(5) Having noted the remarkable contribution of these scholars to the development of Security Studies and State Security Concept in particular, one does not intent to lessen the role of the other theoreticians, such as Walter Lippmann, Hedey Bull, Bernard Brodie, Frank Trager and others.
(6) Buzan B. in: Buzan, B. and Kelstrup, M. (1991) "The European Security Order Recast", London and New York: Pinter Publishers. p. 4. See also: Buzan B. (1991) "People, States and Fear" New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
(9) Solchanyk, R. (1994) "The Politics of State-Building: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine, Europe-Asia Studies, v. 46, N. 1. , p. 59. See also: Nyvang, A. and Anderberg, K. (1994) "Coal Miners Look to Russia". Euroviews. p. 22.
(11) Solchanyk, R. (1994) "The Politics of State Building: Centre - Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine", Europe - Asia Studies, vol. 46, No. 1, p. 59.
(13) Glenny, M. (1994) "Ukraine's Dangerous Divide", Herald Tribune, July 15, p. 5. See also: Tulko A. (1995) "The Problem of Federalism in the Context of National Security of Ukraine". Research. Prague: Central European University. pp. 4-6, 9
(15) Kuzio, T. (1995) . "Ukraine: Back from the Brink". Institute for European Defence and strategic Studies. Alliance Publishers Ltd. # 23. See also: Andrew, W. (1993) . "The Growing Challenge to Kiev from the Donbas" RFE/RL Research Report, No. 33. Bremmer, I. (1994) .
(20) Also known as Rusyns. Ethno-cultural group, living in Transcarphatian region, which uses Ruthenian dialect of Ukrainian language and has distinct cultural habits. According to the official census, the Ukrainians comprise around 78 per cent of the populacy in the region. Among them, 18 per cent identify themselves as Ruthenians and 7 per cent - as Ruthenian-Ukrainians. There are also Hungro-Ruthenians, who comprise 1, 2 per cent. As sociological data also proves, 28 per cent of Ukrainians in Trascarphatian region consider the Ruthenians as separated, different from the Ukrainian nation. Source: Makara, M. P. and Migovych, I. I. (1994) "Karpats'ki Rusyny v Kontexti Suchasnogo Etnopolitychnogo Zhytt'a, Ukrains'kiy Istorichnyiy Zhurnal (Ukrainian Historical Journal)  394. p. p. 123-124. See also: Lusiak-Rudnytskyi, Ivan. , (ed) . (1981) "Rethinking Ukrainian History", Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press.
(21) The plebiscite on the status of Transcarphatia was held simultaneously with the referendum on Ukraine's independence on December 1991 and over 79 per cent of its inhabitants voted in favour of autonomy within Ukraine. Source: Makara, M. P. and Migovych, I. I. (1994) "Karpats'ki Rusyny v Kontexti Suchasnogo Etnopolitychnogo Zhytt'a, Ukrains'kiy Istorichnyiy Zhurnal,  394. p 123. See also: Markus, U. (1994) "Regionalism in Ukraine", Transition, Prague: Open Media Research Institute, V. 1. No. 2.
(22) The Autonomous Republic of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Zakarpats'ka Ukrayina) was established within Czechoslovakia, succeding the decisions of the 1938 Treaty of Munich. In 1945-1946 it was dissoluted and integrated to the Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakia.
(28) The rights and preservation of ethnic, cultural, and religious identities of the Hungarian minority were originally guaranteed by the Ukrainian-Hungarian Declaration of 1991. The agreement resulted soon in setting up a joint committee to pursue cooperation in minority questions, which has done many positive achievements - opened new border-crossing points, achieved new social programs, founded a separate administration for Hungarian schools. Ibidem, p. 56-57.
(29) This claim was based on the fact, that nowadays Ukrainian Transcarpathia belonged until 1919 to a Hungarian part of the Habsburg monarchy (afterwards, during 1919-1945 it used to be a constituent of Czechoslovakia) . The radical forces are quite impotent in Hungarian leadership and in May 1995 a Treaty on Legal Status of the Hungarian-Ukrainian Border, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on Border Issues was signed between Hungary and Ukraine.
(32) Both territories constituted a part of Romania from 1918 to 1940. In June 1940 they became parts of Ukrainian and Moldavian republics, as succeeding the 1939 USSR-Germany Treaty (Molotov-Ribentrop Pact) . The demarcation of existing borders was confirmed by the 1961 USSR-Romanian Treaty. Together with above-mentioned issues, there are problems between Ukraine and Romania in delimiting the Black Sea shelf (island Zmeiny) . Solchanyk, R. (1994) . "The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, p. 63. See also: Szaikovski, B. (1993) "Encyclopedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia and The Successor States" Essex: Longman Current Affairs, p. p. 406-408, 431, 435.
