Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. The Role Of Nuclear Weapons And Its Possible Future Missions Igor SUTYAGIN [Back to Index] Origins Of Nuclear Strategies Of The "Nuclear Club" Members - Brief Overview I.4. France It was the successful assault of Dien Bieng Phu fortress by Viet Kong in May 1954 which finally forced the French leadership to make the decision to launch the national nuclear weapons program. The loss of Dien Bieng Phu had the very negative influence upon the moods in France and - as was decided by the Fourth Republic's leaders - upon the France's international prestige. Under those conditions the French Cabinet was made on December 26, 1954 to launch the full-scale nuclear weapons development and construction program with the main purpose to restore France's grandeur, recover international prestige and increase the state's political weight among Western countries. (49) Hence the purpose to increase the political influence of the state in the international relations was the historically first task of the nuclear weapons it played in the French leadership's point of view. The importance of that role of the Bomb has rocketed up after Charles de Gaulle came to power and the Fifth Republic was established in 1958. The process of development of sound French nuclear strategy itself was started as early as in late 1956 - a year and a one-half year in advance to the official order signed in April 1958 by Felix Gaillard - the Fourth Republic's last Prime Minister - to manufacture the first French experimental nuclear device the test of which was scheduled for the first quarter of 1960. (50)

It seems the U.S. refusal to grant to France and the United Kingdom support during the Suez crisis was the most important individual factor, "the last drop" that finally led to the decision to develop really independent French nuclear postures and strategy. French leadership had to consider seriously that move taking into account the conditions under which the United States refused to support joint French-British actions - that took place when the Soviet Union warned about its willingness to intervene into the situation "with employment of nuclear missiles" if France and United Kingdom would not break off military actions against Egypt. Absence of its own powerful enough tools to withstand that sort of "warnings" from the side of a nuclear power (French and British forces had broken off the military actions against Egyptians in 22 hours after Soviet Ambassadors in Paris and London handed the Soviet Government's messages to the top French and British officials) multiplied by the dependence of the United States will to put in danger the U.S. security for defense of allies' interests had in that situation for Paris (as one can consider) the decisive significance and it definitely was among the most important "votes" for necessity to develop really independent of France's allies nuclear policy. Suez crisis has very convincingly for the period proved that France could not depend too much on its allies. Meanwhile the United States did their best to prevent appearance of the French nuclear Bomb. That was the clear consequence of the U.S. policy of the period aimed to prevention of nuclear proliferation. (51) Nevertheless those American attitudes towards the idea of the French Bomb were considered among Paris political elite as the sign of the U.S. intentions not to let France to increase the role it played - and wanted to play - in the international relations. Without French nuclear arsenal President de Gaulle felt that superpowers would deal with each other paying little attention to smaller nations, their interests and aspirations. (52)

Moreover, consequent deterioration of French-U.S. relations (especially after de Gaulle came to power) gave birth to extremes in the two states relations concerning the nuclear affairs. For instance, in 1962 the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk is said to have warned that France's refusal to follow NATO nuclear policy and establishment of independent operating French nuclear forces could make those forces a target for U.S. nuclear weapons. (53) Needless to say that sort of "warnings" - in fact threats to allied country - from the U.S. side gave absolutely opposite fruits and served as strong evidence of vital necessity to enhance France's nuclear posture and counterbalance the threats - including American ones. The touz azimuts strategy of the France's force de trappe employment became that counterbalance. The thesis about equality of threats to French interests and security from all directions (azimuths) was the cornerstone of that strategy. That critical point of the strategy supposed, among others, willingness of France to use its nuclear forces to withstand, if necessary, the U.S. political pressure - and marked the very important attitude of the French leadership towards the nation's nuclear arsenal on the early stage of its existence.