PROJECTING STABILITY: NATO AND MULTILATERAL NAVAL COOPERATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

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I. Introduction: Colbert’s Heirs

In late 1994, ships from ten NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) nations joined vessels from Russia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden in COOPERATIVE VENTURE 94, the first Partnership for Peace (PfP) naval exercise which was held near the Norwegian port of Stavanger. Activities included "joint manoeuvring, refuelling from a NATO tanker ship at sea, forming communications networks with other ships and groups of flights of naval helicopters."¹ The late Admiral Richard G. Colbert, USN (United States Navy) would have been pleased.

As John Hattendorf has noted, Richard Colbert was a rarity amongst American naval officers. In a profession, and a service, which seemed synonymous with the projection of national power abroad, he was the champion of multilateralism. Elmo Zumwalt has called him "Mr. International Navy," the unofficial president of the global "fraternity of the blue uniform." A great believer in multilateral naval education, he created the Naval Command Course (NCC) for senior foreign officers at the US Naval War College (USNWC) in 1955. As president of the college from 1969-71, he began a course for mid-ranked foreign officers and inaugurated the Sea Power Symposia for foreign flag officers. Most importantly, Colbert strove to put his multilateral vision into action. During his two tours on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) in the mid-1960s and early-1970s, Colbert was one of the moving forces behind greater allied maritime cooperation. He was especially active in the establishment of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) in 1968. In his last post, as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, South (CINCSOUTH) he was credited with lending "credibility to the NATO strategy of flexible response." He fostered "an enthusiastic spirit of solidarity" amongst the five allied nations of the region.² Central to his approach was that multilateral naval cooperation had to be approached from the standpoint of partnership, rather than imposed by Washington.

Ironically, although Colbert saw his multilateralism as directed primarily against Soviet sea power, it was the end of the Cold War that ushered in an unprecedented era of naval cooperation as a growing number of nations (including former adversaries and non-aligned) became interested in collaboration with the USN and amongst themselves. A multilateral force supported land operations in the Gulf War. The old NATO maritime alliance has been given new life with its actions in support of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia, making use of the STANAVFORLANT and the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). New allied strategic concepts, such as the Combined and Joint Task Forces (CJTF), enhance the scope
of naval operations. Most remarkable, the Alliance's PfP program has expanded cooperation at sea to encompass dozens of other countries in Europe including former Warsaw Pact nations.

However, it is also important to remember that Colbert was not always successful in promoting his ideas for greater multilateralism. His plans for the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), an Inter-American Military Force, the Free World Frigate Program, mix-manning of allied ships, and a combined marine amphibious force for the STANAVFORLANT, never came to fruition. By the early 1970s, many governments were suspicious of US schemes for greater cooperation at sea, especially those in the Third World. Older allies were not always anxious to assume the burdens of partnership, and Washington itself was wary of new joint undertakings. There were limits to what the “fraternity could do.”

The reason was that in Colbert's day, as now, navies remained first and foremost instruments of national policy, especially for the USN - now the “unipolar navy.” For Colbert, it was always clear that multilateralism at sea was only attractive because it served US interests. Multilateral naval cooperation is an instrument used by a coalition of nations who deem it in their national self-interests to make use of sea power. The same also applies to other contributors to coalition efforts at sea, including small and medium power navies. Therefore, the tactical, strategic and above all political effectiveness of multilateral naval cooperation will always be dependent upon the cohesiveness of the coalition that stands behind, and especially upon, the will of the major contributing naval powers.

Another limitation upon the effectiveness of maritime multilateralism has been its potential impact ashore. The ultimate purpose of employing sea power is to influence the military and political situation on land. The success of collaboration at sea cannot be measured solely by the ease with which multinational forces operate together or perform their strictly maritime roles. A multilateral naval embargo which succeeds in halting seaborne arms shipments, but can be circumvented by land and air transportation, falls short of its goal. A combined flotilla sent to support peacekeeping forces ashore where those forces are unable to keep or reestablish the peace, cannot be considered an effective use of sea power, however much the different national navies may operate together.

The purpose of this study is to examine NATO multinational maritime cooperation in the post-Cold War era and assess its effectiveness in supporting the new objectives of the Atlantic alliance. The study begins with a discussion of sea power in the post-Cold War era with particular reference to NATO. This is followed by a brief overview of the state of the Russian Navy. It then turns to a review of the ways in which the Alliance has tried to adjust its maritime organization and posture in order to
accommodate the changed international strategic environment. The next section looks specifically at the role of the Alliance’s maritime forces in peace support missions, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. This is followed by a discussion of the approach of the USN to maritime multilateralism before turning to maritime implications of creating a distinctively European multinational maritime structure. Finally, the paper looks across the Atlantic to Canada and the role that its navy has and can play within the larger allied maritime framework.

The study argues that maritime forces constitute an essential component of NATO’s collective military force posture and structure. Indeed, in many ways the allied naval forces are uniquely suited to support the current objectives of the Alliance. Above all, the NATO alliance seeks to promote comprehensive security in Europe. Whereas in the Cold War the allied maritime forces had to be able to project power ashore for the purposes of deterrence and defence, their objective now is to project stability ashore. At the same time, just as in the Cold War, there are limits as to what multilateral sea power can accomplish ashore.

II. Sea Power and NATO in the Post Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War has occasioned a similar challenge to the meaning and role of sea power as that which took place at the end of the Second World War. At that time, the advent of atomic weapons appeared to make navies obsolete and superfluous in any future war against the Soviet Union. "How could enough time be allowed for sea power to take its affect, where war was characterized by strategic bombing with nuclear weapons?" asked leading naval theorist Bernard Brodie. Nations, their land, and air forces, as well as their economies would “disappear in the first blows of the nuclear war.” Not only did atomic weapons appear to undermine the need for sea power, but American sea power seemed so absolute that Admiral Chester Nimitz worried that it would be taken for granted.4

The Cold War atomic era did not see the eclipse of sea power, but quite the opposite. By the early 1950s the USN had developed a carrier-based nuclear strike capability. The last years of that decade saw the advent of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) which with its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) became the capital ship of the new age. It was upon this third and secure leg of the nuclear triad that the credibility of deterrence rested. The development first of nuclear-power attack submarines (SSNs) and later of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) made it evident that nuclear propulsion and especially the deployment of nuclear weapons at sea had
endowed navies, particularly the USN, with a power and strategic significance unmatched even when the Britannia ruled the waves.

Had strategic nuclear deterrence been the sole, or even dominant, role of sea power in the Cold War, then the USN and other western navies would never have attained the size and sophistication that they did. But navies continued to be concerned with traditional roles, protection of the sea lanes of communication (SLOC), the projection of force ashore, gun-boat diplomacy, and naval presence. Even in the absence of a comparable rival Soviet high seas fleet, sea power maintained a relevance in the global balance of power. Indeed, Samuel P. Huntington argued in 1954 that the USN’s monopoly of the seas and Soviet land power in Eurasia had resulted in a new kind of navy -- a “transoceanic” one. The USN’s role was not to prepare for a Mahanian fleet-on-fleet struggle for the high seas but to apply power on the “narrow lands and the narrow seas which like between” the “great oceans on the one hand and the equally immense spaces of the Eurasian heartland on the other.”

This was especially the case for the NATO alliance. From its earliest days the Alliance focused on securing the seas immediately adjacent to Europe. Moreover, while it was the case as Huntington argued that the USN and its allies dominated the high seas, in the “narrow seas” around Western Europe the Soviet Union could, even in these early years, deploy sea denial forces (principally submarines) that would have made the immediate projection of force ashore difficult. In later years when, due to the emergence of a more powerful and high seas capable Soviet fleet along with a considerable land-based naval aviation capability, NATO grew increasingly apprehensive about its ability to protect the transatlantic SLOC upon which the strategy of flexible response rested, sea power had been an essential component of collective defence.

In what turned out to be the last years of the Cold War, NATO took specific and deliberate steps to address what was viewed as a growing maritime threat. In 1981, the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) adopted a “Concept of Maritime Operations” (CONMAROPS) which stressed the importance of containing Warsaw Pact forces through forward operations, of defence in depth, and of gaining and maintaining the initiative at sea. Although differing in some respects from CONMAROPS and the cause of considerable controversy, the USN’s much heralded, and much maligned, Maritime Strategy of the 1980s also drew attention to the need to provide a more effective counter to growing Soviet naval capability.

But it was never the various formulations of maritime strategies which defined the role and significance of sea power in NATO during the Cold War. Nor was it, fundamentally, only the naval balance of power which determined the need for maritime forces. Allied naval plans and the forces acquired to implement
them were simply reflections of the overall goal of NATO which was to provide for collective defence and deterrence ashore in Western Europe. The Cold War had wrought many changes in international strategic relations, but it did not change the true essence of sea power, which remained the ability to secure, deny, and utilize the oceans for the projection and sustainment of military power ashore in peace and war. The ultimate objectives of naval forces, even in the nuclear age, have been ashore because it is there that organized political communities exist. As Colin Gray has observed, "The sea, like the air and like space, has strategic meaning only in relation to where the human race lives, the land." Accordingly, the measure of the effectiveness and significance of naval forces rests in their ability to influence the situation ashore. Whether it was the USN's SSBNs and carriers reinforcing extended nuclear deterrence or the combined NATO fleets support for conventional deterrence through the maintenance of a flexible response capability, the ultimate objectives of allied sea power were ashore. It was this reality which, despite the consternation over the future of sea power at the dawn of the Cold War, made the NATO navies major contributors to the final victory in that "long twilight struggle."

