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FINAL REPORT

The Role of the Trade Unions in the Process of Forming the System of Political Interests Representation in Poland.

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The place of trade unions in socio-economic system decides about more pluralistic or corporatistic „face” of democratic institutions. Description of industrial relations is a valuable indication in research of factors stabilising the young Polish democratic system. Achieved analysis of trade unions role in West European democracy will facilitate me to accomplish the diagnosis of the trade unions’ role in process of forming the interests representation in Poland. In particular useful will be the empirical data and relations between them. In this paper I try to complete some empirical analysis of trade unions role in thirteen West European countries in the years 1970-93 and data concerning selected Central European countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czech and partly Slovak Republic). For classification I have cited data from following materials in print- F. Lehner’s, P. Pennings, H. Compston, J. Steiner, A. Cawson, K. R. Luther, G. Lembruch, K. A. Wojtaszczyk book, R. Herbut articles and Polish Yearly Statistical Report (1995).

1. Interest groups and structure of “interest constellation”. General theoretical findings

Before 1990 – while the Marxist economical, sociological and political literature addressed itself to various ways of thinking about importance of class and class identity, the non Marxist literature stressed mainly the importance of interest groups pluralism. In post-war period one of most characteristic books in the pluralistic school was David Truman’s *The Governmental Process* (published in 1951). In Truman’s concept society consists of limitless number of interests groups - when people share the specific interests – they would likely form new groups. If issues arose that affected the social and/or economic interests in a policy sense, then groups would politicise and apply some specific strategies oriented to correcting political decision-making process. In Truman’s description public policy is in fact the result of rivalry between groups and government is merely “neutral force” or seismograph which only reject actual status of the game ruling between interest groups. Truman’s view has mainly historical value. Nevertheless it constitutes the general idea of understanding the role of interests groups in modern society.

. Parties and non-partisan political actors

In democratic society interest groups together with political parties establish the most important links between government and governed society. While the political parties concentrate on winning elections, building coalitions and broadening their appeals, interest groups are interested in clearer articulation of aims in accordance with the particular aspirations or values of the people they represent.

Both – interest groups and political parties are not only political actors, but they also act as privileged channels of communication between society and the state. The distinction between political parties and interests groups based on different roles. On the one hand as far

as characteristic role of interests groups is considered - aggregation economical and social demands and articulation of these demands - often by the political way. On the other hand – as far a characteristic role of political parties is considered – functional, territorial and ethnic representation. But in fact these kinds of distinctions between political parties and interests groups does not make sense either. That statement concerning not only Eastern-European Countries but of course Western-European Countries as well.

Firstly, because neither - political parties nor interests groups are self-sufficient in their roles –for instance political mass mobilisation, have today become to the activity of powerful interests groups, while defence of sectional interests is usually one of important elements party appeals.

Secondly, because of new problems in areas of modern political action – which increase not only on electoral arena but also in parliamentary, governmental, bureaucratic or industrial relations arena. Newly arisen problems reopened relatively stable division of labour between political parties and interests groups. Moreover, there are visible two main types of co-operation between parties and interests groups – on the left wing social-democratic parties often co-operate with employees organisations and on the right wing conservative parties co-operate with business organisations.

Thirdly, current problems need new solutions - which involve interest groups elite's in the process of political decision making and also in the process of implementation. That is why activity the non-party political actors risen on all mentioned arenas. Interest groups use some original methods of political action. These methods or better styles of political action call interest groups political strategies.

Fourthly, in young democracies boundaries between political parties and interest groups are even more blurred than in consolidated ones. That is so because of special roles played by trade unions in recent years existence of communist camp and during the transition as well. Furthermore in Central European countries, except may be Czech Republic, exist two biggest federations of trade unions. One of them – former pro- communist system is associated with left wing parties sometimes called post-communistic parties. Second of them – former anti-systemic is associated with right wing parties.

1.2. Pluralism and corporatism. The frame of model

Pluralism is the model of industrial relations similar to British and (closely) American solutions. In pluralism the interests groups exerts the pressure on political elite's in more spontaneous and more “accumulated” way. One of characteristic features of pluralism is big number of actors taking part in a political life. Public interest protection frequently means the result of “conflict sum“ of game conducting by individual interest groups, parties and public administration. Smaller and usually decentralised groups of sectional interests are in this arrangement oriented on individual profits.

Corporatism is closer to tradition created in Danish, Swedish, Austrian, Belgian and Dutch industrial relations arenas. Most important features of corporatistic system usually numbered among:

- specific centralised mechanism of interest articulation;
- characteristic - preceded by negotiations - allocation of goods and values;
- high level of involving the partners in the policy making and implementation processes.

Depending on intensity of mentioned features industrial relations students have been enumerated from several to dozen forms of corporatism and pluralism – but usually used simplified classification dividing corporatism from weak – across average and advanced – to most developed form (suitable as pluralism).

Summing up, pluralism assumes that “free” interest game is an optimal way making correction of socio-economic arrangement possible and creating the conditions to achieve political consensus. Corporatism ascribes the mainly meaning to co-operation and co-ordination of interests leading to social agreements. It is obvious that „free” interests game as well as co-operation and co-ordination are only ideal constructions.

The interpretation of consensual democracy model proposed by A.Lijphart makes assumption of the hypothesis concerning perceptible models of relation in the sphere of less or more rivalry solutions of European political practice (consociational and majoritarian). Mentioned relationships are not completely clear-cut but could turn out to be useful in a model-analysis undertaken by Lijphart. The point is in solutions closer to corporatistic and pluralistic version of political process. These hypothesis can be formulated in a following way – the institutional crisis of corporatism, end of “no-rivalry” consociational co-operation are in fact the sign of it victory. After the overcome of dangerous fragmentation the corporatistic strategy can lose significance. It happens because the teary of relationships (also industrial) functioning in a sphere of consensual democracy is constantly looking for a balance. These processes require applying the varied strategies – also corporatistic.

If we divert presented construction and then link mentioned model with Polish situation we would come to a conclusion that in case of some transforming countries along with progress of regime consolidation we can expect that development of less or more advanced interests mediation mechanisms (comparable with stagnation of West European corporatistic institutions) would begin – more or less –the end democratic regime consolidation process (Schmitter 1995, p. 13). In paper I would like to bring a bit closer the role of trade unions in the process of forming the interests representation system in turbulent transformation time – but before that the short look on the role of trade unions in Western European countries seems to be legitimate.

