NATO Institutional Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships (1994-1996)

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Belorussian Neutrality as a Factor Of National And European Security. Ural Latypov, Belarus [Back To Index] Concept of Belorussian Neutrality. Unlike some neutral states, Belarus has not adopted official documents describing the contents of its neutrality. There is one unofficial variant of Concept of Belorussian Neutrality prepared by Security and Development Research Institute, which is of doctrinal value.

4.1 Specific Features of Belorussian Neutrality. At present Belarus is not a neutral state according to the following: First, there are military establishments of the Russian Federation on the territory of Belarus. It should be mentioned that although Belarus declared making its territory a nuclear-free zone a political goal, the task has not been achieved yet. In June 1996 there were 18 Russian nuclear missiles on the territory of Belarus. They are due to be transferred to Russia only by the end of the 1996. Besides, according to agreements between Belarus and Russia there are other military objects on Belorussian territory. Since Russia is not confronting with any other state the presence of its bases on Belorussian territory does not impact relations of Belarus with other states. But in case of hypothetical involvement of the Russian Federation in an international military conflict Belarus undoubtedly could not remain in the frames imposed by a neutral status. Second reason is Belarus's unilateral economic dependence on Russia. Since Belarus acquired independence, Russia has never used this factor to coerce Belarus in the sphere of international relations. However, it is obvious that Belarus has not received the state of economic independence needed by a neutral state. Third reason is that, since proclamation a neutral status its political goal Belarus has done very little to receive recognition as a neutral state. It would be necessary to mention the contrast between Belorussian policy in this sphere and the course of Turkmenistan which declared itself a neutral state and obtained UN General Assembly Resolution of recognition, held some other international actions with the goal of widest possible international recognition of its status. At the same time the neutrality stipulation reflected in Belorussian Constitution remains to be an important element of Belorussian foreign policy. Belorussian neutrality may be characterized nowadays as a policy of non-involvement in international military conflicts, use of military force only for the self-defense purposes and attainment a traditionally neutral status in future. Belorussian neutrality reflected basic trends of neutrality institution evolution. Like other European countries Belarus considers in relation "neutrality-solidarity" the latter a top priority because of practical reasons. But if European neutral states are transforming its already formed neutral status under the impact of European integration and solidarity, Belarus is forming its neutral status under the domination of solidarity within CIS and particularly Russia. Belarus like European neutral states, is trying to adapt its status for participation in the regional systems of collective security but only Eastwards. As other European neutral states Belarus tries to use all the advantages of participation in economic integration that a neutral state may have.

4.2 Neutrality and Belorussian Participation in Integration on the Territory of the Former Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union was legally fixed in the Agreement on Establishment of the CIS. All the four former Soviet republics now striving for neutrality are Commonwealth members (Belarus, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine). From a formal legal point of view membership in the CIS creates an obstacle for execution of responsibilities following neutral status. Article 6 of the Agreement provides that: "States members of the CIS will preserve and support joint military strategic environment under joint command, including joint control over strategic nuclear forces... They also guarantee together necessary conditions for locating and functioning ... of strategic nuclear forces..." Had the provision concerning joint strategic military environment been realized, then the provision that "Parties to the Agreement will respect each others intention to attain neutral status" would be a mere declaration now. Like other agreements and treaties concluded by the CIS-members it is not executed fully. What is more, just those provisions which could complicate execution of responsibilities following neutrality or make it simply impossible are not fulfilled. There is neither joint foreign nor defense policy in the frame of Commonwealth. Therefore the Commonwealth membership should not be viewed in practice as an obstacle for Belarus's becoming a neutral state. Relative amourphity of the CIS and its inability to resolve problems common for the former USSR republics primarily those of economic make countries seek other forms of cooperation. Intensification of integration process on the former USSR territory began in the first half of 1996. A Treaty on Deepening of Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Spheres was signed March 29, 1996 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan and the Russian Federation. On April 2, 1996 Belarus and the Russian Federation signed an agreement on establishment of the Commonwealth of the two states. Influence of two above-mentioned instruments on the process on Belorussian neutrality establishment is thoroughly analyzed in the end-product of the project. However, two basic issues should be described here which are being interpreted controversially both in Belarus and abroad. Both of the treaties endanger neither sovereignty nor state independence of any party, including Belarus. The treaties stipulate that all parties should retain entire independence in the spheres of internal or external policy, while establishing a solid legal basis for economic cooperation and free transfer of people, capital and information. Both instruments provide for creation of international coordinating structures, however in Belarus-Russia case they have more authority than in the other one. The supreme body of the Commonwealth is Supreme