managing NATO-Russia relations.

3. IFOR/ SFOR

The credibility of PFP was probably greatly enhanced by the engagement of the Atlantic Alliance in peacekeeping (or rather "peace-support") operations and also by the joint engagement of NATO members and partner states. The role undertaken in IFOR and then SFOR by NATO states and Partners served as a proof that PFP has a major operational relevance. After all, IFOR was NATO’s first ever ground force operation, its first ever deployment "out-of-area", and its first ever joint operation with NATO’s Partnership for Peace and other non-NATO countries. SFOR took over from IFOR in a similar vein.

IFOR and SFOR most likely boosted the credibility of PFP for neutral states as well. PFP has been appealing to neutral states at least partly because of its emphasis on peacekeeping. Neutrals themselves have great traditions in peacekeeping. Finland, for instance, could still claim in the 1980s to have contributed to every UN peacekeeping

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64 IFOR from NATO’s website.....
65 SFOR from NATO’s website.....
operation since that in the Congo with troops, observers or financial resources. Sweden, on its part, provided nearly 12 percent of the 530,000 troops that had taken part in UN operations by the end of 1991. In line with their participation in PFP, IFOR and then SFOR took force contributions from Austria, Finland and Sweden. Sweden provided, for example, a mechanized infantry battalion serving at Zivinica, while Finland provided an engineer battalion serving at Doboj, both under Multinational Division North headquartered at Tuzla.

4. Support beyond peacekeeping

PFP exercises have been overwhelmingly focused on peacekeeping, humanitarian and search and rescue missions. The process of adaptation revealed, however, that much of the assistance given to partner states went beyond the needs of peacekeeping. The support programs were, at least partly, directed at restructuring and rebuilding the militaries of the Partner states. This commitment to go beyond the needs of peacekeeping certainly enhanced the credibility of PFP for Partner states.

V. Possible problems

The Partnership for Peace has turned out to be an astonishing success through a multifold process of

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67. NATO/SFOR: Fact Sheet - Land Components - January 22, 1997, from NATO’s website.....
adaptation. This process of adaptation was helped on by the credibility of PFP. The success of PFP does not mean, however, that it cannot run into a few problems. In the following, I will turn to some of these.

One of the possible problems is that the enlargement process could strain the cohesion of PFP and therefore undermine its benefits because with enlargement some of the most committed Partners would turn into members.\textsuperscript{68} However, the Partnership is not focused solely on enlargement, and PFP will not become irrelevant for either members or Partners as it is not irrelevant for them now. PFP will most likely make sense until not all European states are members of the Atlantic Alliance and until there is a need for cooperation between members and Partners. The new members will not lose interest in PFP after enlargement just as the old members will not either. It is also unclear why other Partner states should lose interest in PFP. Enlargement will, however, call for some shifts of emphasis in the areas covered by PFP. There will probably be a need for greater regional cooperation between new members and their neighbors. New members will need to demonstrate that they are aware of the concerns of their neighbors and the best way to do so would be through increased regional cooperation. Some (a small number) of the Partners might lose interest temporarily in PFP but they would most likely make up their minds upon realizing that PFP remains

\textsuperscript{68}. Vernon Penner, "Partnership for Peace", Strategic Forum No. 97 (December 1996).
beneficial for both members of the Alliance and the rest of the Partners.

The second possible problem is that the recently established Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the OSCE might somehow undercut each other. From one point of view it is questionable whether it is really necessary to conduct political consultations in a forum that differs only by eleven states from the more inclusive OSCE.\(^69\) From another point of view, the question arises whether EAPC is intended solely to replace the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace or has wider ambitions.\(^70\) Certainly, there is little bit of a redundancy between EAPC and OSCE. It is quite possible that they will be merged at some point to simplify the institutional structures. In that case it would be more reasonable for OSCE to assume the responsibilities of EAPC because the former is more inclusive and has a more comprehensive mandate than the latter. Until, however, these two institutions are merged (if at all), their redundancy is more likely to be benign rather than harmful. If there is an ambiguity in the relations between EAPC and OSCE, it is more of the constructive rather than the disturbing kind. Still, there are ways to improve the relations between PFP and OSCE. One such way would be to include OSCE more heavily in PFP business. OSCE could, for instance, be involved into the planning as well as into the conduct of PFP exercises.

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\(^69\) Bruce George, rapporteur of the North Atlantic Assembly quoted by Atlantic News, April 16, 1997.