It is also this consideration that has made allied sea power relevant to the post-Cold War era. The USN articulated its post-Cold War strategy in From the Sea in 1992. It is an aptly named document for it constituted a shift in focus from the sea of the 1980s Maritime Strategy to the land, where the real objectives of sea power have always been. Command of the sea is meaningless unless it can allow for the projection of force from the sea to the land. "Derived from" the Bush administration's National Security Strategy which emphasizes peacetime presence and engagement, promotion of stability, thwarting of aggression mobility and flexibility in meeting regional, rather than global threats to American interests, the USN's strategic direction was described as:

...a fundamental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea towards joint operations conducted from the sea. The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and can provide the initial "enabling" capability for joint operations in conflict—as well as continued participation in any sustained effort. We will be part of a "sea-air-land" team trained to respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they execute national policy.  

With the coming into office of the Clinton administration, new guidance was provided for the role of military forces, one which reflected the new roles and missions, especially in the
areas of peacekeeping that the US military had undertaken. Given the shift in emphasis towards the "new dangers" posed by "aggression by regional powers," it was necessary to again review naval strategy. In November 1994, the USN published *Forward...From the Sea*. The document notes that while naval forces "are designed to fight and win wars, our most recent experiences...underscore the premise that the most important role of the naval forces in situations short of war is to be engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises." As the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) put it, the "cornerstones" of American sea power will be forward presence, power projection, strategic deterrence, sea control and maritime supremacy, and strategic lift. Naval forces are "going to come from the sea. They are going to work near land and over land".

For Jan Bremer, the USN’s approach to the role of sea power in the post-Cold War era, marks the "end of naval strategy." In making this argument he draws a distinction between naval strategy, which is concerned with securing command of the sea and "maritime strategy" of which naval strategy is a subset and which is concerned with the relationship between navies and armies. Naval strategy is at an end the extent that the USN’s focus is no longer on planning for war at sea but rather on support of joint operations on land. Gone is the "Mahanian vision of naval power as the struggle for command of the sea by battlefleet" -- vision which was integral to the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. The then rising Soviet fleet is gone. Because the USN need no longer "look over its shoulder for the next blue water challenge," it can concentrate on "operations other than war at sea." Indeed, it can concentrate on operations other than war, on littoral operations to contain crises.

Yet, as argued above and as Bremer acknowledges, in 1954 Huntington had already pointed out the importance of the Eurasian littoral as the true objective of American and NATO naval power. In the post-Cold War era the orientation of sea power away from the sea to the land has become even more pronounced. To be sure, allied naval forces continue to prepare for Article 5 operations in defence of NATO territory. To this extent, as the statement on British maritime doctrine makes clear, the principles of NATO maritime operations remain consistent with CONMAROPS. That is; "seizing the initiative, containment, defence in depth and presence." The Alliance cannot fully discount the possibility that it may in the future face a challenge for command of the sea. However, the thrust of the allied military posture has been to support the overall objective of enhancing stability and expanding cooperation in and to Eastern Europe in addition to peace support operations out of area. It is not so much that allied naval forces need to project power ashore as to project...
political and military stability.

For NATO maritime forces this has meant that the preoccupation with the Norwegian sea, open ocean anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and Soviet Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine bastions have given way to heightened concerns about the situation in the Mediterranean basin.\(^{14}\) This shift has come about because it is here -- in the Balkans, in the southern republics of the former USSR, in the Middle East and potentially along the north African coast -- that instability might threaten allied interests, particularly those of Turkey and Greece. "The Mediterranean today represents perhaps the most important conduit linking East with West - the Adriatic with the Black Sea and the Arabian Gulf; and North and South - joining Europe with Africa."\(^{15}\)

III. In the Wake of the Red Navy: Sea Power in the East

For NATO the Red Navy was its Mahanian rival for command of the seas. Today the Russian Navy remains the only fleet capable of challenging the Alliance’s maritime overwhelming dominance but it has suffered from a lack of funds resulting in reduced construction, lower operational readiness and lengthy delays in naval pay. Particularly hard hit have been the surface forces where no new ships have been laid down since 1991.\(^{16}\) The submarine forces, have, however continued to be replaced with newer more capable models.

From the Russian perspective, a strong navy is needed for three central tasks, strategic deterrence, coastal defence, and forward presence.\(^{17}\) The importance of the strategic deterrence role will increase even though the number of Russian SSBNs is expected to decline from about 30 to 10. With the reductions in strategic nuclear forces mandated by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), the percentage of Russian warheads on SSBNs will go from 29 percent in 1996 to 55 percent in the year 2003. The Russians have begun construction on a new SSBN, BOREY (Arctic Wind) which is expected to carry a new SLBM.\(^{18}\) Admiral Oleg Yerofev, the Northern Fleet Commander, has listed the missions of Russia’s general purpose naval forces as; “to support the combat endurance of the SSBN,” by protecting individual submarines and their protected bastions, “repulsing strikes” against Russia by finding and destroying enemy submarines, aircraft carriers and land-attack cruise missile platforms before they can launch attacks, and “anti-assault” defence, being able to secure local superiority at sea and “destroy enemy amphibious forces.”\(^{19}\)

In March 1996, the Northern Fleet conducted, REDUT 96 the “largest naval exercise since the dissolution of the Soviet Union” in the waters off Norway. The exercise involved 13
submarines, 16 surface ships, including the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov and more than 40 aircraft. Lasting three days, it simulated attacking a hostile naval task force moving within range of Russia. According to the USN’s Office of Naval Intelligence, the exercise “confirmed that the basic Russian maritime defence strategy” of “deploying multiple layers of combatants beginning at distances out to maximum foreign naval strike range of the homeland . . . remains little change from the Soviet era.” Moreover, given the vulnerability of the Russian surface forces, the exercise also highlighted the importance attached to SSNs whose firepower and covertness allow them to “effectively challenge task forces outside cruise missile and carrier aviation strike range of the Russian homeland.” In addition, the Russian Navy has continued to patrol off of US SSBN facilities on the American east and west coasts.  

Russian concern about the security of the seas off its own coasts has been heightened by recent maritime trends in these areas. Many of its former Warsaw Pact allies and former Republics have shown increased interest in maritime cooperation with NATO through the PfP program. Ukraine and Russia have reached agreement over basing rights in the Crimea and “the partitioning of the Black Sea Fleet has in theory been set in motion.” Under the accord, Ukraine will get about 18 percent “of the vessels still listed in the combined fleet, to add to those already operating under Ukrainian command and control.” As noted below, other Black Sea countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania have conducted joint exercises with NATO and in the Baltic Sea, PfP and other multilateral exercises have taken place along with planning to enhance maritime cooperation.

Efforts are, however, also being made to expand maritime multilateralism and enhance cooperation at sea. There have been some ‘in the spirit of PfP’ exercises with the Russian Navy. For example, REDUT '96 was preceded by joint exercises conducted in the Mediterranean between the U.S. Sixth Fleet and a Russian flotilla centred on the carrier Kuznetsov. Given Moscow’s concern about NATO expansion, such naval exercises can help the confidence building effort and enhance the ultimate NATO goal of projecting stability ashore.

IV. Maritime Forces and the Changing Alliance

If flexible response described NATO’s strategic concept during much of the Cold War, it might also describe how the Alliance has responded overall to the end of the Cold War. To the surprise of many, it has proven itself to be remarkably adaptable to the changing nature of the international strategic
environment. In terms of organization and strategy, NATO has taken steps which recognize the importance of sea power in securing allied objectives ashore. By 1994, NATO had reduced from three to two Major NATO Commands by eliminating Commander-in-Chief Channel Command, leaving only Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. In addition, a new Major Subordinate Command, under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Allied Forces Northwest Europe, (AFNORWEST) covering the UK and Norway has been created with a naval component. Still to be sorted out are specific naval responsibilities between this new command, SACLANT, and the Commander Allied Forces, Baltic Approaches, which will now shift to Allied Forces Central Europe. Under SACEUR the position of CINCSOUTH, held by an American, will be retained as will the subordinate position of Commander Naval Forces, South (COMNAVSOUTH) held by an Italian admiral. Southern Command has always been predominately naval, dominated by the USN with its powerful Sixth fleet which continues to be forwardly deployed in the region.

Currently under consideration is a further major reorganization of the allied command structure. One option is to create two 'Strategic Commands' (SCs), Atlantic and Europe, roughly equal to the current Atlantic Command (ACLANT) and Allied Command, Europe (ACE). Under the Atlantic SC would be Regional Commands (RCs)-- an RC East at Northwood, West at Norfolk and Southeast at Lisbon. There would also be separate commands for Strike Fleet Atlantic and Submarine Command, Atlantic. The European SC would be divided between two RCs north and south at Brunssum and Naples, within which would be Component Commands, Naval (CC Nav) at Northwood, UK and Naples. The overall goal of the reorganization is to allow NATO to maintain a command structure amenable to the day-to-day coordination of naval activities, especially surveillance, joint exercises and, if necessary, combined action in the event of a crisis.

The Alliance's new military strategy places emphasis upon smaller, flexible multilateral forces as well as mobilization. Reaction forces, comprising less than ten percent of the total, are designed for immediate or rapid response "to emerging military risks." Included here is the new Allied Command Europe multilateral Rapid Reaction Corps. These will be supplemented by standing Main Defence Forces, and mobilized Augmentation Forces or reinforcing units from Europe and North America. "Jointness" has become the watch-word for the US, and thus for NATO. The emphasis on the overseas deployment of "joint" land, sea and air forces was evident in October 1993 when Atlantic Command, headquartered in Norfolk Virginia, was renamed United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) and became the joint headquarters for most forces in the continental United States (CONUS). In shifting "from a predominately naval headquarters to a more balanced combatant command headquarters," USACOM is
designed to "facilitate the identification, training, preparation and rapid response of designated CONUS-based forces currently under the Army's Forces Command, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet the Air Forces's Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Corps Marine Forces Atlantic." Suplementing the rapid capability of the regular forces will be the reserves, whose use becomes more feasible when initial deployments, as in the case of the Gulf War and Bosnia, extend over a period of several months. Indicative of the refocusing of the command was the appointment in October 1994 of US Marine General John J. Sheehan as Commander-in-Chief, USACOM (CINCUSACOM). Thus, for the first time SACLANT was not a naval officer.

