1. Introduction

This report includes the main results of a two-year research that has been mostly conducted at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome but has benefitted from a series of meetings and interviews carried out during the visits to two leading research institutes - the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik of Ebenhausen (June 1996) and the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, CA (August 1996) - as well as to NATO headquarters in Bruxelles (March 1996 and June 1997) and the United Nations' headquarters in New York (June 1997).

The report is divided into three main parts. The first provides an analysis of the main structural shortcomings of the UN peace-keeping policy that affected the UN-NATO interaction in the pre-Dayton phase. The second part concentrates on the various types of mechanisms and procedures of cooperation that were established between the two institutions before and after the signing of the Dayton agreement. The basic purpose of this part is to identify the major problems that emerged, their causes and their broader relevance for the future UN-NATO cooperation. The third and final part summarizes the preceding analysis and offers a set of policy recommendations.
2. Main shortcomings of the UN peace-keeping policy in the former Yugoslavia

The phase of the closest interaction between the UN and NATO began in 1993 when the 'safe areas' policy was launched. At that time the UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, particularly the United Nations’ Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, had assumed some basic characteristics that would have a strong influence on the cooperation between the two organizations. The UN peace-keeping initiatives had revealed several fundamental deficiencies that would heavily condition and constraint NATO's freedom and ability to act. As a matter of fact, given the unsurmountable difficulties the UN was facing, NATO's wider involvement - through the activation of its air power for 'close air support' and 'air strikes' - was regarded as the only possible way for the actual implementation of the various UNPROFOR's mandates. Hence, in order to evaluate the problems of the NATO-UN interaction in their concrete context, an overall preliminary analysis of the UN peacekeeping policy and approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina is needed.

The mandate of the UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has undergone continuous changes. It was progressively enlarged by the UN Security Council, which, through a number of successive resolutions, entrusted the UN force with the task of performing newer and more demanding functions while upholding, at the same time, the old ones. In many cases, the UN failed, however, to obtain from the member countries the additional means - financial resources, troops, other types of manpower, logistic support etc. - that were needed for the accomplishment of the new goals. As a result of the SC deliberations, the UN force had to fulfill a continuously changing and increasingly ambitious mandate without being provided with proportionally strengthened capabilities. This discrepancy between the goals of the mandate and the resources devoted for their implementation - which has to be found also in other UN peace-keeping operations, notably in the one conducted in Somalia (UNOSOM) - was undoubtedly the key factor in the UN failure in the
The successive expansions of the mandate of the UN mission should have been followed not only by an increase in the number of the deployed forces but also by their qualitative transformation. The SC resolutions enhanced progressively the coercive components of the mandate while maintaining the original "traditional peace-keeping" goals. However, this shift towards peace enforcement - which required that the UN force embark on what has been termed a "more robust peace-keeping" or "wider peacekeeping" - was not conceptualized. The SC continued to characterize the mission in terms of traditional peacekeeping - although clearly the basic requirement of the consent by all parties involved was absent - and to emphasize its primarily humanitarian goals. What was needed, in fact, was quite the contrary - only by abandoning the choice of following strict neutrality and by substantially reviewing the structure of the deployed force could the new tasks assigned to the mission be accomplished.

This process of conceptual review and consequent force restructuring should have also entailed assessing whether the previously established goals could have been successfully pursued in conjunction with the new ones. This was applied, in particular, to the various forms of humanitarian assistance. Instead, the UN failed to consider the shortcomings and constraints inherent in an approach centered on the humanitarian action. It became clear very soon that the
provision of humanitarian aid had related, albeit unintended, effects on the war-fighting situation on the ground, by favouring one or another conflicting party. Moreover, the parties had proved capable of manipulating the UN humanitarian action in order to advance their political and military goals. By adding coercive elements to the mandate of the UN mission, the Security Council exacerbated further these problems associated with humanitarian action. As the failure of other UN peace operations has shown, one should avoid to assume that humanitarian action can easily become the centerpiece of a multi-faceted intervention entailing coercive elements. On the contrary, in any given situation the actual possibility to reconcile humanitarian action with coercion should be carefully evaluated.

