Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Military Aspects Of Russian-Ukrainian Relations And European Security Arkady Moshes [Back to Index] Chapter II. Summary of the Research And General Conclusions. Factors of Russian-Ukrainian relationship in the military-political sphere. Two groups of factors can be defined. The first is connected with security dilemmas, threat perceptions and concepts of threat neutralization in Russia and Ukraine. The conceptual background of defence policies (primarily Ukraine's) which was considered as an instrument for neutralizing security challenges played an independent and significant role in the shaping bilateral relationship. The second group of factors is rooted in a common military past, which theoretically should have been a uniting factor, but in reality has not had this impact as the influence of the second group of factors was incomparably smaller than that of the first. The threat perceptions of Russian and Ukrainian elites are different, if not opposit. The dominant point of view in Ukraine, which is naturally stronger among nationalists and national democrats, but also quite wide-spread among the forces in power, says that the main external danger to Ukraine's independence comes from Russia. This belief is logically connected with the understanding of Ukraine's independence as independence from Russia. The assumption that Russia's political aim is to weaken Ukraine's sovereignty has developed into following apprehensions: that on the bilateral level Russia will try to use the ethnic Russian (which numbers 12 million) and considerable Russian-speaking Ukrainian population, concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine and politically mainly Russia-oriented, to destabilize the domestic situation in Ukraine and to achieve the secession of some regions; that for these purposes Russia will use economic pressure; that Russia will use CIS mechanisms and integration processes within the Commonwealth to create a Russia-dominated confederation in which other states will play the role of satellites; that Russia will try to isolate Ukraine from the international scene. Many in Russia considered Ukraine a friendly state, with security interests similar to Russia's. For a long period Moscow thought that military alliance between Russia and Ukraine was possible, providing for united military-strategic space and common defence policy. With the upswing of the socio-econimic crisis in Ukraine, democratic Russian elites stated that the situtation in Ukraine, and not Ukraine itself, represented the most serious challenge to the security and internal stability of Russia. It seems that while shaping its defence policy, Ukraine considered the formation of independent armed forces, refusal to participate in the CIS collective security structures under the pretext of an intention to be alliance-free and intention to obtain security guarantees from the West as the ideological background for this policy, aimed at neutralization of the "Russian challenge". The formation of Ukrainian armed forces, which in the initial stage took the form of resubordination to Ukraine of troops stationed on Ukrainian territory without reaching a consent of other CIS countries, and taking from them Ukrainian oath of allegiance, ran contrary to Russia's desire to keep the post-Soviet military forces within one structure. Later, the so-called "ukrainization", which included the intention to quickly introduce Ukrainian language and Ukrainian spiritual values into the armed forces and intolerance of the "Soviet heritage", became the ideological motive of the defence policy. The openly anti-Russian Union of Ukrainian officers (up to 70 thousand members) very quickly became extremely influential within the armed forces. Due to pressure from this organization, Russian officers who had not sworn allegiance to Ukraine by June 1992 were ordered to leave the country and Russian troops attending the nuclear weapons were labelled as "occupation forces". Gradually, the policy of "ukrainization", though much less active under Kuchma's administration, lead to a change in the ethnic composition of the Ukrainian army in favour of ethnic Ukrainians over ethnic Russians. The legal premise of an intention to reach a non-bloc status was used to help Ukraine resist Russia's attempts to make it a member of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security, signed in May 1992. Ukraine's refusal to participate in CIS security structures was a logical consequence of Kiev's apprehensions that the CIS through its mechanisms would diminish Ukraine's sovereignty. In its practical policy Ukraine did not argue against the necessity to interact with the CIS countries, but went no further than acceptance of mutual assistance in solving military-technical problems. Russia's attempts to gain international recognition of its peace-keeping efforts in the CIS became an area of Ukraine's specific concerns and were characterized as a manifestation of imperial ambitions. Fearing that legitimization of CIS peace-keeping could lead to interference in the Crimean crisis, Ukraine not only naturally refused to participate, but also refused to recognize