REGIONAL ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR
AND RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

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I. INTRODUCTION

Political developments in Russia demonstrate that Russian regions play an increasingly important role in domestic politics, and the proliferation of political parties has made a multidimensional study necessary. Another reason is that relations between regional authorities and national government seem chaotic to many researchers in the West. Problems of economic stabilization and structural revolution make the differences in the development of regions more articulated and more visible. The redefinition of relations between the Center and the periphery is a logical continuation of the collapse of the Soviet Union. What is the impact of nationalism upon these processes?

The aim of the paper is to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of regional dimensions of the Russian parliamentary elections (December 1993; December 1995) and presidential elections (June 1996) in the light of the rising wave of nationalism. The hypotheses were that (1) Russia's striving for great power status has no direct connection with the poor state of its economy; (2) ethnic nationalism has little to do with the process of regionalisation in Russia.

The traditional juxtaposition of political forces along one axis, that of "pro-reform/anti-reform," is insufficient to explain current political shifts in Russia towards a more nationalist line. Additional dimensions are needed to identify and chart patterns of regional political preferences which are not immediately apparent, and thus to explain the source of the nationalists' success. This suggests that psychological factors (e.g. crises of...
national integrity and national identity) are likely to explain the nationalist vote better
than economic models can.

On the one hand, Russian nationalism, exemplified by the populist appeals of
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Alexander Lebed, and, on the other hand, liberal opposition to
Russian establishment, represented by Grigory Yavlinsky, should be added to explain an
interplay of political tendencies in Russia.

**Methodology.** The research is based on factor analysis of data on voting for the
parliament (December 1993 and December 1995) and for the president (June 1996)
permitting a systematic, multidimensional comparison of underlying political patterns. The researcher examined regional variation in support for those parties and candidates
whose platforms present alternative visions of Russia's policy towards the West and
towards Russia's path of development.

Analysis of electoral results was focused at 89 “subjects” of the Russian Federation,
among which are 21 republics, 11 autonomous ethnic regions, based at least nominally on
non-Russian ethnic territories, 55 mainly Russian regions (49 provinces or oblasts, 6
territories or krayas) as well as the two largest cities -- Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The Federal Assembly comprises two chambers, the Federation Council and the
State Dumb. Two “senators,” as the deputies in the Federation Council came to be called,
represent each subject of the Federation. It is almost impossible to take into consideration
all nuances of their political platforms.

The lower house of parliament, the State Dumb, consists of 450 deputies. They are
chosen by a mixed electoral formula: half, or 225 seats, are elected by the “first-past-the
post” (plurality) system in single mandate districts based roughly on population. The
remaining 225 seats are filled by a proportional voting system by party list. For the
parliamentary polls (1993 and 1995), they have become the subject for the analysis. The
proportional voting is carried out with Russia serving as one huge electoral district
(called “general federal district”), and in order to register for a place on the ballot, parties
have to gather 100,000 signatures spread among at least seven different regions. In
addition to these registration hurdles, an electoral threshold of 5 percent was imposed,
partly in an effort to encourage Russia’s weak parties to join together in coalitions or
blocs.

The analysis does not encompass the results of elections to the single-mandate seats
within the State Duma, nor the elections to the Council of Federation, since they were not
held according to party lists and do not show variations in political preferences in a way
that can easily be compared across regions. Most candidates for these seats ran
identifying themselves as “without a party.” The same kind difficulties emerge in case of
the presidential elections, since, of course, personal qualities of presidential candidates
may overshadow the attractiveness of their programmatic agendas.

The preferences expressed by voters in the elections represent an opportunity to
compare the distribution of political attitudes or preferences across Russia. The analysis
draws on regional variations in political preferences in support of political parties or
presidential candidates, which by their present alternative visions of Russia's future.
Apparently, there is an obvious difference between what is announced by a party or a
candidate for presidency, on the one hand, and how this party or a candidate is perceived
by voters, on the other hand.
Therefore, a more sophisticated statistical techniques - so-called factor analysis may be especially helpful. It allows us to identify and chart patterns of regional political preferences that are not immediately apparent due to the number of parties (candidates) and regions. Factor analysis, widely used in electoral studies, permits one to extract the underlying patterns which are hidden in the vote. This is particularly needed with the large number of new, relatively indistinct parties and candidates in the Russian case. Factor analysis pulls out correlations and finds new patterns (factors) among the data which can then be used as a new dimension. Each new factor explains a portion of the variation in the data.

Factor analysis is used here for two purposes: first, to determine the chief dimensions characterising the Russian political scene using data from elections by region; second, to use these dimensions to create a political "map" of Russian regions which show the chief lines of inter-regional conflict.

Acknowledgements. The study of Russian nationalism and regionalism was inspired by Harvard professors Samuel Huntington (Director, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies) and Timothy Colton (Director, the Russian Research Centre). The major part of the on-site research was conducted in Russia in 1995 - 1997. The author made use of his stay in 1995, in Great Britain to get acquainted with the methodology of Russian studies in Europe, and expresses his gratitude to Dr. Margot Light (the London School of Economics), Prof. Archie Brown and Prof. Alex Pravda (St.Anthony’s College, Oxford University), Prof. Julian Cooper and Prof. Philip Hanson (Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Birmingham University), Prof. Richard Sakwa and Dr. Philip Boobbyer (University of Kent). Especially productive was statistical research conducted
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II. Nationalism in Russia (Review chapter)

There are special comprehensive analyses on electoral showings of Russian nationalists in regions. However, the topic of Russian nationalism was far from being neglected in Russian political and social sciences. It is rather popular in the West as well with the figure of Zhirinovsky in the forefront. Special emphasis in the West is somewhat inadequately made at the problem of anti-Semitism in Russia. Only a few works focus on electoral processes in the light of ethnic problems.

The rise of nationalism in Russia after demise of the Soviet Union has become extremely important domestic factor. A process of de-intellectualisation of society accompanied by moral degradation resulted in rising nationalism which filled out the ideological vacuum. Loss of traditional political values and the collapse of the Soviet Union was perceived in mass consciousness as a loss of the unifying principle that had cemented together the Soviet Union. This ideological vacuum has in turn become a fundamental element of nationalism.

The word “nationalism” is used quite differently in Russian than it is in English or French. In Russian parlance, the term generally refers to cultural, linguistic or religious affiliation rather than just territory or ethnicity. Some Western researchers, e.g. Marie Mendras, even argue that the modern Russian nationalism does not exist from the point of view of the Western set of values.
There are three main sources fueling an alarming rise in virulent nationalism. First, economic hardships have nurtured nationalism. Second, there is a significant number of Russian military who want to preserve their former prestige and place in society. Third, the dissipation of the Soviet state over a period of only a few days was frustrating for the national consciousness. The effect might be called a “syndrome of dismemberment”: the secession of even a small piece of territory on a voluntary basis is broadly considered as the greatest humiliation for a nation.

The most spectacular example of how the “syndrome of dismemberment” works is the territorial dispute with Japan. The hard-liners are trying to use the territorial issue as a tool in bargaining for domestic political purposes. Actually, they have made of the Kurile problem a litmus test to weigh the willingness of leaders and population to stand up for Russia’s “national interests,” playing upon the emotions of Russians humiliated by the striking events of the past years. The impact of this nationalist campaign on the population in the Far East regions has been especially strong.

Nationalism in Russia is at work in two major forms, (1) “great-power” Russian nationalism and (2) ethnic nationalisms.

The great-power nationalism has practically nothing to do with ethnic relations. It is enough to look at its most common “imperial form,” i.e. calling for restoration of the Soviet empire to see that the Russian Empire did not dissipate as the Osman and Austro-Hungarian Empires did. It survived due to the communist myth. Now the imperial idea is fueled by great-power ambitions, which are often considered to be a prerequisite for self-preservation of the nation. Advocates of the “great-power ideas” include such
different politicians as the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky and retired General Alexander Lebed.

