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FINAL REPORT

PEACE AND DEMOCRACY: THE REDISCOVERED LINK
THE EU, NATO and the European *System of Liberal-Democratic*
Security Communities

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ABSTRACT

Since the beginning of the last decade, the major actors of the Western European security community have been putting increasing or new emphasis on the need to develop liberal democracy as a form of foreign and/or security policy in the post-bipolar era. Apparently rediscovering the theory of democratic peace of Kantian memory, all institutions of the so-called European security architecture, plus the US, have dedicated a substantial part of their redefined (external) role to democratisation. This (re)discovered emphasis has clearly been a response to post-bipolar security (lack of clearly defined) challenges but has had implications that have gone beyond the specific interests of each actor involved. The discourse and practice of democracy-export has in fact contributed to creating the conditions for the definition of a system of democratic security communities characterised by different degrees of maturity and tightness (Adler & Barnett 1998), but with a common sense of “us”: liberal democracy. The shape of this “system” is sensibly influenced by the international institutions of the so-called European security architecture, but the boundaries of each of the concentric circles within the system do not correspond with those of the various institutions but rather with less material borders that are connected with the interactive practices brought into existence by these institutions outside their strict membership area.

This paper seeks to analyse the progressive enlargement of the Western European security community by means of community building practices and democracy-export in Central and Eastern Europe. In theoretical terms, this paper combines the concept of “security community” (drawn from Karl Deutsch on the one hand, and Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett on the other) with the Kantian theory of democratic peace and Doyleian re-introduction in IR.

CONTENT

Acknowledgments

INTRODUCTION

Organisation of the Paper

A Methodological Note

1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Relevant Literature

1.2. Democratic Peace Meets the Security Communities: Defining the Theoretical Framework

2. REDISCOVERED DEMOCRACY, REDEFINED COMMUNITIES: THE EU AND NATO AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

2.1. Institutional Interests, Identity and Security in Post-Cold War Europe

NATO: Identity, Legitimation and the Security-Through-Democracy Solution

The EU: An International Identity with an Internal Legacy

2.2. The Construction of the European System of Democratic Security Communities: NATO and the EU at Work

2.2.1. NATO

Instruments

Socialisation through the PFP & Co.

2.2.2. The European Union

Instruments

Dictating and Persuading

2.3. Has it Worked? Some Preliminary Data on Democratisation and Securitisation

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

REFERENCES

ANNEXES

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INTRODUCTION

What does the experience of post-Cold War involvement in Central and Eastern Europe by the North Atlantic Treaty organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) tell us about security in post-bipolar Europe and beyond?

I claim that the main lesson is that in post-Cold War Europe major institutional actors have defined “security” as closely linked to “democracy” and enacted a series of policies aimed at developing democratic institutions in the neighbouring Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). As a matter of fact, since the beginning of the last decade, the major actors of the Western European security community¹ have put increasing or new emphasis on the need to develop liberal democracy as a form of foreign and/or security policy in the post-bipolar era. Apparently rediscovering the theory of democratic peace of Kantian memory, all institutions responded *de facto* by adopting Immanuel Kant’s recipe for “Perpetual peace”: (1) “republican constitutions” (in today’s terms *representative democracy*), (2) “federalism” i.e. *international law and organisations* (i.e. enlargement of existent IGOs to new members), (3) the right to hospitality as the core principle of cosmopolitan law, which involves, amongst other things, the *development of free trade*. The core element of the entire enterprise is the development of liberal democratic norms and institutions, also through membership in international organisations. This link between democracy-building and security was first made explicit by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)² which, as Emanuel Adler has effectively demonstrated (Adler 1997a; 1998; cf. Flynn & Farrell 1999), was able to develop innovative security community-building processes and practices according to a new comprehensive concept of security within which the basic principles of liberal democracy apply. However, NATO and the EU also played (and indeed still play) a role in enlarging the Western European security community by means of community building practices.

By doing so the major international institutions of the so-called European security architecture had a twofold aim to: (i) redefine (in the case of NATO) or reinforce (in the case of the EU) their own international identity so to gain new (or reinforced) legitimisation; and (ii) develop security by means of diffusing Western liberal democratic principles and norms. I

¹ Here I refer to Karl Deutsch’s concept of security community (1957) and its constructivist redefinition by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler & Barnett eds. 1998; Adler 1997a). On West European security (or “non-war”) community, see Wæver 1999.

² In 1995 the CSCE became a fully-fledged organisation under the name of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

would claim that the second aim is at least as important as the first one, and in the medium-long term, far more important than the first, given the decreasing questioning around the need to keep these organisations (particularly NATO) alive.

Furthermore, besides the basic aims that Western organisations were trying to satisfy when launching the security-though-democracy discourse and policies, the ultimate effect of their behaviour has been to *de facto* already create the conditions for an expansion of the so-called transatlantic security community and the development of a “system of democratic security communities” characterised by different degrees of maturity and tightness (Adler & Barnett 1998), but with a common sense of “us”: liberal democracy. In other terms, here it is claimed, that a central element (although not the only one) in the development of a system of security communities in post-bipolar Europe has been the spread of liberal-democratic norms and values through the political discourse, policies and practices brought into existence primarily by the CSCE, NATO and the EU.

If the shape of this “system” is sensibly influenced by the international institutions of the so-called European security architecture, the boundaries of each of the concentric circles within the system do not correspond with the boundaries of the various institutions but rather with less material boundaries that are connected with the interactive practices brought into existence by these institutions outside their strict membership area and by the likelihood of third countries becoming successful applicants. It is for this reason that the concept of a *system* of collective security communities is employed here: there is not just the quasi-amalgamated (Deutsch 1957) or tightly-coupled (Adler & Barnett 1998) security community represented by EU member states, but there are also the less mature and tightly-coupled (if not loosely-coupled) security communities represented by the states already negotiating for EU membership, those applying for EU membership but with little possibility of entrance in the medium term and, finally the larger circle of states including those involved in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme but not in the other circles (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, ...). Variation is then evident also within the circles.

Before proceeding, a clarification is due. Given the restricted focus adopted here on the role played by NATO and the EU in the expansion of security three basic facts need to be recognised beforehand in order to avoid misunderstandings:

- (i) The progressive expansion of democracy and the general recognition of this as the only legitimate form of government is one of the features of current processes in world politics that goes far beyond the will and capability of individual actors (collective or not)

to promote democratic transition (cf. Fukuyama). This could be regarded as part of what Hedley Bull called “the expansion of the International Society” (Bull 1977), or as a feature of the current processes of globalisation - most frequently regarded in conjunction with the processes of trans-nationalisation and de-nationalisation (Beck 1997; Held et al. 1999), but also in relation to the universalisation of democracy and human rights (Habermas 1998);

- (ii) Most international actors, governmental or non-governmental, have a role in the promotion and protection of democracy. Virtually all Western states support international efforts aimed at promoting democracy, and most international organisations and hundreds of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a direct role in this enterprise (see Schmitter & Brouwer 2000). The literature on democracy promotion points clearly to the massive effort of the so-called international community in the development of democratic institutions and political culture in non-democratic countries³;
- (iii) Finally, this focus on international agents of “securitisation”⁴ though democratisation should not give the impression that domestic agents and structures of successful democratisation are neglected. As clearly underlined by a large part of the literature on democratic transition, the success or failure both of the transition and of the destabilising effects of it has to do with domestic historical, institutional and cultural factors. This explains to a large extent the variation in the net effects both on the democratisation and securitisation of CEECs. The analysis of these factors, however, lies outside the aim of this paper, but might be taken into consideration in further stages of the development of this research project.

Having recognised that democracy promotion does not involve NATO and the EU exclusively even in the limited area of Europe, this paper aims to point to the specific role played by these two organisations as those which have had the greatest leverage on post-communist European countries (through promise of enlargement of the security and prosperity area they represent) and which contributed to restating and giving content to norms and principles affirmed elsewhere (in the OSCE Charter of Paris, for instance).

³ Jan Zielonka recalls that in 1998, according to statistics, the Soros Foundation invested more in democracy-related projects in Russia than the European Union or its largest member states (Zielonka 2001: 715).

⁴ The term “securitisation” is used here in the sense of increased perception of security, and has nothing to do with definition of Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998; cf. McSweeney 1996; Huysmans 1998).

Organisation of the Paper

After a brief methodological note, the paper goes on to quickly revise the branches of literature that are relevant to this work and presenting the basic theoretical framework here employed. Drawing from the literature on (pluralistic) security communities and from the theory of democratic peace, section one introduces the basic theoretical framework used.

The second section shows how NATO and the EU have contributed to the definition of this security system. This is done by (i) first, showing how the two organisations' (re)gained attention to the promotion of democracy in the post-Cold War era was a result of the interests and perceptions of the two in the changed international circumstances; (ii) second, evidencing with which instruments, mechanisms and styles the security-through-democracy policy was carried out. The type of liberal-democracy exported and the way of diffusing liberal-democratic norms are shown to vary in the two organisations, therefore an evaluation of this variation and an evaluation of the net effect on the creation of the security system is proposed.

Finally, a preliminary evaluation of the development of a democratic security community throughout Europe is provided.

A Methodological Note

Geographical scope: with a view to limiting the scope of the research, attention is here concentrated on CEECs.

Time: as far as the period taken into consideration is concerned, the paper focuses attention on the last decade of the XX century (1990-2000).

Sources: the research draws from official EU and NATO documents, existent literature on various aspects of the theory applied or issues analysed, and, finally, some semi-structured interviews (a list of those interviewed is in annex 4).

1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Relevant Literature

The literature dealing with various aspects of this paper is already wide, but there are limited attempts at providing an overall picture of the evolution of transatlantic security while at the

same time comparing the role played by the two major institutional actors of this game. As a matter of fact, as far as NATO is concerned attention in the literature is mostly paid to the evolution of NATO in the post-Cold War period (Brenner ed. 1998; Drew 1995; McCalla 1996; Yost 1998) and the enlargement of the organisation (Gaddis 1998; Schimmelfennig 1998/9; Solomon 1998; Menotti 1999; MacGwire 1998)⁵. Some literature recently appeared on NATO's attempt to export liberal-democratic norms towards Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig 1998/9; Williams & Neumann 2000; Risse-Kappen 1996). Usually, however, little attempt is made to couple an evaluation of the characteristics and motives of NATO's transformation (mainly in relation to enlargement) with an evaluation of the means, and far less of an attempt is made to evaluate how security in the surrounding area has been affected by the very fact of NATO's deep transformation (interesting exceptions include Williams & Neumann 2000; Gheciu 2002a and 2002b; Flockhart 2001).

As for the EU, the massive body of literature on EU external relations (previously mainly dealing either with economic relations or with foreign and security policy issues) has evolved so as to introduce more theoretically-informed reflections either on the EU as an actor in a globalised world (Jørgensen & Rosamond 2001) or as an international actor which acts differently as it is differently constituted. According to this latter branch of literature the international behaviour but also *identity* of this actor is shaped by its intrinsic nature. On this second point, particularly interesting are the revisions of the literature that depicted the European Union as a "civilian power". The original concept developed by François Duchêne (1972, 1973) and also applied to the description of Germany and Japan's form of international power (Maull 1990) has been refined (Telò 2001, 2002) and reformulated (Manners 2001) so as to indicate that the EU's main form of international power rests in its nature of "normative power", in Manners' words, of a "promoter of norms in the solidarist tradition" (2001, p. 1). This literature, together with that focusing attention on the international identity of the European Union (Cederman ed. 2001; Manners & Whitman 2001; Whitman 1998; Cerutti 2001), provide an important point of reference for the analysis of the EU's role in the development of liberal-democratic security communities, but fails to explicit the link between security and democracy as well as a comparative dimension with the case of NATO.

