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Ukraine And European Security - International Mechanisms
As Non-Military Options For National Security Of Ukraine.
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Chapter 4. "Evolutionary" Approach" - Ukraine And European International Establishments.
Section 2. Ukraine and OSCE
2.4 Ukraine and OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures: Problems with Practical Employment.
Theoretically all of the OSCE mechanisms and procedures supply Ukraine with effective potency in dealing with its security challenges, including emergency circumstances, which can arise in Ukraine's relations with its unstable neighours.
Regardless, the use of them could be limited by a number of shortcomings that hamper the Organization's ability to function effectively, when given a requisite support for its actions.
First and foremost, it is a consensus principle in the OSCE decision-making process, which is truly complex in its essence, unless the OCSE standards are modified. Although, there have been some slight attempts to take political decisions by "consensus-minus-one" rule, regarding breaks of Human Dimensions, applying "the ability of the Council of Senior Officials to "direct" parties to a dispute to enter into conciliation" (250), this decision-making formula is essentially designing in Organization's creation and, thus, goes to the essence of the whole OSCE process.
On the other hand, by operating on 'consensus', it will always be difficult to establish a consensus with any degree of truth. And even if the OSCE crisis management capabilities were changed and modified, the political differences among participants would block their implementation through consensus.
A consistent policy towards necessary political alterations would be advantageous, but this is also unlikely to be formulated in consideration of the fact, that governments wish to hold as much flexibility as possible to avoid undesirable obligations that would come as a result - in reality, it is a natural tendency of each participating party in any international establishment to direct its strategy at domestic interests.
The effectiveness of the whole OSCE process depends also on will-power of all Participating States to cooperate. And consequently, a lack of willingness among participants hampers or, even brakes the application of all OSCE procedures.
Thus, when employing OSCE procedures for management of some particular situation (e.g. Emergency Meeting Mechanism, Human Dimension Mechanism, etc.) Ukrainian leaders can found themselves in quite imaginable situation, when other Participants would decline to invoke necessary procedures, that require a high-level OSCE meeting or at least discussion of all aspects of the crisis situation, with or without recipient state's consent.(251) It has already been proved by CSCE/OSCE proceedings in handling Chechen crisis during the winter of 1994-1995, when the Participants decayed to do so.(252)
Another deficiency of the OSCE current capabilities arises, when to recognize the fact, that new type of crises demands an ability to react rapidly to emergencies and necessitates the establishment of enforcement measures to prop the settlement actions. The events in Chechnya, as well as in some Central Asian States, e.g. Tadzhikistan, have explicitly showed that even with comparatively realistic and distinct mandate, the actions of effective settlement cannot be implemented without credible means to execute them.(253)
It is especially unprofitable in current situation, when OSCE standards, especially the Human Dimension and Confidence Building Measures have been significantly neglected by some states in Eastern Europe.
Finally, notable imperfection in the OSCE's organisational arrangement is also a lack of credible analysis division to enable it to foresee and forestall potential crises before they erupt into violence.
Besides really considerable achievements made by CSCE/OSCE fact-finding, rapporteur or monitor missions to sites of instability in Eastern Europe and former Soviet states, including Ukraine.(254), in broader terms it seems to be credible to have an independent strategic information network of, so as not only to rely on information from participating states or as United Nations for example does, on intelligence provided by member states which possess strategic information systems, such as the United States and Russia.(255) Taking into account that United Nations has the same need for more "in-house" information acquisition and analysis,(256) such system can be for instance, achieved under auspices of both organizations (in OSCE e.g. on the basis of the Conflict Prevention Center), while also banking on specialized information coming from the NATO, WEU and other international organizations.
Collectively with fact-finding and rapporteur missions 'as key instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management'(257) it could be highly useful in identifying "future conflicts even before they actually could break out...[or], in handling of emergency situations which have not been foreseen',(258) as well as in arms control verification, etc.(259)
In general, previously mentioned factors profoundly impact the OSCE's ability in executive duty. The various elements in this OSCE function are just optional in character and, therefore, do not represent a concrete obligations to the individual states. And hence, if the OSCE is to carry its role in the security field - its principal undertaking - these problems must be solved.