With a combination of ultranationalist rhetoric and cunning electioneering techniques, **Zhirinovsky's party** gained success at the December 1993 elections. Russia’s political scene has turned toward nationalism, as politicians from Yeltsin to the Communists seek to exploit the anger and hurt pride that the LDPR leader so skillfully made use of. In economics, he advocates a "multifaceted" approach, codeword for combining private property with an interventionist, paternalistic approach to economic management. Economic programme of the party is highly controversial. Its points are scattered in different brochures and often contradict each other. The basic point deal with state centralized control over prices, high protectionist import barriers, and many elements of state controlled economy.\textsuperscript{xix}

The LDPR’s economic programme was subordinate to these goals. The party does not, in principle oppose a market economy, and it includes on its party list many entrepreneurs from the private sector. In its domestic policy, the LDPR emphasizes the need for the elimination of ethnically-based administrative entities and the complete subordination of all territorial units to a Moscow-based central government.\textsuperscript{xx}

Zhirinovsky’s unabashed “Russia first” policies has given him a prominent niche in Russian politics. However, the LDPR is becoming increasingly fragmented as regional party leaders distance themselves from the antics of its leader. Although Zhirinovsky still emerges as one of the widely recognized figures in political polls, he has by far the highest negative ratings of any political figure in Russia.\textsuperscript{xxi} Now,
however, the political landscape is spotted with other patriotic and nationalist forces, especially Zyuganov’s Communists and supporters of Lebed, which have robbed Zhirinovsky of votes.

Although the Bolshevik leaders did their best to discredit most Russian national traditions, today’s Communists make a stake on revival of Russian traditional values. According to Zyuganov West European-style social democracy stands no chances in Russia and Russia should turn towards great-power traditions. Traces of traditional Marxist terminology, anti-capitalist rhetoric can be found in the current Communist Party programme.

Traditional Soviet values such as the paternalistic role of the state, the great power status and the powerful system of social security are embodied in the ideology of Zyuganov’s Communist Party. This ideology expresses a traditionally Soviet, rather than communist, protest on the part of Russian society. The call of Communist leaders for revising privatization implies not nationalization as such but the redistribution of property from the capitalists who are "trading away the Motherland" to "patriotic entrepreneurs."

Alexander Lebed is a sort of archetipically Russian charismatic leader. As for Lebed’s nationalism, he demonstrated it clearly after he was appointed head of the Security Council. On June 27, 1996, he said that he wanted to tighten Russia's borders against foreign "thieves". ("Everybody comes to Russia to steal," Lebed told a news conference. "I am against this. Russia's wealth is for Russia." Lebed also pledged to protect Russia from Western "cultural expansion".) It is true that such nationalist policies meet concerns of millions of Russians who blame the West
for Russia's post-Soviet hardships. Lebed is certainly trying to find backing in the regions, especially from regional financial structures.

Finally, it should be emphasized that **ethnic nationalisms** are represented in some of the republics of the Russian Federation. Search for national identity in ethnic republics is a specific trait of a broader process of economic regionalism, i.e. of regions’ demands of greater economic independence from Moscow.

The most painful form of ethnic nationalism is demonstrated in Chechnya. In most republics, nationalism exists in its covered form. However, the study of regional electoral preferences helps uncover these tendencies. There is no paradox that Zhirinovsky’s poor showing in some republics means the high level of regional nationalist passions.

However, one of the goals of this paper is to prove that ethnic nationalisms of the republics are far from being the key driving force of some separatist trends. Local political life is still dominated by bosses relying on personal power and not on political organizations built around well-defined political programmes. Manipulation of nationalistic feelings, ethnic identity, or local economic egoism under a vocable like economic sovereignty, became an important part of local politics.

The process of economic separatism characterizes not only Russia’s ethnic republics but Russian regions as well. The conclusion is that the republican leaders make use of nationalism in the interests of their own economic political agendas.
III. The 1993 Parliamentary Elections

The purpose of this section is to go beyond the more obvious impact of the elections to examine underlining patterns and tendencies that could be significant for Russia’s future as a federal, multiethnic state. Data on voting for the parliament, which took place by party list, permit for the first time a multidimensional comparison of political tendencies in Russia’s regions -- in other words, the relative balance of support for, or opposition to, socio-economic reforms and Russian nationalism.

On December 12, 1993, Russia laid its first truly multi-party parliamentary elections. The election was an important element of the effort by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to create a new political system to replace one that had been paralysed by protracted conflict between the executive and legislative branches. In September 1993, Yeltsin dissolved the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies that had been elected in 1990. When the parliament refused to disband, and several of its leaders attempted to seize power in early October, Yeltsin ordered military units loyal to him to storm the White House building and arrest its occupants. Elections for a new parliament were called for December 1993, together with a referendum on the new constitution. Adopted by a vote of 58.4 percent, it established the new parliament, called the Federal Assembly, and set out its responsibilities along with those of the presidency.
The results of the election were a shock to both Western and Russian observers. The most unexpected development was the impressive showing of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia headed by Zhirinovsky, which won more votes than any other party. Thirteen political parties and blocs competed for seats in the State Duma allocated by proportional voting. As a result of the elections by party list, only seven parties won seats in the Duma.

Table 3.1. Overall results of 12 December 1993 Russian election, by party list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent of the vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (Zhirinovsky)</td>
<td>22.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s Choice (Gaidar)</td>
<td>15.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Russia (Zyuganov)</td>
<td>12.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women of Russia (Fedulova)</td>
<td>8.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party of Russia (Lapshin)</td>
<td>7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko (Yavlinsky)</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Russian Unity and Accord (Shakhrai)</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Russia (Travkin)</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What is hidden by the overall figures on party voting presented in Table 3.1 is considerable variation by region in the support for parties. For purpose of simplification, the parties that participated in the December 1993 elections can be classified according to their political platforms and the political views proclaimed by their leaders (whose names were listed alongside the parties on the ballot). Four major groupings can be designated: “reformers,” “antireformers,” “ultranationalists,” and “centrists.” The analysis assume that voters’ preferences were influenced by party programmes and other programmatic pronouncements. All these groupings,
“antireformers,” “ultranationalists,” “centrists” and even “reformists”, are marked by nationalism, though of different colours.

1. Reformers. These parties were Russia’s Choice, Yabloko (the Russian word for “apple,” an acronym stemming from the names of leaders of the bloc Yavlinsky, Boldyrev, Lukin), and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (known by the acronym PRES). All of these parties were strong supporters of a market system, with differences chiefly over the appropriate strategy for achieving this goal. Only Shakhrai’s Party of Unity and Accord had some links with ethnic nationalisms since it stood out from the other reformist parties as a party which strongly supported Russia’s regions. It viewed “the economy and all other problems though the prism of regional and provincial interests.”

2. Antireformers consisted of those who supported a continued strong role for the state in economic activity. These views were coupled with expression of the “great-power” Russian nationalism and even support for restoring the Soviet Union (see Chapter 2). These parties were the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), and the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR). Traditional Soviet values such as the paternalistic role of the state, the great power status and the powerful system of social security are embodied in the ideology of Zyuganov's Communist Party. The call of Communist leaders for revising privatisation implies not nationalisation as such but the redistribution of property from the capitalists who are "trading away the Motherland" to "patriotic entrepreneurs.” This is the core of anti-Western rhetoric of Communist leaders.

3. Russian ultranationalists. This category consisted of one party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). A party with the strongest nationalist orientation,
the LDPR headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, emphasised at the 1993 elections “great-power chauvinist” appeals, including the restoration of the Soviet Union. The LDPR’s economic programme was subordinate to these goals. The party included on its party list many entrepreneurs from the private sector. In its domestic policy, the LDPR, during the 1993 campaign, emphasised the need for the elimination of ethnically-based administrative entities and the complete subordination of all territorial units to a Moscow-based central government.xxxiv

4. **Centrists.** Two other parties active in the elections sought to avoid conventional labels and staked out a centrist position. “Women of Russia” set out to champion women’s interests, and the party had no real economic programme. The Democratic Party of Russia favoured a self-contradictory slogan of “strong state/strong regions”, limited land reform, and a mixed economy.

The analysis of earlier elections and referenda confirm that there were strong and persistent regional patterns in support for, and opposition to, reforms. In general, the population in the northern and eastern regions of Russia tended to support reformist positions, while the south -- which can be roughly demarcated as the territory blow the 55th parallel -- has proven to be hostile to reform (see Map 1 in the Appendices). The first time this divide revealed itself was during the 1989 elections to the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies when all regional Communist Party first secretaries failed in regions located northwards of 55th parallel. They were elected almost everywhere in the more southern regions.xxxv The first free elections for President of Russia held in June 1991 and the April 1993 referendum replicated this pattern. In both the presidential elections and the referendum, a comparison of groups of regions which voted mostly for Yeltsin and
groups that voted mostly against him, shows that the centres of support for, and opposition to, reform were largely unchanged over this period. The 1993 parliamentary elections demonstrated again the pronounced north-south divide between reformers and anti-reformers.

