Individual NATO Research Fellowships (1994-1996)

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Definition, Establishment and Enforcement of New Rules of the Political Game in the Process of Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe Artur Gruszczak (Poland) [Back to Index] Rules of the Political Game in the Process of Democratic Consolidation: Sources, Types and Dimensions Leading transitologists underline that democratic transitions are over when "abnormality" is no longer the central feature of politics, that is, when actors agree on and obey a set of more or less explicit rules defining the main variables of the political game. These variables include channels of gaining access to governing roles, the means employed legitimately in conflict situations, the decision-making procedures and the criteria of exclusion from the game. "Normality becomes a major characteristic of political life when those active in politics come to expect each other to play according to the rules - and the ensemble of these rules is what we mean by a regime" (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 65). In the course of democratization, and particularly at the stage of consolidation of democracy, growing need for a clear, visible, rational action in politics becomes one of the most specific traits. The rationalization of politics requires a good deal of consensus and cooperation. Gross points out the necessity to compromise over a wide range of issues concerning a new political game in the following words: "When political authority and power flow from mutually agreed upon rules concerning proper procedures, they must be laid bare, scrutinized and made transparent especially at the time of foundation" (Gross, 1994, pp. 180-81). In the case of ECE, the social rationalization does not consist exclusively in the establishment of democratic rules of the game. A real task is the introduction of modern market exchange and the development of political institutions that would regulate effectively the market in a democratic manner (Guenov, 1991, p. 352). This is so important for new democratic regimes because the rules of the game in capitalism are developed to grant individuals a range of freedom to pursue their own ends, make their own decisions, and bear the consequences of those decisions (Pejovich, 1993, p. 72). Transitions from communist rule initiated at the end of the 1980's were inserted into the logic of great transformation. In most general terms, political change constituted a part of the epochal systemic transformation referring to comprehensive, long-term, mega-scale developments whose main objective was a progressive passage from one civilizational paradigm to another 6 and meant at the same time a radical, fundamental change of the rules of the game. The communist regimes in East-Central Europe effectively lost the ability to reproduce the socio-political order, revaluate cultural bases (including symbolic resources), renovate and modernize the economic structures and, finally, play the political game in the established normative and institutional framework. Transition to liberal democratic rule and neoliberal transformation of the socio-economic domain were seen as the only alternative solutions to the overwhelming crisis which toppled down the old regimes. The new model of the political game was based on three main premises: Transition to liberal democracy and consolidation of democratic regime will resolve political conflicts and crises and set in strong prerequisites for stability and order. Neoliberal economic adjustment programes will extricate these economies from chronic crisis, overcome structural backwardness and underdevelopment, creating thereby bases for a continuous growth, development and modernization. A successful political stabilization along with economic adjustment should contribute critically to changes in the social structure, particularly to the formation of the middle class as an intermediary agent within the conflictive state-society relationship and as a guarantee for socio-political stability. From the very beginning of the transitions in ECE, the fundamental question to be solved was the working out of new rules of the game. That issue was referring not only to the essence, scope and range, but also to the validity terms, number and origins of the players as well as, for the first time, social response to the new rules. An intricate and complex nature of the process of establishing and enforcing new rules was interlocked with the basic features of democratic transition and was full of uncertainty, contingency, contradictions and dilemmas. The absence of a stable set of political rules, both formal and informal, opens the door for political disequilibrium. A practical consequence of that disequilibrium is instability which in turn creates uncertainty that discourages many important types of social and political activities (Riker & Weimer, 1993, p. 81). The political disequilibrium was additionally deepened by the Communists' strategy of survival. The communist ruling class was thrown into disarray, yet the internal mechanisms and feedbacks of the structural network contributed greatly to the securing of a relative stability of the system. Moreover, the strategy for political change was deliberately designed and established in a consensual way, with a decisive role of the communist leadership, and in the case of Poland and Hungary took more or less explicitly the form of political pacts. Analyzing the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in the case of East-Central Europe, we must bear in mind Bobbio's maxim: "There is an inextricable link which connects the rules of the game to the players and their moves. More specifically, what a game actually consists of is a set of rules which establish who the players are and how they are to play, with the result that once a system of rules is formulated for the game this also lays down who can be the players and the moves they are allowed" (Bobbio, 1987, p. 65). At the stage of consolidation, actors who were playing a guiding part in the transitory phase redefine and stabilize their roles in the political arena. Institutions involved in rule making seek to define limits of its competence and not exceed their powers. According to the theory as well as to the practice of established democratic regimes, the