

The Third Way in Transatlantic Security:

Reconciling NATO and EU security agendas amidst dual enlargement.

A Bulgarian perspective

Final report

The initial working title appears with hindsight somehow more to the point and with a clearer focus: "NATO, ESDP and implications for NATO-aspirant, EU-applicant countries. The case of Bulgaria".

Since the end of the year 2000 (when the working title was constructed in applying for the EAPC fellowship), however, the international security agenda has been enriched in an unprecedented fashion, starting anew from an 11/09/2001 and adding new layers, actors and sets of issues. No surprise then that in comparison a crosscut such as the foreign policy of a country, which seeks membership in both the EU and NATO, against a transforming post-Cold War NATO and a defence-empowering EU would appear relatively predictable and sharper.

The transatlantic security wheel has gone since then several cycles, confronting new security threats like international terrorist attacks, passing through continuity, as in the EU taking over Macedonian mission from NATO, but also through ruptures and divergences like the ones over Iraq and the International Criminal Court, and coming to a stop at a Washington EU-US summit (25/06/03) where differences were openly stated while solidarity on fundamental values and vital interests underscored.

Bulgaria, in its turn, has been heavily occupied with its foreign policy priority of Euro-Atlantic integration. It had furthermore a minor but important role to play in the UN Security Council and was officially invited with six other post-Communist countries to join the North Atlantic Alliance. On 19 June 2003 it participated for the first time in a NATO Economic Committee session (26 format), while the European Council in Porto Carras (19-20/06/03) reaffirmed its support for the efforts made by Bulgaria to conclude accession talks in 2004.

Has the wheel come a full circle to let it rest?

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Introduction

When speaking of revision or of need to reconsider the *acquis sécuritaire* in the aftermath of the Cold War, analysts have hardly expected the twists and swerves security studies would undergo, or predicted the intensive redress of security environment we have been experiencing in the last few years.

The terrorist attacks of 11/09/2001 triggered new perspectives in viewing security at large and opened up the scope of security almost infinitely. Repercussions were mostly felt on the transatlantic security agenda: invoking art. 5 of the Washington Treaty and 'getting out-of-area to stay in business' brought to the surface in a new focus a debate that had to take place a decade ago, at the end of the Cold War and after the Gulf War – how the United States view its role on the European continent; how articulate are EU's ambitions to become a military actor in its own right; and how a transforming NATO will secure transatlantic unity in European security matters.

The two enlargement processes – of NATO and the EU – have played and still play important roles in the process of transformation of the two major European organisations. However, enlargement has not epitomised a vision for transformation of those organisations against a changed international environment - it is rather part and parcel of transformation itself; enlargement has served as a push factor for transformation but not as a *raison d'être*. More importantly, decoupling NATO enlargement of the EU one has allowed a dynamism and divergence in the transatlantic security agenda to which the enlargement processes are only subsequently adapted.

The aim of this paper is to question the impact of EU-US divergences on transatlantic security agenda against a transforming NATO and a developing ESDP. The central argument outlined here is that decoupling NATO enlargement from the EU one has made possible the construction of different (divergent) security concepts. In the process, no overarching mechanism between security and integration was put in place to contain differences and build over the existing similarities in terms of common values and overlapping memberships, while taking stock of the substantial differences in the two security organisations and two enlargement processes

This perspective will be taken within a third way of a broader definition of security to account for the wider range of security concerns and their intrinsic interdependencies (economic, political, cultural, and societal).

The paper is structured in two sections. The first explores the dynamic transatlantic security through the prism of dual enlargement and its security context, reflecting on the potential development of the ESDP and NATO, hence the roles of the two major security international players, the EU and the US, in shaping the European peace order. The second section in a reverse mode focuses on two examples of a 'sandwich Bulgaria' case, namely the crisis in Iraq and the deliberations of the ICC, revealing a clash of diverging security projections with direct implications for the process of Bulgaria's application to NATO and the EU. I conclude by outlining the factors, which need to be contained to avoid ruptures of the kind, as well as the aspects that have to be addressed to ensure a transatlantic security environment generating peace and stability.

Section 1: Constructing the transatlantic security

The Third Way in Security Studies

The changing global system calls not only for reconsideration of security studies and the nature of security in the twenty-first century; it calls for what Adrian Hyde-Price refers to as the 'retooling' of 'Jabberwock'¹. Using [Carol's] Jabberwock as a metaphor for contemporary security studies, he suggests a third way beyond the narrow approach of traditional realism preoccupied with national security and military threats while avoiding the dangers of an indiscriminate broadening of the concept of security. Arguing that security studies must examine both the causes of war and the conditions of peace, Hyde-Price views security in positive (building peace) and negative (avoiding war) dimensions using a more comprehensive approach to the study of conflict.

Security studies cannot – and should not – attempt to address all aspects of human injustice, poverty, suffering, misery, and underdevelopment. Issues such as poverty, immigration, and environmental degradation are *not* intrinsically security issues. They become a concern for security studies *only when* they threaten to provoke conflict and insecurity.

(Hyde-Price 2001:28, emphasis added)

This comprehensive still delimiting approach to the concept of security is apt in analysing transatlantic security, which in the most recent guidelines is said to encompass almost anything from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to problems in the WTO, international terrorism and bad governance, to malnutrition, infectious diseases and rise in temperatures². This approach is also befitting as it balances well International Relations (IR) and European integration studies³, not falling in the trap of *sui generis*-type of analyses of European security.

Conceptualising contemporary security studies, Hyde-Price proposes several 'building-blocks' that provide useful insight in reviewing demonstrations of the nature and variety of transatlantic security. Those may be grouped in general security and European security and summed up as:

General security

- a) focus of security studies is threats to the values and way of life of political communities associated with conflict;

- b) security studies is primarily concerned with the nonmilitary dimensions of security, that is political, economic, social, and cultural preconditions for fostering a security community;
- c) the context of security studies is a socially textured international system, where emphasis is on the elements of society in international politics⁴ alongside a recognition of the importance of history and culture to the development of international society⁵;
- d) marked trend toward growing regional differentiation within the international system;

European security

- e) necessary to identify the elements of continuity and change in contemporary Europe, when demise of the Westphalian state by pooling of sovereignty in multilateral structures is opposed to a revised notion of sovereignty as in the case of Kosovo⁶;
- f) interrelationship between democracy, integration, and markets for building in a 'we-feeling' in an emerging pluralistic security community in the transatlantic area where the threat of war no longer plays a role in interstate relations. This argument is especially valid in accounting for the relationship between security and integration;
- g) security, like state's interests and national identity, is socially constructed. Security is not a given, and perceptions of security and insecurity cannot be divorced from values, beliefs, and identity of the person or thing concerned. This last argument builds on social constructivism, extensively applied over the last several years in security and integration studies⁷.

