Emergent democratic citizenship: a study of changing value patterns in Polish society.

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Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 3-5

Chapter I . OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP
a\ The review of basic conceptions of citizenship ................................................................. 6-15
  • citizenship as a result of a legal status of citizens
  • citizenship as a set of institutional-normative arrangements
  • citizenship as a certain mental and cultural structure of individuals and groups
b\ methodological foundations of the analysis of citizenship .............................................. 15-17

Chapter II . RECEPTION OF THE IDEA OF ‘DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP’ IN POLAND
DURING THE 1980s AND 1990s. DIRECTIONS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
a\ Self-devaluating ideas - a brief characteristic of real-socialist order ............................... 18-26
  • The distorted ideal of citizenship
  • The basic mechanisms of real-socialist societal order
b\ The symbolic representation of social resistance in 1980s ............................................. 26-31

Chapter III . POLISH SOCIETY AFTER THE BREAKTHROUGH
a\ Institutional and normative changes in Poland after 1989 (macro- and meso-level analysis of
democratic citizenship) ...................................................................................................... 32-41
b\ Political discourse in Poland on dimensions of „democratic citizenship” ................... 42-48
c\ Social context of democratic citizenship ........................................................................ 48-55

Chapter IV . DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP IN POLAND AND WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES :
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
a\ Democratic citizenship as an element of socio-political and cultural studies on transition to democracy in Poland (dominant models) ......................................................... 56-58
b\ Empirical democratic citizenship ..................................................................................... 58-63

Tables ................................................................................................................................. 64-72
Figures and maps ................................................................................................................ 73-86
References ........................................................................................................................ 87-95

Introduction
The concept of citizenship - the characteristics of the citizen, its rights, duties and role in the given community, and the nature of the community of citizens - has re-emerged as an issue which is central, not only to traditional philosophical or doctrinal disputes over the prerequisites of a socio-political community, but also to concrete systemic questions emerging in Western as well as in Eastern European countries in relation to the growing there social expectations and claims concerning access to democratic institutions, in particularly to welfare services. A closer examination of the sources and nature of this challenge to the modern ideal of citizenship, however, reveals that the planes of discussion ongoing in the West and East of Europe differ in many points. While in the West European societies the focus is put on the improvement of "qualitative" dimension of citizenship (what one may consider in terms: neoliberal policies versus state interventionism policies), in the East European societies - mainly on the "quantitative" aspects of citizenship, that is, on establishing of a set of the basic standards and rules according to the modern ideal of democratic citizenship. If, moreover, one take into account that the modern notion of citizenship has both international and domestic aspects, then the paradigms underlying theoretical and epistemological assumptions of this Report should accentuate similarities as well as dissimilarities between: first - the presumed theoretical model of democratic citizenship and its practical implementation under concrete political, social, cultural and economic conditions, second - the practice of emergent democratic citizenship in Poland and the Western European patterns and norms relating to this issue. These two general cognitive and theoretical assumptions determined the structure of this paper.

Chapter One contains a detailed description of democratic citizenship theories. It begins with a sketch of etymological meaning of "citizenship" and some of its historical connotations. Then, it presents theoretical interpretations of the development and contemporary aspects of the very notion of "citizenship". Considering the prominence of T.H. Marshall’s conceptual framework of citizenship, the chapter reviews the basic characteristics of Marshall’s understanding of citizenship as well as the standard objections to his theory. Most of these criticisms, however, are not regarded as the objectives in themselves, but as an example of various attempts towards the modernization of citizenship model (B.S. Turner, M.Mann and others). Fi-
nally, this chapter includes a brief explanation of methodological foundations of the analysis of democratic citizenship.

Chapter Two discusses political and socio-economic obstacles imposed under real socialism system on the Polish society to its own aspirations and self-development. Such considerations seem to be necessary, if one take into account the obvious fact that every institutional and normative order is not created ex nihilo. On the contrary, different institutional and normative orders are treated as the outcome of evolutionary processes of structural differentiation or nation-specific processes of changes taking place on every level of individual / social activities. Therefore, the structure of the chapter is based on the assumption that an analysis of historical factors determining the present structure of Polish society, its way of political thinking, political culture and behaviours etc., play an important role in adequate understanding of the scope and character of the impact of the past on Polish society.

The main focus of Chapter Three is on demonstrating a number of value patterns and behaviours which have occurred after the collapse of communist regime. More specifically, the ongoing changes will be observed on three levels, that is, on macro-level (constitutional reforms, new set of institutional arrangements), meso-level (party-system, changes in social structure) and, micro-level (patterns of micro-level interrelationships, trends in attitudes towards the main political and socio-economic problems in Poland, perception of selected components of democratic citizenship etc.). The central question of this chapter is whether the state of social consciousness (ergo: the set of attitudes and beliefs prevailing among citizens) can be regarded as a dynamizing factor of „pro-civil” and „pro-democratic” changes or whether it still remains a factor hampering further systemic reforms. It is worth noting that for political scientists, knowledge of public opinion is of crucial importance for the understanding of social consciousness structuralization as well as for the evaluation of demands and decisions in the political arena.

In Chapter Four the stress shifts from domestic towards European dimensions of citizenship. In the comparative perspective, it is assumed that there exists a certain set of attitudes, value systems and behavioural intentions corresponding to the idea of „democratic citizenship”, which can be applied in explanatory model presenting similarities and dissimilarities among European societies. A review of literature on empirical dimension of citizenship in the chapter is aimed at confronting some opin-
ions and remarks about Polish society presented in previous chapter with cross-
national data gathered in modern industrial societies. The priority is given to the 
comparative analysis of three domains (issues) referring to democratic citizenship’s 
development, namely: political participation (including confidence in public institu-
tions), social inequality beliefs and welfare preferences.
Chapter One - Outline of a theory of citizenship

a) The review of basic conceptions of citizenship

- citizenship as a result of a legal status of citizens

In etymological sense, the notion of „citizenship“ and its definitional attributes can be regarded as derivatives of „citizen“. While examining this issue from historical perspective Bryan S. Turner (1990 : 203) noticed that: „The term for citizen was [then - K.D.] derived in classical times from cīvitās , giving rise in Roman times to the notion of a civitātus. This etymological origin provided eventually the French term citoyen from cité, namely an ensemble of citizens enjoying limited rights within a city context. Thus in French we find in the twelfth century the notion of citeaine and eventually in the thirteenth century the notion of comcitien. (...) In English, the notion of a citizen can be detected in the medieval concept of citizen, but at least in the sixteenth century this term was interchangeable with the notion denizen (deisein). This limited notion of the citizen as simply the inhabitant of a city was both extensive and continuous."

Leaving aside a further description of all historical contexts (: political, social, cultural and national) of evolution of the term „citizen“ it is worth noting that the integral part of its contemporary definitions, which one may find in juridical as well as political studies, is set of certain rights and duties belonging to each individual due to his \ her membership of a given state-national community. (Ehrlich, 1979 ; 205-218 ; Banaszak, Preisner, 1993 : 86-98). According to this view the legal status of individual is seen as a ground for establishing of one’s bilateral relations with the state and particular members of the community. Consequently, in most conceptions, citizenship considered as a product of legal status of individuals, has at least four dimensions: the state/community has to contribute the certain individual rights , the individual has to fulfil certain duties towards the state/community, and the individual has the right which other individuals contribute to her/his rights, and the individual has to fulfil certain duties towards other individuals. (Dekker, 1994a : 1)

In the light of the law, the analysis of the rights and duties (ergo : legal status of individual) is strictly related to the very structure and functions of legal norms binding all members of political community. As their characteristic is that the legal norms - by the reference to the notion of „good“ (this what can be - or in some cases must be -
valuable, desirable, worth protection etc.) - play an instrumental role in establishing or protection of the given standards, values and behavioural patterns. This axiological aspect of legal norms can be regarded as an expression of the legislator’s selective approach towards the reality, or in other words - his approval or disapproval of a certain kinds of behaviours and attitudes in the realm of political, economic and societal relations. This, in turn, results in the very structure of legal norms which are bound up with varied types of patterns (norms) referring to the preferable civic behaviours and attitudes. It is presumed here that conceptualised and idealised forms of these behaviours and attitudes create more or less coherent normative idea of citizenship (in a legal sense).

One also has to admit that the patterns mentioned above (being a sort of legally defined ideals of „civic virtues”) are of very importance as a device in legal and socio-political estimation of these behaviours and social facts. In this meaning the idea of „citizenship” is strongly related to the fundamental function of legal norms under democratic regime, that is the establishing of such societal feelings as safety, self-development, freedom and justice. Just like the legal norms, idealised elements of „citizenship” are aimed to create a sort of „rules of fair-play” in public and private spheres. Effective realisation of the objectives pointed above requires a number of different efforts undertaken by political regime associated with policy of law making and strengthening the law. Functional and teleological aspects of this issue are generally expressed by a outfit of methods and means brought into practice by the regime in order to strengthen cognitive and behavioural components of social consciousness (or : individual’s mentality), as for example : obedience and esteem towards legal norms. (see for example : Ehrlich, 1979 : 199 ; Borucka-Arctowa, 1981: 78-84; Winczorek, 1995 : 28, 38)

Undoubtedly, the analysis of „citizenship” in terms of legal status of individuals, as the members of the state-national community is deeply rooted in positivist conceptions of the state of „law and order” (Rechtsstaat, L’Etat de droit). In its initial stage, that is till the first half of 19th century, the pith of these concepts was also compatible with the well-known Anglo-Saxon model of the „rule of law”, and meant that activities of the state as well as citizens were submitted to general rules of law. In accordance with the positivist principles of a legal system and idea of „Rechtsstaat”, one of the most prominent theorists of German positivism Georg Jelli-
nek formulated “theory of statuses”, whose the core was constituted by the following four ideal types:

1. passive status (*status subiectionis*) - based on a submission of individual to the state;
2. negative status (*status libertatis*) - designates a sphere of individual’s activities which are free from the state intervention;
3. positive status (*status civitatis*) - composes a network of compulsory services render by the state to individuals and groups;
4. active status (*status activus*) - within which the influence of individuals on public life and thus their participation in policy making decisions are secured. (Kedzia, 1980 : 92)

However, interpretation of some of Jellinek’s propositions still remains a subject of various discussions and political debates, and furthermore, the impact of his doctrine turned out to be limited mainly to the continental doctrines, his theoretical explanation of interrelations between the legal status of citizens and normative-institutional infrastructure of the state, was developed by many social scholars. In particularly, this question became of primary importance for sociologists and political researchers from the second half of 19th century, when many of them ascertained significant growth of the state power influences as regards regulative and control functions over the basic domains of public life. The extension of state’s regulations brought to light several new questions and controversies with respect to the political, psycho-sociological and moral implications of increasing dependence of citizens on the state for their satisfaction of needs, development of rights and duties as a response to social conflicts and changing standards of living of many new social, and subsequently political actors.

- citizenship as a set of institutional-normative arrangements

In their study on socio-political changes which have been carried out in most Western societies since the Second World War until very recently Desmond S. King and Jeremy Waldron (1988 : 415) observed that: „Citizens in these countries have grown used to a consistent expansion in the state’s provision of goods and services, in particular goods and services associated with the welfare state like education, health, social security and employment. The 1945 election of the Labour party in
Britain is often seen as a watershed in this regard - an emphatic popular endorsement of state planning as a promoter of the collective good through the pursuit of welfare policies and creation of welfare institutions like the National Health Service."

In a similar mode these trends are described by Claus Offe (1995: 226-228), although his study presupposes the determining role of so-called "old paradigm", of which the central factors are: economic growth, distribution and safety. All these factors (objectives) shaped fundamentals of the post-war consensus in Western societies. Moreover, being a part of political strategy the paradigm is strictly related to widely applied in practice in industrial societies model of welfare state (or its German version called sozialer Rechtsstaat). Under conditions of welfare state as well as sozialer Rechtsstaat a citizen is meant both governor and governed. In order to practise this double role it is assumed that citizen must display a minimum of autonomy, sound judgment, loyalty and a broad access to social services and goods. In accordance with doctrinal principle of welfare state strategy (do ut des) political elite took for granted that loyalty could only be expected from persons who made a tangible contribution to the common good and were therefore directly concerned with careful public decision-making and implementation of decision. Citizens within this model perform functions that were traditionally attributed to others or to outsiders. As Herman van Gunsteren (1994: 36-37) argues very important aspect of their citizenship is that the welfare states "strive for citizenship for all people, including those who are not wealthy. They provide welfare facilities that protect the less wealthy from having to give up their independent political judgements and action for the maintenance of their lives, sustenance and other elementary necessities. Social security and welfare assistance are thus the functional equivalents of property as a prerequisite for citizenship. The same goes for arrangements that aim to provide those not belonging to the elite group of property owners with access to the knowledge, culture and organisation that are necessary for the effective practice of citizenship in modern society." (see also: Antoszewski, Herbut, 1995: 29-43)

Analysing the main trends that have occurred in discussion about citizenship one has to keep in mind that the problem of citizenship has emerged as an central issue not only to practical political questions concerning access to health-care systems, education institutions and welfare state, but also to traditional theoretical debates in sociology and history of political ideas over the conditions of socio-political integra-
tion and social solidarity. Citizenship as an institution is thus constituent of the socio-political community.

These aspects of debates on citizenship are inseparably associated with an analysis of the conceptual framework of citizenship in the work of Tom H. Marshall. The initial idea for his theory of citizenship was developed in ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, published originally in 1949. It was further developed in ‘Social Policy’ (1965), where he addressed the question of the evolution of welfare policies in Britain between approximately 1890 and 1945 as a specific example of the growth of social rights. Finally, he proposed a theory of capitalist society as a ‘hyphenated society’ in ‘The Right to Welfare and Other Essay’ (1981) in which there are inevitable tensions among a capitalist economy, a welfare state and the requirements of the modern state. Marshall was thus primarily concerned with the social-welfare history of Britain between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries in terms of the growth of citizenship as expressed in three dimensions namely, the civil, the political and the social.

In an essay entitled ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ Marshall defined citizenship in the following terms:

“Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed….. Citizenship requires a ... direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law. Its growth is stimulated by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won.” (Marshall, 1964 : 84,92)

Marshall differentiated among three dimensions of citizenship rights and the institutions which supported them. The first one comprised civil rights: that is, those rights concerning individual freedom which were associated with the sphere of ‘civil society’ (: freedom of speech, rights to a fair trial and equal access to the legal system, the right to own property etc.). The second dimension comprised political rights, that is, democratic rights of participation: „the right to participate in the exercise of
political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such body”. The institutions of representative democracy (Parliament and the electoral system) are central to the realization and maintenance of these political rights. Finally, he drew attention in the twentieth century to the expansion of social rights which were the basis of claims to welfare and which established entitlements to social security in periods of unemployment, sickness and distress. Welfare state policies and institutions - the educational system and the social services - are the main expression of this third layer.