(33) It is also important to mention, that whereas Romanians comprise around 12 percent of the total population of the Bukovina (or 135-190. 000 as according to different estimations) , the Romanians and Moldavians form in this region a single ethnic group. This fact also gave the room for territorial claims of some Moldovam officials.
(35) For instance, the Congress of Romanians of the Northern Bukovyna, which has occupied somewhat oppositional posture to the central authorities. In June 1992 the leaders of this organization demanded the establishment of a free border zone for the Romanians in the region, based on the identity papers. When the charge was not satisfied, there were some conflicts with local Ukrainian authorities. Ibidem.
(36) In 1954 the Crimean oblast became a part of the Ukrainian SSR. Indeed, this action was made by the Soviet leadership to celebrate the 300-anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty on Cooperation. (The Treaty of Pereyaslav, 1654) .
(37) Szaikovski, B. (1993) "Encyclopedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe, Russia and The Successor States" Essex: Longman Current Affairs, p. 85. See also: Markus, U. (1994) "Crimea Restores 1992 Constitution"/ RFE/RL Research Report, No. 23, 1994, pp. 9-12.
(38) Negotiators from the Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments agreed that Crimea was integral part of Ukraine, but would have greater autonomy, including the citizenship, substantial economic, social and cultural autonomy.
(42) Restrained position of Russian leaders can be explained by the fact that the 1994 US-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral Agreement, under which Moscow pledged its assurances to Ukraine's territorial integrity, was signed less than a month before and Russia did not want to sharpen its relations with Ukraine.
(43) This resolution was also facilitated with limited economic sanctions. Respectively, the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Ukraine were forbided to finance those Crimean institutions, which in their activities follow ed the cancelled decrees. Financial Times, November 18, 1994.
(49) Some academicians also outline another factor of Tatars political activity - their previous settlement in urban areas of the Central Asian republics. For more information see: "The development of Crimean Circumstances: Ukrainian Dilemma and Implications for Regional Security" 1994. Conference Materials. Kiev. Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Studies.
(50) As the Tatars' leader Mustafa Cemiloglu puts it, that Crimean independence from Ukraine or closer links to Russia will inevitably meat Tatars opposition and could motive a bloody conflict. The Tatars "categorically protest against any violation of the border. Crimea is seen as a Russian territory on the basis that Crimea once was conquered by Russia, but that is no basis. Tatars once conquered Moscow too". Nordenskiold, V. (1994) . "Finally Facing His Lang". Euroviews. No. 4. p. 26.
(53) For instance, in October 1992, Crimean Tatars clashed with local authorities in protest over the arrests of their co-nationals whose homes were destroyed by local authorities. In that incident, 20 Crimean Tatars were arrested. Another clashes between Tatars and Russian criminal groups were reported in July-August 1995, where two Tatars were killed and Ukrainian government had to sent the OMON special militia platoon to settle clashes between the Crimeans and Tatars.
(55) The Russians form the largest national minority in Ukraine, accounting 22% or 11 million. At the same time, a large number of other ethnic groups in Ukraine (Germans, Moldovans, Belorussians, Greeks, etc.) , as well as majority of population in North-Eastern Ukrainian regions uses, primary Russian - this fact significantly increases a number of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine.
(56) Dick, C. (1994) Jane Intelligence Rewiev. /March/ p. 119 cited in: Goncharenko, A. (1995) "Ukrainian-Russian Relations: An Unequal Partnership" London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. p. 38.
(58) Shenfield, S. (1992) . "Dividing Up the Soviet Defence Complex: Implications for European Security". Providence: Brown University. Center for Foreign Policy Development. p. 18. According to the words of the Russian Admiral Chernavin that the closest US Navy presence a threat, that now faces both Russia and Ukraine.
(68) It was agreed that Ukraine would receive only 18 percent of the whole fleet (around 164 operational vessels out of 833 fleet's ships, with a further allowance to sell to Russia the rest of its 50 percent entitlement, previously gained by Ukraine under agreements of 1992) and would "lose" the main navy bases in Sevastopol, Kerch and Balaklava, surrendering them to Russia as the location for 10 percent of Russian fleet. Radio Free Europe Report, August 16, 1994.
(72) For instance, Ukraine receives 90 per cent of oil, 60 percent of wood, more than 60 percent of natural gas, 80 percent of raw materials for industry and 70 percent of supplies to the machine-building industry. All these necessary deliveries come mostly from Russia. Source: Institute for Democracy. Bulletin. No 54  . Kiev. 1994. based on: Wall-Street Journal, September 23, 1994.