A further branch of literature that is relevant for this study is the well-documented studies of democratic transitions (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Bonanate 2000; Diamond 1999), of democracy promotion (Schmitter & Brouwer 2000), particularly in Central and Eastern

⁵ For a comparison between NATO and EU enlargements, see Fierke & Wiener 1999; Sperling ed. 1999.

Europe (for example, Linz & Stepan 1996; Vachudová 2001) and the role of international actors therein (Bonanate 2000; Zielonka & Pravda 2000; Pridham, Herring & Sanford 1994). These studies – frequently but not exclusively - either tend to be primarily empirically-oriented, aiming at evaluation the actual degree of democratic transition and the problems connected therewith, or devote exclusive theoretical attention to theories of democratic transition, rather than to theories of security-through-democracy.

As for the transfer of liberal-democratic norms by international institutions, another branch of literature that provides a valuable source of inspiration and information for this work is the one that goes under the label of *socialisation*. Works by Jeffrey Checkel and other members of his research groups (Gheciu 2002a; cf. also Flockhart 2001, 2002) show how the constructivists' claim that values and ideas matter in politics can actually guide empirically-grounded research (contrary to the initial perception of the potentials of “reflectivism” in the “rationalist” front – see Keohane 1988; Lucarelli 2000: 81ff.). Constant interaction among people produces forms of social learning that regard political elites as well as ordinary people. In these works, therefore, theoretical developments in the sociological fields are used and applied for the analysis of international politics⁶.

As far as the analysis of security is concerned, there are various branches of literature on security and its evolution after the Cold War that are relevant, from the early pleas for the widening of the concept of security by Ullman (1983) to the development of the concept of “security complexes” by Barry Buzan (1983) and later “securitisation” by the so-called Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998; cf. McSweeney 1996; Huysmans 1998). These developments in the study of security have widened the concept from the point of view of both functional sectors (beyond pure military security) and levels of analysis (looking at societies and identities and the main source of insecurity in the 1990s). However, I claim that those theories fail to grasp the essence of the “securitising enterprise” in Europe in the 1990s, that rests on the fact that institutional actors became promoters of liberal-democratic norms in order to respond to the double security challenge of the end of the Cold War: (i) their own international identity and legitimisation; and (ii) possible instability and war in their neighbourhood.

⁶ The founding work defining Constructivism can probably be considered Adler 1997b. Similarly well known are the writings by Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999); John Ruggie (1998a, 1998b); Nicolas Onuf (1989) and

1.2. Democratic Peace Meets the Security Communities: Defining the Theoretical Framework

The fact that democracies tend not to make war among themselves is not a new discovery, but this proposition has been reintroduced rather recently into the internationalist debate and upgraded to the level of theory⁷, when not to the level of proper "law"⁸. The debate centres on the empirical verification of the proposition, the choice of criteria to select relevant cases in which two or more "democracies" have engaged in "war" one against the other (two problematic terms on which the theoretical debate is open)⁹, and the explanations provided for the causal relationship between the internal political system of a state and its propensity to project war towards similar political systems. The latter seems to be the nucleus of the problem: *what in a democratic political system leads to adopting peaceful behaviour towards other democracies?*¹⁰.

Before proceeding to analyse the responses to this question that are put forward in the literature, it is worth spending a few words on the concept of "democracy". This is probably the concept of political theory on which most ink has been used in order to provide suitable definitions, but at the same time it is also one of the most self-intuitive words of Western civilisation. Most citizens of a Western society if interviewed in the street would be able to provide a plausibly acceptable answer to the question "what is a democracy?" Yet the concept continues to be vague and subject to more or less minimalist interpretations. I claim here that

Fredrich Kratochwill. Review articles on constructivism include Checkel 1998; Palan 2000; Guzzini 2000. For a rich overview of the different forms of Constructivisms, see Fierke & Jørgensen eds 2001.

⁷ The founding father of the theory of democratic peace (TDP) is considered to be Immanuel Kant (1795/1991). Since the 1990s, however, there has been renewed attention to the link between peace and democracy. See amongst others: Maoz & Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Russett & Zeev 1993; Doyle 1983, 1996. For a critical perspective or re-reading of this theory, see Risse-Kappen 1995; Brown et al. Eds. 1996; Chan 1997; Cohen 1994, 1995; Spiro 1994.

⁸ Jack Levy defined the affirmation "the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations" (Levy 1989: 88).

⁹ Some observers affirm that in reality democracies have made war on each other several times; it depends on the definition that we give to the two terms "democracy" and "war". See, for example, Layne 1994; Waltz 1993: 78. On the statistical (in)significance of the data shown by supporters of the theory of democratic peace, see, for example, Spiro 1994 and the debate that followed his article: Russett et al. 1995.

¹⁰ The question is without doubt formulated from the point of view of a supporter of the TDP as it excludes a priori that the relation between democracy and peace is spurious, inexistent, as both democracy and peace would find their origin in a third factor of reference. Layne (1994), for example, argues that the structure of the international system is such that democracies emerge where there is less preoccupation for national security, therefore in a context in which the lesser probability of war is linked to the structure of the international system and not to the states being democratic. For support of a realist explanation of the link between war and democracy, see also Spiro 1994. For an evaluation of alternative explanations of democratic peace, see, for

we can talk about areas of democratic peace in a proper way only if we conceive democracy in a broad and requiring sense to indicate a political system which goes far beyond the presence of free elections (as in the minimalist definition of Joseph Schumpeter 1952), and includes a multiplicity of institutional attributes and procedures that enable the system to have *capacity of responsiveness* to the preferences of its citizens, all considered politically equal (Dahl 1971). This *capacity of responsiveness* cannot be relative solely to the existence of free elections as this would be insufficient in absence, for example, of individual political and civil liberties, a division of powers and a political culture that accepts the counterintuitive rule that the rule of the majority is delegated to concurrent minorities on the basis of the electoral vote (cf. Sartori 1957; see also Morlino 1998). What we are talking about is, therefore, “liberal democracy”.

The explanations of why thus shaped political systems do not fight each other fall into three types, two related to the internal "institutional" constraints of a democratic political structure, and one - so-called "normative" - linked to the norms and political culture at the basis of a democratic system (cf. Russett & Maoz 1993; Russett 1993).

1. The first variation of the institutional explanation, directly inspired by Kant, has to do with the fact that democratic governments have to respond for their conduct before their citizens (Kant 1795/1991: 100; Doyle 1983, 1986). The argument is founded on a rational costs-benefit calculation on the basis of which the citizens tend to oppose the participation of their country in a war and consequently discourage the political elites from taking up a war lest they meet with popular disapproval in the successive elections¹¹. In this case it is affirmed that an internal bond exists to democracies making war, but it does not explain why this bond is only valid for wars against other democracies, unless the argument is founded purely on a similar constraint experienced by national leaders of the possible rival democracy. Furthermore, the explanation is very reductive of the complexity of a democratic system and tends to fall into the “fallacy of electoralism” (Lynn Karl 2000: 95-6), i.e. a minimalist definition of democracy that does not capture the potentials of the system.

2. The second "institutional" explanation regards the structure of weights and counterweights in a democratic political system: democratic political systems are characterised by the presence of a complex structure of weights, counterweights and forms of

example, Russett 1993. A detailed critical evaluation of the theory of democratic peace with respect to other explanations (both "realist" and "liberal") of democracies' foreign policy can be found in Panebianco 1997.

¹¹ For an empirical verification of the importance of this explanation for democratic peace, see Siverson 1995.

control - among institutions (executive and parliament for example), between the political systems and social groups, etc. The decision-making process in these systems is, therefore, complex and tends to be slow, above all when it regards matters of peace or war, and makes obligatory the search for a vast internal majority in favour of war. This means that the national leaders are constrained by the internal decision-making processes and they know that similar constraints are encountered by leaders of the antagonist democracy and therefore they do not fear surprise attacks (Russett 1993:40). As Thomas Risse effectively points out, the explanation regards more the inclination towards war of a centralised regime with respect to a decentralised one, rather than a democracy versus a non-democracy (Risse-Kappen 1995: 408). Furthermore, it is not clear why the simple fact that a political elite has good reasons to feel secure from a first strike should prevent it from moving war first. The situation leads back to the security dilemma and frequently it is precisely on the basis of this dilemma that states go to war or make preparations therefore (as the story of the arms race tells). The conciliatory behaviour that should arise from internal bonds and expectations about the counterpart's domestic bonds holds up only if we place the players within a political system at work in which are norms and values that (i) allow for the existence and influence of the system of check and balances and, in game theory terms, (ii) lead the players to play the "international crisis game" in a cooperative rather than non cooperative manner (this avoiding a less than optimal result for both the players/states/societies). This leads us to the third explanation, which we consider to be the central one, not just because it is more relevant than the others, but because it can provide a meaning for the other two as well.

3. Liberal democracies (*de facto* what the literature on democratic peace refers to) are not characterised solely by rules of citizens' participation in decision-making processes, weights and counterweights between institutions and rights, but also by norms, rules and procedures rooted in political culture and institutionalised into the political system (Risse-Kappen 1995: 409). It is precisely on the basis of these norms and principles that democratic regimes are assumed to be committed to respecting human rights, guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and protecting the rights of minorities. The rules of democracy impose a peaceful resolution of conflict among the parties that take part in the domestic political game; they equally imply the acceptance of the majority rule and the alternation of governments - therefore the legitimacy of social and political diversity. The third version of democratic peace argues, therefore, that the peaceful conduct of democracies towards similar regimes is an extension of the norms, rules and procedures that guide internal politics to relations with political regimes *perceived*

to be similar¹². The reason why democracies tend not to adopt the same behaviour in the case of other political systems has to do with the fact that the foreign policy of a non-democratic regime is not subject to the various constraints that a democracy has to face and, therefore, is more difficult to forecast – hence more uncertain and less reliable. Moreover, shared norms and repeated interaction on the basis of democratic norms and values¹³ produce a process of collective identification of the "ins" group which greatly reduces the conflictual consequences of the security dilemma. Then, when the group institutionalises the shared practices and norms to form international regimes or international organisations, the democratic peace grounded on a common identification around a core group of norms and values finds further points of strength.

It is precisely on the basis of this last explanation of democratic peace that the relationship between areas of democratic peace and security communities becomes clear: shared norms and values provide the necessary condition for the self-identification of states as members of a *community*. Put it in different terms, an area of democratic peace represents a specific type of what another branch of literature labels a “Security Community”¹⁴.

The literature on (pluralistic) security communities (Deutsch 1957; Adler & Barnett eds. 1998), lists three main characteristics of a *community*: (i) shared identities, values and meanings; (ii) many-sided and direct relations amongst the units; and (iii) diffuse reciprocity. A community of states is then a pluralistic *security* community when within it there are *dependable expectations of peaceful change*, that is, when the states neither expect nor prepare organised violence as a means to solve their disputes. Reciprocal diffused

¹² On the role of perception see Owen 1994.