Generally speaking, one may argue that the essence of Marshall’s theory comprised the idea that „by providing civil rights, society mitigates the impact of force and violence in relations between people. By providing political rights, it ensures that power is not confined to an elite. And by providing minimum standards in these areas the state offsets the vagaries of market processes and corrects the gross inequalities of distribution arising from the market.” (King and Waldron, 1988: 419).

Marshall’s view of citizenship particularly influenced the works of Reinhard Bendix, Ralf Dahrendorf, Ronald Dore, Seymour M. Lipset, Peter Townsend and many others (see, for example: Lipset, 1973; Turner, 1986; Mann, 1987). The basic assumptions of his model remain strong nowadays and are adopted by a number of theorists who despite some elements of criticism attempt to use Marshall’s concept of citizenship, and thus propose a broader and more innovative analysis of citizenship (such as: Michael Mann, 1987: 339-354; Maurice Roche, 1987: 363: 399; Bryan S. Turner, 1990: 189-217; 1993: 1-17; M.L. Harrison, 1990: 209-213; Peter Saunders, 1993: 57-89).

Regarding citizenship as a ruling class strategy for containing class conflict, Mann (ibidem) suggests that the British case represents only one of several such strategies. In his view liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, Fascist and authoritarian socialist strategies of citizenship have been pursued with some measure of success. He argues that their survival or failure to survive has not been primarily a result of their relative success in containing class conflict. Rather it has been a consequence of victory or defeat in a war.

In turn, Turner (1990) takes a different approach to the historical development of citizenship, suggesting that its character depends on two crucial variables. First, it depends on whether citizenship has been developed from above, that is, by the
state, or from below, for example by the labour movement. Secondly, it depends on whether citizenship is seen as active and public or as passive and private. This suggests four types of citizenship each of them corresponding to a particular type of democratic polity.

Turner's ideal-typical construction of citizenship applied to specific cases:

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<tr>
<td>Revolutionary French tradition</td>
<td>Passive English case + public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American liberalism</td>
<td>German fascism - space</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Turner, 1990 : scheme presented on p. 209)

In paper from 1993 Turner developed his concept of citizenship, of which starting point was based on the ascertainment of global developments in the organisation of modern societies - on the one hand, and changes ongoing in the relationship between human beings and nature - on the other. By focusing on these processes Turner defined citizenship „as set of practices (juridical, political, economic and culture) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups”. (1993 :2) As a consequence of this definition he claimed that citizenship is concerned with the following issues: (a) the content of social rights and obligations; (b) with the form or type of such obligations and rights; (c) with the social forces that produce such practices; and finally (d) with the various social arrangements whereby such benefits are distributed to different sectors of a society. (1993 :3)

In this outline of a theory of citizenship, it is important to stress that both legal and institutional aspects of citizenship situate this notion systematically in terms of psycho-sociological grounds of the present-day actions exercised by both individuals and state agencies. Forms and methods of these activities, however, extensively go beyond state or juridical definition of citizenship as merely an organisation of rights and duties. From the perspective of social and political membership of citizens, analysis of citizenship requires to take into account the whole range of cognitions, intentions and behaviours of the individual as a member of given social and political community.

- citizenship as a certain mental and cultural structure of individuals and groups
My intention in developing this particular perspective of citizenship is to emphasize the determining role of social consciousness in the rise of modern citizenship, or in other words in practices of individuals regarded as competent, responsible and active citizens. This includes the knowledge, insights, beliefs, opinions, preferences, attitudes, values, behavioural patterns and behaviour of individuals acting as the members of socio-political entities. The importance and heuristic value of this dimension of citizenship lies in the fact that it provides us with necessary details related to correct orientation in the continuum which embraces the past, present and future. In the words of one prominent researcher: "Political analysis is the study of changes in the shape and composition of value patterns of society." (Lasswell, 1977: 137).

All the mentioned categories become a part of political culture of given socio-political community and, thus, they create an ideal image of what citizenship / citizen(s) should be. In this meaning the core is the behaviour; other components are seen as more or less supportive for that behaviour. Thus, psycho-sociological concept of citizenship implies several analytical questions concerning for example: political competence or political literacy of individuals, identity of individuals, and their mental and cultural grounds for participation in public life etc. In this sense citizenship can be considered as "a way of thinking and feeling that acts as an anchor in situating oneself in society", and is an answer to the question, "Who am I?" and "What should I do?", when posed in the public sphere. (Dekker, 1994a: 2; 1994b: 11-12) Empirical studies show that citizenship in the political-psychological sense of the words, is sometimes contrary to legal citizenship.

The impact of the described phenomena is very crucial if one takes into consideration that political culture is defined by boundaries which are reflected in the minds and hearts of people living between these boundaries. Boundaries form the framework of each sovereign to influence people’s behaviour (by law, institutions, organisations and associations of civil society, educational system etc.). Living together inside the same boundaries has a strong impact on what people believe, think, find good or bad, on their ethical and aesthetical standards as well as on how they communicate and interact. (see: Kalberg, 1993: 91-114; Wehling, 1996: 53).
While discussing the importance of value systems in shaping the ideal of citizenship one has also to pay attention to theoretical and practical consequences stemming from the exaggeration of the causative role of this factor. In his study G. van Gunsteren (1994: 40) put this question in the following way:

“(…) the quality of civil democracy depends upon such matters as civic-mindedness, religion, education in democratic rules or the development of a public ethic. A total absence of these things means that democracy cannot exist. To embrace them too intensely, however, would mean the same. (…)”

Appeals for responsibility and civic-mindedness serve little purpose. Civic-mindedness will not arise, nor develop, by being called for. Civic-mindedness, legitimacy and public support arise as a by-product generated by other activities and events. They do not come into existence by directing our will, intention or manipulation towards them. The desire is contrary to the nature of the desired result, just as is the case with the will to fall asleep or the yearning to be spontaneous.” (also see: Baier, 1993: 228-248; Dupré, 1993: 687-712; Dahrendorf, 1994: 10-19)

There is no doubt that erroneously understood idea of citizenship may actually lead to many deformations and pathological events in public life. In particularly, these remarks seem to be crucial as concerns conditions created by totalitarian regimes as well as efforts made by some post-communist elites striving to „speed up” the process of consciousness transformation. (this issue will be discussed further in chapter II and III).

Because of these facts and for the analytical purpose I assume - following the conceptions and definitions described above - that citizenship is a form of individual’s cognitive and normative attitude and associated with it his / her patterns of activities, which among other things are expressed by interrelations between an individual and community (private and public sphere), one’s spontaneously accepted obligation to act for the benefit of this community, and the sense of self-limitation in exercising his / her rights and duties. As an element of collective consciousness citizenship manifests itself in legal, societal, moral and cultural acknowledgement of equal status of all persons, their equality under law, and the endowment of each person with set of rights and liberties, which ensure his / her wishing for freedom and self-development. In this sense, democratic citizenship is a syntheses of many elements implying institutional and le-
gal infrastructure of given democratic order as well as related to it mental and cultural characteristics, which are usually described in such terms as „legal citizen”, „democratic character”, „civic culture”, „public activities” etc.

**b\ methodological foundations of the analysis of citizenship**

The analysis, presented in detail below, presupposes that structuralization of citizenship is understood as a process of interactions and mutual influences between objective and subjective factors. This necessitates a distinction between various levels of the existence of structure of citizenship, and this can be used to examine its internal structure and functional relations with the environment as well as ontological aspects of its components. In accordance with the studies on citizenship presented above, which includes also modern theoretical approaches (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Putnam, 1995; Fukuyama, 1996). I assume that there exists a certain degree of interrelatedness and mutual determining influences between the values of citizenship and the given normative-institutional order. From this point of view, one may distinguish three levels at which the above-mentioned phenomena are observed:

First - the level of constitutional order (macro), which constitutes a framework and normative (legal) context for all actions undertaken at meso- and micro-levels. Generally, this is the level on which behavioural patterns (norms, procedures, and permitted forms of activity) are established.

Second - the collective level (meso-), at which collective choices are made (political parties, associations, trade unions, groups etc.). The changes in the political-administrative and social structures, i.e. institutional changes, are located at this level.

Third - the operational level, or the level of social interaction in everyday life. The dynamics of changes, which take place on this level, is determined by the activity of social microstructures (family, neighbours), and individuals. As this is the level at which the effects of policy and change in policy become visible, it can be said that the formulation of values and norms underlying citizenship usually assumes the form of „situational” definitions. More specifically, one might say that opinions and preferences of individuals with reference to such terms (values) as „rights and duties”, „participation”, „civic virtues”, „democracy” etc., are closely related to the surround-
ing events, i.e. the terms operate in more empirical and instrumental forms. Additional features of this type of value are internal incoherence and relativism.

Undoubtedly, any analysis of the mentioned categories must be based on adequate understanding of their meaning and, subsequently, of the functional interdependency among the categories (values) themselves as well as the overall structure of socio-economic, political and cultural subsystems.

An explanatory model of keywords and concepts relating to structure of citizenship regarded as component of two types of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of democratic order</th>
<th>representative democracy</th>
<th>participatory democracy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>Communitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of societal organisation</td>
<td>association</td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human nature is</td>
<td>autonomous</td>
<td>social and political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis for societal organisation</td>
<td>social contract</td>
<td>intertwined with neighbours and other members of social, cultural, ethnical, religious groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in public life</td>
<td>voting, political participation is restricted to the choices of decision-makers ; instrumental forms of activity</td>
<td>voting, decision-making, maximum political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main purpose</td>
<td>safeguarding of one's private interests</td>
<td>acquisition of collective consciousness , integration of individuals in the community ; common good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation of undertaken actions</td>
<td>protection of one's autonomy (against interference from government or society)</td>
<td>development of civic virtues and democratic citizenship competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual identity</td>
<td>horizontal form (deinstitutionalization of religion, non-conformity)</td>
<td>vertical form (stress on relationship between individuals and norms, values, symbols, developed by the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual rights and duties</td>
<td>the „legal citizen“ is seen as the bearer of his/her rights ;</td>
<td>individual rights are contextually defined and are placed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
duties are restrictions of freedom in the background; duties, being obligations, are brought to the fore

| Ideal citizen: | voter | decision-maker |


Analytically, this approach implies both historical (contextual) and structural analysis. Although my purpose is to contribute to the clarification of the issue of democratic citizenship in Poland, I do not attempt to form universal conclusions or to speculate about the future development in Poland’s political system as well as its political culture. The complexity of the undergoing processes and the fragility of most systemic solutions served as a powerful check on such considerations.
Chapter Two - Reception of the idea of ‘democratic citizenship’ in Poland during the 1980s and 1990s. Directions of political discourse.

Self-devaluating ideas - a brief characteristic of real-socialist order.

- The distorted ideal of citizenship.

Democracy, pluralism, freedom and social market economy have become basic ideas and principles in the reforms of the system, as initiated in Poland in 1989. Being normative patterns of the new political and socio-economic order, they are often regarded as symbolic representation of ongoing transformation, contrasting with the monocentric order and with the centrally planned economy. In practice, their function is to re-establish the authentic forms of public life and rapid departure from the communist ideal of „etatistic homogenisation” of the whole society. (Misztal, 1993: 455). Their motivational role is to serve as stimulus in order to give rise to new behavioural patterns and value orientations, and thus to create new forms of relationships among individuals, society and state.

In a sense, the absorption of these liberal-democratic values by the new ruling elite can be regarded as a „natural way” of finding new axiological principles of modernisation, as many people take it to be the most radical departure from the discredited ideology of communism. Undoubtedly, for many people it became clear that „the modernisation of the socialist system”, undertaken by so-called party-reformers, met with serious difficulties, and was practically blocked by ideological tenets, such as centralism and supremacy of a single political agency (the state-party), collective ownership of the means of production, centralisation of regulative and distributive functions in the hands of the state, etc. Many analysts of the communist system claim that, apart from growing contradictions generated by „the economy of shortage” and by the low efficiency of political and economic managerial structures, one of the main sources of the breakdown of the communist system was the exhaustion of symbolic devices that had been legitimised its normative and institutional order. (Barghoorn, 1969 : 450 ; Rychard, 1991 : 60-61 ; Marody, 1992).

The basic characteristics of real-socialist system are well described in many foreign and domestic studies (see, for example : Nisbet, 1962 ; Kolakowski, 1976 ; Matthews, 1978 ; Hirschowicz, 1986 ; Rychard, 1987 ; Staniszkis, 1989 ; Wnuk-Lipinski, 1993), so there is no need to repeat them all here. However, it is worth noting that ideologically defined political culture as well as institutional order of real socialism promoted
a peculiar form of citizenship, of which the core was composed of a set of aggregated values ("class", "nation", "state", "party"). Objectified in the socio-political reality, each of these values took the form of "class identity", "collective co-operation", "collective interest" or "loyalty to state party".

Though its political activities varied in intensity, the communist regime launched a widespread assault on traditional value orientations. As to the past, in the opinion of the regime it was necessary and justified to dismantle the traditional value-generating institutions (churches, communities, associations, families, social movements and local organisations). The regime stigmatised and persecuted the values and relations of the previous economic and socio-political system, as a result driving them underground; this included the norms and values relating to private property, market activities, and personal autonomy, freedom and responsibility. According to the ideological dogma, the patterns ("old civic virtues") were to be replaced by communist norms and rules, among which the following were the most important: collective discipline, altruism, revolutionary consciousness and sacrifice for the party-state’s sake. (Volgyes, 1975: 29-30; Hankiss, 1990: 207).

Instrumentalization of value system turned out to be one of the most significant elements in the process of decision making. This, in turn, made it possible for the communist regime to keep full control over each form of public activity and to shape the political discourse. By combining repression with negotiation the regime neither established constitutional and legal opportunities for exercising civil rights nor it provided real political citizenship (though it provided some institutions of social citizenship). Civil liberties under the communist social order were preserved as long as they were used in support of the existing regime, otherwise they were limited or entirely suspended. Thus, an individual who supported that order (or - more precisely - who supported the ruling state-party leadership) could enjoy his/her civil rights, but an individual who did not support the order usually was deprived of his/her civil rights. A study done in Poland in 1983/84 showed that this kind of inequity resulted in a source of strong sense of deprivation for over 80% of skilled workers and engineers employed in big enterprises. (Koralewicz, Wnuk-Lipinski, 1988).

On the group level the political inequity was expressed in the fact that the right to associate was infringed upon. Only those associations were permitted existing in public life whose activities were not directed against the ruling regime. So there were
limits not only for institutionalised representation and the defence of political interests of various groups, but also to the very emergence and survival of such groups which did not fit to the image of „political interests“ of regime.

- The basic mechanisms of real-socialist societal order.

