INTRODUCTION

No longer is there any turning back from NATO’s metamorphosis. From a Cold War alliance designed to deter or defeat aggression by Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces, NATO will enter the twenty-first century as a much different organization.

By the end of 1999, the Alliance may have admitted or invited five or more new members from central and eastern Europe, becoming one third larger. At the same time, its functions are evolving rapidly, shedding a raison d’etre of a “latent war community...,” wherein conflict or the threat of conflict is omnipresent, into something akin to an “international regime” aimed at peacemaking (Bosnia), civil-military socialization (via PfP), confidence-building (through efforts to ensure resolution of tensions between neighbors), and other collective endeavors.

NATO has become an alliance unlike any other. As compared with historical precedents or its own prior experience, criteria for successful integration into the “new” NATO now have little to do with a state’s military contribution or strategic advantage—factors that used to outweigh everything else. Dictatorships (e.g., Portugal under Salazar), states that teetered on the brink of instability (as seemed always imminent in Italy) and countries that moved in and out of juntas (such as Turkey) were welcomed in the alliance as it was formed or grew in its first years.
Today, however, principal emphasis is placed on how a state and its army behave. No one defines such norms with any precision, but everyone seems to think they exist. In the discussion that follows, a standard by which to assess the behavioral performance of a state and its army is offered under the broad heading of a "civil army." Although an ideal type to which no system can fully lay claim, this notion represents a standard of conduct that can be assessed comparatively.

Is there a way in which to denote a military and national security elite that behave accordingly--i.e., that constitute a "civil army?" And, if so, have NATO programs (Partnerships for Peace--“PfP”-and related activities) and policies of NATO member states (e.g., bilateral exchanges, training, etc.) contributed in any tangible way to diffusing or accelerating the acceptance of such behavior?

To examine these questions, I have sought to consider general conceptual issues after which, as opportunities arose, I conducted a series of in-country research visits to all central and southeast European PfP countries from late 1995 through spring, 1997. Countries not now in PfP, but which could enter in the future, may also illustrate the degree to which NATO's criteria are being effectively transferred. Consequently, research travel to Croatia was also included in late June to early July 1996. Thus, this essay reviews the conceptual basis of a "civil army" and how such an idea enables us to gauge advances in civil-military relations critical for integration into NATO. Further, a brief overview derived from several in-country research visits are provided in a second section.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Armies of European communist regimes, with the exception of martial law in Poland from December 1981 to mid-1983, never ruled. Yet, military leaders were always assured that their needs for human and material resources would be met. Grievous costs were imposed on the societies and economies of the region as political authority relinquished control over national security.

Extraordinarily high levels of military effort were undertaken by the USSR and its six East European allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO or Warsaw Pact). For more than two decades, the WTO region was the world's most heavily burdened both in terms of manpower and material resources devoted to armed forces and from the standpoint of military maneuvers, arms sales, and other military-related activities. After 1985, when data and observations became more accessible, the costs and trade-offs of Soviet and East European military establishments began to become clearer. We now have an unequivocal portrait of the egregious weight created by military effort among WTO states, and we can document the contribution to poor economic performance and popular antagonism derived from defense burden.¹

A central role was played by military officers in communist parties not so much because of their proportion of total membership, but rather because the army was the only institution with a capacity to push the party aside. Further, no communist party leader could ignore that military orders, not the market, provided the impetus for economic growth—albeit an inefficient, extensive growth dependent on the unrestrained input of resources.
All of this has been changing during the turbulent post-communist period after 1989. There has been no choice but to inaugurate a fundamental transformation in the relationship between civil and military institutions. If Europe's eastern half is to emerge in the twenty-first century as democratic in form, process, policy and values, then elected executive and legislative authorities must wrest control of national security policy, the military budget and weapons development and production from those who have held the reins for decades. Losing this critical battle would leave only one alternative--a "bargain" whereby the national security agenda remains outside the competence of democratic politics. For a nascent post-authoritarian, government, that would be a deadly bargain.

PAST AND PRESENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

Post-communist armies and governments have thus far coexisted with suspicion and uncertainty. In the years since the demise of communist regimes, there have been no military coups in the Central European corridor from the Baltic to Bosporus. Further to the east, however, the assertiveness of the Russian military in alliance with conservative nationalists has created a de facto military foreign policy--with former General (and now presidential aspirant) Alexander Lebed and regional commanders articulating views sharply at odds with the Foreign Ministry.

No one should forget, however, that East European armies--with the sole exception of the Czechoslovak military--all have a history of coup activity. In cases such as the Bulgarian Army, coups or plots became a leitmotif of pre-World War II years. During the communist period, armies were either at first indistinguishable from
the Party (as in Yugoslavia and Albania) or were bought off with unbridled access to manpower and material resources.³

Where army loyalty may now lie, however, is another matter. On the surface, force reductions and restructuring, the transition to a new generation of senior officers, doctrinal reorientation and other steps have been preceding. Yet it is also true that military leaders and defense ministers have opposed budget reductions and drastic cuts in their order of battle--coming into open conflict with civilian policy-makers.

