Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Title's First Tendencies Towards Authoritarianism: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Bulgaria Georgi Dimitrov, Petia Kabakchieva, Jeko Kijossev [Back to Index] Conclusions We can draw several main conclusions with regard to: 1. The significance of national historical tradition as a basis of legitimacy of authoritarian rule The socio-historical analysis of the tendencies and cases of authoritarianism in Bulgarian history suggests that they have never been an expression of some sort of general propensity of the national character for this type of government. On the contrary, all cases of authoritarianism have been specific ad hoc solutions of peculiar problems that Bulgarian society has faced in the course of modernization. The authoritarian regimes might appear formally alike, but the problems to which they were a solution are different in substance: for instance, defence of national sovereignty against the encroachments of Russian tsarism in the late 19th century; consolidation of the nation in the aftermath of the disaster in the early 20th century wars; defence of civil society against conservative agrarian authoritarianism; overcoming the political helplessness of political parties that lost prestige; radical mobilization of national resources to cope with the consequences of World War II. The most important conclusion is that the situation in the early 90s is substantially different from that in the first half of the 20th century - on the socio-structural and cultural, as well as the international plane. In this sense, interpreting the alternatives of social development in Bulgaria by drawing historical parallels is pointless in principle. Still, the historical practice of the series of authoritarian regimes and dictatorships fosters a culture of public tolerance for this type of political models. In methodological terms, it is fair to say the same of the situation in Russia. The inherent potential of the tendencies towards authoritarianism are rooted basically in the newly emerging situation of the postcommunist transition. 2. The significance of postcommunist legacy The main feature of Bulgarian and Russian society in the early 90s is the extreme underdevelopment of civil society - across the spectrum of its parameters such as market economy, autonomous public sphere, legitimate and effective juridical infrastructure, liberal culture and civic self-awareness of the individuals. This situation creates the key prerequisites for the crisis of the postcommunist transition: fear of etatism as "the horrible past" vs the need of strong central government which alone could channel the institutional establishment of prerequisites for a future civil society. The corporative interests of the leading political actors are parasitizing this objective contradiction. Differences between Russia and Bulgaria start from this point - as types of social situations, the two can be regarded as test cases vis-a-vis each other. 3. The Russian roulette The leading actors: industrial-financial conglomerates that have acquired legitimacy and power in the past few years. Unquestionably standing to lose from democratization in Russia, which would mean stabilization of the mechanisms of public control over their activity and, just as importantly, a legitimate chance of egalitarian-minded masses to waive the inviolability of private property. Due to their public unpopularity they are forced to support Yeltsin and keep his popularity up. communists supporting Zyuganov. Quite a heterogeneous social actor legitimated by the discontent of proletarian, peasant and pensioner masses; at the same time, their own political elite is too involved with economic structures to afford the actual implementation of a leftist social strategy. That is why representatives of this elite, Zyuganov in particular, might openly preach in both his books, Russia and the Contemporary World and Beyond the Horizon, that capitalism is organically alien to Russia, speculating with the Greater Russian idea and talking of nationalization - if he comes to power, however, he would hardly implement this strategy. If those elites come to power, they will prove forced to take a series of steps taken by Bulgarian Socialists. First, keeping the democratic facade that brought them to power. Second, attempting to create their own economic base through which to counter and subsequently subordinate clan-branch economic actors. Third, mounting an open offensive against the positions of the opponent who is using his economic mechanisms to destroy the macro-framework of social affairs. This breeds popular discontent with the communist government. If they keep the democratic procedures intact, the incumbents will fall from power because they are incapable of stabilizing the economy. Otherwise they are forced to resort to military dictatorship, with which they put off their failure for several years - especially if they recklessly go to war. In practice, however, in both the December 1995 elections and the first round of the presidential race, Zyuganov did not win more than a third of the vote, therefore the communists' chances of winning are slim. KGB structures. Their position is particularly important because of its in-principle ambivalence. On the one hand, Russia's economic stabilization is essential for them since they can survive only by parasitizing guaranteed economic growth. On the other, however, they are vehement opponents of a democratic political system which presupposes considerable transparency in the mechanisms of government, civil control over security services, self-government in a series of sectors of social affairs and, consequently, drastic shrinkage of those structures' field of action and public role. That is why the KGB