Individual NATO Research Fellowships (1994-1996)

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Definition, Establishment and Enforcement of New Rules of the Political Game in the Process of Democratic Consolidation in East-Central Europe Artur Gruszczak (Poland) [Back to Index] Rules of the Game: A Framework for Analysis Basically, in the theoretical framework of systems analysis (Easton, 1979), rules constitute one of the fundamental component areas of every political system, along with structures, norms, values, resources, institutions and procedures. These elements establish a structural framework for the system functioning, regulate the system performance, introduce an internal logic which attenuates dysfunctional and split-up tendencies displayed by particular segments, as well as determine and control the internal dynamics of the system. These components of the political system are attached to and bound up with three basic political objects: the authorities, regime and political community (Easton, 1979, p. 172). Rules, as well as norms, are regarded as regulatory arrangements intended to bring about a given type of behaviour. For that end, they involve sanctions in case of improper or unexpected response on the part of the object of norm application. Usually, they are based on a specific costs-benefits calculation inherent to any rational action. Norms, in general terms, set the way in which members of a system are expected to behave (Easton, 1979, p. 200). They specify, therefore, what actions are regarded as proper and correct, or improper and incorrect (Coleman, 1990, p. 242; Kratochvil, 1989, p. 26). Hence, they determine social behaviour in such a way that if anyone acts in accordance with them, he or she expects to be better off than if no norm whatsoever existed or were disregarded. According to Ordeshook (1993, p. 231), "norms arise and are sustained, because they occassion stable expectations about the behavior of others and thereby efficiently coordinate social activity". Norms are enforced by sanctions, which are either rewards for the type of behaviour regarded as correct or punishments for unexpected or regarded as incorrect forms of behaviour. Like norms, rules can be formal or customary. If rules acquire the status of law, they are embodied in formal documents such as written constitutions, legal codes or judicial acts. However, no system can perform well without effectively operating customary rules which constitute the matrix within which the legal rules themselves are able to operate (Easton, 1979, p. 202). The point is that in the system's normative dimension, customary, informal rules must underlie formal/legal normative framework as complementary proscriptive and prescriptive arrangements performing at the same time a critical function of stabilizing and equilibrating the entire system. In Easton's words, customary rules form a vital understructure for every system. If they were to be eroded, this could easily bring the whole formal, legal structure toppling down (Easton, 1979, pp. 201-02). Giddens, in accordance with his structuration theory, conceives of rules as inherent components of the structure. His approach therefore is different from the majority of theoretical perspectives common for sociological theory. Here are the main points of his argumentation: First and foremost, rules cannot be conceptualized apart from resources, seen as "structured properties of social systems, drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in the course of interaction" (Giddens, 1984, p. 15). Rules cannot be reduced to formalized prescriptions or rules of the game. They imply "methodological procedures" of social interactions and as such relate to the sanctioning of modes of political conduct. One of the main propositions of structuration theory is that rules, as well as resources, are at the same time both ends and means of system reproduction processes. Thus, rules can be regarded as "techniques or generizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices" (Giddens, 1984, p. 21). Formal, legal or explicit rules are not rules as such but rather codified interpretations of rules. Their constituency is subject to a given social situation determined by various factors of internal and external origins (1). Rules, as we could notice, are often thought of in connection with games. In general terms, rules of the game are widespread normative beliefs which exist in the real world of politics (Matthews, 1968, p. 571). What distinguishes this concept from the general meaning of norms and rules is that it is rarely used with respect to formal or written rules - such as constitution, code, statut, court decision - but usually refers to informal or unwritten rules, attitudes, forms of behaviour, expectations, customs and habits. That is why, as Matthews points out, one must seek to determine the content and consequences of the rules of the game for politics through empirical observation, rather than deriving them deductively from an abstract model of a generalized game (Ibid.) The importance of the rules of the game for the system (as a functioning structure) is highlighted in the functionalist perspective. One of the essential features of this perspective is that rules of the game