Armies and defense ministries are not the only question marks. The overgrown military-industrial complexes of former Warsaw Pact states still exist in varying states of disrepair, and have contributed greatly to the difficult movement toward a market economy. Such behemoth industries, although notoriously inefficient, employ large proportions of the workforce; to close them would devastate communities and regions. After 1989, Slovak opposition to any federal government effort to restrict arms sales was rooted in that republic's large defense industry, and the case of T-72 tank sales was only the most visible case of Bratislava's view. It is no exaggeration to say that Slovak independence was given added impetus by federal efforts to constrain Slovakia's military industrial production.

TRANSITIONS AND MODELS?

With such conditions in mind, what can we say about prognoses for civil-military relations in post-communist states? Most democrats throughout Europe and North America hope to see armed forces in post-communist states support elected officials, endorse tolerance and
pluralism, defend constitutional procedure, and uphold the rule of law. But these goals are far too vague to become guides for daily behavior.

The transition through which militaries of Eastern and post-Soviet Europe have begun to pass are multifaceted. As with the U.S. armed forces in the early to mid-1990s, several concurrent transformations were required—downsizing, adjusting to smaller budgets, accepting people of different backgrounds and sexual orientation, altering missions and doctrine, etc. Politically and economically-induced transitions have affected militaries through Europe's eastern half in previous generations, as when communist parties exerted control over armies via commissars or direct subordination to the Soviet Army. But at a time of renewed sovereignty, we can look to more trends that are less imposed by external Great Powers than by a state's indigenous capacities.

During the late 1990s, armed forces and defense ministries in Eastern and post-Soviet Europe have been required to:

1) further **limit** the manpower and material **resources** consumed by the armed forces by "downsizing" total active-duty personnel, and restructuring accordingly (e.g., moving from heavy divisions to brigade or battalion size units);

2) **recreate national militaries without renationalizing armies** by reformulating doctrine to reflect national interests while avoiding the rise of intolerant nationalism within the officer corps;

3) **assert civilian control** over national security agenda via budgetary process and through state organs such as defense councils chaired by the president;
4) modernize inventories with selective purchases of new or more recent-vintage weapons and technologies for command, control, communications and intelligence operations;

5) professionalize the enlisted ranks by reducing the proportion to which force is conscript-based;

6) de-politicize the armed forces both by ensuring that communist remnants have no political organizations and by precluding other (especially nationalist or neo-fascist) cells from proliferating;

7) popularize the armed forces through the use of public affairs techniques, and become more effective in lobbying for military interests in a democratic legislature;

8) re-define the role and mission of national armed forces and plan related restructuring (e.g., to end the emphasis on an armor intensive ground force, to expand the nation's commitment to foreign peacekeeping roles, or to develop an "all-around" defensive posture as opposed to defending against anticipated attack from one direction).

That such transformations represent a wholesale rebuilding of armed forces and their relationships with the public and civilian authority is self-evident. Even so, there are no guides for how to do it. This is a theoretically-impoverished arena; much as there was no blueprint for creating a market economy from a state-owned, centrally-planned system, so too is there no plan for building a democratically-responsive military from one designed to ensure the absence of democracy. We know only that this task will require many
years—a decade or more—before a high degree of assurance of success could be evident.

For countries in Europe’s eastern half invited to join NATO at the 1997 Madrid summit, or those that may be asked in 1999 or thereafter, much of this longterm transformation will be undertaken from within NATO or, at least, the antechamber of PfP. Were NATO to import more countries in which the tradition of civilian authority, parliamentary oversight and devotion to human rights are weak or absent, then the political cost of enlargement will be high indeed.

Academic literature is well-developed in the domain of military sociology and in the actions of defense ministries and militaries as agents in democratic politics—e.g., the notion of an "Admirals’ Lobby" or Graham Allison’s decision-making framework. Also, a record of de-Nazifying German and Japanese militaries after World War II, provides case studies for enforcing a transition in civil-military relations.

But post-communist and post-Cold War civil military transitions are very different. We cannot talk about the Russian or Bulgarian armed forces or defense ministries behaving institutionally like those in the U.S. or elsewhere given the brief development of those entities outside one-party rule. We should also be wary of the assumption that the transitions will operate as in an occupied and defeated Germany and Japan after World War II; neither the armies of communist states nor their industries were destroyed in battle.

Frequent references are made to Spain and Portugal as models for Europe’s eastern half. In the 1970s, both countries managed to thwart right and left wing extremism to emerge as clearly democratic
systems. We need to differentiate these cases from those in Eastern and post-Soviet Europe, however; while Spain and Portugal were secure and had functioning (albeit imperfect) market economies, post-communist Europe had no democracy, market or security. The tasks confronting countries and politicians from the Baltic to Bosporus to Urals were far more difficult because of the absence of all three criteria for stable development.

Similarly, Latin America offers no models for post-communist Europe. Juntas, the prevailing mode for military influence on politics in the region, have been absent in the former Warsaw Pact countries or elsewhere in Europe's eastern half; they have not become Edward Feit's model of "armed bureaucrats" who move in and out of governmental control.⁵

None of the prevailing models of the military in politics, or of paths toward civilian control of the defense establishment, can provide more than an imprecise goal. Little or nothing in the theories of academic literature provides a guidebook for the re-making of military-civilian relations. Rather like trying to create a market economy, one finds that trial and error, coupled with a sense of what ought to be, guides daily improvisation.

