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NATO |
Belorussian Neutrality as a Factor
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1.1 Historic Background and Conditions of the Belorussian Option for Neutrality.
However, in 1772 present day Belorussian territories were annexed by the Russian Empire and since that time to 1991 (more than 200 years) Belorussian and Russian peoples lived in a single state - first, the Russian Empire, then in the USSR. Unlike the three Baltic states, which attained in 1917 independence and statehood for the period of more than twenty years, Belorussian People's Republic proclaimed February 25, 1918 existed only several months. Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic which later became a part of the former Soviet Union was founded March 1, 1919. The fact that Belorussian statehood was realized for more than 200 years together with Russian State, determines present and future of Belorussian neutrality. More than 200 year long period of life together with Russians within one state could not but influence the composition of Belorussian population. Nowadays population of Belarus consisting of 10,3 millions, comprises more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups. Belorussians form an overwhelming majority of population - 77,9 %. There are 13,22 % Russians. Number of Russians had been growing during last period of Soviet history (according to 1959 census Russians formed only 8,2 % population). Belorussians and Russians live in Belarus together often creating mixed families, that is basically due to linguistic and ethnic closeness of the two peoples. Belorussians (except a small group of national-extremists) do not view Russians as aggressors. Basically that is due to the fact that Belorussians were not discriminated at the time of the former Soviet Union, neither in the sphere of economics nor science, education or state service. Moreover, Belorussians all the time occupied rather influential posts in Moscow. Now, more than one million Belorussians live in the Russian Federation. Belorussians continue to play a significant and influential role in Moscow and some Russian industrial centers. Most of those Belorussians living in the Russian Federation have relatives in Belarus and secure contacts with ethnic motherland. Hence, they are in favor of integration of the two countries. Generally all that creates a unique social-psychological phenomena, the essence of which is in the fact that Belorussians and Russians continue to identify themselves as a part of a single society, although they live in different states. This factor is practically ignored by Western specialists, who usually try to extrapolate situation in Baltic states to that of Belarus. They are surprised that Belarus does not repeat political steps of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in relations with Russia. The answer is rather easy - Belarus has different from that of Baltic nations history of relations with Russia as the closest nation to it from linguistic and cultural points. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians strove for independence for long and its attaining was a desired and achieved through much suffering result. Belarus, however, became independent as a result of objective development of events which lead to break-up of the USSR. Suffice it to say, that in the referendum of March 17, 1990, 82,7 per cent of the inhabitants of the republic entitled to vote, voted to retain the Soviet Union. Minsk made steps in direction to state independence, mainly resembling those of Russian and Ukrainian only when it was forced to by events. The same may be said about adoption of Declaration on State Sovereignty July 27, 1990 in which it was specified that Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) put a goal of becoming a nuclear free zone and making the state a neutral one. People's Deputies of the Supreme Council - representatives of Belorussian Popular Front (BPF) were the initiators of the Declaration's adoption and provision of a neutral status goal. According to the documents of the Supreme Soviet (Belorussian Parliament) 229 members of the Parliament voted in favor of neutrality status, while only 2 against. Such a unanimous option was a surprise, since the BPF opposition had only 26 votes out of 360 seats in the Supreme Council. The overwhelming majority belonged to Communists. Study of Supreme Soviet documents and interviews with former deputies show that such an option was predetermined by several reasons. It should be primarily taken into consideration that this decision was made in 1990 when neither deputies of Belorussian Parliament nor most Western analysts anticipated the collapse of the USSR. It was supposed that Soviet Union could go through reforms and Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic would remain a part of it. In that circumstances a part of Belorussian Parliamentarians viewed the declaration of neutrality as a statement which would never be realized. This position is quite understandable if the USSR had remained BSSR would not have been neutral, since it was an integral part of the USSR. The so-called "afghan syndrome" undoubtedly was one of the reasons that made a considerable part of deputies vote for neutrality. The perception of afghan invasion which caused deaths of Belorussian soldiers was extremely negative. Therefore, neutrality associated in minds of people with inadmissibility of Belorussian citizens' involvement in military conflicts abroad. It should be mentioned that in 90s Belorussian society (which was an integral part of the Soviet society) was trying to find a model of future development. Neutral states such as Austria, Switzerland and others were viewed as examples of prosperity and stability. In such a situation a number of deputies voted for neutrality because "neutrality" and "prosperity" seemed to be closely connected for them. Only a group of deputies-representatives of BPF rather thoughtfully proposed and supported the idea of Belorussian neutrality, but not as an instrument of national security . They viewed it as a means of "civilized divorce" with Russia. Belorussian national radicals in 1990 understood that rude anti-Russian policy would not be accepted by Belorussian population which overwhelmingly voted for preservation of the Soviet Union. However, realization of the neutrality concept could inevitably lead not only to separation but also setting apart of Belarus from Russia to some extent. Although the essence of Belorussian neutrality was not explained to the public it was welcomed by the society. According to the research conducted in the framework of this project 25,3% of population support the idea of Belorussian neutrality. Among those with high education the percentage is even higher- 36,6%. Therefore, it looks natural that Article 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus adopted on the 15 of March 1994 reaffirmed the choice made in 1990: "The Republic of Belarus has a goal to make its territory into a nuclear free zone, with its State having a status of neutrality".