2. Interest aggregation process

Mancur Olson underlines the advantages of fragmentation of the process of interests groups aggregation (Olson 1971). He points the better productivity, the higher level of production and industrial innovation when the small organisations are the generator of interests bargaining. Small, specialised interest groups are organised more freely than the bigger ones. According to M. Olson’s analysis of structural and traditional conditions which are the base of rise and decline of institutional system allow to notice the superiority of evolution towards pluralist interests representation in modern democratic systems. In M. Olson’s opinion, the result of collective action depended on the “size” of interest groups (prefers smaller) and on quantity of operating structures (plurality and various representation). The pluralistic interests game causes the disposition to strive after more restrictive forms of social and economic policy. The monetary strategy implying a pro-economic course of fiscal policy is used here more frequently. The useful supplement for mentioned point of view are suggestions by Franz Lehner who proposed to adopt a scale facilitating a confrontation between pluralistic and conciliatory decision making traditions. (Lehner 1987, p.p. 57-58, 72) The grade of institutionalisation of process of forming the group interest is the main variable in proposed scale. Typology adopted by F. Lehner allows one to notice some dependencies deciding about the process of “overgrowing” the economic interests in a political sense.

Firstly, in countries having suitable institutional “equipment” facilitating the process of interests integration and making possible the service of industrial bargaining, the strike activity is lower. The difference of strike activity is most visible in a comparison of extreme solutions – pluralistic and strong corporatistic. Relativity not big differences of strike activity level appear between systems using more frequently the traditional mechanisms of political

pluralism and systems described as a weak corporatism. Those differences are a subject of strong fluctuations and do not have a fundamental character. Differences in a strike activity seem to have an indirect influence on series of political and economical variables. F. Lehner remarks another real aggregation between the kind of representation and appearances of the social anxieties in labour – dismemberment of interests representation limits the possibility for efficacious government's economic interventions and is favourable in displaying the cyclic conflicts on the background of distribution of goods.

Secondly, there exists some connections between level of institutionalisation and concentration of interest bargaining process, inflation and unemployment. F. Lehner's analysis shows that higher institutionalisation and concentration of interests bargaining process some positive courses are more visible. Inflation and unemployment prove downward tendency, but higher inflation often coexists with lower unemployment and fiscal policy which comes inflexible income relations. The political practise in a domain of this kind of solution is the closest to traditional welfare state concept.

Comparison of the state expenses structure, scope of tax scale, economic level rise and public debt permits F. Lehner to set the thesis concerning better utility of traditionally established concerted institutional patterns in the conditions of functioning high integrated structures of interest intermediation. In conclusion F. Lehner mentioned five scores of interaction between private and public interests – pluralism, weak corporatism, moderate corporatism, strong corporatism and concordance. It seems to be possible to simplify the scheme taking into consideration three main categories:

- pluralism and weak corporatism (France, Italy, Great Britain);
- moderate corporatism (Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Finland, Holland);
- strong corporatism (Sweden, Norway, Austria).

In each mentioned above category we could enumerate some specific features of interest representation system and interest bargaining process. In each one trade unions play more or less different role.

3. Classification the political roles of trade unions in selected West European countries

Thinking about better distinction between three groups of Western-European countries of we can use five variables proposed by H. Compston (Compston, 1994, 1995a, 1995b) and P. Pennings (Pennings 1995), F. Lehner (Lehner, 1987) and J.P. Katzenstein (Katzenstein 1985):

- union participation in policy making process (main index). In this scale 0 means no union participation, 1 – 3 participation in consultations (index closer „1” means participation in consultations of narrower character, closer 3 means that consultations begin to transform in agreements), 4 – 6 government and trade unions co-operation in decision making process;
- density of trade unions (union membership calculate as an percentage of non agricultural employees);
- organisational unity of labour at the central level – scores between 0 (fragmentation of trade union movement) and 1 (strong position of union centre, high organisational discipline);
- political „profile” of government – scores between 1 considerable domination of conservative parties, 2 – domination of right-wing parties, 3-balance of right- and left-central parties, 4 – domination of left-wing parties, 5 – considerable domination of social-democracy;
- size of the country – calculated by comparison of the number of population in OECD countries – establish the scale as follows: 0 – small countries, 1 – big countries. Small countries dependence on international economic fluctuations can be favourable to growth

of co-operation between capital and labour. It can also consolidate the coalescent style in policy decision making process.

These measurements allow to qualify each of selected thirteen countries to one of three groups.

In Scandinavian countries (graph 1) the medium value of union participation index was the highest in Europe and amounted to 4,5. Average value of the rest of variables:

- union density: 76,7 %;
- unity: 0,8;
- political „profile” of government: 3,3;
- all Scandinavian countries has been qualified into a small category: 0.


To the second group of countries (graph 2) belong: Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland. The medium score of union participation: 4,19 Medium values of indexes:

- union density: 54,64 %;
- unity: 0,64;
- „profile”: 2,28;
- all countries has been qualified as a small: 0.


Third group form (graph 3): France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain. The medium value of union participation index: 2,79. This group had the most fluctuations of averages in comparison to the both other groups variables:

- union density: 41,25 %;
- unity: 0,4;
- „profile”: 2,35;
- all countries has been qualified as a large: 1.


Graph 1. Trade Union Participation in economic decision making process in Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden). Sources: H. Compston (1995a); P. Pennings (1995, p.p. 6-7); F. Lehner (1987, 59)



Graph 2. Trade union participation in Austria, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium and Ireland. Sources: H. Compston (1994); P. Pennings (1995, p.p. 6-7); F. Lehner (1987, p. 59)



Graph 3. Trade union participation in Italy, Germany, France and United Kingdom. Sources: H. Compston (1995b); Pennings (1995, p.p. 6-7); Lehner (1987, p. 59)



The analysis of the role of Western European trade unions in policy making process allows to single out a few conditions affecting on growth of co-operation and tripartite agreements on the industrial arena.

- . Unique socio-cultural background decides on trade unions role in the interest representation system. Contents of political culture determines of the character, durability and stability of tripartite dispositions. Positive Experiences of co-operation leads to co-operative strategies.
- . Density and unity of trade unions have a strong influence on tripartite co-operation strategies because of higher ability of organisational elite's to disciplining trade union members claims. That is a preliminary condition of trade unions participation in economic policy making process. In countries of high density score, wage and income bargaining has more centralised character and is more stable. Also strike activity and the level of unemployment are lower in those types of countries. These countries have often simultaneously a higher level of inflation and have a preference for a less flexible fiscal policy.
- . Most of trade unions taking part in economic policy making process were co-operate with social democracy government. However, approval of high trade unions activity in policy making process does not always accompanied with the left-wing government profile.
- . Higher density and unity level was noticed in small countries. Nevertheless, the relation between union participation index and size of country is not so synonymous to approval P.J. Katzenstein's thesis that tripartism is a small countries phenomenon.

