

# **Russian Perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance**

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## **Introduction**

**Perceptions play a critical, if often unrecognised, role in relations between states and in ensuring a greater or lesser degree of regional and international stability. The salience of perceptions in international relations is rooted in the anarchical condition of the international system, where international order has to be constructed without a global Leviathan to enforce that order. This anarchical condition is particularly relevant in the sphere of international security since ultimately no state can completely trust any other state to ensure its defence from external aggression. As Kenneth Waltz has argued, the international system is defined ultimately by the need for states to rely on "self-help" to secure their vital national interests.<sup>1</sup>**

**However, the condition of international anarchy is not immutable and is mitigated by a number of institutions and practices, such as alliances, international law and the practice of diplomacy, which forge trust and cooperation between states. However, the key factor which is critical to the success of these instruments is the existence of mutual perceptions of trust forged on a common sense of purpose and identity. Where such perceptions do not exist, and where there remain significant sources of mutual suspicion and distrust, then the danger of an escalating spiral of a mutual sense of insecurity - the so-called "security dilemma" - is an ever-present possibility. Robert Jervis who has written most fully on the role of perceptions in international relations illustrates this in the following way:**

**Once a person develops develops am image of the other -ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image. ... If they think that a state is hostile, behaviour that others might see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity. This cognitive rigidity reinforces the consequences of international anarchy.<sup>2</sup>**

**It is with this sense of the importance of perceptions in international relations that this Paper analyses Russian perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance. The specific objective of the Paper is to assess the Russian response to NATO's redefinition and transformation since the end of the Cold War, focusing in particular on the issue of NATO enlargement to the countries of Central and East Europe.**

**The key argument of this Paper is that there has developed, and there continues to exist, significant differences in the mutual perceptions of NATO (and the member-states of NATO) and Russia over the post-Cold War aims and**

**intentions of the Atlantic Alliance. This is not to say that NATO-Russia relations have descended to the level of the mutual suspicion and antagonism of the Cold War period. On a declaratory and practical level, neither Russia nor NATO perceive each other as threats. Both sides have also been able to conclude significant bilateral agreements, the crowning achievement of which has been the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation" signed in Paris on 27 May 1997.**

**However, the success of the Founding Act should not obscure the strength of the continuing Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, which President Boris Yeltsin indicated in his speech in Paris at the signing of the Founding Act and which reflects a near consensus in the Russian political spectrum.<sup>3</sup> The reality is that Russia remains resolutely opposed to the principal argument of the advocates of NATO enlargement that it would bring stability to Central Europe which is as much in Russia's interest as the West's.<sup>4</sup> The reasons why Russia does not share this perception of the role of an enlarged NATO is the principal subject of this Paper. Implicit in this analysis is that, while Russia continues to perceive the Atlantic Alliance in this negative light, the possibility of a more adverse reaction to developments within NATO cannot be definitely excluded. Thus, there remain significant future challenges in ensuring that the Russia-NATO relationship develops in a constructive and cooperative manner and that mutual perceptions remain positive and based on trust.**

**The structure of this Paper is in two parts. The first chapter provides a broadly chronological account of the development in NATO-Russia relations since 1990. The second chapter seeks to deconstruct the most significant factors behind the negative Russian response to developments within NATO. The argument is that the Russian response has to be understood in relation to three differing, but interconnected, dimensions - first, in respect to internal developments within Russia; second, in relation to Russia's ambitions and interactions with the countries of the former Soviet Union - its so-called "Near Abroad"; and third, in Russia's relationship with the wider international community and the West.**

## **Chapter 1**

### **The Evolution of NATO-Russian Relations, 1990-97**

**The period from 1990 to 1997 witnessed a remarkable transformation in the European continent which has had a profound impact on both Russia and NATO. For Russia, the developments have undoubtedly been the more dramatic. With the loss of its imperial hegemony in Central and East Europe in 1989 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been forced into a geostrategic and territorial withdrawal to borders whose closest historical parallel is with the early eighteenth century. Coterminous with this territorial withdrawal, there has also been a precipitous decline in Russia's economic, political and military power. From its position of perceived superpower equality with the United States, the Russian economy had descended by 1997 to a mere 7% of US GDP and the formerly seemingly invincible Soviet army had been reduced to the demoralised and ineffective rump so tellingly exposed during the failed Chechen conflict. For most Russians, the perception of the 'tragedy of the collapse of the 1,000-year state' has been an unprecedented psychological shock.**

**For NATO, the radical changes in the European security environment have also demanded a profound rethinking and reorientation of the role and purpose of the Atlantic Alliance. However, the context of this reassessment of NATO's functions is radically different from the challenges facing Russia. NATO's problems stem not from any weakening of its power or institutional structures but from the organisation's conclusive success in the Cold War and its contribution, direct and indirect, to the defence of Western Europe against the Soviet threat. The problem for NATO has been to define a new role in the absence of its previous *raison d'être* - the threat of large-scale Soviet aggression.**

**NATO's response to this new geo-strategic reality has been twofold. First, it has focused on internal reform, reducing and restructuring its military forces and structures to be more capable of responding to the new type of security challenges of the post-Cold war environment, of which the war in the former Yugoslavia has been the most notable example. Second, NATO has gradually but inexorably sought to extend its activities and its structures to include those countries traditionally outside the geographical scope of the Alliance, most notably to the former Warsaw pact countries of Central and East Europe.<sup>5</sup> The NATO Madrid Summit in July 1997 represents the culmination of these efforts with the unveiling of the reconfigured NATO force structures and the first invitations for new members from Central and East Europe to start negotiations for joining the Alliance.**

**The contrasting conditions and context in which Russia and NATO have been engaged in their respective internal reforms and strategic reorientation**

**provide the essential background for the tense and difficult evolution of NATO-Russian relations since 1990. Although the changed strategic environment has provided an unprecedented opportunity for NATO and Russia to define a more cooperative and trusting relationship, the underlying reality of differing perceptions and interpretations of both Russia's and NATO's strategic ambitions in the post-Cold War era have been the source of significant tensions and mistrust.**

**The objective of this chapter is to provide a broadly chronological account of the development of NATO-Russian relations which highlights both the potential for cooperation and the reasons for continuing expressions of hostility and suspicion. The chapter is divided into four periods. The first focuses on Gorbachev's reversal of traditional Soviet hostility to NATO and the implicit legitimization of NATO as an international actor, which culminated in the Soviet acquiescence to a unified Germany within NATO. In this context, the highly contested issue of whether the agreement to permit East Germany's incorporation into NATO precluded any further eastward enlargement will be discussed.**

**The second period examines early post-Soviet Russia's relations with NATO and analyses the causes for the shift from openly warm relations in 1992 to the first NATO-Russia crisis in late 1993 as Russia defined an increasingly hostile posture towards eastward enlargement. The third period examines how the initially relatively positive Russian response to the Partnership for Peace programme (PFP) in early 1994 was overtaken in late 1994 by an escalation of the anti-NATO rhetoric which culminated in Yeltsin's warning at the December CSCE Summit in Budapest that 'Europe ... runs the risk of plunging into a "new Cold War".<sup>6</sup> The final section examines the most extreme period of Russian hostility to the issue of NATO enlargement, which coincided with the Russian parliamentary and presidential elections in late 1995 and mid-1996 respectively, but which was subsequently followed by a more pragmatic posture resulting in the NATO-Russian Founding Act of May 1997.**

### **Gorbachev, NATO and German Unification**

**On the basis of its ideological assumption that the main characteristic of world politics was the existence of a 'fundamental antagonism between socialism and capitalism', the Soviet Union was inherently predisposed to viewing NATO as an immutable and existential threat to the Soviet Union and the socialist world. However, ideology was never the sole, or even the dominant, source of Soviet foreign policy and it coexisted uneasily with the more pragmatic logic of traditional**

**Great Power Realpolitik**, which dictated a more subtle and nuanced strategy to maximise the Soviet Union's global and regional superpower ambitions.

Within this more pragmatic approach, there could be discerned two different lines of Soviet thinking and practical behaviour towards NATO which undermined the sense of a monolithic Soviet attitude to the Alliance. The first approach proceeded from the view that NATO, alongside the other European multilateral institutions such as the EC and the WEU, were fundamentally under the control of the United States. This attitude presupposed that all processes of integration in western Europe were part of a global imperialist strategy and had to be opposed at all costs. The alternative approach argued that there did, in fact, exist significant differences in interests between the United States and its west European allies which justified a Soviet *rapprochement* with the European allies so as to weaken or even dissolve the transatlantic link.

However, the significance of this debate between the "Atlanticists" and the "Europeanists" should not be exaggerated. In practical terms, the Soviet Union was constantly disappointed by its attempts to seek to distance the west European allies from the tutelage of the United States which was most strongly confirmed by the failure of the Soviet campaign against the deployment of US medium-range missiles in the early 1980s. In addition, the Soviet Union's pretensions to superpower equality with the United States predisposed Moscow to dealing directly with Washington rather than with the United States' more junior allies in Europe.

A similarly sceptical attitude should also be accorded to the more radical revisionist argument, promoted by some Western analysts, that the Soviet Union, even prior to Gorbachev, *de facto* regarded NATO and the American military presence in Europe as serving Soviet security interests. This argument is based on certain Soviet declarations and actions -most notably the Malenkov's bid to join NATO in 1954 and Brezhnev's consent to the United States to join the CSCE and the MBFR talks in 1970-1 - which suggest that the Soviet leadership supported a Europe linked with the United States in Europe. The principal reasons presented in favour of this interpretation are that the Soviet Union believed that a US-dominated NATO confirmed the bipolar division of Europe, which both legitimated and consolidated Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact and also ensured the division and emasculation of Germany, thereby limiting the size of West Germany's armed forces and preventing its independent possession of nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup>

There is not the space to present the reasons why this interpretation of Soviet attitudes to NATO prior to Gorbachev is unconvincing. Hannes Adomeit does, however, highlight the selective evidence presented in favour of this view and

notes the many instances where Soviet leaders continued to express their determination to seek the withdrawal of the United States from Europe.<sup>8</sup> As Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze acknowledged in 1990 'until quite recently our aim was to oust the Americans from Europe at any price'.<sup>9</sup> Adomeit also argues that the collapse of *détente* and the advent of the second Cold War in the early 1980s, with the vigorous Soviet campaign of opposition to the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, 'revealed the basic underlying goals of Soviet foreign policy of attempting to weaken NATO, singularizing West Germany and separating Western Europe from the United States'.<sup>10</sup>

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that it was only with the accession of Gorbachev in 1985 that there emerged a fundamental revision of the Soviet Union's unremitting hostility to the Atlantic Alliance. The factors behind this shift in Soviet perceptions were based on three foreign policy initiatives set out by Gorbachev. The first was the early Gorbachev theme of the Common European House (*Evropa, nash obshchii dom*) which, at least initially, was little more than a traditional Soviet-style slogan, seeking to weaken western Europe's transatlantic security ties. However, this theme acquired greater substance when it was combined from 1988 onwards with two other concepts, the New Thinking (*novoe myshlenie*) in international security affairs and the principle of Freedom of Choice (*svoboda vybora*) for the countries of central and south-eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's objectives in promoting these foreign policy initiatives was to provide a more cooperative and less conflictual East-West relationship which would provide the international framework for supporting his domestic economic reforms of *perestroika*. However, Gorbachev did not intend that Freedom of Choice would lead to the Soviet-controlled satellites of central and eastern Europe decisively turning against the socialist alternative to western capitalist democracy. Analogously, the amelioration of East-West relations envisioned by New Thinking was not intended to undermine the bipolar division of the East-West security structure. Rather, it was assumed that both military alliances would continue to play a constructive role in maintaining European stability and that NATO and the Warsaw pact would assume joint responsibility in the military-security field.