The clarity of this north-south division was partially blurred by the Zhirinovsky factor since the north-south divide was not so evident eastward from the Urals, in Siberia and the Far East as it had been demonstrated by previous elections and the April 1993 referendum. Thus, Tomsk oblast and Krasnoyarsk kray, with a relatively small agricultural sector and declining military industrial complex should have voted for proreform parties. However, their showing was rather mediocre. On the contrary, Zhirinovsky’s party won plurality in eight Siberian regions, and support for LDPR was especially strong in Krasnoyarsk kray (over 30 percent of the vote). This makes think about a voting of protest against the authorities and old Communist nomenklatura in Siberia and the Far East. This interesting phenomenon receives more articulated explanation in the analysis of the 1995 parliamentary elections. In general, Zhirinovsky’s party ran relatively well in both northern and southern areas. The following regional patterns in the results have been reported by a number of Russia and Western observers.xxxvi

First, no regions gave the nationalists majority of votes.

Second, 33.3 - 50 percent of the voting the nationalists gained in seven regions -- Pskov, Belgorod, Kursk, Tambov, Sakhalin, Stavropol, and Mordovia. Four of them are border regions (see Map 2 in the Appendices). It is note-worthy that Sakhalin region (oblast) is involved into territorial dispute with Japan. Stavropol territory (krai) is
situated in the volatile Northern Caucasus affected by inflows of refugees from Abkhazia, South and North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechen republic. Pskov area is the target of territorial demands from Estonia which claims the western part of the oblast.

Third, 20 - 33.3 percent. Fifty seven regions cover all the country but are concentrated mainly in the European Russia. In some oblasts southward of Moscow, traditionally regarded as bastions of the conservatism, the Communist Party shared the popular support with the nationalists.

Fourth, 10 - 20 percent. Among 20 regions which have provided Zhirinovsky's party with relatively low support are the following: northern regions of Siberia; some autonomous units; Moscow, St. Petersburg (cities), Perm, Sverdlovsk, Samara regions.

Fifth, less than 10 percent of votes the nationalists obtained in four autonomous regions -- Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and Tuva republics. All of them are ethnic republics.

The geographic picture of the nationalists' success is complex and dispersed. Not so many regions provided Zhirinovsky's party with very high or very low backing. In the majority of the regions (57 regions of 88) it gained support in the interval between 20 and 33.3 percent of the vote.

There was a set of regions demonstrating rather strong tendency in voting for Sergei Shakhrai's Party of Unity and Accord (PRES). Spectacular success of his electoral campaign in some regions accompanied by no less spectacular failures in other ones. On the one hand, his constituency around the country is rather limited, and he barely overcame the 5 percent barrier. On the other hand, for example, PRES gained in Kabardino-Balkaria 31.5% of vote, in Tuva -- 37.8 percent, and in Gorno-Altay -- 24.5
percent. Though Shakhrai enjoyed rather close formal and informal links with the leadership of autonomous units as Minister of Nationalities, only this factor could not explain his success in ten republics (except the above mentioned three republics Shakhrai did relatively well in Bashkortostan - 13.6%, Buryatia - 17.4%, Yakutia (Sakha) - 13.1%, Aga (Agin-Buryatsky AO) - 19.2%, Permyakia - 11.3, Taymyria - 13.5, Ust'-Orda - 13.3%).

So, what were the sources of his remarkable success in a number of autonomous units? It is logical to assume that there are some additional circumstances affecting his electoral influence. The hypothesis is that it is connected with his platform which pinpoints the strengthening of regionalism and privileges for ethnic republics and hence ethnic nationalisms. Whereas Zhirinovsky threatened the autonomous units with Russian "superpower nationalism", Shakhrai's regionalism (together with his vague economic programme) attracted many of them as the alternative to Zhirinovsky. Thus, in this sense Shakhrai was considered by the general population as an antagonist to Zhirinovsky. Thus, it illustrates juxtaposition of two types of nationalisms.

**Political conflict among Russia’s regions.** Traditional view of Russian political spectrum portrayed it as one-dimensional -- and in fact, till 1993 this reflected well the political realities. The main political conflict was between "good reformers" and "bad anti-reformers". The real diversity of electoral choice appears to be more complicated. The votes, cast for reformers and communists, are interconnected, whereas Zhirinovsky's success hardly depended on communists’ wins or reformers' failures. In other words Zhirinovsky's performance had practically no connection with economic motives, but rather with the emotional reaction to the fear of Russia's losing a great power status.
On the basis of regional electoral data for all 88 territories, two main factors have been extracted. These factors are latent and cannot be measured directly. The latent factors extracted from this preliminary information are main political preferences of population living in these regions. They may be considered as the main axes of conflicting goals and values expressed by the contesting parties and supported (to different extent) by voters.

**Table 3.1. Factor analysis of voting for parties by regions**
(87 regions, without rotation; significant values are in bold type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties:</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Yabloko&quot; Party</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia's Choice</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>-.69</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP R</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women of Russia</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDDR</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variation explained: 36.6% 17.7%

A value of zero implies that it was equal to the average for all Russian regions taken together. The positive of negative values show a positive of negative correlation between the party in question and the underlying factor. The interpretation of what phenomenon is described by these factors is a subjective one.

The most reasonable explanation for Factor 1 is the programmatic differences of the parties on the issue of economic liberalisation. In other words, parties having the highest “plus” or “minus” values were viewed by voters as, respectively, the most extreme supporters or opponents of reform. In regions where there was substantial support for the highest “plus” parties ("Yabloko", Russia's Choice, and RDDR), there
was a corresponding tendency for low support for the “minus” parties (the Agrarians and the Communist Party) and vice versa.

The issues of ethnic and regional policy are not of great importance in this dimension. This indicator (Factor 1) may be called the factor of the attitude towards the type of economic reform. It represents a main conflict between the economic credos of reformers and communists - "Economic Liberalism" versus "Strong State Control Over Economy". "Economic Liberalism" is considered as a principal alternative to state interventionism into economy and it is focused upon maximal freeing of market forces, and speeding-up of privatisation. On the contrary, "Strong State Control Over Economy" means the strong state interventionism into economy, limitation of market sector, slowing down of privatisation.

It is note-worthy that Zhirinovsky's party’s value on this scale was found to be zero, implying that it was not part of the conflict between reform and anti-reform parties. The similar - very low scores at the Factor 1 scale - has Shakhrai's PRES party which had a relatively liberal economic programme. Yet, in voter perceptions, it appeared to be a centrist party -- if anything, somewhat opposed to reform (though not strongly). Primarily focusing at the regional sovereignty and ethnic issues, it removed the economic issues out of the core of its programme. As a result, it got reputation of a "party of regional revival". This explains why both of these parties (LDPR and PRES) got low absolute values in the Factor 1 column and high values in the Factor 2 column. In ethnic issues, there is direct opposition between Zhirinovsky's Party and Shakhrai's Party. If the first one advocates complete domination of the central government, Shakhrai's main idea is quite opposite, i.e. significant increase of regional independence.
Thus, the second factor may be described as the opposition of "Russia as a centralised superpower" (Zhirinovsky) versus "Russia as union of regions" (Shakhrai). Economic issues played secondary role in their party programmes. Thus, the voters mostly did not take into consideration the parties' economic goals when making their choices. This is why in this case, we can exclude economic component from the analysis of mass attitudes towards these parties. (See Figure 1 in the Appendices.)

The juxtaposition of regional variation in support for socio-economic reform and centre-periphery issues can also be illustrated using data from the voting by party list (See Figure 2). For this purpose, coordinates for the regions were derived from factor analysis on each of the two factors and plotted in the graph. The result is a division of Russia's regions into four groups which correspond to the quadrants in Figure 2.

We can clearly see that the group of "anti-liberal" regions includes only autonomous regions whereas the second "liberal" contains both capitals (Moscow and St. Petersburg), the most industrialised regions of the Urals and northern areas rich in natural resources.

The cluster of "superpower"-oriented regions consists of mostly old European Russian regions, many of which are border areas (with one exception of Mordovia). The second cluster (for the "Russia of regions") contains only ethnic autonomous territories. This juxtaposition appears to be the locus of control for two different forms of nationalism, great-power nationalism and ethnic nationalisms of the republics.

A number of analysts in the Western and Russian press argued that the relative success of Zhirinovsky and the Communist was due to economic hardships and a sharp deterioration in the living standards under Yeltsin’s socio-economic policy. If this were
true, one could expect to find a correlation between the patterns of electoral choice shown by regions and social and economic situation.