At SACLANT headquarters, planning has been underway for several years to make sea power, based upon Multinational Maritime Forces (MNMF), part of the new NATO. The "concept of an overarching non-threat specific maritime force structure has been adjusted to support the new NATO strategy." Multilateral Standing Naval Forces (SNF), "together with individual national deployments," will provide presence and surveillance and will constitute the Alliance's maritime immediate reaction forces in the event of a crisis. Should the situation be prolonged and conflict become a possibility, the SNF would be joined by On-Call forces organized into a NATO Task Group (NTG). With the addition of more units from the naval component of the allied Main Defence Forces, the NTG would be expanded into a NATO Task Force (NTF) or with more units a NATO Expanded Task Force (NETF). It is estimated that the SNF would be available in as little as two days while the NTG, NTF and NETF would take from five to 30 days to assemble. In the event of a prolonged conflict, the Alliance would draw upon maritime units from its combined augmentation forces.

The PfP and CJTF concepts, both of which were urged upon the Alliance by Washington at the January 1994 Summit, also represent dramatic change. Under the former, Russia and Eastern European countries were offered a kind of associated status which will permit consultation and coordination on security issues. Included here are joint exercises including at sea. For example in the North, the NATO nations -- particularly Denmark and Germany along with the former Soviet Baltic republics, Sweden, Finland and Poland -- have conducted a number of exercises including COOPERATIVE BANNERS. There is increased cooperation in the Baltic Sea, where the BALTIC EYE exercise tested combined search and rescue procedures and collaboration in mine counter measures capabilities has increased. Naval forces have also played a major role in PfP exercises in the South. For example, in July 1996 exercise COOPERATIVE PARTNER 96 was held in the Black Sea involving naval units from several allied nations as well as forces from Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine.

The CJTF concept calls for the reorganization of NATO forces
into "combined joint task forces" which will allow different national contingents to serve under mobile commands "for specific operations," such as peacekeeping, or be used by the Western European Union (WEU). In the spirit of "jointness" which now pervades American defence thinking and organization, the CJTFs could be composed of multilateral land, sea, and air forces. They could (and have in exercises) involve forces from Eastern European countries under the PfP 31. At the same time, the task forces would allow the Europeans to "organize independently and, in some situations, take action within NATO but without involvement" of American (or Canadian) forces. 32

For the allied maritime forces, the new NATO strategies and organizational concepts do not represent as dramatic and profound a change as they do for the land and air forces. At sea, the Alliance has had few standing forces and has always relied upon mobilized capabilities in the event of crisis or war. The NATO maritime component also has a long tradition of multilateralism with individual ships and aircraft from the allied navies operating closely together. In addition, the "Fraternity of the Blue Uniform" has always transcended national and even allied divisions, such that navies from very diverse countries often find it easier to come together on an ad hoc basis for specific purposes and tasks. This will make it easier to implement the PfP and CJTF concepts with regard to units from former Warsaw Pact navies.

Even before NATO formally adopted its new ideas, the post-Cold era had already witnessed the employment of the MNMF concept. In the Mediterranean, the on-call force was transformed into the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean under the Command of COMNAVSOUTH. Significantly, some of the first ships to sail with the new standing force came not only from allies in the Mediterranean region, but both Netherlands and Germany sent units. In the fall of 1992, the STANAVFORLANT entered the Mediterranean to temporarily relieve the STANAVFORMED in the Adriatic where it was monitoring sanctions imposed by the UN against Serbia and Montenegro. The STANAVFORLANT later took part in NATO operation "Display Determination 1992" and made port visits to the Black Sea.33

As Eric Grove has pointed out, the long-standing NATO cooperative procedures can now be extended to other navies. The unclassified publication, EXTAC 768, Maritime Manoeuvring and Tactical Procedures, "provides naval manoeuvring and signalling instructions for units of different navies that have not historically operated together and do not have any prior agreement on procedures." Some technical documents on Standard Agreements on Operating Procedures (STANEX) are also being made available.35 Under the leadership of General Sheehan, Atlantic Command has adopted a set of "goals," which stress "joint
operations," improved communications, cooperation with ACE, PfP countries, "other international and security organizations," and "collaboration and dialogue with countries outside the alliance."  

In March 1998, the Alliance will hold its largest post-Cold War exercise to date. STRONG RESOLVE will stretch from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean. It will be an exercise which in many ways will reflect both the changing nature of the Alliance and the continued importance of maritime forces. Indicative of the wider geographic scope of the NATO, STRONG RESOLVE will simulate both in area and out-of-area operations, both traditional Article 5 tasks and support of UN Chapter VII activities. Aspects of the exercise will be restricted to NATO allies while other parts will involve ten PfP countries. Above all, it will demonstrate the new emphasis on jointness, for this will be a ‘BI-MNC’ (Major NATO Command, SACEUR and SACLANT) exercise involving land sea and air forces. The “aim of the exercise is to: 

...Exercise NATO’s ability to cope with multiple, simultaneous crises in separate geographic regions drawing on the resources of both MNCS, and in consideration of the full spectrum of NATO missions. PfP nations may be invited to participate as appropriate in accordance with guidelines in effect.

The “overarching objectives” of the exercise will include:

- to deploy NATO land, sea and air forces in a timely manner from their peacetime locations to a crisis area;
- to provide training for the maximum number of NATO formations, commands and authorities across MNC boundaries;
- to further develop and validate the CJTF concept;
- to exercise the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command of NATO forces operating with the NATO military command structure;
- to practice the roles and interactions between supporting and supported commanders;
- to employ the BI-MNC operational planning system as supported by the exercise planning guide; and
- to promote PfP interoperability.

The Northern component of the exercise will take place in the northwest region and be within the context of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treat. Here the Alliance will “exercise warfighting, providing a visible demonstration of NATO’s ability to conduct combat operations at a high level. A scenario has been development wherein there has been recent conflict between a NATO
member and another country but the non-NATO country continues to threaten the ally. It has requested the deployment of NATO forces to deter aggression. The UN Security Council has adopted a resolution calling for an embargo on the threatening country and requested NATO to enforce the embargo. The offending country has responded harassing the NATO member and allied forces.

The southern component of STRONG RESOLVE will test NATO abilities to accept a UN request, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to undertake peace support operations in an area geographically displaced from NATO territory. It will take place in the Iberian (including the Iberlant area) and will "exercise out of area peace support operations (PSO)" focusing on "two distinct operations at opposite ends of the range of PSO for example a full peace enforcement task and non combatant evacuation." Here the scenario is that a large country out of area has descended into civil war with rebels combatting the government and with some of the armed forces joining the rebels. Cities are being bombed and "government control has collapsed in certain parts" of the country. The UN has called for a ceasefire which is being largely observed by both sides. The mandate to NATO from the UN is to separate the warring factions and enforce a no-fly zone over the country.

For the northern component a range of surface, air, and subsurface naval forces are expected from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US Part of the exercise will involve maintaining SLOC against submarine and air threats. American, British, and Dutch marines will be employed as will elements of NATO's Immediate Rapid Reaction Force (Land).

In the South, the Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic will assemble a CJTF to implement the mandate which NATO has assumed at the request of the UN Security Council. CINCSOUTH will serve as supporting command. Here too, a wide variety of naval forces will be involved, including two to three carriers. Naval forces are expected from France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the UK (which will be supplying one of the carriers) and US Ground forces will come from the sea as well as airlift. This part of STRONG RESOLVE 98 will include Participation from PfP countries will include units from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.38

In addition to conducting exercises in which naval forces constitute key components, the Alliance's Defence Research Group has sponsored a long-term scientific study, Implications of New Technologies for NATO's Maritime Operations in 2015. The aim of this study is to assist the major NATO commanders by assessing the "impact of emerging technologies on future operations conducted by NATO Multinational Maritime Forces..." It seeks to identify "maritime capability shortfalls" and provide direction
for "future NATO and national research and development efforts, paying special attention to affordability."\textsuperscript{39}

Still another dimension of maritime multilateralism is in the area of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to radical regimes could "pose a long-term threat for European countries bordering on the Mediterranean." As Milan Vego has pointed out, even shorter range and less sophisticated missiles such as SCUDs could be used, especially against NATO forwardly deployed forces undertaking peace support or other operations.\textsuperscript{40}

A number of European governments have drawn attention to the WMD and missile threat. In its 1994 White Paper on Defence, the French government noted the need to provide for the protection of French territory "and for that of French forces deployed abroad. This challenge moreover concerns most European countries of the Atlantic Alliance." The British government has also drawn attention to its country's vulnerability to longer-range missiles in the future. Several of the allied nations are cooperating on TMD projects. NATO and the WEU have been looking to TMD with efforts have being made by the latter to arrive at a unified position on TMD. A report issued in 1993, NATO Ballistic Missile Defence in the Post-Cold War Era, "recommended that NATO enhance existing capabilities such as the Patriot, and determine options to meet long-term threats, including the continental defence of Europe."\textsuperscript{41} The recent US-Russian agreement on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which allows for deployment of TMD systems, should enhance these efforts.

For the last several years the US has been promoting a NATO-wide approach to TMD, sponsoring several allied workshops. The USN has pointed to the capabilities of its AEGIS ships including the SM-2 Block IVA missile, the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP), and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) as a means of providing missile defence in Europe. These TMD systems can be deployed on its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In the Southern region there is a TMD Working Group which meets on a "regular basis" to discuss "TMD Policy and Concept of Operations Documents." TMD is "regularly" included in Southern Command exercises and the USS LASALLE, the Sixth Fleet's flagship, has a "TMD Cell which can act as a fusion centre, command, and control centre for TMD operations."\textsuperscript{42}

While acknowledging a potential threat to Europe from some of the countries of the Mediterranean region, the Alliance has also taken steps to improve the strategic environment. COMNAVSOUMOUTH has held conferences for Maritime Commanders in the Mediterranean involving PfP countries. There are also plans to expand these meetings to include other countries in the region such as Egypt, Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, and Jordan.\textsuperscript{43}
V. NATO Maritime Forces and Peace Support Missions

The inclusion in STRONG RESOLVE 98 of a peace support component is indicative of the high priority which the Alliance now attaches to this role. Over the last several years, Allied forces, including naval forces, have been heavily involved in peacekeeping. This is because the nature of peacekeeping has changed dramatically in the post-Cold War era.