Nevertheless, these doctrinal innovations did involve a radical revision of traditional Soviet attitudes to the Atlantic Alliance. For the first time, Moscow *de facto* accepted NATO as a legitimate international actor with whom the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact could potentially cooperate. Gorbachev made this clear during a visit to Bonn in June 1989 when he told his German hosts that the Joint Soviet-German Declaration:

**does not demand that you, or we, should renounce our uniqueness or weaken our allegiance to the alliances. On the contrary, I am confident that adherence to it in our policies will serve to consolidate our contribution of each state to the creation of a peaceful European order as well as shape a common European outlook.**<sup>11</sup>

However, Gorbachev was as surprised as his Western counterparts that the practical consequences of his foreign policy initiatives were the Velvet revolutions of eastern Europe and the unleashing of the dynamic towards German unification. In terms of his domestic critics, the loss of the Soviet empire to the East, including East Germany, was difficult enough to explain. Even more unpalatable was the prospect of a unified Germany within NATO. At a press conference in March 1990, Gorbachev stressed that 'it was absolutely out of the question' that the Soviet Union could agree to any form of participation of a unified Germany in NATO.<sup>12</sup> In a more belligerent mood in a *Time* magazine interview in June 1990, Gorbachev reiterated traditional Soviet hostility to the NATO alliance by stating that it remained a 'symbol of the past, a dangerous and confrontational past. And we will never agree to assign it the leading role in building a new Europe.'<sup>13</sup>

What then led Gorbachev ultimately to consent to membership of Germany in NATO? A number of factors must be taken into account in seeking to answer this question. First, the Soviet determination to construct a viable and cooperative relationship with Germany was a critical constraint against provoking an international crisis over the German question. In particular, Gorbachev's desperation to secure financial support from the West to salvage his failing economic reform programmes represented a strong pressure to concede to German membership of NATO. Second, the changes in NATO's declaratory policies which had been announced at the NATO Summit in London in July 1990 contributed to the shift in the Soviet stance. At this Summit, NATO extended 'the hand of friendship' to the East and announced that it intended to reduce the size of its active forces and move away from 'forward defence' and reliance on nuclear weapons.<sup>14</sup> These NATO gestures provided some leverage for Gorbachev to placate his domestic critics.

However, a third factor behind Gorbachev's consent to German membership of NATO was his expectation of the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact. Despite the revolutions in eastern Europe of 1989, the Soviet leadership was still optimistic that the Pact could be reformed and restructured into a predominantly political regional body, which would mirror the type of transformation envisaged for NATO at its July Summit. Although, with hindsight, this optimism appears singularly ill-placed, it was still the case that in the early part of 1990 Poland remained committed to membership of a reformed Pact as a counterweight to a potentially powerful Germany to its West.<sup>15</sup> In addition, the

**declaration adopted by the Warsaw Pact at its June 1990 meeting did not mention any possible dissolution of the Pact.<sup>16</sup>**

**In fact, the former Warsaw Pact allies only began to seek to distance themselves from the Pact in the Autumn and Winter of 1990 when right-wing forces in Moscow asserted their dominance and Shevardnadze resigned as Foreign Minister. By the beginning of 1991, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were beginning to send out feelers to NATO and to enquire about the possibility of membership. As relations between the Soviet Union and its former east European allies descended into acrimony during 1991, and as Soviet rhetoric against NATO intensified, it was inevitable that the Warsaw Pact would be finally dissolved at the July 1991 Prague Summit.**

**It seems highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would have consented to German membership of NATO, if it had realised that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact would be so swift and comprehensive. Even in his most idealistic and liberal internationalist moods, the central premise of Gorbachev's conceptual vision of European security was the continuation of the bipolar division of the continent. For Gorbachev as much as his more conservative colleagues, a new Europe where NATO but not the Warsaw Pact existed was completely unacceptable. During the latter part of 1990 and into 1991, this was reflected in the Soviet media's far harsher evaluation of NATO which returned to traditional Cold War imagery of the Alliance.<sup>17</sup>**

**The Soviet, and to some extent Western, expectation of a continuing Warsaw Pact sheds light on the highly contentious issue of whether the West, during the Two Plus Four negotiations over German unification, made a long-term commitment not to enlarge NATO beyond Germany's eastern borders. In most post-Soviet Russian diplomatic *démarches* over this issue, it has become an almost axiomatic belief that during these negotiations, though formally it was only agreed that NATO structures would not extend onto east German territory, there was also a private commitment that this prohibition would also apply to the rest of central and eastern Europe. The conviction that NATO's enlargement initiatives of the 1990s represent a betrayal of these private promises is strongly held in Moscow. The influential European specialist Sergei Karaganov articulates this grievance eloquently:**

**In 1990 we were told quite clearly by the West that the unification of Germany would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees because in the euphoric atmosphere of the time it would have seemed indecent - like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other's husbands.<sup>18</sup>**

**However, despite the strength of the Russian conviction of a Western betrayal, the evidence from the time suggests that the issue of NATO enlargement beyond the territory of East Germany was not a significant item on the agenda of the Two Plus Four talks. As has been argued above, Gorbachev and his advisers still worked on the assumption that the Warsaw Pact would continue to exist as a viable entity. Similarly, the Western allies were in no way envisioning at that time any further extension of NATO and were principally concerned about ensuring the continued membership of Germany within NATO.**

**The specific arrangements for the territory of the former GDR were primarily related to agreeing not to extend NATO structures in the transitional period whilst Soviet troops remained. Once Soviet forces had withdrawn, such NATO structures would be extended and the only continuing major concession was that no foreign troops would subsequently be stationed on east German territory. As such, the agreement of the allied countries not to move their nuclear weapons east was a purely symbolic move, since only German forces would be permanently deployed on the former GDR and Germany had already forsaken any possession of nuclear weapons. In all these negotiations, the focus of attention was on the future destiny of the territory of the former GDR within NATO which neither prejudged nor presupposed any wider application beyond Germany's eastern borders.**

**Philip Zelikow, who was a participant in the US negotiating team and who has provided the most substantive in-depth study of the diplomatic history of the process of German unification, argues that no Western commitment was made to the Soviet Union concerning eastward enlargement of NATO.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, he argues it was simply not raised as an issue and that, in any case, no implicit agreement was given that would have precluded further eastward enlargement of NATO.<sup>20</sup> Whether this is correct or not, it seems likely that the importance of the issue has been significantly magnified by the subsequent post-1990 developments between Russia and NATO. At the time, any enlargement of NATO beyond the borders of Germany appeared a highly improbable potential outcome.**

### **From the "Romantic Embrace" to the first NATO-Russia Crisis**

**The disintegration of the Soviet Union after the failed coup in August 1991 provided the Russian administration of President Yeltsin with a unique opportunity to set a radically new foreign policy agenda. To a certain extent, such a reorientation did take place as the new Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, sought to construct a foreign policy which would support and mirror Yeltsin's ambitious programme for economic revitalisation. In its broad terms, he defined the**

**new Russian policy as being intimately connected to the transformation of Russia, involving a 'crossing over to another civilised, democratic side of the barricades' so that Russia would finally become a 'normal power'.<sup>21</sup>**

Kozyrev's ambition to transform Russia into a 'normal great power' was predicated on the need for two major shifts in foreign policy orientation. First, he argued that Russia would have to forego its imperialist past and would, along with all the other former republics of the Soviet Union, 'simply have to learn to live as independent states and to view each other as equal partners'.<sup>22</sup> Second, he believed that Russia would have to eschew its messianic tendencies, its belief in a special destiny, and its traditional anti-western stance. This meant that Russia needed to accept a full embrace of the West, constructing not only good relations but also a 'full partnership' with Western countries, particularly the United States.<sup>23</sup> As Yeltsin argued after his first tour as President to the West, this was required not only to pave the way for Russia's membership of the 'community of civilised states' but also to 'obtain the maximum outside support' for its internal transformation.<sup>24</sup>

This almost uncritical embrace of the West also involved a revision of Russian views of NATO. In place of the traditional suspicion and distrust, the Atlantic Alliance was viewed as one integral component in the overall structure of multilateral institutions, including most notably the UN and CSCE, which was required for the successful management of European and international affairs. Even the question of Russia's possible membership of NATO was openly discussed in Moscow. In December 1991, Kozyrev stated that Russia 'does not regard NATO as an aggressive military bloc' but views it 'as one of the mechanisms for stability in Europe and in the world as a whole. Our desire to cooperate with this mechanism and join it is therefore natural'.<sup>25</sup>

However, Kozyrev's early foreign policy, often later described by Russians as the 'romantic embrace' of the West, proved ultimately to be unsustainable. In part, this was due to the intrinsic naiveté of assuming that the interests of Russia and Western countries were necessarily coextensive and that seventy years of distrust and suspicion could be simply dissolved. More significantly, though, this policy orientation was critically undermined by powerful and important interest groups whose views in the fragmented policy-making environment of post-Soviet Russia could not be ignored. One such group was the army which found itself increasingly involved in armed disputes on the borders of the newly independent states, in particular during 1992 in Moldova and Tajikistan. Russian military leaders also remained tied to more traditional views on NATO with fears in 1992 that the Alliance would seize the opportunity of local conflicts to push for the disintegration of the Russian Federation.<sup>26</sup>

More broadly, there also emerged a coalition of influential and democratic figures who strongly criticised Kozyrev's foreign policy. These included individuals such as Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs; Vladimir Lukin, the Russian Ambassador to the United States; Sergei Stankevich, a State Counsellor and academics like Sergei Karaganov, who founded the independent Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.<sup>27</sup> Although all these figures held differing policy positions, the basic outline of their criticism can be broadly defined. First, they believed that Kozyrev's embrace of the West was naive and short-sighted, which ignored Russian national interests and the reality that these interests could diverge with those of the United States or other Western countries. Kozyrev's willingness in August 1992 to suspend, as a result of US pressure, the sale of rocket engines to India was viewed as a particularly egregious concession.

The second line of criticism was that the Foreign Ministry was playing far too passive a role in promoting a distinctive Russian policy towards the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the so-called "Near Abroad". This ignored, it was argued, Russia's vital interests in the post-Soviet space, which included the integrated economic and security structures established during the Soviet period, the presence of a 25 million Russian Diaspora, and the need to ensure that these neighbouring countries remain friendly with Moscow and do not permit the hostile interventions of outside countries. Kozyrev's critics argued that not only Russia should be a leading advocate for economic, military and political integration within the CIS but must also adopt a more interventionist military role to subdue and resolve the multiple local conflicts emerging in the region. In place of Kozyrev's trust in the mediatory capabilities of international institutions like the CSCE and UN, it was argued that Russia must define its own Monroe doctrine to protect Russia's vital interests in the Near Abroad.<sup>28</sup>

In essence, these critics of the Foreign Ministry were advocating a realist and geopolitical conception of Russia's national security interests to counteract the perceived idealist and liberal internationalist orientation promoted by Kozyrev. As such, it presupposed a fundamental reorientation of Russian foreign policy priorities. Instead of according primacy to relations with the West, the overriding concern must be on counter-balancing the centrifugal forces threatening the disintegration of the Russian Federation and the broader post-Soviet region. It also involved a conception of Russia's Great Power status which was far removed from Kozyrev's idea of a 'normal civilised power' and which required Russia to assert special rights in the states of the former Soviet Union. As Yeltsin was later to

declare in 1994, this overall approach meant that 'ideological confrontation has been replaced by a struggle for spheres of influence in geopolitics'.<sup>29</sup>

During 1993, this geopolitical conception of Russia's national interests broadly supplanted Kozyrev's earlier conception. In April 1993, the Presidential Security Council outlined a Foreign Policy Concept which, though never formally enacted, established an uneasy consensus between the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the Supreme Soviet and the Foreign Intelligence Service. The basic starting point of this report was that Russia remained a great power and that its special responsibility was for the 'building of a new system of positive mutual inter-state relations for the states of the former Soviet Union and that it (Russia) is the guarantor of the stability of these relations'. In line with this basic premise, the report focused particular attention to threats to Russia's integrity from its immediate vicinity, giving priority to the CIS and the strategic aim of the 'attainment of the maximal level of integration of the former Soviet Union as possible'.<sup>30</sup>