the positive side of the peace-keeping engagement, namely that de-escalation of many conflicts was reached through it. There are reasons to believe that Ukraine's non-bloc status, so rigidly observed vis-a-vis the CIS, can be abandoned in the future in favour of joining Western security structures. Ukraine is actively trying to obtain security guarantees from the West through the process of cooperation with Western security organizations, particularly, NATO. Although official Ukraine opposes quick enlargement of the Alliance eastward and deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new potential members, it does not express dissatisfaction with the notion per se. The question has been raised for the national debate of whether Ukraine should join NATO. A rapprochement with the Alliance and gradual accession to its political bodies are being recongnized as policy goals. The comparison between fundamental approaches of Russia and Ukraine to providing security shows that these are completely opposite. Russia does not view Ukraine through the lens of security concerns. Mostly self-reliant in defence matters and remaining rather removed from military-political cooperation with the West, Russia is trying to unite other CIS countries into the collective security system of the Commonwealth. Ukraine, proceeding from the assumption that Russia is the main security challenge for Ukraine, remains suspicious towards Russian policy in the CIS, very passive within the Commonwealth, and formally neutral with a great deal of pro-Western sympathies. Deep contradictions in the fundamental principles of security policies of the two countries and the absence of what can be defined as common security challenges predetermine that there can hardly be a coordinated or common security policy. Therefore, the prospects for cooperation in the military-political sphere are from the very beginning substantially narrowed. The common military history of Russia and Ukraine theoretically could have formed the background for establishing intense cooperation between the two militaries. Initially, the two countries in respective defence policies faced almost identical tasks and problems, rooted in Soviet heritage and similar economic situations. Those tasks were: to reform the command and control system; to reduce drastically the strength of the armed forces, both for economic reasons and to comply with arms control treaties, signed by the USSR; to create a legal base for the military; to finance the armed forces and defence procurement; to man the armed forces and to improve social climate within the military. Despite the similarity of tasks and pressure of the same problems which are far from being solved, in practice the policies of Russia and Ukraine turned out to be different. Russia has preserved much from the Soviet tradition and Soviet military thinking as far as questions of strength of the armed forces and geostrategic assessments among others. This is likely the reason the process of reductions in Russian armed forces was slowed down in the second half of 1994. Ukraine is creating a new military tradition: that of a relatively small European state, unable to protect itself in case of a wide-scale conflict and therefore recognizing the redundancy of a big army in peacetime and more open towards military cooperation with the West. Ukraine, unlike Russia, was in compliance with the CFE Treaty by November 1995 and, facing a lack of resources, intends to downsize the army even more than originally planned, also through the shortening of terms of obligatory service. In short, Ukraine's defence policy is aimed at breaking with the traditions of Soviet military policy. As for the influence of the common history on the emerging Russian-Ukrainian relationship in the military-political sphere, it is clear that in cooperation the two countries could better perform the task of military reform, given the initially identical character of tasks in each country. However, cooperation on this basis has not developed. It appears that basic differences in security concepts dominated the thinking of politicians and made them refrain from cooperation in defence matters. By 1996, the defence policies of the two countries had become oriented differetly. Tactical intermediary tasks still seem to be similar, but strategic goals obviously no longer correspond. Common military history directly influenced the process of decision-making in one way: political elites in Kiev and to a smaller extent in Moscow thought that dividing the Soviet military heritage would facilitate the reform process and therefore paid exaggerated attention to the problem of division. The leadership in both countries for a long time did not realize that numerous disputes and controversies over inherited weapons and equipment could not be a panacea for stumbling reforms but could only contribute to conflict potential emerging between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine's Nuclear Temptation and Russian Response. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship in the nuclear sphere can hardly be taken out a wider international context. On its own Russia would most probably never be able to have reached Ukraine's non-nuclear status. Nevertheless, relations between Russia and Ukraine in this area were more emotional as compared with, for exemple, US-Ukrainian relations, and, to a certain extent, the former were more nuanced and had autonomous dynamics. So, research can be focused on this aspect of the world's efforts to denuclearize Ukraine. It should be noted that although by 1996 the negative consequences of Ukraine's policy in nuclear matters which Kiev pursued in 1992-1994 have been mostly overcome, Russian-Ukrainian disagreements on the question of Ukraine's nuclear policy left behind a considerable amount of mutual dissatisfaction, frustration and distrust, the negative psychological impact of which can be traced in contacts between the two military-political establishments. Ukraine, which after the collapse of the Soviet Union was left with the world's third largest strategic nuclear arsenal stationed on its territory, in its official policy had to take into account at a minimum three very important factors: the seeming possibility of reaching a military-political status equal to that of Russia, which, according to Ukrainian concepts, would allow not only the pursuit of the really independent and effective defence policy of a neutral state, but also the facilitation of overcoming the inferiority complex of the "younger Soviet brother" vis-a-vis Russia; the theoretical possibility to raise its international prestige in general, to strengthen its positions in dealing with the West; and strong negative attitudes towards the non-nuclear option, unanimously shared by leading opposition parties, as well as a growing number of supporters of nuclear status. Some political forces, including certain circles in the administration were serious in striving to retain the nuclear weapons. Others, seemingly the majority in the executive branch, gradually came to a realization of the negative consequences such a policy would have for Ukraine and targeted the measures taken at reaching as many concessions from other countries in financial and security spheres as possible. Even if such a policy were not initially aimed at going nuclear, constant delays in the practical measures of denuclearizing Ukraine (except quick withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons in spring 1992) let the genie out of the bottle and consecutive governments could not successfully resist the pressure of the nuclear lobby until the end of 1994. Ukraine in practice first established "administrative control" over strategic forces, which meant financing, manning, supplying and taking the Ukrainian oath of allegiance, and later, after the parliament in July 1993 declared Ukraine to be the owner of nuclear weapons, established direct control over technical nuclear installations, reaching unhindered control over warheads. It was reported, that Ukraine was actively working on deciphering the codes blocking the use of weapons. These were the practical steps, showing that contrary to official statements, Ukraine in 1993 was very close to finally breaking with the declared policy based on the intention to be non-nuclear in the future. Accompanied by the measures outlined, preconditions put forward by Ukraine as those of its denuclearization (namely, security guarantees from nuclear nations and financial compensations) could not be taken as last on the list. There were no safeguards that new prerequisites would not be invented should the first ones be accepted. The Russian approach was defined by apprehensions that its security would be diminished in the case of the emergence of nuclear Ukraine. These fears were common in the international community as a whole, but Russian interests were threatened more directly. First, Ukraine's position could trigger the process of nuclear proliferation on the territory of the former Soviet Union - Kazakhstan might well wish to follow suit. Second, Russia, at that time actively pushing forward the disarmament agenda, could not let this process (definitely the START-2 Treaty) be jeopardized, providing the "hawks" in Russia with such a strong argument as nuclear Ukraine. Third, the most immediate and most dangerous threat to Russia, there was the probability of a warhead explosion, an accident with toxic fuel, or an unauthorized launch due to lack of expertise in Ukraine about how to deal with nuclear weapons. The two first apprehensions could be seemingly dismissed only in the case of Ukraine's complete denuclearization; the third one could be dealt with through compromising agreements on Russian technical supervision over the weapons. (Ukraine, expecting political consequences from these agreements, argued against them.) Steps taken by Russia to reach the completion of these tasks were doomed to antagonistic contradictions with Ukraine's political imperatives, thus multiplying the conflict potential which was emerging in bilateral relations. However, in the very beginning Russia made some conceptual mistakes, which did not allow to find the tactics of a policy leading to achievement of the strategic goal. In 1992 Russia misjudged Ukraine's intentions with regards to the Alma-Ata Agreement on Common Measures