created the Zhirinovsky phenomenon and his party to keep up the need of struggle with "the enemy within," i.e. its own irreplaceability in a situation in which national-irrationalism has an enormous potential for development. The KGB structures will definitely support economic liberalism in combination with political authoritarianism. regional nomenklatura, who have won quite a lot from both privatization and the powers Yeltsin bestowed on them. In gratitude, they have backed him firmly. the military, the military-industrial complex, as well as political liberals are not autonomous political actors at present since they lack resources to impose their interest as "universal." Notably, while the liberals do not have public prestige, the military are a substantial part of the population in Russia and have double prestige. First, as a symbol of Russian greatness. Second, as "the innocent sufferer" who is assigned a sacred role by Russian Orthodox faith. The main factor excluding the army from the group of key actors at present is its internal disunity. The political framework of political processes: low differentiation of the population on the basis of realized interests due to the absolute non-development of civil society. This explains the farcical nature of political parties, founded and operating beyond the standards of political rationality. At present the Russian electorate has moods, not political will. This means that in normal conditions it could simply be ignored. In a period of irrational exaltation, however, it could become an instrument of political radicalism. However, it is the nationalist rather than the class cause that has the rallying potential right now. abridged powers of parliament, which further weakens the will for intra-parliamentary consensus. Parliamentary practice currently serves Russia not so much as an alternative to presidential power rather than as an argument in favour of the need for strong presidential power. practically unlimited legitimate presidential power, which is controllable - insofar as the interests of some of the leading political actors overlap. Presidential authoritarianism is also legitimated by the striking differences in the political situation in the centre and the periphery; as well as by the nationalities in the federation. There are virtually two variants of development of the political situation: preservation of the present state of constitutional authoritarianism in defence of the economic liberalization of clan-corporative capitalism; militarization of authoritarianism (presidential dictatorship) to neutralize current discontent about the hardships of transition and to seize the military resources from the opponents. This variant is possible either before the presidential power is passed on to Zyuganov or several years after that, if we assume Zyuganov could win the elections, or if the political elites cannot reach consensus as is obviously the case at present. stabilization of the economic system and parallel consolidation of parliamentary democracy in Russia are improbable in the next few decades. The most important thing is that the outlined configuration of the political situation in Russia is practically much more irrelevant to the personae who will play the leading political roles. The first round of the presidential elections confirms this thesis. Close to 15% of the voters voted for General Lebed, i.e. openly supported the idea of "law and order" enforced by a "strong arm." Yeltsin's lightning move and the General's prompt acceptance have shown that everything boils down to horse-trading within the elite. Whatever the vote might be, it is the struggle between the main clans in the elite that is crucial. Ultimately, they are not that different. Both groups - Zyuganov's and Yeltsin's - have declared themselves to be supra-party and to serve Russia and the nation before anything else, at the same time explicitly proclaiming their pro-Western orientation. Even though Yeltsin is more involved with the new economic structures, Zyuganov cannot follow up his words by deeds, sealing off Russia and refusing to implement a market strategy, counting mostly on Russia's available natural resources. Both groups are determined to uphold their position and this increases the likelihood of use of force. On the other hand, they stand to gain from consolidation of the new economic structures, their nationalist pro-Russian ideology is more of a political formula, and their strategy will in all likelihood be that of economic liberalism imposed by authoritarian means. 4. The Bulgarian folk dance The leading actors are quite different: due to limited national resources, the Bulgarian economy has parasitized re-export in the past few decades: energy and raw materials from Russia to the West and technologies from the West to Russia, as well as arms trade. This means that the Bulgarian economic elite is, first, strongly dependent on its foreign trade ties and, second, very closely connected to the secret services which used to conduct "socialist trade." Unlike the Russian KGB structures which parasitize an economic base, the Bulgarian secret services are, to a large extent, effective economic actors. Their main problem is that they are publicly illegitimate and therefore forced to remain in the shadow of publicly legitimate political parties. That is why the political parties in Bulgaria are far more important - hence the particular importance of the political framework. A secondary problem for the effective economic elite is that it is developing in close interaction with organized crime groups founded deliberately even under the communist regime. The embargo on former Yugoslavia gave those groups a unique chance of acquiring enormous financial power. This has given them a self-confidence that is making