For this purpose a number of indicators can be used, including average wages, unemployment rates, and the proportion of urban population. The distribution of regions on the reform/antireform dimension (the horizontal axis in Figure 2) correlates well with several social and economic indicators. For example, for 1993 elections, data on average wages (which to some extent indicates living standards in regions) correlates with popular support for liberal of statist economic policies. The higher the average wage level is, the more probable is the backing of economic reformers.\textsuperscript{xxxviii}

Another socio-economic variable that correlates well with support for reform is the degree of urbanisation. The more urbanised a region is, the more likely its population supported reform parties. The population in less urbanised, rural regions, on the other hand, was more likely to vote for parties favouring strong state control over economy.\textsuperscript{xxxix}

A number of regions dominated by branches of the economy that benefited most from the Yeltsin/Chernomyrdin policies -- particularly oil and gas sector -- included Yamal, Khantia-Mansia autonomous okras (rich in oil an gas), Tyumen region, Komi, and Sakha (Yakutia, the chief diamond-producing region). The 1992-93 reforms resulted in a significant increase in wage differentials in favour of these regions. Accounting for less than 10 percent of the total industrial employment, the coal, oil and gas industries get over 21 percent of the total wages fund. (Let us point out, to compare, that the machine-building enterprises take up less than 27 percent of the total wages fund having about 39 percent of employed.\textsuperscript{xl}). The wage increase in these regions outstripped inflation in consumer prices.
A different picture emerges for the "strong centre" versus "strong regions" dimension (the vertical axis in Figure 2). Regional economic indicators show no significant correlation with voting for the LDPR or Shakhrai’s party. What the distribution of regions suggests is that psychological factors are likely to be more effective at explaining the Zhirinovsky vote than economic models.

It is of special interest to look how the regions are located in both dimensions, i.e. at the crossing of the axis "strong centre" versus “strong regions" and of the axis "strong state control" versus “economic liberalism".

These two axes cut the space of political preferences into four quadrants.

1. "Economic Liberalism" plus "Strong Regions". One would expect to find in this quadrant regions that were relatively well-off and that would benefit most from the development of a market economy. The strong periphery element would particularly benefit those regions that were both well-endowed in natural resources and the home of sizeable non-Russian minorities.

2. "Economic Liberalism" plus "Strong Centre". In this quadrant, support for market reforms is coupled with support for Russian nationalist appeals for an end to the special privileges enjoyed by ethnically based administrative units. Here we find St. Petersburg, Chelyabinsk region (the Urals), highly industrialised Tomsk region (Western Siberia) and such northern or north-eastern regions as Murmansk, Kamchatka and Magadan.

3. "Strong State Control Over Economy" plus "Strong Centre". This quadrant would describe the interests of regions that were the most conservative in political terms - where the local population supports subsidies and continued regulation of the economy.
These regions would naturally benefit by redistributing wealth through tax and budget policy from richer to poorer regions. This groups would also include regions with a large rural population, attracted by appeals from the Agrarians and Communists to retain the system of collective and state farms. Regions with predominately Russian populations in this quadrant would also support ultranationalists’ calls for restoring a strong centre.

4. "Strong Control Over Economy" plus "Strong Regions". Regions in this quadrant would combine political and economic conservatism at the local level (registered by voting for the Communists and Agrarians) with support for a weak centre in order to preserve a non-Russian identity or to enhance the role of local elites. There would be an antipathy to Zhirinovsky in these regions and relatively strong support for Shakhrai --perhaps as a proxy for a regional party. This group is led by Tuva, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Gorno-Altay.

The distribution of regions on this “map” corresponds fairly well to what one would expect given the analysis of regional interests implicit in each of the four quadrants. In addition, in each quadrant there is a large group of regions that are politically divided, thus presenting a more ambiguous political landscape. These regions are harder to classify as either reform or antireform, centralist or federalist. The number of these regions is 46, or just over half of Russia’ regions. Nevertheless, the presence of a region in a quadrant indicates the direction toward which political forces are leaning.

The analysis shows that Russia's regions are politically engaged and polarised according to different preferences. These postures are relatively stable.

The agricultural regions of Kursk, Lipetsk, Orel, Penza, Belgorod, Tambov, Voronezh, situated southward of Moscow, are likely to form a “patriotic” coalition.
Moscow, trying to pursue liberal reforms, may be bitterly challenged by this "red-brown belt" which voted strongly for the communists and Zhirinovsky's party. A red-brown coalition may fail to coalesce, since their ideological outlooks are very different.

The most fundamental political divergences develop between the proponents of "strong regions" and "liberal reforms" on the one side, and "superpower anti-reformers" on the other, i.e. between rich autonomous republics and traditional Russian regions of the southern European part.

The republics favouring regionalism may be considered to be promoters of politically centrifugal trends. However, the danger of Russia’s dissipating is weakened since the autonomous republics targeted towards decentralisation and state control are neither resources-rich nor influential, and they are scattered all over Russia as well. For the republics rich in natural resources market values are far more important. Thus, they seem to counterbalance poor and pro-Communist republics.
The 1995 Parliamentary Election

By and large, the analysis of the 1995 election follows the guidelines of the previous analysis with some minor modifications shown below. In December 1995, the proportional voting was carried out with Russia serving as one huge electoral district of 107,496,507 voters. 43 political parties and blocs competed for seats in the State Dumb allocated by proportional voting, though only four parties managed to clear the 5-percent barrier. The overall picture looks like the following:

- The Communist Party won a little bit over 22 percent;
- Zhirinovsky’s LDPR won about 14 percent;
- Our Home Is Russia bloc won about 10 percent; and
- Yabloko won about 7 percent of the vote.

This is a generalized portrait of Russia, however. No particular region reproduces the picture, and in about half of regions, the picture differs greatly. It demonstrates not only the growing complexity of the Russian political landscape but continuity of regional political attitudes as well.

Generally, there was no use of analyzing the results of all 43 political parties which participated in the poll. Significantly, over a dozen parties got less than 200,000 votes, i.e. number of signatures which they had submitted for registration. (This may mean that the signatures were a thriving business.) These dwarfish parties generally enjoyed equally poor showing all over Russia with some characteristic exceptions.

Only nine (out of 89) cases have been detected when this or that party demonstrated the first or the second best result. For instance, the Derzhava (The Great
Power) headed by the former vice president Alexander Rutskoi won a plurality in Kursk oblast (31.2%). The regionalist Transformation of the Fatherland headed by the Sverdlovsk region governor Eduard Rossel received a sweeping support in the region (33.8%). Chechnya and Ingushetia gave the second share of votes to the All-Russian Moslem Movement (NUR). The Agrarian Party won the plurality in Agin-Buryat autonomous okrug (33.3%) and showed the second result in Ust’-Orda, Bashkortostan, and the Altay Republic. Viktor Anpilov’s hard-line communists were relatively successful in Tyumen oblast (12.3%). These deviations have not, however, changed the overall landscape of regional preferences. Therefore, the dwarfish parties were excluded from the final analysis. The voting for four parties shows that the regions demonstrate strong and persistent patterns of political preferences which were analysed in the context of the candidates chances for presidential elections.

1. Boris Yeltsin formally has no political party. But his name was associated in the December 1995 parliamentary elections with the centrist Our Home Is Russia bloc which is often called a “party of power”. In the elections, it was most successful in the Ingush Republic (35.4), Kursk region (31.2), Republics of Tatarstan (29.4), Tuva (29.3 percent), and Kabardino-Balkaria (25.4 percent). Thus, these regions may be considered to be the most reliable strongholds for the government and Yeltsin since the party supported his candidacy on February 8, 1996.

2. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation had its leader Gennady Zyuganov as its candidate for presidency. At the December 1995 parliamentary elections, the Communists were far more successful in villages and small towns than in large cities. For Zyuganov’s party the interval was between 29 percent in the group of dominantly
rural regions and 14.5 percent in the capitals. The majority of 52.6 percent the Communists had only in rural North Ossetia (Northern Caucasus). Support for the Communist Party was also especially strong in rural regions where the traditional communist *nomenklatura* preserved its strong control over political developments: Altay (over 40 percent), Dagestan, Orel, Kursk regions, Chuvash Republic, Ulyanovsk region, etc. Middle Volga regions remain a traditional source of support for the Communists.

Many students of electoral processes in Russia point at nationalistic platform of the Communists as one of the main sources of their success. An interesting commentary on the Communists’ good showing in the 1995 elections was given by Nikolai Petro:

“Their recent electoral success is due in no small measure to the fact that unlike the proponents of reform, they have integrated Russian nationalism into their platforms treating it as a normal, accepted part of political discourse.