Armies unquestionably will be political actors with an omnipresent capacity to become power contenders; they are never entirely out of politics or entirely confined to the barracks; they have "power capabilities" which constitute the "price for admission" into national politics.⁶ Decisions about national priorities cannot exclude the military leadership because of the army's importance to the larger economy, because of personal ties to those in power,
because the material bases for intervention are always present, and because armed forces are essential to maintaining the balance between threats and capacities that lies at the heart of security.

An absence of models with which to guide post-communist civil-military transitions does not diminish the importance of key theoretical questions. Participants and analysts alike need to identify the requisites of an army fully compatible with democratic governance, and to ask whether armed forces can be an advocate of democracy. With what conditions are democratic values and behaviors in militaries most strongly associated?

In obvious ways, armed forces are never democratic. Their hierarchies of rank and seniority predetermine a command system, without which armies do not function. Most military veterans remember from personal experience that sergeants rarely make polite inquiries when telling conscripts to "double-time," and few will recall being asked for their consent when mess-hall duty was assigned. In their implementation of commands, armed forces cannot pause for votes, consultations or committee review.

But these characteristics of rank, discipline and hierarchy in no way define militaries as anti-democratic. Instead, the "democratic quotient" of any army is judged by its institutional relationship with civil authority and the behavioral conformity of the armed forces to external norms.

Senior officers or defense ministry civilians cannot merely speak the language of democracy. A behavioral pattern must develop in which key decisions are made through plural and open debate, adherence to broad constitutional procedures, responsiveness to
public concerns and preferences, and obedience to elected civilian authorities. Key decisions that might be regarded as testing grounds for democratic civil-military relations would include:

-- the articulation of a national military doctrine,
-- the authoritative allocation of resources within the army and when army needs are juxtaposed with those of society,
-- the degree of criminal activity within and by the army, especially behavior affecting the larger society and economy,
-- the treatment of minority ethnic, religious or cultural groups within the armed forces or in encounters with the military,
-- the treatment of conscripts by non-commissioned officers and officers,
-- and the criteria for assignment or dismissal, promotion or demotion, reward or punishment of the army's own officers.

In none of these arenas can we say that democratic norms point unequivocally in one direction. Yet, where doctrine is formulated only in the General Staff, the nation's human and material resources are provided unquestionably to the military at the expense of popular needs and economic growth, and the armed forces violate laws with impunity (by theft, banditry, or violence against citizens), a "civil army" is certainly absent. And, when conscripts are abused by the army, minorities are systematically excluded from combat units and the officer corps, and the armed forces hold the discretionary power of all personnel decisions within the military based solely on their own judgments, civil-military relations do not approximate what we might expect in a mature democracy. Further, violating of all of these expectations with impunity or over a long period, or
transgressing one more frequently, provides a de facto indication that the defense establishment is not ready or willing to fit into the behavioral norms of a civil army.

One effort to denote a democratic model of civil-military relations that has stood the test of time was offered three decades ago by Morris Janowitz. In his view, primarily based on his observations of new, post-colonial states or underdeveloped areas, democratic civil-military relations are characterized by a sharp differentiation between civilian and military elites. Further, "...civilian political elites exercise control over the military through a formal set of rules...[which] exclude the military [as an institution] from involvement in domestic partisan politics."  

According to Janowitz, this means that "military personnel are professionals in the employ of the state." While officers can be, and often are, seconded to government roles in democracies, or retire in order to assume a senior government role, this migration of talent from the armed forces is to be based on merit and opportunity. Even if it does not always work ideally, the principle of democratic civil-military relations is one in which military expertise supports the civilian bureaucracy, rather than seeking a penetration and "takeover" of the civil service.

For an officer corps accustomed to the mantle of national defense, unconstrained investments of human and material resources, and an intimate link with those holding principal state offices, the notion of acting as "...professionals in the employ of the state" threatens to obviate much of their self-worth.
Further, Janowitz's criteria for democratic civil-military relations do not purport to answer a critical question: Can an army be an advocate of democracy, acting as the leading edge of a transition from authoritarianism? Here, a tentative answer was suggested years ago by Alfred Stepan. In his works, primarily concerning Latin America, Stepan suggests that the military could push for a plural, tolerant polity, but not alone. If a "push" for change exists among business and corporate interests, or a "pull" from a society tired of one-party authoritarianism is evident, then the army may ally itself with these interests. But armies will not act alone; they can be a forceful ally, but will not be innovators.