All those aspects and arguments interplay and determine a changing transatlantic surface of a transforming NATO and emerging (at least on paper) ESDP. How do these two formative processes determine the transatlantic chessboard and interlock the enlargement dynamics?

Reforming NATO

The developments after the adoption of the Strategic Concept in 1991 already pointed towards a new and broader role for NATO – launching the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Military engagements in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo, 1995 and 1999 respectively) caused a decisive shift taking NATO beyond territorial defence.

Despite these developments, the 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirms Article 5 of the Treaty as the essential and enduring purpose of NATO, while continuing to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe and safeguarding the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means⁸. The Defence Capabilities Initiative within NATO launched by the Washington Summit in 1999 aimed to increase the efficiency of military contributions of the European members of the Alliance. The Alliance therefore remained less rigidly but firmly in the military field. Committing itself to a broad approach to security, which 'recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension'⁹, NATO nevertheless states that the effective accomplishment of its fundamental security tasks will be sought mainly through military means.

Confinement in the area of effective organised military effort is something at which the Alliance is relatively good. Moreover, NATO provides a unique template of standards for interoperability, which enables coalitions to be put together with comparative ease outside Europe. Assembling militarily effective coalitions requires two important prerequisites: consensus political will and interoperability of armed forces. NATO may sometimes be bureaucratic and cumbersome, but compensates this with inbuilt habits of consensus-building. Interoperability of headquarters and logistics, command and control arrangements in place is NATO's real strength.

The Prague Summit of November 2002 approached reform of the Alliance by building over its outspoken strengths while accommodating new security threats. The two unprecedented events - invocation of Art. 5 and deployment of forces (of NATO MS) to Afghanistan - brought new roles for NATO, like countering terrorism and dealing with WMD, and put the full stop in the out-of-area debate. Strengthening military capabilities was another major element of the NATO's reform. A reform of the Alliance's command structure has to bring more functionally oriented commands and launch a NATO Response Force. Last but not least NATO's internal reform is geared towards less bureaucracy and more flexibility. Its currently 467 committees will be reduced by 30% and greater use will be made of subordinate committees to alleviate the North Atlantic Council.

The reforms were aimed at reinforcing the military identity and capacity of the Alliance and took good care to incorporate US concerns in the transatlantic agenda. Claiming a distinct role in combating terrorism and giving more prominence to WMD clearly reflects US dominant security concerns in post-9/11 strategic environment.

In relation to the transatlantic connection in the framework of NATO, reforms maintained an enduring continuity. The US continued insisting that Europe keeps apace in military capability and goes beyond 'Europeanisation' of transatlantic security. This will serve a two-fold purpose of improving military capacity and interoperability and freeing resources for the new security threats.

Reforms of NATO were aimed to strengthen the Alliance into a viable military organisation suited to operate in a transformed security environment and to tackle new security threats. Reforms were aimed at increasing European military capability within NATO too. In doing so, reforms preserved the transatlantic connection intact.

From American perspective, NATO continued to be an international forum where the US feels generally comfortable in a European milieu of countries predisposed to relationships with the US (unlike, e.g. Asia). NATO remains the central legitimising framework for US power in Europe. US support for NATO enlargement (for geographical reasons, according to some observers, as the US get bases for out-of-reach operations) vests European stability as a US strategic interest.

From European perspective, United States' unmatched military strength turns it into a needed partner in a number of security matters, while US engagement - into essential part of the wider security scene, something to remain the state of play at least by the time EU MS improve effectively their military strength.

NATO transformation therefore preserved the basics of the transatlantic relationship.

Developing ESDP

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has taken shape miraculously fast over the last couple of years, especially if viewed against almost half a century of staled attempts over European Political Co-operation (EPC) and dubious in effect other EPC-rooted initiatives (WEU, CFSP).

The ultimate security goal of the ESDP has been defined as developing the ability to carry out the so-called Petersberg Tasks, designed in 1992 by the WEU and later incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty under the CFSP by (partial) integration of the WEU to the EU. The Cologne 1999 European Council Summit, in an aftermath of the

British rapprochement to European defence (December 1998 St. Malo British-French Declaration), decided to set up a rapid reaction force to carry out the Petersberg Tasks.

Ever since, mentioning of ESDP goes hand in hand with the mantra that no, the European Union is not 'in collective defence business' and no, it is not building a European army. The purpose of the ESDP's rapid reaction force is two-fold: 'to provide the EU with a military capacity for crisis management, and to lend credibility to other aspects of the EU's foreign policy'¹⁰. The ESDP, to be borne in mind, is but an instrument of the CFSP.

Subsequent European Council in Helsinki (December 1999) worked to adding more flesh to what has been agreed in Cologne. Resolving linguistic disputes over French concerns, the EU committed itself to developing 'autonomous capacity to take decisions' and, 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations' and member governments agreed on the parameters of a European military force: 50-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for a year of operations. Still, a skinny ESDP.

While subsequent European Councils and Presidency Conclusions developed further the establishment of the ESDP and reiterated determined support, criticism was voiced on the insufficient military capabilities of the European defence project¹¹. The capability gap is substantial, and what's more important, ESDP's very parameters put at risk its potential implementation in view of the possible crises to intervene in – the European military force, even with access to NATO assets, would not have been able to intervene in Kosovo, for example.

ESDP genesis has been deeply rooted in the EU institutional framework and hence only some of the WEU *acquis* could be transferred to the ESDP, leaving six non-EU European members of NATO outside the equation¹². Discontent was resolved at the Feira Summit (June 2000), where participation for those NATO members was ensured in EU+6 format, and thus European defence project kept firmly in the EU¹³.

WEU has been used also as a good (theoretical) testing ground for flexibility in the field of defence¹⁴ (something for which France insisted in Nice 2000 but Britain opposed). The draft Constitution of Europe presented at the Thessaloniki European Summit (June 2003) explicitly provides, though differentiating across and within

policies, enhanced co-operation both in CFSP and in defence matters. With all the pros and cons for flexibility, certainly it is better to exercise it (if feasible in practice though provided in theory) within the institutional frameworks of the EU, if this turns to be a faster road to deepening European integration in the future Union of 27 or more member states. Allowing for flexibility in the field of defence but avoiding too much institutional overlaps seems to be the right balance to strike.

