Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. The Role Of Nuclear Weapons And Its Possible Future Missions Igor SUTYAGIN [Back to Index] Origins Of Nuclear Strategies Of The "Nuclear Club" Members - Brief Overview I.5. The People's Republic of China The origins of the Chinese nuclear weapons program can be traced back to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) itself in 1949 and to the determination of the China's leadership - first of all Mao Zedong' one - that China should be a great world power. (54) Meanwhile, it was the United States - and its "decisive" rhetoric accompanied by some practical steps - that provided China with much of its original impetus and rationale for developing nuclear weapons. Indeed, after winning of the Civil war in 1949 which led to separation of China and establishment of the PRC, the Beijing leadership was very much concerned about the U.S.-backed nationalist Kuomintang of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan (Formosa) which was considered the main threat to China. At the same time it was clear for Mao Zedong that Kuomintang (especially in the first years of its "separated" existence on Taiwan) was highly dependent of United States and it was the United States who provided to Chiang Kai-shek guarantees of its "well-being". Hence, the United States accompanied Taiwan in the list of the threats to China - moreover, the U.S. was the main foreign threat to PRC (because Beijing never recognized Taiwan as the foreign country but rather as the province separated by the mutiny). One need to notice that the United States did its best to give as much food to the Chinese concerns as possible. At the early stage of the PRC existence the U.S. engaged in a series of conflicts and confrontations involving China, including the Korean War of 1950 and (later) two Taiwan Strait Crisis and Vietnam War. That made Beijing fear the threat of U.S. forces and the possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons against China. (55)

That perception was reinforced by the fact that the United States did consider using nuclear weapons against China on several occasions during and after the Korean War and even deployed nuclear-armed B-29 "Superfortress" bombers with nine atomic bombs to Guam in 1951 for possible use against targets on the PRC territory. Interested observers - and Chinese leadership definitely was among the most interested ones - did notice that was the very first time since Tinian Island in 1945 that the United States deployed its nuclear weapons outside of the U.S. territory and - what was even more important - gave custody of combat-ready nuclear weapons to the military from civilian custodian of the Atomic Energy Commission in what could be perceived as the final step in preparation of combat nuclear bombardment. (56) In addition to high-level U.S. consideration to use nuclear weapons during and after the Korean War, the United States deployed nuclear-capable Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles on Taiwan in 1958 which was the first overseas deployment of those missiles. It also appears that one squadron of nuclear-capable Matador cruise-missiles (the 17th Tactical Missile Squadron) was deployed at Tainan Air Base on Taiwan in the same time and that nuclear-certified F-84 and F-86 aircraft were deployed on rotational basis from Philippines to Taiwan during that period. (57) Thus China had strong reasons to fear the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons. Meanwhile that U.S. political pressure upon China backed by the U.S. nuclear arsenal was unacceptable for Chinese leadership. It was finally decided on January 15, 1955 that it should be China's own nuclear weapons which stop the "nuclear bullying" by the United States as well as allow PRC to "jump" to the great power status. As Deng Xiaoping, the General Secretary of China's Communist Party's Central Committee described in 1957, "the Soviet Union has the atom bomb. Where does the significance lie? It lies in the fact that imperialists are afraid of it. Are the imperialists afraid of us? I don't think so... The United States stations its troops on Taiwan because we have no atom bombs or guided missiles." (58) Given its perception during the 1950s that the United States alone or in collaboration with Taiwan might decide to attack China with nuclear weapons, Beijing was eager to obtain its own nuclear capability as quickly as possible. Thus the circumstances initially forced PRC to rely on the Soviet Union assistance in creation of the Chinese national atomic industry (and, in fact, the nuclear weapons). The Sino-Soviet cooperation in the military-nuclear field went so far that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrustchev even promised Mao Zedong to provide China a prototype atomic bomb. The corresponding agreement - it became the New Defense Technical Accord - was signed on October 15, 1957. (59) Earlier that year the Soviet Union granted the PRC the licence to produce Tu-16 (code-named Badger in NATO) medium bomber, which in the Soviet Air Force was certified for delivery of nuclear weapons. (60)

The Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate soon after the New Defense Technical Accord was signed and on June 20, 1959 the Central Committee of the CPSU formally (in the official letter sent to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee) notified the Soviet Union would not provide China technical details or working model of atomic bombs. (61) Deterioration of the relations between the USSR and PRC was accompanied by the increasing pressure from the Soviet side and Chinese re-oriented the "02" program - the PRC nuclear weapons development project. While the U.S. "nuclear bullying" was still intact and needed Chinese reply, the new source of political pressure immediately met its reflection in the Beijing leaders' rhetorics and aspirations. Indeed, the importance of the new task to withstand the new Soviet "neu-Imperialistic" pressure aimed in the Beijing leaders standpoint to not let China to obtain the great world power status can be illustrated by the following example. Even such the definitely historical for China event as the planned first test of independently developed nuclear device was assigned the code-name "596" (for the year and month of the Soviets' letter on refusal to provide blueprints of an atomic bomb) to inspire the Chinese atomic bomb engineers and workers. The purpose to counterbalance the outside pressure from the recent close ally overpowered fears of U.S. nuclear attack.