UN peacekeeping is normally taken to mean those operations authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which deals with "Pacific Settlements of Disputes." The term "peacekeeping" was meant to apply to both unarmed observers or larger lightly armed forces dispatched to monitor an agreed upon settlement or armistice. Such deployments are to have the consent of the parties to a dispute. There is no expectation that the peacekeepers will enforce the peace by arms and the force is not authorized to engage in combat except in self-defence. These are what may be referred to as "traditional" or "classic" peacekeeping missions.

In theory, these operations are distinguished from those that the Security Council may authorize under Chapter VII of the Charter -- "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Article 42 authorizes military measures to "maintain or restore international peace and security." This peace restoration or peace enforcement, is -- as witnessed in Desert Storm -- war; coalition war by another name.

In practice, the last few years has seen operations which fall between Chapters VI and VII. These so-called six-and-half missions have the UN deploying "peacekeeping" forces where there is little or no consent and often no peace to keep. Here the troops find themselves having to assume enforcement duties in order to carry out humanitarian missions. Sometimes this has meant calling upon the support of forces not under UN command where more vigorous military actions are required, in some cases such as UNPROFOR, to protect the peacekeepers themselves.

Another trend is where a coalition of states acts at the request of the Security Council, but not as a UN force, to more or less impose a peace, accompanied or followed by a classic UN peacekeeping operation. This was tried in Somalia and seems to have worked in Haiti. Most recently, the Security Council requested that Italy lead a mission to Albania. It could be argued that these operations are more properly, and more familiarly, called armed intervention followed by military occupation. For, however justified on international legal or humanitarian grounds, the imposition of the will of a group of
countries onto another state or faction within that state is foreign armed intervention; and that using military forces to secure a political settlement and maintain internal order is similar to occupation, especially in the way the troops are employed and the duties expected of them -- as in now evident in Bosnia. For the purposes of this study, peacekeeping will be taken to encompass all operations in support of UN or other international organizations, resolutions authorizing the use of multinational forces in whatever capacity, and to secure or maintain a ceasefire to inter-state or internal conflict. To this extent the term, 'peace support operations' is equally applicable.

The changing nature of peacekeeping has provided an expanded role for multinational maritime forces in general UN operations. Such forces were involved in Cambodia, Haiti and were present in Somalia. Naval forces have certain advantages that have been them suitable for peace support operations. In a number of cases, peacekeeping efforts have been accompanied by UN-authorized embargos. Moreover, with their mobility and flexibility they can move close to areas where ethnic and civil conflicts are taking place, usually without being challenged at sea. One characteristic of current operations is that peacekeeping forces are dispatched to areas where a lack of government control, and even a lack of a government, preclude a local consensus on admitting the peacekeeping force. In some instances, where (at least initially) support facilities are not present ashore and maritime forces can provide this. "Manoeuvre from the sea to control coastal waters, the coast itself, and the airspace above is likely to be increasingly significant as red carpet entry on land becomes a rarity." As the mission progresses, naval forces can "hover offshore for long periods," providing continuing support and reserves in case of emergencies.

While forces from various NATO navies participated in UN peacekeeping, it was in the former Yugoslavia that the Alliance began to employ its collective sea power under the NATO banner. In operations SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, DELIBERATE FORCE and then as components of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR), allied maritime forces were employed to support the UN and then implement a peace settlement.

SHARP GUARD was one of the largest, and certainly the longest, NATO maritime operation. In the summer of 1992, NATO forces under operation MARITIME MONITOR and WEU forces, under operation SHARP VIGILANCE, acting separately but closely, began monitoring compliance in the Adriatic Sea with resolutions of the UN Security Council imposing an embargo against the former Yugoslavia. In November 1992 the two operations, renamed MARITIME GUARD and SHARP FENCE, were "amplified in scope to include the enforcement of relevant UN resolutions which included the
component of boarding and search operations. Following a joint decision by the NATO and WEU councils in June 1993, the two operations were joined into operation SHARP GUARD with a single command and control arrangement “under the authority of the councils of both organizations.” The force was to “prevent all unauthorized shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and all arms from entering the former Yugoslavia.”

Combined Task Force (CTF) 440 was formed with NATO forces mainly from the STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORLANT along with the WEU Contingency Maritime Force. Overall operational control of SHARP GUARD was delegated to the Italian Admiral who was Commander Allied Naval Forces South under CINCSOUTH. A WEU staff was attached to his headquarters. Some 14 NATO nations contributed assets to SHARP GUARD. The surface force usually consisted of about 10 Destroyers and Frigates from a variety of NATO countries including France and Spain, 50 percent of which were at sea at all times. It was supported by allied long-range maritime patrol aircraft, and the NATO Airborne Early Warning (AWAC) force. Allied fighter aircraft were deployed to defend the ships from attack. A multilateral forward logistic site was employed to support the operation. From 22 November 1992 to 18 June 1996, 74,192 ships were challenged, 5,951 were boarded and inspected, and 1,480 were diverted and inspected in port. After the UN Security Council strengthened the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro in April 1993, “no ship was able to break the embargo” and six ships were caught while attempting to do so.48

From NATO’s perspective, SHARP GUARD constituted a number of “firsts” which argue well for the future of multinational naval cooperation. These included: the use of the STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED as Immediate Reaction Forces in a crisis; placing the STANAVFORLANT under SACEUR; the willingness of France to place its forces under SACEUR; WEU/NATO combined operations, NATO acting in support of the UN; and much valuable training experience. More importantly, this use of sea power was viewed as contributing to the eventual success of the diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Yugoslavia.

Apart from SHARP GUARD, allied naval forces in the Southern Region also participated in other aspects of NATO’s support for the UN Protection Forces in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). In particular, French and American carrier based aircraft were employed in operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE. The former, which began in April 1993, was tasked with enforcing the no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing close air support protection for UN troops and certain UN-declared safe areas. DELIBERATE FORCE, which began in September 1995, involved an intensive application of airpower principally against Bosnian Serb targets also included the launching of Tommahawk Lant Attack Missiles (T-LAMs) against Bosnian Serb air defence assets from the USS Normandy.49
DELIBERATE FORCE, combined with the Croatian victories on the ground gave weight to the Clinton administration’s efforts and eventually brought the Serbs to the table and paved the way for the Dayton Accords. However, it was always clear that any major allied effort, whether for UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement, would have to be primarily a land operation backed up by sea and air forces. This was evident in IFOR operations and the follow-on SFOR, where the maritime component, though important, is small relative to the ground and air forces.\(^5\)

Supporting IFOR were ships from several nations, formed into task forces and which were available or could have been called upon. Other naval forces in the Mediterranean were also available. When IFOR began the naval forces continued to enforce the UN embargo until it was finally lifted. There were two maritime commanders. COMAVSOUTH, had operational command of naval units which were tasked with keeping the Adriatic SLOC open for the reinforcements and resupply of IFOR forces ashore. In addition, the Commander Allied Striking Forces Southern Europe, (COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH), who is also Commander of the USN’s Sixth Fleet, was ready with power projection forces which remained available to support IFOR “as needed, particularly in the event of non-compliance” with the peace agreement. These included carrier-based aviation and amphibious forces.\(^5\)

For SFOR’s naval component there are ships and aircraft from several nations formed into a Task Force, again under the operational command of COMNAVSOUTH. The force is normally composed of three frigates and seven minesweepers from Greece, Italy, and Turkey, as well as the STANAVFORMED. As with IFOR, SFOR can also count on COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH for air and amphibious forces.\(^5\)

Throughout the Alliance, naval exercises have included training for peace support operations. This is particularly the case with regard to PfP countries. One example is the COOPERATIVE PARTNER series, which saw the largest NATO naval forces ever assembled in the Black Sea. It involved Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, as well as units from France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the United States. In one of the exercises the scenario involved internal troubles that required the rescue of allied citizens in a secure evacuation where the evacuation was being blocked by another country.\(^5\) Although not formally a NATO operation, ALBA, the UN authorized, Italian-led mission to Albania, involves allied and PfP forces undertaking activities, including maritime tasks, similar to those practised in recent exercises in the region.\(^5\)

Canada’s recent MARCOT (Maritime Coordinated Operations Training) series of exercises is based upon scenarios written by the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre and simulates a UN peacekeeping mission to an area of domestic unrest where both peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance is needed. It involves
the landing of forces from the sea and the need to provide coastal patrols. Several allied countries, including the United States, have participated with support from the NATO AWAC force.\textsuperscript{55} Another Canadian contribution to multilateral maritime support of peacekeeping missions has been the training of officers from a variety of countries at the Pearson Centre.

In calling upon the Alliance, the UN has had at its disposal multinational maritime forces long accustomed to operating together. This is preferable to an ad hoc coalition. For NATO, peace support operations are viewed in a joint context, that is they will involve land, air, as well as naval forces. It is for this reason that the CJTF concept is especially applicable to this task. And this is how it must be because, overwhelmingly, the kinds of ethnic and national instabilities against which NATO has shown an interest and where force might be needed, "are simply not maritime venues."\textsuperscript{56} Sea power alone cannot secure or maintain the peace. This is especially true where the conflicts are over specific territories and where combatants may not depend heavily on sea-borne supply. What it can do, and what it has done in Yugoslavia, is simply to make use of the sea for the purposes of projecting force ashore in order to achieve United Nations objectives. In the final analysis forces must go ashore to secure and maintain the peace. Unless NATO is prepared to bring force to bear "from the sea," the impact of naval-only peace operations may be limited.