US support for the development of a European security has not been univocal over the last two US administrations but has always been conditional on feasibility of the project and contribution to the Alliance. The debate may be said to be interlocked in the famous Albright's D's and Lord Robertson's I's: no Duplication of existing NATO structures, no Discrimination of non-EU European members of NATO, and no Decoupling (of European security)¹⁵ and the respective Improvement of European capabilities, Inclusiveness and Indivisibility¹⁶.

NATO and ESDP against a changed transatlantic security

The ESDP is hardly a finished project though the broad institutional skeleton is outlined. Speculations about the future of the ESDP may for the time being delimit to its performance in terms of feasibility, muscle and efficiency. Feasibility refers to interplay of ESDP and NATO; muscle – mostly to military capability; and efficiency – to an ESDP in an enlarged Union.

A possible division of labour between the US and the EU, as remarked by some observers¹⁷, where the US provides what “it likes to spend money on” (high technology communications and surveillance), and the EU provides what the US is reluctant to, namely ground troops, seems improbable. Equally unlikely is a division of labour where the EU, concentrated solely on acquiring autonomous capabilities means, acquires such for low- and medium-intensity conflicts only, leaving the United States to ‘do the fighting’, while the Europeans ‘do the dishes’¹⁸.

The ends that the ESDP and NATO (will) serve differ substantially in nature, scope and approach.

The ESDP differs from NATO mostly in lacking any collective defence provisions (Art. 5 of the Atlantic Treaty). Its scope is defined by the Petersberg's tasks, mainly peacekeeping and peace enforcing. The approach to ESDP will most probably be a complementary one as the ESDP is one out of a number of EU instruments available

(external relations, development policy, stabilisation and association agreements). Attempting a concerted action by using a mixture of the instruments available will also strengthen the EU inwardly as it will have to reconcile community (external trade relations) with intergovernmental instruments (ESDP).

The broad lines of future European security outlined by CFSP HR Javier Solana¹⁹ define European security precisely as an incremental and comprehensive concept where capabilities are increased not least by making proper use of the multifaceted means for exerting international actorness in the world²⁰.

NATO in its turn avail of structures and skills that do not provide for extensive engagement in areas like police work or fighting crime, for example, nor in discussions of wider political agendas²¹. Its military efficiency however makes it a reliable provider of services and a competent executor of military operations, called by the UN, e.g. Most importantly, NATO can foster co-operation between the United States and European states in a forum where the US is comfortable²².

The Alliance could well serve to enhance the European Security and Defence Policy should the Europeans consider reversing the 'rhetorical discipline exercise'²³ and invest in improving military capabilities prior to claiming global actorness 'by default'. This would increase the leverage of the Europeans in the Alliance and enhance transatlantic relations. It would moreover strengthen ESDP by an improved military capacity. Divergences of US and EU approaches in security (when the EU is speaking in one voice) will more easily be contained within bon-ton limits of common fundamental values. If Greek PM Costas Simitis, still holding EU Council Presidency, after the EU-US Washington Summit (June 2003) was diplomatic when saying, "if we [the EU and US] differ sometimes, it is on the best way to apply the principles we share'; the continuation fairly reflects that "our friendship assumes that we agree to differ, that we manage our differences with discipline'²⁴.

The Washington EU-US Summit reaffirmed common determination to strengthen transatlantic relationship on the basis of the vital interests and goals they share. After the serious divergences causing considerable division over Iraq and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Washington summit following the European Council in Greece was careful to reveal maturity in admitting rather than 'bashing on differences', in EC President's words²⁵.

Returning to the 'building-blocks' of contemporary security studies, outlined in the beginning, it is discernible, without plunging in deep IR analysis, that a large part of those arguments are valid for both the EU and the US. Compare for example two major security concepts - US National Security Strategy of September 2002 and EU 'Secure Europe in a Better World' of June 2003.

The US NSS is based on the right of freedom and right of difference (political, economic and religious), underpinning US foreign policy motives. It promotes as a basic foreign policy objective 'maintenance of balance of powers to the benefit of freedom', stresses interrelations with international organisations, in particular the UN, and emphasises a strong regional approach, notably vis-à-vis NATO, Russia, India and China. Development aid will be increased substantially. Of course, ultimately, centring on the new security threats and notably the changed nature of *the* security threat, international terrorism.

CFSP HR Solana's 'Broad lines...' in a similar fashion review new security threats (to Europe), their changed nature, underscoring terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and failed (rogue in US rhetoric) states and organised crime. The document further outlines the strategic objectives for the European Union, first contributing to good governance in EU's immediate neighbourhood (regional approach); building effective multilateralism and tackling both old and new threats. The EU should become more active, more coherent and more capable to deliver the objectives set; partnership with value-alike actors is crucial, while the transatlantic relation is stressed in particular as irreplaceable.

Hopefully no use is made here of discourse analysis of IR, a most interesting otherwise approach and quite insightful²⁶. Performances against those assertions should be sufficiently discerning. Until then, it is important to say that both EU and US (declared) concepts of security fall very much in line with what has been called the "third way in security studies". Both focus on threats to the values and way of life of communities; both include nonmilitary dimensions of security as well; both concepts reveal strong regional features.

Differences appear as well. EU security concept takes into account the context of security as a 'socially textured international system', which 'recognises the importance of history and culture' (the very process of European integration). The EU security concept furthermore is rooted in the 'interrelationship between democracy,

integration and markets' by the very design of the Union, and is indispensable of the 'we' community feeling.

Therefore, changed international security environment has enhanced similarities between the US and the EU perceptions of security. It has expanded their scope beyond traditional military threats. The EU security concept however has expanded even further in the direction of the positive dimension mostly as consequence of its very (*sui generis*) institutional nature. This has made values, beliefs and identity of the security community an intrinsic part of the EU security concept.

The dual enlargement track

Both NATO and the EU, though in different way, are security organisations: the EU has contributed to security in the economic, political and social spheres, while NATO has been a 'hard' security organisation concerned with the provision of military capabilities and territorial defence. Further likenesses include considerable overlap in membership, in political matters, and common emphasis in Western liberal and democratic values.

Most significant differences between the two (oversimplifying) are that the European Union stands for a number of other converging policy lines apart from (or complementing) security, while NATO only operates in the security context; that, unlike the EU, NATO membership has the notable presence of the US (and Turkey); that modus operandi of the two organisations is very different, NATO making recourse only to consensus for decision-taking while the EU availing of different decision-making procedures (co-decision, QMV, unanimity). In short, while NATO is essentially an intergovernmental organisation, the EU is a *sui generis* institution.

While NATO was moving beyond the territorial defence constraint and was taking along new security 'services', the EU was attempting the construction of its own defence policy. Both organisations are undergoing enlargement processes that are often directly related to the processes of transformation of the organisations themselves.

Who enlarges how?