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1.2 Belorussian-Russian Relations and Belorussian Neutrality.
Belorussian-Russian economic relations may be characterized as an interdependence, however the level of dependence is different. Belarus is economically more dependent on Russia. First and the most important reason is that Russia had the greatest share in the USSR's GNP and is an economic giant, so to say, while Belarus had only 4%. Second, Belarus in the USSR's economics played a role of so-called "assembly plant". Belorussian military-industrial complex might well be the best example for illustration, involving more than 400 000 people. As a result of economic relations collapse and cut in Russian orders for this industry, in 1994 it was using only 20 % of its capabilities. Russia is the main consumer of Belorussian military purpose production (of which a major part is not end-products ready for realization on world market). Therefore, it is obvious that this highly technological and scientific brunch of Belorussian industry can survive only as an integral part of a single Russian-Belorussian military industrial complex. Many Belorussian plants are producing goods for Russian market, which will inevitably be lost in case Russia sets alternative production of its own. It is quite obvious that, that will not happen only if Russia is sure in stability of Belorussian-Russian relations. Last but not least, Belarus is highly dependent on Russian energy resources and raw materials. At present Belarus receives 100 % of gas, 90 % of oil and 86 % of different types of raw materials from Russia. Belorussian dependence on Russian raw materials is of a comprehensive character, and some of the problems may not be resolved by purely free-market economy methods. Main of them - price of energy resources. Because of the difference in prices for Russian and Belorussian consumers, prices of goods produced in Belarus are higher and cannot compete with those of Russian on Russian market. It is obvious that equal prices on oil, gas and raw materials may be established only by government regulation, with presence of necessary good will on the Russian part. Belorussian-Russian cooperation is broader than only human or economic connections. Coincidence of political and military-political interests should not be forgotten. However, mutual interest is, so to say, of an asymmetrical character. Being a superpower, although a weakened one, Russia has more comprehensive and developed national interests. Due to its geopolitical position Belarus is a strategic partner for Russia, loss of which could have disastrous consequences for Russian external political interests especially in the sphere of national security. Unlike Russia, Belarus is a middle sized European State which military-political interests are of a regional character. At present, Belarus is interested very much in cooperation with Russia since without it, it would be nearly impossible to support and reform military forces. Belarus could not bear the burden of such a big army inherited from the USSR. Therefore, now it is being reformed. These processes could not be possible without close cooperation with Russia, since Russia is the main military supplier of Belarus. Moreover, many specialists in the military sphere can be prepared only in Russia. It is easy to see now that none of the European neutral states has ever been that much dependent on any foreign state as Belarus is. To be fair, it should be mentioned that other former USSR republics striving for neutrality(Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan) are not less dependent on Russia than Belarus is. This dependence might well be the major and long-term factor determining future of Belorussian neutrality. Since Belarus became independent it has never felt pressure from Russian side aimed at making it abandon striving for neutral status. Russian intention to cooperate closely with the West is probably one of the main reasons of such a situation. In case of conflict with the West (hypothetically, it might happen in connection with NATO's enlargement) Russia has many instruments to involve Belarus in it. The same might happen in case of Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Therefore, it should be concluded that Belorussian neutrality is directly dependent on peace and stability in Europe.
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1.3 Political Elite of Belarus and Belorussian Neutrality.
