Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

Administrative and Cadre Reform in Russia: Opportunities And Perils For Democracy Leonid Rodin [Back to Index] Chapter I. War In Chechnya: A Factor Of Multiple Instability I.3. Forced Tactical Adjustments. The events at Budennovsk and elsewhere at the battlefields of the Chechen war had apparently convinced Moscow that further open hostilities would be too costly politically (of special significance on this account were European pressures to modify Moscow's position), economically (the country was still battling with deteriorating conditions in practically every area of production) and psychologically (the majority of the population was becoming quite restless over the Chechen impass).Consequently,the government decided to make ammends not only at the level of particular individuals involved in handling the Chechen affair,but of general policy as well. In a move reminiscent of 'classical' Soviet nationalities policy,a stake was made on returning to the Chechen political scene of an influencial figure from the past, who used to be able to control local situation with relative success before. The man in question was the same Doku Gapurovich Zavgaev who had evidently started the Chechen drive towards greater independence and eventual sovereignization. Doku Zavgaev was allowed to return to Chechnya and 'peacefully' replace previous Moscow appointees Avturkhanov and Gadjiev to bring the Republic back to the 'status quo ante' and also to finally delegitimize J.Dudaev,since,after all, it was the flaring General who had originallyreplaced Zavgaev by force . There was still another important element involved in the restoration of the former Communist and Soviet politician and apparatchik in one of the 'subjects' of the Russian Federation.Evidently it came as a thinly veiled move to rescind some of liberal-oriented reforms and methods of governance that,in the opinion of Russian leaders, gradually arrived at by the time of the 1995 State Douma elections,were beginning to look like a political 'ballast',that could cost dearly to the ruling elite at the ballot stations. An important digression is warranted at this stage.By late 1995 the President was clearly on the defensive against ambitious and progressively successful attempts by the opposition,particularly neo-Communists and rabid nationalists,to win the electorate.The specter of imminent defeat first in the Parliamentary and then Presidential elections was beginning to loom large over it.Under these circumstances it was impossible to ignore two phenomena that were affecting voters in a particularly significant way -- nostalgia for the Communist past and dissatisfaction with the way national relations were being handled. Since the populace tended to long for the 'good old times' associating them if not with material abundance then with relative uniformity and 'fairness' of socio-economic conditions, drawing people like Doku Zavgaev from out of political 'mothballs' evidently demonstrated that the current leaders was not totally against former Communists or their methods of runnig the affairs of state,especially in the area of ethnic relations,and also created prerequisites for more resolute activities,which,in the Chechen context,meant returning to the use of military force. A new subtle accent appeared in the pronouncements of foremost Russian leaders on the Chechen situation in connection with the return of Zavgaev.It began to be announced that henceforth 'the Chechen settlement would be moved from the Federal level down to the level of internal Chechen dialogue'.To substantiate this policy Moscow and the newly formed Zavgaev government agreed upon something no one in Chechnya could accomplish before -- the conclusion of a separate treaty on 'deliniation of powers and responsibilities between Federal and local authorities'.As the result Chechnya appeared to have aquired a unique status of quasi-independence within the Russian Federation. Embolded by this course of events, Doku Zavgaev decided,apparently not without Moscow's consent, to hold his own 'presidential' elections to coincide with Duma elections of December 14,1995.Running unopposed ,the new Chechen leader declared himself 'the only legitimate ruler of the Republic'. Official Moscow declared that after Zavgaev's 'victory' the solution of the Chechen quagmire was 'moved to the local level'.Theoreticly it also meant that Russia was about to withdraw its troops from Chechnya,putting the burden of reestablishing and maintaining local law and order on the shoulders of local militia and Chechen interior troops. However,official position was hardly shared by anyone outside Kremlin.As 'Izvestiya's' observer Igor Rotar' would put it:"It appears that we are dealing with a last attempt by Kremlin to pacify the Chechen society with the help of a local ruler...At the same time this hope is quite illusory.Elections may only reconfirm the split of that society.Obviously,their conduct puts a final end to negotiations with the followers of Dudaev.The disruption of a truce and resumption of combat activities... seem to be unavoidable" (1). In a prophetic way, little more than three weeks later,on January 9,1996, the Russian and international public opinion were again shocked by a large- scale eruption of violence started by a group of Dudaev guerrillas, headed by one Salman Raduev, capturing a hord of civilian hostages in the Daghestan township of Kizlyar. Footnotes Izvestiya, 14.12.1995.