The short comparison of tripartite practice in thirteen countries shows that relations joined social partners are relatively strong.

Nowadays, carry out the parallel measures in Central European countries is still impossible. Each similar attempt would encounter the substantial interpretations problems connected with hybrid character of industrial relations in this region.

The majority of trade unions in new democracies has been grown from social movements as "forum" type. In a lot of cases trade unions have a suitable structural and financial resources that political parties must strive for. Because of it employees organisations can tell the "partnership" from position of power and do not have to care about loyalty towards coalition with party. The most visible examples is in this case Polish "Solidarity" and Bulgarian "Podkrepa". Both of trade unions have the similar political potential. Also in Hungary political parties are compete for unions support. On the background of mentioned countries the Czech trade unions are much less relevant in political sense. The ambiguous position of Central European trade union movements complicates the possibility of forecasting their strategies on industrial and political arenas. It is still difficult to talk about coalitions between political parties and trade unions *sensu stricto*. Nevertheless, in Hungary (1994) and in Poland (1993) – as the result of parliamentary elections – have been formed the social-democratic cabinets. Political practice of these both governments in a not big part confirms the thesis about closer co-operation between unions and governments during left-wing cadence. As regards of Czech Republic case it is possible to observe some relations connected the "size" of country and increase of co-operative strategies on industrial arena.

Heading mentioned reservations this paper will boil down to presentation the description of links joined the collective bargaining process with political arenas. For the analysis similar as the one carried out by P. Pennings (connecting Western Europe) in young Central European democracies we must wait till their further stabilisation.

4. Processes of Forming Industrial Relations in Selected Central- and Eastern-European Countries

Before 1989 in Central- and Eastern- European countries only the strongest industrial lobbies (organised in branches) performed the role of interests groups. There were especially those of the mining, steel making, and shipbuilding. In a limited degree it has been public agricultural sector and influential conglomerates – for example arms industry.

The sophisticated structure of real-socialist system and its hard ideological dependence did not create sufficient conditions for the process of interests settling. Socialistic paternalism resulted in social passivity and thus, among other things, in the self-destruction of the regime. Substantial part of the society accepted only the distributive function of the regime. Participation in political life was confined to some “ritual” performances and real political aspirations could not appear, mainly because of the party-state control.

Mentioned issues did not waste influence in the 90-ties. In all of Central- and Eastern-European countries we can observe more or less spectacular social conflicts and disturbances in the sphere of communication between the main socio-political actors. On the other hand in Central-European countries the sphere of bipartite and tripartite relations seem more stable and more concrete than in Eastern Europe. In many cases trade unions, political parties and – to a limited extent – entrepreneurs organisations create quasi-coalitions. The core sense of the quasi coalitions is not social- (like in consolidated democracies) but political partnership. One of the reasons of this situation is, among others, underdevelopment of socio-political cleavages. These arrangements are one of characteristic features of Central-European countries. In this paper I will try to illustrate the main elements of Central European-countries industrial arenas. Weak socio-political cleavages are the frame for them – I will take it into consideration, but owing to short form of article I cannot much develop this train of the concept.

1. General frames of real-socialistic industrial relations system

The fundamental elements of East-Block countries economic system were:

- strong domination of public sector, as a result of it state becomes a super-employer,
- monopoly of state in foreign trade with fixed principles of exchange between real-socialistic economies,
- public control over financial sector combined the paternalistic relationships between bureaucratic bodies and management of separate industries,
- shortage of consumer goods take away the consumers right to defend and articulate their interests.

Redistribution in real-socialist system was one of the major social and political problems of the state. It is possible even to say that it was one of the pillars of the regime legitimisation. Decline of the state redistribution system and erosion of structures of centrally planned economy contributed to “emancipation” of the interests groups. The state was finding it more and more difficult to control the economy.

The newly emerging system does not limit an articulation of groups having the strongest position in the post-communist countries economies. Unfortunately, the large autonomy of the interests representation sphere hardly lacks the system of institutions permitting to co-ordinate social claims. For example the Tripartite Commission in Poland is not sufficient level for the co-ordination. The co-operative networks should be more differentiated especially at the industries and factories levels. Result of these deficiencies is growth of social costs of transformation and fast material advancement of the political and economic elite’s. The rise of populist claims can suppress the process of democratisation in Poland. Nevertheless, in most

of East-European countries being under transition we can observe periods of escalating the discussion over the form of relations between employees, employers and administration apparatus. The participants of mentioned discussion between trade unions, employers organisations, state bureaucracy and other subjects interested in evolution of this level public life do not call into question the need of tripartite relations development. The postulate to order the relations within industrial arena is even enumerated among conditions determining success of economic and political reforms. In this context, the need of social pact that is more or less formalised agreement between the strongest groups of interests is frequently propagated. The aim of this document or rather current dialogue's process is the social peace protection. The participants of discussion over the range and kind of co-operation within tripartite relations present varied views on problems deciding about state budget's structure, the form of fiscal policy, permissible scale of unemployment and inflation pace of privatisation process etc.

In all post-socialist countries the lack of suitable experiences enables West European social partners to responsible interests bargaining. In the new, non-consolidated democracies of Central and Eastern Europe even complementary regulations constructed to make the behaviours of individual actors on industrial arena more predictable could turn out to be insufficient. Characteristic can be an example of former **Eastern Germany** where Lands exercise the strong Western-Germany support of transition processes. In the Eastern part of Germany the correct functioning of industrial relations system is threatened by the lack of suitable collective action traditions. Shortly after unification in 1990, all industrial relations system functioning in West Germany has been transferred to Eastern Lands. Seven years after falling the Wall the belief rises that that system will function in a different way than in western part of the country. The low activity of industrial employees at the micro-level is recognised as the main reason of this phenomenon. Although the statistical data lets compare general activity's of "eastern structures" of German trade unions with activity's level of similar organisations in Western Germany in the 70's and 80's but it seems to be a merit of western trade unions' head offices.