The EU has objective criteria for enlargement and a recognised list of candidates – upon meeting all the criteria, the candidate is admitted. In contrast, NATO criteria are more subjective and may be said to come to respect for OSCE norms, resolution of conflicts with peaceful means, promotion of stability, social justice and environmental responsibility. In addition, new members to the Alliance establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, devote to them adequate resources, and comply with some technical requirements towards interoperability of military capabilities. Door of the Alliance not to be closed before anyone who could contribute to the security of the Alliance.

First enlargement of the Alliance took place in 1999 – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Since then the door of the Alliance has remained open to take in new members, ‘willing and able to assume responsibilities and obligations’, while ‘serving the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance’ and ‘enhancing European security and stability’. The 1995 *Study on Enlargement* and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) were introduced to provide some guidance for applicant countries; they could not obscure however the lack of clear rationale guiding NATO enlargement policy.

In contrast, for the EU enlargement has been the most challenging integration project. The EU is supported by a neat ‘weaponry’ of enlargement instruments, clear set of (Copenhagen) criteria, Europe or other agreements, regular reports of progress made, meetings with applicant countries on different levels and in different formats, etc. In view of the security aspect of interest to this process, enlargement posed the general to the Union issue of managing diversity in an enlarged Union. Here the context is that of an evolving CFSP and ESDP in the making, overlap of EU/NATO memberships, neutral states and more national sets of interests in an intergovernmental (security) area.

At first sight, the crosscut between the two enlargement processes is in the area of security – NATO on the whole, and EU in the CFSP/ESDP, aided by very similar political criteria (human rights, rule of law, stable democracy, etc.).

The two enlargement processes, even if bearing certain common features, and certainly affecting both the security architecture on both sides of the Atlantic, however are very different from the perspective of the applicants.

NATO offers to applicants collective territorial defence guarantees; provides transatlantic relationship; multilateral system of defence co-operation; institutionalises a community of values, based on human rights, democracy, etc. and facilitates practical military co-operation. The EU enlargement on the other hand “is what really matters – for political and economic relations, for state sovereignty, for national and European identity, and for structures of transnational multi-level governance”²⁷.

The EU prospects, to say, are different in scale, dynamics and intensity. Although both organisations have far-reaching roles and implications for European security, and by extension membership in each of them brings security guarantees, security cannot be picked-up from the menu of European integration/membership. The differences in the design of organisations, the way enlargement processes are designed and tackled, and the (different nature of) benefits they produce for the applicant countries, trigger different dynamics and attraction powers.

Viewed against the third way in security studies, the EU security concept offered in the enlargement package is extended indefinitely. NATO security concept, on the other hand, is more centred in the third way. Although transformed beyond the rigid traditional concept of military threat, it misses important community features (Deutsch’s ‘we-feeling’).

The third way outlined at the beginning is especially valid for countries, which apply in both EU and NATO. They perceive the organisations as different inasmuch as they are after different agendas. A EU/NATO applicant country would by all means project its security agenda in NATO (which explains why most candidates for ‘double’ membership view NATO as ‘provider of territorial integrity’, i.e. its original function) and would leave most of the rest for the EU framework. To this adds the very prospect of joining, important for the candidate countries also as an acknowledgement to belonging in the Western club(s).

Viewed from a EU perspective, as Helen Wallace rightly points, this “unfortunate disjuncture between military and economic conceptions of Europe has arisen since the 1950s, reflected both the development of separate military and economic organisations (NATO and the EU), and in the conceptual and analytical separation between ‘security studies’ and ‘integration studies’. This has led to a neglect of the complementarities and interdependence between integration and security, and to the effective de-coupling of the process of NATO and EU enlargement. It is also reflected

in the failure to develop 'an overarching concept of European integration that went beyond rather loose assertions of connectedness between these two domains'²⁸.

I would like to add that should an 'overarching concept' or a third way between economy and security been developed, there could have been a comprehensive security concept already in action. Against the dynamic international security context, such a concept would be able to reconcile oppositions and contain divergences – not to the extent of melting distinctions or concealing differences but in securing that they are embedded in an undisputed context of fundamental values.

Section 2: A 'Sandwich Bulgaria' case



This caricature that appeared in a Bulgarian newspaper²⁹ depicting Bulgarian Prime Minister trying to 'stand' upright between the EU and the USA gives an apt illustration of the uneasy third way Bulgaria has been following in its foreign policy in the last several months, attempting to reconcile divergences of its major foreign policy partners within its immediate Euro-Atlantic priorities without losing either balance or face.

What calls for a third way in between the EU and the US and what are the Bulgarian stakes in it?

Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic orientation

Bulgaria is adhering to both the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. Membership in those organisations and relationships with EU and NATO occupy the top of Bulgaria's foreign policy priority list on an equal footing and is very often merged in what has been termed as the Euro-Atlantic integration.

This merger of integration objectives was the result of a gradual process made irreversible with the 'civilisation choice' in the words of then Bulgarian Prime Minister (PM) Ivan Kostov to support NATO in former Yugoslavia in 1999. A highly unpopular choice for the majority of Bulgarians that marked the turning point of sloping public support for the government then in power, all the way down to its loss of elections in 2001. A choice however that placed Bulgaria irreversibly on the road to Atlantic integration. The choice was duly appreciated by the Atlantic partners at the Washington Summit in April 1999 when Bulgaria was offered assistance in its

aspiration to NATO membership through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and participation in NATO South East Europe Initiative (SEEI). The course of Bulgarian foreign policy as a 'de-facto member of the Alliance' in the favourite phrase of Bulgarian first diplomat and the support for operations in Afghanistan added to formal political and technical requirements for membership and in Prague (2002) Bulgaria, together with six other countries, was officially invited to join the Alliance.

The same year when Bulgaria received its MAP, the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) decided to hold in February 2000 a bilateral intergovernmental conference to start accession negotiations with Bulgaria (and five more candidate countries³⁰), which started officially on 15 February 2000. Positioned vis-à-vis the years 2004 and 2007 (finalisation of negotiations and membership respectively) as set by Bulgaria and supported by the EU, the negotiations followed a steady course regardless of change of government in 2001. After a decisive acceleration in 2002³¹, negotiation dynamics were somewhat slowed down, approaching the most difficult chapters. The European Council in Thessaloniki (June 2003) nevertheless reaffirmed its support for Bulgarian efforts to conclude accession talks in 2004.

Bulgaria was furthermore elected by the UN Security Council (SC) in October 2001 as nonpermanent member of the UN SC for the period 2002 – 2003. With no direct relevance to the security context, Bulgaria welcomed Pope John II, a strongly rehabilitating politically visit.