¹³ It might be time to provide some definition of what it is meant here for norms and values. *Values* are notions or images laden with an absolute (i.e. non-instrumental) positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to find/to give to our world (e.g. freedom, whether as a moral or a political concept; honour; justice...good examples are the titles of 5 of the 6 chapters of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity, justice). *Norms* can be regarded as prescriptions regarding behaviour in certain given circumstances. Norms can be of various types (utilitarian/functional, ethical, etc.), but all, to different degrees, reflect a certain system of values (systems that do not have a prescriptive function until they become embedded in normative frameworks of a sociological or a juridical type). *Principles* are the normative propositions which translate values into general “constitutional” norms. The modus of translation depends on how values are interpreted according to a particular worldview and the underlying cultural traditions: freedom is a pretty different thing in a individualistic-liberal or communitarian-collectivistic view of the social world. Look at the different ways worldwide “human” or Western values are translated. Values are not automatically translated into principles, nor principles into norms and norms directly affecting behaviour are certainly not.

¹⁴ On this point cf. Starr 1997.

expectations of peaceful settlement of disputes is therefore what makes a community a *security community*¹⁵.

When the core of the shared identities, values and meanings is provided by common liberal-democratic norms and values, then we can talk about a “*liberal-democratic security community*”. In this case we have a community in which there are:

- a) shared identities, values and meanings provided by liberal-democratic values,
- b) many-sided and direct relations amongst units that are greatly smoothed by the greater level of openness and permeability of liberal-democratic societies,
- c) liberal-democratic institutions and values in the countries guide their peaceful behaviour towards their democratic counterparts and create the basis for a sense of “community. Diffused reciprocity and dependable expectations of peaceful change depend to a large extent on the existence of an area of democratic peace (cf. Table 1).

Therefore, there is a *democratic security community* if there are:

1. democratic institutions and liberal-democratic norms and values
and
 2. many-sided and direct relations amongst units
- which produce dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Historically, the *security community par excellence*, the transatlantic security community, coincided with an area of democratic peace. Shared identities, values and meanings were constructed around a common understanding of the relationship between the development of liberal democratic institutions and norms (plus economic interdependence and common institutions), on the one side, and peace on the other side. The closer the security community has become (as in the case of the European Union), the closer the security community has come to what Karl Deutsch called an “amalgamated” security community, one where there has been a formal fusion of previously independent units into a single, wider unit, with the creation of a common form of government (Deutsch et al 1957: 6).¹⁶

¹⁵ In other words, not all “communities” are “security” communities as Deutsch assessed in his founding work; cf. Adler & Barnett 1998.

¹⁶ Deutsch’s conditions included: (i) similar values (political ideologies but also economic and religious values); (ii) the formation of a common sense of “us”; (iii) similar lifestyles; (iv) a group of leading actors (so as to avoid that the logic of the balance of power prevail); (v) high economic growth; (vi) positive expectations with respect to the advantages of integration; (vii) intensive transactions and communication; (viii) widening of the leading elites; (ix) stable links among the elites of different states; (x) high geographical mobility of the population.

Table 1. *Democratic Security Communities*

<p>DEMOCRATIC PEACE INGREDIENTS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Democratic institutions: (i) public control; (ii) institutional check and balances2. Democratic norms and values <p>NB: It is only in the framework of democratic norms and values that institutional mechanisms run against aggressive foreign policy, especially towards similar political systems.</p> <hr/> <p>SECURITY COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">a) a community of states with shared identities, values and meanings,b) with many-sided and direct relations amongst units,c) and diffused reciprocity and dependable expectations of peaceful change. <hr/> <p>DEMOCRATIC SECURITY COMMUNITY: a Security Community in which there are</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">a) shared identities, values and meanings provided by liberal-democratic values,b) many-sided and direct relations amongst units that are greatly smoothed by the greater level of openness and permeability of liberal-democratic societies,c) diffused reciprocity and dependable expectations of peaceful change depend to a large extent on the existence of an area of democratic peace.

Even remaining in the context of a pluralistic security community – one in which the units (states) maintain independent structure of government – a different degree of closeness can be indicated. Adler and Barnett (1998) distinguish between “loosely-coupled” and “tightly-coupled” security communities. The former is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change... [by virtue of] their shared structure of meanings and identity” (Adler & Barnett 1998: 30). Tightly-coupled security communities go beyond the minimal definitional properties of a security community in that they (i) have a “mutual aid” society and (ii) “possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized government” (Adler & Barnett 1998: 30). In both cases, however, a stable peace is due to the existence of a transnational community where core identities, values and meanings are shared, many-sided and direct relations occur and, finally, reciprocity is applied (either for long-term interest of for sense of obligation and responsibility). Some authors have noticed how NATO and the EU can be considered example, respectively, loosely- and tightly-coupled security communities (Rieker 2000: 16 on-line version).

Adler and Barnett distinguish security communities also with respect as to their being more or less “mature”. Mature security communities have accomplished all three phases of the creation of such a community (Adler & Barnett 1998: 56-7):

- *nascent phase*: governments start considering how they might coordinate their relations with other to increase security;
- *ascendant phase*: new institutions are created and a network of transnational communication is developed that facilitates mutual trust and the emergence of collective identities;
- *mature phase*: accomplishment of a community characterised by a high degree of mutual trust, shared identities, common sense of “we-ness” with respect to others outside the community, low or no probability of war.

In the case of a security community where reciprocal expectations of peaceful change depend on the successful diffusion of democratic norms and values¹⁷, the degree of maturity depends on the extent to which the successful democratisation has provided the type of institutional, societal and cultural guarantees that make an area of democratic peace work. I claim here, that what matters most in the creation of closer links among the members of a democratic security community is not the degree of technical implementation of democratic institutions and procedures (fair and free elections, rule of law, respect of human rights and minority rights legislation, ...) but rather the degree of interaction that the states and societies undertake in virtue of the democratisation process.

In other words, it is claimed here that the crucial elements in the construction of a security community are the creation of common norms and values and of many-sided contacts among the societies.

How are those common norms and values created? In the case of the extension of the “Western security community” eastward, how are Western liberal-democratic norms and values developed in Central and Eastern Europe? There are substantially three explanations of norms-compliance in the literature that follow three different logics:

¹⁷ Alternative explanations for the existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change are offered by rationalist theories such as realism and neoliberal institutionalism that envisage conditions (hegemonic power, the existence of formal international institutions, etc.) under which the interests and preferences of the actors are stable and/or in which the states through a rational cost-benefits calculation see an incentive to cooperate. In this paper, on the contrary, the explanation adopted is clearly one that draws from the branch of social constructivism that does not depart substantially from the traditional ontology of realism, but that recognises a fundamental link between identities, interests and behaviour.

- *the logic of consequentialism* → instrumental rationality behaviour: actors choose to comply if they thereby expect to maximise their utility function in the given circumstances (cf. March & Olsen 1989; an example is Moravcsik 1998)
- *the logic of appropriateness* → actors behave on the basis of what they consider to be the most appropriate – “right” – norm or rule to follow. These norms, then, not only regulate behaviour but also define identities (cf. March & Olsen 1989)
- *the logic of argumentative rationality* (“arguing”) → the choice of appropriate behaviour or best claim about cause-effect relationships is made in a communicative context in which two or more actors aim to persuade¹⁸ each other of the validity of his/her claim. Intersubjective structures of meanings are therefore produced through communicative interaction (Risse & Sikkink 1999; Risse 2000).

The different logics provide different explanations of norms-compliance. In the first case, there can be only *strategic adaptation*, in the second and third cases there is some *social learning*, but of a different type. The logic of appropriateness can be followed even if a norm has not been completely interiorised but simply because it is proposed by a source that is perceived to be authoritative. In the third case, on the contrary, the norm is accepted and interiorised through a process which includes challenging the validity of the norm in a communicative framework (cf. Table 2).¹⁹

I agree with the idea that all these logics take place in international politics and all types of norms-compliance are detectable, although with a different relative importance in different circumstances, phases and countries (cf. Risse & Sikkink 1999).

In the case of compliance with norms of liberal-democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, I claim that next to the obvious *strategic adaptation* made by the local countries to adjust to the requests of the Europe they wanted to “return to”, there is an actual degree of *social learning* through interaction with international actors.

The above argument implies that democratic security communities are not a reality only for stable democracies but are *created also through the process of democratisation* that is nourished by closer relationships between the elites and the societies of different countries. This does not deny that democratic transition is a delicate phase that “could also create a fertile climate for biases, hatred and thus conflict” (Isakovic 2002: 15 on-line version), but

¹⁸ “Argumentative persuasion is a social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion” (Checkel 2001: 562).

¹⁹ *Strictu sensu*, argumentative rationality is more difficult to be found in international relations in its ideal-type form which requires very strict conditions regarding the actors' self-recognition as equal and a shared “common life world” (Risse 2000:10).

rather it is to stress that *democratisation* (the process itself) can have positive effects on the construction of future security frameworks.²⁰

This “democratic security community” theoretical framework, therefore, regards both democracy and *democratisation* as fertile grounds for the emergence of actual security communities.

Table 2. *Logics of Action and Types of Norm-Compliance*

LOGIC OF ACTION	TYPE OF NORM-COMPLIANCE
<p>LOGIC OF CONSEQUENTIALISM</p> <p>Instrumental rationality behaviour: actors choose to comply if they thereby expect to maximise their utility function in the given circumstances.</p>	<p>STRATEGIC ADAPTATION</p>
<p>LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS</p> <p>Actors behave on the basis of what they consider to be the most appropriate – “right” – norm or rule to follow. These norms, then, not only regulate behaviour but also define identities.</p>	<p>SOCIAL LEARNING</p>
<p>LOGIC OF ARGUMENTATIVE RATIONALITY - Arguing</p> <p>the choice of appropriate behaviour or best claim about cause-effect relationships is made in a communicative context in which two or more actors aim to persuade each other of the validity of his/her claim. Intersubjective structures of meanings are therefore produced through communicative interaction.</p>	<p>SOCIAL LEARNING</p>

²⁰ The literature on the negative effects of democratic transition on propensity to war in/by a democratising country is voluminous and controversial. It is generally accepted that a democratising country's proneness to war is not the same as that of a stable democracy, as in the former one there are various social and political forces that regard the use of violence (internal or international) as profitable and they are in the condition to recur to it in the absence of strong counterbalancing democratic institutions. However, the literature differs quite a lot in the analysis of the conditions under which this general rule applies. For instance, to the affirmation by Mansfield & Snyder (1995) that the possibility of war is higher in periods of democratic transition, other scholars have replied that the value of this general statement varies considerably according to the political system from which transition occurs. Reinhard Wolf, for instance, has noticed, in states with strong feudal traits, old elites would successfully turn to nationalistic and militaristic ideologies to slow down a process that deprives them of their privileges, and they have the capabilities to do so by virtue of the rigid social differentiation that gives them direct control on politic and social power. In the case of former communist states, on the contrary, the existence of a more egalitarian society and the state control of political and social power gave local elites less power to inactivate similar ideologies and policies (Wolf in Wolf et al. 1996). Other authors point to the importance of consistency and progress in transition. Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward (2000) empirically showed that democratisation generally does reduce the risk of war, but that uneven transition towards democracy can increase the probability of war. Rose & Shin (2001) point to the risks of instability of current “third wave democracies” that introduced free elections before basic institutions of the modern states were settled. Other relevant literature on democratisation and peace includes: Isakovic 2000, 2002; Wolf et al. 1996.