Towards Nuclear Weapons (December 1991), binding Ukraine to become non-nuclear by 1994 and the Lisbon protocol to the START-1 Treaty (May 1992), making Ukraine party to the Treaty. Timely completion by Ukraine of the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawal process was found sufficient evidence of its willingness to be bound by the agreements' provisions and/or not to clash with the international community on the issue of denuclearization. As a result, Russia, during the first stage of nuclear controversy, apparently did not elaborate any consistent policy in this field and focused on further disarmament steps, such as START 2 negotiations. Momentum in the process of denuclearizing Ukraine was lost. By early 1993 Kiev had prepared its stand for nuclear bargaining. Russia was not ready for such a turn in Ukrainian policy and turned out to be unable to understand the complexity of Ukraine's position, to agree that some demands of the latter were legitimate. Moscow found it natural to try to exert economic pressure on Ukraine ("Massandra approach") which, however, was rather rhetorical than real. In fact, Russia did not go beyond making diplomatic demarches (in April and August 1993). At the same time Russia was unable to bring its point of view to the West, which was Russia's pragmatic partner in this issue and later proved it by its policy. This was one of the reasons why Western policy towards Ukraine remained tolerant, relying on putative but not real pressure. For these reasons years-long negotiations between Russia and Ukraine obviously failed. Shifts in Western policy, caused by "conditional" ratification of START-1 by the Ukrainian parliament in November 1993, which made the US take rigid stand vis-a-vis Ukraine, allowed Russia and the United States to combine their efforts. The threat of Russian oil and gas sanctions and that of forming a consolidated Russian-US position towards Ukraine's nuclear policy which would take into account some of Ukraine's concerns but would be very strong in principal matters quickly (from mid-November 1993 to mid-January 1994) made Ukraine ready for compromises. This period was a decisive time in Russian-Ukrainian dispute. After the trilateral Agreement between Russia, Ukraine and the US (January 1994) and especially after the accession of Ukraine to the NPT (December 1994), although relapses of strong pro-nuclear sentiments were very visible in Ukraine, the nuclear controversy took on other dimensions. Discussion of compensation is still possible, but the principal readiness of Ukraine to go non-nuclear is unlikely to be challenged and practical measures prove it. The eventual success of the world community in denuclearizing Ukraine has serious international importance and implications. Tactics of nuclear blackmail failed. Despite growing sympathies to Ukraine in the West, Kiev was unable to convince other countries to accept its demands fully. Security guarantees, obtained by Ukraine, are in fact nothing but confirmation of US obligations within the NPT and Helsinki agreement. Financial compensation will be considerably smaller than the amounts asked by Kiev. Nuclear disarmament of Ukraine was made possible through common Russian and Western efforts. This is an example of pragmatic partnership, valuable for all actors. Active participation of Ukraine in its own disarmament which followed signing the above-mentioned agreements, allows the establishment of patterns of multilateral cooperation. On the bilateral level the fact that Ukraine agreed to give up nuclear weapons allowed to substantially diminish the conflict potential which had emerged by early 1994 also due to Ukraine's nuclear policy. The negative impact of the nuclear controversy on bilateral relations was gradually disappearing and in 1996 is of academic interest. Black Sea Fleet Dispute and Security in the Region. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Black Sea Fleet was gradually losing its combat power. In 1995 the strength of the Fleet assessed in such quantitative characteristics as number of personnel and number of ships by categories was 2-3 times less than in the late 1980s. Due to the economic weakness of Russia along with other reasons the real state of the Fleet (number of unoperational ships, lack of proper personnel training) was even more critical than it may appear from the figures. The main reason for such a deplorable situation among the Black Sea Fleet is the fact that it became "an apple of discord" between Russia and Ukraine, a symbol of political conflict between the two inheritors of the Soviet military power which apparently did not and do not have a clear conceptual vision of the strategic role their naval forces can play in the region. At the outset, for both Russia and Ukraine an imperative to have naval forces on the Black Sea was based on psychological values. For Russia to keep the Black Sea Fleet under its control meant to maintain its military presence in the region, to emphasize formal continuity of its policy as compared with that of the USSR. Should Russia withdraw from bases in Crimea and Southern Ukraine, should it allow Ukraine to subordinate the Black Sea Fleet, Russia would