Retrospective analysis of Poland’s political development indicates that because of the genuine dangers to the national sovereignty, and because of partitions and occupation by foreign powers, Polish political culture on a societal level was dominated by norms and values related to the organic concept of society. In this concept society was characterised by strong links with an idealised nation-state. For many years the issue of how to regain the national sovereignty constituted the core of various political programmes, formulated by the main Polish political and social movements. Under these conditions there was no room for the Anglo-Saxon concept of civil society, based on the principle of autonomous local public bodies and on a clear distinction between political and civil society, i.e. between the public and the private interest. The need to preserve the national identity, exemplified mainly by the Roman Catholic Church with its traditional values, petrified a community of the organic type. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, despite the nascent capitalism in the 19th and 20th century, the idea of the national interest remained the supreme criterion for all political and social activities. Moreover, the reception of the liberal ideas, which constituted the cultural background of the modern politics in the West, was hampered by the weakness of the middle class and the underdevelopment of cities. The mentioned influence of the Catholic Church on political culture in Poland and a mythologization of the state have contributed to the peculiar political consciousness of the Poles, which Marcin Król called a corporatist way of thinking about politics. This type of consciousness means, as Król explained it, that in Poland „the idea of citizenship was intertwined with belonging to the nation (...) In the life of an individual it was more important to guard the fulfilment of the national duties of the fellow citizens and oneself, than the individualistic actions. It was this attitude which hampered capitalist developments in Polish lands“. (Król, 1993 : 2).

Reliance on national ideology played on the one hand a crucial role in maintaining a high degree of national mobilisation against the „invaders“ (positive function). But, on the other hand, it often led to the promotion of nationalism as a basis of indi-
vidual/group loyalty and to a closed ethno-national form of community (negative function). Political and social implications of this process were summed up by G. Schöpflin (1990: 75) as follows: "(...) nationalism as a political doctrine provided answers to very few questions of political organisation and the distribution of power. It created strong identities and a sense of belonging to the state - for members of the dominant group - but said nothing about political structures, the resolution of conflicts of interest, the allocation of resources and values, participation and representation, i.e. the day-to-day problems of political, economic and social life. If anything, by stressing a transcendental vision of politics, in which implicitly all members of the nation shared a near identical view of the political elements of nationhood, nationalism came close to denying the need for intermediate institutions between the state and the individual, and state and society."

The disjunction between the slow but gradual development of capitalist relationships in Poland’s economy and value system, generated by political and socio-cultural sub-systems, seems to be an important fact hampering individualisation and establishment of autonomy of various segments within Polish society. Under these circumstances structuralization of political consciousness led to a permanent tension: values and motivation related to the functioning of the market economy (economic criteria of one’s achievement, individualism based on ownership) contrasted with societal homogenisation, motivated ideologically or politically. Even when Poland, as the nation state, was re-established after the World War I, the dominance of the national value orientation forced on the society a process of homogenisation that forced out most of the democratic forms of citizen identity. As H. Dekker (1994b: 20) observed, the status and political consciousness of citizens “was marked by subordination rather than possession of a set of democratic political, economic and cultural rights”.

The very political language of the ‘Sanacja’ political camp in the interwar period was permeated with this corporatist spirit. A similar attitude can be also found in the language of the other influential political formation of interwar Poland - led by the Marshall Pilsudski. The political discourse of this camp was composed of moralistic slogans calling for national unity, improvement of understanding by citizens of their public obligations, implementing a state of commonwealth and motivating citizens to undertake collective efforts for the sake of a moral revival of the nation. The public
duties of the citizens prevailed in that discourse over the rights of individual and legal protection of citizens against state power. The state was perceived in a mythologized way and was defined in terms of conservative moralistic philosophy of the superior goodness and organic commonwealth. The idea of the „fatherland” overshadowed the concept of a state of law and liberties of citizens and other values so important in modern British or French liberalism. (Jablonksi, 1996 : 41)

In its specific way, the practices of state socialism in Poland strengthened these negative tendencies. Considering the main purpose of this paper, it seems to be justified to emphasize these elements of state-socialism societal order, which have had a significant impact on value orientation and behavioural patterns of Polish society.

It can be assumed that the most critical institutional principle of state socialism was that society as a whole was run „as a single organisation via relationships of command and subordination”. Thereby the autonomy of the state party vis-á-vis society was secured by the exclusion from the social and political scene all other forms of power and by its claims to „legitimacy from the top”. (Misztal, 1993 : 455). The legitimacy was based on the communist bureaucracies’ claim of possessing „a superior truth”, on a monopoly with relation to political discourse. Thus „their truth could not be falsified by reality, their commands were always correct, their tasks could never fail by their shortcomings”. (di Palma, 1991 : 57). Independent intellectuals were replaced by party bureaucrats who acknowledged themselves as a form of „collective mind”, i.e. a supra-individual rationality. (see : Kennedy, 1992 : 30-58).

A closed circle of decision makers, directly or indirectly, affected the formulation of esoteric forms of political communication. Deprived of authentic public life, the citizens were forced to behave according to the rules and norms imposed on them by the paternalistic state. The institutional structure of the system induced - on the collective level - a peculiar form of socio-political relations, which were characteristic of an atomised mass society. Its distinctive feature was the dualistic structure of societal self identification („we” - „they”), which, in turn, involved „ethical dualism” : standards and rules observed in „our” group were invalid with respect to „them”. In addition, because of the lack of crystallised political interests, the goals of collective activities were set by the reference to the ideal vision of „normal life”, the shape of which was defined by fundamental social values such as freedom, justice, equality and the general affluence. All these attitudes and expectations were associated with
phenomena, frequently reported in sociological studies, such as social mimicry and a strong tendency towards levelling of socio-economic differences.

On the whole, the impact of the communist order on structures of societal system had predominantly a levelling effect. But a serious limitation of freedom was a price to be paid for this outcome. As E. Parkin pointed out: "Egalitarianism seems to require a political system in which the state is able continually to hold in check those social and occupational groups which, by virtue of their skills or education or personal attributes, might otherwise attempt to stake claims to a disproportionate share of society's rewards. The most effective way of holding such groups in check is by denying them the right to organize politically, or in other words, to undermine social equality." (quoted from: Wnuk-Lipinski, 1990: 324)

The social policy of communist regime was aimed at achieving equality of conditions rather than equality of opportunity. Due to economic constraints it was generally a process of equalizing downward: low salaries were accompanied by cheap food, housing and transport, free education, health care etc. Nearly all resources were concentrated under state control, and the redistribution of resources followed the political priorities of the ruling elite: stabilisation of the system, forced industrialisation, reproduction of manpower, social peace, full employment policy, social security. So in this period, social policy was an integral part of more general domestic policy orientated towards a total reconstruction of society. The socialist state possessed a range of policy instruments to ensure that all "deserving citizens" enjoyed at least a minimum standard of living. These included price controls and subsidies which were intended to reduce the price of floor goods. To be sure, in the communist system, the political and economic elite - the nomenklatura - enjoyed a wide range of privileges. In general, these privileges, involved access to goods or services not available to the population at large. (Ferge, 1991; Habuda, 1992: 33-53). But, at the same time, many other social and occupational groups also enjoyed some of these privileges. It produced an illusion that the regime was not the only one of incumbents participating in 'extraordinary distribution' of goods.

However, it would be naive to assume that real-socialism contributed to the growth of "citizenship" in any sense of Marshallian theory. It must be stressed here that although social rights under socialism may have reduced risk and insecurity, they did little to enrich civilised life, being low level and eventually of the last resort.
Thus, the collective as well as individual aspects of social rights, the provision for society as a whole and for individual instances, was rejected.

The destruction of political society, the negation of the public sphere, and finally the accommodation between the party state and the society produced a huge clientele system. Interpreting this phenomenon G. Ekiert argues that: „clientele networks” relied, in a selective and arbitrary way, on distribution of privileges and resources in exchange of political compliance or withdrawal from politics. „The party-state targeted intellectuals, professionals and selected groups of highly concentrated and educated workers (miners, steel workers and shipyard workers) with higher salaries and special privileges. Such practices caused the corrosion of law, demoralisation and a widespread sense of moral crisis in all segments of society.” (Ekiert, 1991 : 303-304)

In the 1980s, the research findings focused on this issue seem to point to the existence of two fundamentally different axiological opinions in the Polish population. The first and at the same time the most common one (nearly 50% of the national sample) singled out the structure of power as a source of illegitimate privileges. The second opinion (which was much less common - 12% of the national sample) was the perception of the socialist market as a source of undeserved privileges. There was also the third option which located the source of illegitimate privileges in various pathological micro structures (‘cliquess’), but this option was rather marginal (4%).

Analysing these findings E. Wnuk-Lipinski (1990 : 326) noticed that: „People have learned from common experience that money is not the most important regulator in the distribution mechanism. This function, at least partially, was taken over by position in the power structure, while distribution itself was regulated by the enigmatic sultanic principle: „to each according to his functional usefulness to the system”. The data suggest that this principle and the redistribution mechanism working on its basis were not only commonly visible - in spite of the hidden process of distribution - but also generally questioned. In other words, the major cause of economic inequities was located here.

| Here table 1, 2 |
This type of a generalised sense of relative deprivation was especially widespread among professionals, skilled workers, owners, members of „Solidarity” of middle age and residing in cities. The results of empirical studies are absolutely explicit as regards social groups’ assessment of opportunities to influence policies through participation in the existing socio-political organisations or use official channels and procedures. The existence of such opportunities was pointed out by about 6% of respondents in 1985. Characteristically, among the relatively few respondents who in general admitted the existence of possibility to influence the policies by the ordinary people, the largest number (13.2%) pointed at more productive and thorough work as the form of this influence. In other survey held in 1984 as many as 72.8% of respondents - when asked: „What do you think about the elections to people’s councils?“ Do you think that people should go to the polls?” - answered in a way which indicated that they attached no importance to that form of participation in political life and depreciated it as a political fact and a social event. What was interesting though was the fact that at the same time over 80% of respondents said they believed people should turn out at the polls. Therefore one can say that for more than 50% of respondents, the only reason for taking part in the elections was the fact they were being held.

Of course the motives which made people participate in the officially established forms of political life are more complex and include both the sense of civil duty as well as fear of presumed political sanctions. However, irrespective of the different motives for such participation what was common for statements by respondents was the denial of its political significance. The area of officially established forms of political life under real-socialism was perceived as a domain governed by customary norms, an area for rituals in which participants play roles designed for them in some other dimension of reality.

The perception of politics as the exclusive domain of authorities was accompanied by low level of interest in official political life, small knowledge concerning official political events as well as by absence of political beliefs declared by a majority (61.5) of respondents. (Marody, 1991: 134-147)

There is not sufficient data to estimate precisely to what extent rules and norms of state socialism were interiorized by particular sections of Polish society. It can be said, however, that a series of worker’s protests in 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980, and
the 1968 social unrest, led by students and intellectuals, clearly showed that the communist regime was not successful in establishing an expected degree of loyalty and obedience. Accumulation of societal discontent undermined the normative foundations of the structure of state socialism; thus it became the main source of an open legitimacy crisis in Polish society.

The analysis carried out in 1984 revealed a remarkably high level of social acceptance of the view that the system did not function in accordance to universal moral norms, such as justice, legal equality, respect for human dignity, etc. There was a widespread opinion that the above values had been frequently violated by the communist regime. Many respondents indicated that there was a huge discrepancy between systemic rules and political practice. (Jasinska-Kania, 1990 : 267-292)

b\ The symbolic representation of social resistance in 1980s.

When examining the reconstruction of citizenship in Poland G. Kolankiewicz (1992 : 141-158) rightly pointed out that, whereas in the Marshall sequence civil rights predated political rights, in the case of Poland’s road to democratic citizenship one may notice that the establishment of industrial and social rights such as existed under real socialism was the platform of trade unionism that was used to press for civil rights. The feelings of growing deprivation and the moral rejection of political practice exercised by the regime gave rise to first dissident groups. For many years, however, the Catholic Church had been the sole legally acting institution which put forward a coherent and extensive vision of a “just and democratic society”, and which was opposed to communist ideas. Acting under conditions of strong pressure of materialistic values, the Church attempted to focus the public opinion on the values and norms relating primarily to spiritual and moral spheres.

Thanks to its symbolic representation of social defiance, the Church became one of the most influential public institutions after the collapse of the socialist system. It is against the background of a normative vacuum following this historic event that one should interpret the position taken by the Church with respect to spiritual, social and political problems affecting the whole society. For many political and social groups religious fundamentalism seemed to be a remedy for materialistic values. This, however, triggered opposite reactions, especially among young people and high-educated and liberally oriented groups. It can be thus said that the policy of the
Church after 1989 led to mixed social feelings. The surveys by CBOS (Centre for Social Opinion Research) in 1993 reported the percentage of respondents that evaluate positively the activity of the Church decreased from 74% in 1991, through 48% in mid-1992, to 40% in August 1993. (Serwis Informacyjny CBOS 11\1993 : 67)

Between 1956 and the mid-1970’s, the most articulate criticisms of Communist policies came from the intellectuals. The writers, scholars, and artists did not constitute an organised group, but through their frequent interactions they formed a closely-knit milieu. Generally, they denounced the restrictions on cultural freedom, but they also condemned some especially flagrant abuses of human rights. The intellectuals’ proposals for reforms, however, stayed within the limits of Communist system, for they were resigned to the fact that it could not be changed. Moreover, their criticisms were often constrained by their own past: most of them had been leftists, and many also had formerly been members of the ruling PUWP. Having assumed that it was still possible to achieve a „true” form of socialism, dissidents addressed their grievances to the party-state. Also, they believed that the working class consciousness is a kind of „creative power” to arrange a new just order. Such efforts were developed in the mid-1970’s by three well-known figures in Poland’s public life nowadays, namely: Adam Michnik, Karol Modzelewski and Jacek Kuron.

In March 1965 J. Kuron in common with K. Modzelewski advocated a program of „workers’ democracy” , as a new version of political and social democracy based on production units (the workers’ councils were curbed by W. Gomulka in 1958). In their famous Open letter to the Party in 1965 and program on workers’ control in 1969, Kuron and Modzelewski opted for transition to system, in which: „(...) the working class must organize itself along multiparty lines. In practice, a workers’ multiparty system means the right of every political group that has its base in working class to publish its own paper, to propagate its own program through mass-media, to organize cadres of activists and agitators - that is, to form a party. A workers’ multiparty system requires freedom of speech, press and association, the abolition of preventive censorship, full freedom of scholarly research, of literary and artistic creativity. (...)”

The working class character of multiparty system would follow from the nature of the State power, organised as a system of councils. This means that parties seeking
to influence the centre of political power would be obliged to win influence among workers."

Although, in an article written in 1974 Kuron upheld his view on „socialism” as a „respectable” idea for dissidence, the erosion of positive feelings towards this form of governance became more evidence. Dissidents (including Kuron himself) criticised the system because it produced a permanent destruction of all social relations and because it tended to disregard the national traditions. Interpreting the functioning system in terms of „totalitarianism”, they came to the conclusion that it led to a moral and cultural atrophy. Simultaneously, they were in favour of the very idea of socialism system, pointing at its achievements in such areas as free health services, wide educational opportunities, moderate egalitarianism, and the possibilities for social advancement. (Hemmerling, Nadolski, 1991).

In the mid-1970’s the overall political situation in Poland changed significantly as a result of a number of factors. To begin with, in the eyes of many Poles, the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe reduced the chances that the USSR would intervene in Poland as it had taken place in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Carter Administration’s early pronouncements about human rights heartened them as well. There were also a few „internal” factors which contributed to the establishment of oppositional groups.