it increasingly difficult to keep them in the subordinate position that they were assigned originally. These groups are making ever more distinct claims for the status of legitimate, autonomous business elite. Their strategic interest is in keeping the democratic institutions ineffective - the moment their capital turns into industrial assets, however, they will promptly take the side that calls for "stable domestic law and order." as a result of stratification, as well as restitution of large urban property and piecemeal restitution of land, about a quarter of the population of present-day Bulgaria is clearly aware that its interests are associated with a liberal market situation and has not lost its intuitive faith that those interests of private property can be guaranteed by the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy. Those are the only actors consistently staking on constitutionalism. about a third of the population, however, is clearly aware of its immediate dependence on government protectionism and places those interests above civil freedoms and the principles of democracy. the military in Bulgaria, because of the historical peculiarities described above, are not a real actor. However, a very important fact should be kept in mind. The army is the institution of state that has enjoyed the highest and practically unflagging public approval in the period of transition. In this sense, the army is the only source (exponent) of comparatively uncontested authority. At the same time, however, this authority is due to the total aloofness of the military from socio-political affairs. in the present situation, the monarchic institution is a marginal social actor whose social significance, however, has been changing actively (as a radical alternative to the discredited political practice in the period of transition - confidence in the central institution of power, Parliament, has fluctuated between 15% and 5% in the past few years). The monarchic institution's main problem is not so much in its problematic constitutional legitimacy. Actually that is its chance. The problem is in the cultural tradition of Bulgarian intolerance for "the alien" monarchy, i.e. the monarchy would not be universally values-legitimate and therefore has a slim chance of accomplishing its main mission as a sacred centre stabilizing the framework of the political arena. The political framework: Bulgaria's political parties are far more distinctly structured, with comparatively sustainable consolidation: the BSP is the party of peasants who do not have the chance or resources to go into (family) commercial agribusiness; of most pensioners, who make up at least a third of the population; as well as of most civil servants (including the formally depoliticized law enforcement institutions - the army and the police), who are about one fifth of the labour force. In this sense, the BSP is doomed to remain the biggest political party. That is why the publicly illegitimate economic elite remains under its umbrella (not just because of the erstwhile genetic bond with the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party). For the economic elite it is easiest to lobby for its interest via the biggest and best organized and disciplined party. Paradoxically, both the BSP grassroots and the economic elite stand to gain from the preservation of the principle of parliamentary democracy. The former because of hope that parliamentary victory would guarantee them government protectionism. The latter because of the guarantees of the inviolability of private property and the person ensuing from the principles of democracy. The UDF is a party that is ideologically consolidated foremost on an anticommunist basis, without real resources of government. That is why they will do anything to preserve parliamentary democracy intact - parliamentary democracy is their only real basis for a share in social affairs and power. The MRF is a purely ethnic "party" and it is indifferent to the form of political structure. The Democratic Party of restituted capital and the agrarian party (BANU) of rural owners have not formed a joint political body, the Popular Union, by pure coincidence, realizing that this is the only way they can win representation in the structures of power. Since the principles of parliamentary democracy rule out their getting a crucial share of power, they have an ambiguous attitude to power. They win only when the major political parties are in crisis, and deliberately pose as their alternative. Yet due to the heterogeneity of the interests which they represent, the members of the Popular Union are forced to promulgate the principles of parliamentary democracy as inherent to their political programme. In other words, the principles of democracy do not give them a chance for real power but lend them political legitimacy beyond the particular interests which they represent. the Bulgarian Business Bloc, which by definition ought to defend the interests of medium-scale and small business, gets electoral support from the so-called "crypto-Socialists," i.e. from those who are disillusioned with the BSP but are nevertheless reluctant to identify with the opposition. This formation's political leaders frankly support a "strong-arm" policy, unambiguously claiming that they are best suited to play that role. For that political formation racked between ideology and interests, "public law and order" is the cause that can cover up the contradictions in the substance of their political presence. Realizing they have no chance to win power through democratic elections, the other political formations are persistently propagating the need of another political system. the constitutional framework of political institutions in Bulgaria concentrates the lion's share of power in