NATO and the EU both contributed to the process and the final end of democracy-building in a broad sense of the word. In particular, the two organisations contributed to the development (although yet unfinished) of some fundamental conditions for a democratic security community to emerge:

1. they contributed to the establishment of *institutions* of liberal democracy (formal democratic institutions and procedures, rule of law, respect of fundamental freedoms and rights),
2. they contributed to the diffusions of *norms and values* of liberal democracy, playing on their power of attraction, their authoritative capacity to set the boundaries of appropriate behaviour, and their ability to create communicative frameworks which (i) facilitated the transmission of information necessary for strategic adaptation to happen, and (ii) allowed real communicative interaction to produce proper social learning;
3. they created the conditions for the development of many-sided and direct relations amongst states and societies both within Central and Eastern Europe and between this area and Western Europe;

thereby contributing to the diffusion of mutual trust and dependable expectations of peaceful change both within the area and between the countries in the area and Western European States and institutions.

2. REDISCOVERED DEMOCRACY, REDEFINED COMMUNITIES: THE EU AND NATO AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Shared values and norms of liberal-democracy have always been recognised as being crucial for the existence of the transatlantic security community, but the attention paid by NATO to such norms and the actual construction of a security concept and security-building practices around such a conviction is a result of the post-Cold War. It is precisely with the end of bipolarism, in fact, that common values become not only one of the glues that kept the community together (with internal exceptions on the way), but also an instrument of external conduct. Since 1990, NATO has started to pay unprecedented attention to the development of democratic institutions in the neighbouring European area. Similar attention was devoted to this issue by organisations that more traditionally have attempted to diffuse democratic behaviour, in the first place among their members (the Council of Europe, the C/OSCE, the

EU). This (re)discovered emphasis on democracy probably has different explanations for the institutions mentioned, but in all cases can be regarded as a response to post-bipolar security challenges (or, better, lack of clearly defined challenges) and the need for them to redefine their role in what was perceived as a new, uncertain, international system. As a matter of fact, although now (at least until September 11, 2001) the link between democracy and peace seems to be obvious, it might be useful to recall that from the 1960s to the mid-1980s there was a dominant consensus in the West that security interests could be best guaranteed by authoritarian regimes which could provide political stability and openness to a capitalist-like economy (cf. Zielonka 2001 and further references therein).

If we conceive the end of the Cold War as the “point zero” of the story here told, we can then indicate two other relevant steps in the story, one which more or less coincides with the immediate aftermath of the 1989/90 end of bipolarism, and a second one - longer in time and not yet finished - that started in the early 1990s.

Section 2.1. presents an analysis of NATO’s and EU’s immediate reaction to the end of the Cold War and their effort to respond to the challenges represented by this international breaking point. The two organisations’ (re-)gained attention to democracy is here regarded as a response to an identity/legitimisation problem, although of a different type in the case of the two.

Section 2.2. presents a review of the main policies and practices undertaken by the two organisations that have contributed to the development of the conditions for the development of a system of democratic security communities in Larger Europe.

In a certain sense, it is here claimed that the two organisations have contributed to creating the conditions for democratic security communities in Europe both for *what they are* (their international identity as it is perceived by themselves and by external actors) and for *what they do* (policies, communicative practices, etc.). The two roles have coexisted since the early 1990s, but the first one was predominant in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

2.1. Institutional Interests, Identity and Security in Post-Cold War Europe

NATO: Identity, Legitimisation and the Security-Through-Democracy Solution

Since 1990, NATO documents such as the *London Declaration on East-West Co-operation* (July 1990), the *Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation*, those concerning the

definition of a *New Alliance's Strategic Concept* (November 1991 and then April 1999), as well as those launching the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC - December 1991), and the Partnership for Peace (PfP - December 1994) have identified new security threats and the possible responses that NATO could offer. These documents include in the definition of both security threats and security strategies a direct reference to the concept of democracy, to related concepts such as “transparency” or “respect of rules,” and to concepts related to “*liberal* democracy” such as “respect of human rights”.

NATO’s Security Concepts before 1991 were not made public and so a comparison between those concepts developed before and after 1991 is not possible. However, rather than containing specific references to democratic principles, documents signed before this date, and in particular the Washington Treaty, reveal a rather general claim to common democratic values among the Allies:

The Parties to this Treaty ...reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are *determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law*. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949, Preamble, emphasis added).

Moreover, and more significantly, NATO’s record of democracy-defence was very low, if not non-existent, during its first 50 years.

In contrast, post-Cold War security documents and practice expose a growing link between security and the development of democracy.

The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept of 1991 placed the new strategic threats to security in Europe and NATO’s role therein. The document presents a wide concept of security and a renewed role for the organisation in the changed scenario, with the reaffirmation of Article V collective security tasks but also with a broader role in the construction of security in Europe:

...In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional...[and they are most] likely to result from ... the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe...To achieve its essential purpose [to provide security in Europe], the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks: (i) to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a *stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes*, ... (ii) to serve... a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests... (The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, 1991, emphasis added).

Elsewhere, the Strategic Concept stated clearly that “security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension.” (Part III, 24)

Attention to the respect for human rights and to democratic national institutions was then re-stated with the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991²¹. The enlarged Atlantic Council - generally focused on political and security issues but involving consultations also on many other issues – developed various Work Plans.

The *Partnership for Peace*, launched in 1994, engaged/s the Allies and the participating Partners in concrete cooperation activities, in order to increase transparency, ensuring democratic control of the armed forces, maintain a capability to contribute to UN or CSCE operations, strengthening the participants' capability of undertaking peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, enhance the compatibility of the Partners' and the Allies military forces (cf. *PfP Invitation*, NAC, 10-11/1/1994, Brussels).

The subscribing state signs a Framework Document in which it accepts to commit itself to the preservation of a democratic society; the respect of obligations undertaken in the field of arms control; the respect of the principles of international law, of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and all CSCE/OSCE documents:

...protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and *peace through democracy* are shared values fundamental to the partnership ... They reaffirm commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights... they also reaffirm commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents... (PfP Framework Document, 1994).²²

²¹ The creation of the NACC in December 1991 was the culmination of a process of increased cooperation with the former Soviet block of Europe. At the July 1990 Summit in London, the Allies invited the governments of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO. In November, the Allies and their new partners signed a Joint Declaration stating that they would not regard each other as adversaries any more. The relationship between the Allies and the new partners went further with the June 1991 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen. In this occasion, contacts and exchanges of views between the Allies and the partners took place at various levels. Eventually, when the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Rome in November 1991, the process of consultation with the "former enemies" called for a decisive step. This was made with the decision to institutionalise the process of consultation and cooperation, starting with the creation of a framework to discuss political and security-related issues: the NACC. Membership of the NACC had increased from 25 countries in 1991 to 40 countries by 1997 – when it was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

²² The countries that as of 1 May 2002 had signed the PfP Framework Document were the following: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (plus the most recent Member States Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic). The same countries plus the Member States take part in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Applicants to the PfP programme should submit a Presentation Document in which they state the desired scope and level of participation in cooperation activities with NATO, as well as the necessary steps to achieve the political goals of the Partnership, in line with the requirements of the PfP requirements mentioned above (see Individual Partnership Programme - IPP).

Building upon the success of NACC and PfP, in May 1997, the Foreign Ministers of the Allied and Cooperation Partners, meeting in Sintra (Portugal), inaugurated the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The aim was to raise political and military cooperation among the participant countries to a new qualitative level. In the EACP Basic Document NATO members, in close cooperation with partner states, reaffirmed their joint commitment to strengthening and extending peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to cooperating to this end on the basis of shared values and principles, notably those set out in the PfP Framework Document.

Furthermore, in view of the enlargement of the organisation, the NATO Participation Action Plan of 1994 stated that “participants in the Partnership for peace should be invited to become full NATO members if they ... remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens...” because – as clarified by the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 - “protection and promotion of human rights is an integral part of genuine security”. The document continues:

...[I]n evaluating requests for membership in NATO, the human rights record of the emerging democracies in Central and Easter Europe should be evaluated according to their commitment to fulfil in good faith the human rights obligations of the Charter of the United nations, the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act. (NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, 1996)

Finally, in 1999 the Alliance’s Security Concept implicitly reserved the possibility of entering the Alliance only to *democratic* states²³, and the Membership Action Plan (adopted at the same Washington Summit on April 1999) explicitly stated that:

Future members must conform to basic principles ... such as democracy, individual liberty ... [and] would also be expected: (a) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means; [and] (b) to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights; (Membership Action Plan, 1999).

Similar attention to the respect for human rights and the rule of law, coupled with political-strategic concerns, offered the main argument for the Alliance's "Operation Allied Force" in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1999. During the operation, frequent reference was made to "humanitarian intervention", to an intervention aimed at stopping the genocidal behaviour of an undemocratic regime. In other words, issues such as human rights, democracy, and respect of law were at the core of NATO's discourse and action.

Meanwhile, in the same years of NATO's transformation, it is interesting to observe that the US Clinton Administration also seemed to rediscover the Wilsonian tradition. Clinton put "democracy-export" high up on the foreign policy agenda of the post-Cold War United States (cf. Cox 2000) and founded the legacy of NATO's enlargement on extending Western European liberal-democratic ties. On October 1995, he declared:

NATO's success has involved promoting security interests, advancing values, supporting democracy and economic opportunity. We have literally created a community of shared values and interests, as well as an alliance for common defence. Now, the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union want to be part of enlarging the circle of common purpose, and in doing so, increasing our own security.²⁴

It appears clear from the brief reconstruction above that drawing a direct link between security and liberal democratic institutions and norms was a fundamental part of NATO's transformation in the 1990s. The organisation clearly responded with this formula (and with the development of a crisis-management capacity; cf. Yost 1998) to the two major threats it faced in the aftermath of the post-Cold War: (a) the possible end of the reasons for its existence after the collapse of its historical enemy and (b) instability, if not violent conflicts, in the neighbouring former Eastern block.

The core values already recognised by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s as a basic glue of the transatlantic community provided the conceptual framework within which security (and NATO's role in it) could be redefined in the changed international circumstances. Following the timid New Security Concept of 1990 and its generic calls for the development of democracy as a means towards security in the early 1990s, were concrete steps towards the

²³ The document says that "No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration."

