Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Baltic States: Cooperation on Security and Integration into the European Security System Talavs Jundzis [Back to Index] Part III. Military policies of the Baltic States Chapter 1. Defense strategies of the Baltic States The Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are to be ranked in the small state category. The number of inhabitants in Estonia is 1.5 million, Latvia - 2.6 million, Lithuania - 3.7 million.(66) Having regained their sovereignty by democratic means and peaceful methods, these three relatively small states accepted the responsibility for also defending this sovereignty; in their defense arsenals, military means also have assigned roles. The Baltic states can not at present proudly display concrete and clearly formulated defence strategies, which would prescribe the optimal ways to use the set of political, economic, military, social and judicial means to organize state sovereignty, defence of people and territory. This can be explained primarily by the fact that the security of states in this region continues to be influenced by a very broad spectrum of internal and external risk factors which are also constantly changing. Besides, during the years of occupation the Balts were not meant to acquire strategic planning experience, which similarly to the pre-war period, makes defence strategy development more difficult. Likewise it should kept in mind that it is still unclear as to when and if the Baltic states will be integrated in European security structures, including NATO, as well as how real and close will be their own political and military integration. These and other issues have led to the situation where defence strategy has become an unending object of discussions, disputes and political intrigues. Up to now the Baltic states, with the exception of Latvia, have not been able to develop and coordinate their national security and defence concepts to the point of being accepted by their parliaments or governments.(67) Since regaining independence, neither Lithuania nor Estonia has passed any laws on national defence which would regulate national defence goals, systems and functions.(68) However it is well known that the majority of Baltic politicians and military specialists hold similar views on solving the primary national defence issues, even though some differences have appeared. Defence of small states and their ability to repulse numerically large and well armed invaders are not easily solvable problems. In the case of the Baltic states these problems are further complicated by their internal situations and comparatively large segments of their populations which are unwilling to accept Baltic independence. The difficult economic, social, and political situation in the Baltic States, similarly to other post-socialist states, creates a broad range of risk factors for internal security. Furthermore, the instability in neighboring states, poor border control, inadequate suppression of organized crime and other reasons add to these internal factors a whole list of external risk factors (see Appendix 1).(69) Regardless of their threatened positions, the Baltic states are commited to defend themselves military, to exact politically unbearable losses on any invaders. Their defence strategy is primarily based on numerically small defence forces and units of volunteers as territorial reserves. It is conceived that an aggressor will be met by mobile, well trained and well armed units. If required the infantry units will be supplemented by a mobilized reserve whose manning is provided for by the compulsory service system and militarized volunteer units. In the case of the aggressor's numerical advantage the goal of the resistance is to last until the arrival of international assistance or to provide time so that other countries and the international community can react to the events. If occupation occurs, it is conceived to engage in guerrilla warfare and civilian non-military resistance; to deprive the aggressor of an unlawful governing mechanism and prevent it from really controlling the country. Even though a portion of the inhabitants of the Baltic states are very skeptically disposed toward the possibility of military defence, however the events in Chechnya clearly show that a small nation's resistance to a large country's aggression is not only possible, but may be of relatively long duration. Let us remember, that it took the Russian army almost two month just to take Groznyy. Furthermore, we must bear in mind, that both in population and territory any of the Baltic states is considerably larger than Chechnya. Likewise, the ethnic makeup of Chechnya also is not homogeneous. Even though large area of Chechnya is mountainous, this did not play a significant role during the fighting. Not only the analysis of the war in Chechnya, but also in the many hot spots of the world, can be instructive and useful for Baltic defence strategy planners. In the Baltic situation, attention must be given not only to possible external aggression, but also to large scale staged riots where weapons may be used. People who have not reconciled themselves with Baltic independence may engage in armed activities at opportune times. It is no secret that within this group are a large number of former USSR military and special services personnel, whose corresponding skills are sufficiently high. Within this context the Baltics also have to contend with the potential influx of volunteers from Russia and other former USSR republics who will strive to actively support those desiring to re-establish the empire. It is necessary to do everything by political means, so that such a situation does not occur, yet be prepared to use military force. In history and in the present are many examples of small states creating substantial military potential. It may be that someday the Baltic states may resemble Israel or Singapore in military power, however under today's conditions the most important thing to do is to create even an elementary defence system and to strengthen the conviction that armed resistance will be shown regardless of the aggressor's military might. This strategy could keep a potential aggressor from using military force, because a military victory still could mean political defeat for the aggressor. This is supported by Baltic history both during the January 1991 crisis period and the pre-war period. Historians are unanimous in that in the 20's the Baltic states would not have retained their independence more than a few month, if they did not have their own, even relatively small armies. Taking into account the fact that the Baltic states, at least in the next few years, will be unable to develop somewhat strong national armed forces, then it would be advisable for them to carefully consider including other non-military and civilian components in their defence systems. Here the most appropriate model may be the well known "total defence" of Scandinavian countries; where besides the military component all possible spheres and civilians are involved in national defence. First of all, the whole economic system is prepared to function optimally under emergency conditions or wartime. Secondly, strict regulations govern the responsibilities of local governments, health care institutions, transportation enterprises, as well as the press, radio and television during wartime conditions. Thirdly, the people are psychologically and practically prepared for non-military resistance and possible activities during wartime or under occupation. (70) The "total defence" model is receiving some attention in the Baltics, yet neither conceptually nor practically has its implementation gained any confirmation in any of the countries. Estonia has come the closest in its "National defence postulates" developed by the Defence Ministry, which emphasizes that Republic of Estonia's security policy must be based on total defence principles.(71) Latvia's defence concept chiefly stresses only military defence means, even though the November 24, 1994 law "On national defence" asserts that Latvia's defence is the totality of political, economic, military, social and judicial activities and systems.(72) For the time being and for several reasons the "total defence" model is not sufficiently popular in the Baltic states. Firstly, the public and many politicians are not well enough informed about it and are unable to understand how the various civilian institutions and the population will resist a potential attack.(73) Secondly, after fifty years of Soviet occupation a large part of the population has developed prejudices against any kind of defence issues as well as deeply ingrained conviction that resisting a large army is senseless. Getting the public in the Baltics involved in resolving defence issues is additionally burdened by the dissatisfaction people feel about the difficult economic conditions and heavy social problems. Thirdly, military specialists feel that involving civilians and civil authorities on a large scale may unacceptably increase the number of casualties, therefore the applicability of total defence is rather limited. This viewpoint is still debatable, because timely preparadness of civil authorities and civilians may also reduce possible casualties.