(73) After the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine has left with many enterprises of heavy industry, which consume enormous amount of energy: 50 to 60 mln. tons per year. The country's own oil extraction could cover not more than 8% of its needs See: The Economist. , (1994) V. 330 March 12, p. 55. also: Smolansky, (1994) p. 68.
(80) According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems' poll conducted in Ukraine in December of 1994 more than 91 per cent of the public is dissatisfied with living conditions in the country. See: IFES Poll of the Ukrainian Electorate. "Analysis of Preliminary results", January 18, 1995, p. p. 1-2.
(82) Here we particularly refer to a cluster of national surveys of general populations and elites, conducted by Audience and Opinion Research Office of the Open Media Research Institute in Prague and leading research institution throughout the CEE region during 1994-1995. Analysis was conducted comparably in European Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, where interviews were carried out with 2000 respondents and Slovakia and the Czech Republic with 1000 respondents interviewed. See: Connors, S. and Gibson, D. and Rhodes, M. (1995) . "Caution and Ambivalence Over Joining NATO". Transition. OMRI: Prague. p. p. 42-46.
(91) One can also speak about Muslim affiliation. To consider this issue, as well as the question of religious confessions in Ukraine, see: Martyniuk, J. (1994) "The State of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine", RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, No. 7. Stewart, S. (1994) . "The Tatar Dimension". RFE/RL Research Report, No. 19. p. p. 22-26. More about the question of Religion in Ukraine see: Tulko A. (1995) "The Problem of Federalism in the Context of National Security of Ukraine". Research. Prague: Central European University. p. 22-24.
(97) Security for Europe Project. Final Report. Center for Foreign Policy Development, Providence: Brown University. p. 11
(101) Barry Buzan defines the weak state as the state with the most lesser degree of socio-political cohesion, with "lack of a coherent national identity, or the presence of contending national identities within the state". Ibid. p. 97-100.
(106) Here we refer to the concept of subjective and objective securities, where objective security considers to be as "protection from danger", and subjective security as "feeling safe". See: Buzan, B. (1991) "People, States and Fear", New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 36
(108) Ibid. p. 3 See also: Meinecke, F. (1957) "Machiavellianism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History", Yale University Press, and Carl von Clausewitz (1976) "On War". Princeton, Nj: Princeton University Press.
(111) As Michael G. Roskin argues, the Realist approach was somewhat discredited during the Cold War period by misusing and misunderstanding of it by politicians, e. g. by using it in escalation of the Vietnam War, etc. Also, as Dr. Roshkin suggests, many scientists think that "national interest" approach should be suspended by "world interest' or 'word order', which go beyond the inherent selfishness of national interest. However, one would still find national interest a better predictor of state strategy than world order". Roskin, G. M. (1994) "National Interest: from Abstraction to Strategy", Carliste Barracks, PA: U. S. Army College, Strategic Studies Institute, Ibid p. 18.
(115) While drawing given table, the author used the methogological approach of Dr. Roshkin, presented in: Roskin, G. M. (1994) "National Interest From Abstraction to Strategy", Carliste Barracks, PA: U. S. Army College, Strategic Studies Institute.
(122) Both blueprints of the military doctrine, introduced by Defence Minister Morozov on October 1992 and in April 1993 were rejected by members of Parliament, as inconstituent.
(123) Ukraine's non-block, neutral aspiration was originally adopted in the Declaration of Sovereignty in July 1990. Section 7 of this document stated that Ukraine intends to become "a neutral, non-aligned state that will not build, acquire or deploy nuclear weapons".
(127) Some analysts also explain Ukrainian intentions to keep the neutrality for defence purposes, by using the principle of "armed neutrality" in defence planning, e. g. used by Switzerland or Sweden. This principle presumes the neutral state to provide its defence independently in the event of outside attack. Nevertheless, this principle is not a necessary international legal concomitant of a state's neutral status. The Ukrainian military doctrine does not preclude country from participation in allied operations in the event of war, and reduces the demands placed on Ukraine's independent military forces. See: Allison, R. (1993) "The Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States", London: Institute of Strategic Studies. Writing Series. N. 280.
(133) In the case of China, one can also speak about China's economic importance for Ukrainian trade - China is Ukraine's largest trading partner outside the CIS, while Ukraine is China's second largest within the Commonwealth. Trade between the to countries stood at $587 million in 1993 and continues to grow up. [Ministry of Statistic of Ukraine. 1993. Annual Report. Quoted in RFE/RL Report. September 7, 1994] Nevertheless, favorable conditions in trade relations with China do not reduce the importance of Ukraine's economy trans-parency with other former CMEA-countries economies. . In all, Ukraine trades with 126 countries. It exported the most goods to Belarus, China and Russia, and imported the most from Russia and Turkmenistan.