²⁴ William J. Clinton, "remarks by the President at the Harry S. Truman Library Institute Legacy of Leadership Dinner", 25 October 1995; quoted in Williams & Neumann 2000: 372. See also Clinton's intervention at the North Atlantic Council summit of January 10, 1994: "Partnership for Peace: Building a New Security for the 21st Century". On the US attempt to rediscover a sort of idealist geopolitical vision of American foreign policy founded on NATO as a "democratic league", see Strausz-Hupé 1995. On US foreign policy after the Cold War, see also Cox 1995; Ruggie 1996.

progressive definition of a new role for NATO that not only reminded of the importance of democracy and human rights in public documents, but made direct request of proved transition towards democracy for the states applying for a closer partnership with the organisation. Furthermore, and most of all, NATO progressively defined itself as a security provider far beyond Article V (collective defence) tasks (cf. Yost 1998). The progressive definition of a role for NATO in the enforcement of UN resolutions in the various Balkan conflicts is part of the same evolving tasks for NATO. The same applies to the organisation's tasks in the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia and peace-building in Kosovo. The Partnership for Peace machine, however, represented the core of NATO's response to new challenges and the major step towards a new type of organisation that is now going to face a new significant shift with the second round of enlargements.

The initial response, which was grounded in the basic values of the original community, influenced subsequent developments both within and outside the organisation, giving rise to a loop in which the security community has expanded far faster than the security guarantees of Article V provisions (i.e. far faster than full membership in the organisation). NATO transformation was a major vehicle of stabilisation of Central and Eastern Europe, even beyond the initial aims of the organisation, and it is now applying the same formula to the stabilisation of the Mediterranean and Central Asia, although for many Partner countries in these areas NATO membership is not an objective.

Put in other way, the response that NATO gave to a double security interest (self-protection as a living institution and protection of its member states from the consequences of the instability of war in the neighbouring area) was completely inscribed in the normative DNA of the organisation and its member states. The choice among the possible alternative solutions provided was smoothed by the core values of the community of reference which made alternative solutions (dissolution and return to an *ex ante* situation; construction of a new enemy – as it was suggested in the early 1990s) unacceptable or dis-functional with respect to the core problem of redefining the international identity of the organisation so as to maintain international legitimacy.²⁵

²⁵ A great deal of literature on NATO enlargement is relevant for this argument on the relationship between interests and values in NATO's transformation. However, the argument presented here intends to go beyond specific attention to enlargement and claim that the basic problem of international identity-legitimisation guided/s the role of the Alliance beyond the areas of possible future membership. For alternative explanations of NATO enlargements, see, amongst the many works, Fierke & Wiener 1999; McGwire 1998; Menotti 1999; Schimmelfennig 1998/9; Gaddis 1998; Solomon 1998. For a comparison between NATO and EU enlargements, see Fierke & Wiener 1999; Sperling ed. 1999. On NATO's transformation in the post-Cold War era, see, among many others: Brenner ed. 1998; Drew 1995; McCalla 1996; Yost 1998.

The narrative reconstruction of NATO's identity in the post-Cold War period along the lines of a "democratic security community" more than a collective defence club affected not just what NATO stated in its documents, but also what was demanded for the new partners and, most of all, contributed to defining (or restating) the *boundaries of appropriateness* – i.e. the boundaries of what could be considered appropriate and acceptable behaviour and identity, both for NATO and for its neighbouring countries. As Michael William and Iver Neumann have demonstrated, the "narrative reconstruction of NATO's identity played a powerful role in the debates taking place simultaneously within Russia regarding its post-Cold War identity" (2000: 361) by rendering a powerful political option (anti-Western identity) "inappropriate" given the transformed nature of NATO.

The narrative reconstruction of NATO's identity, therefore, not only allowed NATO to effectively respond to the threat of fragmentation, but provided the Alliance with a way to define a new international role and acquire the power to set new boundaries of appropriateness that constrained the debate on self-identity not just in Russia but in the former Soviet block as such.

The EU: An International Identity with an Internal Legacy

Although the entire process of European integration has always been based on the idea that interdependence among liberal-democratic states brings peace, it was only with the first Mediterranean enlargement (Greece, Portugal and Spain) that democratic principles and respect for human rights were formally added to the *acquis communautaire* (Jørgensen 1999). Such principles were then "reinforced" with further conditions for membership adopted at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993²⁶. These conditions went beyond the *acquis* of the time and in fact only found space in the EU legal system with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty which, in Articles 6 and 7, requires members to meet certain democratic standards or else be excluded from voting in the Council.

Democratic conditionality, however, was adopted by the EU even before 1993, in the cooperation agreements signed throughout the 1980s, and more specifically towards Central and Eastern European Countries with the conditions for recognition of new independent states

²⁶ The Copenhagen criteria for aspiring members call for the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minority rights.

adopted in December 1991 and the *Europe Agreements* launched in 1992.²⁷ On the same date, the Maastricht Treaty formally established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the objectives of which included the development and consolidation of democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU, Title V).²⁸ Finally, with the Commission's *Communication on Conflict Prevention* of April 2001 and the agreement on the *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* at the Göteborg Summit in June 2001, the circle was closed and democracy, rule of law and good governance were explicitly recognised to be fundamental instruments of conflict prevention²⁹.

As for principles, it is also the case with the EU that since the *Europe Agreements* reference is constantly made to C/OSCE documents and particularly the Charter of Paris, to whose principles and provisions EU member states and the other signing countries express firm commitment.

Where does the EU's attention to democracy export as a tool and aim of foreign policy come from? The history and nature of this political system provide most of the answer. The entire process of European integration has been grounded on the idea that interdependence among liberal-democratic states brings peace. A great deal of the European *Community* has to do with the shared belief in a Kantian peace progressively built through democratic institutions, close economic interdependence and common institutions, nothing more, nothing less. The idea of progressive development, spillover effects and long-term construction of peace through institutions and norms is part of the European identity. The "civilian power Europe" model, therefore, was (is) not just the necessary response to the weaknesses of an unaccomplished international actor (lacking military power, but strong in the economic field), but also the external representation of a type of actor which behaves differently as it is

²⁷ Since 1992, economic assistance programmes such as Phare and Tacis also include programmes aiming at assisting the transition to/consolidation of democracy. Of the nearly infinite literature on the EU's external role as a "civilian power" exporting economic interdependence and using democratic conditionality, see, for example, Rosencrance 1998; Smith 1998; specific chapters in Zielonka & Pravda eds. 2001. On the EU's policy in Central and Eastern Europe, see Smith 1998; Grabbe 1999; Lykke & Murphy 1999. Particularly focused on EU enlargement are: Avery & Cameron 1998; Senior-Nello & Smith 1998; Redmond & Rosenthal eds. 1998. On the process that led the EU to decide over enlargement, Schimmelfennig 2001a.

²⁸ The literature on the CFSP is already huge. To mention but a few examples: Regelsberger, de Schouteete & Wessels eds. 1997; Hill ed. 1996; Cameron 1999; paying attention more specifically to defence policy is Missiroli 2000.

²⁹ On the EU's capacity and record of conflict prevention see Hill 2001. For an evaluation of the EU's efforts at *mainstreaming* conflict prevention (i.e. making sure that all EU policies consistently take into consideration their impact on conflict and conflict prevention) as requested at the Göteborg Summit, see Gourlay 2002. A report on progress in this field will be presented by the Spanish Presidency at the June 2002 Summit of the EU in Seville.

differently constituted. This idea is captured by the concept of “normative power Europe” as recently defined by Ian Manners:

The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis ..., but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in international relations. It is built on the crucial, and usually overlooked observation, that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is - a unique international entity which transcends notions of state and international in way which demands an analysis of competing discourses of international and world society. (Manners 2001: 9).

In reality, the concept does not depart substantially from François Duchêne’s definition of Europe as a “civilian power” (Duchêne 1972, 1973), which already referred to the important role of the European community as exporter of democratic norms and principles (Duchêne 1973). The civilian power concept is better reformulated and refined in the “normative paradigm” but not denied.

Why, precisely at the point in which the EU is defining a role as a military power is it still worth talking about Europe as a normative power? First of all, the two concepts are not in antinomy as the “normative power” Europe paradigm helps overcome the dichotomy “civilian vs military power” Europe, rejecting it as part of a debate that takes place within a state-centred paradigm of international politics.

Moreover, the normative character of the international identity of the EC/U was particularly rethought and underlined after the end of the Cold War. As a matter of fact in the case of this organisation and in the case of NATO, although to a very different extent, the end of bipolarism posed challenges that required an imaginative effort to define the international role of the Union. The direction undertaken has been one that - unevenly but still clearly – underlines a growing international role for the Union (see the definition and inclusion in the treaties of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992) with basically civilian/normative type tasks (cf. objectives of the CFSP, Art. V TEU). The developments in the defence field (Rapid Reaction Force for Petersberg tasks) do not challenge such a role but rather provide further tools for it.

Such a redefined role is not simply a step in the linear direction towards a “normal foreign policy” but rather represents a response to the contingent challenge of the end of the Cold War and the longer-term challenges of the evolution of politics in contemporary international relations. If the EU system of governance (multilevel, multifunctional, ...) is itself part of the evolving nature of politics and a perfect example of the crisis of traditional politics in a

globalised world, so its international acting is both an example of (and a response to) the changing nature of international actorhood in contemporary world politics.³⁰ The extent to which this peculiar political actor will be able to respond to the main challenges of an ever closer world is still unpredictable. For the moment we can only notice that some two decades before Habermas wrote about *Weltinnenpolitik* (the domestic politics of the world - Habermas 1999; cf. also Bonanate 2001) and drew conclusions about the necessity of an international responsibility even when apparently performing pure domestic politics, François Duchêne had already made explicit reference to the need for an ethic of responsibility in foreign policy similar to that applied in domestic affairs (Duchêne 1973). Whether the EU is better suited for this task is hard to say, but there are elements that might encourage this type of argument, especially the tendency to export to the international arena normative frameworks developed for the domestic context.

It is claimed here that, as in the case of NATO, the EU process of self-definition as an international actor has influenced the parallel processes of self-definition of the neighbouring countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In a similar way, the EU implicitly and explicitly set the *boundaries of appropriateness* and developed specific policies to support democratic transition.

2.2. The Construction of the European System of Democratic Security Communities: NATO and the EU at Work

The story of how in the early stages of the post-Cold War NATO and the EU's responses and efforts to adapt shaped and constrained the response of other state-actors in the surrounding area is a story of structural power of a peculiar type. *Power* is recognised to be one of the fundamental structural conditions for the development of mutual trust and collective identity (Adler & Barnett 1998: 38 – 41). In the very early stages of post-Cold War transition both organisations exercised both a *power of attraction* and the less conventional *power to set the boundaries of appropriateness* for subsequent behaviour and self-definition efforts of the neighbouring countries. I claim here that the effectiveness of this power was to do not just with the threat of punishment (in case of a state overstepping the boundaries of

³⁰ The EU seems to represent both for its internal governance and its international actorhood the quintessence of a political system which in fact is post-national, post-Westphalian and even post-modern – if political modernity is a type of statehood which includes exclusive sovereignty over a territory.

appropriateness), but with the fact that the boundaries of appropriateness were set implicitly by providing a tangible example of an international identity (NATO and the EU's) built within such boundaries and according to clearly defined norms and rules that provided shared meanings and understandings.

In a further stage of transition, NATO and the EU continued to exercise a similar type of power (although in an uneven manner) which became even stronger due to the leverage represented by the prospect of future membership (a priority for all CEECs since the early 1990s, primarily for either security or economic reasons – cf. Paquette 2001).