The rift between European and American partners

In the immediate aftermath of September 11 there was a surge of European solidarity towards the US best summed up in the *Le Monde* headline "We are all Americans now". Within thirty-six hours of the attacks the European Council adopted measures aimed at combating terrorism, Washington appealed to its European allies to invoke NATO's Article V, and European hopes for a U-turn to multilateralism in US (Bush) Administration foreign policy grew.

One year after that the U regained original standing in a unilateral US policy and subsequent deterioration of EU-US relations. European observers pointed to US rejection of the Kyoto protocol, abandonment of the ABM arms control treaty, imposition of steel tariffs, and massive subsidies for the US farm industry³².

The US preference for unilateral action, albeit with a marginal British contribution, in Afghanistan, seemed another European case in point of US unilateralism. Despite European allies willing to contribute to a small war against al-Qaeda, the US preferred to dispense with their help. Iraq did not come to discourage accusations in US unilateralism but only to pour more fuel in them.

The rift between the US and its European allies showed most eminently over the crisis in Iraq. Divergence of positions and failure to act together under UN mandate threatened not only the transatlantic relationship but seriously undermined the major security institutions – EU, NATO, and the UN.

Divergence was ruling the UN Security Council after a unanimous UNSCR 1441 in November 2002, holding Iraq in 'material breach' of disarmament obligations and offering final chance to comply. Differences aroused between the two major camps – the Atlantic one of the USA, UK and Spain, who pressed for decisive (military) actions against the regime of Saddam in the obvious failure of the dictator to comply with the UN Resolution, first by way of a second UN Resolution, then without UN mandate. At the other end in the UN SC were France and Germany EU MS, supported by Russia and China as permanent members of the UN SC, who insisted that the peaceful means for disarmament of Iraq are exhausted to the full. They insisted in giving more time for proper completion of UN inspection and wait for their results.

Against this background Bulgaria, being nonpermanent UN member (2001 – 2003), was confronted with the difficult task of finding the proper balance between diverging Atlantic and European positions, as it adhered to both the EU and NATO. When the rift opened too much, it was standing in a conflict of priorities.

The divergences of the European and Atlantic positions were displayed in all three major security fora.

- EU

The European Council of 17 February 2003 managed as far as the lowest common denominator, namely to give a 'last chance' to Iraq. The conclusions of the Council clearly embed responsibility for disarmament of Iraq with the UN Security Council, where the 'Iraqi regime alone will be responsible for the consequences if it continues to flout the will of the international community and does not take this last chance'.

The compromise position reiterated that UN inspections are effective way to disarmament of Iraq; however, 'inspections cannot continue indefinitely in the absence of full Iraqi co-operation'.

Against this moderate position the UK and Spain openly supported American determination to deal with Iraq, while France and Germany were holding an opposite stance. 'We see no reason [...] to change our logic, which is a logic of peace, and switch to a logic of war,'³³ Schroeder and Chirac said after a meeting in Berlin.

- NATO

Rifts between allies were made officially public in the end of January 2003 when eight European NATO members, including all three latest ins, issued a declaration to firmly state that Iraq should be disarmed. The split was further aggravated when France and Germany moved the diplomatic battle from the UN Security Council to NATO. Together with Belgium, they blocked US demand that the Alliance grant Turkey military defence in the occasion of conflict with Iraq. According to the three, this would have been tantamount to ending the efforts for peaceful disarmament of Baghdad.

- UN

An outbreak of disunity split the Security Council in the Iraq endgame. America, Britain and Spain tabled a short second [draft] resolution saying that Iraq has failed to comply with UNSCR 1441 and concluding that Saddam Hussein has 'failed to take that final opportunity'. The phrasing has been pitched to draw as much support as possible. Though not in need of extra legal clout, 'Mr Bush, too, sees the value, politically and diplomatically, of working for as much UN consensus as possible, if only to make it easier for other countries and organisations to join in the reconstruction of Iraq'³⁴. That went along with Bush saying that even if the council refuses to pass the resolution, he will lead a 'coalition of the willing' to disarm Iraq anyway.

France implied using veto in the UN Security Council, and tabled a memorandum, supported by Germany, Russia and China arguing for peaceful disarmament of Iraq and more, though not indefinite, time (four months) for inspectors, who have only just started their work, to finish the inspections. In addition the four saw no need to support a new resolution, which by stating the obvious is plainly intended to pave the way for war.

Iraqi crisis seen from Sofia

The official Bulgarian position on the crisis in Iraq and possible alternative solutions was somewhat chaotically presented to the general Bulgarian public.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Passy first told in an CNN interview that Bulgaria will support the USA in case of a war against Iraq, hence Bulgaria was mentioned by international agencies as the only certain ally, together with Spain and the UK, of American plans for Iraq. After an open session of the UN SC (27 January 2003) the Minister said that 'we are still fighting for a peaceful solution though getting ready for the alternative one'. Later the same week he announced that the 'government has not yet started deliberating the conditions upon which Bulgaria could join a military coalition against Iraq'. Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesperson in his turn said that both 'on January 27th, and on February 4th [GAERC conclusions on Iraq] Bulgaria adhered to and actively supported the EU position on the crisis in Iraq'. No EU position however made any mention of military intervention.

In the meanwhile, neither the Consultative Council on National Security with the President, nor the Council on Security with the Prime Minister have discussed seriously operation against Iraq. Neither the President, nor the Prime Minister have expressed their stances on Iraqi regime or at least shared their visions on solving the crisis in Iraq. Opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) were clear only on demands for guarantees of national security. Guarantees in exchange for what was not quite clear.

This public evasiveness can only be explained with Bulgarian government sending confusing signals to trade eventual support for Iraq, or with resisting different pressures from European and American partners, or with lack of a concerted position. Or a combination of those.

Bulgarian way between European and American partners

On February 5th Bulgaria signed with the Vilnius group a Declaration, which qualified as 'convincing' the proofs presented by the USA in the Security Council in support of the claim that Saddam Hussein was violating the UN Resolutions. The Vilnius Declaration further on called for 'decisive actions'. Two days later, before any of

either EU or NATO member states had, the Bulgarian Parliament granted territory and armed forces for possible military intervention in Iraq. This obvious American leaning exacerbated in particular French President Chirac, who accused the Vilnius countries of ill demeanor, saying that they were “not well-mannered” and at the same time “unaware of the dangers of getting too close to the American position”. Mostly, the Vilnius countries missed a ‘good chance to remain silent’. What was even worse, Bulgaria and Romania were “especially frivolous” in their approach, more so in view of their ‘extremely delicate situation with regard to Europe’.