focus is shifting to civil society as the main subject of democratic game and principal source of processed rules. In the changing relationship between the state and civil society, the role of political society is being transformed as well. Last but not least, a great variety of informal groups, taking advantage of kinship, contribute, sometimes critically, to the establishment and enforcement of numerous rules of the political game. Therefore, one can distinguish three dimensions, accompanied by three kinds of structural relationship as well as three general types of the rules of the game, with reference to the position of rules on the axis "formality-informality". The first dimension concerns the relationship between the state and political society. This involves above all institutions and public agencies called upon to establish and maintain socio-political order, mostly by formal and legal means. A complex interplay of interests, authoritative decisions and competing strategies originating in the institutions of political society and the state apparatus, underlie rules of the game transmitted onto the entire political community. This kind of rules may be called proclaimed rules. They emerge by force of decisions taken by authoritative bodies representing state authorities and political society. They are not necessarily specified as formal statements, parliamentary laws or political declarations. Rather, they are unwritten principles legible for everybody and set as a background for political decisions. The second dimension refers to the sphere of civil society and the interactions through which it is linked to political society, economic realm as well as informal associations. This dimension is virtually constitutive for democratic polity. This fact is emphasized by Cohen and Arato (1992, p. 23) in the following words: "the rights to communication, assembly, and association, among others, constitute the public and associational spheres of civil society as spheres of positive freedom within which agents can collectively debate issues of common concern, act in concert, assert new rights, and exercise influence on political (and potentially economic) society". Civil society can be seen as one part of the twofold core of democracy. It represents the "corrective mechanism", whereas the rule of law as an institutionalized system of checks and balances including a strong and independent judiciary could be regarded as the "stabilizing mechanism". Behind these mechanisms there is a set of political-cultural habits developed into a complex and steady intellectual and organizational infrastructure for the rules of the game (Volten 1990, p. 65). Civil society, according to the liberal theory and the political practice in the consolidated democracies, generates the whole range of rules of the game and can exert influence over other players in the democratic game, mostly the institutions of political society as well as state agencies. In some cases, civil society can modify, change or eliminate rules introduced by other actors. Civil society formulates constitutive rules. This type of rules deals with constitution sensu largo (in the already-mentioned approaches of Rey and Coleman), embodying thereby consensually elaborated regulations which are endowed with popular legitimacy and as such form a strong basis of state power and structures of authority. As long as civil society is defunct, the rules of the game are tenuous and lacking in direction. Laws can be written, but without institution-building through civil society, the legal system either remains abstract or turns into a repressive device (Volten 1992, p. 11). Beside the formalized and institutionalized spheres of political activity, there exists a dense network of groups, organizations and associations set up to represent and satisfy various interests. They were formed in protest, or as an alternative, against the formal, established channels, mechanisms and means of interest representation and realization that for many social groups did not perform satisfactorily or fulfilled the original objectives only partially. In the context of regime transition, they were identified with old interests and goals transferred from the authoritarian setting and adopted to the new democratic framework. Therefore, they were characterized by a considerable degree of continuity, notwithstanding modifications and conversion necessary to adjust to the new normative and institutional requirements. These may be called processed rules. Hence, processed rules are specific patterns of behaviour in politics, inherited from the old system, rooted in the social consciousness as customs and habits, and adopted to the new normative and institutional framework. In the ECE democratic transitions, numerous processed rules were transferred to the new democratic framework as a legacy of the old regime, as part of the strategy of recomposition of the former dominant communist class and conversion of its power. The recomposition consisted in the reorganization of the communist leadership and membership base and reformulation or establishment of new alliances with organizations and movements of civil and political societies. Power conversion meant the relocation of vital interests from political arena to the economy. Thanks to the evolutionary path of transition to democracy, the communist elite was allowed to safeguard its strategic resources and interests as well as pursue activities aiming to attain the primary objective: return to state power. In exchange of accepting democratic norms, procedures and institutions, it obtained guarantees that its vital interests and security would be respected. These dimensions of the political game find different institutional and cultural contexts in the ECE transformation. In general, there are three categories of approach to functional interactions between the three spheres of polity. The first one gives emphasis to state institutions as a source of basic rules and a guarantee of their stability. The second one points out the role of civil and political society in creating, enforcing and legitimizing rules of the game and procedures of their introduction. The third approach focuses on informal mechanisms and processes which make up the essence of politics, beyond the formal structure of political system. One should be aware of the fact that the political