Bulgaria

Trade unions

The process of political transformation initiated on Nov. 10th 1989 gave rise to two big political coalitions. On the left wing there are the organisations deriving from communist regime: Socialist Party of Bulgaria, Confederation of Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions (CITUB). On the right wing: Union of Democratic Forces and Labour Confederation "Podkrepa" derived from underground organisation founded on Feb. 89 by Bulgarian intellectuals (Dimitrova, 1995, p. 55). In 1991 CITUB associated 2.5 million of members against 700 thousand members of Podkrepa.

Podkrepa quickly started to use the strike force against "reformed" (mainly in verbal sense) government. As a result of energetic actions of the union in favour of creation the political alternative to the reformed communistic party, on Dec. 10th 1990 arose the Union of Democratic Forces ("genealogy" of this party is similar to Polish Union of Freedom). The Union consisted of puzzle of smaller parties, organisations and movements under leadership of collegial National Co-ordination Committee (Thirkel, Atanasov, Gradev, 1994, p. 102). The second main "pillar" on Bulgarian political scene is Turkish Movement in Favour of Law and Freedom. At the beginning of the 90's, the Movement was supported by Podkrepa. This

After the referendum carried out among members the communist party renamed to socialdemocratic group and started to use new rhetoric.

ethnic party is relatively strong. This is the main reason to recognise ethnic and industrial conflict as characteristic features of Bulgarian transition. In 1991 the situation has been additionally inflamed by confiscation of part of the property of post-communistic CITUB head office (conducted by D. Popov's government). At that time the industrial relations arena abounded with strikes. In 1991, 140 strikes have been organised. In the beginning of 90's in Bulgaria, as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the view about need of participation of employees' organisations in the process of economic policy decisions making was widespread. Also this belief contributed to the escalation of the tensions. The poll carried out on Jan. 1991 among the CITUB members have pointed that this view had 1.8 supporters in the union itself (Thirkel a.a. p. 103).

The position of Bulgarian Podkrepa on industrial and political arena has some parallels in the history of Polish Solidarity but the role of CITUB is not so clear. In the beginnings of the 90's this union took part in proceedings of Bulgarian Round Table and contributed to resignation of J. Atanasov communistic government (replaced with "social-democratic" cabinet in the beginning of 1990). The union (CITUB) activity on the enterprise level was almost synonymous with "social-democratic" party's political activation. The party structures at the enterprise level did not exist already but the bonds joining party and the union were still strong. CITUB and Podkrepa rivalled but also co-operated many times (for example during the tripartite debate over the second version of Bulgarian social pact. Beside both unions organised simultaneously the strike actions. Apart from mentioned unions' federations another important one is "Jedinstvo". This union appeared at the end of 1990 with about 250 thousand members at that time. The rest of union organisations associated all in all about 17 thousand employees (Thirkel a.a. p. 114). Level of unity of work force in Bulgaria belongs (beside Poland) to the highest among Middle and Eastearn European Countries and amounts about 78%.

Employers organisations

In 1940, merely after 50 years of state independence, in the economic structure of the country dominated agriculture concentrating about 75% of work force. In 1990 this sector employed "only" about 30%. So the employers' movement in Bulgaria had no conditions to mould the traditions. About the modern employers organisations one may say no more there are mainly the directors of state enterprises perceived as enfranchised "nomenclature". The new owners of private firms also do not have a good reputation because of suspicions of speculative character of their business. To the most representative organisations of Bulgarian business belongs Bulgarian Business Block. This movement, outwardly similar to one of Polish party faction - Polish Party of Beer's Friends-"Big Beer", declares aspirations for representation of employers in parliament (13 members of parliament). But in reality the Block with its leader and sponsor - Z. Gonczew, the American citizen resembles Polish Party "X" of S. Tyminski. Z. Gonczew sings his political declarations with accompaniment of the guitar, promises the rules of "iron fist of law", strikes on nationalistic cord, and proposes the reactivation of war industry and turn to Russia. So in fact the Bulgarian capital is represented by National Union of Employers, Bulgarian Union of Private Producers "Revival", Union of Co-operators Producers, Main Union of Co-operators and Bulgarian Industry Association (Dimitrova, Dimitrov, p.152).

At the same time (1991) in Poland 28% of respondents expected the interference of Solidarity in economic cases, 18% opted for awarding this privilege the second main union- OPZZ. In 1994 similar- 33% and 27% (J. Gardawski 1996, p. 81)

In 1993 the level of employment in Bulgarian private sector amounted to 24,2% and participant in *PBN* 19,4%

Tripartite relations

In the process of development of Bulgarian industrial relations one may separate a few principal stages connected with changes of cabinets. The first fell (in the period) between Nov. 89 and Dec. 90. On Mar. 90 as a result of an agreement reached between D. Popov government, CITUB and National Association of Employers the National Committee to Interests Co-ordination has been brought into existence. This agreement was renegotiated and signed again in Aug. 90 with participation of Podkrepa. As a result of agreement achieved on Permanent Committee's forum (it was managed to reduce the inflation) was considerably reduced within one of the main, six-month long period of social consensus. It has been negotiated this time that of Permanent Committee would be structurally related to the apparatus's lower level institutions (Thirkell a.a. p.106). F. Dimitrov's government did not continue this policy. The government brought into existence in Nov. '91 tried to understand the liberal course. The wave of strikes organised by CITUB and Podkrepa and further economic recession forced the government to taking up the debate in May. 92. As a result of it appeared National Council of Tripartite Partnership. The deepening crisis was the reason of the liberal government downfall. In Dec. 92 appeared Prof. Berov's "experts" cabinet which had to accept the existence of tripartite institutions because of its justification in a new code. The break in a Council's functioning thought government fault was a reason of the next wave of strikes in Mar. 94 (Gradev, Petkov p.155).

In Bulgaria (like in Poland) the sharp recession and sudden institutional crisis coupled in a trap of conflicts the trade unions, political parties and successive executives. Interests discrepancies did not find the appropriate "service" in the sphere of tripartite relations and the agreements concerned usually the division of poor state resources. The leaders of Bulgarian trade unions are exposed to strong pressure of populist-minded members. For Podkrepa the important treaty is also the Turkish ethnic group. Satisfying of unions' claims leads to the steady reduction of participation of Bulgarian economy in international exchange. On the other hand, at that time "only the prime-minister having the full support of Podkrepa and Movement Law and Freedom may offer the international community any guarantee fulfilling of the commitments" (Myant p.30). Bulgarian recession is the subject of feedback and the reasons of this phenomenon reside in strength and at the same time in the lack of responsibility of trade unions and also in the weakness of other structures of interest representation.

Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic

Trade unions

During the last months of 1989 in Czechoslovakia was noticed the accumulated activation of labour force. The part of state owned industry's employees put up the initiative within the structure of (existing since 1945) federation known as Revolution Union Movement (ROH). Another aimed their activity of organising the independent industrial plant's committees evolved later into strike committees. On November 27th 1989, during the "velvet revolution" spontaneously created committees announced the general strike. The speed the committees (this time existed about 6000) organised the new representation system with shows the power of Czech-Slovakian labour force activity. The first, illegal (or rather not legally valid) congress of significant trade organisation Metal-Kovo took place in February 1990 (Rychtelnik p. 242). In March 1990 Union-wide Congress brought into existence Czechoslovakian Confederation of Trade Unions. In this way on Confederation has joined 41 labour organisations.

Characteristic feature for Czechoslovakian way of transformation the structure of interest representation was the certification of handing over the ownership made by Revolution Union Movement leadership. The new organisation also consisted of ten “old” unions (Burianek, Mazalkowa, Kuchar, p. 70). In Czechoslovakia already on the transformation’s beginning there was no trace after the old trade unions head office (expected the ownership handed over). In the midst of many possible conflicts in Czechoslovakia avoided the dispute about property, which took place in Poland between “old” confederation OPZZ and “new” Solidarity (in the 90’s). Against the rest Middle-Eastern European countries, background the Czechoslovakian case of forming the new unprecedented phenomenon. The new Czech-Slovakian Trade Unions Federation (CSKOS) initially associated about 80% of all employees. Later the level of employees associated in 67 federation component organisations. Loss the members involve with privatisation progress and private sector development. In Czechoslovakia (distinguishing from for example Bulgaria) the flow of members to alternative trade organisations did not ensue.

The number of arisen on February 27th, 1990 the Confederation of Culture and Art Trade Unions (KUK) varied between 100 and 2000 thousand of members. Declaring the right-wing orientation leaders of KUK announced that activity of new union will be direct against the “social demagogy” of the biggest head office (CSKOS). In reality both federations co-operated with each other in many issues. On May 4th, 1990 one more federation arose with about 50 thousand members - Association of Bohemian, Moravian and Slovakian Trade Unions. Mentioned Unions played a marginal role on Czechoslovakian industrial arena. (Myant pp 63, 64)

Division of industrial relations arena was accompanied by the separation of state federation. The union movement in the Czech Republic faced any different problems and assumed another prospects of activity in the sphere of industrial relations than labour force organisations in Slovakia.

Since division of federation, in 1993 the pro-liberal government has been the partner of Czech employees associated in Czech-Moravian Trade Chamber. In tripartite discussions government promotes the policy of “low incomes and low unemployment”. The inflation in Czech Republic in 1995 did not exceed 10% and unemployment varied between 3-4% (in Slovakia respectively - 7%, but earlier 14%) (M. Kotrusowa p. 11). Czech trade unions declare egalitarian preferences and because of it realisation of “amortisation the transformations” (used the instruments of income control and keep - to June 1997 - lower value of Czech currency) policy of V. Klaus government does not encounter the barriers from employees organisations side. The sign of this policy was almost full employment with relatively low incomes and controlled prices’ level. The commentators of Czech industrial relations do not agree in their opinions. Part of them perceive the situation as the government’s clever subterfuge which aim is limiting the trade unions activity, another attribute the Czech system to development little similar to British industrial relations arena evolution, the other look at Czech run to the “negotiated economy” (Myant p. 80, Rychtelnik p. 253). The Czech Republic belongs to the group of smaller European countries and this could be probably one of the determinants of its further development.

In Slovak Republic according to the Constitution (Article 37) everyone has the right to freely associate with others to protect his economic and social interests (paragraph 1). Trade unions are established independently of the state and trade unions number is unlimited (paragraph 2). Activity of trade unions and other social- and economical interests organisations as well, is restricted by law in such cases like protection the security of state, public order or the rights and liberties others (paragraph 3). In Slovakia the Confederation of Trade Unions KOZ SR has 1,4 million members in 26 branch organisations. The union

membership is relatively high (about 70%), but in most of units it is declined. The decline of percentage is highest in primary production. On the other hand trade union influence – especially on the level of units – trade union influence has been increased more often than trade union membership has been risen.

Employers organisations

In Czechoslovakia, in Dec. 1989 arose first employer's organisation - Czech-Slovakian Entrepreneurs, which aspired, to capital representation status. Then in May 1990 emerged one of the biggest and most influential "business" structures - Industrial Confederation of the Czech Republic with 530 managers representing the strongest state enterprises employing on the whole 1.200 thousand. Another important organisations were – the Czech Manager's Association and Czech-Slovakian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In Sep. 1990 all mentioned organisation has formed the common Co-ordinating Bureau to participation in appearing industrial bargaining (Rychtelnik p. 241). In Czechoslovakia, like in other post-communist countries, the capital force in newly established tripartite relations was weakly represented. Most employers associated in Industrial Confederation of the Czech Republic and Czech Manager's Association were simultaneously the members or sympathisers of trade unions. The logic of free market was at that time strange for "entrepreneurs". The restrictive monetary policy and government's liberal course presented a threat for managers accustomed to the former administration methods. In Feb. 1991 Industrial Confederation petitioned on Federal Assembly forum the mitigation of transformation course. The proposal remained unconsidered.

In the new Czech state employers organisations gain a new image. Currently seven organisations act - all in the sphere of Confederation of Employers and Entrepreneurs Associations. The biggest element of confederation are - Confederation of Entrepreneurs Associations and Industry Associations (represented in Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe - UNICE) (Burianek, Mazalkowa, Kuchar p. 71). Representations of Czech capital are still not the real employer's organisations. In 1995 in Czech economy 60% of enterprises belongs to the state, about 8% of them has co-operative ownership character (state-private) and about 31% were private (mainly small firms and construction industry).