This was the case regarding Operation SHARP GUARD. As noted above, this operation is regarded by the Alliance as model for future allied naval collaboration in peace support operations. It did have an impact on economic conditions in parts of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, it is not evident that the embargo had any serious impact on the level of fighting, especially given the Croatian offensive during the summer of 1995 and the failure of NATO and the UN to provide protection to a number of "safe havens" until more forceful measures were adopted. Both IFOR and SFOR were primarily land operations.

VI. The USN and the NATO Maritime Alliance.

The enhancement of NATO’s maritime multilateralism is due in no small part to the fact that the USN has continued to be a "transoceanic" navy postured to support American global interests. More important is the fact that the nation whose Navy now rules the waves like no other before has been prepared to employ that vast sea power in further collaborative efforts. To the extent that the leadership of post-Cold War USN fosters maritime multilateralism in order to promote American interests
and values, they are very much the heirs of Richard Colbert. At the same time, the USN’s approach to cooperation at sea is also reflective of the more narrow sphere of American vital interests, imposed by foreign and domestic considerations.

The military capability to act, especially in a multilateral capacity, remains and has been demonstrated repeatedly since the end of the Cold War from the Gulf War to a series of interventions in various peace support operations. The Clinton administration is still holding to the ideas in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, which held that the US had to be prepared to fight and win two major regional wars simultaneously. The two contingencies cited most often are conflicts in the Persian Gulf against Iran or Iraq and one against North Korea.

With the withdrawal of large numbers of American forces from overseas bases, all branches of the US military have been shifted from "forward to defence" to "forward presence" and power projection, the ability to dispatch forces, and if necessary intervene militarily, with forces based in the US. This includes the US Navy, with its new naval strategy focus having shifted from the high seas to bringing force to bear ashore "from the sea." Even the US Air Force now claims that it is especially well suited to sustain a "global presence," not only with forces that can be quickly deployed, but with the "virtual advantage obtained with space forces and information-based capabilities."57

Since the bulk of the fighting falls upon the US Army, it has reoriented itself away from the Central European battle field to intervention scenarios. It even succeeded in overcoming US Marine objections and obtained Congressional approval for the deployment of an army heavy brigade afloat with more than 4,200 tracked and wheeled vehicles, able to carry out "sustained land combat" beyond the landing area. The dominant theme in US military strategy is jointness.58

This approach to sea power lends itself to maritime multilateralism, as the USN will be primarily focused on bringing power to bear on the littoral where the US will usually be intervening in regional disputes on behalf of states, governments, or peoples ashore and in circumstances where cooperation with regional or other outside actors may be desirable. This is fully consistent with the national military strategy which notes that "Our armed forces will most often fight in concert with regional allies and friends as coalitions can decisively increase combat power and lead to a more rapid and favourable outcome to the conflict."59

But it should be understood that for the US maritime multilateralism is a policy option, not a practical necessity. As Hirschfeld notes: "For now, there is virtually no mission that the US Navy could not perform by itself."60 One of the key advantages which sea power affords the United States is the
capacity to act unilaterally; "...the sea is the best avenue for US strategic mobility; and Naval Forces are not subject to the political whims of foreign governments." Despite this ability to conduct naval operations unilaterally, the US has chosen to employ its unchallenged sea power in coalition and cooperative efforts when it has been in the US interest to do so. This has made a good deal of maritime multilateralism possible in the post-Cold war era.

It has been considered to be particularly in the American interest to sustain and expand NATO's long-standing tradition of multilateral naval cooperation as well as the maritime aspects of PfP program. This was evident in the 24th annual US-invitational maritime exercise, BALTOPS 96 which involved forces from 14 countries under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe. The Commander of the USN's Carrier Group Two was the officer conducting the exercise and the officer in tactical command. As with the forthcoming STRONG RESOLVE 98, this exercise had a NATO-only component and one that included PfP countries such as Sweden, Poland, Finland and Lithuania. The NATO phase was meant to test "the participants operating in a multithreat littoral environment and evaluate their tactical flexibility." In the PfP phase a range of potential activities were exercised, including mine countermeasures and the use of ship-borne helicopters. Particular emphasis was also placed on improving the ability of USN, other NATO and PfP ships to operate together, particularly in the area of communications.

This is not to argue that all maritime multilateralism is dependent upon the participation of the USN. Small, regional navies can develop patterns of collaboration. Indeed, one of the goals of the USN’s promotion of multilateral exercises is to enhance the ability of countries to work together on their own as a means of promoting regional stability. As noted above, in the Black and Baltic seas, other NATO countries and PfP partners have been conducting joint exercises without USN participation. Similar efforts are being made to foster closer cooperation in Southeast Asia, where the KADUKU II exercise in March 1995 brought together units from Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand. To the extent that regional navies of countries friendly to the US develop closer working relationships, it will, if the need arises, make them better suited to join in larger coalition efforts with the USN. The degree to which the effectiveness of joint naval operations requires American support will vary with the nature of the undertaking. For example, traditional peacekeeping, where a framework of consensus and consent exists and where no hostile action is expected, may be carried out entirely by the less sophisticated and more lightly armed maritime forces of smaller powers.
As James Tritten argues, the USN should use its position as the "inspirational leader of the navies of the world with the development of multinational doctrine" to improve ties with smaller and medium size navies. Smaller navies can be especially useful in the monitoring of embargoes. In this regard, the long-standing relationship between the USN and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), which has experience in the tasks performed by smaller navies, should be used "to form the basis of how the US Navy might approach medium size power-navies from other nations" and assist in the formulation of multilateral naval doctrine. Indeed, in BALTOPS 96, the USCG assigned a ship for the first time. The "high endurance Cutter Gallatin demonstrated coastal patrol capabilities, sanction enforcement by visit-board-search-and-seizure procedures, environmental disaster response and containment of environmental hazards." As the level of hostility increases, and the maritime missions likewise escalate from monitoring to threatening action towards peace enforcement and intervention, then, as Eric Grove notes, "the roles of maritime forces...are identical to the normal combatant roles of navies as outlined in...From the Sea." For these coalition actions, and indeed even for more restrained applications of sea power, participation by the USN seems essential. Only the United States can bring to bear the extended surface and sub-surfaces forces, carrier based air power and amphibious capabilities that might be necessary to secure the seas and project power ashore. Further, only the USN can call upon the vast Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence and Information C4I2 networks that have become the "foundation of stone" of modern naval warfare at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. "Any major international enforcement effort will probably have to rely" on US C4I2 assets, "even if most of the participating forces fly other flags." At the same time, other allied navies, in particular those of the NATO countries, can make a contribution to a coalition enforcement effort. Indeed, as evident in the Gulf War and more recently in the Adriatic, the ability of the USN to take advantage of maritime multilateralism is enhanced by the fact that naval forces from many countries can "fit together" in combined task forces with "relatively little difficulty." Most modern navies include ASW, anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and anti-air capabilities. The US and its allies "now have the benefit of global intelligence and data distribution system that can transmit a detailed intelligence picture to a work station in the operations room of warships deployed anywhere in the world." In the tradition of Admiral Colbert, the US has gone to great lengths to foster an unprecedented capability for other nations' navies to operate with the USN. In a certain sense it is not so much that the international community relies upon the USN
to sustain maritime multilateralism, but rather that maritime multilateralism is often the result of the deliberate policy of the United States to use its sea power in coalition settings in order to further its own interests. The distinction is important because what is offered so enthusiastically in some circumstances, making collaboration at sea work so well, can be withheld in others, thereby making it impossible.

The United States obtains several advantages from maritime multilateralism, some of which are inherent in the very nature of sea power with its intrinsic flexibility. First, in day-to-day peacetime conditions, it allows the US to maintain and cultivate security relations with the growing number of nations who are now interested, for political and technical reasons, in exercising with the USN. Not only does such cooperation provide "opportunities to influence the future development of other navies," but it affords a means to sustain contact without the political complications associated with land and air collaboration. Moreover, with the withdrawal of American forces from around the world, a wide-ranging program of bilateral and multilateral naval exercises allows for a certain "continuity of forward presence" that could be useful in the event of regional crisis. It also might "foster the relationships that make it easier both to request assistance ashore and to grant such assistance."

A second advantage of maritime multilateralism is evident in instances where Washington wishes to be involved in a particular cooperative effort, yet at the same time wishes to maintain a certain distance and independence of action. This was the case regarding the NATO/WEU operation SHARP GUARD. The USN participated in this activity although Washington's policies with regard to the conflict and the efforts of the UN Protection Force diverged from those of the UN and its NATO allies contributing ground forces to the operation.

Third, when the US decides to take a more active role by intervening with significant forces, then maritime multilateralism, in addition to providing useful assets, also enhances the legitimacy of the operation abroad and at home. Within the international community, naval contributions are often the easiest way to multilateralize what would otherwise be an American only, or American, British, and French, or NATO only operation. It is noteworthy that of the 36 nations participating in the Gulf War coalition, nine states contributed only naval vessels and aircraft, while only seven deployed ground forces "actually engaged in combat." Similarly, several states were persuaded to participate in the Haitian embargo.

This maritime multilateralism, which enhances the "appearance of broad support," also serves a domestic legitimating function making it easier for the President to secure Congressional and public support. In the present
international security environment where vital interests are often not at stake in regional crises, the American people and the Congress are wary of foreign intervention. Thus, "acting alone will be increasingly difficult." Domestic support is easier to secure when the administration can show that other nations are also contributing.