The impact that this more internally-focused prioritization of Russian foreign policy had on Russian attitudes to NATO was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, the priority accorded to threats in or close to the borders of the Russian Federation entailed a relaxation of the threat perceptions emanating from the Atlantic Alliance. This was most clearly reflected in the new Russian Military Doctrine published in November 1993 which, unlike the earlier draft doctrine of 1992, included no Cold War phraseology and identified instead local conflicts as the main threat, noting that 'of particular danger are the armed conflicts engendered by aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance'.<sup>31</sup> Russian officials also emphasised that they supported the continued existence of NATO so long as the Alliance transformed itself from a military-political grouping to become an instrument for guaranteeing stability on the basis of the principles of collective security.<sup>32</sup>

However, this highly conditional understanding of the proper function and role of NATO also meant that Russia remained highly sensitive to any perceived intention on the part of the Alliance to extend the activities or structures of NATO closer to the borders of the Russian Federation. The full extent of this Russian ambivalence only became fully apparent to the West after President Yeltsin appeared to sanction Polish membership of NATO during his visit to Warsaw in August 1993. In Western capitals it appeared that, in one stroke, the spectre of Russian opposition to eastward enlargement had been overcome. In response, the German government, whose Defence Minister Volker Ruehe had been an early advocate of Polish membership, came out in official support of enlargement.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, also confirmed that NATO's move towards the east represented the new mission of the Alliance.<sup>34</sup>

However, the actual wording of the Russian-Polish joint declaration signed at the end of Yeltsin's visit only offered a highly conditional acquiescence to Polish membership of NATO. It was noted that the Polish stance met with Yeltsin's understanding and that 'in the long term, such a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interests of the overall European integration does not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia'.<sup>35</sup> As Russian diplomats were later to confirm, this only presupposed Polish membership in NATO for the distant future and only as part of the larger process of European integration.<sup>36</sup> Yeltsin himself asserted this in a letter he sent in late September to the leaders of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. In this letter, he reportedly argued that the countries of Central Europe could only become members if Russia was also invited and noted that enlargement was illegal 'under the terms of the international deal that led to German unification in 1990'.<sup>37</sup>

After this reversal in the official Russian position, the period up to the NATO Summit in January 1994 saw an escalation of the dispute between Russia and NATO over the issue of enlargement. This external dispute also coincided with the dramatic unfolding of the internal political struggle within Russia, the storming of the White House in September and the election of a highly conservative and nationalist Duma in December. Although most of Russia's political energies were focused on this internal struggle, attention was also given to articulating the substance of Russian interests and opposition to the principle of NATO enlargement. This was given its fullest expression in a report at the end of 1993 entitled "Perspectives on the Enlargement of NATO and Russian Interests" prepared by the Foreign Intelligence service, under the leadership of Yevgeny Primakov.<sup>38</sup>

Following closely the new priorities set out in the Foreign Policy Concept of April 1993, the intelligence report reached three main conclusions over the potentially negative consequences of enlargement. First, in terms of developments within Russia, it was argued that enlargement would require a substantial restructuring and strengthening of defence capabilities which would greatly strain the Russian defence budget and, if not implemented, could potentially lead to the 'dissatisfaction of armed circles, which would not be in the interest of the political and military leadership of Russia'. More generally, enlargement could result in greater anti-Western sentiments, stimulating the strengthening of domestic isolationist feeling.

Second, in terms of Russian interests in the CIS, enlargement would be viewed as extending NATO's zone of responsibility towards the borders of the Russian Federation, internationalising local conflicts within the CIS and potentially undermining the CIS Collective Security system. In this regard, particular attention

**was given to the prospect of Baltic entry into NATO, since it was argued that this would directly contradict the defined Russian interest of ensuring no third-party military presence in the region of these states.<sup>39</sup> Third, it was argued that, an enlarged NATO, which had not simultaneously transformed itself into a 'post-confrontation collective security mechanism', threatened the return of bloc politics and the drawing of new confrontation lines in eastern Europe.**

**In terms of the specific diplomatic struggle to ensure that the oncoming NATO summit did not commit itself to enlargement, Kozyrev and the Foreign Ministry continually raised the spectre of a reactionary red-brown or communist-nationalist alliance which would overturn Yeltsin's reformist government. This was a theme which Kozyrev had regularly resorted to, most notably at his infamous mock "hard-line" speech at the CSCE ministerial meeting in Stockholm in December 1992.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, this approach appears to have reaped dividends. In the latter part of 1993 US and German officials initially supportive of fast enlargement were persuaded by Strobe Talbot that, after the suppression of the Russian parliamentary opposition, 'it would draw a line across Europe and strengthen nationalist forces and critics of reform within Russia'.<sup>41</sup>**

**The eventual compromise reached at the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994 was, at least initially, viewed as a significant diplomatic victory for Russia. At that Summit, NATO did commit itself to the principle of enlargement but the nature of this commitment was left vague and ill-defined. The more substantive proposals related to the Partnership for Peace programme (PFP) which defined new avenues and mechanisms for cooperation between NATO and non-NATO members. However, from the Russian perspective, what was important was that PFP did not breach the principle of inclusiveness established by NACC and did not set out any specific linkage or timetable for the acquisition of full membership of NATO. As a result, Russian officials boasted that, due to the success of their diplomatic efforts, NATO had been dissuaded from 'extending eastwards...and the programme is in effect an alternative to enlarging the alliance through the early admission of members'.<sup>42</sup> A more cautious note was sounded by Sergei Karaganov who suggested that Russia had only won 'the first round' in its struggle with NATO.<sup>43</sup>**

### **Towards the Second NATO-Russia Crisis**

**In the first few months of 1994, the initial Russian enthusiasm for PFP was overtaken by a predominantly negative public debate, which included two special hearings in the Duma. The domestic critics of the NATO Summit agenda strongly advocated that Russia should not participate in PFP for four major reasons;**

first, because PFP was interpreted not so much as an alternative but as a vehicle for preparing the central and eastern European countries for membership of NATO at a later stage; second, since there remained the theoretical possibility of membership being offered to the countries of the former Soviet Union; third, due to the fact that PFP treated Russia as an equal to smaller partners and did not recognise Russia's great power status; and finally, since PFP's objective of promoting interoperability and standardization of weapons systems represented a significant threat to Russian arms markets in central and eastern Europe.<sup>44</sup>

These arguments were, though, counter-balanced by those who viewed a Russian rejection of PFP as undermining the earlier diplomatic success of countering fast enlargement, leading to Russia's self-isolation and inability to influence the future course of NATO.<sup>45</sup> On this basis, an uneasy compromise was reached between the Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry to promote a two-pronged campaign. The first prong involved a Russian diplomatic effort to make Russian agreement to PFP conditional on NATO developing a special relationship with Russia outside of the PFP framework, which would include regular and *ad hoc* consultations. Implicit in this campaign was that any Russian commitment to PFP would be withdrawn if NATO accelerated the process of enlargement.

The second element of this campaign was the promotion of a Russian initiative to reform the CSCE so that it would assume a 'coordinating role' in European security affairs, with an overarching responsibility for all the principal European multilateral institutions such as the CIS, NACC, the EU, the Council of Europe, the WEU, as well as NATO. As set out by Kozyrev at the Vienna Permanent Council of the CSCE in June 1994, Russia advocated turning the CSCE into a fully-fledged international organisation with its own governing body, including an executive committee modelled on the UN Security Council.<sup>46</sup> A further objective of the Russian initiative was to obtain CSCE legitimisation for Russian and CIS peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

However, despite the energy expended in promoting this two-pronged campaign, the eventual outcome was broadly recognised in Moscow to be a comprehensive failure. As regards the CSCE proposals, Russia found itself almost completely isolated as there emerged almost no support from the other parties to CSCE for the body to assume a pan-European responsibility which would offer Russia such a powerful role in pan-European security affairs. At the CSCE Summit in Budapest in December 1994, the conference was elevated to an organisation but without any substantive reform of its structures, functions or authority.<sup>47</sup> The countries of east and central Europe were, in particular, strongly opposed to any ending of the principle of consensus in the decision making process of the CSCE.<sup>48</sup>

In addition, Russia found itself backtracking on its ambitions to attain CSCE legitimization of CIS peacekeeping operations. Russian enthusiasm diminished as other CSCE countries sought to ensure that CSCE legitimization would be conditional on a Russian agreement to limit its participation in such operations and to accept internationally-recognised standards of peacekeeping practice. Russian sensitivities were also exercised by the CSCE engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In the latter part of 1995, Russian officials started criticising the CSCE for allegedly taking the side of Azerbaijan and for seeking to marginalize the Russian role in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.<sup>49</sup> Kozyrev dismissed CSCE mediation in Nagorno-Karabakh as an 'immature' attempt to compete with Russian mediation and called for the CSCE to 'renounce its rivalry in the Karabakh conflict...in favour of practical assistance to Russia's diplomatic efforts'.<sup>50</sup> More generally, Russian diplomacy sought to minimize CSCE practical involvement in CIS peacekeeping by stressing that 'an agreement between Russia and the CSCE should be a general textbook establishing broad rules which can be used in every situation'.<sup>51</sup>

As with Russia's ambitions towards the CSCE, so the campaign to secure a more prominent Russian role within NATO proved ultimately to be unsuccessful. Initially, progress was made. In June 1994, Russia signed up to the PFP framework document as the NATO Council in Istanbul agreed to develop relations with Russia both within and outside the PFP framework, though strong reservations remained amongst NATO members over the wisdom of regular consultations with Russia. At the same time, a landmark EU-Russia Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation was signed. In September, the evidence of a warming of Russian-NATO relations appeared to be confirmed by the staging on Russian territory of the first US-Russian peacekeeping exercise.

However, these moves towards a *rapprochement* between Russia and NATO were undercut by the decision at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1994 to commit itself to initiating an enlargement study which would prepare NATO to make a decision on inviting new members by the end of 1995. Although not to Russia's liking, this decision by NATO should not have been unexpected. The American political establishment had, in particular, been moving towards a more assertive pro-enlargement position with Clinton promising in Warsaw in July that the issue of NATO enlargement 'is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion will not depend on the appearance of a new threat in Europe'.<sup>52</sup> Internal developments within the United States, particularly the Congressional elections which had brought in a Republican majority strongly committed to fast expansion, had also contributed to this shift. But, in

**addition, the outcome of the December 1993 parliamentary elections in Russia, and the subsequent removal of key reformists from the Chernomyrdin government, strengthened those in the US administration who advocated enlargement as a 'protective shield' if things should go badly wrong in Russia.<sup>53</sup>**

**However predictable this outcome might have been, it still represented a severe blow to Yeltsin and more especially to Kozyrev and the Foreign Ministry. Kozyrev's response was an unprofessional display of diplomatic pique at the North Atlantic Council in December 1994 as he refused to sign, in front of the awaiting cameras, the formerly agreed PFP Individual Partnership Programme and the special NATO-Russia protocol. At the CSCE Summit a few days after the NATO Summit, Yeltsin escalated the sense of crisis by declaring that 'Europe, which has not had time to rid itself of the legacy of the cold war, runs the risk of plunging in to a "cold peace"'.<sup>54</sup> At a press conference later, he confirmed Russia's opposition to enlargement since 'Russia cannot accept NATO's borders being moved right up to the border of the Russian Federation'.<sup>55</sup> A few days later, the full-scale Russian military attack on Chechnya only increased the sense of crisis in Russia's relations with the West.**