emerge as a result of political interactions characterized by conflict and cooperation, bargain and agreement, and thus possess a high grade of social and political legitimacy. A social aspect of legitimation refers to models and mechanisms of interest representation. Rules of the game provide a specific glue linking sources of demands and expectations to their addressees or potential recipients as well as facilitate the creation or choice of a most appropriate, in relative terms, channel of interest representation. The functional feature of the rules of the game may be illustrated by the way how the intrinsic conflict between the workers and employers in the capitalist economy was resolved through establishing firm and clear rules of the game which were accepted and observed by accountable sides and adjusted to the institutional (trade unions, professional organizations, political parties) as well as systemic (democratic, corporatist) settings. Political legitimacy acquired by the rules of the game usually stems from the dynamics of political actions that are obstructed, restrained or delayed due to the static nature of formal rules, which in some cases display a considerable degree of inflexibility, anachronism and arbitrariness. Actors who enter into numerous interactions in pursuance of their interests and goals, decide to work out, establish and, in case of positive effects, reinforce some regulatory arrangements which meet the expectations of major political forces. Broad consensus is a prerequisite, though in no case the condition, of the establishment and consolidation of a given set of rules of the game. From the functionalist perspective, rules of the game perform a complementary role in relation to formal, constitutional, normative framework. They fill momentary or temporary shortcomings or defficiencies, regulating the overall performance of the system and contributing to its self-reproduction. That process requires that the rules of the game be clear, unambiguous and accountable. The functioning of the entire social mechanism is often deficient since the democratic game results problematic when the rules are not clearly defined, widely accepted and correctly applied (Guenov, 1991, p. 353). From the other point of view, shared by students of political crises or breakdowns, the spontaneously emerging rules of the game do not adjust to the existing normative and institutional structure, do not accommodate to the ontological bases of the entire system, but generate a high dynamics of constitutional (sensu largo) changes, eroding or shattering some normative structures, changing or modifying the systemic context of the institutions and, in the most radical scenario, bursting large segments of the political system, what can lead to its collapse. This was the case of communist regimes wherein strict, ideologically motivated rules of the game were subverted by informal rules, habits and practices which gradually replaced the official normative setting regarding the structures of state authority, public administration, state-society relationship and societal organization (Tarkowski, 1994). In the functionalist perspective, one of the key issues is the role of consensus and the way how it affects the political system. Sartori (1987, pp. 90-91) adopts the concept of consensus to the Eastonian systems theory and transforms its objects, corresponding to the major sub-systems at the same time (values, rules of the game and governmental policies) into three levels of consensus: the community level, regime level and policy level. On the second level (procedural consensus), rules of the game are established. A paramount rule (or a set of rules) is the rule that determines ways and means conflicts are to be resolved. If a political society does not share conflict-solving rules, it will conflict over each contradictory issue. Sartori suggests that in the process of democratic consolidation, procedural consensus, and specifically consensus on the majority conflict-solving rule, is the sine qua non condition. The issue of consensus as a prerequisite to the formation and establishment of the rules of the game involves yet another problem, described by Linz (1978, pp. 27-34) as disloyalty and semi-loyalty. It refers to a certain type of political behaviour due to which some consensually established rules of the game are rejected for ideological, nationalist or religious reasons (disloyalty) as well as to a situation when political actors, being authors and makers of a given set of rules and procedures, seek to reformulate or change them, usually via secret negotiations (semi-loyalty). Linz points out that "in a political system characterized by limited consensus, deep cleavages, and suspicions between leading participants, semiloyalty is easily equated with disloyalty by some of the participants" (Linz, 1978, p. 28). From the comments of both Sartori and Linz, one can draw a conclusion that the dilemma of consensus-making and its implications for the interplay of political forces, including the role of disloyal and semi-loyal oppositions, concerns the question of establishment and reinforcement in a functional context of certain rules of the game, yet it does not exclude a good portion of continuity on the regime level. Some