Each of these advantages has allowed maritime multilateralism to serve US interests in the post-Cold War era and this has especially been the case in the NATO context, in particular when it comes to peace support operations. In recent years American support for UN commanded missions has waned, particularly after the experience in Somalia. However, Washington has been willing to have NATO undertake peace support missions. Indeed, it has promoted greater participation of PfP countries in these activities.

At the same time, because the main motivating considerations are political, there may be limits in the future to the desirability and applicability of maritime multilateralism even in the NATO context.

While frequent joint naval exercises allow Washington to maintain security links with a variety of old and new allies, they do not bind Washington to firm security commitments in a way that forward based land and air forces once did. To this extent, the expansion of naval contacts can be viewed as consistent with the contraction, rather than expansion, of American vital interests. More nations may wish to obtain the benefits of closer contact with the USN, but without a global threat the imperative on the American side to make those benefits available has diminished.

In addition, although American involvement in maritime multilateralism has been evident in many coalition efforts in the post-Cold War era, including in support of UN peacekeeping, its impact has been limited by the nature of conflicts in which it has been employed. Unless Washington is actually prepared to come "from the sea," that is to send in ground forces, USN support for maritime multilateralism may be not be enough to achieve international objectives.

Moreover, the case of SHARP GUARD highlights how USN participation in even the most advanced maritime multilateralism is circumscribed by US interests that may diverge from those of other contributing counties. In late 1994 the Clinton administration, acting in response to Congressional pressure, ended the participation of the USN in certain parts of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. Thus, while American Admiral W. Leighton Smith Jr., acting in his NATO capacity as CINCSOUTH, continued to "oversee the embargo" he was not able to direct American ships to enforce the ban. Further, if he received American intelligence about weapons shipments he was not able to act upon that information." While these restrictions did not
seriously hamper the allied effort, they did highlight the political divisions behind those efforts.

There was also another dimension to the SHARP GUARD experience. While the combined NATO/WEU fleets were enforcing the arms embargo, the Clinton administration knew about Iranian arms shipments of weapons to the Bosnia government forces and decided to do nothing about. At the same time it was fighting Congressional efforts to lift the embargo. These weapons, which were eventually used to launch the offensives in the summer of 1995, paved the way for the Dayton Accords but in the process ended UNPROFOR's activities. The point is not whether the Clinton administration acted in bad faith, it clearly had reasons both to sustain allied cooperation and covertly arm the Muslims. This approach turned out to be essential in achieving the battlefield conditions which allowed Washington to broker a settlement. This simply showed that multilateral naval cooperation, being essentially a political undertaking, can be manipulated to serve the interests of the larger coalition partner.

Finally, the Bosnia experience points to the double-edged nature of maritime multilateralism as a political legitimatizing tool for the United States. Naval cooperation can enhance the acceptability of US intervention in the eyes of the international community. This "appearance" of broad support is important if the administration is to secure the backing of the American people, and especially of Congress. However, to be fully legitimate in the domestic context, multilateralism must also mean the acceptance by contributing nations of US command in the field (or at sea) and policy objectives at the negotiating table. This why President Clinton was prepared to offer only limited support to UNPROFOR, and even adopt policies that undercut the UN, yet all but staked the future of his administration on the success of IFOR.

It is not that American interests are necessarily at odds with those of contributing counties - all may wish victory over an aggressor, or a settlement to a regional dispute, or the provision of humanitarian relief. It is really a question of which nations' approach to achieving these ends will prevail. In other words, it is Washington's view of how the shared political objectives are to be achieved which often determines the effectiveness of any maritime multilateralism in which the USN takes part or even if it takes places at all.

Dependence upon American naval power, combined with anxiety that America might choose to use that power unilaterally, or not at all when US vital interests and values are not challenged, leads allies old and new to accept US conditions as the price for maritime multilateralism in the post-Cold War era. Yet, given the alternatives and wide-spread benefits that have and can accrue from a US Navy actively engaged abroad, this new transoceanic
bargain seems just as necessary as the one which won the Cold War.

VII. NATO Maritime Multilateralism, the WEU and the European Defence Identity

Despite the acknowledged importance of continued American support for NATO’s maritime multilateralism, the shift in allied naval concerns from the need to secure command of the seas for deterrence and defence to the promotion of stability in Europe, has highlighted the maritime aspects of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the WEU. In 1992, Michael Pocalyko argued that “the European pillar may be emerging as the maritime fulcrum of the Alliance.” The deployment of a WEU flotilla to the Persian Gulf during DESERT SHIELD/STORM and the participation in SHARP GUARD, were viewed as first steps towards a more formalized and distinctive European contribution to maritime security in Europe. As evident in steps being taken in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, and in operation ALBA in Albania, NATO and WEU members along with PfP navies have also been moving toward cooperative arrangements outside the NATO military structures.

In May 1995 the WEU created a “provisional” naval task force, European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) “to be employed primarily in the Mediterranean. Naval units from France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were to be part of this force with the United Kingdom expressing “some interest.” As with the combined army corps, European Force (EUROFOR) is to be tasked to conduct “humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management including peacemaking.” It is to be employed under either WEU or NATO command: As described by Vego, EUROMARFOR will be a non-permanent, multinational, maritime task force capable of acting on its own or together with EUROFOR. Its composition and organization will depend on the mission to be accomplished. A typical composition might be an aircraft carrier with four to six escorts, a landing force, and a supply ship. Command of EUROMARFOR will rotate among senior officers on the scene.

It still remains unclear what the eventual military organization for the ESDI and its relationship the European Community’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the WEU will be. An important aspect of these developments is the success of the CJTF concept. A recent study done at the NATO Staff College noted, under CJTF the Alliance’s “collective assets”
could be made available to operations led by the WEU. This "offers the advantage of maintaining a single multipurpose system and gives concrete form to the notion of separable but not separate forces." In this way the ESDI "will find its natural place at the heart of the Alliance" and avoid "the creation of a second military structure." In future operations, the EU would "issue mandates to the WEU which, in turn, would execute them in collaboration with NATO." \(^7\) Decisions taken at NATO Ministerial meetings over the last several years have directed the military staffs to refine the CJTF concept, with particular emphasis on the WEU and the ESDI. At the 12 June 1997 meeting of Defence Ministers, it was recommended that "as soon as practicable in a future exercise a CJTF should be led by WEU calling on Alliance assets and capabilities and employing European command arrangements." \(^7\)

Maritime forces are an essential component of the CJTF concept given their inherent flexibility and mobility. In fact they are uniquely suited to support the policy given that they are the most "separable" of the Alliance’s collective military assets. The CJTF to be formed as part of exercise STRONG RESOLVE 98, will be commanded by the Commander of the Striking Fleet Atlantic and the headquarters for CJTFs will likely be afloat if they are committed to out of area peace support operations.

Apart from major CJTF deployments under the WEU, there is an argument that can be made for greater maritime multilateralism amongst the European Allies on a continuing, day-to-day basis to meet non-military or low threat situations. As Johan Holst pointed out several years ago:

> In relation to limited contingencies in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, European navies may have comparative advantages in terms of proximity and political profile. Such contingencies could involve protection of fisheries and off-shore installations. \(^7\)

While maritime forces appear particularly well suited as part of a more structured and formalized ESDI/WEU component of European security, a case can also be made that the unique characteristics of naval forces make such efforts unnecessary and somewhat unrealistic. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a marked enhancement of maritime multilateralism involving the NATO countries along with PfP partners and others. These have been ad hoc arrangements where "those nations able and willing to make military contributions to a particular operation" have "come together" under national or Allied leadership "using the common procedures and command infrastructure developed over decades by NATO." \(^7\) In the Gulf War, the United States supplied the leadership -- while in SHARP GUARD, IFOR and SFOR, it was NATO’s Southern Command. The addition of another command arrangement, or
the “non-permanent” EUROMARFOR, would not seem to appreciably augment the ease with which the allied navies have been able to develop and carry out cooperative ventures at sea when national governments wish to do so. This is particularly the case since as the statement on British maritime doctrine stresses, “NATO remains the enduring bedrock of any security architecture in Europe.”

Moreover, WEU initiatives might well complicate NATO’s and the USN’s efforts to expand maritime contacts and collaboration with the PfP partners. The objective of these efforts to enhance the ability of the PfP nations to operate together and with NATO as a whole. In this regard Richard Sharpe has pointed out that the 1995 WEU proposal to form a permanent Baltic naval force included the three Baltic States, but not Sweden or Finland. It was a proposal which also upset Moscow. Another formal structure could add an element of rigidity to the benefits that can be obtained from maritime multilateralism which relies upon a large measure of flexibility. This is not to argue that specific local collaboration should be discouraged, but rather that such limited arrangements can be accommodated within the overall maritime multilateralism that has, and continues to, develop amongst all the NATO and PfP countries.

For the United States, the ESDI/WEU and CJTF proposals have some attraction since it could foster a more equitable, in Washington’s view, burden sharing for European security and peace support operations out of area. At the same time, from a maritime perspective, it is difficult to imagine any major undertaking related to European security or where NATO played a major role, that did not include significant USN forces and therefore American leadership. As has been made clear in recent years with regard to UN efforts, the US Congress does not regard American military assets as “separable” from the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief. For operations undertaken as part of NATO, this does not present a problem since SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCSOUTH are US officers. However, for missions that could be undertaken by the WEU which would rely upon significant NATO maritime assets, issues surrounding American support remain unresolved.
VIII. Canada and NATO Maritime Multilateralism

If the future of NATO maritime multilateralism depends upon the USN, it can be argued that to a large degree the future of the Canadian Navy’s place in the Alliance may well depend upon the continued relevance of NATO maritime multilateralism. Indeed, in light of recent trends in Canadian defence policy, continued participation in the maritime dimension of the Alliance could well become Ottawa’s strongest link to European security.