Western analysts tend to view such nationalist appeals as a weakness of Russian democracy, but it is actually a source of stability and hence predictability. It is presently the only value upon which a broad political consensus can be forged between populace, political elites, and economic elites.”*xlv

3. “Radical reformers” were to be represented at the presidential elections by Grigory Yavlinsky. At the December 1995 parliamentary elections, they were represented by his *Yabloko* bloc. It has received the highest support in Far Eastern Kamchatka region (20.8 percent!), cities of St. Petersburg (16.2) and Moscow (15.1) as well as in Rostov (14.3) and Yaroslavl (12.0) regions.

4. Vladimir Zhirinovsky was in 1995 a presidential candidate of his misnamed Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). At the 1995 parliamentary elections, his party was far less successful in Moscow and St. Petersburg (2.9 percent) while there was
no great difference between mainly rural districts (12.7), small towns (12.8 percent) and urban regions (9.6 percent). In spite of ultra-nationalist rhetoric, Zhirinovsky’s party gained in December 1995 only half of its success at the 1993 elections.

**Political conflict among Russia’s regions.** The use of factor analysis permits going beyond the more obvious, one-dimensional classification of Russian regions (which divides them into “democratic” and “conservative”) revealing the main dimensions of political conflict on Russian political scene.

Two major factors were marked by the factor analysis (see Figure 3 in the Appendices).

1. The most influential factor (Factor I) regards the attitude towards the economic reform and democratization (however, not exactly so as in the previous analysis of the 1993 elections). The regions giving the lowest share of votes for Communists and LDPR tended to be regions showing the highest support for reformist Yabloko and Our Home Is Russia, and vice versa (see Graph). Russia is still divided along the 55th parallel.\(^{xlv}\)

2. Factor of the December 1995 elections shows that there is another political conflict—between two different elites. **Factor II seems to measure electorate’s preferences for different types of elite.** On the one side, along this axis, one can find Yabloko and the LDPR, while the Our Home Is Russia and CPRF, are on the other side. Actually, this political conflict was detected in the Far East and some other parts of Russia (for instance, in Yaroslavl). Presumably, the “common denominator” here was the perception of the CPRF and the Yeltsinist Our Home Is Russia as an “old”, or “traditional”, elite.”
On the other edge of the spectrum, we find newly-emerging elite represented by the Yabloko party and Zhirinovsky’s LDPR. Judging by their platforms, they have very little in common. What is truly common is the lack of participation of their leaders and members in the top echelons of power structures neither under Communist rule nor in the Gorbachev period. In both cases we have to deal with a sort of “political modernism.” Yavlinsky and Zhirinovsky were pointing at Yeltsin and the Communists as forces who had already proved their inconsistency at power. Good showing of the Zhirinovsky’s LDPR was also a sort of a response to governmental inadequacy, but in contrast to a Communist vote (a “nostalgic protest”), the LDPR vote appears to be a “challenge protest.”

For Yabloko’s and LDPR’s electorate, Factor II characterises an emotional vote of no confidence in the old and current governments—“those who promised a better life, but cheated.” Thus, the second motivation (Factor II) may be called “Conformist Choice versus Non-Conformist Choice”, characterising the electorate’s attitudes towards a pro-nomenklatura/anti-nomenklatura elite represented by the Communist Party and the Our Home Is Russia. Though the latter is called “a party of power”, in fact, it consists of the former communist officials.

As in the previous chapter, it is worth verifying this hypothesis at the next stage of the research by finding correlations between the patterns of electoral choice in this or that region and socio-economic conditions indicated by living standards, average wages, the proportion of urban population etc. in all 89 regions. Even at the initial stage, different levels of correlation of the election results with economic indicators are note-worthy. For
instance, there was a strong correlation of the LDPR vote with regional indices of
defence production.

**Table 4.1. Correlation of the results of the elections and some socio-economic indicators** (covariation coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>NDR</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Share of population employed in the state sector</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Share of population employed in public organizations</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Indices of the defense production</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Share of enterprises with back-pay liabilities</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.29*</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Share of urban population</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.60**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Average wages</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Industrial output per capita</td>
<td>-.28*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Economic indicators were taken from: Goskomstat Rossii. *Sravnitelnye pokazateli ekonomicheskogo polozheniya regionov Rossiskoi Federatsii* (Comparative Indices of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Regions), (Moscow: The State Committee of the Russian Federation on Statistics, 1995), pp. 5-9, 27-34, 41-43, 103-104, 286-287. Variables were controlled for turnout (2-tailed regression). * - signif. LE .05; ** - signif. LE .01

It should be stressed that the correlations with economic indicators cannot be considered as quite reliable. For example, data on average wages must be corrected for differences in the cost of living. Furthermore, the products traded in inter-enterprises trade are mainly those for which information was implicit or, at very best, cannot be completely summarized by a price vector. Imperfect information situations are producing tremendous noises in the informational environment. They imply that economic efficiency can have different meanings in different regions. Therefore, the above table is reproduced here only to illustrate the methodology of trend searching.
Only one indicator, **degree of urbanisation**, demonstrates a persistent and strong (opposite) correlation with the vote for two parties, CPRF and *Yabloko*. The more urbanised a region is, the more likely its population voted for *Yabloko*. On the other hand, the population in less urbanised, rural regions, was more likely to vote for the Communists. The reasons seem to be not only economic: the urban population is much more informed about the real processes that are taking place in Russia, while the rural population feels itself more confused and for this reason is reluctant to support the changes without being sure of their possible outcomes.

First, as Table 4.2. shows, there was only one weak correlation detected between the vote for four parties and indices of economic risks, which may mean either that economic reasons are losing their former weight and importance for voters or that economic data are not reliable.

Second, a strong political conflict between electorates of CPRF and *Yabloko* was detected. The regions that voted for *Yabloko* in 1995, mainly had voted in favour of the constitution in 1993. And on the contrary, the regions supporting the Communists tended to vote against constitution in 1993. However, what is more important, the electorates of Zhirinovsky and Chernomyrdin’s bloc showed indifference to the constitution. (The fact that the Our Home Is Russia did not exist in 1993 makes virtually no difference since the analysis was focused on regional political attitudes.) At the same time, a Communist vote was more characteristic for regions with higher political risks while more stable regions tended to vote for *Yabloko* in 1995 and for Yavlinsky in June 1996.

**Table 4.2. Correlation between the 1995 election results, voting for the 1993 constitution and risk rating**

(coefficients from +1 to -1)
Indicators  | CPRF     | LDPR    | Our Home | Yabloko |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The constitution referendum (1993)</td>
<td>-.69**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political risks</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic risks</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral risks</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** - very strong correlation.


Third, the regions with low behavioural risks tended to vote for Zhirinovsky’s nationalist LDPR. Probably, this tendency was due to the voting in the North Caucasian republics which had very high indices for unsafe population behaviour, and on the other hand, Zhirinovsky’s low profile in these regions efficiently worked against him. However, Yabloko and CPRF were indifferent to this indicator.

The regions with lower average income tended to vote for the parties of nomenklatura (CPRF and the Our Home Is Russia) while more prosperous regions tended to back Yabloko and LDPR. Far more interesting is a correlation (though a weak one) between regional share of export production and support for Yabloko and LDPR. In short, the more export production is produced in a region, the more its population tends to vote for Yabloko and LDPR and the less for CPRF. However, Yabloko and LDPR received similar results for different reasons. Both parties did especially well in the Far Eastern zone (Kamchatka, Magadan region, Primorie kray). They backed Yavlinsky’s bloc most likely because they were trade-oriented regions which benefit from reform and lose from protectionist constraints.
LDPR did well in these regions for another reason—they need centralised state and protectionist import barriers to deal with a growing influence of strong neighbours, for instance China and Japan. Examples of St. Petersburg and Pskov region may serve as a litmus test to verify this hypothesis. The former, one of main ports oriented towards external trade, gave strong support to Yavlinsky’s party (and in the June 1996 presidential election support for Yavlinsky was 15.27 percent against 7.42 percent of the Russian average). By contrast, neighbouring Pskov region, which has miserable export potential but may suffer from territorial claims from Estonia, largely supported Zhirinovsky’s LDPR. xlvii

Another common peculiarity for Yabloko and LDPR was their total failure in the North Caucasian belt. On the one hand, Yavlinsky’s reformism enjoys questionable chances to succeed in this mainly counter-reformist zone with modest export production potential. Zhirinovsky’s chances here were even smaller because of the population’s growing hostile attitudes towards Moscow during the Chechen war. The main factor is possibly a strong ethno-cultural traditionalism rejecting political innovations and making the people vote for old elites.

It is note-worthy that the ethnic republics were mainly split between support for the Communist Party and the Our Home Is Russia. It looks very much like the final choice depended on local leadership as the local agendas took an upper hand over national one.