The words of the French president, “Chirac the Delicate” as the papers called him, naturally produced a large public reaction. Passing by the emotional aspects, however, the French president reminded, maybe a bit straightforwardly, that Bulgaria was going too far in its support for the US and doing so in detriment to her future prospects for EU membership. “If [Bulgaria and Romania] wanted to reduce their chances to get into Europe, they couldn’t have found a better way to do so.” Bulgarian foreign policy in principle should side with that of the European Union, formally stated in the Europe Agreement and by extension in the (provisionally) closed negotiation chapter on foreign relations. The fact that EU member states like Britain and Spain were acting in disconcert with common EU positions in no way served as a ground for Bulgaria, even only an applicant country, to follow suit. As Mr Chirac said, “when you are in the family, you have more rights than when you are knocking on the door.”

Chirac’s outburst, be it over waning French leadership in EU’s external projection, or irritation over Romania’s signing a bilateral agreement with the USA limiting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, placed in juxtaposition Bulgaria’s two foreign policy priorities. Membership in NATO vs. membership in the EU, is of course ridiculous, more so when it goes for foreign policy and security matters.

Divergences in European and Atlantic stances projected itself onto smaller players in the international chessboard. Bulgaria appeared in the limelight by accidental accumulation of circumstances and factors – the crisis in Iraq, Bulgaria’s non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and the country’s geographical position were factors just as important at that moment as were invitation to join the Alliance and application for EU membership.

Bulgaria certainly could attempt a more moderate position or at least a more precise one time wise – rushing to grant territory before NATO had reached a compromise on Turkey's demands surprised Western diplomats in Sofia. It could furthermore use its non-permanent membership in UN SC with greater leverage to accommodate Bulgarian and EU positions, instead of “throwing its full weight behind the draft [USA-UK-Spain] resolution³⁵”.

It is true that the rift between partners in the Iraqi crisis was too large for any party involved to remain aloof. Predictability was to be favoured to futile attempts to square the circle in trying to make everybody happy. Choices, when inevitably made, usually go with careful gain-and-loss analysis. What were the Bulgarian stakes in this case?

Bulgarian stakes in the Iraqi crisis

With regard to the EU, Bulgaria's main stake was accession negotiations. As Mr Chirac said, Bulgarian position in the EU was delicate. In a TV interview Bulgarian Minister for European affairs Meglena Kouneva said that support by Bulgaria in the UN SC for a resolution clearing the way before US and their allies for war in Iraq would result in slowing down the negotiation process with the EU. “The whole integration process after all passes through the bilateral relations with the fifteen”, she added. Later on the floor leader of National Movement Simeon II (NMSII) ruling party, the foreign minister Passy, and the minister of defence Svinarov each tried to discharge any linkages between EU accession negotiations and the Bulgarian position on Iraq. Italian foreign minister, visiting Sofia in the beginning of March also assured that Bulgarian position on Iraq would not influence negatively talks with the EU.

Notwithstanding this reassurance, Bulgaria's positioning in the enlargement process – outside the big-bang group of the ten acceding to the Union in 2004, unclear set-up of the Union which Bulgaria will be joining, no particular EU MS lobbyist – rules out any back ups in the accession talks. Negotiations moreover on the toughest policies, agricultural and regional, still lie ahead while progress on other open chapters, e.g. justice and home affairs, has been slow.

In relation to the US, firm support for the American position would guarantee US (Congress) support for Bulgarian NATO membership. In a comparable situation in 1999 Bulgarian government's unconditional support for Joint Guardian operation in

Kosovo contributed largely to the invitation extended to Bulgaria in Helsinki. However, then Bulgaria had the support of most of the EU MS as well.

Support to the US could be instrumental furthermore in relation to getting back (part of the) Iraqi debt to Bulgaria (1,623 billions USD), gaining access for Bulgarian companies in the reconstruction of Iraq, and enhancing economic and military co-operation. Following Bulgarian PM Saxe-Coburg-Gotha meeting with President Bush in the first week of March 2003 in the US³⁶, trade secretary Donald Evans visited Bulgaria in the framework of a regional visit (including also Romania and Slovakia) bringing alongside American recognition of Bulgaria for market economy. The recognition has no direct benefits but can increase the country's credit rating, Bulgarian Minister of Industry commented.

However, Iraq's debt amounts to 383,2 billion USD, more than half of which are compensations for the 1991 war, and Bulgarian peanut portion certainly could be swapped in priority terms for the Romanian one, for example, which is above 17 billion USD. The USA, moreover, can sooner than later reconsider their ad hoc coalition building approach to opportunist motivated partners and revert to traditional (EU) ones. After all, it's not just the economy, (stupid!)³⁷.

In short, the stake of Bulgarian accession negotiations with the EU and prospects for their finalisation on time is vital for the country and has no alternatives; support for Bulgarian NATO membership in contrast could also be sought from the European allies of the Alliance. What leaned then Bulgarian position more to the American one?

Partly this could be placing shorter-term priorities first, although minister of defence Svinarov ruled out adamantly such possibility as early as the end of August, 2002. On a question on the Bulgarian position over the ICC, he said that Bulgaria "has never ever stated that its membership in NATO should be for sake of membership in the EU. Nor has she stated that the security our country wants to ensure for herself and its partners through membership in the Alliance would impede the type of security we want to ensure ourselves through membership in the EU and its security structures"³⁸.

Partly it was the rift in EU-US positions over the means for sustaining democratic peace in Iraq.

Mostly it was the lack of a truly European position as opposed to the American in result of ruptures inside the European Union. British and Spanish involvement as 'willing' in the American coalition made impossible the construction of any truly European position contrasting the American one at heart. The internal EU opposition furthermore stole much of the value and strength of the European Council conclusions of 17 February 2003, which came too late anyway to block war preparations.

Iraqi aftermath gave chances to shrink the differences. Mr Blair's hopes that after the fighting in Iraq all sides will discover an interest in building the new Iraq and rediscover the spirit and art of compromise turned out right. Attempts for new diplomatic ruptures in the UN Security Council were overcome, the final result being UNSCR 1483 (22 May 2003) which lifted sanctions against Iraq, determined UN role in the rebuild of the country and its institutions and the gradual cease of the 'Food for oil' programme.

Mitigation of stern stances and more compromise have been witnessed indeed in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. No miracles have taken place in EU-US relationships but a tempered realism has been displayed by both parties.

The International Criminal Court (ICC)

Divergences in EU-US relations have interfered in the question of ICC as well. Strong American reaction to the ICC threatened the healthy birth of the Court after more than 50 years in the making.