**Nevertheless, despite the dual setbacks of the NATO and CSCE Summits, Kozyrev continued to sanction the search for a compromise with NATO which might offset the negative consequences for Russia of the accession of new members from central and east Europe. However, the domestic constituency supportive of such a compromise was becoming increasingly beleaguered. In February 1995, Kozyrev sent Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgii Mamedov, to Washington to start negotiations with the US administration over the conditions of NATO's enlargement. In particular, Mamedov sought to ensure that there would be no stationing of nuclear weapons or NATO combat troops on the territory of any future new members.<sup>56</sup> But, once these negotiations became known in Moscow, the outcry by the opposition forced Yeltsin publicly to dress down Kozyrev in a speech before the Foreign Ministry Collegium.<sup>57</sup>**

**At the end of May, though, Russia did finally sign the Individual Partnership Programme of PFP and the framework for a political relationship outside of PFP which was set out in an enhanced Russia-NATO Dialogue and Cooperation document. However, the political mood in Moscow was visibly hardening in its attitude to NATO. The Defence Ministry and General Staff remained opposed to PFP and ensured a commitment that Russia would withdraw from PFP if the North Atlantic Council agreed to enlargement. It was also generally recognised in Moscow that the enhanced Russia-NATO Dialogue and Cooperation**

agreement was unsatisfactory and offered more in the way of dialogue than any substantive cooperation.<sup>58</sup>

The hardening of political attitudes was most fully reflected in a report entitled 'Russia and NATO' prepared by the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy in June 1995.<sup>59</sup> The report warned that the NATO-Russia dispute over enlargement could lead to 'the first serious crisis in relations between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War'. It was suggested that 'especially in the United States, there is a desire to consolidate the geopolitical sphere achieved by "winning" the Cold War'. Even though it was recognised that the 'interests are understandable and legitimate' of those countries seeking membership, 'Russia does not consider [this] an optimum and well-balanced response to their anxiety. If they join NATO, the security of the eastern and central European countries will be achieved at the cost of Russian security'. As such, it was recommended that 'official or semi-official talks on "compensating" Russia for NATO enlargement should be avoided at all costs'.

### **From the Third NATO-Russia Crisis to the Founding Act**

The report 'Russia and NATO' presaged a severe deterioration in Russia-NATO relations which was to lead to the third and most serious bilateral crisis lasting from September of 1995 to the end of 1996. There were three major factors behind this crisis. The first was that the NATO-Russia relationship became inextricably intertwined with the Russian opposition to NATO actions in the escalating conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Ever since 1992 and the initial Russian engagement in the conflict, the Yeltsin administration had faced a difficult balancing act to support its Western allies whilst placating the nationalist pro-Serb sentiments in the Russian legislature. This was manageable so long as the West did not take serious action to enforce its view that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for the conflict and Russia's verbal defence of the Serbs satisfied domestic critics while not provoking a crisis with the West.

However, during the course of 1995, this careful balancing act became increasingly unsustainable. In June, after NATO had engaged in air-attacks on Bosnian Serb ammunition dumps, NATO decided to deploy a Rapid Reaction Force. Despite the signing a few days earlier of the Russia-NATO agreements, Russia was not forewarned of this development.<sup>60</sup> After further air-strikes in an effort to save the UN safe havens of Srebrenica and Zepa, the State Duma passed a resolution blaming NATO and calling for Russia's unilateral withdrawal from the sanctions regime against the former Yugoslavia. The nationalist rhetoric only intensified with the successful Croatian offensive in August which saw the expulsion of the Krajina

**Serbs. The failure of the West to condemn this Croatian offensive was viewed in Moscow as particularly hypocritical.**

**The final straw came with the large-scale bombardment of Serb sites at the beginning of September. Again, Russia was not given any prior warning of these attacks and Moscow's disquiet intensified as it was the United States and its energetic mediator Richard Holbrooke who took the diplomatic initiative, effectively marginalizing Russia's role. This time both the government and the Duma strongly attacked these NATO actions. Yeltsin accused NATO that 'in proclaiming its "peacekeeping mission", the North Atlantic alliance has essentially taken upon the role of both judge and jury'.<sup>61</sup> The Russian government even accused NATO of committing genocide against the Bosnian Serbs.<sup>62</sup> Kozyrev was also strongly criticised for failing to stop these attacks at the United Nations and this criticism, along with his failed campaign against NATO enlargement, effectively terminated his career as Foreign Minister.<sup>63</sup>**

**Although the Yugoslav thorn in Russia-NATO relations was partially removed by the Dayton Accords and Russia's agreement to participate in the ensuing Implementation Force (IFOR), NATO's actions in the former Yugoslavia during 1995 did cause serious long-term damage to Russian perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance. First, since Russia was not consulted about these actions, despite the NATO-Russia agreements which were assumed in Moscow to ensure such consultations under the 16+1 formula, these episodes were taken to represent another example of Western betrayal and duplicity. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the large-scale NATO attacks were taken as conclusive evidence that the Alliance had ceased to subscribe in practice to its proclaimed purely defensive functions. As Aleksei Arbatov, a prominent democratic figure in the Duma noted, 'the massive air-attacks of NATO on the Bosnian Serbs from the Summer of 1995 demonstrated that force, and not patient negotiations, remained the principal instrument of diplomacy and that Moscow's position was only taken into account so long as it did not contradict the line taken by the United States. In the eyes of the majority of Russians, the myth of the exclusively defensive nature of NATO was exploded'.<sup>64</sup>**

**The second major development which also contributed to the deterioration of NATO-Russian relations was the publication of the NATO enlargement study in September 1995. From the Russian perspective, the study was problematic not solely because it paved the way for the political decision to invite new members to join the Alliance. The study also singularly failed to provide any reassurance for Russian concerns over the nature and conditions of the process of enlargement.**

To begin with and in a clear reference to Russia, the study stressed that 'no country outside the alliance should be given a veto or *droit de regard* over the process and decisions of enlargement'. The study also noted that any new members would have to be full members, implicitly excluding the French or Spanish-style variants of membership which would have been more acceptable to Russia. Any new potential members were also required not to 'foreclose the option' of foreign troops and nuclear weapons being stationed on their territory, although there was no '*a priori* requirement' for this to be the case. The study also concluded that the process of enlargement remained open-ended and did not preclude any NATO Partner, including the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, from potential membership.<sup>65</sup> For the Russian military, in particular, such disregard for Russia's perceived military security concerns was unacceptable. In late September, indications of the Russian military's opposition were reflected in lurid, if unauthenticated, reports of a new military doctrine which sanctioned immediate invasion of the Baltic states if they were ever offered membership of NATO.<sup>66</sup>

The final factor which contributed to the deterioration in Russian-NATO relations was the start of the campaigns for the parliamentary elections in December 1995 and for the presidential election in July 1996. In the highly nationalist atmosphere of this period, no serious discussion of compromise with NATO could be contemplated. Instead, practically all political figures and significant interest groups competed in asserting the strength of their opposition to NATO. The period was also marked by more well-defined and uncompromising threats of possible Russian retaliation to enlargement. The content and nature of these retaliatory policy options fell into three broad categories. The first set of options related to the specifically military and politico-military responses to any perceived strengthening and expansion of NATO structures closer to the borders of the Russian Federation. One element of this was the threat by Russia to refuse to abide by, or fail to ratify, formerly agreed international arms control agreements. In this regard, attention was particularly focused on the 1990 CFE treaty and the Start II treaty. Russian officials emphasised that the conventional forces and arms limitations of the CFE treaty had been agreed when the Warsaw Pact still existed and at a time when there was no talk of NATO enlarging eastwards. A particular grievance was with the "flank limits" of the treaty, which capped the number of heavy weapons that Russia was permitted to position along its northern and southern borders.<sup>67</sup> Given that during 1995 Russia was already in severe breach of the CFE flank limits in the North Caucasus region due to the Chechen conflict, many Russian military figures argued that NATO enlargement would be an ideal excuse for tearing up the anachronistic CFE treaty.<sup>68</sup>

The START II agreement, which had been signed by Yeltsin and Clinton in January 1993 and which had been ratified by the US Senate but not by the Duma, was a similarly controversial issue. For many in the Russian political establishment, START II, which committed Russia and the United States to reduce their strategic arsenals to 3,500 weapons, was seen to provide a significant nuclear advantage to the United States, since it required Russia to engage in a more radical restructuring of its nuclear forces.<sup>69</sup> Again, the prospect of NATO enlargement provided a potential justification for non-ratification. More ominously, many Russian strategic analysts argued that Russia's conventional inferiority in relation to NATO required a far greater reliance on tactical nuclear weapons as a strategic counter-balance. One popular scenario was that, in response to NATO enlargement, tactical nuclear weapons would need to be deployed to Kaliningrad, Belarus and Western Russia.<sup>70</sup>

The second category of policy options related to Russian intentions to consolidate the integrative processes within the CIS in response to NATO enlargement. The underlying logic of this was first officially expressed by Defence Minister Pavel Grachev who noted that Russia would be forced to 'find allies' from among the CIS and countries of the former Soviet Union if Russia was faced by 'a new powerful bloc'.<sup>71</sup> The decree on CIS strategy signed by Yeltsin in September 1995 similarly stated that Russia would push harder for the transformation of the CIS into a true collective security alliance and aim for a more consistent implementation of completed military pacts, such as the May 1992 Tashkent collective security agreement.<sup>72</sup> More specifically, Russia promoted the process of integration with Belarus as being, at least in part, connected to the issue of NATO enlargement. Analogously, any indication that the Baltic states or Ukraine might be considering closer ties with NATO were attacked in Moscow with barely veiled threats of reprisals.<sup>73</sup>

The third set of policy options related to threats of a decisive shift in Russia's foreign policy orientation away from the West and towards the East. Again, the logic of this was driven by the Russian assertion that its potential exclusion from Europe due to NATO enlargement would necessitate a more assertive diplomatic strategy to the countries to its East and South. With the accession of the noted orientalist, Yevgeny Primakov, as Foreign Minister, this eastward tilt appeared to take a more substantive form. Russian economic and military cooperation with Iran, which had already been a major issue of contention with the United States, was strengthened. In April 1996, Yeltsin visited China and he noted with approval both the warming of Sino-Russian relations and China's agreement in opposing NATO enlargement.<sup>74</sup> More generally, Russian diplomats made clear that there were a

**number of anti-Western countries, such as Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea, which had historically close ties with Russia, as well as representing important arms markets, and with whom closer relations could be reinstated.**

**However, despite the escalating rhetoric of Russia's potential negative policy responses to NATO enlargement, in the middle of 1996 there were signs that Russia had decided on a more pragmatic approach. In the 16+1 NATO-Russia meeting in July 1996, Primakov singled out the 'nucleus that is absolutely unacceptable to Moscow - moving up NATO's infrastructure to our borders. On this basis, Russia is inviting NATO to conduct a dialogue, and now they have agreed to this.'**<sup>75</sup>

**This shift toward a more accommodating Russian posture was driven by a number of factors. First, Yeltsin's victory in the presidential election and the inclusion of key reformist and pro-Western figures in the government, most notably the influential Head of Administration Anatoly Chubays, provided a critical momentum to the search for a resolution of the continuing NATO-Russia crisis. Second, the fact that Primakov would be responsible for these negotiations with NATO, and was someone not tainted with the Kozyrev's perceived predilection to concessions to the West, lessened domestic opposition to a compromise. Finally, the fact that NATO had committed itself to inviting new members in July 1997 and had demonstrated a greater willingness to accommodate Russian concerns concentrated minds in Moscow.**

**The dynamic towards more intensive negotiations gained full steam after the December 1996 NATO Summit set out firmly the objective of reaching an agreement 'at the earliest possible date' to 'intensifying and consolidating relations with Russia beyond the Partnership for Peace'. With this in mind, the final communiqué identified what became known as the "three no's" - that 'NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or policy - and we do not foresee any future need to do so'.**

**In the subsequent intensive rounds of negotiations between Russia and NATO during the first half of 1997, the Russian negotiators, led by Yevgeny Primakov, focused on three principal objectives - no extension of NATO "infrastructure", though what was meant by this was left deliberately vague; a final NATO-Russia agreement which would be legally binding; and a new Russia-NATO institutional forum where Russia would have the right of regular consultation and, ideally, a right of veto. For its part, NATO countries were willing to make concessions to Russia so long as they did not breach what Strobe Talbot described as the "five no's": no Russian expectation of a delay in the process of enlargement itself;**

**no Russian veto either over NATO enlargement decisions or over NATO internal matters; no exclusion of any state over the longer term from the process of enlargement; no second-class membership for the new members; and no interference in NATO decision making, which encompassed no subordination of NATO to the UN Security Council or any other forum.**

The final agreement which was reached at Paris in May for the signing of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" broadly fulfilled these NATO conditions.<sup>76</sup>

Russia secured the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council it was seeking but it was explicitly stated that this mechanism 'for consultation and coordination and, to the maximum extent, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint actions ... will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia'. Also, it was noted that the provisions of the Act 'do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other'. On the issue of extension of NATO "infrastructure", Russia secured in addition to the NATO "three no's" on deployment of nuclear weapons a commitment from NATO that 'in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than additional permanent stationing of substantial combat troops'.