In general, the Security Council's decisions to authorize UNPROFOR to employ increasing force in implementing its mandate were not accompanied by a serious and sober assessment of the implications this would have had for the UNPROFOR's relationship with the warring parties. In order to remain within the realm of "traditional peacekeeping", the Security Council tried its utmost to present the expanded possibility granted to UNPROFOR to use force as a way for ensuring UNPROFOR's "self defense". This was made possible by the ambiguity that characterizes the concept of "self defense" in general as well as when applied by the Security Council to the UN peace-keeping operations. While in some cases this concept is used with a strict reference to the physical security of the blue helmets, in others it clearly serves the purpose of authorizing enforcement action in a surreptitious way. The most striking example is provided by the Security Council's Resolution 824 of 6 May 1993 concerning the protection of safe areas whereby the UNPROFOR was authorized to use force «in reply to bombardments against the safe areas...or to armed incursion into them...or in the event of any deliberate obstruction...to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys», but only «acting in self-defense». 
In sum, the Security Council showed a pronounced attitude to overlook or underestimate the possible effects of its decisions allowing the application of the force for the implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate. This attitude corresponds to the UN's constant effort to present its military interventions, as much as possible, in terms of "traditional peacekeeping". One can see this attitude reflected also in the long time it took the Security Council to move from "monitoring" to "enforcement". Four months - from July 1992 to November 1992 - passed before a monitoring mission like "Operation Maritime Monitor" was coupled with an enforcement mission like "Operation Maritime Guard". Similarly, it took from October 1992 to March 1993 for the monitoring of the no-fly zone - "Operation Sky MONitor" - to be complemented by an enforcement action - "Operation Deny Flight".

In the case of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - and the same applies to the one in Croatia - this UN attitude also reflected some basic political realities: the need to ensure the consent of all Security Council's permanent members, the reluctance of the Western countries themselves to provide additional troops and resources, the lack of a clear idea about a possible enduring political solution of the conflict. What has to be stressed here is that this UN's ambiguity and undecisiveness in defining the significance of the use of force in the Bosnian context became soon a source of major problems in the phase of closer interaction with NATO. NATO was in fact much more willing and ready to apply force without the somewhat inherent constraints of the controversial concept of "self defense".

Other basic weaknesses of the UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina that proved to be relevant for the interaction with NATO also have to be stressed. The first and more important was the UN's baroque and inefficient system of command and control. The military commanders of the three UN missions in the former Yugoslavia (deployed in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia) were all subordinated to an overall force commander, who, in turn, received command guidance by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The responsibility for the
supreme direction of the missions rested with the UN Headquarters in New York. This was too long a chain of command that made it difficult to respond promptly to the changing situations on the ground.

Furthermore, like in other UN operations, the contributing countries were reluctant to accept that the force commander exercise full command on their troops. From time to time this represented an obstacle to the rapid accomplishment of the planned goals.

The functional relationship between the mission in the field and the negotiating process were also ill-defined. The two aspects were quite disconnected, which made it impossible to elaborate and implement an integrated strategy whereby the military presence could be used as a means to extract concessions from the parties at the negotiating table. The relations between the chief international negotiators and the force commanders were not ensured by adequate channels.

In some crucial technical fields which would prove decisive for the practical cooperation with NATO, the UN mission showed major shortcomings as well. In particular, the communications system linking the national contingents, the local headquarters in Sarajevo and the central headquarters in Zagreb proved inadequate due to the shortage of equipment and some problems of interoperability. Finally, the traditional deficiencies of the UN planning system at the New York headquarters contributed also to the slowness in the deployment of the military force and in its successive redeployments following the mandate changes or the exigencies on the ground.

3. The cooperation between the UN and NATO in the former Yugoslavia

3.1. Introductory remarks
As already noted, one of the major problems that obstructed the development of an effective cooperation between the UN and NATO in the former Yugoslavia was the substantially different conceptual approaches the two organizations have adopted on the significance of the use of force in conflict management and resolution. The UN's concern to conduct "traditional peacekeeping", maintaining neutrality and employing force only in self-defense, prevented it from developing a credible deterrence policy to contain the conflicting parties that violated the SC resolutions. On the contrary, NATO's doctrine has always emphasized the need to ensure that the use of force for both deterrence and coercion be part of an overall strategy of effective and credible intervention. NATO does have a strong institutional interest in preserving its credibility as the main military guardian of security and stability in Europe. This credibility can be jeopardized by involvement in strategically ill-conceived international interventions. As a matter of fact, this conceptual cleavage between NATO and the UN undermined the relationship between the two organizations. Only in mid-1995 a common policy of use of force was eventually defined and consistently pursued.