Tripartite Relations

The cabinet formed as a result of parliamentary election in July 1990 started the consultations with CSKOS (Rychtelnik p. 244). As a result of the negotiations the scenario of Social Reform adopted by parliament in Sep. 1990 appeared. At this time the first proposition of forming the official co-operation structures appeared. Trade unions proposed creating mixed committees and government put forward creating of the tripartite social Agreement Council. As the result of these consultations, on Sep. 30th 1990, Socio-Economic Agreement Council appeared. In the sphere of these institution six members of CSKOS represented trade unions and one of KUK, government and employers organisations had seven-man representations too. The analogous structures have been appointed in federal countries (Moravian and Bohemian). Against the trade unions' opinion the Council's existing did not find the legal justification. The most urgent subject of proceedings concerned the new Work Code and the Act of Collective Bargaining. Unions demanded broader participation in the decisions concerning further reform's development. In Nov. 1990 V. Klaus described these aspirations as a desire to return to "bolshhevik practice". The bequest placed in a new Work Code about unions' right to information and consultation in the cases of "fundamental

problems and prospects of further economic development” presents in a large degree on outcome of the federal- wide strike alert declared at the end of 1990 (Orenstein p. 173). The regulations adopted in Dec. 1990 established the negotiations order on a tree - federal, state and industrial plant-levels. The discussions on Council forum took place regularly. The Council consisted of 21 members. Each of three partners had an equal number of representatives. The head of governmental representation was Deputy of Prime Minister responsible for economic reform issues. While the trade unionists and employers was headed by suitable Presidents of both associations.

After the federation’s division the Czech government tried to promote a new style of industrial conflicts solutions- by the Civil and Work Codes regulations. Owing to decisively egalitarian attitude of trade unions we should take into account the eventuality of stronger stimulation of Czech industrial relations development in the moment when the left- wing will reach the advantage. The long- term strict control of prices, incomes and the level of unemployment can lead up to the solutions resemble (in a certain degree) the Scandinavian and Austrian. If the trade unions still lose their members we could expect the outlining of situation remanding the British case. In Slovak Republic new Council statue was reflected formally in March 1993. The results of tripartite negotiations are usually visible on the branch and regional levels. At the beginning of the 90’s, on Slovakian arena of tripartite relations, one of the main elements was newly established Law on the Association of Citizens provided a framework for the organisation of trade unions and employer organisations.

Hungary

Trade unions

At the end of the 80’s in Hungary the representation of labour force was neutralised in the face of strong position of state enterprises’ directors. Extremely strong development of technocratic state structures was the result of realised during the long run policy of corporatistic paternalism - one of the elements of Hungarian “goulash democracy”. In this, characteristic for Hungary, order the directors administrating the big enterprises took part in peculiar interests bargaining encompassing the individual trades: agriculture and state administration. These mechanisms have been a kind of market simulation. The aim of this practice was a protection of consumption growth to ensure the regime’s legitimisation. The bargaining structures at state level and also at the level of individual enterprise were not formalised. The rules of their activity were wavering and the employees’ claims „service” has been the essence of mechanism. The effect of bureaucratic bargaining process was a high national debt (comparable with Polish debt) and administrative chaos.

Since 1985 in some Hungarian enterprises the system of industrial quasi-democracy (councils) has functioned. The regulations concerning this part of interest representation prevented the directors from being elected as council’s members. In 1988 first independent trade organisation - League appeared. The year after “old” National Trade Unions Council (SZOT) separated from Federation of Employees Council (MSzOSz). Further process of SZOT fragmentation appointed four confederations - ASZOK, ESZT, SZEZ, MSzOSz and many branch unions (Toth p.86). It is difficult to reproduce a very complicated process of Hungarian labour force division. The reasons of this situation can reside in former system. As a result of further diversity of union movement six union confederations appeared:

- Autonomous Trade Unions ASZOK - organisation of chemical branch (410,75);
- Association of White - Collar Workers ESZT (110,75);
- Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions (250,120);

- National Union of Hungarian Trade Union MSzOSz - construction industry, industry, public service (1200,1000);
- Forum of Trade Unions Co-operation SZEF - health service, teachers (550, 250);
- National Confederation of Employees Councils (160, 50).

In parenthesis I indicate the data concerning the number of members of Hungarian unions, in order- in 1993 and in 1995. The differences of numbers are perfectly visible (Hethy p. 231, Csako, Simonyi, Toth p. 127)

Employers organisations

The reality of started in 1968 program of putting into practice the New Economic Mechanisms equipped the managers with favourable positions. They were the local “proxies” of system. The state protected this professional group hoping that it can keep the economic rationality of bargaining treaty at a decent level. In this time existed the co- operatives associations etc., and the membership in it was forced. (L. Bruszt p. 269) In 1989 started to appeared the independence organisations describing themselves as employers interests representation. In 1995 the most important organisations representing the capital force enumerated were:

- National Association of Employers MAOSZ (2000 thousand of members);
- National Association of Entrepreneurs VOSZ (500);
- Hungarian Association of Industrial Employers MGYOSZ (70);
- Hungarian Industrial Association OKISZ (250);
- Hungarian House of Agriculture (no data);
- Hungarian Association of Food Industry AFETOSZ (100);
- National Association of Agriculture Producer (a few hundred thousand).

In parenthesis I indicate the data concerning the number of employees associated in mentioned organisations (Hethy p 232, Csako p 128). The Republican Party is treated as political representation of employers. Variety of employers’ coalition could imply the development of diverse interest of this sector.

Tripartite relations

During the transformation the most important forum giving the shape to decision-making process at micro-level were the “enterprise four” created by enterprise’s director, secretary of party’s unit, representative of League of Young Communists and representative of trade unions. The directors had the most comfortable situation in this construction. Trade unions had the least triumphs but (like in Poland) the power of union was directly proportional to the prestige of enterprise’s branch (L. Bruszt, D. Stark p.p. 79-80). At the beginning of transformation the managers accustomed to the role of employees` movement “animators” often have been the strike’s co- organisers. The biggest demonstration of labour force in Hungary - protest in Pecs was initiated together by leader of SZOT and the director of big local enterprise.

Hungarian industrial relations are still characterised by significant decentralisation of negotiations. National Council of Interests Reconciling was appeared in 1988 created to establish the lasting rules of enterprise’s bargaining. The shapes of this structure were described by work code in 1992. The agreements made in a Council’s sphere initially contributed to quick regulations of a long list of transformational problems. However, since 1992 any board social agreement has not been made. The reasons are: decline of membership in Hungarian trade unions movement and reproduction of candidates to participation in

bargaining, board package of problems accepted in 1992 as legally binding in tripartite discussion which seems to be too extensive today.