The first signs of open dissent started in the mid-1970’s, following Gierek’s move to amend the Poland’s constitution and consecrate both the leading role of Polish United Workers’ Party and the friendship with the USSR. On 5 December 1975 the so-called Manifesto of 59’ addressed to Parliament by Professor Edward Lipinski and other intellectuals contained political complaints and demands for civil liberties. In June 1976, a sound but clumsy attempt at price increases, without consultation, led to workers riots in Ursus and Radom. Subsequent repression induced the signatories of the Manifesto of 59’ to set up, on September 23rd, 1976, a Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR - Komitet Obrony Robotników), linking representatives of intelligentsia and workers. However, KOR was aimed primarily to help those repressed by the regime, it also played a significant political role in inspiring many irregular groups to self-organising. In October 1977 KOR re-emerged as a wider Committee for Social Self-Defence (KSS KOR).
The other circle of opposition was formed in 1977 by A. Czuma and L. Moczulski as a secret Movement for Independence (NN - Nurt Niepodleglosciowy). The members of NN, unlike KOR, claimed that real socialism was completely „irreformable”, and for that reason it had to be smashed. Some of them, under the leadership of Moczulski, in September 1977 formed a new political organisation, that is, Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN - Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej). Emphasizing the importance of such values as independence, solidarity, democracy and tolerance for a „creative development of Polish society”, KPN opted for a model of state, in which „it was necessary to establish social justice and virtual equality of all citizens”.

The process of the organisation of social defiance against communist regime comprised also many other political movements, such as the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO), Peasants’ Self-Defence Committee, Student Solidarity Committees. Except Movement for Independence, all these organisations were self-limiting in their strategic goals and non-violent. The focus of movement actions was socio-cultural, rather than economic and strictly political. The distinctive feature of their programmes was that they stressed universalistic values and they did not assume to take over the power. Worthy of note was the reappearance, by the end of 1970’s, of an idea of „Free Trade Union”, which for the first time was practically founded during the riots in December 1970.

The combination of economic crisis and political ferment turned into a deep political crisis in the summer of 1980. As a result of long standing negotiations, in August 1980, a new self-managed independent „Solidarity Union” was officially recognised and registered. Legal recognition of Solidarity meant that new forms of self-liberation of Polish society were opened. At Solidarity’s peak in 1980-1981, ten million men and women gathered in public and embraced one another in a great whirling euphoria of liberty. Participation in Solidarity was for most of them their first taste of common activity in a common cause. It was a first step toward participation in the civic life of the national community. For the first time, from 1945, many groups were becoming citizens in their own state.

Leaving aside a further analysis of all socio-economic and political events that occurred within the 1980s, the following phenomena seemed to have decisive impact on direction of changes ongoing in Poland during this period:
Though, the martial law in December 1981, instituted by W. Jaruzelski temporarily „saved” socialism from its total disintegration, retrospectively, the use of constraint entailed a distinct power asymmetry between the state and society. The social perception, and then, rationalisation of this process in the following years, above all, generated a moral response to treat „the society” and „the state” in terms of „right and wrong”. The moral rejection of political institutions of the state /or in terms of Arato’s (1991) study: the announcement of the idea of civil society against the state/, however, strengthened in social consciousness a historical image of the state (politics) as an area of immoral and anti-societal behaviours and activities. In practice, these views have been hampered the democratic reconstruction of political system in Poland since 1989.

By the end of 1988, there ensued a further development of internal structures of Solidarity. The extension of „Underground Solidarity” encouraged many people to manifest their disapproval of the existing system, what took shape of a number of social protests, even after the repeal of martial law in 1985. As regards the issues and concerns formulated by Solidarity in the 1980’s, one has to admit that it is difficult to link them with any consistent model of class interest, class concerns or class identities. The focus of the movement was on the issues concerning political freedom, national sovereignty, democracy, human dignity, justice, citizenship, human rights, constitutional legalism, as well as the traditional „class issues” of wages and working conditions. (Pakulski, 1993: 139). Solidarity became a symbol for various political groups (except the faction of ultraliberals led by J. Korwin-Mikke), what in turn, considerably obfuscated their own political and ideological image. This policy intensified during the first non-communist the Mazowiecki and the Bielecki governments. Briefly, there occurred a sharp conflict between two options: syndicalism and liberalism.

Among specific to that decade value changes, taking place within the social consciousness, particularly important was the failure of socialist project of socio-economic order which was accompanied by the transition towards the views accepting some criteria of market-oriented basis of social stratification. Although, the proportion of persons living below the poverty line, in 1983, rose to 27,2 per cent (in the 1960s and 1970s it oscillated between 15 to 20 per cent), and decreased again in the following years to 16,3 per cent in 1989 (Danecki, 1993: 49), sociological studies
discovered that, by the late 1980s, there was a higher support - in comparison with 1960s and 1970s - among people to justify some of the areas of poverty as “deserved”. (Nowak, 1986; Zaborowski, 1989; Turski, 1989; Kolarska-Bobinska, 1989). It is necessary to notice that the acceptance of market mechanisms was built upon the idealised model of Western European economies, that is, on the belief of their efficacy and capacity to maintain high standards of living for all people.

here: table 3, 4; figure 1
Chapter Three - Polish society after the breakthrough.

Institutional and normative changes in Poland after 1989 (macro- and meso-level analysis of democratic citizenship).

Due to the structural (socio-economic and ideological) conditions inherited from the past, in Poland (like in many other post-communist countries) the state found itself under the necessity of being the chief modernizer of the economic, legal and political order. This means that the state remains largely responsible for building a new legal order and a new polycentric social order as well as for securing an effective free market economy. Regarding this fact one may argue that Poland’s road to democracy, pluralism and market economy clearly differs from most of western systemic changes. This is also contrary to liberal-democratic constitutional principles which restrict the active role of the state, particularly in the economic sphere. From the comparative perspective it can be said that reforms initiated in Poland after 1989 have much in common with so-called „Prussian’s road to capitalism”.

Considering the fundamental role of the state it is possible to define Polish attempts to build socio-economic infrastructure of a market economy as attempts to establish capitalism „from above” (or by „design”), that is capitalism which is designed and implemented by the state apparatus. In order to establish effective economic and political institutions, however, the state has to act in conjunction with several segments of society, and thus, it has to create new patterns of co-operation among them - on the one hand, and between them and the state itself - on the other. Despite these difficulties, equally important from the West European perspective seems to be the fact, which Ph. Schmitter put into the following words : „The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union find themselves in a dramatically more difficult situation. Not only must many of the institutions of pricing, credit, monetary policy, collective bargaining, consumer protection, and the like, be created \textit{ex nihilo}, but this must be done at the same time that key political arrangements are being chosen. (...) It is important to stress that the problematic relationship between capitalism and democracy - ‘necessary, but necessarily modified’ - is structural. It stems from the root difference between a polity that distributes power and status relatively unequally. This poses a dilemma no matter how well the economic system is performing at given moment.” (Schmitter, 1994 :67)
The basic system transformation of the state is best expressed by the changes in the character and the functioning of the law. The new state constitution withdrew from real-socialist model of law and order, and moved towards a democracy under the rule of law. It articles sets out the basis for citizenry. It refers to the rule of law, Poland as a democratic state, and the implementation of principles which provide for society of citizens. The new legal system, in terms of content as well as function, provides the foundation for such principles as: freedom to establish political parties (and consequently - multiparty system), protection of property and inheritance, freedom of economic development and local self-governance. Legal rules also legitimize a division of functions, interests and responsibilities within the political system, including competing parties, free elections, and the emergent functional differentiation of parliament, government and president. The state guarantees the participation of local governments in wielding authority and freedom to activate other forms of self-government. (Kurczewska, Bojar, 1995: 146-149). All these constitutional settlements, however, did not meet with public acceptance, primarily due to the sharp critical estimates formulated by the Church and Solidarity. One of the basic objections of these organisations to the Constitution is its „anti-religious and anti-national character”. Not surprisingly, that such arguments made the public opinion chaotic and divided, what was expressed by the clear division of society into supporters of parliamentary project of Constitution and its opponents (associated mainly with church and Solidarity).

The next issue to be raised is that the departure from single party system in 1989 led to the formation of almost 300 parties (data from 1996) entered into the register of Regional Court in Warsaw. There is also a number of groupings active in the background of mainstream political movements. The number of parties does not rule out the strength of traditional political movements. The contours of Poland’s political map, still lacking clear division lines and well articulated programs, are characterised by powerful post-communist and socialism orientated movements, increasingly significant national movements, slightly increasing popularity of conservatism, syndicalist and minority formations. The parties of the new plural order represent a very
broad spectrum of ideological and political positions. Until October 1991 the majority of the new parties were closely identified with Solidarity, its programmes and ethos. During the period of 1991-1993, this a little bit „artificial” unity, however, became much more disintegrated. Nevertheless, that process did not create the familiar and enduring political divisions into the left, right and centre so characteristic as it takes place in western democracies.

The split, and proceeding fragmentation of the Solidarity brought about bafflement of the very voters. In the first competitive parliamentary election to Sejm (the lower chamber of Parliament) in 27 October 1991 almost sixty parties and organisations (not mentioning regional ones) participated. The voters, had to choose among the christian-democratic, socialist, liberal, national-catholic, agrarian, conservative, ecologist and nationalist-patriotic orientations, knowing a little what it really meant. It is rather obvious that those political divisions only partially coincided with the main political cleavages. Additionally, there were several parties within one orientation. In this situation the majority of voters could find no guidelines in either interest or tradition to help them make their choice. Similar symptoms are also observed in 1993 parliamentary election.

In some sense, such a polarisation of political forces within the Parliament was a „natural” consequence of adoption of the electoral system based on proportional representation. It is no wonder, then, that most eligible voters stayed at home: the turnout in the October 1991 election was a mere 43,4 percent, almost 20 percent less than in the first round of presidential balloting a year earlier. Similar figures were noted during elections in September 1993 (51,5 percent). The substantial difference between those two elections is that there are only 6 political parties acting in Sejm (previously - 29). Analysing these events A. Antoszewski (1996 : 165) noticed that: „no large social group (the only but partial exception is peasantry) has supported one party and, on the other hand, no party is named as the political representative of a given social group.”
The democratisation and pluralisation of public life has enabled the propagation of the ideas to some extent suppressed by communist authorities - e.g. nationalism, intolerance for minorities, domination of Christian values in public life and so on. One may get the impression that they have dominated since 1989. In addition, the majority of parties and leaders present themselves as the representatives of the Right. But this „rightness” refers to morality, nationalism, clericalism and the need of maintaining the tradition rather than addressing economic issues (Union of Real Politics, led by J. Korwin-Mikke is the exception). To start with, most of these values are the expression of anti-communism and the willingness to throw away the communist past. Since the rightist political thought had no chance to be developed under communist regime, it has returned to collective consciousness in unmodernised, pre-war, very traditional form (Schöpflin, 1991 : 238). Therefore, so long as the anticommunist feeling is strong, the nationalism and clericalism treated as the opposition to the communist past may shape the political attitudes of significant part of Polish society.

While discussing the sources of political as well as social confusion after the collapse of state socialism, many researches stress that when Solidarity came to power it experienced serious troubles with its own identity, i.e. with the implementation of its programme in the new circumstances. As the cross-class movement, Solidarity strove to persuade the citizens that the objectives of its programme had been set up in everyone’s interests, and targeted equally to workers, peasants, intellectuals and entrepreneurs-to-be. In D.Ost’s opinion : “(...) Solidarity began its postcommunist life as a very strange interest group indeed : arguing that the interests of its members were best served by accepting deep sacrifices on behalf of a class that did not even exist, in return for benefits that it was hoped - and only hoped - would accrue in the future.” (Ost, 1993 : 465) Likewise, this issue is interpreted by K. Kumar, who notices that : „What Solidarity was able to provide, on a heroic scale, was the structure and practice of social movement whose hallmarks were national mobilisation and monolithic solidarity”. (Kumar, 1992 : 387)
Not surprisingly that under conditions of „normative vacuum”, which resulted from the collapse of real-socialist ideological values as well as from the break-down of Solidarity ethos, one of the most influential public institutions turned out to be the Roman-Catholic Church. As in the whole political history of Poland, the Church actively has taken part from the beginning of systemic reforms in mental, cultural and political life of Poles. Above all, it plays considerable role in the process of political socialization, appealing for the subordination of the law to Christian values. The moralistic standpoint of the Catholic Church was pointed out in the interview of prelate H. Jankowski for the daily Rzeczpospolita; „The Church requires that state order and all life of political community should be in an accord with the rules of the Christian social order.” (Jankowski, 1993 : 10).

The Church officials have participated in the discussion on the new constitution. They have demanded, among others, invocatio Dei, concordat, freedom of teaching religion in public schools and the penalty of abortion as the constitutional norms. Polish episcopacy has firmly opposed against the separation of the state and the Church. Its commitment to the constitutional debate has been tantamount to the support for Solidarity draft of the constitution, based on social teaching of the Church. As A. Smolar (1994 : 80) suggests after the 1993 election, „thanks to its subsidiary parties, the Church has imposed on the country a very restrictive anti-abortion law, respect for Christian values, a tacit censorship of radio and television programming, as well as an indirect limitation of the right to divorce”. Both the value system and institutional arrangements propagated by the Church are aimed to establish in Poland a new public morality and normative foundations of community, of which principles are very often opposed to liberal-democratic ideals of citizenship and civil society. It is no wonder, then, that the objectives of Church’s policy have been meeting with social and political resistance, especially from liberal-oriented, educated and young Poles.

| here figure 4, 5 |

Both, the failure of Solidarity’s idea of civil society and the loss of identity patterns of a new community, brought about a peculiar understanding of politics regarded as an arena of opportunities and self-development of citizens. As M. Marody (1991 :
136) points out, Poles still perceive politics „as the art of managing rather than governing the society with all domains of social life being subject to political decisions”. In other words, it is seen as a set of external decisions rather than the process in which every citizen may take a part.

In the light of data offered by successive releases of public opinion polls one could easily see that a substantial part of the Polish society perceived a „real politics of interests” with growing discontent. In the period since 1990 through to 1993 public opinion polls were reporting a continuous decline in the positive image of politics, political leaders and political institutions. The Polish political scene, said one eminent sociologist, „...is actually perceived as a source of conflicts and destabilization (...) society is watching political conflicts with uneasiness and is afraid that they may threaten the living conditions of the people.” (Kolarska-Bobinska, 1994 : 11). Taking the existing evidence it seems true that a breakdown of ethical-moral values of early phase of postcommunism and a shift toward the „politics as a marketplace” created division lines in the formerly integrated anti-totalitarian political culture. One line of division has been drawn between the weakening culture of the „Solidarity ethos” and the strengthening culture of real adversary politics, consisting of numerous political conflicts, particular political ambitions of the leaders and egoistic motivations of interest groups and parties. In many cases, today’s ethos groups are being copied by groups which, in contrast to their predecessors, are focused solely on political goals alien to the new, democratic political arena.