But with whom will the Army ally most readily? Ideologically-driven movements and cadre parties are not comfortable associates for Army general staffs. With their raison d'être focused not on successful administration or the rational allocation of resources, but rather on agitation leading to revolution and loyalty to charismatic authority, cadre parties offer little of assurance to military leaders. By contrast, the more institutionalized and ordered political environment of mass parties, less driven by charisma and fanaticism, has far greater appeal to general staffs. Through parties open to all, not just "true believers," political systems can generate the broad appeal necessary for armed forces' recruitment or mobilization in times of crisis. Such an affinity between mass parties and the military can, of course, be dangerous; seeking to insure its place in political life, the development of an "army's party" is a prospect that could lead from one authoritarianism to another.
PARTIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: UNCIVIL ARMIES AND NATO'S ENLARGEMENT

As NATO expands to the east, the new members will not be equally prepared to live within the Atlantic Alliance's broadly accepted, but poorly defined, standards of civil-military relations. Some new members, indeed, will still have "uncivil armies" if gauged by the conceptual norms described above. Further, many of the PfP states seem to have made negligible or halting progress in this arena during the 1990s, despite substantial military to military exchanges, training, and education from NATO or bilateral support. Such assistance from the United States alone is substantial and derived from a number of budgets— from DoD’s programs and exercises, State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF), DoD Joint Contact Team (JCT) and State’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. For the fiscal years of 1995 through 1997, six Central European PfP states received more than $143 million from these sources.¹⁰

This is neither an argument for slowing integration of the first tranche invited at the July 1997 Madrid Summit, nor resisting further NATO enlargement in 1999 and beyond. Indeed, there are ample questions about the behavior of the armed forces among current NATO members—most notably, the Turkish Army. And, in the history of NATO, many of the members' militaries have occasionally been indicted for plotting and effecting coups, corruption, racism, criminal activity and undisciplined violence. Non-American observers might also point to the frequent and embarrassing violence by U.S. armed services personnel against women—for example, the “Tailhook” scandal, rapes on Okinawa of young Japanese, and attacks by officers and drill instructors on female trainees at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in
Maryland. Other allies, when their forces have been deployed (e.g., elite Canadian units in Somalia) found serious lapses in discipline and human rights. For the most part, however, these have been exceptions to the rule; few of the armies within NATO do not share a kind of civil comportment along the lines suggested earlier.

NATO enlargement has, thus far, been the pursuit of elites not a “cause” for the peoples of East-Central, Southeastern or post-Soviet Europe. Where a nation's political elites are united in their desire to enter an alliance and where the perceived costs of joining (principally financial but also political), public acceptance can be built over time as was the case with Spanish entry into NATO.

But it is far more difficult to alter institutional behaviors. Re-making the attitudes and behaviors of an army is both initially more critical and more difficult than convincing the public about the commitment to an alliance. Outside the uniformed military, many institutions linked to and dependent on national security policy—whole sectors of economic activity and significant parts of higher education (in engineering and sciences, for example)—will resist changes that diminish their claim on resources or prominent role.

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, who had served as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe in the latter years of World War II, concluded his presidency by warning of the power of the American “military-industrial complex.” And, authoritarian or democratic politicians share a reluctance to insist on reform within an institution and culture that they often do not understand; President Clinton abandoned, de facto, his intention to end the U.S. armed
forces policy of excluding homosexuals and accepted the now-infamous “Don’t ask; don’t tell” notion which left in place the status-quo.

Eight years after the watershed of 1989, and more than three years after the idea of Partnerships for Peace was inaugurated by NATO, most of the external, structural changes have been accomplished in East-Central and Southeast European armed forces. Data on force levels for manpower and weapons comply with or cut more deeply than CFE. Restructuring has moved ahead, brigades have become the standard organizational unit, and the old Warsaw Pact notion of heavily armored divisions have been set aside. In those eight years, however, much less has been done to transform the behavior of individuals and groups in these states’ militaries or, in some cases, the larger relationship between civilian and military authorities.

Several of these impediments to truly civil armies and a democratic national security process are evident across the former Warsaw Pact region:

**Criminality**

Although exceptions exist, most militaries in Europe’s eastern half have developed ties with criminal factions and/or engage in corrupt practices. Much of this activity is related to the diversion of weapons and equipment from factory production, and theft from depots or unexplained losses from warehouses. Sometimes, however, outright sales have been initiated by members of the armed forces to criminal elements, to warring parties in nearby or distant zones of conflict or to potential terrorists.

In Poland, for example, more than four dozen armored personnel carriers were apparently sold to an unnamed African state in 1993
without the knowledge of the Defense Minister. A few years later, the same kind of problem again arose, this time concerning shipments to Angola of ammunition and vehicles.\textsuperscript{12} The good news is that these instances became part of parliamentary and journalistic debate; that the Army has been arranging sales on its own, however, raises serious doubts about civilian oversight unless scandal breaks out into the open.