(136) Presentation given by Dr. Olexiy Haran' at the International Conference on Ukrainian Security Dillemmas, Luce Hall, Yale University, April1-8, 1995. Quoted in Rutland, P. (1995) "Search for Stability". Transition. Vol. 1. No. 9. p. 23.
(138) US-UKRAINE-RUSSIA Trilateral Agreement, was signed in Moscow, on January 14, 1994. Following the Trilateral Meeting in Moscow, Presidents Clinton, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk decided on simultaneous actions to transfer SS-19 and SS-24 warheads from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling, and to provide compensation for Ukraine in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations containing 100 tons of low-enriched uranium. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin declared that USA and Russia are to provide security assurances to Ukraine's state sovereignty and territorial integrity. On its side President Kravchuk restated his country's commitment that Ukraine accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state in the shortest possible time.
(140) Vechirnij Kyiv, December 1, 1994. At present, there are nine factions in the Ukrainian parliament: the Communists (91 seats) , the Agrarians (41 seats) , the Socialists (25 seats) , the Unity (28 seats) , the Interregional Deputies Group (30 seats) , the Center (58 seats) , Rukh (29 seats) , the Statehood (30 seats) , and the Reform (40 seats) . The rest of the deputies are formally independent.
(151) Deutsch, K. (1968) "The Analysis of International Relations". New Jersey: Rentice-Hall. p. p. 101-111, See also: Douggherty J. E. and Pfaltzgraff R. L. (1990) "Contending Theories of International Relations". Harpre Bllins. p. 435
(152) Deutsch, K. (1968) "The Analysis of International Relations". New Jersey: Rentice-Hall. p. p. 193-201. See also: Douggherty J. E. and Pfaltzgraff R. L. (1990) "Contending Theories of International Relations". Harpre Bllins, p. 436.
(154) Early Neofunctionalist theory was dependent on the notion of 'spillover', both functional and political. Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the European Communities in 1950th, believed that successive functionalist forms of integration would inevitably create a type of federalism: by gradually transformation of economic sectors from national to a Community level of competence. Haas E. in Couloumbis Th. A, Wolfe, J. H. (1990) "Introduction to International Relations - Power and Justice". Prenctice Hall, p. 433 About Functionalist theory of David Mitrany See also: Deutch K. (1968) , p. p. 167-168
(157) Lithuania had declared its independence on 11 March 1990 and Georgia on 9 April 1991, and even as the coup progressed other republics joined them: Estonia on 20 August; Latvia on the 21st; Ukraine on the 24th; Belarus' on the 25th; Moldova on the 27th; Azerbaijan on the 30th; Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the 31st; Tajikistan on September; Armenia on 23 September and Turkmenistan on 27 October.
(158) A meeting of the Heads of the State of the former Soviet Republics in Novo-Ogorovo (near Moscow) , after failed Moscow putch in August 1991, where President Gorbachev intorduced new proposals for the reformation of the Soviet Union.
(160) Algthough, previously many scholars used to analyze the CIS' internal political proceses through distinction of three groups, according to the member-states' political differentiation, this study provides division on two main parties, in spite of recent developments within the Commonwealth.
(162) Calka, M. (1995) . "Russia and the Making of a New Collective Security". Research Paper. Polish Institute of International Relations. p. 119.
(163) This idea has been favoured by Russian 'Eurasianists' - one of the two strongest political lobbies that re-emerged recently. Eurazianists argue that since Ukraine and Baltic states had driven a separating line with Europe, Russia should concentrate on the federation-type model of cooperation with Central Asian states, that would pursue less pro-Western oriented policy and ensure Russian predominance in Eurasia. Indeed, it seems that many "Eurasians" estimate that Russia's natural allies were to be found in the South. In contrast, the lobby of 'Westernizers' considers that Russia should aim to cooperate with Europe, including Eastern European states and join a core group of the industrialized Western states in earliest possible time. For more information about the concept of 'Eurasianism' (Evrasiystvo) in Russian classic philosophy see works of Russian scholars Nikolai Trubetskoy and Georgii Vernadskiy, whose theory gave a name for modern Russian political lobby.
(164) Sheely, A. (1993) . "The CIS Charter". RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 3. No. 12. pp. 23-27. Previous CIS agreement (Belovesh Agreement of 8 December 1991) was ratified by Ukrainian parliament with 12 reservetions "to ensure that Ukraine has the right to have its own Armed forces". Szaikovsky, B. (1993) "Encyclopaedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe,. Russia and The Successor States", Essex: Longman Current Affairs. p. 70.