In the diplomatic efforts to secure Russian support for an agreement, NATO countries also offered a number of other incentives. In June 1996, Russia was given a further three years to meet the CFE flank limits and at the same time the flank area was contracted, thereby permitting Russia to deploy more heavy weapons along its southern and northern borders. At the Yeltsin-Clinton Summit in Helsinki in March, the United States also acceded to the long-standing Russian objective of shifting CFE negotiations away from a bloc-to-bloc to a regional and national basis. Clinton also offered Russia, once and if START II was ratified by Russia, the prospect of moving directly to negotiations for a START III treaty, which would lead to further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and overcome some of the anxieties and perceived costs and disadvantages for Russia of implementation of START II. In addition, Clinton offered Russia full membership of the G7/G8 as well as supporting Russian membership of the World Trade Organisation and the Paris Club of lenders.

Taken as an overall package, these various incentives and concessions provided the political ammunition for the Yeltsin administration to sign up to the Founding Act and thereby open the path for Russian acquiescence, if not support, for the invitation to countries of central and east Europe to join the Alliance in

**Madrid in July 1997. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia's fundamental opposition to enlargement has been assuaged or that large sections of the political establishment do not remain hostile to the intentions of the Alliance. The existence of the 260 members of the Anti-NATO non-factional association in the State Duma, which vigorously denounced the signing of the Founding Act, confirmed that the relationship between NATO and Russia remained fraught with significant sources of mutual distrust and suspicion.<sup>77</sup>**

## **Chapter 2**

### **Deconstructing Russian Distrust of the Atlantic Alliance**

**The objective of this chapter is to seek to identify the main sources of the highly ambivalent Russian attitude towards the Atlantic Alliance, which has**

**made the evolution of the NATO-Russian relationship, as seen in the previous chapter, so difficult and sensitive.**

**The first point is to emphasise that, barring the most extreme communist and nationalist opposition, perceptions of the Alliance differ fundamentally from the Cold War period. There is no perception that NATO represents the existential external threat which it was believed to pose during the years of the Cold War. Indeed, it is generally recognised that, in terms of external threats, Russia enjoys an almost unprecedentedly unthreatening environment. As one Russian diplomat has suggested, 'traditional military threats from both the European and Asian directions have disappeared. Russia has found itself in a situation similar to what it had been confined to for the total of 7-8 years after the Berlin Congress and the formation of the Triple Alliance'.<sup>78</sup>**

**This absence of a direct threat perception of NATO should not, though, obscure the deep sense of Russian disillusionment, disappointment and frustration with the perceived evolution of NATO strategy since 1990. Despite the success of the Founding Act, there remains in Russia an almost unified consensus in opposition to the principle of NATO enlargement. As Aleksei Arbatov has argued, only the small and now insignificant "super-liberals", such as Yegor Gaidar, Andrei Kozyrev, Sergei Yushenkov and Konstantin Borovoi, are exceptions to the overwhelming consensus 'from democrats to communists, patriots, great power advocates and nationalists who consider the enlargement of NATO to be contrary to the interests of Russia'.<sup>79</sup>**

**Given the absence of a direct external threat posed by NATO, the sources of this continuing distrust must be found in the more complex, and constantly evolving, Russian self-perception of its own identity in relation to the outside world in the radically changed post-Cold War regional and international environment. It is in this introverted national and psychological crisis of self-identity, rather than in any particular actions or developments within the Atlantic Alliance, that the core, underlying reasons for Russia's continuing disaffection with the Atlantic Alliance must be located. It is, though, inherently difficult to disentangle this struggle for Russia's self-identity from the specifically Russian perceptions of the West and of NATO. All these differing perceptions, in the highly fragmented and complex situation existing in Russia, interconnect and are intertwined to a degree which makes any analytical separation difficult and, to a degree, necessarily artificial.**

**Nevertheless, the rest of this chapter will seek to make this analytical deconstruction. The first section will look at the extent to which history has offered a guide to Russia's post-Soviet identity. The following three sections will seek to**

**develop a composite picture of Russian perceptions of NATO moving from: first, Russian perceptions of domestic, internal developments; second, perceptions of Russia's desired relationship with the countries of the CIS; and finally to Russian perceptions of its place in the wider outside world. It will be argued that all these differing layers of perceptions and self-perceptions have contributed to the dominant Russian attitude towards NATO and the issue of NATO enlargement.**

### **History as a Guide to Russia's Predicament**

**It is clearly only stating the obvious that developments in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been an enormous psychological shock. The people and leaders of Russia have had to accustom themselves to an unprecedented withdrawal from empire, to the formation of new borders which in the European western part of the country correspond most closely to Muscovy's borders in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and to an unparalleled economic, social and military decline. In this context, history provides more evidence of discontinuity than of elements of continuity.**

**This sense of an almost ahistorical condition that Russia finds itself is most evident in the manner in which the collapse of Russian power has been generally interpreted. Amongst Russian people, there is a resistance to accepting parallels to the disintegration of other earlier empires, such as the Ottoman empire or the Austro-Hungarian empire. Even though 'the tragedy of the loss of a 1,000 year state' is regularly mourned, it is not presupposed that this loss is permanent or cannot be reversed.**

**In addition, there has emerged in Russia a considerable reluctance to perceiving Russia's post-Soviet condition as comparable to the fate of Germany or Japan after World War II. Unlike these countries, Russians are quick to stress that they have not suffered a decisive military defeat but have, to a large extent, willingly and voluntarily taken on the burdens of moving towards democratisation, economic reform and imperial withdrawal. As such, alongside the sense of humiliation at their present weakness, there exists a strong feeling of pride and self-worth.**

**It is this underlying sense of continuing Russian exceptionalism which explains why there quickly emerged such a strong opposition to Kozyrev's early perceived "romantic embrace" of the West. Dissatisfaction with Kozyrev's approach lay mainly in the perception that it was condemning Russia to a role analogous to post-World War II fate of Germany and Japan. Instead of the full partnership with the West which Kozyrev promised, the Russian political establishment came to sense**

a Western determination "to dictate the terms of the post-war peace, to redesign its political and economic system as they saw fit and to deprive [Russia] of the right to its own foreign policy".<sup>80</sup> It was in the Russian reaction to this perceived Western agenda that the notion of Russian "great power" status (*derzhavnost*) and the need to shift to a geopolitical assertion of Russian national interests became predominant. This shift became formalised in the Foreign Policy Concept published in April 1993 (see above p. 12-3).

However, from the Russian perspective, this geopolitical turn was not a proactive but a reactive departure. As one Russian analyst suggested, it was driven by the fact that:

While Russia rejected the logic of geopolitics in 1988-1992, the West showed that that logic was alive and at work. This alone destroyed Kozyrev's concept of deliberate subordination to American leadership, since that concept meant going along with the US's endeavour to strengthen its geopolitical position as much as possible at the expense of Russia's weakened influence.<sup>81</sup>

But, even though a consensus in Russia emerged of the need to assert Russia's interests as a great power - a theme which was repeated in an almost mantra-like fashion from 1993 onwards - the far more difficult question was how to realise these pretensions to greatness given the actual conditions of pervasive Russian weakness and international marginalization.

In attempting to answer this question, two competing approaches can be identified in Russian discourse, which can be broadly characterised as following "geopolitical" as "geoeconomic" principles.<sup>82</sup> The geopolitical approach rests on a traditional understanding of the roots of Russia's historical greatness and the manner in which this greatness was attained. It presupposes that Russia's national security interests are most adequately safeguarded by the acquisition or control of territory over the vast Eurasian landmass which is required to provide a vital margin of safety against any external threat of the use of force. More broadly, it defines greatness in terms of technological and military capabilities, based on a geopolitical and geostrategic space under Russian control and Russian-dominated structures of economic integration.

Such geopolitical thinking is clearly present in the November 1993 Russian military doctrine which relies on forward defence, on the entrenchment of territorial defences and on the existence of a security perimeter which is as long as possible. The admonition in the military doctrine that 'no foreign forces are to be deployed to countries bordering the Russian Federation' corresponds to a traditional geopolitical view of a buffer zone around Russia. Likewise, the dislike of a

concentration of power in the rest of the European continent, which Russian leaders have historically sought to weaken through promoting looser proposals for a pan-European collective security system, represents a long-standing and traditional Russian geopolitical objective, stretching from Alexander I proposals for a collective security system in 1815 to Yeltsin's proposed reforms of the CSCE in 1994-5.<sup>83</sup>

In general, this geopolitical outlook provides the underlying rationale for much of the Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, as well as of the frequent demands for a consolidation of CIS integration. However, despite its rhetorical dominance, the logic of geopolitics does not have a monopoly in Russian strategic thinking and is counter-balanced by what might be called a "geoeconomic" approach. However, this approach does not question the premise that Russia must restore its greatness. Rather, its critique is the manner in which this is to be achieved. The first argument it makes is that the presence of nuclear weapons has radically undermined traditional geopolitical thinking, since the possession of such weapons undercuts the value of territory. In fact, the Russian military has implicitly accepted this logic by conceding that Russia's nuclear arsenal acts as an "equalising" factor to NATO's overwhelming conventional superiority. As such, the nuclear protective shield significantly reduces the Russian General Staff's sense of a direct and immediate threat from NATO as a consequence of the territorial expansion of the Alliance.

