NATO Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships (1994-1996)

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Creating The European Security System in a Post Cold War Period Dr. Alexander Konovalov [Back to Index]

Evolution Of Russian Approaches Towards NATO: A Brief History The August 1991 events in the USSR appeared to mark the beginning of intensive public discussion on new relations with NATO. Several days after the failed coup, prominent Soviet analyst Sergei Blagovolin suggested that identified the need for close relations with NATO, but stressed that the immediate Soviet membership in NATO is premature, because it presupposes a long and complicated process. Dr.Blagovolin concluded that Russian military posture and strategy should be oriented toward joining the West in the construction of a security belt which the US Secretary of State James Baker had suggested should stretch from Vancouver to Vladivostok. (4) After the break up of the Soviet Union, the first official formulation of the vital national interests of the new Russian state included a close partnership with the West. A month after the failed coup in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote that Russian foreign policy must be aimed at historical goal: to transform Russia "from a dangerous and sick giant of Eurasia into a participant of the Western zone of common prosperity." (5) In January 1992 he published an article in which he formulated the priorities of the Russian foreign and security policy, and characterized the USA and other developed Western countries as "the natural allies to Russia." Subsequently, the idea that "the Western democracies are as natural allies to democracy in Russia as they are enemies of totalitarian regime" was repeated by him many times. (6) This view dominated the official attitudes of the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the development of the closest collaboration with the West in the international security area in the initial period after Russia was recognized as an independent state.

Unfortunately this political course and a historically unique "window of opportunities" for creating the principally new type of relations with Russia were not properly responded and used by the West. On the contrary, the Western policy which in many cases openly ignored Russian interests and treated Russia as a weaken looser of the Cold War resulted shortly in serious changes in the Russian policy. Many analysts and political elite representatives started to oppose one-sided orientation of the Russian foreign policy. It was stressed that the wise Russian foreign policy should concentrate on at least two other directions: the Muslim world to the south of Russia and China to its east. According to Sergei Goncharov, a Russian expert on the Far East: "Even in case of the most favorable development of Russian foreign policy toward the West, any confrontation, whether it occurs with Muslim states or with China, could bring enormous damage to Russian vital interests." (7) At that period many experts and politicians started to express the view that joining NATO or creating the other formal military-political alliance with the West would put Russia in a very difficult position vis--vis Muslim countries and China. It was even stated that any formal politico-military alliance of Russia with the West would inevitably lead to a reciprocal counter-alliance of leading Muslim countries, with the possible engagement of China, and a new global confrontation with Russia. This assessment seems at least highly debatable, first of all due to deep contradictions in the Muslim world itself, but it can not be wholly rejected. In any case Mr. Goncharov in his article, mentioned above, suggested that Russia should never join formal military-political alliance which could be perceived as being specifically oriented against any given country; rather proposed that Russian foreign and security policy should be "a constructive non-alignment with a definite preference for the West." (8) This shift to more balanced approach in the Russian foreign policy was a natural one in coincided in many respects with the interests of the West and the United States in particular. A well-known American specialist Alexander Rahr wrote commenting this trend that a Eurasian reorientation of Russian foreign policy (which started to replace Atlanticism) does not necessarily conflict with Western interests. For the USA, France and the Great Britain, democratic Russia would be a decisive counterweight to the new world giants - Germany in Europe and Japan in pacific. (9) During 1992, the Russian press published several other analyses prepared by independent experts, who insisted on more balanced approach to the foreign policy issues. One set of such recommendations was introduced in the report published by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. This document suggested that it was in Russian interest to foster the preservation of NATO and the development of a partnership with it. It cautions, however, that a one-sided orientation towards the West would be counterproductive; and that Russia should develop political and economic relations with important partners in Asia, as India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Iran. (10) The position of Foreign minister Kozyrev in October 1993 was that for democratic Russia the choice in favor of "partnership and, in perspective alliance with the West is natural... But partnership and alliance never mean unification. Russia has always had and will continue to have its own interests." (11) This view was responded by Vladimir Lukin, former Ambassador to the United States an Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the State Duma. As he stated : "I am sure that it is both possible and necessary to collaborate with the USA but not at the expense of our own interests." (12) In sum, the period between the break-up of the USSR in 1991 and the next crises of power in Russia in October 1993 saw an evolution from what can be characterized as a "romantic pro-western Atlanticism" based on the assumption of a full convergence of the interests of all democratic states, to more realistic understanding of the specificity of the new Russia's interests. The search for a reasonable balance between the position of Atlanticists and Eurasians in this period dominated debates on military security issues and the future role of international institutions in this area. The idea of a close partnership with (and even participation in) NATO had strong proponents both in academic community and among top officials; nevertheless, there were serious doubts about the possible role of Russia in this organization, even among the most committed to democratic ideas and partnership with the West. In one of the first attempt in Russia to define the possible mission of Russia in NATO, Dr.Alexei Arbatov, now deputy of the State Duma, wrote that "until now there has been a clear cut distribution of missions in NATO: the United States was the security guarantor in case of Soviet aggression... Western Europeans, in turn, contributed to collective defense and provided the US with their territory for military bases and other facilities. Russia could hardly play a role in this arrangements. Its internal problems do not permit her to take on any military security obligations outside the Former Soviet Union. At the same time, Russia does not need any military protection from the USA. There is now neighboring state which could represent a serious military threat to Russia for the foreseeable future. All real security threats are linked with Russian internal problems, which NATO would be unable to solve." (13) He stated further that in the moment when the situation in Russia is completely normalized, and it is ready to join NATO, this alliance will immediately become meaningless. It will then be necessary to set up a true system of collective security, which would include the US, European countries, Russia and its neighbors, Japan and others. Since the time this analyses has been made the political situation has changed dramatically. NATO launched a number of important moves trying to arrange itself for the new political realities. It started with creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). But this step did not prevent Euro-Atlantic community from a necessity to answer the crucial question: should the future European security system, if Europe needs any formalized security arrangements at all, be based on the idea of gradual enlargement of NATO to the Russian border? Until August 1993 the answer seemed clear: Central European countries saw NATO membership as a desirable bit long-term goal; NATO was ready to collaborate with them in security field but did not display any enthusiasm for their formal membership in alliance; Russia, preoccupied with domestic problems, made it clear that it would never agree to NATO's expansion to the East.