It needs to be acknowledged, however, that the cooperation within the framework of the international response to the Yugoslav conflict was the first interaction between the two organizations. There were no past experiences from which one could draw lessons or infer a possible model of cooperation. Thus the pioneer character of such endeavour accounts for many of its shortcomings and difficulties. After all, only in June 1992 - about a year after the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict - NATO had declared its willingness and readiness to participate, on a case-by-case basis, in peace-support operations, by placing its assets and expertise at the disposal of the CSCE (now OSCE). In December 1992, while reaffirming the refusal of any type of automaticity, the alliance made the same declaration with regard to the assistance it could provide for the conduct of peace support operations mandated by the UN's Security Council. Therefore, when NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia began in July 1992 with the Operation Maritime Monitor,
no prior arrangements for regulating cooperation were in place. The discussion within the alliance on this issue was at a very embryonic stage. Moreover, there were considerable contrasts among the allies - particularly between France and the US - on the degree of freedom of action NATO had to maintain while cooperating with the UN.

On the other hand, both NATO and the UN had long been hesitant to accept the idea that intervening in a conflict such as the Yugoslav one could be among their institutional tasks. It must be recalled that in the first months following the outbreak of hostilities the UN Secretary-General characterized the conflict as an internal one, thus tending to exclude a direct UN intervention. This, in fact, was decided only in December 1991, when the UN Security Council approved the plan for the deployment of the blue helmets in Croatia. The UN did not take over central responsibilities in the negotiating process until mid-1992. The reluctance of NATO to intervene directly was, in turn, motivated by a series of political as well as institutional reasons: the US desire to abstain from the participation in the management of the crisis, leaving this burden to the European allies; the unlikelihood to receive the needed political support from Moscow; the uncertainty surrounding the link between military intervention and the peace-making effort; the deep-rooted idea that the alliance was essentially a collective defense organization; the conviction that it was ill-suited to intervene effectively in an ethnic conflict. Not surprisingly, either organization had to face a number of problems when it decided eventually to take over a central role in the international efforts to put an end to the conflict.

The pre-Dayton cooperation between the two organizations included various forms and mechanisms of interaction: not only was NATO called by the Security Council to perform several quite different missions, but the concrete arrangements of interaction established for some of them were changed under the pressure of the events or as a result of the continuous political discussion on how to make international intervention more effective. New types of cooperation were envisaged and implemented pursuant to the Dayton agreement. In the following paragraphs the
focus is on the peculiarities of the individual cooperation arrangements established between the two organizations. Their major weaknesses will be underlined with the purpose of providing a set of suggestions for eventual future forms of cooperation.

3.2. UN-NATO cooperation before Dayton

3.2.1. Naval embargo

The first mission undertaken by NATO at the request of the UN Security Council was the maritime monitoring of the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions - *Operation Maritime Monitor* - which began in July 1992. In November 1992, following the Security Council's Resolution 787, NATO started its action to enforce the maritime embargo (*Operation Maritime Guard*). Both the monitoring and the enforcement missions were performed in cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU), although a single chain of command was established only in July 1993 with the launching of the *Operation Sharp Guard* in which the range of action of the two organizations was extended to the territorial waters of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. An important novelty for NATO was the activation of the recently established Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). The naval blockade was widely considered a success. Only very few attempted infringements of the embargo were reported. Generally speaking, the NATO maritime missions contributed effectively to the wider strategy to press and isolate the Serbs in order to obtain from them major political concessions.

In the case of the missions aimed at ensuring the naval blockade, the division of tasks between NATO and the UN was quite clear-cut: the latter provided the mandate, while the former
performed the operational role. The mission was autonomously executed by NATO. There was no interference in the chain of command. It must be stressed that, according to several analysts, this is the only sound pattern of cooperation between the UN and regional institutions in carrying out military operations. Rather, in the realization of the naval embargo, the main problems in the command and control field concerned the cooperation with the WEU. Satisfactory C2 arrangements were achieved only for the *Operation Sharp Guard* following the decision to set up a single chain of command for both organizations.

3.2.2. No-fly zone

In October 1992, pursuant to the Security Council's Resolution 781, NATO started the *Operation Sky Monitor* aimed at monitoring the no-fly zone over Bosnia. The enforcement of the no-fly zone through the *Operation Deny Flight* was activated in April 1993 after the authorization given by the Security Council's Resolution 816 of March 1993.