The described phenomena are accompanied by the low level of interest in politics, shallow knowledge of political phenomena and processes, and mixed opinion about the idea of democracy. As empirical studies show, for a small minority, democracy has brought political rights and liberties such as freedom of speech, to form an association, and the possibility of taking part in public affairs. But for various reasons, among them the growing feeling of pauperisation, deprivation etc. - these achievements remain unimportant for a large part of Polish society. (this issue will be discussed in further part of the chapter).
Some researchers also pay attention to the mental and cultural heritage of real socialism, that is, to behaviours and way of thinking implying the term *homo sovieticus*. By using this term in arbitrary way in studies analysing transformation of political consciousness in Poland, some of them would like to reduce this very complicated process to the discrepancy between liberal attitudes (pro-reform attitudes) and *homo sovieticus* attitudes (anti-liberal and anti-reform attitudes). This way of thinking is also very often employed in politics, and in fact it obscures the basis of the public discussion about the system of values, thus it obscures the essence of the public dispute as to the desired model of the normative-constitutional order in Poland. Furthermore, on the basis of observations of political life in Poland, it can be argued that the characteristics of *homo sovieticus* (e.g., opportunism, variability of political views, willingness for making decisions on behalf of society, etc.) can be applied in equal degree to groups longing for the old regime as well as to some new political elites. As to the latter, there is ample evidence that political rhetoric and style of politics of some post-solidarity elites have much in common with discredited, and often being criticised by these elites, doctrinaire thinking about social and political problems (for instance: the reluctance of some politicians to the anti-abortion referendum testifies to it, focus on lustration or de-communisation as the best remedy for all aberrations of public life). This opinion converges with another more general view, expressed by W. Sokolewicz, who rightly noticed that most political elites in Poland lack the habit of functioning within the democratic order and especially, of acting in accordance with the procedures typical of democratic system. „(...) in a situation where democratic custom is still in the making, the range of acts regulated by provisions of law has to be broader. If, for instance, the law fails to ban combinations of certain posts or types of activity, very foolish ideas are likely to emerge, frequently defended with considerable effect by the refrain: «What I’m. doing is nobody’s business, since the law doesn’t prohibit such conduct»” (Sokolewicz, 1995 : 261)

Another type of behaviour is the „defensive adjustment“, which is still practised in every-day life, despite its negative consequences for macro-social integration and social self-organisation. Many citizens, and many groups formed for the purpose of intervention, try to benefit their place of residence or work by forming informal relationships with, and within, state institutions and public organisations in order to speed up the bureaucratic procedures and be treated better than others. And al-
though access to institutions and organisations is much easier nowadays than it used to be under real socialism, many individuals and social groups still habitually look for „access” and connections, forgetting that they could arrange their business formally, with no bother at all.

Concluding, it can be said that the gap between the value systems created by „the world of politics” and „the world of individuals”, being petrified during the period of communism, has remained or - as some researchers argue - has even broadened. Three years after the successful abolition of the totalitarian institutions as few as 7% of the Poles were of opinion that they would like to participate in public life, while 86% expressed the view that they would like to be well-governed. (Glinski, 1993a : 3) The delegitimization of political elites, the withdrawal from political participation - all these facts has shown that there was , and still is, a serious conflict between the preferred macro-level order and its perception by different sections of society. This estimation seems not to be exaggerated : the public opinion surveys have shown since 1995 the durable decline of trust in basic public institutions in Poland, such as Parliament (Sejm), army, local authorities and government.

Having confronted these surveys with the results of empirical studies, which had been carried out in the period of 1992 - 1996, one may come to the conclusion that there is still a widespread uncertainty and irresolution among Poles on whether the democracy is a sufficient form of ruling or not.

The low level of constructive political participation in Polish society seems to be particularly striking given extensive social participation in democratic and anti-totalitarian movements in some periods of their struggle for power, and also given the quite considerable attendance at a variety of current public protest manifestations. What should be mentioned separately, though, is the fact that - in contrast with the former mass participation of citizens in routine public life under real socialism - the present freedom includes freedom not to participate also. (Sokolewicz, 1995 : 260-
On the other hand, however, it must be taken into account that such passive attitudes, even if they are rationally motivated, do not create a fixed basis for further development of many civic virtues (for instance: self-responsibility, knowledge about political processes, ability to participate in public debates etc.).

Searching for an explanation of these difficult and complex phenomena, some Polish political scientists stress that both, the feeling of distrust and the lack of positive, constant image of public institutions should be regarded as the evidence of increasing disapproval of economic and political changes which have been introduced since 1989. (Reykowski, 1993: 41-42). But, they also can be perceived as a sign of fundamental change in collective understanding of politics and its meaning for individuals. As A. Smolar (1994: 81) remarked, the people start to believe that „their lives depend less and less on the political scene” and „politics no longer fills the people with great dread or great hope”. Despite the basic democratic institutions and civil rights which have been established during last eight years, the large part of Polish society get the feeling of the loss and alienation under the rules of democratic order. CBOS surveys have revealed a strong correlation between the negative attitudes toward democratic values and all those persons who feel the pain of transition. This concerns in the first place: pensioners, less educated, women and inhabitants of under-developed regions of country (eastern and south-eastern regions of Poland). On the contrary to these groups, the findings have noted that „pro-democratic” attitudes mostly occurred among representatives of such groups as young people, high-educated, managers, skilled workers and inhabitants of big towns.

The answers given by participants of the survey to the questions constitute prima facie a basis to formulate a conclusion that approval for the term „democracy” is a feature of attitudes displayed by the most segments of Polish society. This means that the majority of society agrees to basic mechanisms and rules of democratic order. A more detailed analysis of the character of the questions reveal, however, several inconsistencies as regards cognitive and behavioural attitudes. Such ambiguous conclusions spring, for example, from the survey conducted by J. Garlicki in 1992, on a sample group of 578 people including 303 students from Warsaw col-
leges and universities, and 275 students from Warsaw secondary schools. According to J. Garlicki (1994: 170): “(..) many of the declared pluralists are, at the same time, ardent defenders of tradition, ready to sacrifice some aspects of freedom of speech. The group of pluralist-traditionalists accounts for a total of 59.3% of the population. For comparison, the consistent pluralists who are really tolerant, and who would not like to sacrifice the freedom of speech for the sake of tradition constitute a group of less than 20% (the exact number is 19.4%). On the other hand, there is 5.5% of clear separatist-traditionalists. The figures presented may prove a certain social personality split of the young people. The majority of them display declarative support for pluralism, under which they hide traditionalism and reluctance to foreign ideas. The latter being stronger than their devotion to the freedom of speech.” (see also: Ulinski, 1994: 150-161)

According to authors of other socio-political studies (Wnuk-Lipinski, 1990; Kolarska-Bobinska, 1991; Holly, 1994; Rose and Makkai, 1995; McDonough, 1995) it should be more appropriate to speak of the implementation rather than consolidation of democracy in Poland. There are still many symptoms for that democratization is seen by a large part of society as a process „from above” rather than active ‘self-education”. Although, such attitudes may be regarded as a „side-effect” of systemic transformation in Poland, one has to keep in mind that they create a good ground for establishing the model of liberal-democratic citizenship as well as of authoritarian or paternalistic forms of policy. As important as the legal changes is thus the adjustment of the Polish political culture to European norms with their respect for pluralism, individualism, and tolerance. Different institutional solutions can well function successfully within one and the same political culture - yet one and the same institution functioning in the environment of different cultures may have entirely different effect.

It should be also taken into account that pro- or anti-democratic attitudes are - to some extend - declarations of respondents, and that at the most general level. The problem of whether these declarations find positive (or : negative) confirmation in behaviours of the given social and political groups is a subject matter for further analyses or - at the very most - of worthless speculation.

b\ Political discourse in Poland on dimensions of „democratic citizenship”
1989 was a turning point for Polish political life. The legacy of the communist Poland in the sphere of ideas, system conceptions and the rules of social life was rejected, which, however, did not guarantee a total rupture with the past or an automatic appearance of new meanings and values in political culture or of new modes of categorising and discussing reality.

Having analysed the programmes of Polish political parties it becomes obvious that these programmes can not be regarded as the definitive criterion of social approval and scope of the given political party. It could be taken as a rule that the programmes appeal to the general, not to say sketchy, principles and norms, their addressee is the whole of the society, not a particular social group. The programmes of that kind include set of slogans which are directed to everyone: pensioners, farmers, workers, youth, unemployed, women, and unescorted mothers. The vision of citizenship is formulated turbidly and schematically without pointing at its normative, social and institutional basis. These programmes often lack internal coherence and logic. In the programmes of the Right there predominate ideological and axiological declarations, whereas in the social-economic questions there are a lot of populism, and paradoxically leftist ideas of state and society. Next, the Left, concentrated upon universal, moral and political values, refers to the free-market rules in the field of economy, willingly uses such terms as: democratic rule-of-law state or social market economy. (Paszkiewicz, 1996: 8-9)

It has been already mentioned that the lack of clarity of ideological identity of Polish political parties does not allow to use the terms: „the right”, „the center” and „the left”, in their pure sense. The political arena in Poland is bipolar, that is, there are two main camps: the post-Solidarity and post-communist. This division is constituted by the historical factors, and unables the voters’ identification based on the clearly precised structural purposes, proclaimed by these parties. The lack of obvious of coherence between the party aims and specified interests of the society can be particularly observed in the instance of the party situated from the Right to the Centre of political arena. This sort of parties readily define themselves as the rightist parties, what emphasise not exactly the character of their political and social programme, but their distance to very term „left”, which is identified with the real socialism system. First of all, it concerns post-Solidarity camp, which makes a lot efforts create its political image with reference to tradition, slogans and symbols. To a small
degree the parties being the part of this camp (apart from the Union for Freedom (UF), and leftist Union for Labour (UL.)) take into consideration the questions connected with the dynamics of changes in the society, that is progressive differentiation of classes and groups.

Then, so-called post-communist parties (the Social-Democracy of Polish Republic (SDPR) and the Polish Peasant Party (PPP)) are distinguished by more accurate bond and the feeling of specific union. The historical origins of these parties make the part of society perceive them as the instance of ideological and political mimicry, what is the reason why the credibility of the mentioned parties as the democratic civil order’s participants is much lowered.

The matter connected with relating the democratic and pro-market reconstruction to the idea of democratic citizenship was exposed especially by the liberal parties, among which the most important are: the Union for Freedom and the Union for Real Politics (URP). The active party members of the UF recognise establishment of the ‘rule of law’ as the first step towards political reconstruction of Poland’s system. According to the interpretation of this principle it should permeate every sphere of public life and must expand civil rights and liberties. Defining individual freedom as the „indivisible and intransferable good” the UF argue that the position of the individual in the State political structure should be reinforced. One of the ways proposed by the UF in which this idea could be realised is decentralisation of the governmental form and development of different means of social control on the political institutions’ activities. This party pays a lot of attention to the issue of how to enlarge the institutional and juridical infrastructure of mass participation in political making decisions. The results of these actions must be: first development of the citizens’ independent initiatives (civil society), the growth of civil competence and the feelings of one’s identification with given community (town, region, nation). The most important role in the process of civic education is performed by self-governments. In the Programmatic Resolution formulated by the UF (May 1991) it is stated that „The State decentralisation claims existing multilevel and non-hierarchical local government, which is competent and has the real possibility to create economic policy”. (Uchwala Programowa Zjazdu Zjednoczeniowego UD, 1991; also see: Rezolucja Krajowej Konferencji...,1993). Reduction of the State activity’s area proposed by this party should be treated as the firm step towards making the liberal conception of freedom be real,
that is, the limitation or constraint and the enlargement of freedom’s sphere of responsibility.

In the Programme of UF (1993) (Program UD, 1993) its authors excluded the possibility of analysing relation between individual and state in terms of the interests contradiction or “fight for area of influence”. It could be read in mentioned document that the value which ought to unite this arrangement is the „common good”, while the state is perceived as an important institution in daily life of citizens, performing significant function in the field of politics, social relation and national culture. The State presence in these domains is generated by the universal principle do ut des, whose conceptual form is expressed by the idea of „State subsidiarity” and „the rule-of-law state”. The latter is described as a state which ensures citizens for common equality to the law, and absolute freedom to exercise their rights and liberties. In the party documents, however, there can be found only foggy remarks on such important questions concerning governmental form as for example: the degree of citizen’s subordination towards the state, relation between property right and social justice, or between „individual good” and „common national good”. Having carefully analysed the programmatic papers of UF one can point at effect that inside of this party there shaped three programmatic – political options proclaiming different projects of civil order: liberal-conservative, social-liberal and christian-democratic.

Opinions of near resemblance these mentioned above were held by the Liberal-Democratic Congress (LDC) - the party which, in conjunction with the UF, formed the Union for Freedom in 1994. Among Polish parties of that period the LDC was the one which postulated most that State law order and international standards should be linked together. The LDC wished the legacy ensuring priority of international law over internal one to be incorporated into Polish legal system. That rule was supposed to embody de-regulation of individual rights and liberties. The LDC stressed stronger than the UD that market rules took precedence of moral and political norms. According to the programme of the LDC economy was to be primary domain before civil society which, in turn, should be primary to the government. In that „self-governing society” there existed urgent need to state general rules that is legal norms, which were to uphold inviolability of the individual intransferable subjective rights. Stressing, property right as the first and most important one. (see: Deklaracja
The political conception of the UF are particularly estimated by high-educated persons, the young (pupils and students), private owners, and inhabitants of big towns.

The most radical programmatic slogans, however, are proclaimed by the URP. This party constantly defends the conceptions formulated by F.A. Hayek, M. Friedman, R. Nozick. According to the party’s leader J. Korwin-Mikke democracy is not *sine qua non* of liberal order. It is held by the URP that the most urgent thing to be done is the market reconstruction based on the principle of unlimited private property right. One of the party’s purposes is to reduce the taxes and - in the future - to establish the sole tax, which ought to be equal for everyone, that is, so-called *per capita* tax. The URP stands in strong opposition to any State intervention in the economic and social field, which leads this party to an apologetics of *laissez-faire* policies. The party’s expression of the citizen idea embraces the Smithonian *homo oeconomicus* conception. (see: *Program liberalów*, 1983; Korwin-Mikke, 1990; *Program gospodarczy UPR*, 1990). The URP’s programme is chiefly approved by young people (especially by students), intelligentsia, and private owners. (Dziubka, 1994: 145-166; Dziubka, 1996: 163-186)

Many elements of political and economic liberal were also accepted by the conservative parties. It needs, however, to be emphasised that the term „conservatism” can be applied widely and is connected with certain moral-political attitude towards such domains of social life as „morality, religion, family, tradition, culture etc. Making use of different philosophical systems this sort of parties present miscellaneous and sometimes opposed opinions on detailed principles, norms and organizational forms of the field mentioned above. This situation, in turn, causes big fragmentarization of the whole political current. Being concentrated upon one or several chosen values determining the life of community, the conservative parties represent extensive spectrum of ideological and philosophical trends, among which, the most important place is taken by: christian-democratic (The Agreement of Center, The Christian Democracy - Labour Party, The Christian-Democrats Party), national-Catholic (The Popular Christian Party, Movement for Poland’s Restoration, The Christian-National Union), national-democratic (The Confederation for Independent Poland, The New
Democracy), syndicalistic-christian (the Electoral Action „Solidarity”), liberal-conservative (the Conservative-Monarchist Club, the Conservative Coalition, the Conservative Party, the Movement of „100”), and national (the Polish National Community) and others.

