Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Tendencies Towards Authoritarianism: A Comparative Analysis of Russia and Bulgaria Georgi Dimitrov, Petia Kabakchieva, Jeko Kijossev [Back to Index] IV. The Bulgarian Transition 1. Was there strong civil society in Bulgaria? During "late socialism" there was real social differentiation in Bulgaria without, however, group identification; there was discontent with the existing status order and a desire for change - but those mass dispositions were moral-abstract and, with few exceptions, had nothing to do with definite political strategies. Let us note the reasons thereof. As mentioned above, the processes of industrialization inevitably lead to social differentiation, but the latter was ultimately modified by the precepts of communist ideology. Communist ideology postulated primacy of the party elite ("vanguard") over "the working people" by definition; of the most promising industrial branches over the other spheres of the economy; of the intermediaries between the official ideology and everyday consciousness: the intelligentsia. Thus the real processes of social differentiation ensued from a definite ideological line and were therefore largely subordinate to a party voluntarism that often deliberately avoided formation of coherent status order. Typical of the status order in Bulgaria is what G. Lensky calls "status inconsistency": preventing the formation of internally non-contradictory homogeneous statuses which would directly determine a definite measure of self-confidence and clarity vis-a-vis the position in the social hierarchy. On the contrary: the labour of intellectuals, for instance, was highly prestigious but underpaid. And vice versa: under-skilled non-prestigious activities were compensated by higher pay and social privileges. A survey on the prestige of Bulgarian occupations(11) compared with the average wages by branch in the years the survey was conducted substantiates this thesis. Besides, the "official" ranks in "late socialism" started to be doubled by the hierarchization of statuses in the shadow, informal economy, with "informal" statuses coming into conflict with the former. Status inconsistency thus overlapped with the mixture of different social orders, which ultimately led to diverse social differentiation but not to distinct group identification, therefore to an impossibility of formulating group action strategies. Status inconsistency and constant dependence on the official policy of incomes formation and prioritizing activities in certain periods are a prerequisite for the absence of firm group identification on a socio-economic basis. We believe that the dichotomy of "social differentiation" - "group identification" (or at least awareness of one's own particular interest) is of paramount importance in the formation of civil society. We could have a sufficiently viable civil society only if both processes are present as a sine qua non for the emergence and affirmation of active agents of civil society. While the first process was under way in Bulgaria, the second was still in embryo. That gives us reason to argue that at the start of the change there was no civil society in Bulgaria yet. Society had the potential energy of change, was ready for it, but could not be its agent as regards either accumulated discontent or certain preconceived strategies. It is not accidental that the first dissident groups, which appeared as late as 1988, were too small, were made up almost entirely of intellectuals and did not evoke broad public response. Consequently, in Bulgaria in late 1989 there were still no conditions for revolution seen as an explosion from below - unlike Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, where there had been consolidated groups that dared uphold even political interests ever since the late 60s and early 70s. In addition to the different socio-cultural context of these countries, this also resulted from their bolder economic policies. All the more so since the specifically modernizational tasks of communism were more of a mimesis in an existing structure and culture than modernization proper. In our case, the "economic mechanisms" constantly changed - neither were they too radical as yet, since the cycle of industrialization took more time. We should also note that in comparing the six communist countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Poland) with the industrialized European countries on the basis of per-capita income, Bulgaria was the only country that had made some progress in 1980 vs the 1926-1934 period (Janos, 1994, pp. 3-4). This means that there were rates of growth of a modernizing Bulgaria which did not fuel social tensions. Combined with the inconsistent social status of most groups, that prevented their formation as agents of civil society. Hence if the term "velvet revolution" is more appropriate for countries like Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia as they also had grassroots groups that upheld the idea of change in a consolidated manner, in Bulgaria the only agents with a feasible preconceived strategy not of change but of transformation of the system in the name of their own interest were a certain type of top party elites (by "elite" we mean functional elite). The top communist party elite was the only group immune to that status inconsistency since the top position in the social hierarchy guaranteed enormous rights. This is a prerequisite for the formation of a clearly manifested group consciousness consolidated on the basis of the preservation of the privileged status. The completion of the industrialization cycle of communism necessitated the separation of economic from political power and that process started in Bulgaria too. This, along with growing social differentiation, was the reason why the top party elite felt that it was in real danger and developed survival strategies. There definitely are arguments in favour of Zeleny & Zeleny's thesis (Zeleny, Zeleny 1993 - a thesis now upheld by quite a few researchers) that the transition is ultimately the fruit of the party elite's preconceived strategy on transformation of political into economic power. The group of the top communist party elite was hardly coherent inside either. This was the case in Russia too. Notably, in the late 80s there was distinct activity on the part of the top political elite - at that, there were two different strategies. On the one hand, there were intensified repressive measures against certain groups in Bulgarian society: the Turkish ethnos and intellectuals. Perhaps those were also the two groups capable of forming certain group strategies - the former by force of its ethnic identification, the latter by force of its occupational status. That is why the former was subjected to the so-called "regenerative process," an attack on ethnic consolidation, whereas the latter came under fire precisely with its institutional organization - the so-called "artistic unions," i.e. professional organizations, as well as the University of Sofia. Those attacks included expulsion from the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and sacking of prominent Bulgarian intellectuals. On the other hand, political language started changing, along with certain norms of regulation, gradually incorporating market mechanisms: "Decree 56" of 1989. For instance, the report at the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) plenum of 29 October 1989, i.e. on the eve of the coup within the party, is unambiguous in this respect: it spoke of corporate organization of the economy, a new type of taxation, convertibility of the Bulgarian currency (lev), civil society of a "socialist type," political and religious pluralism, amendments to the Constitution, introduction of principles separating party from State, on the one hand, and representative bodies, executive and judiciary, on the other, etc. The model of ruling was declared "to have exhausted its potential. A new model is now being built" (Rabotnichesko Delo, 30 October 1989). All that suggests a carefully preconceived strategy of regulated market change. In the first case, we had a desperate attempt to preserve the system - and that must have been the strategy of the "conservatives" in the party elite. In the second, the possible transformation of the system was being prepared, and that was the strategy of the "transformers." Consequently, at the end of 1989 we had representatives of the top communist party elite who had a strategy of change, on the one hand, and top party functionaries who were trying to change the system, on the other; a weak dissident movement; accumulated public tensions which, however, were not articulated from the position of distinctly realized private interests. This situation charged "post-change" new political figures, eager to stand up to the veteran top communist party elites, with enormous responsibilities right from the start. When Todor Zhivkov's authoritarian regime "collapsed," accumulated discontent poured forth in a universal collective euphoria expressed both at rallies and in everyday conversations. This was not a revolution that presupposes vehemence and some form of violent resistance - it was a popular festivity - a carnival, to be precise - in which the social hierarchy, until recently regarded as irreplaceable, was upended. That is why that dormant and suppressed discontent was vented in a typical carnival manner: in songs, parody, spontaneous physical outbursts, derision, magic phrases - incantations, etc. The old ideological language proved absolutely alien, but a new political discourse was yet to be created. Therefore on the everyday level, the new situation was verbalized in curses, swearing and abstract hopes, whereas on the level of rallies, singing proved most appropriate. The language of youth rock subculture proved best suited to the change with its arrogant derision of the status quo, while all resources of pop music were rallied in expressing the rapturous vision of the future. Caught unawares by the rapid development of processes loyal Bulgarian Communist Party members, who were initially also delighted with the change, resorted to the reliable party rhetoric, to old party hymns and classical phrases-incantations of the "Bulgaria-above-all" type. The absence of even a proto-political language indicates that the change did catch most people by surprise. To the point where language stammered, lost its semantic premises and resorted not only to an until recently alien rhetoric but also to alien gestures such as the V-sign, thumbs-down and come-on signs. In his 1990 article "The Screaming Deaf-and-Dumb Revolution," prominent Bulgarian literary critic Nikola Georgiev even claims that language had disintegrated to its bodily forms of expression (Georgiev N., 1990, Kultura, No. 32 of 10 August 1990). This raises the crucial question of the possible emergence of new political agents who would channel the accumulated energy for change, lend it adequate political form and try to develop political strategies alternative to the until then dominant ones. For considering that Bulgarian civil society has proved too weak yet and can only support change without upholding any specific group interests, the only remaining alternative of democratic development is the emergence and confrontation between different elites. Thus if there is a real political clash between them, they will control each other. As mentioned above, in most contemporary theories of democracy reciprocal control by different centres of power is a prerequisite for democracy. Hence the question: have new elites, articulating the possible guidelines of change in the name of a national rather than a particular group interest, succeeded in consolidating? At face value, the question of whether there are competitive elites in Bulgaria is rhetorical for at least two reasons. First, because there have been three free parliamentary and one presidential elections since the change; second, because there were many contenders who represented all sorts of parties. Even the first elections, for a Grand National Assembly in 1990, were contested by five blocs comprising 32 different civic and party formations and another 34 parties, whereas the number of parties that ran in the 1994 elections in coalition or independently reached 106, each one of them claiming to defend specific interests of certain groups and to have a unique programme. At that, seven governments and three national assemblies, with different majorities, have changed in the six years of transition. This quite volatile political process suggests that there is intense circulation of elites which, in turn, presupposes differentiation of different groups and subgroups within them. Is this really the case; does the volatility of the political process result from confrontation between different elites and clash of different strategies; or is it the consequence of fast "wearing out" of political parties in a situation in which they promise one thing and do another. Or do they streamline their strategies to their own interest only, which proves detrimental to the national interest? We will analyze the publicly declared political action strategies of the main political parties (i.e. those represented in all three national assemblies) - their campaign platform. The degree of difference or, vice versa, similarity between them, as well as the degree of coherence and sustenance of the positions they upheld from the start of the transition to the last elections will be one of the criteria of the existence or, conversely, absence of alternative elites.