NATO was not the only organization involved in the execution of the monitoring of the no-fly zone. Both the UN and the European Union - the latter through the European Commission Monitor Mission (ECMM) - participated in the undertaking. While NATO used its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, the UN and the ECMM relied on their monitors deployed in the airfields in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia. In practice, NATO acted in parallel with the UN and the ECMM. Of these NATO, however, was the only organization with effective means of surveillance and reconnaissance. In general, the flow of information was made difficult by the absence of a centralized system of data collection, analysis, and sharing.
The UN was also responsible for authorizing the conflicting parties to use helicopters for humanitarian purposes. NATO had, therefore, to cooperate with it in order to detect the violators of the fly ban.

The responsibility for the enforcement of the no fly zone lay solely with NATO. In performing this task, it could thus work in full autonomy from the UN (like in the enforcement of the maritime embargo). It was in the framework of the Operation Deny Flight that NATO conducted its first combat action: on 24 February 1994 four Serbian Galeb aircraft which had taken off from the Udbina airfield were shot down by two US F-16s.

The air denial action realized by NATO under the Operation Deny Flight was instrumental in reducing, albeit only partially the military superiority of the Serbs, by eliminating their huge advantage in air power provided by fixed-wing aircrafts. Reportedly, very few violations by Serbian jet fighters were detected. Detecting and preventing military action by the helicopters proved much more complicated - helicopters employed for military purposes were hardly different from those performing humanitarian or relief action.

3.2.3. Close air support and air strikes

The Security Council's Resolution 836 of June 1993 authorized NATO to use air power for supporting UNPROFOR in the protection of the six "safe areas" designated in April and May 1993. In fact, the UN force was clearly unable by itself to ensure such protection because of its limited size and capabilities. This became even clearer in the following months as the UN member countries failed to contribute the additional troops that, as indicated by the Security Council in its subsequent Resolution 844, were needed, together with the air power, for an effective implementation of the safe areas policy. As a result, NATO's Close Air Support was performed in
the absence of the UN force's reinforcement that had been considered essential by the Security Council upon suggestion of the Secretary-General.

The provision of air support by NATO was placed under the political control of the UN exercised first by the Secretary-General and then by his Special Representative acting locally. The authorization of the weapons delivery had to be given on a case-by-case basis. In case of a UN request to provide air support, NATO, in turn, reserved the right to evaluate whether there were the necessary conditions. This arrangement, which became known as 'dual key' system, would become one of the major source of difficulties and controversies in the UN-NATO interaction.

Indeed, the decision-making process for the activation of close air support was very time-consuming since it involved practically all the major hierarchical levels within both the UN and NATO. In several cases, the complicated procedures of request and approval had a paralyzing effect which progressively weakened the credibility of the military commitments of both organizations.

The close air support system was, in many respects, structurally unable to ensure a timely response to the attacks on the UN troops and the violations of the safe areas. Responsiveness was indeed the key requirement for the success of close air support mission, but the lengthy process regulating weapons' delivery made it very difficult to achieve. When too much time had passed after the initial request had been submitted, the whole exercise was likely to come to nothing. For example, in March 1994 NATO was reportedly unable to fulfill the first UNPROFOR's request for close air support in the Bihac area because of the complicated procedure for political authorization.

However, the overall performance of the close air support system did improve over time thanks to some technical achievements. Particularly helpful was the planning conducted jointly by NATO and UNPROFOR officials. Furthermore, NATO contributed remarkably to train and equip
the UN forward air controllers (FAC) who worked with the UN ground troops. Their task was to provide NATO aircraft with guidance needed to hit targets situated in the immediate vicinity to the blue helmets.

The close air support mission proved unsuccessful not only because of the shortcomings associated with the inefficient C2 arrangements. Not less important was a closely related factor: NATO's inability to escalate the use of force when faced with growing violations of the Security Council's resolutions by the Serb troops. In fact, NATO was often compelled to resort to limited response, or sometimes to even interrupt its action for fear of the Serb retaliation on the ground troops which was made possible by their structural vulnerability. As a matter of fact,
the capabilities of the UN force did not go beyond those of light infantry.

This situation led to a gradual erosion of the deterrent effect that the close air support mission was expected to provide. From February 1994 to mid-1995, in response to the application of air power by NATO, the Serb forces carried out a variety of retaliation tactics - hostage-taking, obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, disruption of negotiations - all of which were relatively effective. In many cases, the use of force by NATO was excluded by the UN Force Commander or by the commander of the Bosnia mission in order to avoid one or more of these actions. It became increasingly evident that, without streamlining the C2 arrangements and providing the ground troops with more effective military capabilities, the close air support mission was simply undeliverable.