In public discourse on the systemic transformation in Poland these parties recognise as the most significant question the exact cooperation among three elements of the public life’s organisation, that is state - nation - individual. The factors to connect these elements are: christian (religion) or national values (tradition and culture). Political order has to be based upon the idea of strong and active state realising the interest of the whole nation and collaborating with the Catholic Church in this field. The programmes of these parties insist on superiority of the national interests over the individual ones, what generate exposing the citizens’ duties towards national community and, in particular, recognising the primary status of the collective life’s norms and principles over the individual ones. (Tezy programowe KPN, 1992 ; Uchwały III Kongresu PV, 1994 ; Program Stronnictwa Narodowego....., 1991 ; Deklaracja programowa IV Zjazdu Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego, 1995 ; Deklaracja ideowa Tradycjonalistyczno-Konserwatywnego.....,1995)

In this connection the liberal idea of the separation between the Church and the State and the liberal concept of liberal freedom are totally rejected. The basic reference system to the individual rights and liberties is not exactly constituted by the statute law, but the transcendental law of nature, which is located higher in the law hierarchy and determines the purview and functions of the public laws. These natural laws define also the character of interpersonal and social bonds. In accordance with conservative philosophy it is proved that religion is not only one of the most significant kinds of community bonds, but keeps guard over moral order as well. In this connection, one may argue that religion should be treated as a source of moral restoration of the society, what comes into great prominence in the conditions of the post-communist atomised society. These conceptions usually go together with very aggressive rhetoric, the symptoms of which are the demands of decommunization and lustration. Decommunization and lustration are treated as a precondition for the construction of „the new, truly democratic society”. In the social economic sphere these parties (excluding the conservative liberal ones) proclaim the necessity of defending domestic capital from „the invasion of the foreign capital”, and furthermore,
they see the need for protective State activity and State support for the extensive social provisions. This makes the conservative parties be approved by different social groups what allows to name them as the „catch-all parties”, known in the Western European party systems. The ultra-faction of the conservative (nationalist) current is represented by small political groupings as: the Polish National Community (leading by B. Tejkowski) or, tending towards fascism, the Polish National Front (its leader J. Bryczkowski). Both of these parties proclaimed that Polish governmental form should be replaced by the specific system based on the *Führerprinzip* rule. Moreover, they argue that individuals should be subordinated to „will of nation” and the purity and separateness of Polish culture must be maintained etc.; there often appear anti-Semitic, anti-Russian and anti-German slogans. These parties are hostile to the European rules of collective life, because of its tending towards „weakening the patriotic feelings” and, „the cultural purity” of the particular nations, consolidation of the big nations’ hegemony over the small ones etc. The electorate of these parties is composed of the young. (Polska Wspólnota Narodowa. Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe : Zalozenia...,1990)

The significant place in public discussion on the forms of citizenship is taken by **social-democratic (socialist) movement**. On the political arena this current is represented by a dozen or so parties, among which the most important are: the Social Democracy of Polish Republic, the Union for Labour, and the Polish Socialist Party. These groupings willingly refer to Western European patterns of „welfare state” and a State interventionism. They emphasise that political democracy cannot develop without social and economic ones. In accordance with their opinion the State duty is to ensure social protection for the poorest social groups. Criticising the liberal projects of economic reforms SDPR and the UL. argue that social justice and equality have the same importance for self-development of individuals as the property rights and freedom. This questions were raised during the discussion on the project of Constitution by the UL. This party wished variety of social and economic legal norms (for example: cost-free education, health protection, State policy of full employment etc - art. 64-76 of the Constitution) to be constitutionally ensured. The social equality rule is perceived as „a system warranting all the individuals the practicability of equal start”. For the UL. leader R. Bujak it means to ensure every individual the chance to take, according to her \ his talents, the correct position independently of her \ his
material situation. (Leszczynski, 1994 : 24). The external symptoms of connecting political rights with social and economic ones are also proposals to transmit the civic powers to the level of factories in the shape of workers' self-governing and to increase the competence of trade unions in the private sector.

It is worth noticing that the social-democratic parties disapprove of certain acts passed by the Parliament which, according to them, have designs against the fundamental civil rights and liberties, for example: the anti-abortion law, inclusion of religion lessons into public schools programmes, the concordat. Those parties explicitly pronounce for the State neutrality in the philosophy of life, demanding the State not to use the means of the criminal and administrative law to execute moral norms proclaimed by the Catholic church. In the programmes of these parties it is often stress that the State institutions should ensure all the citizens the right to free religious observances and worship. (Program społeczno-gospodarczy Socjaldemokracji..., 1991; Uchwala programowa UP.....1993 : 6,7; Program Socjaldemokracji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej., 1997)

c Social context of democratic citizenship

When looking for factors which played a role in the emergence and evolution of social dimension of civil society K. Poznanski ascertained that: „With the death of traditional Communist ideology, many post-communist political forces of Eastern Europe have instinctively embraced the philosophy of liberalism. The liberal doctrine of freedom is favoured since it appears to many people as the most decisive departure from the discredited ideology of Communism. Moreover, the ideas of liberalism appear most consistent with the recent effort to quickly rebuild a capitalist economy and its foundations - private ownership and freedom of enterprise.” (Poznanski, 1992 : 89)

Emphasizing the strategic importance of liberal values for the success of reforms of the Polish political and economic system, the proponents of this option argued that implementation of liberal values patterns is indispensable in the reconstruction of entrepreneurial ethos and civic values inherent in liberal democracy. Additional arguments for rapid and wholesale assimilation of legal and institutional standards adopted by modern liberal states in the Polish political order stem from the political
decision to join, as soon as possible, the structures of the European Community and NATO.

Analytically, the Poland’s transition to a new socio-economic order brought about at least two central questions:

first - to what degree a set of new rules and norms implying capitalist liberal market have been acquired by the particular groups of the Polish society and, furthermore, whether an ideal of socio-economic order preferred by these groups is compatible with basic objectives of reforms ongoing in Poland?

second - what are the structural premises of democratic citizenship?

According to three succeeding governments of Mazowiecki and Bielecki and Suchocka, private property was the best form of property, and as Bielecki said: „It must be the only one form of ownership structure in Poland’s economy.” The focus on private property as the chief objective of governmental policy was expressed by the „fast track” of privatisation program elaborated by the government. The additional argument supported this policy was the lack of domestic small and middle bourgeoisie, that is, the group regarded as a one of basic elements of „the genuine civil society”. (Staniszkis, 1992 : 180). The main dilemma of the socio-economic reforms, which brought to the light very soon, was the fact that each attempt toward acceleration of the process of economic and social polarisation of Polish society had been strictly associated with growing impoverishment of many social sections. If aggregate income is constrained, or is falling, gains to some must imply losses to others. Therefore, not surprisingly that there appeared various symptoms of social unrest or, even, of open opposition to the aims and measures of the policy implemented by the political elites.

From the very beginning of the introduction of market rules, there appeared a typical syndrome of a „hopelessness”, especially amongst those groups who were afraid of changes and did not accept the reduction of a size of social state-protection, and at the same time - the syndrome of an „entrepreneur”, with a capital of faith in his \ her own abilities. A study done in Poland in 1990\1991 showed that none of the social and occupational groups among the urban population was free from the sense of poverty threat, even those working on their own account. (see : Beskid, 1992). The process of impoverishment has mostly affected the middle-income strata. This is best shown in the ratio of average income to the minimum subsistence
level, accepted in Poland as the most adequate criterion of poverty. Compared with 1989 figures, in three quarters of 1991 the ratio fell from 1.78 per cent to 1.32 per cent in employees' households, from 1.90 per cent to 1.25 per cent in workers-farmers’ households, from 2.06 per cent to 1.11 per cent in farmers' households, and from 1.39 per cent to 1.30 per cent in old age and invalid pensioners’ households. (data is taken from: Danecki, 1993: 48-49).

During the first two years of „the shock-therapy” the sphere of poverty distinctly extended. In comparison with 1989, the data from 1991 indicates that the percentage of persons living in poverty in employees’ households rose from 14.9 to 37.4 per cent and in the households of pensioners from 27.4 to 33.9 per cent. The percentage of people living in families with income less than 70 per cent of the social minimum (i.e. at the level allowing for subsistence) rose during these two years in employees’ households from 4.9 to 14.0 per cent and for pensioners from 10.7 per cent to 13.3 per cent.

The considerable fall of living standards of the Poles within the years 1990-1993, brought about the revival of an „old” axiological dilemma, being usually an integral part of policy making decisions process, namely freedom and \ or equality (or in other words: political citizenship and social citizenship). Although, in many political doctrines this issue is often described in terms of freedom versus equality (as for instance in neoliberalism and libertarianism), it seems to be justified to argue that both of them play crucial role in harmonising and keeping the balance among competing interests and needs within the plural society. Calling for one or the other value individuals often manifest - in this way - their own ideals of such normative and institutional patterns as democracy, justice, character of interpersonal relations within the given community etc.

The relationship between these two values is presented by OBOP’ (Centre for Public Opinion Research) findings, which were carried out from 1988 to 1993. The data indicate that the growth of public support for equality is closely related to such negative side-effects of economic changes as: frustration, deprivation and pauperisation of many social groups.

here : figure 15
The research conducted by the same staff (OBOP) in 1993 revealed that the social acceptance of „freedom” was strongly associated with an expectation of equal rights and equal opportunities for each person. The investigation also showed that the principle of justice became one of the most important criteria of the individual’s evaluation of social and political reality.

It must be stressed here that these empirical results do not indicate that there existed a popular support for levelling disproportion and inequalities among various groups, which one could interpret in terms of radical egalitarianism. A study done in Poland in 1991, among the town inhabitants showed that only one fifth of respondents spoke for radical egalitarianism. The opinion that „all people deserve the same and thus, they should have the same living standards” was expressed by 20% of respondents. On the other hand, the opinion that „not all people deserve the same and they should have different living standard” was supported by 74% of respondents. Besides, 6% of respondents did not express any view in this matter.

A greater percentage of the supporters of radical egalitarianism was observed among the people with the lowest level of education, while the highest percentage of the supporters of social differentiations - among the people with the highest level of education. The highest percentage of the supporters of social differentiations was also among private proprietors (95%), non-technical specialists (91%). The supporters of radical egalitarianism made the biggest group among the unemployed not receiving the benefit, unskilled (46%) and skilled workers (39%). (Beskid, 1992 ; Suffin, 1992).

Recently published research reports by CBOS indicate a significant shift in the attitudes concerning poverty and well-being, their structural determinants and sources. In comparison with survey carried out in December 1994 the percentage of respondents accepting „well-being” as a „natural” thing has grown from 69% to 74% in January 1997, while 53% (previously 45%) of them expressed the view that well-being should be regarded as an „advantageous” phenomenon for the structure of Polish society.

Here: table 7, 8; figure 16
It is worth emphasizing that the social perception of the sources of income inequalities, and further - of the basis of structural differentiation of society - is connected with such factors as reliability, hard-work, gifts, initiative and high level of education, whereas the problem of poverty is usually perceived as the result of one’s being unemployed, sickness and invalidism, life’s resourcelessness, alcoholism, laziness etc. (see: CBOS, March 1997). With respect to plural society and its different criteria of segmentation, one may say, that the mentioned factors can be treated as a significant change in public opinion. This also can be the premise for establishing new interrelations at micro- and meso-levels. The aberrations of this trend one may observed in the areas, which are often regarded as „the social costs of transformation”. This issue is still of a great importance in establishing positive beliefs about some market rules (or: socio-economic dimension of citizenship). For instance, the findings of social feelings about „the gainers” and „the losers” of economic reforms from 1990-1992 noted that such groups as dodgers, swindlers, the rich, representatives of central \ local authorities and the former communist nomenklatura, topped the list as „the gainers”, whereas workers and farmers were regarded as two groups which lost the most. (see: CBOS, 1992, No 11-12: 42). The data showed that the perception of socio-economic reforms undertaken in the first years of the transformation started to manifest itself in terms of domination of stronger, shrewder and more unscrupulous people. Unfortunately, approximated results have been noted in CBOS survey from 1997, in which it is argued that negative opinions about the rich are mostly observed among .... inhabitants of big towns, managers and private owners (!), intelligentsia, pensioners and unemployed. On the other hand, such opinions are hardly ever observed among such groups as: inhabitants of village, low-educated, housekeepers, pupils and students. (CBOS, February 1997: 10-11)

Also, the research reports by CBOS that were published in last two years indicate an ambiguity in the attitudes concerning the preferred model for an economic system. On the one hand, they offer data supporting the pro-market orientation thesis - high level of acceptance for ideas of private ownership and market competition. On the other hand, one may find negative attitude to the ideas of free labour market and unemployment as a justified part of a system. The former idea was perceived more positively in the 1980s, then obtaining as much as 31-34% supporters. In 1990 this...
support declined to one fourth of the interviewed population. In 1992 public approval for unemployment as a phenomenon that could be officially recognised by a government as a „normal in the market economy” was rejected by the dominant majority (75%) of Poles. According to the opinion of CBOS analysts, „the public mood concerning a model of economic system in 1992 was similar to that of 1980 when people used to think in abstract terms of ‘good system’ that was symbolised by the most advanced Western countries. Popular knowledge about complex realities of the Western economic systems was very little and simplified at that time”. (CBOS, 1992 : 64). The real contact with market-oriented policies of the reform-minded governments at the beginning of 1990 evoked in society preferences for the modified image of „a good market economy” (or as some used to call it : „capitalism with human face” - sic!), embracing the merits of both capitalist and socialist systems.

The idea of economic freedom has now begun to be perceived as a virtue only selectively, not in a whole spectrum of economic and social mechanisms of Western type capitalist economy. If the market is not treated as the ideal mechanism of providing goods, then people expect the state policy to correct the market forces in favour of citizens who assume they do not have any possibilities to secure jobs, housing, education for the children on their own. However, strong social demands for „more egalitarian policies”, supported be the syndicalist or catholic ideas of „just order and solidarity”, may place a limit on the emergence of new political and, especially, civil rights. Such a pressure of public opinion on the state may lead to serious disturbances in socio-economic infrastructures, in particularly in the reconstruction of private ownership relations and social consciousness related to this.