(167) Quotation of Turmeni President Sapharmurad Nyazov in: Szaikovsky, B. (1993) "Encyclopaedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints in Eastern Europe,. Russia and The Successor States", Essex: Longman Current Affairs. p. 71.
(169) Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 April 1994 and Nezavisimost', October 28, 1994. With a Collegium and permanent staff in Moscow, the IEC became the first supranational body of the CIS and exercise coordinating and managerial powers delegated by the signatory states.
(171) Ukraine was also within a group of states, which expressed unwillingness to the proposal to attest the control over their vital economic structures to Russia as well as to proposals to empower the IEC to impose sanctions for alleged breach of contract failed to pass owing to opposition from most states. Interfax, 21 October, 1994, Reuters, 22 October, 1994.
(172) The agenda at this summit was scheduled by issues of security and integration. It also included a discussion of a peace and stability pact, proposed by Kazach President Nursultan Nazarbaev. This meeting, newertheless showed rather notable contradictions in members' attitudes to the development of the Commonwealth. See: OMRI Report, Prague, February 11, 1995.
(173) According to this agreement (CADS) , Ukrainian Air-Defence will integrate to the new system of air-defence, which designed for protection of air-space in the CIS area. To some extent, this achievement renews the former Soviet air-defence structure, however it is dealing mostly with technical questions (discovering of the targets, early warning, etc) . The Main Technical Management of the CADS, with merely technical functions is located in Moscow, under the auspices of the Russian Air Defence.
(176) Kozyrev, A. (1992) "Russia: A Chance of Survival", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, pp. 10-12. This priority of Russian external policy was confirmed by President Boris Yeltsin during his February 1995 visit to Belarus. See also: a report prepared by the Russian External Intelligence Service: "Russia-CIS: Does the Western Position need to be Corrected?", Moscow, 1994.
(179) Raphael, T. "Russia: the New Imperialism", Wall Street Journal June 22, 1994.
(181) At the CSCE summit in Budapest in December 1994, President Yeltsin called repeatedly for the CIS to be recognized as an international organization that could guarantee security in the former Soviet Union. Afterwards, on 8 September, 1995 he declared that if NATO expanded, the CIS would develop into an integrated political and military block. This view has been repeated on September 21, 1995 by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.
(182) For instance, during his visit to the Baltic states in May 1995, Ukrainian President Kuchma has expressed several times his critic to "nationalistic trends in Russian foreign policy". The same views have been expressed by other Ukrainian leaders. See: Interfax May 17, 1995; OMRI, September, 22, 1995.
(184) Rogov. S. (1994) "Three Years of Experiments and Mistakes of Russian Diplomacy". Research Study. Centre for the Problems of National Security and International Relations. Quoted in: Goncharenko, A. (1995 "Ukrainian-Russian Relations: An Unequal Partnership". London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. p. 11.
(196) As far as the Article 4 of the Tashkent Treaty assumes that an aggression against one of the memberstates will constitute a casus belli for all the parties to the Treaty. See: Foye. S. (1993) . "The Soviet Legacy". RFE/RL Research Report. Przhebilsky. S (1994) . "On the question of Military Security of the CIS states", Institute of International Studies, Prague, Czech Republic.
(208) It was perhaps, the main reason of Western opposition to the creation of the ZSC. One can also speak about Western resistance to the creation of "multi-polarity" in Central Europe.
(210) Mircea, I. (1995) "National Security Priorities of CEE States: Romania". Presentation. International Seminar "Partnership for Peace: New Security Priorities for Central and East European States. Warsaw, 26-28 May, 1994" p. 4. This statement of Dr. Ioan Pasku of Romanian Defence Ministry refers particularly for characteristic of previous Ukrainian-Polish attempts to achieve closer cooperation in the military field among CEE states. See also: Clarke, D. "Central Europe: Military Cooperation in the Triangle" RFE/RL Research Report. 10 January 1993. and Blank, S. (1995) "The Future Security of the Czech Republic", in: Jane's Intelligence Review. Vol. 7, No. 9.
(214) 'The meeting of H. E. Roman Lubkivsky, Ukrainian Ambassador to Czech Republic with the Head of the Atlantic Section of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs I. Bushniak, 28 January 1994'. Porohy. Ibid.
(217) Valid for five years, the military cooperation accord includes a clause prohibiting either of the contracting parties from allowing potential aggressors against the other to use its territory and provides for closer security ties between the signatories.
(218) Indeed, despite Bulgaria's good relations with Greece and Turkey in military sphere, the state by large feels insecure. The situation in the region puts Bulgaria among three potential antagonists - Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. From this point of view cooperation with Russia seems quite justifiable, as well as cooperation with Western international institutions, where Bulgaria has been remarkable successful.