To this structural power, the two organisations added specific policies that in fact are recognised to be conducive factors in the development of mutual trust and collective identity. The effect was increased transactions and social learning.

The quantity and quality of transactions - *bounded communication* in Adler and Barnett's definition (cf. 1998: 41) - between Western Europe and CEECs and within the latter group has dramatically increased also due to policies of the two organisations. This could not but contribute to the establishments of the many-sided and direct relations amongst states and societies indispensable for the development of a security community. The two organisations have contributed to the creation of multiple channels of communication both at the level of institutions (governments, parliaments) and at the level of societies (within the area and between the area and Western Europe) by means of: (i) creation of permanent *fora* of discussion and regular high level meetings; (ii) workshops, seminars, more informal gatherings; (iii) financial support to exchange students / professor programs; (iv) policies directly addressed towards local NGOs and other public constituencies.

At the same time, both organisations contribute to elite and/or mass socialisation around social practices, decision-making styles, basic values and norms. This created the conditions not just for *adaptation* but also for true *social learning*, that is, for an actual reinterpretation of national beliefs and identities. The degree to which social learning has actually taken place varies considerably in the different Central and Eastern European countries, mainly due to domestic circumstances, but the conditions created by the international actors were such that room for social learning was created (although not always encouraged in the proper way). It should be noted that one of the most powerful vehicles for social learning was precisely the development of the transactions mentioned above. In particular, the more or less formal gatherings of national and international elites organised by the two organisations resulted in real communicative frameworks within which different meanings and understandings could be compared, but most frequently where Western meanings and understandings were

powerfully (in the sense explained above) shown. These gatherings ranged from highly formal meetings with representatives of the EU Commission for the negotiation of the *acquis communautaire*, to the far less politically stringent participation of local parliamentarians in the meetings of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Finally, both NATO and the EU, although in a different way, as we shall see, have contributed to the promotion of democratic *institutional structures* by means of (i) hard conditionality (set conditions that should be met according to specific procedures and specified ends); (ii) soft conditionality (a general set aim that could be reached in a variety of ways); (iii) technical advice / teaching; (iv) providing models to emulate.

The effort of the two organisations does not differ only in the area of greatest concern for democratisation (civilian control of the armed forces for NATO, development of highly regulative but still liberal democratic institutions in most areas in the case of the EU), but also in the instruments and the style adopted by the two organisations.

Table 3. *NATO and the EU's Contribution to the Development of a Liberal Democratic Security Community in Larger Europe*

<p>PHASE 0 Precipitating condition: structural change on an international level (end of the Cold War).</p> <p>PHASE 1 NATO and the EU's power of attraction and power to set the boundaries of appropriateness for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ behaviour and collective identities in post-communist states and ▪ the organisations' behaviour in the area. <p>PHASE 2</p> <p>a) NATO and the EU's power of attraction and power to set boundaries of appropriateness;</p> <p>b) NATO and the EU's policies aimed at (or with the involuntary effect of):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ increasing transactions ▪ producing social learning ▪ constructing institutions embodying the norms and values the two organisations want to embody and want to export.
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2.2.1. NATO

Instruments

The main vehicle for NATO's contribution to the development of a security community in Central and Eastern Europe has been represented by the various activities and forms of institutionalised cooperation with former adversaries that I here put under the label "PfP & Co."

As already seen, in December 1991 NATO established the NACC. Three years later, the Partnership for Peace was launched to enable Partner countries to develop individual programmes of practical cooperation with NATO. In 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replaced the NACC and built on its achievements. At the same time NATO developed a structural dialogue with Russia and with Ukraine, the first of which eventually lead to the definition of a "NATO at 20" area in which Russia acts as a co-decision maker although without a veto power (*Rome Declaration*, May 2002). A further step towards the development of the partnership into a future membership has been the establishment of a Membership Action Plan (since 1999) whereby each signing country could define its road to NATO together with the Allies. At the same Washington Summit, NATO launched the South East Europe Initiative, a series of programmes and initiatives aimed at promoting regional cooperation and long-term stability in the Balkans.

This range of initiatives towards the former Soviet Union area has its core in the PfP. The EACP is the multilateral forum which also serves as the political framework for the PfP.

The EAPC brings together 27 Partners and 19 Allies for regular consultations on issues encompassing and concerning security in the broad sense of the word. Meetings take place regularly at the level of ambassadors, foreign and defence ministers, and chiefs of defence (occasionally also heads of state and government as in Washington in April 1999).³¹ Work on areas of particular interest is done at the level of working groups, where states participate according to their specific security concerns. The effectiveness of cooperation is facilitated by the participation in the working groups, the various levels of regular meetings and the diplomatic missions of non-NATO EAPC members at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

³¹ The two-year EAPC Action Plan provides a basis for longer-term consultation and cooperation on political and security-related matters, including regional issues, arms control, peacekeeping, defence economic issues,

The PfP represents by far the largest programme of bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries, but its effects go beyond the enhanced communication and cooperation between NATO and the individual country, as a range of activities require the individual countries to communicate and cooperate among themselves. The basic aims of the PfP (to promote transparency in national defence planning and military budgeting, democratic control of national armed forces, and develop the capacity for joint action) are pursued through an Individual Partnership Programme drawn up between NATO and the partner country from a wide menu of activities listed in the PfP Work Programme for the coming year. The flexibility of the system, already visible in the EAPC, is then evident also in the case of the PfP where countries shape their programme (within the boundaries defined by NATO and the technical advice of the latter) according to their specific interests and needs.

Permanent coordination is guaranteed through the Partner's diplomatic mission to NATO, the Partnership Coordination Cell (at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - SHAPE) whose task is to help coordinate PfP training and exercises, and the International Coordination Centre (at SHAPE) to provide briefing and planning facilities for all non-NATO countries taking part in NATO-led missions in the Balkans.

How has the PfP & Co. contributed to the expansion of the "democratic security community"? The PfP includes some of the worst autocratic regimes in Central Asia and in its relationship with Russia a serious screening of the democratic progress of this country has never been on the agenda (nor was it a prerequisite for the Rome Declaration of May 2002). Furthermore, NATO's record of military intervention in support of violated democracy and / or human rights is not exactly excellent although it has "improved" over time (from Bosnia to Kosovo and Macedonia). So, can it be claimed here that NATO has contributed to the expansion of the liberal-democratic security community in Central and Eastern Europe simply because it has created forms of technical cooperation? I would claim here that NATO has done a very good job through the creation of communicative frameworks where the only acceptable shared meaning was provided by a liberal-democratic conception of defence and an institutional relationship between civilians and the military. This despite having used reference to democracy more as a "rhetorical" tool than an actual condition for military cooperation.

civil emergency planning, scientific and environmental issues, and, since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, international terrorism.

Socialisation through the PfP & Co.

Through the various initiatives described above, NATO has contributed substantially to developing high intensity *communication* between the Allies and the countries in the area and also amongst the latter group. As a matter of fact NATO has created and multiplied the international *fora* of communication and *social learning*.

The number of meetings at various levels, involving both civilians and military personnel is impressive. The number of workshops, seminars and other types of international gatherings organised within the PfP goes beyond any imagination. The biennial PfP Work Programme contains more than 2,000 activities, which can vary considerably in type (seminar, lecture, workshop, conference, course, military exercise), length (from a few days to far longer lengths), and areas of concern (from the purely military to defence-related cooperation in fields such as crisis management, peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, air traffic management and armaments cooperation). The activities involve very different numbers and types/levels of people and are performed in various parts of the world (cf. *Partnership Work Programmes*, at: <http://www.nato.int/pfp.htm>).

If we then go to countries that signed a Membership Action Plan, then we have a further example of the intensity of consultations between the country and the Allies at various levels. MAP requires that each year candidate countries submit an updated Annual National Programme (ANP). The programme is first subject to consultation between the Allies and each candidate in the autumn; then in the spring this preliminary dialogue is followed by in-depth discussions in the candidate's capital with a NATO team of experts (both military and civilian). NATO then issues a report on the progress made in individual countries which provides the basis for further consultation between NATO Ambassadors and a delegation of the aspirant country (usually lead by foreign and defence ministers). Finally, NATO issues a general report on MAP for the next spring's NATO Ministerial meetings (cf. Boland 2002).

This dense area of communication is not only functional to the adaptation of the national Eastern European structure to Western standards (as a rationalist view of the role of international institutions would claim), but also provides the framework within which values, norms and ideas are transferred (as social constructivism would expect). This happens substantially in various ways:

1. PfP & Co. activities provide an area in which communication takes place within normatively-set boundaries that define what is *appropriate* and what is not (see the

reference to liberal-democratic norms in the founding documents of the EAPC, PfP, MAP *infra* chapter 2.1).

2. The PfP & Co. provide a communicative framework in which the *construction of a common interpretation of the same norm* is developed *through a process of communication* (arguing). For example, the literature already provides clear evidence of the fact that at the beginning of NATO's partnership effort the Allies and the partners had a completely different interpretation of what "civilian control of the armed forces" meant (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster 2002; Gheciu 2002a). Clearly the legacy of communism was still strong and this influenced the conception of the relationship between civilian and military levels. Furthermore, in filo-Russian countries, the military were closer and more loyal to Moscow than to the national political authorities. By presenting itself as a Western institution embodying a set of values opposite to those represented by the Soviet block, NATO was able to use the communicative frameworks to change the partners' conception of civil-military relations. To put it differently, NATO "educated" though never gave the impression of putting the partners at the level of third-class student³². Clearly NATO could use the advantage of its authority as the Alliance that had won the Cold War and the organisation that defined itself around a core set of norms (liberal-democratic) presented as incontestably "superior".

3. By reinforcing control on compliance with respect to the *conditionality* adopted. In reality, the type of conditionality that NATO sets is rather soft if we compare it with the EU conditionality policy, especially with respect to the applicant countries. NATO's conditions are not only more limited in scope (as they focus on NATO's primary area of concerns) but also different in strictness. Usually NATO sets boundaries within which transitions should take place and then sets certain objectives leaving the countries rather free in the way they want to achieve them. Then it sets procedures whereby the interaction between NATO and the country on that particular objective is frequent and at various levels, including procedures of control and evaluation that always come after exchanges of opinion and NATO advice has taken place. This implies that although there is conditionality and a verification of the extent to which the country has matched the conditions, there is also the possibility of influencing the transition of the country by

³² Interviews with Parliamentarians and Defence advisors of CEECs (May 2002). For more groundwork of NATO's teaching in the case of the Czech Republic and Romania, see Gheciu 2002a.

intervening with softer communicative instruments that include *arguing* and *persuading* rather than *dictating*.

4. NATO's position is frequently reintroduced in the bilateral debate through an apparently neutral tool: *technical advice*. Technical advice is usually very welcome and does not take the form of a teaching activity on NATO's part (for this reason it is better accepted by the Partners). Technical advice is also the basis of state-to-state military cooperation between individual NATO member states and individual Partners.
5. Explicit *teaching* activities do take place in the context of courses and seminars that have the further advantage to provide *fora* of interaction among people (frequently young military wo/men) from different countries of the NATO family/ies.

To what extent does this remain confined to the individuals that attend the meetings, courses etc.? I would claim that it does not.