At the beginning of August 1993, on the basis of a broader interpretation of Resolution 836 which was first advocated by the US, the North Atlantic Council made known its readiness to execute air strikes against positions of the Bosnian Serbs in order to prevent further strangulation of the safe areas. At that time the most worrying situation was around Sarajevo where the Serbs came close to occupying the strategically crucial Mount Igman. The air strikes mission was meant to strengthen the military impact of air power by using it not only against forces attacking the blue helmets or obstructing their movement, but also against other relevant military targets. The objective was to increase the overall deterrent effect of NATO aircraft's military action.

In contrast to close air support mission, in which air power was to be applied solely in a reactive way, air strikes mission allowed for its proactive use against pre-planned targets. This attenuated, to some extent, the operational constraints inherent in the dual key C2 arrangements which were reaffirmed by both NATO and the UN. It must be added that NATO first seemed inclined to reserve its freedom of choice regarding the time and the targets of the air strikes, but it then agreed to prior political authorization from the UN. Common targeting procedures for the air strikes mission were defined by the two organizations at the beginning of 1994.
The structural situation on the ground, which, as already noted, enabled the Serbs to carry out effective countermeasures, prevented NATO from engaging in a credible and consistent escalation strategy in the case of air strikes as well. In fact, from February to April 1994 the threat of the use of air power by itself did coerce the Serbs to renounce their strangulation strategy against both Sarajevo and Goradze and to comply with the 20-kilometre heavy-weapon exclusion zones around those safe areas established by NATO. The Serbs were also forced to de-escalate their attacks against Bihac. Later on, however, when they renewed their offensive, the actual use of air power by NATO proved ineffective. As a matter of fact, until mid-1995, due to the political and operational constraints described above, Nato's air strikes were executed in a way too limited and occasional to influence the behaviour of the forces engaged in growing violations of the safe areas and the heavy weapons exclusion zones. An additional factor contributing to the erosion of the combined UN-NATO military action was the UN's evident inability to ensure effective control of the heavy weapons left by the Serbs around Sarajevo. The eventual result was the fall of Srebenica and Zepa in July 1995.

In mid-1995, as a response to this dramatic development, remarkable changes were introduced in the structure of the ground force in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in the C2 arrangements regulating the interaction between the UN and NATO. These changes would have far-reaching effects on the overall strategic situation, paving the way for the signing of the Dayton agreement in November 1995.

With the deployment of the mobile and heavily armed Rapid Reaction Force, the overall military capabilities of the ground force were substantially increased. It was now able for the first time to counter effectively the Serbian attacks. Furthermore, its vulnerability was reduced through the implementation of other measures aimed at its reorganization and partial redeployment.
The second crucial move was the decision to give the power to authorize the use of air power directly to the Force commander, while previously the authorization came from the Special Representative of the Security Council. While this decision did not amount to abandoning the ‘dual key’ system, it contributed significantly to reduce some of its shortcomings. It must be noted that the chain of command had already been changed previously, as the Secretary-General had delegated his own right of authorization to the SRSC.

Serbian forces were weakened also by the parallel offensives launched by the forces of the Croatian and Bosnian governments in Western Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Summer of 1995.

These developments allowed NATO and the UN in August-September 1995 to engage in a two-week air campaign against the Serb positions following the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August. In contrast to the previous limited and mostly reactive use of the air power, the operation, called Deliberate Force, was characterized by a massive and pro-active military action on the basis of pre-planned targeting. In order to obtain complete air freedom, a parallel pro-active operation, Dead Eye, was launched against the air defense of the Bosnian Serb army. Air strikes against counter-air systems on the ground had been previously carried out only in response to direct threats to NATO aircraft.

The two combined operations Deliberate Force and Dead Eye succeeded in their strategic objective to coerce the Serbs to withdraw. By changing the situation on the ground, they also made possible the implementation of a more effective diplomatic strategy which eventually led to the Dayton agreement.