(219) Also known as Danube Adria Group, created on 12 November 1989 by Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Later on, when Czechoslovakia joined it in 1990 it became Pentagonal Group and then, Hexagonal Group, following the admission of Poland in 1991. Afterwards, the July 1992 Summit admitted former Yugoslav republics - Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia and adopted the present name of the group.
(225) As one can suppose, this trend still continues, at least fragmentary, in Ukraine's foreign policy vision. It is for instance, reflected in tendency of some Ukrainian leaders (as well as Ukrainian official media) to describe security assurances given to Ukraine under 1994 US-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral meeting and similar given later by Russia, the United Kingdom and the United states on the Opening session of 1994 Budapest Follow Up meeting as 'security guarantees'. In fact, both were provided in the form of a memorandum and do not present any legal commitments. See: Kuzio, T. (1995) "Ukraine. Back from the Brink". Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies. London: Alliance Publishers Ltd. No. 23. p. 30 Whereas this study touches a subject of security guarantees only in general, for more analysis and information, See: Rutland, P. (1995) "Search for Stability". Transition. Prague: OMRI. Vol. 1. No. 11. pp. 20-23. Goncharenko, A. (1995) "Ukrainian-Russian Relations: An Unequal Partnership", London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies; Ukrainian issues of November 1994 - January 1995 (Holos Ukrainy, Uriadovy Kurier, Narodna Armiya, etc.) .
(226) Country's security was seen by Ukrainian policy-planners as that, based on four main elements - Armed Forces, Cooperative bi-lateral relations with neighbours in military and military-political fields, Participation in regional and sub-regional systems of security and System of national security guarantees. See: Kharchenko, I. "Ukraine: National Security Perspectives". ed. in Barry, C. (1993) "The Search for Peace in Europe. Perspectives from NATO and Eastern Europe". Fort Lesley: National Defence University Press, p. p. 121-132.
(227) From the beginning, Ukrainian leadership favoured the idea of the UN Security Council guarantees, it however has received no effect. Ibid. p. 130.
(228) After one year of Ukrainian sovereignty (within the Soviet Union, proclaimed on July 16, 1990) and just a few weeks before the announcement of State independence by Ukraine, President Bush gave a speech to the Ukrainian parliament on August 1, 1991, being on official visit to the USSR. American President called the Ukrainian SSR' republican policy as "suicidal nationalism" of "Chiken Kiev" (the latter gave a name for the given speech of American leader among political scholars, studying Ukraine) . Since then, for almost a year up to Bill Clinton taking office in January 1993, American policy towards Ukraine concentrated chiefly on nuclear question.
(233) Matejka Z. (1994) "The CSCE In Today's Europe", Manuscript,. cited in Bouvard, L. , George, B. (1994) . The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Case of Identity". Working Group on The New European Security Order. Draft Interim Report. International Secretariat, November. NatoData: Leuven.
(235) The discussions on Baltic membership were raised for the first time at the Copenhagen Meeting of June 1990 and at the CSCE Ministerial meeting in New York of September 1990. The Soviet delegation objected to the admission of the Balts, referring to the paragraph of the Helsinki consultations of 1973 that determines the participants of the CSCE 'as sovereign and independent states'. Until the admitting to the CSCE, Baltic representatives usually were included in delegations of other countries. See: Zagorski, A. (1993) . "The New Republics of the CIS and the CSCE". in The CSCE in the 1990: Constructing European Security and Cooperation. / ed. by Michael A. Lukas. (1993) . I. Aufl. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl. -Ges. p. p. 280-294.
(237) This position was rather contrary to those of other CIS states. The delegations of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazachstan, Azerbaidzan and Russia were participated at the September 1991 Moscow CHD meeting within the Soviet delegation. Afterwards, being admitted, Central Asian countries shown little interest in the CSCE activities, perhaps with international recognition, as only interest in the CSCE participation. Ibidem.
(238) For more details see: Statement by First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine N. P. Markevich at the opening of the 4th CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Helsinki) , March 25, 1992. in: Lukas M. A (ed.) (1994) "The CSCE in the 1990: Constructing European Security and Cooperation". I. Aufl. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl. - Ges. p. 280.
(245) It was reflected in previous Ukraine's plans to maintain substantial levels of TLE (Treaty Limited Equipment) under the CFE Treaty, to create new command structures (including mobile operational commands) and to shift to a highly mobile corps and brigades. In January 1995 Ukrainian delegation, informed other participants to the Treaty that Ukraine has to allocate additionally in Odessa military district 106 tanks, 7 ACVs, and 72 artillery systems. OMRI-DAILY Report, January 19, 1995. For more: see also following section "Ukraine and NATO" of this study.