find itself not only weaker in a strict military sense, but a second-rank power in the region. Initially Russia decided it was interested in preserving the status quo. It took Russia about three years to realize that to have an aging Black Sea Fleet would be a military-political liability rather than an asset, a financial burden rather than an advantage. Ukraine, in turn, also believed it needed naval forces to raise its prestige in the region, to make it equal or even superior to Russia's. Ukraine's plans in this aspect were very ambitious. It seemed natural for Kiev to subordinate the Black Sea Fleet (which would be only a continuation of policy towards other parts of the military organism of the USSR), to make it a material base for an independent navy. The dispute over whether and how to divide the Fleet was initiated by Ukraine when in April 1992 President Kravchuk issued a decree, declaring the Fleet to be the property of Ukraine. Russian President Yeltsin undertook a similar step. Both decrees were then recalled by the respective presidents as able to lead to open confrontation. The dispute itself passed through two stages. The first lasted from April 1992 to mid-1994. The main motive of that period was the problem whether to divide the Fleet at all. Despite the fact that in summer 1992 Russia formally agreed with Ukraine to divide the Fleet by the end of a three-year transitional period (for which purpose the Fleet was taken from the structures of the CIS Strategic Forces and subordinated to the two presidents), it obviously tried to postpone practical steps, raising the question of whether it was willing to implement those agreements. Such a state of affairs greatly contributed to conflict potential in the bilateral relationship (also in military-political area), which reached its peak in April 1994 when Ukrainian air-borne unit captured one of the bases of the Black Sea Fleet (in Odessa). After that, real division became unavoidable. Besides the principal question, there were other important problems to be solved, namely: whether or not to divide the coastal facilities which Ukraine considered to be its property not to be divided and to be paid for by Russia, while Russia saw these facilities as an inalienable part of the Fleet to be divided; formally at that time the Russian approach was accepted by the sides; how to finance the Fleet during the transitional period; although the parity financing was agreed upon, Ukraine de facto refused to pay (stopped all payments in December 1993), and Russia unsuccessfully tried to hold Ukraine this financial commitment; how to modify the principle of equal division in order not to overburden Ukraine with redundant forces at the same time as relieving it from part of its debt to Russia; at that time a solution to this problem was not found - Ukraine's acceptance of the idea to sell its part of the Fleet together with its infrastructure to Russia as payment for energy debt lasted only for a few days in September 1993. The second stage of the dispute started after L. Kuchma's victory in Ukrainian presidential elections in July 1994. Russia changed its position admitting the necessity to divide the Fleet, because there had appeared an opportunity to achieve two goals - to improve the relationship with a new Ukrainian administration, which in turn, was making similar advances to Russia, by de-escalating one of the most serious crises in bilateral relations, and to get rid of the financial burden of maintaining the whole Black Sea Fleet. Russia chose a tactic of small steps, willingly compromising in many areas. The "package" principle (discussion of the Fleet problem together with that of Ukraine's indebtedness) was abandoned by Russia in March 1995, when it agreed to restructure Ukraine's debt. In 1995-1996 almost all bases of the Fleet were given to the Ukrainian military. Neither calculation principles nor the list of ships to be divided in accordance with the agreement reached in June 1996 (18.3% of ships to Ukraine and 81.7% - to Russia) caused disagreements. At the same time the Russian position became even more uncompromising in the area where it is considered to be of principal nature. This is the problem of basing naval forces. Russia believed that base in Sevastopol (4 bays) should become the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and of its Headquarters, while the Ukrainian Navy should be based in other places. Ukraine for financial and political reasons (the fear of facing an ex-territorial status of Sevastopol) stated its will to also base its forces in Sevastopol. These two approaches for the time being seem irreconsilable. The problem of Sevastopol became the stumbling block and the conditio sine qua non on the way to finishing the dispute. Correspondingly, other remaining problems are seriously influenced by the uncertain future of Sevastopol. It's completely unclear what will be the amount of rent to be paid by Russia and other terms of lease of Sevastopol. As a consequence of clarity here, mutual financial claims - which may seem well-founded - appear on each side. In the area of Sevastopol the psychological incompatibility of the servicemen from the Black Sea