But this relatively stable situation was exploded during president Yeltsin's visit to Poland in 1993. The Declaration he signed with Polish President Walensa on 25 August 1993 stated that Russia would not be threatened if Poland joined NATO. This paragraph in the Russian-Polish declaration has opened a Pandora box and a new stage in the NATO enlargement issue. On 4 October 1993, polish Foreign Minister Skubishevskiy declared that "Poland can not be secure, prosperous and civilized without close links with the European Community and NATO... We expect that NATO, in its January 1994 Summit, will set up a perspective for its enlargement... The polish aspiration to NATO is irreversible." (14) The wish to join NATO was also expressed by Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and the Baltic states. In the fall of 1993, NATO modified its previous position with regards to the possibility of its enlargement. Secretary General Worner stated that "it is time to propose a real perspective for the Central European countries to join NATO." Similar views were expressed by many Western politicians. German Defense Minister F.Ruhe, during his visit to the Czech Republic, supported the idea of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joining NATO in the near future. (15) Less than a month after the signing of the Russian-Polish declaration, President Yeltsin sent a confidential letter to the leaders of US, UK, France and Germany. In this letter he argued against a possible NATO expansion Eastward. Instead of NATO enlargement he proposed the Central European countries to be granted with mutual security cross-guarantees simultaneously from the United States and from Russia. But this idea was unacceptable for Central Europeans from the very beginning because made them subjects of the security and foreign policy of the big powers rather than independent and equal players on the European political scene. The news of Yeltsin's letter had barely been made public when most analysts agreed that the paragraph in the Russian-Polish declaration saying that a decision by Poland to request NATO membership would not contradict "either the European integration process, or Russian interests" (16) should be considered as an aberration, and an example of poor improvisation in the foreign policy are made by some of presidential closest aids or by Yeltsin himself. This "deviation" in the Russian foreign policy was met negatively by the Russian experts representing all parts of political spectrum. According to Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Presidential Council, "an inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO will not lead to a growth of the military threat to Russia. But the political and psychological consequences of such step would be devastating. It will inevitably produce negative reactions on the main part of the military leadership, whose influence in society is growing, and will be rejected by politicians of different orientation... Anti-Russian feelings might grow within NATO when the Eastern Europeans there air their worries about the imperial policy of Russia... The West should avoid a military isolation of Russia... We can not and should not prohibit our neighbors from joining the alliance they choose. But Russia must make it clear that NATO enlargement would deepen its isolation and would directly threaten its democratic development... Russia should also insist on joining NATO at the same time... our partners should understand that the choice is either to invite Russia in NATO, or to openly isolate her." (17) Very quickly the problem of NATO enlargement united all political parties, groups and political figures in unanimous negative attitudes towards this idea. It became and continues to be the only political problem where national consensus does exist. This move is seen as a potentially dramatic change contradicting vital national interests of the country. This assessments united democrats and communists, radicals and liberals - all parts of the political spectrum existing in Russia. In November 1993, Academician Evgeniy Primakov, Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service at that moment, has publicly presented a report entitled "The Prospect of NATO Enlargement and Russian Interests." This report represented the most comprehensive analyses of the consequences such a move could result in different areas. The document stressed out in particular that it would be wrong to suppose that the geographical extension of NATO will be used as play-ground to attack Russia or its allies. But this does not mean that such an enlargement might not pose new dangers for Russian military security interests. The report outlined consequences which would logically follow from NATO's enlargement: a review of Russian defensive concepts, a reorganization of TWD (Theater of the Military Actions), the creation of additional infrastructures, the re-deployment of huge military formations, and changes in operational planning. This would constitute a military reaction to changes in the military strategic environment, but would have nothing to do with political assumptions about NATO's intentions. The state budget would be burdened by this military reorganization and the defensive power of Russia would be weakened. Furthermore, the programs of arms reduction and reorganization of the armed forces might be jeopardized. Finally, if the Russian government is unable to provide the armed forces with the necessary human, financial and material resources, discontent could escalate to the extent that it would undermine the Russian leadership and perspectives of domestic political reforms. (18) On November 26, 1993 Yeltsin's press office made the following statement: "The concerns expressed by Mr.Primakov are shared by the armed forces, Russian citizens and political forces concerned with the strategic interests of the state." (19) By the end of 1993 Russian political leadership came to conclusion the legitimate Russian interest were taken into account by the Western leadership. In December 1993 , during the NACC meeting in Brussels the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev even stated that "the idea of quick enlargement of NATO has been buried." (20) Given the climate, NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP), announced by the US State Secretary Christopher during his visit to Russia in October 1993, was seen in Moscow as a step in a right direction. This plan proposed a broad spectrum of bilateral contacts between Central European countries and NATO (including joint military exercises and other form of military cooperation), bit did not give them security guarantees or full membership. The program was understood in Russia as an attempt of the NATO states to respond simultaneously on two external factors: on the one hand it demonstrated that NATO is not indifferent to the Central European countries growing pressure to join the alliance and to get security guarantees from NATO, on the other, Russian security concerns and necessity do develop a broad military partnership with this country.