(246) At present, these forces include 226 tanks and 117 artillery systems. This equipment, namely ground weapons of coastal defence divisions and naval infantry regimes will be reduced according to a separate agreement to be implemented in conjunction with CFE. Source: Ghebali, V. -Y. and Sauerwein, B. (1995) . "European Security in the 1990th: Challenges and Perspectives". Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmement Research. p. 25. See also: Statement of Ukraine's Defence Minister Valery Shmarov. ITAR-TASS. November, 1. 1995.
(247) Here we particularly mean a cluster of bilateral documents on intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in the military sphere, interstate military deliveries and payments, signed by Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and his Ukrainian counterpart Valery Shmarov in Sochi on November 25, 1995. Although, a Russian view to further development of cooperative trends with Ukraine in this field was highly optimistic (as according to Pavel Grachev, who described a meeting as a "historic event which has changed the military and political climate between the two countries") , Ukrainian leaders recognize it rather as the working proceedings on technical questions, like division of the Black Sea Fleet, transfer of heavy bombers to Russia, regular meetings between the staff of both defence ministries, etc. See: UNIAN Daily News, Kiev. 25 November 1995. AFP, Moscow, November 25. OMRI Daily Report, Prague. November 26, 1995.
(250) Bouvard, L. and George. B. (1995) . "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Case of Identity". Draft Interim Report. Working Group on the New European Security Order. Leuven: NATODATA.
(254) As far as rapporteur missions were sent to each new state after its admission to the CSCE, a mission went to Ukraine in March 1992 and generally gave Ukraine a positive assessment. In addition, the Rapporteur/Fact-finding Missions was already effectively used by Ukrainian leadership when the Trans-Dnister conflict has been discussed by Senior Officials, and the four states involved - Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Romania - have used CSCE meetings to develop their cooperative efforts in finding a solution. See: "CSCE. Human Dimension - Report on Ukraine". Reprint. (November 1992) p. 29.
(255) As UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan states, "we have to be careful because the big powers only give us what they want us to know. " See: Renner M. (1993) "Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping", Washington, DC, Worldwatch Institute Paper No. 114 p. 41
(256) The Office for Research and Collection of Information, established by the previous Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, was dissolved by the incoming Boutros-Ghali in March, 1992. Its functions were divided between the new Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, neither of which holds direct responsibility for "early warning. " While the reformation in the UN is indeed warranted, this action is seen by many as considerable elimination of the Organization's infant intelligence collection and evaluation capability. See: Renner, M. (1993) "Critical Juncture: The Future of Peacekeeping", Washington, DC, Worldwatch Institute. Paper No. 114 p. 41 and Toscano R. (1993) "Peacekeeping in the New International Situation, " The International Spectator, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January-March. p. 52
(259) Ibidem. . Considering the sharp decrease in military examinations during recent years: whereas in 1987 - 17 observations of military exercises and 18 inspections, in 1993 2 and 9 respectively, and in 1994 - 2 and 9. Source: Bouvard, L. and George B. (1994) "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Case of Identity". Working Group on the New European Security Order. Draft Interim Report. Leuven: NATODATA, November 15.
(260) The statement by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk/BBC SWB Former USSR, 29 July 1993, in: Ham, P. (1994) "Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy", Chaillot Papers, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, No. 13, p. 50.
(261) This point particularly refers to the US mediatory role. As it for instance, was stated by one Russian Foreign ministry official that 'Russia did not ask the USA for mediation at the talks with Ukraine, concerning the Black Sea Fleet'. Open Media Research Institute. Daily Report. Prague. May 5, 1995.
(262) Michalka, M. (1995) "Restructuring European Security". Transition. Vol. 1 No11, 1995. p. 6.
(263) The statement of former Russian Ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Lukin, quoted in: Ham, P. (1994) "Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy", Chaillot Papers, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, No. 13, p. 50.
(264) Quotation of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities at the Trird Annual Session of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in: Bouvard, L. George B. "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Case of Identity". Draft Interim Report. Working Group on the New security Order. NATOData. November 1994.
(289) As it was stated in the document "The Presidents [of Ukraine and Latvia] recognize [that] threats and political pressure from a common bordering state prompt many countries to want to join reliable and stable political alliances to ensure their statehood and development". Reuters, 28 May 1995. cited in Transition, 11 August, 1995 p. 55.
(290) Kharchenko, I. "Ukraine: National Security Perspectives". ed. in Barry, C. (1993) "The Search for Peace in Europe. Perspectives from NATO and Eastern Europe". Fort Lesley: National Defence University Press, p. p. 126.