Fleet and those from the Ukrainian Navy is reportedly and allegedly growing what becomes a destabilizing factor and a sound argument for Russia to demand separate basing. Technical aspects of running the base and controlling the Fleet are sometimes hard to manage. From a legal point of view with the expiry of the transitional period in the end of 1995, the status of the Fleet as a whole and in Sevastopol in particular has no background. In the wider context of regional security in the Black Sea/Mediterranean an analysis of Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the Black Sea Fleet leads to the following conclusions: at present the Black Sea Fleet does not pose any threat to the countries of Black Sea/Mediterranean region and is hardly able to protect maritime borders, coastal areas and economic zones of Russia and of Ukraine in case of a large scale conflict in the region, however inprobable such a conflict may seem now; by 1996 Russia and Ukraine became hostages of their previous approaches, especially of those of the former; of the many problems which seemed to be unresolvable before, one serious problem remains, namely that of Sevastopol's status; if Russia made concessions the way it did on other questions in 1995, a final solution to the problem could have been found; however, evolution of the Russian position here is not likely because Russian elites believe their country had compromised enough without seeing Ukraine to be reciprocal; only if Russia and Ukraine reach an agreement on division of the Fleet, the main principles of which can be separate basing but coordinated patrolling and responsibility for area defence (formation of joint forces or even formal joint actions do not seem to be probable anyway), it will be possible to hope that Russian and Ukrainian naval forces on the Black Sea will be able to fulfill their defence commitments; if agreed division principles differ from a proposed scheme and Ukraine denies defence cooperation with Russia in this aspect, the naval forces of both countries will rapidly lose their relatively modern character, and their potential role in the region will be quickly reduced to a negligible one; the same outcome is to be expected if present lack of clarity in questions concerning the division of the Fleet continues; the vacuum of power in the Black Sea, resulting from the rapid weakening or disappearance of one of the key pillars of the power balance in the region, which the Black Sea Fleet used to be, can by itself become a security challenge in the Black Sea/Mediterranean, if not neutralized by stabilizing mutually non-provocative and confidence-building measures, thereby enhancing the assuredness of all the states in the region of the indivisibility of security; if relations between Russia and NATO keep worsening as a result of NATO enlargement, Russia may perceive the growing naval activity of the Alliance in the vicinity of its borders as intended to weaken its security and therefore try to strengthen the Black Sea Fleet by measures aimed at levelling the disparities. Such steps by Russia would lead to a restart of the regional arms race. Taking into account the limited abilities of Russia to increase the conventional strength of the Black Sea Fleet, the logic of hidden confrontation would quickly demand the reintroduction of and reliance on sea-based tactical nuclear weapons which would be the most destabilizing factor as far as security in the Black Sea/Mediterranean region is concerned. Russia-Ukraine: Is Cooperation Possible? Although differences and contradictions are likely to dominate the bilateral agenda in the military-political sphere, areas where cooperation is still possible and potentially mutually beneficial still exist. Under certain circumstances (although not in the short term), if cooperation turns out to be possible in practice, cases of ad hoc cooperation can grow into a relationship of partnership. At least three areas look promising in this respect, namely, cooperation in creating together with other CIS countries an Air Defence system of the Commonwealth, cooperation in defence production and mutual arms trade, and cooperation in strengthening regional security. In February 1995 Ukraine along with other 9 CIS countries including Russia signed an agreement establishing a united CIS Air Defence System. For Ukraine it was a logical step, a continuation of the country's policy on this particular issue beginning in 1992. Ukraine fully realized that its own air defence was weak and was going to be weaker as a result of deep reductions and of its merge with the Air Force. For economic reasons Ukraine's air defence was becoming obsolete and unoperational. Even if Ukraine could finance this branch properly, it lacked technologies and facilities to build its own system. Due to the agreement Ukraine by providing Russia and other participants with information will ensure air defence protection of its own territory. By cooperating with Russia Ukraine can modernize currently used systems and can hope to receive orders for its military-industrial complex. Ukraine also gets access to test sites in Russia and Kazakhstan where it can train its personnel and examine