Since, there have occurred many positive trends in social attitudes and beliefs, the main sector of public opinion still believe and expect that government should be more responsive to the social needs. Furthermore, people believe that government occupies the position which allows it to influence deeply the welfare of citizens. Recently published research results on this question indicate that in the belief of a prevailing majority of Poles the government and president is in possession of 56% of resources that affect material well-being of the Polish family, 39% of resources having impact on the local affairs and 73% of factors having impact on the affairs of the whole country. (Jablonski, 1996 : 46-47). The social psychologist has commented recently that the Poles „are waiting for social protection flowing down from a ‘good’
authority, which is conceived of as the overwhelming distributing entity”. (Woyciszke, 1995).

It can be assumed therefore that such attitudes and beliefs will have a great impact on the interpretation of constitutional social rights as well as on the normative foundations of social citizenship (i.e. forms of social cooperation, social stability, interpersonal relations etc.). This issue, subsequently, gives rise to many other theoretical and practical dilemmas and doubts, as for instance: (a) how to reconstruct Poland’s economy without jeopardising equality and social security, (b) how to invigorate the functioning of democratic institutions under conditions of social apathy and excessive demands and expectations, and finally, (c) how to protect and improve ‘the bargain position’ of nascent bourgeoisie as well as to attain social peace.

The last mentioned question remains a subject of many sociological studies focusing on the nature and the range of main structural barriers, which the Polish society has to overcome to become a civil society. According to sociologists the class-stratum structure of the Polish society, inherited from the real socialism, is the main barrier of its transformation toward democratic citizenship and self-governing society. Their misgivings are closely related to the unfavourable greater dynamics of the growth of unemployment than that of the middle class. (Wesolowski, 1990; Mokrzycki, 1994: 38-52; Wnuk-Lipinski, 1993; Zagórski, 1996: 81-122). Such opinions seem to be justified if one take into consideration the fact that the class of private owners is strictly connected with the market. The systems of „open” strata: upper, middle and lower have become important factors of order in the civil societies. As self-control systems - while distributing nobility, respect, prestige based on the extent of consumption, property, power, or education - the stratification systems eliminate the repressive function of the state in reference to the citizens for the sake of their subjectivity. This system of stratification can be created only in close connection with market classes and classes of private owners. But at the present the Polish society is a society of the transformation period, „mixed” in its segment structure. The researchers argue that in the class-stratum structure the symptoms of the „pro-civil” crystallization are: (1) transformation of some segments „living on the state’s keep” into self-dependent (subjective) segments so that the middle class will become a structural dominant, (2) transformation of peasants into the agriculture part of the class through „farming”, (3) transformation of intellectuals and intelligentsia into the cate-
categories of the middle class working in free professions and finally (4) reduction of the „mixed” segments and of the unemployed „defining” the structure of the society of the transformation period. It is expected that the last mentioned category will result from the market activity in the full meaning of the notion (investment, capital, consumption, labour markets) and not from a mechanical reduction of employment being the effect of system changes (mainly through abandoning full employment without creating new labour-saving places of employment).

Concluding, one may notice that in Poland the public opinion is being formed together with the still transforming, pre-civil society growing „open” and becoming subjective. This is why the state of social consciousness reflects the state of objective structures. Thus the set of attitudes and beliefs in Poland still is not a dynamizing factor of „pro-civil” changes in many areas of its activity. On the one hand, the changes ongoing in political and economic order are generally accepted but on the other hand - the decline of support towards them is clearly visible. Under conditions of disintegrated society individuals used to regard „democracy” as a mere means, not as a value in itself. This can also be one of the reasons why some social groups expect direct gratification, provided even by a „heavy hand” government, rather than further democratisation and decentralisation of political structures.
Chapter Four - Democratic citizenship in Poland and Western European societies: a comparative study.

 Democratic citizenship as an element of socio-political and cultural studies on transition to democracy in Poland (dominant models)

Regarding the prerequisites for establishing civic culture Almond stressed that this type of culture is largely based on “rationality-activist model” of democratic citizenship, the model of successful democracy that required that all citizens be involved and active in politics, and their participation be informed, analytical, and rational”. This model, however, is considered to be only “one component of the civic culture, but not the sole one”. Almond writes: “Indeed, by itself this participant-rationalist model of citizenship could not logically sustain a stable democratic government. Only when combined in some sense with its opposites of passivity, trust, and deference to authority and competence was a viable, stable democracy possible”. (Almond and Verba, 1980: 16)

But, if civic culture is, at least partially, based on „passivity, trust and deference”, which are correlated to „apathy”, one can only question its compatibility with democracy and citizenship which demands participation. The significance of this issue is especially stressed by these authors, who advocate the „participatory-democracy” model of citizenship as a structural component of democratic reforms in Poland. The central thesis of this model is that the engagement in public activities brings about better understandings of public good, strengthening of one’s civic competence and interpersonal relations. To begin with, this type of democratic citizenship order has much to do with the political ideas of communitarianism, social-democracy, New Left and some trends of contemporary conservatism (for instance: ordo-liberalism). Most of them have at their core a conception of „active state”, which is to ensure equal access to basic welfare service and to counteract socio-economic inequalities. Based on empirical data, the authors of these studies emphasize the importance of such systemic and cultural requirements for the establishment of „the genuine democratic citizenship” in Poland as, for instance: the degree of interest of large part of society in actual major political issues, sense of political efficacy, knowledge of actual democratic rights and duties of citizens, their willingness to participate actively in public life, legal protection of the „weaker” social and occupational groups etc. Fol-
lowing these principles Przeworski (1995: 76) expressed the view that: "Citizens in new democracies expect to enjoy social as well as political rights. Demands for the satisfaction of „social citizenship“ (...) require that security and opportunity be shared by all. Social policies respond to these demands through the provision of health and education and through income maintenance. This provision is generally limited when new democracies venture on the path of economic reforms: this is why short-term effects of stabilization and liberalization threaten the basic livelihood of those adversely affected by the steps toward market economy." (also see: Kumar, 1992: 309-356; Nielsen, 1993: 199-241; Greven, 1994: 17-41; C. Offe).

Contrary to this conception, some authors attempt to analyse the changes of citizenship and civil society in Poland from the perspective of individualism and individual rights which are regarded as a central element of citizenship. Such studies are in most cases inspired by either neo-Hegelian or neoliberal thinking. Both sets of the theories are focused on mental, cultural and social implications of individual rights, in particularly those associated with property relations ( : civic and economic rights, among which the right to private property is of special importance). In this view, „in all Eastern European societies the base for the patterns of socialization typical of civil society would emerge only after the dissolution of state ownership”. (Staniszkis, 1992: 222). Criticizing the supporters of „the Government’s commitment to social provision“, they also stress a positive function of privatization and deregulation of public services in order to speed up the process of consciousness’ transformation of Polish society and, thus, to achieve the higher level of individual’s responsibility, one’s socio-economic mobility and self-sufficiency.

Because of differences in scope, forms and intensity of expected state - society / individuals mutual relations, two models of democratic citizenship differ in interpretation of empirical surveys of value systems, beliefs and attitudes connected with a particular aspect of citizenship. Indications of requirements to be satisfied by the citizens are varied, and if present, they are in most cases relatively general. Therefore, it is hardly possible to schematize these different requirements (indications) for each of the democratic citizenship version as well as to state which of the requirements are more important than others. There is also a „jeopardy“ that through selected presentation of findings one may come to simplified conclusions about the real im-
age of given society, its state of consciousness and political culture, trends in political debates, correlation between political interest and institutional-legal structure etc.

Besides, there is not one coherent set of empirical indicators, which one may employ in comparative description of value patterns adopted by the Western and Eastern European societies. Because of the analysed earlier historical factors, Polish society as well as the other Eastern European societies have had little time to consider or to experience all positive, but also negative consequences of functioning of democratic order. In this context, the opinion expressed by van der Broek and de Moor seems to play a significant role in an adequate understanding of various kinds of research surveys made in this part of Europe. According to them: „Under normal circumstances a successful cross-sectional study designed to measure people’s attitudes taps the prevailing mood in a particular period. It has to be kept in mind that the mood of the respondents in Eastern Europe may have been one of mixed feelings. There is a serious problem of interpreting their responses because it is unknown whether they referred to past communist experiences, to contemporary experiences or revealed some degree of wishful thinking.” (1994: 202-203). All these reservations should be taken into account in further explanation of empirical (comparative) dimension of democratic citizenship.

b\ Empirical democratic citizenship

On the basis of collected empirical surveys carried out in both the Western European societies and in Polish society, one may single out some sets of attitudes, value systems and behavioural intentions related to the idea of „democratic citizenship” which can be applied in explanatory model presenting similarities and dissimilarities among these societies. It is assumed here that there are at least three domains, of which comparative analysis may become a basis for general conclusions and remarks. More specifically, the following domains (issues) are considered as central regarding democratic citizenship’s development: political participation (including confidence in public institutions), social inequality beliefs and welfare preferences.

A review of the literature on empirical dimension of citizenship in the Western European countries reveals that extremely small part of society is actively involved in
political process, such as political campaigns and activities of political organisations, and has a weak partisan identification.

The studies also indicate that many young citizens are politically ignorant or have incorrect political beliefs. Only extremely small minorities are members of a political party or an interest (or pressure) group, and contact their representatives in elected bodies to raise an issue.

Confronting the results of empirical studies in the Western societies with the democratic ideal of citizenry P. Allum (1995: 131) ascertained that: „Reality is very different. Not only is interest in politics very limited (about 20 per cent of the electorate state that they are very interested in politics, while about 50 per cent claim that they keep in touch with political events) but the level of information is very low: if a majority of the electorate know the head of the government’s name, the percentage falls rapidly when it is a case of news about a specific event or project.” The empirical data presented by Neumann (1986), van den Broek and Heunks (1994: 67-96), Dekker (1994b: 17-19), Allum (1995: 122-147), Kasse and Newton (1995: 60-64) and Duke (1995, 293: 311) confirm a decline of confidence in public institutions and growing dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the Western world.

Comparing with the Western societies, it can be said that the level of political involvement in Poland is relatively higher if, for example, one consider such „external” forms of public activity (interest) as: the number of political parties, percentage of public opinion finding politics very important or being interested in politics, self-image of Poles as a „strongly politicised society” etc. (see: Chapter Three). Next to these symptoms, however, many sociologists and political scientists argue that Polish society still do not take full advantage of institutional and legal prerequisites enabling society to regain its sense of agency. It is hard to find examples of any large-scale participation by either individuals or larger groups in non-governmental organisations. The data presented by the main pooling centres in Poland (CBOS,
OBOP) show that citizens’ social activity is generally limited to the private domain of the family or small social group. People are rarely involved in any individual activity in public sphere. About one third of Poles participated in activities aimed at putting pressure on the authorities, 14 percent of the respondents participated in strikes, 14 percent signed letters of protest, 10 percent took part in the demonstrations. Numerous surveys have revealed that the citizens are passive. This question seeks individual support from institutions whose job is to intervene with the state on their behalf, but they are disinclined to act for themselves collectively in institutions of their own dedicated to citizen protection and the improvement in living standards. (Serwis Informacyjny CBOS, June 1992 : 51-60; Serwis Informacyjny CBOS December 1993 : 101; Serwis Informacyjny CBOS, April 1994 : 91; Serwis Informacyjny CBOS, January 1997 : 12-18).

Collective activity, which contributes even more to education in democracy than to individual activity, is rather low. Group identities of the civic type are still relatively undeveloped; very few people participate in various types of civic organisations and movements. In his paper in 1993 P. Gliński pointed out that one third of respondents reported their membership in cultural associations and local social movements, 3 percent were members of religious organisations, 4.5 percent belonged to professional associations and 22 percent to trade unions. 53 percent of respondents declared that no organisation in Poland met their interests. (Gliński, 1993b : 104).

While looking for the reason of this passive defensive response to „civil actions”, one has to keep in mind that, despite the new opportunities established by democratic order, many forms of civic passivity has survived as a living example of the enduring nature of socialist experiences, habits and patterns. They discourage association and action on behalf of the others and provide citizens with a justification for civic non-participation. Such attitude is frequently accompanied by the belief that public activity is merely a „jumping board” to political privileges or a career in the civil service. (Swida-Ziemba, 1994 : 35-50).

One of the reasons why the fragility of organised civil activity is specific characteristics for the Polish society in comparison with the Western European ones, can be also this which was given by Kurczewska and Bojar, who pointed at the persistence of the romantic model of activity, „according to which good intentions are what counts, not the practical effects of behaviour. While quixotic behaviour is admired, it
is much more difficult to win plaudits for day-to-day individual or group cooperation towards the common good. The negative social effects of the romantic model are also manifest in the respect accorded pathetic failures in the face of reality. In public opinion, individual and group activities which have aborted for some reason or another are still highly esteemed. On the other hand, well-organised and successful cooperation is neither copied nor even accepted since it does not fit the pattern of noble defeat inherited from the nineteenth century.

The traditional belief in "gloria victis" does not encourage people to undertake practical endeavours, especially if they are to be successful. This is why so many circles respond so negatively to clubs and associations formed by those who have been successful because many Poles still believe that to be successful in new Poland is something shifty and deplorable." (1995 : 188-189 ; also : Bromke, 1981 : 14).

One may also assume that some justification of the „pessimistic“ indications presented above can be the view, such as this formulated by B. Goodwin, as a side-note in her analysis of P. Bachrach’s study on „apathetic voters“ in the USA. Considering that she has concluded : "Perhaps we should reform social conditions rather than revise the democratic ideal". (Goodwin, 1992 : 228).

The issue of impact of social arrangements’ structure on stability and effectiveness of democratic order is an integral part of the classic and ongoing debates among political actors and theorists in Poland and the Western European countries alike. In both cases, one of the basis questions is social context of citizenry, especially in the field of social-economic State activities. As discussed in Chapter Three there is a widespread expectation in Polish society as regards equalising of socio-economic and cultural inequalities. In public opinion an important role as an instrument providing social groups with various social provisions is to be played by the state. The government should then undertake and stimulate different sorts of activities to protect the weak and being in need from many „social diseases“ which are thought to be the sides effects of the process of transformation. It is becoming to be obvious that the process of speeded polarisation reinforces the social expectations to put more emphasis on social rights and welfare system. Contrary to many opinions formulated in political circles in Poland, such attitudes and beliefs are nothing odd when compared to analogous demands and claims articulated by the majority of the Western European societies. The empirical data gathered by the Social and
Cultural Planning Office in Rijswijk (Netherlands) show that in almost all high-developed countries a majority believes that income differences in their own society are too large. The authors of the study entitled *Social and Political Attitudes in Dutch Society* stated that support for welfare state policies appeared to be highest in Italy, followed closely by the „social-democratic mixed economies“ of Austria, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, while the ‘capitalist democracies’ of Australia and the United States showed least support for welfare state benefits. Additionally, the authors stressed that: „Personal evaluation of actual inequality is mediated by individual perceptions, and these perceptions are influenced by all kinds of political sensibilities and social preoccupations. When the income distribution is relatively compressed, people may become preoccupied with the persisting differences (cf. Austria versus Australia). When, because of historical conditions, a society is comparatively strongly based on consensus, people may be more sensitive to threatening conflicts (cf. perceived social cleavages in the Netherlands).“ (Dekker and Ester, 1993 : 214-221; cf. also: *Social and Cultural Report*, 1990 : 99-140377-381; *Social and Cultural Report*, 1992 : 99-158).