Poland

In Poland the transformation of political regime led to the dramatic changes of industrial relations system. Trade unions had to define their social, political and economic role in new conditions. In 1989 in Poland two big trade unions centres existed. Solidarity, reactivated by virtue of the “round table” decisions and All-Poland Trade Unions Agreement (OPZZ) concluded in 1983. Solidarity’s elite’s, considering the history of union, felt responsibility for a course of reforming process. Because of this Solidarity at the beginning of transformation performed not only the role of labour force movement but also that of specific coalition on behalf of social, economic and political reform. Therefore “independent” candidates in parliamentary elections in June 1989 came forward under Solidarity’s umbrella. Citizen Parliamentary Club (OKP) was the success of Solidarity coalition and later formed the basis of the first non-communistic government Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In 1990 the process of the division the Solidarity’s elite’s has intensified. This phenomenon was labelled by Lech Walesa as “war on the top”. Elite’s oriented towards strict policies started to create their own parties- later defined as Post-Solidarity parties. Now Solidarity remains active on the both industrial and political arenas. The process of privatisation just started and the government remains the main partner of the Union in the collective bargaining. In the period from 1989 to 1993 specific conditions of political exchange between Solidarity and so-called „Solidarity’s cabinets” was rising and stabilising. However, the government exercised much stricter economic policy than Solidarity wanted to see. In parliamentary elections in 1991 the Union got 27 mandates and occupied the position in the parliament. Alongside with progressing recession and radicalisation of the employees’ claims the relations between Solidarity and the Solidarity’s cabinets began to cool down. Inside the Union discussion about creation of a party being the political representative of the labour increased. Solidarity’s party did not emerge but the Union gained the material and staff benefits. A number of Solidarity’s leaders have got the offices in the state administration. In this period the Union undoubtedly took up its capacity to co-operation with other actors. In 1993 parliamentary elections Solidarity has obtained 11 mandates. Later on by the initiative of Solidarity the parliament expressed its distrust to the cabinet of H. Suchocka.

The second largest unions’ federation in Poland – OPZZ - after 1989 endeavoured to regain the confidence of the society. This union was that time in the red part of political spectrum because of its co-operation with communist authorities. The union was looking for a political ally, which finally became the post-communist Social-Democratic Party. Then the OPZZ joined SLD - The Alliance of Democratic the Left Wing. After victorious 1993 elections OPZZ entered the parliament, i.e. obtained 61 parliamentary mandates.

Besides these two unions’ centres there are a lot other trade unions in Poland. There are branch centres (e.g. very strong railway workers organisation) or unions formed after 1989 and representing narrow professional groups. Their activity is limited to bargaining on meso- and micro- levels. Until 1992 participation in direct negotiations with unions and employers was the government’s duty.

Polish trade unions as social and political actors

In 1989 elite’s characterised as Solidarity enjoyed the unique kind of social confidence but the idealisation of transition processes did not lasted long. The feeling of deepen “transitory period” appeared along with progressing destruction of “old” paternalism state’s system. At

the same time successive Solidarity cabinets seemed to ignore sudden regress of support. Criticism and anxiety deepened and Solidarity leaders began to formulate the thesis about a need for “finishing the revolution”. The Trade activists did not design the projects of arrangement the relations with the state and capital because in their opinions these subjects took responsibility for negative phenomena in economy. In connection with mentioned trends on political and industrial arenas appears numerous conflicts thanks to which the views about need to cross the transformations out started to have a support (for example populist movement Self-Dependency - “Samoobrona”). At the same time the membership of trade unions has been constantly dropping. Also in Solidarity appeared the conflicts rising since 1989 round the problem of limit between trade and political activity. Support for both parties – “trade” and “political given by Lech Walesa who realised his own tactic in a time of mentioned “war on the top”. In the result of these conflicts Solidarity did not adopt a clear arrangement concerning the rule of trade in public life. Trade unions activity connected mainly with earnings claims still had to be plaited with realisation of the independent political game. Union’s political thesis about the need for “finishing the revolution” appeared in solution of Convention of Union’s Delegates in 1993 (solution recognised the need of keeping the union’s representation in parliament). Initiated by NSZZ (Solidarity) the fall of H. Suchocka’s cabinet was the result of mentioned processes. Elections in 1993 have completely changed a political situation. In the result of it OPZZ head office itself in a position reminding the earlier position of Solidarity. After two failures of post-solidarity elite’s (parliamentary and presidential) the aspiration of NSZZ to consolidate the pragmatically image became to be more visible. The new image is sometimes covered up by comments of trade’s fraction’s leaders using populist and chauvinistic rhetoric, but the head office tries to present a moderate style. The close relation between Solidarity and OPZZ at a plant level is the essential feature of contemporary industrial relations in Poland. Both trade unions, constantly losing their members, more and more frequently co-operates with each other in concrete issues. Within another influential employees’ organisation whose representatives sit on a Tripartite Committee we should enumerate:

- Federation of Railways Employees Trade Unions;
- Confederation of Power Industry Employees;
- Agreement of Technical Supervisors Trade Unions “Kadra”;
- Engineers and Technicians Trade Union;
- Polish Engine Drivers Trade Union;
- Engine Industry Trade Union.
- Trade Union of Public Transport Workers

The new interesting trend of trade movement development in Poland is dynamic increase of local trade organisations. The register of polish trade unions consists from the three sections:

- section A is reserved for trade unions which are active in plants and local or regional environments (about 24 thousand trade unions);
- section B - for trade unions which are active on area of the country (about 270 trade unions);
- section C is designed for whole-country federations and confederations of trade unions (nowadays there are existing 9).

Employers organisations

In Poland as in the other transforming systems the employers’ representation is developed very weakly. Members of capital’s organisations frequently represents the super-employer (state-owned enterprises). According to the estimates Polish business organisation represents

only a little part of entrepreneurs. Within functioning coalition of employers and entrepreneurs we can find:

- Confederation of Polish Employers (founded in 1992);
- Business Centre Club (1991);
- Polish Business Council (1992);
- Polish Craftsmanship Union;
- National Economic Chamber (1990).

Mentioned organisations are established on a basis of four different law certificates. Describing the condition of state administration and trade unions do not attribute a special importance to capital's organisation. Employers in Poland also do not have a political representation. Character of Polish tripartite relations is determinate in a negative measurement by complicated conflict between proceeding cabinets and trade unions.

Tripartite relations

In 1997 Polish tripartite relations consist - in negative dimension - of sophisticated mosaic of conflict between cabinets and trade unions - in positive dimension - languid process of institutionalisation the co-operation in frames of Tripartite Commission and around The Pact of State Enterprise.