The disputes between the EU and the USA started in the UN Security Council in August 2002 when the draft resolution to continue peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina was voted. The US voted against, as it did not accept the possibility that American soldiers could fall under ICC jurisdiction. The US had already threatened during the signing of the Rome Statute to withdraw its forces from the Balkans, if their views on the Court were not accepted.

Bulgaria was the only country then that abstained from voting, the remaining countries voted favourably. This gave food to some observers to suspect Bulgaria in giving the US additional arguments to support invitation to Bulgaria at the Prague

Summit in November later the same year, as from the entry as non-permanent member of the UN SC Bulgaria has been either voting with the US or abstaining from voting. Arguments for a more individual position trying to strike the balance can also be provided.³⁹

The massive US campaign for concluding bilateral agreements with UN members aiming to exclude US citizens from the jurisdiction of the ICC resulted in a EU compromise. In October 2002 the EU Council (ministers of foreign affairs) came up with 'principal guidelines' for the EU MS which would like to conclude bilateral agreements with the US. The bilateral agreements would exclude US soldiers, civil servants and diplomats (but not all US citizens) from the ICC jurisdiction, and would be committing the US in bringing the Americans accused in crimes against humanity before American courts.

The compromise did more damage than good. In relation to the newly borne ICC, it questioned the very *raison d'être* of the ICC set up as a universally legitimate law administering international institution. The EU was rifted in two camps – UK, Spain and Italy expressed willingness to sign the US bilateral agreements, while Germany refused to strike any deals.

Bulgaria saved face only by accident. Romania, which was the first EU candidate country to sign bilateral agreement with the USA, roused angry reactions in the EU. The official reply from Brussels came immediately, calling on EU applicants not to rush signing the proposed bilateral agreements, and expressed regrets over Romania's move which, the EU implied, was perhaps dictated by its wish to join the Alliance. The US reaction was equally pungent in accusing the EU that it tried to determine foreign policy choices of applicant countries.

First releases of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) routinely spoke of consultations with the American side but did not mention the EU. Strong EU reactions however halted any Bulgarian moves before an official EU position had been adopted. Deputy minister of foreign affairs Draganov flew over to Denmark, holding the EU presidency, for speedy consultations. Torn between Brussels and Washington, Bulgarian diplomacy once more was in a position to have to priorities its priorities.

American position on the EU “Guidelines” was delayed, and the crisis in Iraq pushed the issue down on the agenda. At the European Council Summit in Thessaloniki (19-20/06/2003) the ten future EU MS, the EFTA countries, as well as Bulgaria and Romania stated that they subscribe to the EU Council common position concerning the ICC. The US affirmed in a confidential memorandum just few days afterwards that EU’s appeal to its future MS not to sign such agreements could “undermine all our efforts to repair and reshape the transatlantic relationship”⁴⁰. The EU-US Summit on 25 June 2003 made sure to keep the issue out of its agenda.

The stake for Bulgaria is 20 million USD in military support from the US, as an American law, which will be enforced on July 1st, 2003 prohibits that military support is provided to countries which have not signed bilateral agreement on ICC. Exception is made for NATO members and few individually listed countries. Derogations may be decided only by the US President.

The news failed to produce sensation. Talks and discussions were going on in Washington and in Sofia; US Ambassador to Sofia and Bulgarian deputy-minister of foreign affairs spoke moderately of the possible outcomes. “Positions are known, together with the other countries Bulgaria would like to be treated as NATO member”⁴¹. After NAC decision of 17 June 2003 to give all NATO applicants access as observers in most of the Alliance’s committees and organs, treating Bulgaria as NATO member is not really outrageous.

Once again irreconcilable EU and US stances confronted Bulgaria with an impossible situation to choose between foreign policy priorities that were complementary but in no case convertible. The substantial time lags in the evolution of the ‘priorities conflict’ gave a certain distance in perspective. Mitigated US-EU divergences softened US reaction. The dynamics of the European Council played a decisive role interlocking issues in a single broad agenda. Moreover, and not because the ICC has always been a European project: the Council presented the draft Constitution of the European Union. With its many flaws it is still a milestone in European integration, a “new page in European history”, as Costas Simits said. Staying firmly in the European caucus was the only possible Bulgarian option.

Conclusion

The review of two particular cases – the crisis in Iraq and the International Criminal Court served to demonstrate how divergences between the major security actors, the EU and the US, influence particular third parties like EU/NATO applicant countries, and side processes like the enlargement ones.

The divergent positions displayed in the security context are related to different security concepts. Upon review however, European and Atlantic security concepts display differences *and* similarities. Similarities largely stem from attempts to answer the challenges of a changed security environment. They include focus on threats to the values and way of life of communities; incorporated non-military dimensions of security; and strong regional approach. Differences reflect the distinct nature of security actors: as a *sui generis organisation* the European Union incorporates in its security concept characteristics intrinsic to its nature. Those are the perception of the international system as socially textured; recognition of the importance of history and culture in security context; and a deep interrelation between democracy, integration and markets', indispensable of a 'we' community feeling.

The two security concepts are projected on transformation processes going inside the actors, a reforming NATO and a developing European Security and Defence Policy. The genesis of the two formation processes has shown an enduring continuity and complementarity in the area where they intersect. The differences in the security concepts have defined the directions of transformation: for NATO this is expanded scope beyond territorial constraint, new 'security roles', and increased military capability and efficiency. For the EU this is own defence policy instrument to complement its remaining instruments and enhance its international role. Overlapping membership and common area of action (EU-led operations availing of NATO assets) serve to enhance transatlantic relationship rather than be points of contest due to the different nature and *raison d'être* of the actors.

Another area of projection of the security concepts of the two security actors is enlargement, an indispensable part of the transformation processes going on. There the enlargement processes follow individual dynamic, work by different *modus operandi* and the two security concepts divert mostly from each other. In the case of NATO the security concept is narrowed to efficient military capability and US

involvement. In the case of EU the security concept is indefinitely extended and includes all spheres of the European Union. However, no overarching mechanism has been created in this dual process of enlargement to relate the most diverging ends of the two security actors.

Failure to entangle differences has in turn moderated similarities. The vacuum created by decoupling the two enlargement processes left no common ground for security and integration to interact, which obscured a very basic fact beyond security concepts - common fundamental values and shared interests in democracy, peace, and the rule of law.

The case study for Bulgaria showed the absurdity of conflicting the two security concepts. The rifts that occurred have been exacerbated by the *practice* of security concepts, not by the concepts themselves. It is therefore important to ensure that point of departure for any 'practice of security' will be the common fundamental values. Such security practices will contain differences without letting them extrapolate to serious rifts and ruptures and will enhance a mature transatlantic security environment of mitigated divergences.