The second, and perhaps more critical, argument of the advocates of this alternative approach is that any attempt to realise practically the imperatives of traditional geopolitical strategic thinking would be economically, politically and socially catastrophic. First, any attempt to use military force more widely to secure Russian interests would, as shown by the Chechen debacle, only lead to the further disintegration and demoralisation of the Russian armed forces. As such, reconstructing a viable defence against a perceived new Western threat as a result of NATO enlargement, would be economically unviable and would undermine attempts at military reform, leading to the collapse, rather than the regeneration, of the Russian military.<sup>84</sup>

The second plank of this argument is that Russia's economic situation demands an economy open to international trade and world markets as well as a willingness to integrate with the stronger economies of the West. Autarchy, as the Soviet experience demonstrated, is not a possible avenue and any attempt to provoke a confrontation with the West would be economically highly damaging. The reality of underlying Russian support for this is shown in the fact that there is no opposition, indeed there is clear enthusiasm, for the process of EU integration and enlargement and for Russian engagement with the EU.<sup>85</sup> Associated with this is

**the view that, despite the perceived lack of Western sensitivity to Russian interests, Western countries continue to be vital allies for Russia, in particular as regards to the potential and actual threats emanating from the East and the South. On a more sober assessment of Russia's strategic interests, the potential threats of Islamic fundamentalism or a resurgent nationalist China demand relations of cooperation rather than confrontation with the West.<sup>86</sup>**

**The geo-economic approach, therefore, suggests a more pragmatic and compromising stance towards the West and the issue of NATO enlargement. It has been this underlying logic which, though far less prominent in Russian discourse, has ensured that compromises have so far been reached in the NATO-Russian relationship. As such, it is the critical antidote to the confrontational logic of the geopolitical approach.**

**Nevertheless, both the geo-economic and geopolitical approaches have certain elements in common. They both assume the need for Russia to regain its greatness, to reassert its dominance in the region of the former Soviet Union and to restore Russia's status in the international community. Both approaches are, as a result, revisionist in their intentions, though one relying on military power as a short-cut to these ambitions and the other on more conventional economic, political and military means for the restoration of Russian power. Both approaches also retain a sense of humiliation at the reality of Russia's weakness. And it is in this widely perceived sense of shame and humiliation, driven by the fact of Russian weakness, that provides the most fertile source for Russia's continuing opposition and distrust of NATO.**

### **The Domestic Context of Russian Perceptions of NATO**

**In essence, the sources of Russian distrust of NATO are principally symbolic in nature. For Russia, NATO acts as a symbol of the West's power and economic strength, which secured the West's "victory" in the Cold War. The developments in NATO since 1990, most prominently the issue of eastward enlargement, are further symbolic of the West's perceived failure to take Russian interests into account and to act in a manner which exacerbates rather than contributes to the resolution of Russia's difficulties. The negative symbolic imagery of NATO are only accentuated when reflected in the mirror of Russia's continuing decline and the difficulties Russia has faced in seeking to overcome this decline.**

**From the Russian perspective, the post-Soviet Russian state faces challenges from three levels. First, it faces the principally domestic challenge of**

reversing the centripetal forces which have led to chronic economic weakness, the fragmentation of the structures of political power, and the acceleration of the process of regionalization which has threatened to undermine the territorial integrity of the state. The second level is on the wider stage of the CIS and the states of the former Soviet Union. Here, again, the Russian challenge has been to reverse the post-Soviet centripetal forces and to restore, if ideally in a voluntary and non-coercive form, the economic, political and military ties which had been destroyed since 1991. For the political establishment in Moscow, such a restoration of the post-Soviet space, even if partial, is a *sine qua non* for the resurrection of Russia's great power status. The third level is in the broader context of Russia's wider European and international position and how Russia might restore the weight and importance in international affairs it feels is its due given Russia's historical and geostrategic centrality in international affairs.

On all these different levels, the issue of NATO and eastward enlargement plays a significant role. In the context of the domestic internal political struggle, concern over NATO enlargement is most acutely raised by those figures supportive of a pro-westernising and pro-reform orientation for Russia. This was a constant theme in Kozyrev's criticism of NATO's eastward ambitions as he argued that this would only strengthen the forces of reaction within Russia. Grigorii Yavlinski, the leader of the Yabloko faction, has rather more vividly described this perception in an interview given during his presidential electoral campaign in 1997:

For simple people in some Siberian villages it sounds as if they are sitting in their orchard and, as they talk, they see a tank is moving, approaching their orchard. But someone says: "It's not really a tank. It is a pink thing with flowers, with girls dancing on that, it is a very peaceful machine. It is not fighting, it is just a peaceful tank". [Russian] people are saying: "Still, it is a tank".... So it is very difficult to explain what NATO means and how it works".<sup>87</sup>

In a wider historical context, the problems identified by Kozyrev and Yavlinskii reflect a recurring problem that Russian pro-westernisers have traditionally faced in securing domestic support for their stance. The famous nineteenth century pro-westerniser, Theodore Herzen, was continually upset by the negative perceptions of Russia expressed by his west European liberal colleagues.<sup>88</sup> The sense that the West does not consider Russia to be truly western, that it fails the test of being 'a civilised and normal country', places pro-Western figures in a difficult domestic position in relation to their more assertive nationalist or eurasianist opponents. In the NATO enlargement debate, it is difficult for them to argue convincingly that this process is in no way connected to western perceptions

**that Russia is still to be considered as a potential threat. It cannot be obscured that there remain significant western concerns over such developments as the Chechen war and the election of extreme communist and nationalist figures to the State Duma. In addition, despite all verbal statements to the contrary, there can be no avoiding the fact that one of the contingencies that an enlarged NATO would prepare for is a Russia returning to its old imperialist habits.**

**It would be a mistake, though, to see the domestic internal struggle within Russia as a simple bifurcated struggle between pro-Western democrats and anti-Western communist and nationalists. In reality, the political, economic and military structures within Russia are extremely fragmented and disconnected. The absence of the central coordinating structures of the Communist Party's apparatus, and the corresponding centralised control over the economy, has meant that policy making since the collapse of the Soviet Union has become fragmented and dispersed.**

**It is not only that, as can be seen in the evolution of Russian policy making towards the enlargement issue, the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, and the Presidential Administration have promoted differing and competing policies. Political power is also wielded by certain economic interest groups or cartels, the most visible of which are those groups connected respectively to the energy sector, the industrial sector, the military-industrial sector and the banking and financial sector. All of these competing economic cartels have their own specific interests which promote differing degrees of protectionism or openness to Western markets and which can manipulate the issue of NATO enlargement to their own particular political benefit. For example, as Yavlinskii has argued, the military-industrial complex would benefit from a more confrontational relationship with the West, since this would increase domestic demand for their products, act as a catalyst for the reintegration of the CIS and the Soviet military-industrial infrastructure, and open markets in the Middle East and elsewhere currently closed by Russian-supported sanctions regimes.<sup>89</sup>**

**To an even greater degree, the Russian armed forces have been deeply affected by the damaging consequences of Russia's internal implosion. It is not only that the Russian army is demoralised and facing an acute economic crisis but large number of troops - some estimate almost half of all men under uniform - are not under the effective control of the General Staff but are at the service of 24 other ministries.<sup>90</sup> In addition, the delays and failure to pay the army from the centre has led to an increasing reliance on local and regional power centres, threatening a regionalization of the armed forces and the creation of independent regional armies.**

**From the Russian military perspective, NATO presents a problem primarily because its strength and sense of purpose only highlights the chronic weakness of the Russian armed forces. As such, it is very difficult for NATO states to convince Russian military leaders that it has engaged in a real internal transformation, which has greatly reduced the size and capabilities of the organisation, when the condition of the Russian armed forces is so dismal. NATO enlargement only accentuates the concerns of the Russian military since it appears to promote a strengthening of NATO's structures as well as a geopolitical extension of these structures closer to Russia's borders. Likewise, PFP's objective of encouraging interoperability and standardization of weapons systems to countries bordering the Russian Federation strengthens the perceptions of an deliberate policy of containment. Even on the level of bilateral Russia-NATO military contacts, PFP is viewed predominantly as demanding expensive joint peacekeeping exercises rather than offering assistance on the urgent demands facing the Russian armed forces of military reform and the modernisation of military structures and weapons systems.**

**In general, the conclusion to be drawn from the implications of NATO enlargement on domestic political developments in Russia is that a less distrustful and suspicious attitude to the Atlantic Alliance is dependent on a Russia overcoming its economic crisis and creating a reformed, modernised and more confident military. While Russia remains weak, NATO will inevitably remain a symbol of a victorious and unforgiving West. NATO's demonological status will only fully disappear once Russia has the self-confidence and the underlying power to perceive itself as an equal and thereby engage in genuine cooperation and collaboration in resolving those regional and international conflicts where there exist a genuine coincidence of Russian and NATO interests.**

### **The Regional Context of Russian Perceptions of NATO**

**As in the domestic sphere, Russia's perceptions of its own weakness and declining influence in the countries of the CIS is a critical factor in fostering a negative perception of NATO enlargement. Although it might seem that NATO and the CIS are independent from one another, Russian officials presuppose a close connection. In an interview given in mid-1996, Primakov noted that the two major irritations in Russian foreign policy were NATO expansion and perceived Western negative attitudes to CIS integration.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, the perceived connection is even closer in that NATO enlargement is generally considered in Moscow to be one element in an overarching Western strategy to undermine Russia's ambition to**

reverse the centrifugal forces within the CIS and to promote closer economic, political and military ties.

The key Western text to which Russian analysts refer as underpinning this negative Western attitude to CIS integration is an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled 'The Premature Partnership' by former US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.<sup>92</sup> In this article, Brzezinski argued that Western policy should shift from the idealistic goal of a full partnership with Russia to a more activist policy to defend and consolidate the political and economic sovereignty of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The policy he advocated he described as "geopolitical pluralism", which would seek as its principal objective to ensure that Russia would not succeed in its 'proto-imperial' ambition of becoming a 'mighty supranational state and a truly global power' through the 'economic and military integration of the once-Soviet states'. If pursued successfully, Brzezinski argued that Russia would finally have the chance to cease being an empire and become 'like France or Britain or earlier post-Ottoman Turkey, a normal state'. To illustrate this, he argued that in terms of Russian-Ukrainian relations, 'without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire'.

For the Russian political establishment, Brzezinski's article has become the canonical text for the belief that there has emerged 'a US interest to encourage centrifugal tendencies in the post-Soviet space'.<sup>93</sup> The perceived Western policy of geopolitical pluralism is also taken explicitly to oppose the clearly defined Russian policy towards the CIS which has been constantly reaffirmed by the Russian government. Indeed, Russian analysts agree with Brzezinski that 'without a strategic alliance with Ukraine, Russia will not become a genuinely great power which would in reality be appreciated, respected and addressed as a real power in the new system of international relations'.<sup>94</sup> Where there is a difference is that Russian analysts do not accept that such an alliance would resurrect a Russian empire. In essence, the major Russian complaint is that the West fails to make the distinction between a coercive and militarily-imposed process of integration, which the Russian government agrees would be unacceptable, and a voluntary coming-together of the states of the former Soviet Union based on a set of genuine mutual interests to promote closer economic, political and military ties.<sup>95</sup>

From the Russian perspective, the problem with NATO enlargement is that it appears to be a practical implementation of the policy of geopolitical pluralism. Even with the limited enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the process of NATO enlargement is perceived in Moscow to have damaging implications for Russian relations with the countries of the former Soviet

**Union. For a start, the fact that the process of NATO enlargement remains open-ended leaves countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states as potential candidates for the next wave of enlargement. Any hint that NATO might look favourably on applications from these countries produces the most neuralgic reaction from Moscow. Primakov has warned that a "second wave" including the Baltic states would be 'completely unacceptable' and that 'as soon as the Balts took such a path in Brussels, our dealings with NATO would be over'.<sup>96</sup> For the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that even the most reformist and pro-Western Russian government could compromise on this issue.**

**Even without any second wave of enlargement, Russia perceives a number of potentially damaging consequences of the accession of the Visegrad countries. Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to full members of NATO would, it is argued, lead NATO to adopt a more hard-line anti-Russian posture. Russian analysts also point to the fact that Poland historically has had border and territorial disputes with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine which, though currently latent, could be reasserted when Poland becomes a full member of NATO.**

**Russia is also conscious that an enlarged NATO would necessarily become more interested in the internal developments in bordering countries such as Belarus and Ukraine. In this regard, Russia has perhaps identified an issue which NATO states have not fully explored. For example, it is probable that NATO would have been more concerned about Belarus's authoritarian pro-Russian turn, and not deemed it largely a Russian affair, if Belarus had been NATO's forward position.<sup>97</sup> Related to this is the Russian fear that Poland might assume the role that Germany played during the Cold War and become the geostrategic battleground for diverging Russian and Western interests.**

**Russian concerns over NATO's eastward projection are also not limited to the region of central and eastern Europe but extend further south to the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. In some ways, it is in these regions that Russians perceive most strongly the sense of a geopolitical struggle for influence with the West. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Russia views one of the existing member states of NATO, Turkey, as having an explicit foreign policy objective of extending its influence in these regions at the expense of Russia. As such, Moscow tends to assume that there exists a Turkish-US ambition to utilise the PFP programme to wean the countries of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia away from their military and security dependence on Russia and to assert their independence from the CIS. In February 1997, the presidential spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, criticised the visit of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana to the countries of the Transcaucasus on the grounds that 'the undeclared, as it were behind-the-scenes**