Because of lack of place I will not busy myself with negative dimension. The essence of process in positive dimension is an idea of Pact associated till today with activity of Minister Jacek Kuron. Negotiations concerning the Pact have been preceding the biggest wave of strikes of the 90's. In the scale of year to one employee fallen 1,5 day of protest. After a next strike's wave on April and May 1993 the Sejm (Polish Parliament) adopted the Pact. But only on February 1994 government resolution has formed The Tripartite Socio-Economic Commission. In the Commission participate administration's experts, employers representatives as well as representatives of Solidarity, OPZZ and seven smaller union centres. Decision reached unanimously. Monitoring, giving opinions on macro-economic processes and formulating the recommendation in employment cases are the main task of Commission. The Act of Wage System Negotiations imposes Commission the duty of payment - forming in a macro scale. The most controversial subject of proceedings is a budget project for next year and also the project of social insurance reform.

In 1993 Tripartite Socio-Economic Commission – the main area of co-ordination bargaining process on the state level, was created. In the Commission administration's experts, employers' representatives as well as representatives of Solidarity, OPZZ and seven smaller union centres are participate. Trade unions' participation in the Commission's activities is based on separate agreements. The conventions are essentially the same, but are formulated differently considering the ideological views of each union. The Commission consists of three subjects: Solidarity, OPZZ and seven branch unions. Each subject, including government and employers representation, dispose of one vote. Because of the imbalance of the votes, the decisions are being made unanimously provided than the option of each party is taken into consideration. In the beginning of every year each side puts forward its own propositions and than Commission adopts the agreement of the Commission's activity. The most important topic of discussion is the budgetary project for each next year and then also project of social insurance reform. Moreover the Act of Conciliatory Forming the Wages System (in 1993) imposes on the Commission the responsibility to define the average growth rate of wages for the next year.

Tripartite Commission main task is the arranging of the collective bargaining process. Meetings of the government, employers and employees allow to avoid to some extent the escalation of claims, which is characteristic to the dispersed negotiations. The aspiration of

the other unions' centres to participate in the Commission is a sign of a little success of this form of collective bargaining. It is possible that development of Tripartite Commission establishes the basis for Polish version of tripartite mechanism. Despite of this, the situation on Polish industrial area is still not so ripe to forming a social pact. The trial was Pact of State-Owned Industries in Transformation, but because of H. Suchocka's government fall it did not come into force. Actually, the tripartism idea could be used in the most depressed industries. Tripartite negotiations should concern the problems of deepening social inequalities, privatisation, forms and levels of employees' participation in a decision-making process, unemployment, modernisation of agriculture, social insurance and education.

The way to achieve an agreement on the central level is contracting pacts in the above mentioned arenas. The main problem and barrier of development Polish industrial relations system is still insufficient culture of negotiations.

Conclusions

David Stark described the predominating in Middle-East Europe transitional phenomena as a "path dependence" process. Expected fundamental similarity inhered from the period of socialistic development some evolutionary analogies are good visible indeed.

Firstly, in all mentioned countries we deal with a non-consolidated interests representation system. The activity of trade unions (which always have better organisational background) is balancing between behaviours characteristic for political parties and unions activity. The similarities between Polish Solidarity and Bulgarian Podkrepa are standing out. In a range of both large social movements have been developing the policy networks, which gave the beginning of a new political elite's. In both cases on union's own initiative arisen an important political parties. Thanks to these connections Solidarity as well as Podkrepa could fulfil the role of a "political barometer" within related political environments.

Secondly, expected the Czech CSKOS the union organisations in mentioned countries possess their own *alter ego* in a form of organisation having a bad reputation of a post-communist union. The competition is characterised by comparably strong political aspirations. The change of political treaty does not have to mean the separation a new government from employee's claim pressure.

Thirdly, the employer's organisations are the weakest actor on industrial arena. Then it is difficult to discuss about the real tripartite treaty. Taking into consideration the trends to state power reinforcement and the fact that partners can (in a pessimistic scenario) represent three aspects of one bureaucratic interest, we should ask about the probability of neo-ethatic trends' in development of industrial relations. J. Kornai, L. Bruszt and D. Stark described possible forms of mentioned threat. The unique situation moulded in Hungary where the directors of state enterprises have won the stronger position than in other transforming regimes. Position like this let them pass over the complicated structure of industrial co-operation and put an informal or quasi-formal pressure on state administration.

Process of privatisation lead to the still blurred distinction between employers and employees. In 1994 the private sector produced 46,4% of GNP and gave jobs for the half of the labour force. At the begin 1995 number of employers in the private sector that about 5 millions people. Only about 40% were contracted employees, while the rest, i.e. 56,5% being employers and single entrepreneurs. For among 2.0 millions' companies in the private sector 1.9 millions is very small, up to 5 employees, or just fronts for single entrepreneurs. The State is still the most important employer and but also the owner of the majority industries and services. In the industry, i.e. in the major sector of national economy output of the public sector was in 1994 twice that great as that of private sector (21,1% against 11,1%). The government interventions targeted two potentially conflicting goals. The first one was to prevent the underpayment of specific jobs, which could result in worsening the social inequality. The second aimed to preserve and even to reinforce (for political reasons) the existing income privileges.

Fourthly, in all countries of region (maybe expected Czech Republic) constantly develop the phenomenon of “spontaneous privatisation”, consequently the character of enterprises’ ownership and all view of industrial bargaining covers up.

Mentioned trends of transformation let us notice the negative (conflicts, claims) and positive (negotiations) forms of co-operation. In my opinion the current shape of industrial relations is not mature enough to formulate the satisfactory answers to questions given in the title of my work. The shape of negotiations still differs from corporatistic strategy described in literature. In many Middle-East-European countries the hybrid forms will appear most probably, just like J. Hausner has predicted. Further stabilisation of a treaty with developing interests differences would be extremely optimistic assumption. These conditions would create a chance for appearing the phenomenon of “strutting agreement” (known in Germany). But if the negative trends win, it could lead to conflicts destroying the potential co-operators. The result of an escalation of unwelcome phenomena is visible on Bulgarian example very well. So far, the most “linear” development of industrial relations we can observe in the Czech. If the consensus between trade unions egalitarianism and income-price policy will remains, this country would be nearest to the social peace and consolidation of industrial arena. So in the event of Czech of the corporatistic scenario seems to be probable. Taking into consideration the Czech territory where the deep and rational reconstruction of economy with participation of labour sector has been done in a relatively short time, in further assessments we should always devoted to a very important factors of industrial relations evolution – “size” of country and the socio-cultural conditions.

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