Throughout the Cold War, Canadian national security policy rested upon four broad roles: support for NATO; collaboration with the US in the defence of North America, especially through the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD); national tasks such as sovereignty protection; and peacekeeping. While in the past Canadian governments have often stressed the peacekeeping and national sovereignty roles, the posture and weapons procurement decisions of the Canadian forces have been primarily driven by NATO and NORAD.

During the Cold War, Canada’s place in the Alliance had always been somewhat unique, “unlike the European countries it was not directly threatened; unlike the United States, it could not be decisive in the common defence.” In formal terms, North America was part of NATO territory. There is a Canada-US Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) which reports to the Military Committee. But in reality, North American defence was a strictly bilateral matter. It was managed through the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), and above all NORAD. The Alliance’s Atlantic Command was the only MNC headquartered in North America and although its wartime roles and missions were primarily directed toward Europe, its peacetime functions were meshed with those of the USN in the Western Atlantic and therefore formed the basis for bilateral Canada-US maritime cooperation. This focused on the need to maintain surveillance against Soviet submarines.

Ottawa acknowledged the need to meet the Soviet threat collectively, and therefore the priority attached to NATO and NORAD. These organizations also afforded Canada an opportunity to participate in global strategic affairs in a manner that its relative military power and non-European status might not otherwise have allowed. Though useful and of high calibre, there was always a large degree of symbolism attached to Canada’s military contributions to collective defence. The end of the Cold War presented Ottawa with a profound challenge in formulating a new defence policy since even indirectly, it appeared that Canada faced no immediate threat and less value seemed to be attached to the political symbolism of military contributions. Stability in Europe remained a concern and Canada wanted to remain diplomatically active. Nevertheless, the new relationship with
Europe was now of a different nature than it had been in the past.

A January 1995 government statement by Ottawa emphasized that "direct threats to Canada's territory are diminished" and that future challenges to Canadian security are increasingly likely to be of a nonmilitary nature, that is: economic, environmental and demographic. Drastic cuts have been made to the Canadian forces. By the end of the decade the regular force will drop to 60,000.

With the end of the Soviet threat, direct aerospace and maritime threat to North America has declined. This has not, however, meant a dismantling of strictly bilateral Canada-US defence efforts. The need to provide continual surveillance and warning of missiles and aircraft remains. Thus, while scaling back on the scope of its operations, the two countries renewed the NORAD agreement in 1996. Discussions are also underway on the possibility of NORAD playing a greater role in future TMD developments.

As to the maritime defence of North America while the submarine threat has diminished, Russian Akula-class submarines have been detected patrolling in North American waters. In May and June of 1995 they conducted exercises near Kings Bay Georgia, the East Coast SSBN base for the USN. According to the USN Office of Naval Intelligence, this "was the first deployment by a Russian submarine near the US East Coast since 1987." Later in 1995, an Akula was operating near the Bangor, Washington SSBN base where "Russian SSNs have not been seen in recent years."

For over 40 years Canada has been a participant with the United States in the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) which had several facilities including at the USN base in Argentia, Newfoundland. When the US closed the Argentia base because of budget cuts, Canada decided it would build a new facility to process and display information from the IUSS. In May 1995, Trinity, the Canadian Forces Integrated Undersea Surveillance System Centre was opened in Halifax. Commanded by a Canadian officer with a staff of about 140, 30 of whom are members of the USN, Trinity is "a unit of Canadian Maritime Forces, Atlantic but falls under the control of the US Navy’s commander, undersea surveillance," at Norfolk.

With regard to Canada's role in NATO, the Cold War was scarcely over when the Canadian government announced in 1991 that the country's two military bases in Europe, both located in Germany, would be closed and that the Canadian military presence in Europe would be reduced to a token force of 1,100 -- to be stationed at a British or US base. A year later, Ottawa abandoned even this political symbolism. Canada's two fighter squadrons and armoured brigade group would be brought home.

Nevertheless, the 1994 Defence White Paper states that Canada will maintain "multi-purpose, combat capable armed forces
able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad." It will continue to supply naval forces to the alliance, crews for the NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft and individual personnel for various allied staff positions. Further, it will retain in Canada air and ground forces which could be sent to Europe as part of NATO's Immediate Reaction Forces. Despite overall force reductions, some 3,000 personnel will be added to the land forces. In the event of a major overseas contingency, Ottawa would be prepared to send land, sea, and air forces simultaneously and "this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel." However, this reconfiguration entails an even greater reduction in Canada’s commitment to European defence in the event of a major crisis than many realized. The White Paper does not earmark these potential expeditionary forces for NATO alone. Rather it states that they will be available for contributions to international security in general "within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries." As the White Paper acknowledges, a major crisis in Europe might find the very hard-pressed and undermanned Canadian land forces deployed elsewhere requiring difficult and protracted redeployments.

At the same time, it can be argued that in the post-Cold War era Ottawa has done more than its share in responding to Europe’s current security needs. A long-time contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, and still preferring that the UN be the major sponsoring agency for such missions, NATO’s involvement in peace support missions has nonetheless provided Canada with the opportunity to mesh its commitment to peacekeeping with its desire to remain actively engaged in NATO’s efforts to promote stability in Europe. Canada had the third largest contingent in UNPROFOR, maintained ships in SHARP GUARD and has participated in both IFOR and SFOR. Moreover, it has been an active participant in allied exercises and with its own MARCOT series which have involved allied forces.

As the recently released document, Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada makes clear, one of the prime tasks of the Navy will be to secure Canadian sovereignty and maritime resources. At times this has put Ottawa at odds with its NATO allies. In 1994-95, a dispute arose between Spain and Canada over codfish and fishing quotas off the east coast. At one point, the Navy dispatched a frigate and a destroyer to back-up the Canadian Coast Guard in challenging a Spanish trawler which was itself escorted by two small Spanish patrol boats. Open conflict was avoided and with British support within the EU, Canada was able to negotiate a settlement.

One of the factors that appears to have contributed to the eventual peaceful resolution of the fishing dispute with Spain was the familiarity of the Canadian and Spanish navies with each
other as a result of working together in NATO. While stressing its role in defending Canadian sovereignty, even against allies, the new naval strategy also makes it clear that the Canadian Navy must be prepared for multilateral activity abroad in response to regional contingencies and “in support of the Western community in the face of a major regional threat or war.” As with the Army, the Canadian Navy has seen wide service in support of UN and NATO peace supporting operations since the end of the Cold War, with deployments to the Adriatic and Haiti. In addition, consistent with the overall thrust in Canadian foreign policy to expand ties in the Asia-Pacific and Latin American regions, the Canadian Navy has made more frequent visits to these regions.

While not escaping the budget cuts of the recent years, the Canadian Navy has emerged the most unscathed of the three services and its relatively well prepared to fulfill national and international roles. It has 16 surface warships, including 12 state-of-the-art new City Class frigates and is acquiring 12 maritime coastal patrol vessels (MCVD). One of the three support ships, which had been scheduled to be paid off in 1996, will be retained. Also retained will be the existing force of 18 maritime long-range patrol aircraft. Shortly after its election in 1993, the Liberal government fulfilled a campaign promise to cancel the program to acquire 50 new helicopters to replace the existing fleet, including those carried on the destroyers and frigates. The government is still looking for new helicopters. The Navy is also pressing the government to buy Upholder submarines from the United Kingdom to replace the three 1960s vintage Oberons. One of the arguments advanced is that they will enhance Canada’s ability to protect its off-shore resources against challenges from the United States and Spain. In addition, the Navy has been looking at acquiring a multirole support vessel, one capable of transporting troops and equipment, making Canada less reliant on allied sealift in peace support operations.

As the Alliance continues to move toward greater reliance upon flexible and deployable forces, including for peace support missions out of area, the Canadian Navy may well constitute the country’s most important military contribution to NATO. To be sure, the small ground forces will be available and the existing fleet of CF-18 fighters are quickly deployable and have also participated in allied exercises including in the Mediterranean. But although of medium stature, the Canadian Navy has a truly global deployment capability. Moreover, it is a Navy which has been traditionally geared toward NATO maritime multilateralism both as a national policy and in terms of anticipated operations. One commentator has described it as “a European navy far from home.” The changes in the post-Cold War international strategic environment have not fundamentally altered this orientation and seem to have reinforced it. For example, Canadian naval forces have been more active in the Mediterranean on behalf of NATO in
the post-Cold War era than before. For all the increased participation by the Canadian Navy in exercises and port visits in the Latin American and Asia-Pacific regions, Ottawa has no binding security commitments in these areas the way it still has to European security.

Finally, with the withdrawal of Canadian ground and air units from Europe and the expected changes to the NATO military command structure, Atlantic Command will become the only NATO MNC (or Strategic Command) in which Canada has a permanent physical presence. In the past, Ottawa has resisted the concept of a North American pillar, fearing that it might create a transatlantic rift within the Alliance and as a consequence leave Canada isolated in North America as an indistinguishable part of that pillar. However Washington has not shown any desire to retreat into a fortress North America, taking Canada with it by default. Nor is there any indication that the US is seeking to expand ACLANT’s role to absorb the CUSRPG, the MCC, the PJBD or NORAD into some comprehensive North American command.

Atlantic Command has changed from one that was predominately naval to one that is more joint, consistent with the revisions to United States Atlantic Command and the overall NATO strategic concept and one whose focus is not North American defence. The joint character of the command can be viewed as an advantage for Canada since it is from Norfolk that any dispatch of Canadian forces for NATO whether to Europe or elsewhere is likely to be coordinated. Further, any such deployment will involve a significant Canadian naval contribution.

It is the case, some have argued, that the lack of Canadian lift and amphibious capability will hamper Canada’s participation in operations in which the US does not participate. But present fiscal realities will make even the acquisition of much-needed helicopters uncertain, let alone submarines. This is apart from the demands of the Army for heavier equipment to operate in the new peacekeeping environment of the 1990s. Moreover, the current posture of the Navy allows it to perform its national and North American tasks with the same forces it will use for NATO and peace support roles. Additional sealift and amphibious capabilities cannot as easily fulfill multiple roles however much such a capacity would be of benefit.