Finally, by scaling all regions through extracted political dimensions, we can demonstrate the bases for potential interregional conflict. For this purpose, the coordinates for the regions derived from the factor analysis were plotted on the graph. Thus we shifted from a chart of parties to a chart of regions.
There is a large group of 54 regions that badly articulate political interests. As it is hard to classify them because of ambiguity of their attitudes towards the reform and elites, they were omitted from further analysis. The remaining 35 regions demonstrate spectacular political attitudes. Zones of total domination of political parties occupy the corners of the graph. For example, Yabloko bloc enjoy total control only over Kamchatka region where Yavlinsky’s bloc won over 20 percent of the vote having left behind all political adversaries. (In June 1995, Yavlinsky received strong support in this region.) Yavlinsky’s and Zhirinovsky’s showing was better in the eastern part of the country.

In comparison with the 1993 elections, this line of political divergence has become visible, that between the European part of Russia, cradle of “Russianness”, stronghold of traditionalism, and, therefore, bastion of conformist vote. On the contrary, Siberia and the Far East revealed non-conformist patterns of vote, for Yavlinsky and Zhirinovsky.

If were look deeper into the history of Russia, we may see that this Siberian distinctiveness was well pronounced about 150 years ago. After the Great Reforms of the 1860s, the ideas of economic autonomy were still alien to emerging local elites, with the exception of Siberia. Since then and up to 1917, so-called “Siberian regionalism” (*sibirskoe oblastnichestvo*) existed in Siberia as a socio-political movement. Some representatives of Siberian intellectuals considered Siberia and the Far East to be economic and political entity with its own distinctive path of development. Moreover, they perceived Siberians as a new specific nation, and their concept was characterised by marked separatism.\(^{xlviii}\)
Separatist trends in Siberia and the Far East have become pronounced again after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The governor of Irkutsk region Yuri Nozhikov’s challenge to the Centre is eloquent enough. “If the Centre ruins this country, and it is capable of doing this as the former Centre has ruined the former country, we’ll have to take all we have... and unite, at least Siberia and the Far East.”

However, there are some important counter-tendencies at work. Institutions that cross regional barriers are developing: the big Moscow banks are extending their activities into the provinces and developing financial-industrial groups that transcend region. Migration flows are bringing people in and out. Such a unifying factor as the national financial discipline is reducing regional politicians’ ability to distribute subsidies. These trends are far from being the subject of this research.

What is really important for our study is that the great-power nationalism is one of the powerful factors at work that hampers the collapse of the Russian Federation.

As for the current crisis in the Primorie province, there are also very strong specific obstacles to separatism. The region is certainly under threat of inflow of Chinese. The province has no human resources (border troops, police) to control the situation without help from Moscow.

All this makes think about some peculiarities of political mentality in this more dynamic, and less conformist, part of Russia. Actually, Siberian regions have a huge potential to give birth to separatist movements based on strong territorial identity, protest against injustice, decline of economy and exploitation of local resources by the Centre. This Far East pioneer mythology may be compared to mythology of American Wild-West pioneers. In fact, this strong territorial identity and a feeling of being exploited by
Moscow fuels *a priori* such movements. Some researches are inclined to speak about “apolitical”, “antipolitical” sentiments of the Siberian population pointing, among other reasons, at low turnout in Siberian and Far Eastern regions. Perhaps, it would be better to explain it by non-conformist mentality.

V. The 1996 Presidential Elections

On the eve of the presidential elections in Russia, the outcome of the democratic experiment in theis country was unclear. On the one hand, Russia had developed multi-party system, and free press. In December 1995, Russia held the first "normal" free democratic elections under auspices of the current constitution. However, paradoxically, while the 1995 parliamentary elections were a triumph for the process of democratisation, the results threatened to undermine democracy itself: never in Russian history had the Communists been as legitimate as they did on the eve of the presidential elections. Their victory in the elections could herald the abolition of the democratic electoral system and a return to authoritarianism.

The final part of the analysis is focused on the first round of presidential election held on June 16, 1995. This is not the central part of the analysis because of two major reasons and it serves only to illustrate persistence of some electoral patterns. First, these elections did not reveal new patterns but reduplicated previously described patterns of
regional political behaviour. Second, presidential elections are not so spectacular for the purposes of the research as personal qualities of candidates may influence the electorate more than their political platforms.

Moreover, the results of the second round (3 July 1996) were excluded from the analysis (Yeltsin won with 53.83 percent of the vote). One can judge little on the nationalist trends from the result of the second round. For those who had voted for others candidates than the two finalists, the second round was a poor choice either between the lesser of the two evils, or between casting a vote against all candidates and abstaining. The second round does not give an opportunity of absolutely free expression of individual’s political attitudes since the results are perceived as a national choice. The first round of the presidential elections provides with far more opportunities to investigate regional attitudes since the spectrum of candidates’ platforms is far more representative.

There are no difficulties in finding correlations between regional results of the parliamentary and the presidential elections results in spite of some insignificant modifications.

The major pattern of the parliamentary elections that has been again replicated is the north-south divide. In a bipolarised country, from the very beginning, it was actually a dichotomical choice between Yeltsin’s regime and former Communist regime. In a breakdown of the country into four zones from west to east, Yeltsin and Zyuganov were on equal footing in the centre of European Russia, each at 34 percent.

In the Urals, Yeltsin had a clear lead with 39 percent, 10 points ahead of Zyuganov, while in Siberia, Zyuganov was strongest, with 34 percent to Yeltsin’s 29 percent. These
positions were virtually reversed in the Far East however, where Yeltsin won 33 percent to 28 for Zyuganov. As it can be seen, the north-eastern regions are more favourable for reforms. Regions that voted for Yeltsin are more adapted for promoting market economy and therefore, the political climate there is preferable for foreign investments. By the same token, the pro-Zyuganov regions are mostly against liberal economy. Actually, the Yeltsin-Zyuganov competition has once more confirmed the north-south divide in particularly spectacular manner.

The presidential elections have revealed somewhat strong correlations between the role of the regions in external trade and electoral behaviour. In this respect, the differentiation of the regions is striking. For example, 10 regions embrace 56 percent of all Russian export. They are: Tyumen, Samara regions, Krasnoyarsk territory (kray), Vologda, Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk regions, Khabarovsk kray, Kemerovo, Bashkortostan. (These regions, with the exception of Kemerovo and Bashkortostan, voted for Yeltsin.) Furthermore, 20 leading exporting regions account for 76 percent of Russian export. Remaining 69 regions enjoy less than 24 percent of export. The latter are mainly conservative and isolationist regions. In what concerns import, one can see similar disproportion’s. 20 leading regions control about 39 percent of import. These are also mainly regions that tend to vote for Yeltsin and Yavlinsky.

Interesting correlations were found in co-operation with Jacques Sapir (Centre d’Études des Modes d’Industrialisation, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales) in Paris in April- May 1997. The Yeltsin-Zyuganov vote strongly correlates with the average saving propensity (ASP), a coefficient reflecting level of regional demonetarisation. Regions with high level of tend to vote for Zyuganov, and vice versa.
Demonetarisation implies, at worse, quasi-feudal forms of social orientation, non-market relations, with a predominance of lateral and vertical integration, coercion and bargaining as coordination tools.\textsuperscript{iv}

\textbf{Table 5.1. Comparison of the electoral results} (1995, first round 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary elections</th>
<th>Presidential elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\textit{December 1995}</td>
<td>\textit{June 1996}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>Yeltsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>35.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Communist</td>
<td>Zyuganov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Lebed</td>
<td>Lebed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Yavlinsky</td>
<td>Yavlinsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Zhirinovsky</td>
<td>Zhirinovsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The results of the first round of the presidential elections demonstrate some shifts in public preferences if compared with the results of the December 1995 parliamentary elections. Yavlinsky and Zhirinovsky were supported by a small number of regions. As always, Zyuganov enjoyed support mainly in southern regions with large and dense population. Although pro-Yeltsin northern regions are less populated than more conservative south, Yeltsin was supported by a larger number of Russia’s ethnic republics which were controlled by local leaders while Yeltsin himself controlled local leadership.

Five other candidates may be omitted from the since they failed to get over one percent of the national vote and their total surpasses two percent.

One of the most obvious results was Zhirinovsky’s failure, which has demonstrated dramatic decline of his popularity.

As we can clearly see, the major sensation of the presidential election is the rise of General Lebed who was supported by about 11 million voters in the first round accounting for just less than 15 percent of the vote. No sociological survey has predicted such a result. Lebed's "patriotic" electorate made its anti-Yeltsin choice intentionally. However, Yeltsin ran for re-election in the second round, not with Alexander Lebed as advisor and supporter, but behind Lebed, as if the general were the presidential candidate. All this made of Lebed the central figure between the two rounds of the elections.