Council comprising of heads of States, those of Parliaments and Governments of Belarus and Russia. An inter-parliamentarian body was established, containing an equal number of parliamentarians from each state. The inter-parliamentary body does not have a legislative power of direct application. Model laws elaborated by it should be adopted by national Parliaments. Executive Council is a permanent body responsible for elaboration and realization of joint programs, primarily in economics. It is evident that under the treaty parties accepted responsibilities that could complicate attaining neutral status by Belarus. That is true primarily concerning Article 3 of the Treaty which says that parties should coordinate foreign policy, form joint positions on basic international issues, cooperate in safeguarding of security, protection of borders and struggle against crime. However, Belarus has a possibility, even after signing this treaties to pursue the policy of non-involvement in international military conflicts. Moreover Belorussian high rank officials several times declared that Belarus will never send its military abroad for participation in an international military conflict. It should be mentioned that Commonwealth of Belarus and Russia is a less strict structure than the EU. Since it was estimated appropriate for neutral Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland to become EU members it should be acknowledged as that concerning Belorussian participation in integration on the territory of the former USSR.

4.3 Neutrality and the Participation of Belarus in Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Interventions and Non-armed Sanctions Organized by the UN. Belarus is one of the founder members of the United Nations. The proclamation in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the aim of attaining neutral status did not affect the question regarding the Belarus's participation in UN activities. Although Switzerland considers its neutrality to be incompatible with UN membership, this was not accepted as a precedent to be followed in the Republic of Belarus. The example chosen to follow was the practice of countries such as Austria, Sweden and Finland whose neutrality is combined happily with participation in UN activities. A certain complication at the politico-legal level involves the participation of neutral member countries of the UN in essential measures developed by this organization in relation to states which infringe the principles and standards of international law. Here, the most important question is whether to participate in military sanctions, as the quest for neutrality implies that military actions are only performed to defend oneself against aggression. Article 25 of the UN Charter defines the obligation of member states 'to defer to the decisions of the Security Council and to implement them'. How is Belarus supposed to behave in the event of a conflict between the decisions of the Security Council on military sanctions and its quest for neutrality? In Minsk it is hoped that by virtue of its limited (compared to the Great Powers) military potential, Belarus will not be drawn into this kind of action. As we know, Article 48 of the UN Charter envisages that, having discussed the question of military sanctions, the Security Council has the right to specify a group of specific states to participate in them. Belarus expects that in situations such as this, the Security Council will take into account the republic's quest for neutrality and release it from the obligation to participate in armed sanctions. As far as participation in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions are concerned, Belarus tends to follow the example of Sweden and Finland. As we know, the soldiers of these two traditionally neutral countries have participated in the majority of the more than 20 UN peacekeeping operations and have sent along military observers. And nowadays, the 'blue helmets' and 'blue berets' include not a few Swedish and Finnish citizens. It should be noted that the political leadership of Belarus has even expressed a specific interest in participating in peace keeping operations, seeing this as a means for consolidating its international authority. At the same time, the draft concept of Belorussian neutrality takes into account the fact that peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions may be of varying types. In numerous cases, the multinational forces of the UN have to carry out military actions on a broad scale. An obvious example of this is the humanitarian intervention in Somalia. The draft concept of neutrality for the Republic of Belarus makes particular mention of the non-participation of Belarus in this kind of military action, because it is not compatible with the quest for neutrality. Therefore, Belarus can only participate in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions which are not connected with military actions. Specific problems are also encountered with regard to the question of Belarus's participation in non-military sanctions undertaken by the United Nations in relation to states violating international law. As we know, the doctrine of international law expresses the opinion that participation in even non-military economic sanctions is incompatible with neutrality. With regard to Austria, A. Verdross wrote that 'it cannot be expected that any state subjected to a blockade involving economic measures on the part of another state will consider that state to be neutral." Accordingly, A. Verdross suggested that an amendment to the UN Charter be accepted which would release permanently neutral countries from participation in economic sanctions. As we know, this suggestion was not put into practice. In this matter, Belarus prefers the idea of international solidarity and believes that it will be possible for it to participate in economic sanctions performed as a result of a UN decision. This approach appears to be perfectly justified as refusing trade, financial and other relations with one state or another cannot be considered to be an infringement of neutrality. The maintenance of economic relationships is a right and not an obligation of neutral countries. On the basis of this, Belarus will carry out the UN decision regarding an economic boycott of Yugoslavia and will support this kind of approach in the future.