Notwithstanding the difference in opinions concerning best models of security policy, views of the most considerable political groups concerning security policy in general and neutrality status as a part of it should be mentioned. Although any classification is to some extent conditional, approaches of Belorussian politicians may be divided into two major groups. One of them is based primarily on ideological position. Another one rests on a pragmatic approach towards the issue of the country's security policy. The strategy proposed by the representatives of ideological approach is overwhelmingly dominated by the ideas they are cofessing. Both radical right and left wing representatives of Belorussian political specter use this approach. The essence of the right-wing national-extremist approach to the Belorussian security policy was most clearly and vividly expressed by the leader of BPF Z. Poznyak in an article "About Russian Imperialism" published in an official Parliamentary newspaper "Narodnaya Gazeta". Russian imperialism was described as the main threat to Belarus as well as were explained claims concerning territories nowadays under Russian control which sometime belonged to Grand Duchy of Lithuania. While expressing anti-Russian rhetoric BPF is trying to show off itself as the most powerful democratically oriented movement in Belarus. That is directed to produce impression on the West. During Presidential elections of 1994 Z. Poznyak used the motto "return Belarus to Europe" which in his interpretation undoubtedly excludes any specific relations with Russia. BPF which is in favor of conducting relations with Russia from "position of power" (territorial claims, toughening of Russian transit conditions etc.) is itself in very complicated conditions today. In recent years BPF had stable - about 10% support of voters. However, as a result of last parliamentary elections they did not have a single candidate elected. Mainly that was caused by the fact that anti-Russian position could not objectively receive support of a considerable part of population. Constitutional provision on neutrality is being interpreted by the national-extremists through their anti-Russian views. The weakest point of this position is that it nearly absolutely ignores economic dependence on Russia and common historical heritage of the two peoples. Although in a reverse direction, ideological motives lead another political group which aims at restoration of the former USSR or even more - Russian empire of the beginning of the 20th century. Supporters of these ideas continue to view West as the main threat to security and call for unification to oppose the danger. This approach is also absolutely ideological. Its supporters are mostly people who retained their communist views notwithstanding the changes of last decade. Basically they are elderly people, veterans of the Second World War, professional military. They still view NATO as an aggressive military-political block. In their view West after destruction of the former USSR is now moving Eastwards with secret plans of the former Soviet peoples enslavement and natural resources exploitation. From psychological point of view most of them continue to feel themselves as citizens of a super-power - USSR. In short, the essence of their strategy is in the following: establishment of a military-political block is necessary, which could oppose NATO. As closer to reality primary defense measure against the West they propose to reconstruct the USSR. Those politicians are widely supported by public. Monitoring of public opinion held in 1996 showed that more than half of Belorussian citizens (57,4%) would vote for the restoration of the former USSR if a referendum on the matter were held.7 In conditions of the USSR break-up political will of the left wing was, so to say, paralyzed. The situation has changed however. In Belorussian Supreme Council (XIII) elected in 1995 communists form the most influential group. Party of Communists of Belarus has 43 (21,5%) seats in the Supreme Council, confessing nearly the same foreign policy Agrarian Party - 33 (16,5%). Suffice it to say, that the head of the Parliament is a representative of Agrarian Party, First Deputy Head - communist. Supporters of unification of Slavic peoples and a Russian politician V. Zhirinovsky's followers compose although a young and relatively small (if to compare with communists), but an active group. They also view West as a threat to Slavic unity and deem unification of at least three Slavic peoples (Belorussians, Ukrainians and Russians) in a single state necessary. Their ultimate goal is to reconstruct the Russian Empire of the beginning of the 20th century. It is obvious that the very idea of Belorussian neutrality seems to be a mistake for these political forces. In case they come to power, undoubtedly, the neutrality provision will be removed from the Constitution. Although from the first sight the two radical approaches might seem to be totally different in reality they have some common features , ideology is the basis for national security policy in both cases. Attention is paid to real factors only where they meet ideological requirements. Therefore, none of the above-mentioned approaches may be brought into reality without catastrophic consequences for Belarus. Present political leadership of Belarus shows a pragmatic approach to the national security policy issue. One of its main features is that it pays necessary attention to the extent of economic dependence of Belarus on Russia. Its supporters realize that further destruction of industrial cooperation would inevitably lead to social instability and economic catastrophe. In a wide specter of cultural, political and other connection economic cooperation is a top priority. Understanding that nothing but close cooperation of Belorussian military-industrial complex with that of Russian and specific political relations with Russia may help a great part of our industry survive Belorussian government makes necessary meaningful steps in this direction. This policy rests on support of overwhelming part of Belorussian society which is for close links between the two states. Belorussian people expressed their will on the matter twice in the last two years. First time in 1994 by 70% support of Alexander Lukashenko in presidential elections. His motto was "closer integration with Russia". In May 1995 an overwhelming majority of voters in national referendum again gave a positive reaction. President A. Lukashenko expressed his approach in the following way : "We are against the dilemma - Belarus with Russia but against the West or together with the West against Russia. We want to cooperate with both Russia and the West". This approach is pragmatic also because Russia is viewed by Belarus as the main but not the only partner in external political or economic affairs. Unlike right and left wing radicals, present Belorussian leadership is interested in further development of cooperation with West European countries and USA. Belarus viewing West as a partner but not an opponent is trying to involve Western business in economic reforms. Pragmatic approach bases on the principle of safeguarding of national security interests regardless of development of relations with Russia. Belorussian sovereignty is recognized by the Russian Federation and other states and won't be abandoned. Concerning the idea of Belorussian sovereignty it should be mentioned that it has "deep roots" in Belorussian society now (especially among youth, students and intellectuals). At present conditions in which is Belarus, only pragmatic approach gives an opportunity to make steps following declaration of neutrality status acquisition a policy goal.
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