3.3. UN-NATO cooperation after Dayton and the problems of the civil-military cooperation
NATO's IFOR mission for the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton agreement was authorized by the UN Security Council with Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995. The political control of the mission was wholly left to the North Atlantic Council which exercised it through NATO's chain of command. Therefore, here again there was a clear-cut distinction between the legitimizing role of the UN and the operational role of NATO.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was responsible for the overall military direction of the operation. The theater commander had to take orders from him, but the rules of engagement empowered him to authorize the use of force if he considered that the situation on the ground so required. Therefore, in contrast to the previous NATO air operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not only was the fundamental requirement of the chain of command of IFOR ensured, but its overall C2 system was sufficiently de-centralized to allow NATO forces to fulfill their mandate successfully.

A second feature of the IFOR mission that distinguished it from the previous military UN-mandated operations in the former Yugoslavia, was the explicit enforcement nature of its mandate. NATO forces were given considerable freedom of action including the use of force in response to attacks or to counter attempts to prevent them from fulfilling their mandate.

The third major feature of the IFOR mission was its limited and clearly defined mandate, which was essentially restricted to the military field. This combination of a limited mandate and a considerable power to act was widely considered within NATO a key condition for the success of the mission. The objective was to avoid dealing with a hybrid mandate characterized by a mix of military and humanitarian goals as was the case of the UN military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As a matter of fact, the IFOR mission accomplished its major tasks within the established deadlines. They included the prevention of a renewed outbreak of the hostilities, the separation of
the armed forces of the Bosnian Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, the transfer of territory between the two entities and the placement of heavy weapons in designated sites.

An assessment of the results of the follow-on NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) mission is not within the scope of this paper. However, it is worth mentioning here that it is characterized by the same fundamental features of IFOR: NATO's authority to perform enforcement action, rules of engagements that allow for a strong response to interference with the implementation of the mandate, unity of command. Given SFOR's smaller size - it is about half IFOR's size - it must be more selective in its engagements in terms of both geographical areas covered and issues addressed. Moreover, the fact that the most urgent and demanding military tasks were already fulfilled by IFOR, makes, to some extent, easier SFOR's job.

From the very beginning, the most controversial aspect of NATO's IFOR mission was its contribution to the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement, i.e. institution- or state-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under the peace plan, IFOR was given the task of creating a secure environment for various organizations and bodies engaged in the civilian field, chief among them the High Representative, who is responsible for the overall coordination of civilian activities. Indeed, IFOR commanders and the High Representative managed to establish successful cooperation which proved of crucial importance especially in the first stages of the operation. This cooperation was promoted, in particular, within the framework of the Joint Military Committee and the Joint Civilian Committee. Furthermore, the liaison arrangements which NATO set up with the various organizations working in the civilian field were also important.

The IFOR mission was not meant to be directly involved either in institution-building or in humanitarian functions as was instead the case for some UN military missions including the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The apprehension about disruptive 'mission creep' - the fear that the mission could be caught up in tasks for which it lacks the resources and the capabilities - voiced particularly by the US, is widely shared within the alliance. Furthermore, the experience of the UN
involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown that the participation in humanitarian activities could easily prevent a military force from developing a credible deterrence policy. At the same time, the separation between the civilian and the military implementation of the Dayton agreement was also aimed at ensuring that, in case of a deterioration of the security environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina which should require the application of force by IFOR, the negative impact on the humanitarian effort was minimized.

This approach has been criticized by those who have underlined the need for closer synergy between military and civilian action in order to ensure the success of the latter. Some have also advocated the establishment of a civilian head of IFOR. This would have resulted in another departure from the principle of the unity of command with the negative implications that have been illustrated above. It must be noted that the prediction made by some analysts claiming that Dayton's arrangements would inevitably led to the emergence of unsurmountable contrasts between IFOR and civilian organizations and agencies have not materialized so far.

On many occasions, NATO officials have emphasized the direct and indirect contribution of IFOR to civilian implementation. This include a variety of activities ranging from the repair and replacement of roads and bridges to the transportation and communication support provided to key offices such as the High Representative and the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees, military protection of the September 1996 elections, assistance for specific community development projects etc.. In order to foster civil-military cooperation NATO has deployed about 350 people - mostly US reservists - specialized in various civilian fields.