Begun almost as soon as communist regimes’ control began to collapse, illicit arms sales and involvement in other illegal activities have been a life-line for armies and military industries, and highly profitable for many generals and politicians.\textsuperscript{13}

In general, these problems worsen as one moves east and southeast, but are also evident to lesser degrees in countries that received invitations at Madrid. The principal motivations for illegal activities are difficult to isolate, but must be strongly related to low budgets, diminished respect, and low morale within armed forces, plus much widened opportunities for black market activities in the unruly early capitalism of the region. Tensions within military families under financial duress, recruitment of less “upstanding” personnel as departures from armies far exceed enlistments, and other trends are repeatedly demonstrated in sociological surveys and journalistic accounts.\textsuperscript{14} Rather than becoming an institution in which individuals view their futures positively and anticipate appropriate rewards, the inverse has been true in much of post-communist Europe. Ample demand for military equipment and weapons in Europe (in the Balkans and Caucasus) plus continued worldwide interest in small arms
or conventional weaponry, exacerbate the appeal of short-term relief to desperate conditions that might be gained from illegal activity.¹⁵

Very little data about such activities are in the public domain. Yet, senior officials in the defense ministries, parliamentary defense committees and security-related think-tanks in each of the PfP countries of Central and Southeastern Europe do not, when asked directly, deny losses from pilfering, theft or the social costs of family violence and other crimes that plague their armed forces.¹⁶ Although defense ministry personnel are quick to point to improvements and controls, sociologists who undertake contract research for the Polish, Czech and Hungarian militaries speak of intra-military, police and customs trafficking in small arms, drugs and other contraband.¹⁷ In countries of southeastern Europe, these problems may be proportionately even more widespread and the role of police, interior ministry forces, and regular armies from a number of former communist states in facilitating drug transfers from Central Asia and the Middle East to Western Europe and the U.S. has drawn the attention of global law enforcement.¹⁸

**Procurement Fraud and Corruption**

The processes for manufacturing and buying weapons, equipment, and supplies are riddled with inefficiency and kickbacks. How to elicit bids, what the proper behavior of Ministry of Defense or armed forces procurement officers should be, and the criteria for decisions are all poorly understood.

Examples cited by sources from the region--from defense committees in national legislatures, national security journalists, and uniformed military officers--include such episodes as the 1996–97
Polish decision on an air-to-ground (anti-tank) missile for its “Husar” attack helicopter. Rockwell’s “Hellfire” missile, already in production and tested in combat, competed against the Israeli “Rafael” project, a thus far untested product on the drawing board of Elbit, a major arms manufacturer in Israel. Western and Polish journalists, and members of the Defense Committee in the Sejm, spared no criticism of the Army and Ministry’s handling of this important procurement, alleging improper behavior and procedures that led to signing with the Israeli firm.

The tactics of large American aerospace and technology firms that secured contracts in Romania, and the rush to market major weapons systems to NATO invitees and suitors has also been examined. In the Romanian case, Bell-Textron had signed a deal to build up to 96 “Cobra” attack helicopters in Romania under license. After Romania was denied an invitation in the first tranche of NATO enlargement, the budgetary sacrifices to make this arrangement happen seemed far less compelling, and Romanian government guarantees for the $2 billion deal were withdrawn as the Constantinescu-Ciorbea government struggled to convince IMF that it was not overextending its resources in order to receive new credits. Rumors were widespread, however, regarding what and to whom promises and offers had been made in order to create the Bell Helicopter deal in the first place.

Other efforts to modernize defense infrastructure, and to enhance compatibility with NATO standards, have meant that major firms such as Westinghouse and Lockheed (among American-based companies) have been active in the region. Radar modernization, to enhance civilian and military air control capacities, has been sold
to Hungary by Westinghouse and to Romania by Lockheed-Martin. In both cases, allegations of corruption again surfaced. A parliamentary commission began to explore the former case in 1996\textsuperscript{22}, while the intimate links between Lockheed-Martin, the “U.S. Committee to Expand NATO” (chaired by Bruce Jackson, director of strategic planning for Lockheed-Martin) that lobbies Congress, and sales efforts for the F-16, radar systems, and other equipment are difficult to miss. Romania’s purchase of Lockheed radars, helped out by a U.S. Congressional Research Service employee who left Romania in the 1980s, was, according to several senior Romanian defense and government figures, not secured without benefits to key military or political decision-makers.\textsuperscript{23}

Without public disclosures or judicial proceedings, there is little of substance that can be offered to detail such concerns. Yet, there is much to wonder about, and ample doubt that the procurement process is working to the public interest.

**The Civilian “Glass Ceiling” in National Security**

PfP thus far has failed to generate a significant improvement in the level of civilian control over national security matters; a “glass ceiling” for civilians (especially those without a prior military career) has persisted during the first decade of post-communist government in national security matters. Both the number of people and their degree of knowledge are inadequate in every state of the former Warsaw Pact including those countries in the first tranche of NATO’s enlargement. And, most important, their effect on decisions affecting the armed forces is most often tangential or belated.
The primacy of military to military exchanges was a logical consequence of NATO’s Cold War identity as a latent war fighting organization. But, without a corps of civilian (not just retired military) experts in all domains of military tactics and strategy, planning, budgeting and procurement, discipline, promotion and retention, a civil army will be ephemeral.

Some modest correctives have been attempted via bilateral training programs between NATO countries and candidates for membership. Both the U.S. DoD’s Marshall Center in Garmisch and NATO Defense College in Rome, too, have invited civilians. The number of nominal civilians has grown in defense ministries of first-tranche enlargement countries—and a rough figure generally accepted in Poland and the Czech Republic by early 1997 was 30-40 percent of professional employees in the ministries of those countries are not active-duty, uniformed military personnel. Increasingly, one can find departments of bureaus with a civilian chief and a uniformed deputy; who is “in charge,” of course, is a matter for debate.