**reasons' for the visit was that 'the West as a whole and the leadership of NATO in particular are against any forms of integration of the newly independent states, the republics of the former USSR'.<sup>98</sup>**

**As in the domestic sphere, the sources of this highly negative perception of NATO engagement in the CIS countries are closely related to the actual weakness of Russia's position in the CIS. It is generally recognised in Moscow that the Russian military is already over-extended in the post-Soviet region. The instrumentality of the use of military force to achieve Russian objectives is also seen to be counter-productive, as the Chechen episode demonstrated.**

**Yet, Russia also realises that the other instruments at its disposal, such as its economic or political levers, are currently insufficient for attaining Russia's general ambition of CIS integration. Certain countries, like Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are amenable to a fast process of integration. But, given that much of this willingness is driven by their economic backwardness and the chronic weakness of their state structures, this creates as many problems for Moscow as it solves. For those countries which have been more successful in constructing an independent national and state identity, Russia has found itself impotent to reverse a decline in its influence or to oppose their greater openness to the outside world. Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have all, to varying degrees, resisted attempts to give supranational powers to the CIS institutional structures.<sup>99</sup> Even with Russia's attempts to secure a CIS consensus in opposition to NATO enlargement, certain CIS countries refused to conform, including Uzbekistan whose President, Islam Karimov, described NATO as 'an organisation of democratic countries which does not threaten peace or calm'.<sup>100</sup>**

**The temptation for Moscow is to treat this reality of geopolitical diversity in the CIS as the outcome of a deliberate Western policy of fostering anti-Russian sentiments. This leads to the Russian predilection of viewing this region in geopolitical and bloc terms. There is a tendency to presuppose a pro-Russian axis, including not only countries like Kazakhstan and Armenia but also non-CIS states such as Iran and India, which is in competition with a pro-US axis of countries such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Pakistan. Such a bloc mentality, which is accentuated by perceived NATO intrusions into the region, undermines the prospects for Russian cooperation with NATO and the West over policies, such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and countering the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, where there exist genuine mutual interests and concerns.**

### **The International Context of Russian Perceptions of NATO**

**On the broader international context of Russian-NATO interaction, the principal overt source of Russian negative perceptions of the Alliance rests on the conviction that the West has been duplicitous with Russia over its plans for NATO and NATO enlargement. This conviction has gained an almost universal credence amongst the Russian policy establishment. The origins of this perception of Western dissimulation lie in the Russian claim that the West made a verbal promise not to enlarge NATO eastward during the negotiations for German unification. The signs of a shift in Western policy during 1993 provoked the first Russian claims of a betrayal. The belief in Moscow that the January 1994 NATO Summit had promoted PFP as an alternative to, rather than a preparatory stage for, enlargement was similarly a source of feelings of betrayal once NATO's policy of inviting new members became more explicit at the end of 1994. These perceptions became even more strongly embedded during 1995 when the NATO enlargement study was published and NATO was seen to be taking a highly activist military role in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.**

**The sense of betrayal and duplicity over NATO enlargement has not only become an article of faith amongst the Russian elite but the issue has been conflated to act as a symbol of Russian dissatisfaction over a number of other perceived negative Western actions towards Russia. These include the belief that, most notably in the period from 1988-1992, the West obtained a number of concessions from Russia which were detrimental to Russian interests. The CFE treaty, START II, Russian compliance with Western policy towards the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya - in all these areas it is felt that Russia has been disadvantaged and that the West has secured significant strategic gains at Russia's expense.**

**The belief that Western economic aid has failed to materialise to the degree that was initially promised or expected has only further contributed to this disillusionment with the West. Likewise, there is much popular support for the belief that the "shock therapy" economic reforms promoted by Western advisers were deliberately aimed at weakening the power of the Russian state. The perceived Western failure to condemn what Russians saw as the Latvian and Estonian disenfranchisement of their Russian immigrant populations during 1992 and 1993 was also a major turning point. As Anatol Lieven has argued, from this point on, 'the image of Westerners as mendacious hypocrites, using the language of democracy and partnership to trick Russia into strategic concessions' has been growing steadily in strength.<sup>101</sup>**

**As in the domestic and regional contexts, the temptation for Russia is to revert to a geopolitical approach which presupposes a Western opponent which is**

**seeking to gain unilateral advantage in a zero-sum competition for geopolitical influence. The buzz-word in this conception is that the United States is seeking to promote a 'unipolar' world which requires Russian counter-measures.<sup>102</sup> In April 1997, Yeltsin indicated such a geopolitical approach by expressing satisfaction at the 'China-Russia-India "triangle"<sup>103</sup>.**

**However, although there is a certain attraction for Moscow to promote the idea of Russia moving East if NATO moves East, the reality is, as one Russian commentator has noted, 'there is nowhere in the East to go'.<sup>104</sup> On a more sober strategic analysis, Russia has markedly more difficult and potentially more threatening neighbours to the East and South than it has to the West. As Britain handed back Hong Kong to China, it would not have passed Russian attention that large parts of Russian territory to the East were the subject to what China views as the "unequal treaties" of the nineteenth century. The problem of dealing with the rising power of China with its vast population is, on any serious analysis, a factor which should encourage Russian-Western cooperation rather than geopolitical competition. Likewise, there is a greater congruence than conflict in Russian and Western interests as regards resolving the many sources of conflict in the Middle East, whether in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf or in the Arab-Israeli arena.**

**In reality, during 1997, Russian leaders, and most notably the Foreign Minister Primakov, have gone to considerable lengths to delink any perceived connection between NATO enlargement and Russian *rapprochement* with countries of an anti-Western orientation. After Primakov met Tariq Aziz in Moscow in March 1997, he reassured the West that 'Russia's relations with Iran or Iraq are not now nor will become in the future a function of NATO expansion'.<sup>105</sup> The signing of the Founding Act was similarly an affirmation that the mutual interests of a stable Europe were ultimately dependent on a relationship of coexistence and cooperation, rather than of confrontation, between Russia and NATO. After much soul-searching, it was a critical reaffirmation of the need for Russia and the West to continue on the tortuous path of finding common ground rather than face the disastrous consequences of a return to a situation of Cold War confrontation.**

## **Conclusion**

**This Paper has argued that perceptions play a critical function in international relations and that it is particularly important to understand the perceptions of other states over issues of regional and international security which are of mutual concern. On this basis, the Paper has sought to understand the complex and, at times, bewildering, set of Russia perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance and, in particular, towards the issue of NATO enlargement. This involved an analysis of how these perceptions have developed and changed during the period from 1990-1997 and an attempt to identify the underlying sources and factors which have most directly influenced these perceptions.**

**The principal conclusions are that Russia continues to have a highly ambivalent, and at times explicitly negative, attitude to NATO and the post-Cold War developments within NATO. The factors which underlie this attitude, however, are complex and are driven by a number of concerns which are only tangentially connected to the existence of NATO or the particular actions of NATO. As much as what NATO says or does, Russian perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance are influenced by the serious internal crisis facing the Russian state, the problems that Russia faces in seeking to promote a process of integration amongst the CIS states, and by Russian feelings of exclusion and marginalization in the broader international arena. To a significant extent, the Atlantic Alliance and the issue of NATO enlargement have assumed a symbolic function to express, and deflect attention from, much of Russia's deep sense of frustration at its economic, political**

**and military decline and its disillusionment with the evolution of developments since the collapse of the Soviet Union.**

**The Paper argues that the strength of Russian opposition to NATO enlargement should not be underestimated, despite the manner in which this issue has become conflated with a number of other perceived problems that Russia faces. There remains the danger that Russia might pursue a negative geopolitical response to NATO enlargement which would have serious implications for European and international security. However, the geopolitical approach is not the only option available to Russia and there exists a strong counter-current which, though less visible in general Russian discourse, promotes regeneration for Russia through consolidating economic reforms, maintaining a Russia open to world markets and the outside world, and preserving relations of cooperation with the West. It is this alternative geo-economic approach which has promoted a more pragmatic attitude to NATO and which has provided the dynamic for compromise over the issue of NATO enlargement which resulted in the signing of the Founding Act in May 1997.**

**Perceptions are not, though, driven purely by internal factors.**

**Particularly in Russia's case, the manner in which the Russian political establishment interprets how the West perceives and judges Russia is a critical factor informing their own perceptions. Russia has always had a deep desire to be treated as an equal in European affairs and to be accepted as a legitimate and civilised partner. During some of the period which has been covered in this Paper, NATO, and the West more generally, have perhaps not accorded sufficient attention to seeking to reassure Russia over its intentions in enlarging NATO and in providing structures and mechanisms for enhancing NATO-Russia relations. However, this deficiency has subsequently been attended to through the intense diplomatic efforts during the latter part of 1996 and early 1997 to find common ground with Russia which, while preserving the vital interests of the Atlantic Alliance, would resolve some of Russia's core concerns and establish a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Forum which would provide Russia with a significant voice, if not veto, over NATO decisions.**

**The NATO-Russia Founding Act is a historic landmark in the post-Cold War evolution of NATO's transformation and a vital component in the emerging pan-European security framework. However, the Act does not signify the end but only a staging post in the difficult and complex evolution of NATO's relationship with Russia. Before any likelihood of a substantial change in Russian perceptions of NATO, Moscow will carefully evaluate if the Act genuinely secures Russian interests in practice. There will continue to be a highly cautious attitude which will be looking for any hint that the Act will be less substantive in practice than initially expected and which would then consign the agreement to another**

**example of Western perfidy and duplicity. The opponents of cooperation with the West and NATO will also be keenly looking out for any opportunity to present the Founding Act as Russia's and Boris Yeltsin's "Versailles Treaty". For its own part, Russia will continue to be a difficult partner for NATO because there will inevitably remain significant Russian national interests in respect to European and international affairs which will conflict with the interests of the West and of NATO member states.**

**The challenge for the future, therefore, is to ensure that the NATO-Russia Founding Act provides the foundation for genuine bilateral cooperation and collaboration which can thereby undermine the negative attitudes that both sides continue to have of the other. The importance of this challenge should not be underestimated since, as Robert Blackwill argues, 'there is no problem on the [European] Continent that is not made more manageable through Russian cooperation, and none that does not become more intractable if Moscow defines its interests in ways that oppose Western interests'.<sup>106</sup> Indeed, the most important challenge facing European security as a whole is in ensuring that the NATO-Russia relationship develops in manner which enhances, rather than undermines, mutual perceptions of security and trust. The NATO-Russia Founding Act provides a good start to this difficult challenge but there remains much further work to be done.**

<sup>1</sup> K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.; Addison-Wesley, 1979). For an excellent neo-realist assessment of post-Cold War European security, see J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future. Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 14:4, 1990, pp. 5-41.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 70.

<sup>3</sup> Yeltsin in his speech in Paris stated that 'Russia still views negatively the expansion plans of NATO'. This speech can be found on the NATO website on <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970527e.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> Senior US government officials have provided the most substantive public justifications behind the rationale for NATO enlargement. For example, see Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 'Enlarging NATO: Why Bigger is Better', *The Economist* 15 February 1997, pp. 21-3; Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke, 'America, A European Power', *Foreign Affairs* 74:2, March/April 1995 pp. 38-51; and Strobe Talbot, 'Why NATO Should Grow', *New York Review of Books*, 10 August 1995.

<sup>5</sup> For a more extensive analysis of NATO's post-Cold War reforms, see Roland Dannreuther, *Eastward Enlargement: NATO and the EU* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), pp. 23-43. See also by the same author, *Strategic Survey, 1996-7* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 110-20.

<sup>6</sup> *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 7 December 1994.