(a) In the first place, the effects of the entire process have already been translated in documents and institutions in the partner country in line with Western norms of liberal-democracy. In some cases it has been demonstrated that the institutions for the civilian control of the military have been the result of a shift in the political culture of the elites (and not the other way round). For instance, in the Polish context as Paul Latawski explains, "the laws and institutions have tended to reflect the evolution of thinking of political society on civil-military relations rather than the other way round." (Latawski 2002: 39)

In institutional terms, the civilian control of the military has proved to be rather successful in the countries applying for NATO membership (where the incentive to adapt was clearly higher). In particular, the informative work on democratic control on the military directed by Andrew Cottey, Tomothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (eds. 2002) shows that in these countries the implementation of institutional forms of democratic control of the armed forces (with control by a democratically-elected government and/or president, a parliamentary oversight and an increasing civilian debate over armed forces and defence) was relatively easy. Progress was made also as far as the democratic control of foreign policy is concerned, with the establishment of clear constitutional and political procedures for the deployment of the armed forces. Less developed in institutional terms remains the third form of civilian control of the military: the democratic control of defence policy. However, although with some difficulties, since the early 1990s, various mechanisms to ensure the civilian control of

defence policy have been activated and have profited a lot from participation in the PfP (cf. Cottey, Edmunds and Forsters eds. 2002: 257-260), which “required them to adopt detailed defence planning standards and practices operating within NATO” (p. 259). Far more backwards in all regards of democratic control of armed forces are former Yugoslav republics (with the exception of Slovenia) and Albania (not to mention Russia, Ukraine and other former socialist republics).

It is equally interesting to look at the evolution of the basic national documents developed in the PfP & Co. framework by individual partner countries. Though in the first documents the countries were underlining their effort to construct the type of democratic institutions that the PfP and other basic NATO documents requested, in the Annual National programmes for 2000-1 this reference is not explicit and the affection of the country to liberal-democratic norms is most frequently taken as a fact to which there is no longer the need to make frequent reference.

(b) In the second place, the vocabulary and principles that individuals find and use on the NATO level tends to be transferred by the same individuals in the public domestic debate. This is particularly clear in the case of members of national parliaments attending the meetings of the apparently not so important NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA). Frequently, through participation in the Parliamentary Assembly, local MPs develop personal channels of communication with their counterparts in other countries, play an international game within the rules of the framework of reference, gain knowledge about security issues and gain sufficient domestic legitimisation so as to be able to import into the agenda of their own Parliament certain items and terms of discussion developed in the international framework. Furthermore, this international experience gives the MP in question a stronger voice in security issues in his/her own Parliament and country.³³

(c) In the third place, although the bulk of NATO’s activities have targeted the political and military elites in the partner countries, NATO has also developed some other ways to influence the state concerned. One is represented by the media campaigns (coordinated with the applicant countries) to gain popular support for the new 1997 members. The second, and even more interesting activity is connected to NATO’s Science Programme that offers grants for collaboration in civil science between scientists in partner countries and NATO countries. In fact, the programme contributes to the development of further strong transnational links between the societies of Western and Central and Eastern European countries. To have an

³³ Interview with Gediminas Kirkilas (Lithuanian MP, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee and Committee on European Affairs), May 2002. An original study of socialization through NATO PA is in Flockhart 2002.

idea of the numbers involved, it might be sufficient to recall that in 2001 over 10,000 scientists from NATO and partner countries collaborated together through joint research projects, participation in conferences or workshops, etc. (see <http://www.nato.int/science>).

What has made NATO – PfP effective? I argued that NATO could use various forms of power (power of attraction, power to define the borders of appropriateness) and was able to create communicative frameworks where these powers could be spent.

Both types of powers set the initial conditions for the transition of Central and Eastern Europe towards Western norms and rules, setting what was (and was not) acceptable and what could be the implications of falling outside the boundaries of appropriateness. Immediately afterwards, NATO was able to use both its powers to get the most out of the communicative interaction it started with neighbour countries without giving the impression of “dictating” policy change, but rather presenting its contribution to policy change more in the form of technical advice and support.

The fact that countries willing to become members of NATO were more successful in making institutional reforms could demonstrate that material incentives mattered more, but it could simply mean that those that could aim at membership (the better off) were better equipped to meet the conditions for it. However, it cannot be denied that the prospect of NATO’s enlargement was an important incentive for *strategic adaptation* in all applicant countries.

Next to this, however, there are mechanisms of *social learning* that go beyond strategic adaptation and that are made possible by intensive communication, especially in a framework where apparent conditions of equal-level-partnership are created. In these conditions, there seems to be more space for the *logic of argumentative rationality* and for actual social learning.

That of the European Union seems to be a different story.

2.2.2. The European Union

Instruments

The EU is probably the international actor that displays the greatest number of instruments for support of democratic transitions. This is particularly true in the case of Central and Eastern

Europe, where one should add to the traditional EU tools the additional incentive to compliance of the powerful prospect of future membership. For this reason, a complete review of tools and mechanisms would be impossible and attention will be limited to those that have been more relevant for the development of conditions for the realisation of a democratic security community.

1. *Conditionality*. The main tool of the EU's support to the definition of a system of security communities in Central and Eastern Europe has been the use of democratic *conditionality*³⁴. As we have already seen, democratic conditionality has been a tool of EU external relations for many years now.

Clearly, EU leverage on democratising states has been higher with regard to aspiring member states (which excludes former Soviet countries such as Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan or Georgia). By 1999 the EU had thirteen officially recognised candidates and five quasi-candidates for membership. With the first group (Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Cyprus) the EU began negotiations in 1998; with the second group (Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta) in 2000; with Turkey (an official candidate since 1999) the start of the negotiations was postponed. In relation to all these states EU democratisation leverage is detectable, although it varies from country to country (cf. Vachudová 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001b; Zielonka & Pravda eds. 2001).

In the case of the Western Balkans, a specific EU strategy came late (and has not yet been completely defined). Its main tools now are the Stability Pact and the Stabilisation and Association Process (both of 1999). With the Stability Pact it has been recognised that South Eastern Europe needs a “‘holistic’ security strategy” (Espen Barth Eide (ed.) et. al. 2000: 51) which combines economic, political, institutional and security-related initiatives. In this framework, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)³⁵ has started a specific contractual relationship with each Western Balkan State and has set demanding political and economic conditions with a strong emphasis on cooperation with neighbouring countries (similar to the Copenhagen criteria for the CEECs). Political conditionality is, clearly, mainly democratic conditionality.

³⁴ For a systematic analysis of democratic conditionality as a tool of conflict prevention, see Youngs 2001.

³⁵ The countries involved in the SAP are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Croatia and Macedonia have already signed their Stabilization and Association Agreement.

2. *Regional Cooperation.* A second, frequently underestimated policy conducive to the development of a security community has been the support and active promotion of *regional cooperation*. In the early 1990s, regional cooperation, based on the model of the EU itself, was promoted as a way to stabilise the area without the enlargement of the Union itself. Many EU member states started or improved regional (state-to-state or trans-national) forms of cooperation. The great expectations of regional cooperation of the early new era, however, were largely frustrated by the reaction of the countries in the area, clearly ruling out the possibility that it could replace membership in the EU and NATO.

An early, very neglected form of regional cooperation that led to concrete results was the Stability Pact of 1993 (so-called Balladur plan). The plan was conceived in the EU framework as one of the first EU "Joint Actions". The concrete project was presented in June 1993 and concluded in May 1995; since then the OSCE has been entrusted with the pact's follow-up and implementation. The plan consisted in the organisation of a pan-European conference aimed at stabilising "the Central and Eastern European Countries which may eventually be associated to varying degrees with the EU" (par. 3). The immediate aim was the definition of principles to solve minority and border disputes. The goal was the signing of bilateral agreements between countries with border and minority problems. Eventually, 100 new and existing agreements have been signed, including the bilateral agreement on Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania. The plan has been an important step not just in the regulation of minority rights and protection in the area, but also as a way of establishing strict and targeted communication between local countries on issues of democracy-building.

Regional cooperation has then been explicitly requested in South-Eastern Europe since the 1997 regional strategy for the Balkans. Later, the Stability Pact of 1999 was explicitly a matter of regional cooperation, although it failed to be sufficiently nourished with fresh funding and, most of all, was not well orchestrated with the other instrument of promotion of democracy in the Balkans: the Stabilization and Association Process. It is clear now that rather than represent the general framework of a more targeted approach to a certain area of South Eastern Europe, the Stabilization and Association Process has already become *the tool* of EU policy in the region and is regarded by local states as the main way of interaction with the Union. As the SAP refers explicitly to the development of conditions that can eventually lead to full membership in the EU, the process is *de facto* weakening the already not strong regional cooperation of the Stability Pact. Balkan states usually take part in regional cooperation initiatives only to the extent that they are promoted/supported by the US and/or Europe, but with little interest in regional cooperation as such. To put it differently, the

efficacy of the “regional approach” of the Stability Pact is weakened not just by the lack of a sense of “communality” within the Balkans (and existent structural differences among states), but also by the fact that the states with the best accession prospects are concerned that an undifferentiated regionalism would detract from the promise of Europeanisation. The Croatian President Mesic has stressed that the process of Europeanisation is "a regatta, not a caravan", in which each state moves forward at its own pace³⁶. The approach is dangerous, given the fact that EU membership for most Western Balkan states is still very remote. Frustrated expectations might reverse a process of democratisation which has just started and that would need to be nourished by the enhancement of mutual trust among the actors in the area. The need to overcome reluctance to be involved in regional cooperation has been explicitly underlined by the Commission’s first annual *Report on the Stabilization and Association Process in South-Eastern Europe* (SEC 2002 339-343 April 4, 2002). Finally, financial assistance (CARDS programme) is provided to develop regional cooperation³⁷.

3. *NGOs and Civil Society*. One of the areas of promoting conditions for effective democratisation and enhancement of transnational mutual trust which is frequently neglected in the studies on EU policy in CEECs is the “EU’s... distinctive, bottom-up approach to democracy assistance” (Youngs 2001: 362). A very high proportion of the Commission PHARE and TACIS Democracy programme went to the NGOs. Financed programmes touch all areas of social life, although they tend to privilege the protection of human rights (Youngs 2001). These, together with other programmes aimed directly at supporting and giving content to liberal-democratic norms (for example financial support to free media), allow the EU to work at ground-level socialisation. This socialisation effort works through the promotion of social institutions which embody basic liberal values and through financial support to educational campaigns of various types.

³⁶ ESI, Report “Democracy, Security and the Future of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”, 4 April 2001: 17.

³⁷ For the period 2000-2006 the CARDS regulation provides some €4.65 billion. CARDS assistance “will finance investment, institution-building and other programmes in four major areas:

- Reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, reconciliation and the return of refugees.
- Institutional and legislative development, including harmonisation with EU norms and approaches, to underpin democracy and the rule of law, human rights, civil society and the media, and the operation of a free market economy.
- Sustainable economic and social development, including structural reform.
- Promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among SAP countries and between them, the European Union and the candidate countries of central Europe.” (from http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/ip01_1464.htm).

4. *Support to Transnational Exchanges.* Community programmes such as Erasmus have proved to be a very important instrument for the development of (elements of) a common European identity within the Union. The extension of the same programme to CEECs and further financial support to exchange students cannot but produce effects in the direction of growing mutual knowledge and trust. Results are intangible for the moment, but they will become visible when those students reach professional positions in their countries.³⁸

Dictating and Persuading

What type of style has the EU adopted?