weapons systems. While preparing the agreement Ukraine amended it so as to make sure its non-bloc status would be secured(*). Member countries will undertake not "joint" (which was Russia's proposal), but "coordinated" actions in case of an air attack. Ukraine's contribution to the operation of the system is intelligence and information and not combat systems. Decisions of the Coordinating Committee (under Russia's chairmanship) are considered as recommendations and are not binding. Active participation of Ukraine in the CIS Air Defence system could become a serious factor in a Russian-Ukrainian rapproachment, taking into account the fact that the system had started to be exploited at the end of 1995. However, the ambiguity of Ukraine's position, rooted in the deep societal split as far as Russia is concerned, persisted despite the obvious benefits to Ukraine of participation in the activity of united air defence. Ukraine's signature under the agreement was severely criticized from the standpoint that it should be inadmissible for Ukraine to be in common security structures with Russia. Critics point out that united air defence will be a factor detrimental for Ukraine's chances to drift "westward". In a strict military sense, opponents argue, the system will serve the interests of Russia only, by protecting it from the west and providing it with additional time for preparation of a response, while Ukraine will be a buffer zone, the first target in case of an air attack. It's very likely that the present lack of clarity in legal interpretations of the agreement and strong domestic opposition will prevent Ukraine from being an active participant. This, in turn, will make Russian position also one of restraint. In general, the prospects of successful operation of the CIS common air defence in the Russian-Ukrainian bilateral aspect are not very promising, although some hope persists. The less Ukraine gets from the agreement, the more it concludes that its original expectations were exaggerated, especially in terms of prospects for the military-industrial complex - the less interested Ukraine will be in participating in the agreement. However, if the air defence system proves to be effective in practice, Ukraine may again become more active and find it necessary to make its position closer to that of Russia. Interaction of the Russian and Ukrainian MICs was an objective imperative for bilateral relationship. MICs of the two countries during the Soviet era were highly integrated. Ukraine's defence industry constituted 1/3 of the Soviet MIC and was the leader in shipbuilding, tank production and electronic equipment. Russia was dependent upon Ukraine for missile-building, shipbuilding and aircraft technologies. However, Ukraine used to be a big "assembling factory", heavily dependent upon deliveries of components and spare parts. Ukraine was able to produce very few items of weapons nomenclatura without cooperation with other countries, primarily with Russia. Nevertheless, cooperation ties between Russia and Ukraine in the early months of its independence were broken. One reason for that was the assumption that Russia's aim would be to strengthen Ukraine's dependence on Russia through getting access to Ukrainian know-how, preventing Ukraine's independent appearance on the world arms market, preventing production of weapons on Ukrainian territory, trying to keep the old structure of Ukraine's industry dependent on deliveries from Russia etc. Correspondingly, Ukrainian leaders believed that breaking ties in this sphere and organization of the weapons production cycle of its own would diminish Ukraine's overall dependence on Russia. Again, an excessive number of weapons inherited created an impression that Ukraine would not need to buy new systems for some considerable period of time. The second reason for the breakup of ties was the "shock conversion" in both countries which was really drastic because of the lack of finance and absence of priorities in military-technical policies (as in defence reforms in general). Scare resources were spent within respective MICs not to enhance the unemployment. For Russia it was an easier task as it was able to reorient large part of production to its own enterprises. Lack of priorities did not allow the two countries to realize timely which weapons they would need - therefore lists of enterprises to cooperate in the priority order were not defined. Russia was more open towards cooperation with Ukraine, especially after Kuchma's electoral victory in July 1994. Russia tried to restore cooperation in defence production (in shipbuilding/ship repairs primarily) and to purchase weapons in Ukraine (strategic bombers, later strategic missiles). Ukraine for too long had been asking a price Russia was not ready to pay - that was a policy, detrimental mainly for Ukraine, which could have been pursued only until a certain point before the harm of isolationsm did not become obvious. With the changes in Ukrainian approach the situation started to look more promising. In short, it can be concluded that Russia never completely lost interest to cooperation with Ukraine in fields of MIC and bilateral arms purchases, however limited