The previous elections since 1989 demonstrate the same pattern: urban population clearly tends to vote for democratic forces while more rural regions are more likely to vote for the Communists. The reasons seem to be not so much economic: the urban population is much more informed about the real processes that are taking place in Russia, while the rural population feels itself more confused and for this reason is reluctant to support the changes without being sure of their possible outcomes.

It was privately evident in May that Yeltsin's climb in the poll had interrupted. Lebed's rise started in April, but his rise above the 10-percent mark in May reflected a switch of potential Yeltsin voters drawn by Lebed's softening towards Yeltsin. That softening was the result of Lebed's negotiations with the Kremlin.

The one bloc of votes Yeltsin was sure of retaining were those military men who abandoned Vladimir Zhirinovsky on June 16, and crossed to Yeltsin or to Lebed. They were estimated to number at least one million. Yeltsin’s strategy is also a subtle appeal to the Zhirinovsky vote, without having to make a bargain with Zhirinovsky.
himself. Zhirinovsky's price for backing Yeltsin was a government post that would be at least as prominent as Lebed's. This prospect was absolutely ruled out.

Counting the roughly two million who voted for Zhirinovsky last December but for Lebed on June 16, plus 4.4 million who stayed with Zhirinovsky, there is the potential for 6.4 million fresh votes for Yeltsin, rather than for Zyuganov.

Grigory Yavlinsky received 5.6 million votes on June 16, but it was also unclear how many of these voters could be counted for Yeltsin in the second round. Yeltsin's campaigners believed virtually all of them will go for Yeltsin, and none to Zyuganov. However, a sizable number of Yavlinsky supporters opposed Yeltsin too heartily to vote for him. They opted not to vote at all, or they decided the Lebed-Yeltsin ticket was acceptable enough.

Zyuganov, on the other hand, competed just as hard for the Lebed total, and the Zhirinovsky voters. What none of the polls has been able to predict since 1993 is the volatility of protest, outside Moscow, St. Petersburg and a couple of other large cities, that had put forward Zhirinovsky in 1993 and now Lebed. What was new in the current situation was that, acknowledging all the disadvantages of incumbency, it was Yeltsin who was trying to capture the protest vote for himself.

By bringing Lebed into the government team Yeltsin had significantly strengthened his position though had not automatically assured himself of victory. This was only a part of political game to win the elections.

Another strong pattern is the voting of the border regions for nationalist candidates. This time, the pattern was demonstrated not only by Zhirinovsky but by Lebed as well. For example, in the Far East province of Primorie (Primorsky kray), Zhirinovsky’s
traditional stronghold, Lebed got 19.47 percent and Zhirinovsky got 12.73 percent of the vote. The results of these two nationalist candidates were there above their averages, whence the results of Yeltsin and Zyuganov proved to be deplorably below their averages (correspondingly 29.55 and 24.56). The same picture is in the Pskov region: Lebed and Zhirinovsky got 23.56 and 10.19 percent, while Yeltsin and Zyuganov got 24.81 and 30.39 percent. (See Tables in the Appendices). Both Lebed and Zhirinovsky showed equally poor results in the ethnic republics, especially in the Northern Caucasus. This once again demonstrates incompatibility of the great-power nationalism with ethnic nationalisms. (However, the picture is not so strikingly obvious as it was with the LDPR in December 1993.)

Balancing on a brink of separatism, Tatarstan signed several international documents, including trade treaty with Iran. It was Tatarstan that the Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov visited immediately after the peace treaty with Moscow was signed. In spite of somewhat uncertain status of Chechnya, Mentimer Shaimiev signed a treaty with Maskhadov. At the same time, Tatarstan demonstrated higher support for Yeltsin than Russia’s average (respectively, 39.9 percent and 35.2 in the first round, and 63.7 and 53.8 in the second round).

The voting in the North Caucasian republics showed mostly the same linkage between the voting and their leaders’ support for, or opposition to, the Center as in 1995. These patterns imply that cleavages between the ethnic republics with the Center and Russian oblasts are likely to turn the problem of separatism/federalism into the permanent headache for Moscow.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

• The analysis of the elections in Russia (1993 - 1996) confirms that the political preferences of population tend to be concentrated in distinct geographic zones. Russia is divided into the more "proreform north" -- zone of relative support for the reformist parties - and the "antireform south", where more conservative orientations prevail. It is in the southern, traditionally conservative part of the country, the reformists gained less support and, on the contrary, the communists ran much better than on the average.

There are two main explanations for the north-south divide:

(1) Electorate in urban regions (north and east) is more likely to vote for reform than in the rural areas (urban population data by regions is attached -- see tables.xls in the Appendices). The communists as well as the Agrarian party won the highest support in villages and small towns.

(2) Among the so-called northern regions are the largest cities -- Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the industrial oblasts -- Sverdlovsk, Perm, Yaroslavl, Chelyabinsk, Murmansk, etc. On the other hand, this group includes some territories with dominance of oil and gas extraction in their regional economies -- Yamalia, Khanty-Mansia, Komi, Yakutia (Sakha) etc. They are rich in natural resources and possess of the infrastructure to benefit from their exploitation (such as the diamond-producing Yakutia-Sakha and the oil-rich Khanty-Mansia Autonomous Okrug). The 1992-93 reforms resulted in significant increase in wage differentials for the benefit of these areas.

• New finding (together with J. Sapir) is that there is a strong correlation between the level of regional monetarisation and voting for Yeltsin and Yavlinsky. The
The Zhirinovsky votes (1993-1996) reveal no significant correlation with economic indicators. Therefore, it is no longer adequate to measure political tendencies solely on the basis of support for, of opposition to, socio-economic reform.

- The second principal divide is between Russian regions (*oblasts*) and ethnic republics. The republics have supposedly been privileged in budgetary arrangements (like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia-Sakha). The larger net recipients tend to be the relatively rural, less-developed regions plus much of the Far East and Kemerovo, with its subsidised coal mining. The centre-region redistribution system is a most powerful means of Moscow’s control over the provinces which helps keep them together.

- Some republics demonstrate a kind of ethnic nationalism close to separatism. Since many ethnically Russian regions pursue the policies of regionalisation, ethnic nationalism in the republics is far from being the focal point of the centre-region relations. Local leader make use of nationalist feeling in order to instigate devolution of power and regionalisation.

Zhirinovsky with his ideas of regional conformity does bad in the majority far-flung autonomous republics, since his electoral platform favors the abolition of the ethnic sovereignty and strong domination of the Centre over territories. However, LDPR does well not only in areas where opposition to Yeltsin's policies had emerged after the 1991 elections (the central black-earth economic region, the Volga region, and parts of the Northern Caucasus) but also in many traditionally neutral or democratic areas.
Regional nationalism raises concerns about "legal separatism" in the regions. Moscow tries to scrap the bilateral power-sharing agreements signed between the federal government and 26 regions declaring the Russian constitution and federal legislation to be supreme on all Russian Federation territory. Moscow’s efforts to force them to do so now are likely to antagonize regional elites and prompt some to demand greater autonomy. Such demands could quickly escalate beyond the capacity of the central state apparatus to control. The tax breaks Yeltsin gave to Tatarstan and Sakha sparked public outrage, but the special favors he has extended--generally in secret--to other regions may be even more advantageous. Yeltsin has worked hard to buy off the regions and to prevent further decay of central authority, but if he now tries to reassert the power of the center in the area of taxes, he will likely find that he has lost much of what he gained. That is not to say that a tougher approach toward the collection of taxes will spark a new drive for secession.¹¹

- The 1995 parliamentary elections revealed one more principal divide in Russia, the one between the European and Far Eastern parts of the country. European part, cradle of Russian traditions, tends to vote for well-known politicians, like Zyuganov or Yeltsin, both representing so-called “old elite”.

The Communists who made “Russian grandeur” the centrepiece of their platform, enjoy strong positions, especially in rural Russia. The implications of regional balance of political forces for the future of political and economic reform are profound. The old communist nomenklatura has regional network. Moreover, it has the advantage of name recognition, a factor that works against any candidates that other parties can nominate. Furthermore, when the communist-era nomenklatura at the local level successfully holds
on to power through the ballot box, they gain something that had eluded them in the past -- the legitimacy that stems from winning office in a competitive, multi-party election. After local governors gain legitimacy, attempts to carry out reforms from Moscow meet perhaps insurmountable opposition in many regions southwards of the 55th parallel.

