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Ukraine And European Security - International Mechanisms
As Non-Military Options For National Security Of Ukraine.
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Chapter 3. "Gradual" Approach
Section 2. Ukraine and the CIS
2.3. CIS and Ukrainian-Rusian bilateral relations
Due to the CIS ineffectiveness, as mechanism for cooperation Ukraine has put forward the question of signing of comprehensive bilateral treaty with Russia, which would serve as a basis for eventual relations, as well as for resolution of current disputes. Up-to-date, Ukrainian-Russian relations are regulated by the treaty of November 19, 1990, which contains many controversies and can not serve as effective mechanism to coordinate relations.(185)
The Ukrainians hoped that the treaty will be signed during 1994-1995, but due to the unfinished draft, it has not been happened to be completed. The main obstacles for developing of a comprehensive treaty included the clauses on the questions of dual citizenship, advocated by Russia and opposed by Ukraine, economic issues and questions over the division of the Black Sea Fleet.
It is important to mention that question of a 'dual citizenship' "is a basic position of Russia's policy not only toward Ukraine but also toward the other CIS states"(186) It was evidenced at the beginning of 1995, when President Eltsin has ocassionally but seriously remarked, that he would not visit Ukraine to sign the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty if the dual citizenship clause is not included.(187)
After long diplomatic debates, Russia has hovewer agreed to remove references to above-mentioned issues from the text of the treaty since they are so controversial, but other differences still center on the wording of the clauses dealing with territorial integrity.
Yet, there is possible to foresee other complications if the treaty is to be finally signed. As previous experience shows, Russia hardens its line on treaties with the CIS states, by insisting on particular cases to be filled by the other party, before ratification by the Russian parliament. For instance, Russian Duma delayed several times the ratification of the treaty with Georgia (which provides for Georgia's territorial integrity) until the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. Similarly, Russia refused to consider ratification of the treaty with Moldova, signed in 1990, because of unresolved Transdnestrian conflict.(188) Thus, no one can be sure that Crimean question, which is of particular interest of some Russian politicians, will not be applied in the same way.
Without a treaty on friendship, Russia can covenant respect for Ukraine's integrity within the framework of the CIS, according to principles of the CIS Declaration on the Commonwealth of Independent States Participant States' Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity the Moscow Summit of April 15, 1994.
Nevertheless, given Russian insists to "facilitate the legal defence" of ethnic Russians and give "an additional guarantee to persons who don't want to break links with Russia,"(189) such arrangement can not work on Ukraine's favour, especially since it may lead Russia to demand concessions on this or other issues from Ukraine in future.(190) It would largely irritate big part of Ukraine's internal socio-political and economic problems.