transformations in ECE have a predominantly "downward" character. The central role of the state in the transition processes results both from the political traditions of ECE (Schöpflin, 1990, p. 62) and from the scope and course of change as well as the kind of social response to the transformation. In ECE at the beginning of democratic transitions civil society was still in its infancy while the state could no longer perform well its extended functions. Reforms and changes had to be introduced form above since the society was unable or unwilling to respond adequately to the challenges issued by the transformation (Staniszkis, 1991, pp. 216-18). Public relations and socio-techniques look to be more important than the established structural framework. The elites have to shape and actively influence mass behaviour and the big obstacle is that the masses are neither open for the government strategy nor ready to formulate and give their own response to the challenges of the transformation in the form of a long-range political strategy which could exert a strong impact on the government strategies and policies. The state and government are considered as primary sources of concentrated benefits and their regulatory role in numerous public domains is an object of desire from different groups. Interest groups as well as their representatives in the parliament and in the very government insist on taking effective measures in order to achieve their goals. Pressures upon the government come from different, often contradictory, sources and the policy space within which government is acting becomes increasingly crowded. The most critical tensions emerge in the field of interest representation as a result of strong feedback between societal pressure on the government and an insatisfactory response on the part of the state apparatus. Democratization opened new channels and possibilities for articulation and representation of certain type of aspirations, expectations and demands, regarding both political liberties as well as economic interests. Post-communist governments were put in charge of securing fundamental rights and liberties as well as constructing institutional and normative bases for a new regime. Most of all, the new governments intended to put into effect radical reforms under the banner of democratization and economic stabilization. Subsequently, certain social groups began to present explicitly their particular interests which were mutually more and more conflictive and contradictory. The state apparatus is unable to cope with all of those demands what leads straightforward to overload and delegitimation. Perhaps the crux of this matter lies in the political tradition of Eastern Europe and the burden of the communist past. In the Soviet system imposed on ECE after World War II, the Party-State was legally above law and its efficacy was reduced to the ability to keep in power thanks to the repressive police and secret service apparatus. The rule of law gradually introduced in the course of liberalization required redefinition of the state role in the political system and the structural reconfiguration of its institutions. The state broke up in disarray and real power was intended to be ceded to the people yet the vast space having been occupied by the communist state for such a long time turned out too large to be filled with society-born rules and institutions. In ECE civil society was identified with the opposition to the regime and the form of protest against distorted power relationships, public policies, political repression and unjust judicial apparatus. It encompassed more or less coordinated collective actions directed against the state (and the ruling political class) in defense of interests of selected social groups or the whole of the society (identified thereby with the nation or the people). The structures of civil society emerged as the opposition to formal institutional network imposed by the communist authorities. However, they were not transformed into autonomous institutions on the level of political society. Tamás explains this by force of logic: "Institutions in a civil society are shapeless congeries of decisions between mutually consenting private persons; in other words, they are not institutions" (Tamás, 1994, p. 217). Let alone the radicalism of this point of view, it stresses a very important trait of civil society: it is conceived as a regulative idea, with respect to the state as well as to other obligatory domains. This is particularly important with regard to the dynamics of political change in ECE since civil society has not presented a wide heterogeneity and political society was filled mostly with political movements that oriented their appeal even directly to the masses (like Solidarity or Civic Forum). Reasons of the state were dealt with respect combined with a sort of indulgence, for the communist state was supposed to erode and decay. Only after the demise of communist rule, the area of the structural relationships between the state and society became to be settled by numerous associations, organizations and the whole range of social interactions on the level of civil society as well as political parties and other organizations which aimed to have an influence or direct access to the state power. An interesting diagnosis of these processes is proposed by Csepeli and Örkény. They argue that under communist rule the ECE societies were frozen at a pre-conventional stage, sharing basic characteristics of the model mass society (see Kornhauser, 1959) and making up the politically anonymus "silent majority ". From the beginning of transitions to democracy, the societies have fragmented into three big segments belonging in the three basic levels of political consciousness: pre-conventional, conventional (stable political behaviour, conformism regarding state policies, respect for the established system of the rules of the political game) and post-conventional (flexibility, capacity for political and ideological innovation and adaptation, reproduction of the functional rules of the game). Both authors claim that in ECE a serious problem is the dominance of pre-conventional political behaviour that distorts the institutions and structures of democracy and obstructs its consolidation. Post-conventional behaviour is the domain of narrow groups of intellectuals and the middle