What do the election results tell us about the nature of future conflicts between Russian regions? The most fundamental divergences are likely between ethnic Russian regions of the conservative south on the one side, and the proponents of economic reforms on the other. This shapes up as a struggle between rich, autonomous republics and conservative, southern regions. The regional nature of conflicts between the various lobbyists, government officials, and interest groups representing these regions are evident. The northern regions, for example, have long been represented by the oil and gas lobby. (The current Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, has long-standing ties to this industry.) Other regions, such as Lipetsk, Orel, Belgorod, Tambov, Voronezh oblasts, situated southward of Moscow, have formed an anti-reformist opposition. The mainly agricultural regions of this “red-brown arc” encircling Moscow will likely push for subsidies and a continuation of state-run agriculture.

The republics favouring a strong periphery are, in their most extreme manifestation, a potential threat to Russian territorial integrity. The most dramatic and painful example is Chechnya. However, the danger of a collapse of Russia that would mirror the collapse of the Soviet Union is not great. The territories inclined towards “strong regions/antireform” lack resources and are scattered over Russia. For the “strong regions/proreform” regions, the level of support for economic reform tends to outweigh
the support for a weak centre (which might seem to have an agenda that would prevent them from cooperating with autonomous republics that vote for Communists.

As for “strong centre/antireform” regions, their great-power nationalism is a strong centripetal factor in spite of their hostile attitude towards Moscow. In a way, great-power nationalism appears to be one of the powerful obstacles to dissipation of the Russian Federation.

• What would be the regional base of support for a candidate favouring reforms for 2000 presidential elections? The traditional centres of reform (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Perm, etc.) are not populous enough to determine the outcome of an election. The pro-reform north and far east, while large in territorial scope and possessing immense resources, are limited by a relatively small population. Therefore, any proponent of liberal economic policies who might run for president in 2000 must attract voters in other regions as well in order to be elected. This is one of the most powerful sources of Russia’s drive towards more nationalistic stance.

Although the shift of the regions towards more nationalist posture signifies a worrying tendency, the implication for foreign policy may be less radical than some commentators have been suggesting, bearing in mind (a) the relative insulation of foreign policy from parliament and regional pressure groups and (b) the fact that Russian foreign policy had already been moving in a more conservative direction.

26 June, 1997
Figure 1. Main Dimensions of Political Conflict Among Russian Political Parties, the 1993 Elections
(factor analysis based on regional election results, with Factor 1 on the horizontal axis and Factor 2 on the vertical axis)

“Strong Regions”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>Women of Russia</td>
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<td>DPR</td>
<td>RDDR</td>
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</table>

“State Control Over Economy”

| Agrarian Party | Communists |

“Economic Liberalism”

| Russia’s Choice | Yabloko |

“Strong Center”

| LDPR |

Figure 2. Main Dimensions of Political Conflicts Among Russia’s Regions, the 1993 Elections
(factor analysis based on support for political parties in each region)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Strong Regions”</th>
<th>“State Control Over Economy”</th>
<th>“Economic Liberalism”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuva</td>
<td>North Ossetia</td>
<td>Chelyabinsk</td>
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<td>Kabardino-Balkaria</td>
<td>Karachai-Cherkessia</td>
<td>Tomsk</td>
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<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>Altay kray</td>
<td>Murmansk</td>
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<td>Gorno-Altay</td>
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<td>Kamchatka</td>
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<td>Aga (Agin-Buryat)</td>
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<td>Magadan</td>
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<td>Ust’-Orda</td>
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<td>St. Peteresburg</td>
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<td>Buryatia</td>
<td>Yakutia</td>
<td>Evenkia</td>
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<td>Bashkortostan</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Strong Center”</td>
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</table>
Figure 3. Main Dimensions of Political Conflict Among Russian Political Parties, the 1995 Elections
(factor analysis based on regional election results, with Factor 1 on the horizontal axis and Factor 2 on the vertical axis)

“NON-CONFORMISTS”

* LDPR
* YABLOKO

“ANTIDEMOCRATS” ———— “DEMOCRATS”

* CPRF
* OUR HOME IS RUSSIA

“TRADITIONALISTS”
Figure 3. Main Dimensions of Political Conflict among Russia’s Regions
(factor analysis based on support for political parties in each region, the December 1995 parliamentary elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“NON-CONFORMISTS”</th>
<th>YABLOKO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorie</td>
<td>Magadan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirov</td>
<td>Yaroslav</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“ANTTI”-Smolensk</th>
<th>Moscow</th>
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<tr>
<td>“DEMOCRATS”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bryansk</td>
<td>Moscow obl.</td>
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<td>Belgorod</td>
<td>Kalmykia</td>
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<td>Amur</td>
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<td>Ulyanovsk</td>
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<td>Chuvashia</td>
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<td>Ust-Orda</td>
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<td>Tambov</td>
<td>Dagestan</td>
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<td>Orel</td>
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<td>Adygeya</td>
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</table>

| CPRF              | OUR HOME IS RUSSIA |

Endnotes

I. Introduction

The author bears full responsibility for all opinions contained within this paper. They do not imply any approval from institutions for which the author works or has worked.


The election law was published in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 8 October 1993.

II. Russian Nationalism (Review chapter)


III. The 1993 parliamentary elections


The party lists appeared in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 12 Nov. 1993.

The Central Electoral Commission published data on voting for party lists for each of Russia's 89 territories, with the exception only of Tatarstan and Chechnya. In Tatarstan, an unofficial boycott resulted in a turnout of less than 13 percent which was less that the required 25 percent. On March 13, 1994, after negotiations between Russian President and the President of Tatarstan, Mentimer Shaimiev, elections for

the single-mandate districts were held (but not the party list balloting). In Chechnya, a boycott of the election took place, and no polling stations were allowed to open.

xxxii Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 3 December 1993.


xxxiv The LDPR program was published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 3 December 1993.

xxxv See Kolosov, V., N. Petrov, and L. Smirnyagin, ed. Vesna 89: Geografia I anatomia parlamentskikh vyborov (Progress: Moscow, 1990), pp. 69, 74-75.

xxxvi The correlation coefficient between level of urbanization and statism/reformism was $r = .61$, with $p$ less than .001.

xxxviii A statistical analysis of this variable found a coefficient of correlation of $r = .57$, with $p$ less than .001.

xlii Petrov, N., Paper presented at a seminar at the Center for Comparative Socio-Economic and Political Studies, 2 February 1996.


IV. The 1995 parliamentary elections.


xiii For detailed analysis of classification of parties also see: Kolosov, V. and R. Turovsky, "Kampaniya 1995 goda: regionalnye strategii predvybornyh blokov" ("The 1995 campaign: regional strategies of electoral blocs"), Rossiya na vyrorakh: uroki i perspektivy (Russia in Elections: Lessons and Prospects). Ed. V. Kolosov (Moscow: Center for Political Technologies, 1995), pp.141-190. In fact, the spectrum of political alignment was broader. The parties boil into four major groups according to their political programs and the political views proclaimed by their leaders. "Reformers" in the broad sense of the word were represented by Yavlinsky's Yabloko bloc, Gaidar's Democratic Choice of Russia, Boris Fedorov's Forward, Russia! bloc, Irina Hakamada's Common Cause, Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko bloc and some other minor parties. "Anti-reformers" are represented by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation headed by Gennady Zyuganov, Viktor Anpilov's more hard-line Communists for the Soviet Union, Nikolai Ryzhkov's Power to the People bloc etc. "Nationalists" were represented by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Congress of Russian Communities headed by Yuri Skokov and Alexander Lebed. "Centrists" were mainly pragmatists, who were between the groups. They were represented by Chernomyrdin's Our Home Is Russia bloc, the Women of Russia bloc and some minor groups.


Rozov, N. “Puti samoopredeleniya Rossii v kontekste geopolitiki” (“Russia’s self-identification in the context of geopolitics”), *Rossiya i sovremennyi mir (Russia and the modern world)*, no 1 (14), 1997, p.76.


V. The 1996 presidential elections


The falsifications seem to have been insignificant. See: Sobyanin, A., “Problema falsifikatsii na predstoyashchikh vyborakh” (The problem of frauds at the forthcoming elections”), *Prezidentskie vybory v Rossii*, bulletin 4-5 (Moscow: Carnegie Foundation, 1996), p.28-32.

VI. Conclusions

Interesting analysis may be found in: Parkansky, A., "Rossiiskie regiony i vneshniaia politika" (Russian Regions and Foreign Policy), *Segodnya*, June 19, p.5.