<sup>7</sup> The full argument can be reviewed in Lawrence Freedman, 'The United States Factor' in Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal (eds), *Soviet Strategy Towards Western Europe* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 94-5, 108; and in Jane M. O. Sharp, 'Why Discuss US Withdrawal?', in Jane Sharp (ed), *Europe After an American Withdrawal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 20-23.

<sup>8</sup> Hannes Adomeit, 'The Atlantic Alliance in Soviet and Russian Perspectives', in Neil Malcolm (ed), *Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation?* (London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp. 33-37.

<sup>9</sup> As quoted in *ibid.* p. 34 from *Izvestiia*, 19 February 1990.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>11</sup> *Pravda*, 13 June 1989.

<sup>12</sup> *Pravda*, 2 March 1990.

<sup>13</sup> *Time*, 4 June 1990.

<sup>14</sup> For full text of London Declaration of NATO, see *New York Times*, 7 July 1990.

<sup>15</sup> See statement by the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in *Associated Press* (Warsaw), 21 February 1990.

<sup>16</sup> *Pravda*, 8 June 1990.

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Marshal Akhromeev's statement that 'he did not know why Germany needed NATO' as quoted in *Neues Deutschland* 4 October 1990.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Anatol Lieven, 'Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion', *World Today*, October 1995, p. 198. See also President Yeltsin's letter to President Clinton outlining Russia's reasons for opposition to enlargement in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 October 1993; and Yu.

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**Rakhmaninov, 'The Reasons for and Possible Consequences of NATO Expansion', *International Affairs (Moscow)*, 42:4, 1996, pp. 4-5.**

<sup>19</sup> **Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (Cambridge, MASS., Harvard University Press, 1996).**

<sup>20</sup> **P Zelikow, 'NATO Expansion was not Ruled out', *International Herald Tribune*, 10 August 1995.**

<sup>21</sup> **Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1992.**

<sup>22</sup> **Izvestiia, 2 January 1992.**

<sup>23</sup> **Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1992.**

<sup>24</sup> **Radio Moscow, 2 February 1992.**

<sup>25</sup> **Radio Mayak, 23 December 1991.**

<sup>26</sup> **See Pavel K. Baev, *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles* (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p.**

**29. See also, in this context, CIS Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Shaposhnikov's warning that any intervention from Turkey in the Transcaucasus could cause a Third World War in *Izvestiia*, 8 May 1992.**

<sup>27</sup> **Ambartsumov in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 20 October 1992; Lukin in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 20 October 1992; Stankevich in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 23 June 1992 and Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 March 1992. See the Council's 'Strategy for Russia', in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 19 August 1992.**

<sup>28</sup> **This was first promoted by Ambartsumov in *Izvestiia*, 7 August 1992.**

<sup>29</sup> **Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30 May 1994.**

<sup>30</sup> **The broad outlines of the report can be seen in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 28 April 1993.**

<sup>31</sup> **'Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation', *Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report*, January 1994.**

<sup>32</sup> **See the report entitled 'Perspectives on the Enlargement of NATO and Russian Interests' presented by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26 November 1993.**

<sup>33</sup> **Agence France Presse, 10 September 1993.**

<sup>34</sup> **Reuters, 10 September 1993.**

<sup>35</sup> **ITAR-TASS, 25 August 1993.**

<sup>36</sup> **Suzanne Crow, 'Russian Views on an Eastward Enlargement of NATO', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 15 October 1993, p. 21.**

<sup>37</sup> **Reuters, 1 October 1993.**

<sup>38</sup> **Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 November 1993.**

<sup>39</sup> **It is explicitly stated in the Russian Military Doctrine that 'the introduction of foreign troops onto territories of states adjacent to the Russian Federation' represents a threat to Russia. See 'Basic Provisions....', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1994.**

<sup>40</sup> **See also Kozyrev's warning in December 1993 that NATO enlargement would humiliate Russia and strengthen the hand of Zhirinovskii in *New York Times*, 29 December 1993.**

<sup>41</sup> **Report by Peter Riddell in *The Times*, 10 January 1994.**

<sup>42</sup> **Boris Kazantsev, 'First Steps Towards Russia's Partnership with NATO', *International Affairs (Moscow)*, 41:3, 1994, p. 17.**

<sup>43</sup> **Izvestiia, 24 February 1994.**

<sup>44</sup> **For examples of this line of argument, see Vladimir Lukin in *Moskovskie novosti*, 16, 1994; Andranik Migranyan in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 March 1993; and V. Chernov in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 February 1993.**

<sup>45</sup> **See Andrei Zagorski, 'Tilting from the CSCE to NATO?', *Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenie*, 12, 1993, pp. 13-20.**

<sup>46</sup> **Agence France Presse, 1 July 1994.**

<sup>47</sup> **See Michael Mihalka, 'Restructuring European Security', *Transition*, 30 June 1995, pp. 7-8.**

<sup>48</sup> **Izvestiia, 12 October 1994.**

<sup>49</sup> **Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 November 1993.**

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- <sup>50</sup> *Wall Street Journal*, 27 September 1994 as quoted in Istvan Szonyi, *The False Promise of an Institution: Can Cooperation between OSCE and NATO be a Cure?* (Stanford, CA.: Centre for International Security and Arms Control, 1997), p. 11.
- <sup>51</sup> Head of Russian Delegation to the CSCE Summit, Yury Ushakov, in *Reuters*, 11 October 1994.
- <sup>52</sup> *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 30:2, 1994, pp. 41-2.
- <sup>53</sup> Strobe Talbot, in particular, stressed that NATO enlargement would be dependent on the evolution of Russia's policies. See *Reuters*, 8 February 1994.
- <sup>54</sup> *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 7 December 1994.
- <sup>55</sup> *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 8 December 1994.
- <sup>56</sup> Alexei Pushkov, 'NATO Enlargement: A Russian Perspective', *Strategic Forum*, 34, July 1995.
- <sup>57</sup> *Moskovoskiye novosti*, 19, 19-26 March 1995.
- <sup>58</sup> For fuller details of this, see 'Summary of Conclusions of discussions between the North Atlantic Council and Foreign Minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev, Brussels, 22 June 1994', *NATO Review*, 4, 1995, p. 35.
- <sup>59</sup> *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 21 June 1995. Translated in 'No Role for Russia in a Security Order that Includes an Expanded NATO', *Transition*, 15 December 1995, pp. 27-32.
- <sup>60</sup> *Pravda*, 21 June 1995.
- <sup>61</sup> *Rossiiskiye vesti*, 8 September 1995.
- <sup>62</sup> See Scott Parish, 'Twisting in the Wind: Russia and the Yugoslav Conflict', *Transition*, 3 November 1995.
- <sup>63</sup> For the failure of Kozyrev to block UN Security Council Resolution 836 which was used to legitimate the NATO attacks, see *Izvestia*, 31 August 1995.
- <sup>64</sup> *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 March 1997.
- <sup>65</sup> For a fuller discussion of this, see Roland Dannreuther, *Eastward Enlargement*, 1997, pp. 39-41.
- <sup>66</sup> *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 29 September 1995.
- <sup>67</sup> For a fuller analysis of this issue, see 'The CFE Treaty: Can it Survive?', *Strategic Comments*, 8, 12 October 1995.
- <sup>68</sup> *Segodnya*, 18 August 1995; *Obshchaya gazeta*, 28 September-4 October 1995, p. 4.
- <sup>69</sup> For an example of this perception of START II, see Anton Surikov, 'START II: Contradictions are Still There', *Yaderny Kontrol*, 3, Winter 1996/7, pp. 9-10.
- <sup>70</sup> Defence Minister Igor Rodionov argued that 'we might objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons in the Western regions' in *Oborona i bezopastnost*, 143, 2 December 1996, p. 4.
- <sup>71</sup> *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 November 1995.
- <sup>72</sup> Full text of the decree can be found in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 23 September 1995.
- <sup>73</sup> The most notorious of these was the alleged threat of an immediate invasion of the Baltic states in the event of their invitation to join NATO, as reported in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 29 September 1995.
- <sup>74</sup> For a report on Sino-Russian relations and the NATO issue, see *Moskovskoye novosti*, 51, 22-29 December 1995, p. 5.
- <sup>75</sup> *Izvestia*, 8 June 1996.
- <sup>76</sup> For the full text of the Founding Act, see the NATO website on <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm>.
- <sup>77</sup> RIA News Agency, 24 April 1997.
- <sup>78</sup> V. Lukov, 'In Search of a Concept that Would United Us All', *International Affairs (Moscow)*, 42:2, 1996, p. 3.
- <sup>79</sup> *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 March 1997.
- <sup>80</sup> For an illuminating insight into Russian perceptions of Kozyrev's foreign policy, see Alexei Pushkov, 'Kozyrev's Foreign Policy: What Should Replace it?', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16 November 1995.
- <sup>81</sup> *ibid.*

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<sup>82</sup> For this distinction, see A. Torkunov, 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', *International Affairs (Moscow)*, 42:2, 1996, pp. 15-17.

<sup>83</sup> For an excellent analysis of the constant Russian and Soviet attempts to construct such a collective security system, see John Erickson, 'The Soviet Union and European Detente', in Kenneth Dyson (ed.), *European Detente: Case Studies in East-West Relations* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), pp. 172-197.

<sup>84</sup> For an excellent analysis of the problems facing the Russian military and the damage that an anti-NATO posture would entail, see Pavel Felgengauer, 'The Russian Army's Crisis: Origins, Solutions', *Segodnya*, 18 August 1995.

<sup>85</sup> While Chernomyrdin called eastward enlargement 'nearly the worst and biggest mistake since the end of the Cold War', he was enthusiastic and uncritical about the EU. See report by *Interfax*, 19 April 1997.

<sup>86</sup> For the role of the China factor in promoting the logic of Russian-NATO rapprochement, see G Chudakov et al, 'Russia's Interests and Approaches Towards the System of Interlocking European Institutions', in B. Von Plate, *Europa auf dem Wege zur Kollektiven Sicherheit*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994).

<sup>87</sup> 'NATO Distraction', *Transition*, 21 March 1993.

<sup>88</sup> Alexander Tchoubarian, *The European Idea in History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 58.

<sup>89</sup> 'NATO Distraction', *Transition*, 21 March 1997, p. 33.

<sup>90</sup> See Igor Rodionov's concern over this issue in *Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye*, 22, 28 November 1996 p. 4.

<sup>91</sup> *Izvestiia*, 8 June 1996.

<sup>92</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Premature Partnership', *Foreign Affairs*, 73:2, March/April 1994, pp. 67-82.

<sup>93</sup> Alexei Pushkov in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 16 November 1995.

<sup>94</sup> S. Kortunov, 'Russia in Search of Allies', *International Affairs (Moscow)*, 42:3, 1996, p. 156.

<sup>95</sup> See Aleksei Arbatov in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 March 1997.

<sup>96</sup> *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 5 March 1997.

<sup>97</sup> Sherman Garnett, 'Russia's Illusory Ambitions', *Foreign Affairs*, 76:2, March/April 1997, p. 73.

<sup>98</sup> *Interfax*, 12 February 1997.

<sup>99</sup> *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 17 January 1997.

<sup>100</sup> *Interfax*, 17 March 1997.

<sup>101</sup> Anatol Lieven, 'Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion', *World Today*, 51:10, October 1995, p. 199.

<sup>102</sup> See Aleksei Arbatov's comment that a 'unipolar world under the guise of the United States is not acceptable for Russia' and that the issue of whether 'the United States is an enemy of Russia is debatable, but it is clearly not an ally and will not be one in the foreseeable future' in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 14 March 1997.

<sup>103</sup> *Interfax*, 21 April 1997.

<sup>104</sup> A. Pushkov, 'National Interests in Russian Foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, 42:2, 1996, p. 21.

<sup>105</sup> *Kommersant-Deyli*, 6 March 1997.

<sup>106</sup> Robert D. Blackwill et al, *Engaging Russia: A Report for the Trilateral Commission* (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1995), p. 25.