Parliament. This dooms the political system itself to failure for the selfsame reasons that discredited parliamentary democracy in the first half of the 20th century. First comes the discrediting of the separate parties, which cannot elect an effective government since the social tasks due to be solved presuppose sweeping unpopular measures. This subsequently discredits Parliament itself, the least popular institution of power according to regular opinion polls. Third, the very constitutional framework which produces an ineffective political system is also discredited. The presidential institution is a constitutionally-based apple of discord between the institutions of public power. Besides, it has lost its credit of public confidence but has retained control over the secret services. Consequently, the variants of development of authoritarian tendencies in Bulgaria are far more complicated: on the one hand, there are enough political actors interested in the preservation of the democratic political model as guarantor of their particular political interest. On the other hand, this model has no chance to prove socially effective in the course of transition. It neither guarantees everyday life nor creates resources for structural adjustment. On the contrary, it generates periods of practical anarchy, in which public wealth is plundered indiscriminately. the past few months have seen public political discourse actively legitimate the thesis of the life-saving authoritarian regime. Therefore the most probable models of development of the political situation in Bulgaria are within the various shades of the authoritarian spectrum. First, development of the situation in the direction of the present Russian model, with Parliament becoming a smokescreen for the real political actors. The only difference is that the legitimate authoritarianism in Russia merely maintains the conditions for the self-propagation of quasi-liberal, clan-branch capital structures, whereas in Bulgaria such hidden authoritarianism will have to solve two parallel tasks: maintenance of the already formed economic conglomerates which will guarantee its stability and, at the same time, development of prerequisites for liberal economy without which oligarchic capitalism will lose stimulus for national progress. This variant is feasible even under the effective Constitution and was de facto tried out in the 1992-1994 period. Absence of a consolidated parliamentary majority is a necessary and sufficient condition for this variant. The only thing that can lead to this variant is the political indifference of the general public. This, however, is highly improbable since structural adjustment will inevitably affect broad strata of the public, at that after living standards have plummeted already as it is. As noted in the previous section, Bulgaria does not have the political culture and charismatic figure that will legitimate civil authoritarianism. We therefore think, second, that the chances of forcefully imposed authoritarianism are rising dramatically against the background of an escalating general crisis. However, there are two distinct subvariants. Presidential authoritarianism. Constitutionally legitimate in a critical situation - which we already have. The President can rely not only on the army but also on the old economic conglomerates that elected him in office in 1990. In addition, he will be backed by a series of political parties - the Popular Union, MRF and entire constellation of extra-parliamentary political dwarves ready to rule in his name. This variant is most probable not just because it will be opposed by the financially and institutionally helpless UDF only. (The BSP will refrain from active resistance since presidential authoritarianism will save it from answering for the 1996 social crisis.) Presidential authoritarianism is probable because it can count on Zhelev's political authority abroad, which is crucial in procuring resources for crisis management. Besides, having lost the 1 June 1996 primaries of the opposition, Zhelev has nothing to lose. Still, the other subvariant of forcible authoritarianism is not to be underrated: that from BSP circles, party-legitimated by the ruling parliamentary majority. Against the backdrop of escalating public discontent, it could be effected by a government headed either by incumbent Prime Minister Zhan Videnov or his successor. This authoritarianism, however, would have far more opponents: the entire opposition, the President, factions within the BSP itself, Western public opinion. It will garner support from the general public demand for law and order, stability, combat of crime, clear personal assumption of responsibility for government (This, however, is a resource of confidence in the presidential variant of authoritarianism too.) Consequently, this variant is possible only on condition that it gets external support from the authoritarian line which won power in Russia. In that case, the military-police authoritarianism of Bulgarian Socialists will trade national political loyalty to Russia for economic "aid" that will be presented by the Russian authorities as a step towards restoration of their erstwhile geopolitical positions. This is highly probable if Zyuganov wins the presidential elections, but this scenario cannot be ruled out under any other president. In this sense, the variant of the coming authoritarianism in Bulgaria depends a lot on the elections in Russia. However, the choice of strategy of the enforced authoritarianism - pro-liberal or pro-etatist, will be even more relevant to world political developments. For pro-etatist authoritarianism inevitably associates with the nationalist cause in an effort to win ideological legitimation. Which is just a step - a very short step - away from military brinksmanship.