The third possible problem is that PFP has a strong military but a somewhat weaker civilian side. The Partnership for Peace Framework Document set a number of goals for PFP. One of them is to help ensuring the democratic control of defense forces.\(^7\) In order to improve the record of PFP in this respect as well, it would be useful to upgrade its civilian component. The North Atlantic Assembly could have a role in this field. The NAA could hold regular PFP sessions focusing on the parliamentarian aspects of participation in PFP. However, the NAA should not turn its attention only to parliamentarians. It should also seek contact with civilian experts from governmental and non-governmental circles and involve them in PFP related work. The NAA could, for instance, commission these experts to report on their assessments of their countries' participation in PFP.

Civilian experts from Partner countries could possibly be involved in other aspects of PFP as well. The Partnership for Peace planning and review process (PARP) is not strong enough on the civilian side. Civilian experts could be involved at least into the discussion of Assessments in individual sessions but possibly also into the revision and amendment phase of Assessments. The EAPC could also be used to enhance the civilian component of PFP. If the EAPC is provided with a support structure (a staff component?) in the future, civilian experts from Partner states could be

\(^7\) Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Point 3 (b).
involved in it. The point is that the civilian component of PFP should not be restricted only to broadening the opportunities for political consultations but it should be expanded to the staff level as well. Civilian experts should be given the opportunity to discuss issues of common concern with their counterparts in NATO’s International Staff.

VI. Conclusions

This paper has had three aims. One of them was to demonstrate that PFP has been a puzzling process. The puzzle of PFP resides in the initial ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the Partnership. At the early stages of PFP it was totally unforeseeable that it would turn into a major success. And yet, the Partnership managed to get from restrictive interpretations and limited intentions to broader and bolder ones, and it went from uncertainties and confusion to well beyond the initial expectations of its architects.

The second aim was to demonstrate that the success of PFP has been brought about through a manifold process of adaptation. This process involved the adaptation of every side participating in PFP from NATO states to Partner states in the "East" to neutral states. This process of adaptation was promoted by the credibility of PFP. Finding the elements of the credibility of PFP was the third aim. Elements of this credibility themselves had to be achieved and established. These elements include the enlargement of the
Alliance, the setting up of NATO-Russia arrangements outside the framework of PFP (thus relieving PFP from the burden of managing NATO-Russia relations), the involvement of NATO and Partner states in the settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia in the framework of the IFOR and SFOR operations, and the dimensions of PFP going beyond peacekeeping. The successfulness of the process of adaptation, in turn, contributed itself to the credibility of PFP.

The question then arises as to what other steps could be taken to sustain the momentum of PFP and to further enhance its success. Based upon the paper, the following proposals can be made. First, regional cooperation should be upgraded within PFP. NATO enlargement will anyhow push regionalism higher on PFP’s agenda. Accordingly, it would be important to increase regional cooperation between NATO states, and more specifically new NATO members, and their neighbors after enlargement. However, increased regional cooperation between NATO and Partner states could be useful before enlargement as well. Second, it would be advisable to increase transparency in PFP related issues. The usefulness of the recently established EAPC could be greatly enhanced if Partner states were ready to make their IPPs public and accessible to each other. Third, the civilian component of PFP should be strengthened. Recent experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina has demonstrated that civil-military cooperation is an essential dimension of both crisis-management and
peace-keeping operations. Accordingly, OSCE could be involved much more heavily into PFP exercises and preparations for peace-keeping and crisis-management missions. Moreover, the scope of cooperation between OSCE and PFP should not be restricted to these areas but it should be extended to crisis prevention as well. Crisis prevention does not have to be treated as a "lesser art" suitable only for OSCE's attention. Instead, NATO and Partner states should equally prepare and train for crisis prevention and establish crisis prevention capabilities accordingly. PFP and the involvement of OSCE into PFP programs could provide a useful training ground in this respect. Fourth, the civilian component of PFP should be strengthened also in the sense of increasing the involvement of civilian experts from both governmental and non-governmental circles as well as of parliamentarians in PFP business. Fifth, the military component of PFP could also be upgraded. Recent experiences have demonstrated that a "new generation" of peace-keeping operations, that is the generation of crisis-management and peace support operations is on the rise. These heavier and more massive operations should figure higher on the PFP agenda.

In sum, the successfulness of PFP resides in that it has turned into much more than a simple outreach program of the Atlantic Alliance. In this context, the importance of

72. Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation - Operation Joint Guard, SFOR Text, NATO website.....
PFP is that it puts the Alliance itself into a different perspective. PFP is not merely a side issue in the reform of the Atlantic Alliance but an essential dimension of it. PFP is the proof that the Alliance has turned into the center of an inclusive cooperative security order in Europe.