(293) Here we mean previously existed trends among some Eastern European leaders to recognize PFP as a way to enter NATO. While the notion of PFP contains itself some criterias for the eventual acception of the new members, it however does not design as a "final step" for NATO membership for all Eastern states in the PFP frame. And perhaps, it was a considerably big mistake, when the PFP was seen by some only in terms of eventual NATO membedship - indeed, such approach has lead only to disappointment.
(294) Pirozhkov, S. 1994. The Concept of Ukraine's National Security. Presentation at the international conference "Partnership for Peace: New Security Priorities for Central and East-European States", (Warsaw, 26-28 May 1994) , p. 8.
(295) As the Invitation to PFP offered to non-NATO countries stated: "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security". "NATO. Partnership for Peace. " (1994) Reprint. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press. p. 4.
(297) The training in Poland was provided between 9-18 September 1994, together with US, Hungarian and Polish militaries, which accounted up to 920 multinational personell for peace-keeping exersices near city Poznan. Holos Ukrayiny. September, 12. 1994.
(299) It is important to sugget, that developing its own peace-keeping units, Ukraine has offered two test sites (near Lvov and Odessa) for the training of peace-keeping forces of other PFP states. See: Kuzio, T. (1995) Ukraine and the Expansion of NATO". Jane Intelligence Review. Vol. 7, No. 9. p. 390.
(305) Brzezinski, Z. (1995) "A Plan for Europe", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, p. 38. quoted in Pavliuk, O. (1995) "Ukraine After Presidential Elections", Research Paper. Prague: ESS, Institute for East-West Studies. p. 36.
(313) Final declaration of the Copenhagen European Council, June 1993, quoted in: Ham, P. (1994) "Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy", Chaillot Papers, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, No. 13, p. 47. Since 1992, when Ukrainian leadership suspended the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia and the nuclear position of Kiev became doubtful for the West, the EEC and later the EU tried to involve political pressure on Ukraine to ratify all inherited Soviet agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation.
(315) Up to December 1994, Ukraine received approval of $ US 371 mln. from the IMF, when the US committed $ US 70 ml. and pledged to give the total of $ US 100 mln. if the EU provides similar aid. Canada promised CA $ 25 ml. Through Ukraine obtained initial sources of financial support, it was a good sign to the political leadership and people in Ukraine. The approval of the IMF stand-by loan to Ukraine and obtaining Western financial aid have given a highest support to the new Ukrainian economic program, as well as increased the popularity of President Kuchma among Ukrainian citizentry. (See also following section of this chapter "Ukraine and International Financial Institutions") .
(316) OMRI, Report, May 26, 1995.
(317) The Economist. July 22, 1995. Some athours suggest that whole process of reorganization can take even much higher expences - up to US $14 bln. See: Aslund A. (1995) "Eurasia Letter: Ukraine's turnaround". Foreign Policy. No. 100. p. 140.
(319) Following the WEU Petersberg Summit in June 1992, the WEU set up the Forum of Consultations for CEE states which included Czechoslovak Federation (later on, since 1993 Czech and Slovak Republics) , Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.
(320) Speech of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko at the 39th Session of the WEU Assembly in Paris on 2 December 1993. Quoted in Ham. P. (1994) "Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy". Chaillot Papers. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union. No. 13 p. 49.
(325) On 26 October, 1994 the IMF has approved its first loan to Ukraine - worth US $ 371 mln. - as the first stage of a major effort to aid Kiev. The first tranch was to cover state budget deficit, which was to be cut by half in the fourth quarter of 1994 slashing the central budget deficit to around 4 per cent in 1997 - in 1994 it standed at 20 percent of GDP, and it was planned to slash it to 7, 3 percent in 1995 "The Economist", November 25, 1995, p. 60;
(333) The World Bank pledged to make its credits up to $ 3 bln. over a three years period avaible, if Ukraine is to restructure its economy. See: Kuzio, T. (1995) "Ukraine Back from the Brink", London: Alliance Publishers. Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies. p. 25.
(334) Michalka M. (1995) "Restructuring European Security". Prague: OMRI Transition. Vol. 1, No. 21. p. 4. It was agreed to reshedule $ 2, 5 mln. out of $ 3, 1 bln. of Ukraine's debt payements to Russia for 1995. Turkmenistan, the second larger creditor to Ukraine among CIS, has also agreed to reschedule US $ 700 mln. out of US $ 1 bln. for natural gas delievery. See: Aslund, A. "Eurasia Letter: Ukraine's Turnaround", Foreign Policy, No. 100 /Fall/. p. p. 139-140.