this cooperation could have been. Russia had other options and did not feel stalemated when found Ukraine's behavior somewhat unconstructive; Ukraine suffered more from its unwillingness to cooperate on Russia's conditions. By the end of 1995 the prospects for bilateral cooperation in this area had become better under the impact of transition to the tactic of mutually beneficial "small steps" which do not pretend to be finding solutions for political problems. In early 1996 the situation in bilateral relations in the MIC provides ground for cautious optimism. There are examples showing that two countries may come to cooperative patterns of relationship. The question whether Russia and Ukraine can promote cooperation in strengthening security in the Black Sea region can be discussed in a rather academic hypothetical sense. There are no evidence with regards the intentions of the two countries. However, the approaches of Russia and Ukraine at present evolve in similar direction, primarily, because Russia clearly shows an interest in establishing stability in post-Soviet states as compared with its previous policy of taking advantages out of conflicts. If eariler, when Ukraine supported Tbilisi regime and was against Russian military presence in Transnistria it contradicted with the Russian policy, supportive towards Abkhasian and Transnistrian separatists, now, when Russia is also an ally of the Shevardnadze's Georgia and the withdrawal of the former 14th army is a settled deal, other imperatives emerge. Cooperation in Transnistria looks quite possible. Russia and Ukraine are interested in guaranteeing autonomous status of the Transnistrian republic within Moldova. For Ukraine, it would stabilize the situation on its border, potentially dangerous in case of Russian withdrawal, secure balance against Moldova's rapprochement with Rumania, which has territorial claims to Ukraine, would strengthen relationship between Kiev and Kishinev. If Russian-Ukrainian cooperation could be established in strengthening regional security - in whatever limited form - it would substantially improve the climate in bilateral relations overall. General Conclusions. Russian-Ukrainian military relationship passed through two stages: a) 1992-early 1994, when there was a real crisis, rooted in basic differences in approaching the formation of national armed forces and unwillingness to understand each other, and b) mid-1994-1996, when the crisis took a chronic shape, allowing to solve individual problems but preventing the two sides from establishing stable relationship. Despite common military and historical past, centrifugal forces are and at least at the short-term perspective will continue to be dominant in bilateral relations, although in many concrete cases the "final divorce" will be very painful, taking into account how close the ties were in the past. Intense and mutually beneficial Russian-Ukrainian cooperation in military sphere with some exceptions proved to be hardly achievable and its qualitative and quantitative enlargement without general improvement of bilateral relations is unlikely. Ukraine was the driving force of the process resulting in the drift of Russia and Ukraine in opposite directions. This was a logical consequence of Ukraine's perception of Russia as a threat to its independence and security. Russian policy was rather reactive and inert while keeping opportunities open for cooperation and giving evidences of readiness to cooperate, although the Russian vision of cooperation might not seem ideal for Ukraine. So, changes in Ukraine's course are a prerequisite for changes in bilateral relationship. By 1996 it has become clear that the military aspects had lost their primary importance for the Russian-Ukrainian relations in general. Economy became the key sphere. If cooperation potential contained in mutual economic interests is fully exploited, it will have serious positive implications in the military-to-military relations. Breakup of economic ties will make military cooperation even more problematic. Among military aspects of bilateral relations the most crucial and urgent one is the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet. This problem has to be dealt with in the priority order on the high political level, otherwise for technical and financial reasons it will very soon disappear from the agenda together with the Fleet, thus undermining the security of the two countries. At the same time this dispute is the area where Russia and Ukraine can realize that the fate and future of their relations should not be sacrificed and made hostage to one particular issue, however important. If Russia and Ukraine rethink their policies towards each other in military-political sphere, if Ukraine ceases to consider Russia through the lens of security challenges, and if Russia starts to treat Ukraine as a potential partner (for that after disappearance of the nuclear debate and solution of some problems connected with the division of the Black Sea Fleet some conditions have matured) and offers acceptable incentives for cooperation, then renewed Russian-Ukrainian relations will become an important factor of strengthening European security.