Yet, the number of people who have not served in the Army or had no prior military career is very few, and half (or more) “civilians” are ex-professional military officers who have retired early in downsizing; as a senior civilian defense ministry official in Poland told me in mid-1996, “I can count on one hand the civilians who are civilian in this ministry.”24 Three years earlier, when he was Defense Minister, Janusz Onyskiewicz lamented that “…there are not many civilian counterpart experts.”25

In countries invited to join NATO at Madrid, a few key civilians have been the principal “contact points” for Western and particularly
American programs to enhance the non-uniformed expertise within such ministries. In Poland, Deputy Defense Minster Andrzej Karkosza has been an essential player as has Janusz Onyskiewicz (former defense minister and now a key parliamentary opposition leader); in Hungary, a few names such as Andras Toth, and later Istvan Fodor, and Istvan Gyarmati have been central to the “civilianization” of the defense ministry, while Tamas Wachsler, co-chair of the parliamentary defense committee, has been the key legislator watching over Hungary’s civil-military relations. In Romania, during most of the Iliescu presidency through late 1996, the principal civilian in Romania’s defense ministry was Dr. Ioan Mircea Pascu who, as State Secretary, held a post equivalent to deputy minister.

From country to country, the same pattern persisted--a handful of civilians held fairly senior posts, below whom one could find very few other non-military individuals in leadership roles in national security. And, while the total number of non-uniformed personnel in defense ministries has unquestionably increased, particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic, civilians (without career military backgrounds) do not yet head departments and bureaus to the same degree. Their efficacy, even when nominally in such a post, also leaves much to be desired. Pervasive mistrust of civilians, and an effort to deny secrets to anyone not in uniform, is clear even in soon-to-be NATO members--occasionally expressed in public.

Recognizing the weak training and minimal expertise of any civilians brought into security-related posts during the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. has spent about $7.3 million for a DoD Warsaw Initiative in six Central European countries between 1995-1997.
Several programs of this initiative were aimed specifically at helping “...partner states’ civilian officials assert control over their military structures ...” 28 With so little money to be dispersed among six countries over more than three years, however, few individuals benefitted from the endeavor and some who participated regarded the experience as a “superficial exposure,” not serious training. 29

The Army’s Public Image

The public persona of the armed forces, in almost all states in Europe’s eastern half except for Poland, is negative. Armies are either not trusted or not valued as a professional path or both. Attitudes toward military service and toward the uniformed military vary—higher in Poland, for example, but low in the Czech Republic and Hungary and not improving in any country. The militaries and defense ministries do not understand the need to cultivate their relationship with society as a whole, and have little capacity to do so. 30

Opinion surveys are unequivocal regarding the poor or tainted perception of the Army as an institution in much of Europe’s eastern half, and low esteem for the military as a profession. Although public confidence in the military is a separate phenomenon from prestige, a country such as Poland is high on both measurements, while the Czech Republic is low on both. In Hungary, “...a high level of public confidence in the military does not mean equally high prestige.” 31 Romanian and Slovak militaries retain high trust, and a prestige higher than Hungary, but lower than Poland; Bulgaria’s Army
may have improved its standing after early 1997 unrest, but had been slipping badly in public assessments in the prior couple years.

Explanations for the military’s diminished public esteem may stem from violence toward conscripts, minorities and poor record on human rights. The Russian military, of course, has been indicted often for the brutality toward recruits and, especially in the Soviet period, minorities. Yet, even in Hungary, a larger proportion of the public (in 1994) thought that treatment of conscripts since the end of communism had worsened or been unchanged; twice the proportion of rural residents, however, suspected that conscript treatment had worsened (15%).

That the armed forces and defense ministry must engage the public, often via the media, is a still-rudimentary notion. To be open, detailed, informative and responsive are behavioral traits that do not cross the minds of national security elites in or out of uniform.

High Command, Low Compliance

Vehement resistance from within the military high commands to civilian direction has been evident throughout the region; despite a new defense law in Poland, Polish defense ministers have had an ineffectual record vis-a-vis the General Staff; not even President Kwasniewski’s dismissal of General Tadeusz Wilecki from the post of Chief of the General Staff in March 1997 ended debate about control of the country’s national security agenda. Indeed, instead of ending the argument about “who is in charge,” the dilemma was simply pushed more deeply into the ministries, parties and Army itself. The issue was always less Wilecki (or Walesa), and much more one of pervasive
culture; until the culture of military primacy and secrecy is driven from prominence, civilian and uniformed leaders will talk past one another.

In other countries with large military establishments--e.g., Romania--a new center-right government elected in November 1996 acted in early 1997 to wrest control of the Defense Ministry from the General Staff. By summarily firing General Dumitru Cioflina, who had served in that post for several years under President Ion Iliescu, and naming General Degeratu to the post, incoming President Constantinescu hoped to give his Defense Minister, Victor Babiuc, more solid authority. Instead, Degeratu has been widely perceived as “in over his head.” The additional dismissal of the popular (within the Army) head of Military Intelligence, Major General Decebal Ilina, has made the atmosphere even more tense. The Army, now seeking to defend its prerogatives, is viewing itself as under duress from political authorities, and Babiuc’s role in day-to-day military matters is seen as very limited.