rules are modified or changed, yet the structure is maintained in the state of a relative equilibrium. New rules emerge instead of those that loose their consensual basis, and next are replaced by others when do not come up to expectations. The functional aspect of the rules of the game requires accountability of actors who decide to accept those rules and comply with the outcomes of their practical application. An interesting look into the question of compliance with the constitutive rules is presented by Juan Carlos Rey. Basic rules of the game, which are at the heart of every constitution, should be considered as valid and obligatory by the main actors or social groups in the manner that any sanction applied against those who violate political or social order should be felt by them as just and proper. Rey sees the constitution as a totality of basic rules of the game, both formal and customary, which essentially concern political behaviour (Rey, 1990, p. 352). He points out that the constitutional dilemma, which refers to the ways and means of establishing and enforcing widely accepted rules of the political game, also addresses the issue of the establishment and maintenance of a stable and persistent political order. He observes, therefore, that not every type of political order is accompanied by a genuine constitution, even if there exists a written one. In certain cases, the lack of consensus among main political actors or groups as to the basic rules of the political game results in the failure of establishing a genuine constitution (Rey, 1990, p. 357). Such a standpoint is shared by Coleman who writes that the effective constitution is far broader than the written document and includes the unwritten norms and rules, as well as the written ones (Coleman, 1990, p. 327) (2). If we perceive norms and rules as determinants of social and political action, for they provide both incentives and sanctions, constitution, from Ordeshook's viewpoint, is a coordination mechanism based on a supra norm seeking to coordinate action in politics (Ordeshook, 1993, p. 231). Constitution must establish a set of stable and self-generating expectations about people's actions in such a way that no member of a community has an incentive and ability to defect to some other mechanisms (Ordeshook, 1993, pp. 204, 206). Another issue touched on by Rey (as well as by Easton), that of stability function of norms and rules, corresponds with Pejovich's perception of the rules of the game as calculatory arrangements reflecting an actor's evaluation of costs and benefits. According to him, rules yield a flow of benefits: the predictability of other actor's behaviour. Costs refer to the inability to engage in some specific activities. Benefits derived from a set of rules depend on their stability. Frequent changes in the rules of the games, in Pejovich's words, "reduce the time horizon over which individuals make their decisions" (Pejovich, 1993, p. 69). A major objective of the rules of the game is "to protect interactions among individuals by alleviating risks and uncertainties associated with those problems" (Pejovich, 1993, p. 70). Rules of the game constitute one of the components of the regime seen on its turn as one of the objects of the political system. As we already mentioned, Easton's typology - most influential in the modern political systems theory - distinguishes three basic political objects: the authorities, regime and political community. Regime is a set of constraints on political interactions that are generally accepted by the authorities and the political community alike and that give prescritpions with regard to goals, practices and attitudes in the system (Easton, 1979, p. 192). The regime encompasses general and particular indications which regulate to a bigger or lesser degree the relationships within both the authorities and the political community as well as between each other. As Easton points out, "The regime refers to the general matrix of regularized expectations within the limits of which political actions are usually considered authoritative, regardless of how or where these expectations may be expressed" (Easton, 1979, pp. 193-94). Regime's components are three-fold. Firstly, there are political values and principles, incorporated into ideologies and doctrines, which provide patterns of behaviour and shape general attitudes towards the purposes for which the resources of the system may be committed. Secondly, there are norms and rules which specify the way in which members of the system are expected to behave in politics. Lastly, there are structures of authority which regulate the distribution of organization and power with regard to the authoritative decision-making and decision-enforcement. Through the designation of formal and customary patterns, they establish and determine the relationships through which authority and power are distributed and exercised. A slightly different meaning of the rules of the game is proposed on the basis of the definition of political regime formulated by O'Donnell and Schmitter. By regime, they mean "the ensemble of patterns, explicit or not, that determines the forms and channels of access to principal governmental positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted and excluded from such access, and the resources or strategies that they can use to gain access" (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, p. 73). Rules of the game may be perceived as mostly those patterns which are not explicitly formulated and introduced into political structures, but nevertheless constitute a primary and sometimes the only basis of the regime's internal regulative mechanisms. Rules, as the inherent element of structure, in the most important aspect of structuration theory, are recursively involved in institutions (3). Although some authors identify political institutions with procedures and rules of the game (e.g. Shepsle, 1989), institutions depend on the meaning that is accorded to them by the actors. In a nutshell, "institutions embody normative intuitions and principles of those who live in or under the institution in question" (Offe, 1994, p. 2). Jon Elster simply and briefly defines institution as "a rule-enforcing mechanism" (Elster, 1989, p. 147). Since we agree that rules are a specific type of norms involving external, formal sanctions, it seems obvious that there have to be mechanisms and procedures of the enforcement of the sanctions. Such mechanisms consequently ought to be formalized, operationalized, incorporated into a certain type of organization. They should also design a specific instrumentation along with procedures and modes of its application. Institution implies action whose aim is to engender a certain type of behaviour, convert it into socially generalized patterns which are characterized by stability and recurrence. Institutions therefore contribute greatly to the rationalization of the political game as well as attitudes and forms of behaviour revealed by the participants (Guenov, 1991). Such understanding is present at the conceptual propositions launched by Huntington (1968, p. 12) as well as Luhmann (1965, p. 13) and Berger (4). The latter, defining institutions as a distinctive complex of social actions, points out that the main role of the institutions is to provide procedures through which "human conduct is patterned, compelled to go, in grooves deemed desirable by society" (Berger, 1963, p. 87). There is a widely-shared consensus among scholars as to the fact that in a society of any greater complexity or heterogeneity, structures of power and authority as well as political regime and community cannot exist without creating political institutions. Institutions are responsible for the maintenance of a certain kind of normative order which relies upon conditional procedures of rule-enforcement and imposition of attitudes of compliance and accountability as well as feelings of obligation on individuals and groups. In other words, institutions establish normative and cognitive standards, as to what preferences and objectives can be expected to meet with approval (Offe, 1994, p. 2). Not only they generate and stimulate support and observance of norms and rules of the game on the part of social actors, but also reaffirm and legitimize the existing power relationships. Legitimacy in this perspective can be seen as collective recognition of, and orientation to, institutionalized and binding rules of the game (Stryker, 1994, p. 858). Institution, as an action-stimulating agency, operates through distinctive procedures that are responsible for the proper mode and method of rule-enforcement and the acomplishment of the stated goals, what in a consequence refers to the engendering of an expected type of behaviour. Effectiveness - attaining given goals - becomes part of the institutionalized rule set (Stryker, 1994, p. 860). The employment of a certain type of procedure depends largely on the stated objective, internal determinants and external environment, the structural context of action as well as the type and properties of available instruments. Every procedure, that reflects the operational aspect of the institution, implies the specification of costs and benefits and in this respect it refers to calculatory arrangements. Finally, pondering over the meaning and substance of the concept of rules of the political game, one has to come one step down the levels of system analysis and focus on certain elements of social theory, especially those referring to rational choice, collective action, social capital, trust and accountability. Rule enforcement cannot exclusively rely on sanctions applied by given institutions. It is much more efficient when resting on socially embedded norms entwined with basic elements of social capital like rationality, reciprocity, responsibility and sense of obligation (Putnam, 1995, chap. 6). All the versions of the now-in-vogue new institutionalism stress the importance of norms of reciprocity and the networks of collective action within civil society (e.g. Ostrom, 1990). Civil society and civic culture do play a critical role in the making of politics in modern stable democracies. However, regimes--which are the main objects of the present analysis--as sets of procedures and rules, with norms and values behind them, and particularly non-consolidated or would-be democratic regimes, are strongly determined by social context, political tradition and continuity regarding patterns of governance or structures of authority.