In January 1994, at the Brussels NATO Summit, the PFP was adopted. In Russia it was accepted as a reasonable compromise and evidence of NATO readiness to take legitimate Russian interests seriously. The PFP initiative was presented at the NATO summit in the form of two documents: a Framework Agreement and an Invitation. The former corresponded with the strategic interests of any democratic nation (the establishment of democratic civilian control over the military sphere, transparency of the defense budget, etc.). But the Invitation stated that NATO "would welcome expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East", and proclaimed that PFP "will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO." (21) There were serious debate in Russia on the issue which could be characterize as a dilemma - "to join or not to join". This became a subject for special hearings in the Defense Committee of the State Duma the author has attended as an expert. These hearings together with the expert assessments published in the Russian press, demonstrated that Russian legislators and at least some independent analysts had serious concerns about possible consequences of such a decision. But the arguments of the proponents of the program looked more convincing. (22) By March 1994 it became clear that Russia had to take its decision soon. More than sixteen European states, including several among New Independent States (NIS), showed interest in joining PFP. The ministry of defense and the Security Council of Russia announced on 17 March that "Russia can join PFP before the end of March." (23) Foreign Minister Kozyrev was more cautious about the time schedule, but confirmed that Russia has decided to do this step. But it should be taken into consideration that the final decision to join the PFP program was taken in Russia basing on the assumption that this program will not be seen by its participants as preparatory class for those who planned to join the alliance. On the contrary, PFP was considered not as a forerunner of NATO expansion, but as an opportunity to block this scenario and to propose a constructive alternative which would really correspond with the security risks and challenges of the modern Europe. Footnotes Blagovolin Sergei: "Does the USSR Need to Join NATO?", Rossiyskie Vesty (The Russian Herald), August 1991, No. 16, p.11. Quoted in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), 16 August 1993, p. 5. Ibidem. Goncharov Sergei: "Specific Russian Interests: What they Are", Izvestia, 25 February 1992, p.3. Ibidem. Rahr Alexandr: "Atlanticists versus Eurasians", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 August 1993, p.4. Nesavisimaya Gazeta, 19 September 1993, p.5. Moskovskie Novosty (Moscow News), No 43, 24 October 1993, p.15A. Ibidem. Arbatov Alexei: "Russia and NATO: Do We Need Each Other?", in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 March 1992, p.2. Segodnia, (Today) 16 October 1993, p.5. Segodnia, 16 October 1993, p.2. Izvestia, 2 October 1993, p.3. Moskovskie Novosty, No 38, 19 September 1993, p.7A. Nezavicimaya Gazeta, 26 Novenber 1993, p. 3. Segodnia, 27 November 1993, p.4. Segodnia, 7 December 1993, p.2. NATO Partnership for Peace, Brussels 10th January 1994, p.1. See Alexander Konovalov, Sergei Oznobischev, "Partnership for Peace": the Road Russia Has to Choose", Segodnia 26 March 1994, p.10. Segodnia, 18 March 1994, p.1.