In Bulgaria, the government of Zhan Videnov did little to assert civilian control, and the importance of the Army in stabilizing the country in early 1997 has heightened the new UDF government’s reliance on the military. Throughout the region, armies control their own personnel policies (promotions, assignments, dismissals), and write their own doctrine based upon outdated notions of their capabilities.

**COMPLETING THE TRANSFORMATION--FORGING CIVIL ARMIES**
NATO’s enlargement process must address these needs, where possible before ratifying admission, through focused programs within or appended to PfP. Addressing such matters ought to be preconditions of NATO membership or, at the very least, concomitant with the political process of amending the Washington Treaty. For those countries not in the first tranche, heightened assistance should be developed and targeted specifically at these persistent obstacles to civil armies.

None of the issues outlined above are insurmountable, and none are equally severe in all countries over time. Yet, their persistence through the first decade of post-communism, and evidence that criminality, procurement corruption, minimal civilian presence or control, disaffection from the public, and low compliance by top military leaders to civilian authority affect all aspirants for NATO membership is worrisome. In the extreme, these are behavioral characteristics incompatible with what NATO is becoming—an organization imbued with ideals, defined by democratic norms more than its capacity to deter or defeat enemies. While no PfP country of East-Central or Southeastern Europe (ignoring for the moment Albania, where the Army disintegrated in early 1997) exhibits the worst behavior in all dimensions noted above, even those included in NATO’s first wave of enlargement are well represented among these problem-areas. And, neither being invited nor being asked to wait in the PfP antechamber for another few years will ensure that such behavioral improprieties can be eliminated.  

Instead, specific NATO and U.S.-led programs will have to target each problem area in a concerted fashion. That funding is scarce and
time limited are obvious constraints. Yet, the danger of importing such an array of uncivil behaviors into NATO (when there are already some cases among NATO’s current sixteen that exhibit most if not all of these difficulties) is very real. To complete its metamorphosis, NATO must have capacities to keep the peace, to enhance confidence and security, to defuse potential conflicts between neighbors, and to deploy forces in humanitarian or civil crises. The Alliance therefore needs armies and defense ministries among its members that comport themselves well in those roles, even more than it needs new members with many troops, tanks, or combat aircraft.

Simply put, it matters more in the new NATO that new member states have a few thousand people who can successfully act as peace observers than it does whether their aircraft have the most advanced avionics or whether their tanks are equipped with laser targeting sights. NATO’s metamorphosis means that small, civil armies skilled in collective security actions and devoid of a reputation for human rights abuses, criminality, or wanton violence has become proportionately more valuable to the Alliance than fielding big, heavily armored formations.

To ensure that new members conform to such changing Alliance needs, NATO’s emphasis should be much less on integration, compatibility and interoperability as gauged by technical standards, and far more on attitudes, norms, and the culture of a professional military within democracies.

Major NATO-sponsored PfP exercises, or bilateral PfP-related endeavors, typically provide a few days of briefings, intermingled with familiarization visits to and capabilities demonstrations at
Alliance military bases, followed by a week of “low-impact” joint exercises. Lectures, simulations, social interaction, and a bit of soldiering are standard fare. The “academic schedules” for SACLANT’s Eloquent Nugget exercises offer briefings on “teambuilding,” “forming a combined-joint-taskforce headquarters,” “multinational operations,” “interagency coordination,” “operations planning process,” “force protection,” “C4I Interoperability,” and “public affairs.”

But, long-term exposure to the way of life of Allied officers and NCOs is absent except for PfP officers who attend war colleges or the National Defense University (or equivalents in other NATO states). And, substantively, nothing is discussed about combating problems noted earlier—criminality, procurement corruption, public credibility, etc. Missing entirely in these exercises, or in such efforts as the US government “Warsaw Initiative,” is any contact with the toughest issues that stand in the way of building civil armies:

- combating the appeal of criminality at times of severe austerity and maintaining a strict understanding of penalties and sanctions for illegal activities;
- the problems and efforts to minimize misunderstandings, waste or fraud in the defense procurement process;
- civilian-military trust and shared expertise;
- the responsibilities of national armed forces toward minorities and human rights in international law, and the proper distinctions between rights of minorities or NGOs in open societies;
rights and limits of the press concerning the military and security issues;

dangers to stability and democratic consolidation from non-compliance by military officers to policies and decisions of elected civilian leadership.

NATO’s ability to provide a new form of Euro-Atlantic security in the twenty-first century will depend on the Alliance’s functional and geographic enlargement—to metamorphose into a new organization with many collective responsibilities added to common defense. To do so without severe damage to its own capacities requires NATO’s urgent attention and commitment. NATO and its principal members must ensure that members-to-be enter the Alliance as states with civil armies, ready to behave within norms and procedures generally accepted in Western democracies. And, of equal importance, they must now be able to contribute to Alliance goals that today require far more complex skills than was required when armies confronted each other in static positions for forty years across the Fulda Gap.

