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Ukraine And European Security - International Mechanisms
As Non-Military Options For National Security Of Ukraine.

Bohdan Lupiy
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Chapter 4. "Evolutionary" Approach" - Ukraine And European International Establishments.

Section 1. Ukraine's Vision of European International Organizations and the Question of Security Guarantees.

As one can assume, that up to 1994 Ukraine has not been dynamic enough in the activities of international organizations. Whereas such inactiveness can be naturally connected to usual country leadership's awareness of possible Russian reactions to any move of Ukraine on international arena, as well as to several faults in Western policies to comply with new geopolitical circumstances in the former-USSR area, to some extent such development has also been prerequisited by notable element of Ukraine's external policy - "search for guarantees", or approach which sometimes led to esteem of any particular security establishment through counting on a level of protection, it could provide Ukraine with.(225)

Though such element can also be easily found in the tactics of other Central and Eastern European states, at the beginning stages of Ukraine's independence, it presented rather one of the main goals in country's external policy conduct.(226)

During that initial period, Ukrainian leadership has counted primary on obtaining direct guarantees from the United States and NATO.(227) The former aspiration has obviously met no direct response, at least due to the US domestic political circumstances and attitudes of Bush Administration to Ukraine.(228) And realising no support from the Americans, Ukrainian authorities raised a discussion over possible guarantees with NATO officials - for the first time during the visit of Supreme Allied Commander, General John Shalikashvili to Kiev in November 1992.

This issue, however was put apart of diplomatic dialogue, because NATO delegates found it difficult "to discuss NATO guarantees to concrete [Eastern European] states".(229) In this respect, it is useful to quote Roy Allison of the University of Birningham who objectively suggested, that "Ukraine ... [needed and needs] to accept this limitation, even if it is aware that Western states would be seriously alarmed by any significant military aggression against Ukraine by some third party (such as Russia). Ukrainian military ...may expect NATO involvement [in this eventuality] in ...another form".(230)

Moreover, it is quite foreseeable that neither the countries with the greatest capability to play a decisive role in security protection (and here, especially the U.S. and Germany), nor any of existing security organizations in Europe are likely to provide Ukraine with really workable security guarantees in the near-by period.

Even the NATO Alliance in its current competence, is unable to support the country like Ukraine by the guarantee, similar to that, under Article 5 of Washington Treaty - conceivably, most credible kind of guarantee in today's Europe. It is foremost, if to consider legally binding obligations - there is still missing prove that these commitments can actually be honoured.

One can also suggest another kind of guarantee - military assistance in the case of massive foreign attack. For instance, one of the possible ways for NATO to comply with emergency situations in Central and Eastern Europe, was advanced by Theo van den Doel of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" in the Hague. According to his assume, the following criteria can serve as a guiding principles, when "on the basis of certain conditions [NATO] intentions [particularly, contribution "to the fate of new democracies"] may be turned into guarantees:

  1. There must be an (armed) external threat, as defined by article 51 of the UN Charter.
  2. There is no "provoked aggression" which lends the external aggression a preemptive character.
  3. In addition to political instruments, the use of military means is urgently needed.
  4. The assistance should have an essentially de-escalating effect.
  5. The goal of the rendered assistance is keeping or restoring international peace and security."(231)

Driving merely theoretical assumption of 'preventive' type guarantee, which "...expresses commitment and solidarity and ... gives a clear warning signal to a potential aggressor" Theo van Del Doel, nevertheless suggests that effectiveness of it is only practical if " is incorporated in "contingency planning" and does not remain just hollow rhetoric".(232)

While this option theoretically probable, there is also questioning about practical possibility to employ it - at least due to the fact, that such measure has never been practiced by NATO to assist Central and Eastern European countries. One, nevertheles, can foresee Ukraine given by chance to count on such assistance from NATO in future, following the development of its cooperation with the NATO, which will be discussed following.

Thus, to make the outcomes of its foreign policy conduct more profitable, it is crucial for Ukrainian leadership to provide it with more realistic vision and concentrate country's diplomatic potency on those areas of international security establishments and particular Western states, where they could essentially strengthen country's security.

At the same time, Ukraine's adjusting to European international structures through "evolutionary" approach is a complex process, in which it needs appropriate support. Significant portion of such patronage can be maintained through Ukraine's membership in the OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as in the country's partnership contribution to the processes of the NATO, EEC and other international institutions.

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