class which altogether find themselves in minority (Csepeli and Örkény, 1992, pp. 19-20). The societies of ECE countries constitute a complex mix of different national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious groups. This diversity requires from the government a peculiar sensitivity with respect to the rights and privileges of every single autonomous societal segment. Moderation and restraint in government are primary and necessary conditions of stabilization and consolidation of democratic polity. The use of power cannot be seen with fear and felt as threatening principles of identity of every single autonomous group. This concerns in a special way ethnic-state relationships in Slovakia, on the one hand, and in Poland as well as Hungary, on the other. In Slovakia, unlike Poland or Hungary, rule-establishment and rule-enforcement became subject to the state-building process and have had harsh effects on ethnic minorities, Hungarians above all (Fisher, 1995). In Poland, Solidarity governments put a special, sometimes exaggerated, emphasis on nationality questions from the legal as well as political standpoint. As a result, minority groups enjoy a wide range of rights and liberties what does not preclude conflicts, mostly on religious grounds. A specific feature of East European transitions has been an important, sometimes predominant, role of leaders and political personalities (see Appendix 2, table 2). This feature stemmed from the traditional form of political society composed of political parties tending to be personal coteries united by loyalty to an individual rather than a political program or ideology (Schöpflin, 1990, p. 72). Discredit for communist parties and other institutionalized forms of political activity as well as weak confidence in new parties gave an opportunity to display political skills by opposition leaders. Personalization of politics gave leaders and activists wide prerogatives regarding the definition and establishment of new rules of the game (Rose and Mishler, 1994, p. 161). Some of them, like Mazowiecki and Walesa in Poland; Havel and Klaus in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic; Pozsgay and Antáll in Hungary; Kovácz and Meciar in Slovakia, left their impress on the constitutive rules of the game in the transition and consolidation period. One type of political leadership refers to an idealistic, faithful, yet consensual and non-orthodox style of Havel, Kovácz and Mazowiecki. The ideals of democracy underlied their activities and faith in reason, responsibility and accountability of citizens and political actors results in firm and unshaken belief in the rule of law, inviolability of the basic rules of the political game, universality of the principles of politics and the moral supremacy of the common good. A specific attitude, characteristic of this type of leadership, is related to Tadeusz Mazowiecki's philosophy of governance. The famous "thick line" policy regarding the communist past was motivated not only by the political pacts concluded between Solidarity and the PUWP, but first and foremost by a humanistic stance with respect to the big dilemma of social reconciliation and indiscriminate participation of all societal segments in the would-be polyarchy. Politically naive and short-sighted, as critics said, Mazowiecki's inclusionary approach facilitated the definition and establishment of new rules of the game but the big paradox of his period in government was that these were predominantly informal, conventional and transitory rules while the formal juridical dimension of the game was of a rather secondary importance. The other type of leadership is illustrated by a complicated, controversial, sometimes bombastic and rude political performance of such statesmen like Lech Walesa or Vladimír Meciar. A characteristic trait of their political style is an unhindered inclination to the changing of rules of the game. Both politicians respond to Lloyd Etheredge's characteristics of a "hardball practitioner". Both conceive of politics as a neverending game where what does matter are the players who due to their inborn skills, shrewdness and firmness can produce desired outcomes according to the rule "winner takes all". Walesa's insertion into a state-level "conventional" political game carried many features of populist takeover. Solidarity chairman did not hesitate to forcefully bend the rules if necessary. As a result, legitimacy of state institutions already appropriated by society was weakened (Gross, 1994, p. 175). Walesa's political campaigns went down to posterity as startling revulsions in his strategy carried out under catchy slogans like "war at the top" (the split in Solidarity) or "strengthening the left leg" (political protection of the post-communist left). As president, Walesa relatively seldom took advantage of his constitutional prerogatives, regarding particularly the legislative initiative. He repeatedly emphasised, however, that "the law is bad" and it must be changed (Reykowski, 1995). Meciar's trimming brought about varied effects, really crucial for political and social developments in Slovakia, before and after independence. His controversial leadership of the Public Against Violence, dubious activity in the Interior Ministry, turnabouts during the negotiations over the status of Slovakia, ambiguous policies of his succeeding governments, especially in foreign affairs, permanent conflicts with the main institutions of the political system, populist rhetoric and nationalist orientation, strengthened by political alliances of his party, draw a gloomy picture of an ambitious, unpredictable, Machiavellican leader, arbitrarily imposing certain rules of the game (Zitny, 1992, p. 68; Butorova, 1992, pp. 64-65; Janasovsky, 1992, pp. 78-79). Political game remains a mere scheme until its main participants begin acting and behaving in accordance with their interests and goals. The mechanisms of social and political interactions are the basic substance of rules of the game. Institutionalization of personal and group interactions as well as dominant patterns of behaviour is conducive to the establishment of a formalized and relatively cohesive system of norms and rules. The political crafting of new democracies means preparing favourable conditions for a careful introduction and next enforcement of new rules of the political game.