On a day-to-day basis, Atlantic Command will remain primarily concerned with the Atlantic Ocean region, a region that includes vast Canadian ocean spaces and the Atlantic approaches to North America. It is and will continue to be the NATO command that literally touches Canadian shores. As the focal point for much of NATO’s maritime multinationalism, it is therefore also a logical focal point for Canada’s contribution to NATO.
IX. Conclusion

As we approach the 21st century, the heirs of Richard Colbert have achieved a level of sophistication and importance in multilateral naval cooperation that not even he could have dreamed of. The core of this maritime multinationalism continues to be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. All of this has added a measure of strategic and political stability in an otherwise uncertain and unstable post-Cold War era in Europe. In making use of the seas in this way, the combined NATO navies have continued to fulfill the fundamental purpose of sea power which has always been to support military and political objectives ashore. Given the reduction in allied standing air and land forces and the wider geographic scope of NATO’s security concerns, it can be argued that the Alliance’s collective sea power has assumed relatively greater importance in the overall military posture.

In order to foster stability in Europe, NATO has sought at once to maintain its fundamental collective defence posture while using its military assets to solidify new links with PfP countries. Maritime forces have been active in this regard. The past few years have witnessed numerous multilateral exercises and arrangements to promote cooperation that allow allied and other navies to work together within specific regions and more broadly in out of area missions. Progress has been made in improving inter-operability which in certain respects is more easily achieved at sea than on land. As Roger Palin has observed, from a practical point of view multinational maritime operations are "not generally problematic."

In various peace support operations, the Alliance has been able to make available to the UN the benefits of its long-standing ability to operate together at sea. It has been the case that contemporary peacekeeping has remained fundamentally a matter for land forces. Nevertheless, the allied navies have played a role in supporting the exercise of power ashore. To the extent that future NATO peace support missions may necessitate making use of the sea, especially as envisioned under the CJTF concept, then the nature and scope of current exercises such as STRONG RESOLVE 98 would seem to enhance NATO’s role in this activity.

An essential component of NATO’s new maritime multilateralism has been the approach of the USN. Through a range of bilateral and multilateral initiatives the USN has remained committed to collective security and defence at sea. With the withdrawal of large numbers of US troops from Europe, the involvement of the USN in maritime multilateralism in European waters, including the Baltic and the Black Sea, has served to reinforce transatlantic ties.
Efforts, particularly within Europe, to promote arrangements at sea which complement those of NATO and the USN should not diminish the benefits of maritime multilateralism. Working together with PfP nations, there is a local role for greater collaboration in dealing with a range of missions. However, it remains to be seen whether measures taken within the WEU to create a European Defence and Security Identity, including a naval component, can appreciably enhance what is already taking place. It will be important to not constrain the inherent flexibility of naval forces with politically appealing, but operationally awkward, new naval multilateralism. The existing structure should also reinforce Canadian ties to NATO. Given that multilateral maritime forces remain essential components of the new NATO, enhancing the relative importance of Atlantic Command, a solid basis exists for the continued involvement of Canada in European security affairs.

If the pattern of NATO multilateral maritime cooperation has revealed the potential of sea power to enhance stability in Europe, it has also shown something of its limitations. Ironically, these limits also have to do with the inherent flexibility of sea power. Naval cooperation is less problematic in its implementation but does not carry with it the same political significance as collaboration on land. It is much easier to arrange for multilateral maritime exercises than to overcome fundamental political disagreements about the future of the Alliance and the best means to secure stability in Europe. The EUROMARFOR "or a WEU-led CJTF can be successful in the absence of a common foreign and security policy on the part of the" European Union." The PfP countries who are now anxious to establish links with the NATO navies have their own, sometimes conflicting, security and foreign policy agendas that are not automatically reconciled by a growing membership in the "fraternity of the blue uniform."

The limitations of maritime multilateralism are most evident in NATO’s response to regional conflicts and its role in peace support operations. This was clearly the case in the former Yugoslavia. Here, despite being able to command the sea and the ease with which multilateral naval forces operated together, maritime forces had a minimal impact in managing the crisis and minimizing the scale of death and destruction. Maritime forces can be essential in moving forces to the scene of unrest and in projecting those forces ashore but ultimately it will be the land forces who secure and maintain the peace. The danger is that it may be easier to find countries willing to participate in the maritime components of peace support operations than in moving from the sea to the shore. The CJTF concept may only work if it is both combined and joint, that is if participating nations are prepared to commit their air and land forces and not just hover off shore.
Yet these limitations are nothing new to an understanding of sea power, especially in the NATO context. Their recognition only reinforces the need to mesh initiatives taken with regard to maritime multilateralism with the vast array of other military and political efforts underway to create a new security architecture in Europe. The strategic and political stability that NATO seeks to establish in Europe will not be found at sea. But the collaboration and confidence now being fostered at sea by the allied navies is the most important use that could be made of the sea as the Alliance prepares to mark its first half century.
# GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command, Europe</td>
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<td>ACLANT</td>
<td>Atlantic Command</td>
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<td>AFNORWEST</td>
<td>Allied Forces Northwest Europe</td>
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<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces South</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>ASuW</td>
<td>Anti-Surface Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWAC</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BI-MNC</td>
<td>Bi-Major NATO Command, SACEUR and SACLANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCNav</td>
<td>Component Command, Naval</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Cooperative Engagement Capability</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CINCSOUTH</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, South</td>
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<td>CINCUSACOM</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, USACOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined and Joint Task Forces</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>COMNAV SOUTH</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces, South</td>
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<td>COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH</td>
<td>Commander Allied Striking Forces Southern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONMAROPS</td>
<td>Concept of Maritime Operations</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<td>CUSRPG</td>
<td>Canada-US Regional Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defence Planning Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Identity</td>
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<td>EUROFOR</td>
<td>European Force</td>
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<td>EUROMARFOR</td>
<td>European Maritime Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUSS</td>
<td>Integrated Undersea Surveillance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile</td>
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<td>MARCOT</td>
<td>Maritime Coordinated Operations Training</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Military Cooperation Committee</td>
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<td>MCVD</td>
<td>Maritime Coastal Patrol Vessels</td>
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<td>MLF</td>
<td>Multilateral Nuclear Force</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Command</td>
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<td>MNMF</td>
<td>Multinational Maritime Forces</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>Naval Command Course</td>
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<td>NETF</td>
<td>NATO Expansion Task Force</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTF</td>
<td>NATO Task Force</td>
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<td>NTG</td>
<td>NATO Task Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PJBD</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Board on Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Strategic Commands</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Sea-Launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lanes of Communication</td>
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<td>SNF</td>
<td>Standing Naval Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAFORLANT</td>
<td>Standing Naval Force Atlantic</td>
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<tr>
<td>STANAFORMED</td>
<td>Standing Naval Force Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>STANEX</td>
<td>Standard Agreements on Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-LAM</td>
<td>Tommahawk Lant Attack Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Forces in Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACOM</td>
<td>United States Atlantic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>USNIP</td>
<td>United States Naval Institute Proceedings</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNWC</td>
<td>United States Naval War College</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Joel J. Sokolsky is a Professor of Political Science and the Head of the Department of Politics and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Queen’s University Centre for International Relations. The author wishes to thank the NATO Fellowship Program for its support of this research. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and not of the Royal Military College of Canada, any other agency of the government of Canada, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NOTES


8. United States, USN, From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st


19. As quoted in, United States Navy, World Wide Submarine Challenges, p.12

20. Ibid, p.13


22. Interview, AFSOUTH 6 March 1997.


24. The French government has suggested that CINCSOUTH be an European admiral, but there appears to be little support for this in other countries.


35. Interview, AFNORTHWEST, 3 March 1997.


37. The following description of STRONG RESOLVE 1998 is drawn from the unclassified document Strong Resolve 98: Exercise Planning Instruction (Edition One) supplied by the Canadian Department of National Defence at an interview with the J-3 staff, 4 June 1997.


41. Steven A. Hildreth and Jason D. Ellis, “Allied Support for theater missile

document. See also: Summary of Report, Fourth Allied TMD Workshop,
The Economist vol.340 23 March 1995:87-88; Mark Hewish, "Providing the

43. Interviews, AFSOUTH, 6 March 1997.

44. The analogy with occupation forces was suggested by Dr. William Durch of
the Stimson Center, interview, 11 March 1996, Washington, DC.

45. For example, see Michael C. Pugh, "Multinational Maritime Forces: A
Breakout from Traditional Peacekeeping?," *Southampton Papers In
International Policy* 1 (Southampton,UK: University of Southampton,
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, July 1992) and Peter C.
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Peacekeeping Partnership* (Clemensport, NS: The Lester B. Pearson Canadian
International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1995).


47. Details of SHARP GUARD are drawn from "NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard,”
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1997.


December 1996.

52. Ibid., “SFOR Maritime Component,” (undated).

53. Allied Forces Southern Europe, *News Release* 96-20, 24 July 1996 and
interviews at AFSOUTH 6 March 1997.

appears that some support is being received from AFSOUTH in the form of
the ALBA force using NATO airfields and the provision of airspace and
naval management.

55. Stephanie Blair, “Canadian Peacekeeping Policy and Practice: The Case of
Maritime Forces Atlantic in MARCOT’96,” *Maritime Security Working Papers*


67. Ibid., p. 17.

68. Hirschfeld, Multilateral Naval Cooperation Options, pp. 1, 3.


70. Hirschfeld, Multinational Naval Cooperation, p. 15.


75. Ibid.


77. NATO, "Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session held in Brussels on 12th and 13th June 1997, Final Communiqué."


88. Ibid., p. 34.

89. Ibid.


92. Canada, Adjusting Course, p.29.


94. Wooley, “A European Navy Far From Home.”

95. Ibid., p.54.