¹ A. Hyde-Price (2001) "Beware the Jabberwock!": Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century," in Heinz Gaertner et al (eds.) (2001) *Europe's New Security Challenges*. (Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.)

² See, e.g. US President Bush's 'National Security Strategy' presented in September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ncs/nss.pdf>, and CFSP HR Solana's document on a 'Safe Europe in a better world', presented to the EU heads of state and government during the European Council in Thessaloniki, Bulletin Quotidien Europe 8481, Document No. 2320 *Javier Solana's first paper on broad lines for European Security Policy*, 26/06/2003.

³ 'Comprehensive security', which views security as reaching beyond the military and diplomatic fields to embrace economic, societal, environmental and cultural aspects, became common in 1990s. Discussions varied between a wider definition of the term and voiced concerns of risking militarisation of civilian policies, e.g. drugs and refugees. The Danish foreign minister further enriched the notion in 1996 by distinguishing between soft security, hard security and civic security. See Clive Archer (2001) "What security? What order?", in M. A. Smith and G. Timmins (2001) *Uncertain Europe: Building a New European Security Order?* (London: Routledge)

⁴ John Ruggie (1998) *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation* (London: Routledge), Hyde-Price *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁵ The starting point of the legacy of history and culture in addressing international politics belongs to the English school.

⁶ The Kosovo case, Hyde-Price suggests, *op. cit.*, p. 44, put forward the question whether a state still enjoys sovereignty if it commits gross violations of human rights.

⁷ See Ben Rosamond (2000) *Theories of European Integration* (London: Macmillan Press), esp. pp. 171-174; Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell (1999) "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the 'Construction' of Post-Cold War Europe", *International Organisation*, no. 53, 3, Summer 1999, pp. 505-535.

⁸ The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999 (1999) *The NATO Handbook Documentation* (NATO Office for Information and Press)

⁹ *ibid.*, paras 25 and 26.

¹⁰ Horst Guenter Krenzler, chairman, Milada Anna Vachudova, rapporteur (2001), "The European Defence and Security Policy and the EU Enlargement to Eastern Europe", Report of the Working Group of the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, *Policy Papers*, RSC No. 01/1 (European University Institute, Florence).

¹¹ Jan Davidson, "The European Union and its near abroad," *Challenge Europe*, 22 November 2000, p. 4, at http://www.theepc.be/Challenge_Europe/.

¹² Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

¹³ In the deliberations of ESDP the WEU has been proposed to take on European clothing and serve as a fourth defence pillar. This would have posed problems with regard to memberships, as the full WEU members are members of both the EU and NATO.

¹⁴ Antonio Missiroli (2000), "CFSP, defence and flexibility," *Chaillot Paper* 38 (Paris – February 2000).

¹⁵ Conditions set by then US Secretary of State Madelaine Albright to the development of European defence capability, 7 December 1998.

¹⁶ First statement of Lord Robertson as NATO's new Secretary-General.

¹⁷ Charles Grant, "European defence from 2010 – a British view," *Challenge Europe*, 21 October 2000, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸ In the words of a French observer, p. 94, in 'NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11', *Parameters*, Summer 2003, pp. 89-97.

¹⁹ Javier Solana (2003), *op. cit.*

²⁰ An interesting view in this aspect is expressed by Stelios Stavridis, who argues that developing a [C]ESDP will purport the civilian power role of the Union by allowing the EU to "force the external promotion of democratic principles", emphasis added). See Stelios Stavridis (2001), "Why the 'Militarising' of the European Union is Strengthening the Concept of a Civilian Power Europe", in *EUI Working Papers* RSC No. 2001/17 (2001: European University Institute, Florence). The discussion on Civilian Power Europe is interestingly represented in its other pole by Jan Zielonka and Karen E. Smith, who argue that substituting Duchêne's civilian power Europe with anything outside the purely civilian scope would be detrimental to the perception of Europe as a promoter of a specific set of (civilian) values. See Karen E. Smith (2000), "The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?", *The International Spectator*, Volume XXXV, No. 2, April-June 2000, pp. 11 – 28, and Jan Zielonka (2000), "Transatlantic Relations Beyond the CFSP", *The International Spectator* Volume XXXV, No. 4, October – December 2000, pp. 27 – 41.

²¹ William Hopkins (2001) *Enlargement: a new NATO* (October 2001: Institute for Security Studies of WEU).

²² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²³ NATO SG Robertson on ESDI, urging European leaders to 'exercise rhetorical discipline', in Douglas Hamilton, "European Rapid Reaction Force Unlikely by 2003," *Reuters*, 29 March 2000, p. 1.

²⁴ Kostas Simitis (2003) *Bulletin Quotidien Europe* 8492.

²⁵ Romano Prodi (2003) *Bulletin Quotidien Europe* 8492.

²⁶ Useful in this respect can be the analysis of speech acts and their contexts for creating institutional interests, norms and identities, see K. M. Fierke and Antje Wiener, "Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO enlargement", *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:5 December 1999, pp. 721-42.

²⁷ Adrian Hyde-Price, "The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargeemnt and the Reshaping of European Order," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (December 2000), pp. 139 – 167 (London: Frank Cass).

²⁸ Helen Wallace, "Pan-European Integration: A Real or Imagined Community?", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1997), pp. 214-33.

²⁹ Caricature of Ivan Koutouzov, *Kapital*, 7 March 2003.

³⁰ The 'Helsinki' group of candidate countries, the other five are Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.

³¹ In 2002 Bulgaria was recognised by the European Commission the 'champion in accession negotiations'. For one year only it managed to open all 30 negotiations chapters and doubled to 20 the number of closed ones.

³² Ian Davidson, "In a time warp: Europe and American Superpower", *The European Policy Centre*, 17 May 2002 at <http://www.theepc.be>.

³³ As quoted in *The Economist*, March 1st 2003, p. 23.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³⁶ The visit was allegedly postponed awaiting the EU position on the crisis in Iraq at the European Council on 17 February 2003.

³⁷ 'It's the economy, stupid!' is a remark of Bill Clinton,

³⁸ Interview with Minister of Defence Nikolay Svinarov in *Kapital*, 31 August – 5 September 2002, p. 11.

³⁹ Sasho Peychev (diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), explains at length why two successive Bulgarian abstentions in the UN SC are not a satellite syndrom but consistent moves of Bulgarian diplomacy, See "[the Bulgarian diplomacy], This tender but brave small lady", in *Sega newspaper*, 2 September 2002, p. 11.

⁴⁰ *Bulletin Quotidien Europe* 8480, 25/6/2003.

⁴¹ *Dnevnik Daily*, 24 June 2003, p. 2.