The interaction between NATO and the UN within the framework of the implementation of the Dayton agreement has been multi-faceted. In fact, the world organization is involved in several activities directly or through its agencies. One of the most discussed problem has been the level of assistance IFOR should provide to the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). From the very beginning NATO has ruled out IFOR's direct participation in the hunt for indicted war criminals, although it has been repeatedly asked to be more active in this
field. A Memorandum of Understanding aimed at regulating the cooperation between NATO and the ICTY was signed in May 1996. It called for NATO to provide the ICTY teams with adequate security conditions for the accomplishment of their investigative job and to monitor mass grave sites. NATO, however, has maintained its policy of arresting war criminals only if met in the performance of its functions. This attitude has been continuously criticised by some leading figures of the ICTY.

Another critical area was NATO's cooperation with the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) which was given the task of assisting the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Republika Serpska in the re-training, restructuring, and monitoring of their police forces. IFOR was also active in supporting the IPTF's activities, for instance by removing illegal checkpoints and confiscating unauthorized arms. However, many obstacles have complicated the accomplishment of the IPTF's mandate. Its deployment on the ground was quite slow because of the difficulties encountered in recruiting the personnel. Even after the IPTF reached the required size, the process of meeting the required standards for the local police force has proceeded too slowly. This fact has proved to be a significant drawback for the progress of the peace process. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that IPTF's efficiency is a key condition for the success of the overall international operation. In view of these difficulties, some analysts have advocated that a greater NATO contribution to the recruitment of police forces be used for peace support operations.

4. Concluding remarks

As is evident from the preceding discussion, the closer, although often difficult, cooperation that was established between the UN and NATO during the peace support operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is part of a more general trend towards a growing delegation of functions and authority from the overstretched world organization to regional institutions. This trend is, in many respects, promising, but it is not devoid of problems.
Generally speaking, a widely accepted model for effective task-sharing between the UN and regional institutions has not emerged so far. The experience of the international response to the Yugoslav conflict indicates that the simple hierarchical relationship envisioned in the UN Charter can hardly work in practice. In order to be efficient, this relationship should be case-specific, since the capabilities and specialization of the various regional institutions vary across a wide spectrum of possibilities. Moreover, the political relationships the UN has established with the individual regional institutions are also quite different.

Among others, the case of NATO-UN interaction in the former Yugoslavia also revealed the limitations of the so-called 'sub-contracting' model. In the pre-Dayton phase NATO sought a growing freedom of action as a key condition for the successful implementation of the missions it accepted to take over. In the post-Dayton phase, NATO, far from acting as a mere 'sub-contractor', has reserved the right to define by itself the scope and the boundaries of its commitments.

A closely related lesson which can be drawn from the experience of NATO's cooperation with the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that the leading role in managing and conducting a peace support operation should be assigned to one single organization. In general, this is a key prerequisite to realize a well-defined sharing of tasks and responsibilities thus preventing the emergence of tensions among the organizations involved.

The Yugoslav experience has also confirmed the key importance of the unity of command. The existence of two parallel chains of command, as happened with the 'dual key' arrangements, cannot but erode the credibility of military effort. This was particularly true in the case of the UN-NATO interaction, since the two organizations followed quite different conceptual approaches with regard to the use of force.
The successful conduct of a peace support operation in a highly volatile environment, where the consent of the parties is precarious or absent, also requires a constant ability by the deployed force to escalate its military effort if challenged by one or more of the conflicting parties. Particular attention should thus be devoted to the removal of those elements that can undermine this escalation capability. The passage to a more robust enforcement action and the addition of qualitatively new military capabilities often require a substantial restructuring and redeployment of the forces already deployed. In particular, a successful application of air power is difficult to achieve if the ground troops are vulnerable and can easily become targets of retaliation.

In sum, in any given peace support operation, the interaction between its different components should be carefully assessed in advance. The interrelationship between military action and humanitarian assistance is perhaps the thorniest problem. What emerges from the Yugoslav case is that they can easily become mutually blocking undertakings. In order to prevent this outcome, there should be a division of labour among the international institutions based on a clear-cut distinction between military and humanitarian tasks. Moreover, an overall re-evaluation of the mission should be done when either of the two element is added to the other.

Given the difficulties of the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement, one may ask whether NATO could do more in this field. The only 'grey area' where a greater NATO contribution could be envisaged seems to be the training and recruitment of police personnel whose role has proved crucial in some recent peace operations. A standing international capability in this specific sector is not available today. However, the fundamental problem is the absence of effective mechanisms concerning the overall civilian planning of the peace operations. The case of the ongoing operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown that there can is a serious efficiency gap between military and civilian planning. Filling it in is one of the most demanding and least unexplored task that faces the international institutional system.