4.4 Neutrality and the Participation of the Republic of Belarus in Collective Security Agreements As a preliminary comment, it should be noted that regional agreements on collective security may be divided into two categories. The first category of agreement covers the creation of a military and political bloc with its own organizational structure. The second category comprises multilateral agreements in which the participants are obliged to undertake to help each other to repel aggression, but do not establish any joint armed forces for this purpose. This circumstance is very significant when examining the question of the compatibility of Belarus's neutrality policy with participation in collective security agreements. It is evident that the quest for neutrality will preclude participation in military and political blocs as this deprives the neutral state of the possibility of carrying out its main obligation, to keep out of wars. The quest for neutrality has a direct influence on the policy of the Republic of Belarus with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Unlike its Baltic neighbors and Poland, Belarus does not intend to join NATO. Public opinion polls conducted in the frame of this project show that less than one fifth of Belorussians (19,1%)agree to tie their security issues with NATO, while 75,3 % are in favor of participation in CIS collective security system. The question of whether Belarus should join the Collective Security Treaty for the countries of the CIS is more complex from both a political and a legal point of view. This agreement was signed on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent by the heads of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. The question regarding joining the Collective Security Treaty for the countries of the CIS was raised by Belarus in the spring of 1993, when on the verge of a severe political crisis. In April 1993 the government of Belarus submitted a proposal to the Supreme Council in favor of joining the Collective Security Treaty. This proposal was not based on the fact that Belarus was being threatened with aggression or other danger from abroad (this threat was not realized and none is predicted for the foreseeable future). The main argument put forward by the government was that joining the Collective Security Treaty was a conditio sine qua non for an economic union between Belarus and Russia. The BPF opposition was against signing the treaty. Their main argument was that Belarus's movement towards neutrality was incompatible with participation in a system of collective security. The Supreme Council had to turn to the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Justice and other authorities and parliamentary commissions for a consultation. The overwhelming majority of ministries (including the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Justice and others) and committees in the Supreme Council concluded that, in principle, joining the Collective Security Treaty for the Countries of the CIS was compatible with Belarus's quest to obtain a neutral status. Does this conclusion based on the doctrine of international law conform with the concept of neutrality? The answer to this question may be found from a comparative analysis of the obligations resulting from the Collective Security Treaty and the rules which have to be observed by a state which wishes to become neutral. The Treaty obliges its participants to refrain from using force or the threat of force in international relationships and to settle all disagreements between themselves and other states by peaceful means and not to participate in military unions and groups directed against other members of the Treaty (Article 1). All these conditions are perfectly compatible with the strictest of neutralities, including permanent neutrality. Article 2 provides for periodic consultations to take place between the signatories of the treaty on all the important questions of international security, for agreements on their position with regard to these questions and for immediate consultations 'in the event of a threat to the security, territorial integrity or sovereignty of one or more of the member states or a threat to international peace and security'. It would appear that consultations of this kind do not affect neutrality and are compatible with it. The matter is more complicated regarding Article 3, which provides for the creation of a Collective Security Council consisting of the heads of the member states and the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS. Without beating about the bush, here we are talking about the formation of military and political union in which, in principle, a permanently neutral state could not participate if it wished to retain this status. The same may be said of Article 4, according to which an attack on one of the members of the treaty would be treated as an act of aggression against all of them and all the other members would be obliged to provide 'the necessary assistance, including military assistance' and support with the means at their disposal for collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Regardless of the type of neutrality it has chosen, a neutral state cannot accept these conditions unconditionally without risking losing its neutrality. It should be noted that Article 7 of the Treaty states that 'the location and function of facilities belonging to a system of collective security on the territory of the member states will be regulated by special agree ments.' This is referring to the possibility of locating the troops of other members of the treaty from the