Forging a civil army in each new democracy of Europe’s eastern half is a prerequisite for NATO’s successful enlargement. National security establishments must fit comfortably within competitive, plural, tolerant societies and economies. If not, the price to pay to protect a state and its sovereignty will be catastrophic as democratic values and norms are victimized by nationalists and demagogues. Without forging a civil army, national security becomes the playground of anti-democrats, and threats to the state and nation become blunt instruments by which to weaken tenets of democracy.


4. See, for example, Vincent Davis, The Admirals' Lobby and Graham Allison, Essence of a Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).


6. These observations were made by Charles Anderson in his Politics and Economic Class in Latin America (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), Chapter 4.


8. Alfred Stepan, "Paths Towards Redemocratization", in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Transitions from
Authoritarian Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1986), pp. 64-84, especially pp. 75-78.


12. Jeffrey Simon recounts these episodes in NATO Enlargement and Central Europe (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996), p. 93, 95 and 106. His references include citations to Polish periodicals that reported the events, as translated by FBIS-EEU.


14. There are innumerable examples of such data gathered by indigenous organizations. One of the more revealing was a late 1994 survey of the Hungarian military, published in Magyar Nemzet (November 16, 1994) entitled “Sociological Survey in the Army--Morale is Lost Without Money.”, translated in FBIS-EEU (November 17, 1994), p. 23. Two years later, the Hungarian Army was bitter about its “ghetto state”, and voicing its emergency condition. See, for example, “We Must Break Away from the Ghetto State,” Magyar Nemzet (June 15, 1996), translated in FBIS-EEU (June 18, 1996), p. 21.


16. The author spoke with uniformed and civilian defense officials from all east-central and southeast European PfP members, with the exception of Albania, in multiple visits to the region from late 1995 through early 1997. In the course of many discussions that covered a range of topics, I inquired about disciplinary problems, social difficulties arising from reforms and downsizing, and reports of intra-military/ministry criminal probes or corruption.

17. In the Polish case, export of drugs facilitated by police, military and customs officials’ corruption, may have reached the
point of rivaling traditional sources in the Middle East, Latin America or Southeast Asia. See, for example, a story on such illegal exports in Zycie Warszawy (September 26, 1994).

18. Author’s notes from Voice of America conference “Poppies Along the Silk Road: Drugs, Security and Democracy in Central and Southwest Asia” (Washington, D.C., March 27, 1997).

19. A military aviation show at Kecskemet, Hungary during mid-1997, for example, was portrayed to me as a particularly vivid example of U.S. and West European pressure to buy and buy soon some very expensive military hardware. Sponsored by major U.S. and European corporations in the defense business, such events utilize every legitimate sales technique mixed with ample hyperbole about what such purchases will do for a country’s security, ties to the West, and specific policy-makers’ future opportunities.


21. While no data or specific information were ever provided to this author, frequent assertions were made about the process leading to this deal, involving political and military elites. I was unable to corroborate the assertions, except to say that they were frequently heard.

22. A television report on the launch of this Parliamentary investigation was aired on April 9, 1996. See FBIS-EEU 96-071 of the same date (p. 15) for a translation.


24. Personal communication, Warsaw, Poland (May, 1996).


26. A personal communication deserves special mention in this regard. For a Polish colonel in the defense ministry, being directed by a younger civilian was wholly unacceptable. Expressing his intention to resign soon from the Army, he pointed out with something less than political correctness that accepting such a chain of command (from a young civilian) would be like his wife calmly accepting directions from him in the kitchen.

27. An egregious example was Col. Wieslaw Rozbicki’s comments, cited in Gazeta Wyborcza (June 9, 1994), pp. 12-13 wherein he suggests denying civilian ministers access to intelligence information. Although fired for his comments, the brazen attitude reflects a wider mistrust that will require time, education and law to eliminate.

29. Comment to the author by a Czech MoD civilian who had participated in a “Defense Planners Exchange Program” event.

30. In Bulgaria, when I opined that greater effort might be expended to portray life in the Army to the Bulgarian public, and to underscore the contributions of the military to the nation, one general shot back, quite irritated, that “...we do not need ‘public relations’; we are the ‘people’s army’”. Personal communication, Sofia, Bulgaria, November, 1995.


33. This was an opinion offered to the author by a senior American analyst with NATO-PfP responsibilities in mid-1997.


35. SACLANT sponsored “Eloquent Nugget” seminars, for example, are major annual events that, in 1996 and 1997, brought together officers from most PfP countries for a week of briefings and tours in Hampton Roads and Norfolk, followed by what I refer to as “low impact” field exercises. The latter are primarily scripted peacekeeping or humanitarian scenarios, in which very limited numbers of troops are involved (usually symbolic numbers—a platoon, for example, per country). Besides the substantially political purpose of the exercise, logistics and communications bottlenecks likely to occur in multinational operations can be demonstrated and, presumably, mitigated. Author’s interviews with Col. Bobby Smith (July, 1996) and Col. James Flock (January, 1997), U.S. Atlantic Command JTASC, Suffolk, Virginia.