Likewise, the dominant trends in social feelings of the Western European societies is estimated by Kasse and Newton. They noticed that the citizens of Western Europe „distinguish and discriminate between different kinds of public policies and programmes, choosing to support some strongly, others less strongly, and some not at all. For example, there seems to be robust support across most of Western Europe for a greater degree of income equalisation. Many do not think their societies are yet equal enough, but this does not mean strong support for radical or total equalisation. Rather (...) the public seems to want a narrowing of existing income difference and greater equality of opportunity, not the complete equalisation of society.” (1995 : 82; cf. also tables : 4.4 and 4.5 presented there).

In brief, the conclusion springing from these and many other cross-national surveys seems to confirm the general view that, despite the existing differences among European societies, central to the modern idea of „citizenship“ is the emphasis on the rights of all individual members of a collectivity to claim material support from either their fellow members or from the State in situations where they cannot for some reasons sustain life according to the standards prevailing in that society. (Saunders, 1993 : 76; cf. also: Hindess, 1993 : 19-35). A common feature of the
modern notion of citizenship has become also its direct usage to the complex phe-
nomena related to the ideal of „quality of life”, of which the new sense and functions 
are frequently described in terms of „European citizenship” or „Union citizenship”. 
(Preuß, 1996 : 534-552). Implementation of this ideal should be accompanied by the 
Huntington’s view that : „ In the modernization of the non-Western parts of the world, 
however, the problems of centralization of authority, national integration, social mo-
bilization, economic development, political participation, and social welfare have 
arisen not sequentially but simultaneously. The ‘demonstration effect’ which the 
early modernizers have on the later modernizers first intensifies aspirations and then 
exacerbates frustration”. (1968 : 46). What seems to be necessary is thus the 
knowledge about the current changes taking place in public and social in Poland, 
and their possible implications with reference to the both normative and practical di-
mensions of citizenship. This knowledge, based on further developed empirical as 
well as theoretical studies, is essential for an adequate understanding of the nature, 
forms and specific characteristics of democratic citizenship in Poland.
## Table 1

The answers to the question on "Who could you rely on in settling important matters?" presented by respondents in 1980, 1984 and 1988. (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who could you rely on ?</th>
<th>1980 N= 2340 *</th>
<th>1984 N= 1798 *</th>
<th>1988 N= 2247 *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>on myself</td>
<td>47,6</td>
<td>63,4</td>
<td>43,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on family, folks, friends,</td>
<td>20,4</td>
<td>36,1</td>
<td>43,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on public institutions or organisations</td>
<td>9,6</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on government, central \ local authorities, party</td>
<td>9,3</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on enterprise I work at</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other possibilities</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>12,8</td>
<td>4,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents could point at more than one of possible answers

source : Wnuk-Lipinski, 1989 : 57

## Table 2

Persons pointing at different segments of authority perceived as a source of undeserved privileges (the survey was carried out in December 1981) (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of respondents</th>
<th>Groups perceived as the main socio-political forces exercising undeserved privileges</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>including :</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>authority</td>
<td>members of Polish United Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>army and militia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inhabitants of town :</td>
<td>49,8</td>
<td>32,0</td>
<td>5,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inhabitants of village :</td>
<td>32,8</td>
<td>22,0</td>
<td>61,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Membership of Trade Unions (in XII 1981):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>69.4</th>
<th>39.0</th>
<th>14.8</th>
<th>15.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-called pro-establishment trade-unions (OPZZ)</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not belonging to trade-unions</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Occupational Groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>60.8</th>
<th>32.3</th>
<th>15.5</th>
<th>13.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Level of Education:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>33.4</th>
<th>21.5</th>
<th>5.6</th>
<th>6.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3

Social acceptance of differences existing between the highest and the lowest level of income. (in % of total number of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The existing differences of income are</th>
<th>1988 (N = 2349)</th>
<th>1990 (N = 1843)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>too big</td>
<td>63,5</td>
<td>62,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good enough</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>too small</td>
<td>9,0</td>
<td>10,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not know</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>16,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>1,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4

Some indicators of socio-economic order preferred by Poles on the threshold of systemic transformation. (in % of total number of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of surveys</th>
<th>most certainly</th>
<th>rather - yes</th>
<th>rather - no</th>
<th>most certainly not</th>
<th>it is hard to say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the highest salaries</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>70,6</td>
<td>19,0</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>3,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>50,7</td>
<td>27,9</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>29,6</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>22,7</td>
<td>12,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>27,5</td>
<td>29,0</td>
<td>20,1</td>
<td>13,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>27,2</td>
<td>27,6</td>
<td>22,2</td>
<td>12,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy of full employment</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>50,3</td>
<td>27,1</td>
<td>9,8</td>
<td>5,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>29,8</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>22,4</td>
<td>11,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>25,2</td>
<td>28,2</td>
<td>22,8</td>
<td>10,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>25,3</td>
<td>34,5</td>
<td>16,0</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>34,1</td>
<td>32,8</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should stop privatisation</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>11,8</td>
<td>33,1</td>
<td>24,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the state</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>32,8</td>
<td>33,1</td>
<td>14,6</td>
<td>7,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The state must keep control over the prices, the whole economy, and the salaries should be differentiated according to one's professional qualification. The economy should be based on the principles of market mechanisms and free competition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>10,1</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>25,0</td>
<td>30,7</td>
<td>21,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>25,8</td>
<td>30,2</td>
<td>43,6</td>
<td>40,4</td>
<td>37,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>55,0</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>55,0</td>
<td>6,5</td>
<td>55,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**table 5**
The level of the support for political camps in parliamentary elections in Poland 1989-1993 (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political camp</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>67,0</td>
<td>43,2</td>
<td>36,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcommunists</td>
<td>33,0</td>
<td>23,1</td>
<td>35,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>„Third&quot; parties</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>33,7</td>
<td>28,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Antoszewski, 1996 : 168

**table 6**
Answers to the question: "Do you agree with the ascertainment that in present situation in Poland the democratic order should be abolished in favour of the introduction of 'heavy hand' government?" (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Undecided, no opinions</th>
<th>Total number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Male</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Female</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inhabitants of:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* village (population : to 20.000)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* town (population : to 20.000)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from 21.000 to 100.000)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from 101.000 to 500.000)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from 501.000 and more)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>level of education:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* elementary</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* post-elementary technical schools</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* secondary</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* university</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>occupational status:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>managers, intelligentsia</em></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>skilled workers</em></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>unskilled workers</em></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>farmers</em></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>entrepreneurs</em></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other groups:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>pensioners</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>pupils and students</em></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>unemployed</em></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>housewives and others</em></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendance at religious practice:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>several times a week</em></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>once a week</em></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>several times a month</em></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>several times a year</em></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>never</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political orientation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>left</em></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>centre</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>right</em></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>undecided</em></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBOS, January 1997: 21 (N=1132)

**Table 7** Social perception of well-being (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The fact that some people are much more wealthy than the others is for you:</th>
<th>XII’ 1994</th>
<th>I’ 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>something natural</em></td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>something unnatural</em></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>hard to say</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>advantageous</em></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* disadvantageous</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard to say</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* fair</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* unfair</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard to say</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBOS, February 1997, p.15 (N=1101)

**Table 8** Social perception of the rich as a particular group in Polish society. (in percentage)

In your opinion, the group of the rich is held in respect and esteem of other people:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>♦ strongly agrees</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ rather agrees</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ rather disagrees</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ strongly disagrees</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>♦ it is hard to say</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBOS, February 1997, p. 16 (N= 1101)

**Table 9** Levels of invisible political participation (per cent)

Interest in Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A great deal</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

nd : no data (data is taken from : Allum, 1995 : 129 (table 4.1)
**Table 10** Political participation in Western Europe, 1959-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,734</td>
<td>6,148</td>
<td>13,315</td>
<td>15,107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Entries are aggregate percentage. All the original data have been re-analysed.

*Source:* Kasse and Newton, 1995: 50 (table 3.3)

**Table 11** Levels of visible conventional political participation (per cent)

Types of political activity (1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes / rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Convince friends to vote as self</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attend political meetings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work to solve community problems</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contact officials or politicians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
<td>nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

nd : no data

Source : from Allum, 1995 : 130 (table 4.2)
Figures and maps

**figure 1**
Social support for the limitation of the highest salaries during the period of 1981-1990.


**map 1** The results of constitutional referendum
Percent of people voting for the constitution:

- more than 60%
- between 50-60%
- between 40-50%
- up to 40%
**figure 2** The results of constitutional referendum
Social approval and/or disapproval of parliamentary project of Constitution. (criterion: sex of voters)

![Bar chart showing approval and disapproval by sex](image1)

**figure 2a** The results of constitutional referendum
Social approval and/or disapproval of parliamentary project of Constitution. (criterion: age of voters)

![Bar chart showing approval and disapproval by age](image2)

source: The Study for Social Research in Sopot (taken from: *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 24.05.1997, p.4)

**figure 2b** The results of constitutional referendum
Social approval and disapproval of parliamentary project of Constitution. (criterion: political preferences of voters)

Source: The Study for Social Research in Sopot (taken from: Gazeta Wyborcza, 24.05.1997, p.4)

Legend: SLD - Alliance of Democratic Left; UW - Union for Freedom; UP - Union of Labour; PSL - Polish Peasant Party; ROP - Movement for the Restoration of Poland; AW"S" - Electoral Action „Solidarity"
**Figure 3** The social structure of the electoral support of the main parties in 1991 election (in percentage)

**Manual workers**

- UD: 42.10%
- PC: 8.50%
- PSL: 9.00%
- ZChN: 9.70%
- SLD: 6.30%
- KLD: 6.00%
- KPN: 6.60%
- Other: 11.60%

**Non-manual workers**

- UD: 30.30%
- PC: 6.20%
- PSL: 8.10%
- ZChN: 6.00%
- SLD: 12.30%
- KLD: 9.00%
- KPN: 7.00%
- Other: 21.00%

**Farmers**

- UD: 32.00%
- PC: 5.00%
- PSL: 8.00%
- ZChN: 14.50%
- SLD: 10.50%
- KLD: 7.50%
- KPN: 14.20%
- Other: 10.10%

**Pensioners**

- UD: 40.70%
- PC: 3.30%
- PSL: 5.40%
- ZChN: 1.90%
- SLD: 3.60%
- KLD: 33.60%
- KPN: 3.20%
- Other: 1.10%

Source: Antoszewski, 1996: 165

Legend: **UD** - Democratic Union (now: Union for Freedom - UW); **PC** - „Center” Agreement; **PSL** - Polish Peasants’ Party; **ZChN** - Christian National Union; **SLD** - Alliance of the Democratic Left; **KLD** - Liberal Democratic Congress (merged with UD as the Union for Freedom); **KPN** - Confederation for an Independent Poland
figure 4
Social acceptance of activity of the main public institutions in Poland.

source: CBOS, February 1997: 3-7

figure 5
Attitudes towards the Roman-Catholic Church regarding electoral basis of the given party. (in percentage). (The survey was carried out in January 1997; N = 1101)

source: CBOS, February 1997: 7

Legend: AW "S" - Electoral Action „Solidarity” ; PSL - Polish Peasant Party ; ROP - Movement for the Restoration of Poland ; SLD - Alliance of Democratic Left ; UP - Union of Labour ; UW - Union for Freedom ; KPEiR - National Party of Pensioners

figure 6
Question: On the whole, do you think that your life depends on what is going on in politics?

- It depends: 28%
- It does not depend: 63%
- Do not know: 9%

Source: Serwis Informacyjny CBOS, April 1994, p.47.

Figure 7a
Social approval of activity of the following public institutions and organisations playing crucial role in public life in Poland. (percentage). (The survey was carried out in February 1997; N = 1151)

Source: CBOS, March 1997: 2

Figure 7b
Social disapproval of activity of the following public institutions and organisations playing crucial role in public life in Poland. (percentage). Data from 1997

source: CBOS, March 1997: 2

**figure 7c**
Changes of public opinion between VII’1995 and I’1997

**figure 8**
Answers to the question: "Are you satisfied (or you are not) with the manner of working of democracy in Poland?"

Source: CBOS, January 1997: 1

Figure 9a

Answers to the question: "With which one of the presented opinions do you agree?" (in percentage). (The survey was carried out in November 1996; N=1134)

Source: CBOS, January 1997: 7

Figure 9b
Answers to the question: “With which one of the presented opinions do you agree?” listed in accordance to the options of the main political parties in Poland. (in percentage)
(The survey was carried out in November 1996; N=1134)

source: CBOS, January 1997: 7

**Figure 10**

Answers to the question: “Why are you not satisfied with working of democracy in Poland?” (respondents could point at two possibilities). (in percentage)


**Figure 11**
Answers to the question: "Do you agree with the ascertainment that democracy prevails over the all other forms of governance?"
(in percentage)

source: CBOS, January 1997: 8

**Figure 12**

Answers to the question: "Do you agree with the ascertainment that sometimes undemocratic governance is more desired rather than democratic one?"
(in percentage)

source: CBOS, January 1997: 9

**Figure 13**
Answers to the question: "Do you agree with the ascertainment that in present situation in Poland the democratic order should be abolished in favour of the introduction of 'heavy hand' government?" (in percentage)

source: Serwis Informacyjny CBOS, January 1993 (N=1172)
map 2 Societal approval or disapproval of ‘heavy hand’ government in regional sections

Yellow: Agree 11% Disagree 77%
Gray: Agree 14% Disagree 72%
Green: Agree 20% Disagree 63%
Brown: Agree 15% Disagree 71%
Blue: Agree 21% Disagree 54%
Other: Agree 20% Disagree 63%
Pink: Agree 24% Disagree 62%
**figure 14**

Item: To what extend your own problems depend on the character of the party (-ies) exercising the power in Poland? (N=1228)

![Pie chart showing survey results](image)

- **Very much**: 35%
- **Not much**: 24%
- **Does not matter at all**: 31%
- **Do not know**: 10%

Source: Serwis Informacyjny CBOS, April 1994, p.47.

**figure 15**

Item: Though, both freedom and equality are very important matters, if you have to make a choice between one or another, which one will you choose?

![Bar chart showing survey results](image)

- **The most important is freedom**: 49%
- **The most important is equality**: 41%
- **Hard to say**: 10%

Source: OBOP, 1993 (N=1111)
figure 16

A\ Question:  *Do you think that nowadays in Poland each person has the same chance to enrich him/herself?*

- XII' 1994: 10%
- I' 1997: 9%

B\ Question:  *Do you think that nowadays in Poland only few people have a chance to enrich themselves?*

- XII' 1994: 86%
- I' 1997: 86%

C\ *it is hard to say*

- XII' 1994: 4%
- I' 1997: 5%

source: CBOS, February 1997, p.5 (N=1101)

figure 17  Types of political participation in Britain in 1985

source: Allum, 1995 : 133 (figure 4.2)
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