Combined Armed Forces of the CIS on the territory of a member state and to the establishment of military bases, strong points, military facilities etc. However, the stationing of foreign troops and foreign military bases would prevent the attainment of permanent neutral status. And finally, Part 3 Article 8 obliges a state which has signed the Collective Security Treaty not to conclude international agreements which are incompatible with the treaty. If Belarus participated in the treaty, this provision could prevent it from drawing up an international agreement for its status of permanent neutrality, if it were to choose this particular type of neutrality. Therefore, the content of the Collective Security Treaty shows that, a country which wishes to become neutral cannot become a member of this system of collective security unconditionally and without adding a few conditions, since the obligations arising from the treaty, which we have examined above, are not compatible with neutrality. The only possible legal steps in this situation which enable the prospect of neutrality to be retained to some extent would be reservations to the treaty. In particular, it could be stipulated that Belarus will only provide assistance, including military assistance, to a member state which is the subject of an armed attack if the attack takes place through the territory of the Republic of Belarus. In this case, the military action carried out by Belarus would count as self-defense which is perfectly permissible from the point of view of neutrality. In addition, it is suggested that it be agreed in advance that the participation of the Republic of Belarus in collective security measures in the event of aggression against one of the members of the treaty, but not against Belarus herself, will be limited to the provision by Belarus of auxiliary, administrative or medical personal, but not military units, weapons or military technology. Of course, it is vital to stipulate a reservation to the effect that troops, military bases and facilities belonging to other members of the treaty or other foreign states may not be stationed on the territory of the country. At present the Republic of Belarus participates in CIS collective security system with a reservation prohibiting the use of armed forces of the Republic of Belarus on the territories of other states and the deployment and use of the armed forces of other countries on the territory of the Republic of Belarus without the permission of the Supreme Council. It is not difficult to see that clauses formulated in this way do not exclude the use of Belorussian armed forces on the territory of other states and the deployment of foreign troops and military facilities on the territory of Belarus. Although, obviously, when the Supreme Council makes a specific decision, it will take into account the provision regarding the aim of attaining neutrality, which is consolidated in the Constitution.

4.5 Neutrality and the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Belarus The provision on Belarus's quest for neutrality consolidated in the Declaration of State Sovereignty has a direct influence on the country's defense policy. A decree passed by the Council of Ministers on 16 December 1992 states that the military doctrine of the Republic of Belarus is based on the concept of armed neutrality and permits cooperation with other states for the repulse of aggression for purposes of defense. The Republic bases the size of its armed forces on the principle of sufficiency. However, this principle is formed in an abstract way. The military doctrine of the Republic of Belarus states that 'sufficiency for defense means the number of armed forces which is commensurate with the level of the military threat and necessary for defense against a sudden attack from abroad and deployment of the main forces deep into the territory." In actual fact, however, the size of Belarus's armed forces is determined not by the size of the military threat (at present, there is no such threat and therefore its size cannot be estimated). Economics are the decisive factor, that is, the ability of the country to keep a specified minimum level of forces. It should be noted that Belarus inherited from the Soviet Union of the largest and best equipped groups, numbering more than 200,000 men and making up the Belorussian Military District. At the time of independence, every 43rd citizen of Belarus was a soldier. Both the political leadership of the country and the military leadership understand that it is not feasible to set an objective of defeating any possible enemy. Belarus does not have sufficient military potential for this. Therefore, the prevailing opinion in these circles is the idea that Belarus should be in a position to inflict unacceptable damage on the attackers. In this regard, Belarus is tending towards the example of the traditionally neutral Sweden. The quest for neutrality places severe restriction on the use of armed forces. The Belorussian armed forces may only be used for the purposes specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter, to repel aggression against Belarus or to cut off attempts at aggressive action against third countries through its territory. In peacetime, the armed forces may be used in accordance with international law to prevent the violation of state boundaries by military aircraft. Military doctrine specifically mentions Belarus's adherence to political methods of resolving international disagreements. The reform of the armed forces being carried out at present takes into account the possibility of Belarus achieving a neutral status.