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Ukraine And European Security - International Mechanisms
As Non-Military Options For National Security Of Ukraine.

Bohdan Lupiy
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GoChapter 4. "Evolutionary" Approach" - Ukraine And European International Establishments.
GoSection 2. Ukraine and OSCE

2.3. OSCE Confidence and Security Building Measures and Arms Control Regime in Europe.

As it was previously suggested, from the first days of country's participation at the CSCE process, Ukrainian leadership has paid special attention to the Confidence-Building Measures within the Conference's frame and the question of the Conventional Arms control regime in Europe - the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

The latter Ukraine's regard to the Helsinki Process has often been of crucial importance - while providing a considerable level of European stability during the Cold War period, this block-to-block agreement has significantly affected the development of the Ukrainian Army. Although, political-military and especially, specialised technical questions of further development of the CFE regime relate rather to the responsibility of the NATO, the role of the OSCE - is in the promoting of Confidence relations among its Participants, engaged in the CFE process.

Besides enormous technical and economic restraints after the final implementation of the CFE treaty by Ukraine (see following section 'Ukraine and NATO'), rather significant factor of current CFE regime arises in terms of difficult Russian-Ukrainian relations and presence of the Russian military units on Crimean peninsula and neighbouring Trans-Dnistrian region of Moldova.

These two accounts apparently affect the defence planning standards of Ukraine and require necessary force allocations, currently impossible to be realized under CFE 'flank limits' restrictions.(245)

Furthermore, so far no final agreement has been reached between Russia and Ukraine on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, and specifically, on division of the coastal defense forces, which also must be reduced under the Treaty.(246) The actual problem here, is which country should reduce what amount - thus, it cannot be solved until the Fleet is finally divided.

At the same time, military cooperation between Ukraine and Russia, at least at the Black Sea region is unavoidable fact. The initial moves have recently been implemented and for the first time a new annual plan on inter-governmental cooperation was signed.(247) Yet, it seems to be necessary to engage OSCE capabilities in maintaining credible partnership and in providing supervision of inter-actions between two biggest military in the region under control of the respective international bodies.

There is indeed, a place, where the OSCE rules on the Confidence and Security Building Measures, which offers a program for military contacts and cooperation, as well as a set of provisions on defence planning, regulations in arms transfers and non-proliferation can take up their role - to correspond a peaceful co-existence and partnership, with special options such as full demilitarization of the Crimean region.

Here, nevertheless, appears a problem with current defficiency of the OSCE confidence-bulding regime - being the CSCE/OSCE decisions, a set of the Confidence Measures is not politically obliged for implementation and presents only meaningful provision of intra-state norms of behaviour without any specialized follow-up mechanisms and credible enforcement measures. This fact can indeed, be said about all OSCE rules and procedures.

Thus, whereas the present OSCE nature has little chances to be armed by such measures, there is a necessity to achieve closer cooperation with other international security institutions, which can supply OSCE with "more aggressive approach...", as Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko puts it.(248) And if one to remember, that the Confidence and Security Building principle has pushed in late 1980th the process of negotiations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, which resulted in signing of the CFE, Open Skies, START I and START II Treaties in 1990-1993, it is essentially effective to continue close cooperation between these two organizations. Current instabilities in Eastern Europe highlight this necessity.

The NATO/OSCE interaction can also significantly contribute to the solution of many Russian-Ukrainian dilemmas. For instance, it would be practical to achieve a strategy of NATO/OSCE cooperation in supervision of the Black Sea Fleet division, where NATO could regulate all political-military and technical questions, e.g. advise on military matters and defence planning, and OSCE will monitor all diplomatic proceedings, based on mutual confidence and respect.

Besides all positive outcomes in the Ukrainian-Russian relations and encouraging Ukraine, that it is supported by international community, such program can also reduce any attempts of separatist movements in Ukraine to engage the Black Sea Fleet in probable conflicts. It should be noted, that previously there were some efforts of the Crimean administration to attract the support of Navy officers in Sevastopol.(249)


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