(a) Frank Schimmelfennig effectively notes that “European governance in the Eastern and Southern non-members resembles state-centred ‘old governance’ based on hierarchical relationships between rule-makers and rule-takers and steering by command and control much more closely than the ‘new governance’ that purportedly characterises governance beyond the nation-states” (Schimmelfennig 2001b: 5). The main form that norm-transfer has taken has been that of “conditionality” with a very clear hierarchical relationship between the EU and the non-member states. It is not that the EU is much more powerful than NATO *vis-à-vis* these countries that in this case clear asymmetry is justified by material reasons. It is a question of both *acquis* of the institution and *style*.

Clearly the huge *acquis communautaire* in the case of the European Union in a sense obliges the organisation to make sure that countries willing to become members (even in the longer period) adopt it in the way the member states and the EU institutions have defined appropriate: NATO’s *acquis* is far more limited and therefore less demanding in terms of supervision. What counts more is mutual trust and effective interoperability that, however, can be achieved more by learning-through-performing than by pure plans on paper.

However, there is a further reason for the EU’s style. The EU is a normatively dense organisation and shows a faith in regulatory systems (v. EU defined as a regulatory state) that NATO does not. The explanation for the latter difference does not rest only in the different degree of integration in the two organisations and the relative security communities (more

³⁸The “know us - love (or not hate) us” equation has originated various initiatives. The German Marshall Foundation has a long-standing visiting programme which brings American young leaders to Germany and *vice versa*. The US Department of State has the largest International Visitor Programme in the world and its results can be exceptionally good ... apparently (a DoS story) Margaret Thatcher developed her friendship with George

tight/amalgamated in the case of the EU and more loose in the case of NATO) but also in the cultural value attributed to regulation in the two institutional frameworks. One of the explanations can be the influence of US political culture in NATO, which calls for more pragmatism, flexibility and horizontal social relations.³⁹

Whatever the reasons for the EU's style and choice of tools, the net effect is here claimed to be more (with respect to NATO) conducive to institutional change as a result of strategic adaptation. It is equally very powerful in setting the boundaries of appropriateness (which in the case of the EU are spelled out in an even more detailed way), but it seems to be less conducive to socialisation of the elites through a process of communicative interaction that leads to behaviour on the basis of the best argument. EU partners never get the slightest impression of being treated as equal nor to be taken really seriously. They could not, in the material sense, be considered equal, but their problems and claims could be taken more seriously, this is the usual complaint.

A further, more recognised and tangible shortcoming of the EU's strict conditionality policy has to do with the paradox of a foreign-made democratisation: in the end it undermines the very basis for democracy. The huge international democracy promotion in Eastern Europe – recalls Jan Zielonka (2001) – particularly if through “dictation”, did not have only good results but also to a certain extent inhibited democracy in some states when: (i) it made their citizens subject to crucial political decisions that were not taken by their representatives but far away in Western Europe; and (ii) it closed any debate about alternative models of democratic governance which might better suit Central and Eastern Europe⁴⁰.

(b) On the other hand, one cannot forget that the EU's contribution to a larger European Security Community does not rest only on conditionality in its various forms, and has to do with the bottom-up efforts at democracy promotion that have as their main objective and

Bush far before they become heads of Government/State when, during her tour as an International Visitor, she was randomly selected to have “home hospitality” at the Bush's house!

³⁹ In the United States, both the education system and the legal system (case-law) display these cultural features. I am indebted to Brian Guss (US Department of State) for a stimulating conversation on these issues (Washington, April 2002).

⁴⁰ A further strong criticism of EU's attempts to export democracy have to do with the not perfectly democratic nature of the EU itself. How can the non-democratic EU be credible? Literature on the democratic deficit is quite extensive but frequently suffers from “Wesphalian myopia” whereby the democratic/undemocratic nature of the European institutions is analysed with democracy in a nation-state in mind. For an analysis that aims at analysing these issues from a perspective which takes the peculiarity of the EU polity more seriously, see amongst others: Schmitter 2000; Zürn 2000. For an interesting link between democratic deficit and EU credibility as an international actor, see Zielonka 1998. A plea for the attention to European *identity* as an indispensable basis for EU democratic accountability is in Cerutti 2001.

result the creation transnational links among societies (and/or groups) and support to civil society initiatives. The type of ground-level socialisation to basic liberal-democratic values and norms is very important for the effective democratisation of target countries.

Furthermore, the variety of transnational links that the EU has contributed to supporting have tangibly contributed to creating that web of relations that are indispensable for the formation of a security community.

In a comparative perspective, the EU has been more effective in facilitating social learning of civil society than at the level of political elites. This does not deny the importance of the communicative frameworks created by the EU at the elite levels, but attach to this form of socialisation less importance with respect to the results of that at citizen level.

2.3. Has it Worked? Some Preliminary Data on Democratisation and Securitisation

In the first part of this paper I specified that there is a *democratic security community* if there are:

- democratic institutions and liberal-democratic norms and values
- and
- many-sided and direct relations amongst units

which produce dependable expectations of peaceful change.

In Chapter 2. I have shown that both NATO and the EU – although in a different way - have created the conditions for the expansion of Western European democratic security community to CEE by contributing to both expanding liberal-democratic norms and values, establishing democratic institutions and creating many-sided direct relations among the elites and the peoples. Has this succeeded? Claiming that democratic progress (or lack of it) in Central and Eastern Europe has exclusively to do with the role of NATO and the EU would be misleading. Many other actors, as already noticed at the beginning, have contributed to such democratic transitions and literature has already shown that the degree of success depended to a great extent on domestic historical, institutional and cultural factors. However, the role of these two organisations has been particularly relevant mainly due to their power of attraction and recognised international legitimacy. Therefore, even if absolute data on the democratisation/securitisation of Central and Eastern Europe do not “prove” anything about

NATO and the EU's role, they say something about the degree to which a democratic security community is in the making.

The first interesting set of data concerns democratic transition. According to Freedom House (2002), looking at the political spectrum (left to right), political rights, civil liberties and freedom status, most CEECs have considerably improved in the last 12 years, while an analogous amelioration in freedom conditions have not appeared in other parts of the world. The figure provided (Table 4) combines averages for political rights and civil liberties and considers "free" countries as having a rate of 1.1 to 2.5, "partly free" countries rate at 3.0 to 5.5 and "not free" countries rate between 5.5 and 7.0. Here are some telling results⁴¹:

Table 4. *Summary of "Freedom Rates" in Central and Eastern Europe 1973-2001* (elaboration of data from Freedom House, *Annual Freedom in the World Country Scores 1972-3 to 2000-1*, at <http://www.freedomhouse.com>).

Country	"Freedom rates" over time (1972/3-2000/1)
Albania	Albania was stable at a rate of 7.7 from 1972 to 1990. Since then, conditions have improved to an average of about 4.4 (with a better rate of 2.4 and 3.4 respectively in 1993/4 and 1994-6).
Bosnia-Erzegovina	Bosnia-Herzegovina rated 6.6 (not free) in 1992/3 and reached a slightly better 5.5 (partially free) in 1996/7, and has maintained the same level (5.4) until now.
Bulgaria	Bulgaria passed from a stable 7.7 (1973-1990) to a 3.4 in 1990/1 to stabilise at 2.2/3 from 1991 to 2001
Czechoslovakia / Czech Republic	Czechoslovakia passed from a stable 7.7 (1973-1990) to 3.4 in 1990/1 to stabilise at 2.2/3 from 1991. It then improved its rate as the Czech Republic to a stable 1.2 in 1993-2001, in line with Western Europe ⁴² .
Croatia	Croatia (independent since 1991) saw a significant shift only in 2000 (clearly for domestic leadership turnover), passing from a stable 4.4 to 2.3.

⁴¹ Cfr. also data in Freedom House 2001 partially reported in Annex 1.

⁴² To give an example, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and others have been stable at 1.1 – 1.2 for the entire period considered (1972/3-2000/1). Italy has at points reached 2.2 (1976-1979 the Red Brigades years), so has Finland (1972 to 1987).

Hungary	Hungary had a stable 6.6 until 1986, with a minor reduction in 1989, to reach a stable 2.2 in 1990-1992 and 1,2 in 1993-2001 (therefore reaching Western European standards).
Poland	Poland had a stable 6.6 until 1986, with a minor reduction in 1989, to reach a stable 2.2 in 1995 and 1.2 in 1995-2001 (therefore reaching Western European standards).
Yugoslavia / Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia rated about 6.6 until the break-up and the successor countries (later Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) did not substantially depart from this rate until 2000/1 when the new political leadership started internal reforms that granted the Serbia and Montenegro a rate of 4.4.
Baltic states	In the Baltic area, Estonia and Latvia had a similar trend, with a more difficult beginning (about 3.3 until 1994/5) with a reduction and stabilisation at 1.2 since 1996/7 (Estonia) or 1997/8 (Latvia). Lithuania was better off since the beginning with an early 2.3 which became a stable 1.2/3 since 1993/4.

Rates about political and civic liberties therefore confirm the existence of a three-speed Central and Eastern Europe at the present stage (data referred to 2000/1):

- the Czech Republic (1.2), Estonia (1.2), Hungary (1.2), Latvia (1.2), Lithuania (1.2), Poland (1.2), Slovenia (1.2), Slovakia (1.2)
- Croatia (2.3), Bulgaria (2.3)
- Bosnia (5.4), Albania (4.4), Macedonia (4.3), Romania (4.4), Serbia and Montenegro⁴³ (4.4)

However, as stability in transition countries very much depends on the level of social satisfaction, equally relevant is data showing how the degree of life (dis)satisfaction in 2001 with comparison to 5 years before has risen in most countries candidate for membership in the EU (Cf. Tables in Annex 2).

A similar opinion poll conducted by the Central European Opinion Research Group, CEORG (<http://www.ceorg-europe.org>) revealed that in April 2000 a significant percentage of people interviewed in the “better-off countries” were not satisfied with the functioning of

democracy in their country: 63% in Poland and Hungary, 60% in the Czech Republic, 65% in Lithuania. Equally relevant is the data regarding these people's trust in the fact that the Parliament acts in the interest of the whole society (5% Poles, 1% Czechs, 6% Hungarians, 2% Lithuanians).⁴⁴

Clearly this data only refers to candidate countries, but we can expect the situation not to be better in the Western Balkans.

This simple data confirms that the degree of success of democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe ranges considerably from country to country and that the transition process is far from being completed in certain areas (particularly the Balkans). Furthermore, the level of trust in democratic institutions, even in some candidate countries, is still lower than the Western European average. However, it seems to be confirmed by the available data that although in democratic regimes in Central and Eastern Europe a majority of citizens are usually dissatisfied with the way that democracy is working, they also accept the view that there is no alternative to it (cf. Rose 2002).

Another interesting set of data in relation to the establishment of conditions conducive to the formation of a security community in Central and Eastern Europe, has to do with the tangible development of "many-sided and direct relations amongst units". Not only do the military and political elites of these countries attend regular meetings in international fora, but the population has far higher possibilities of travelling abroad and being exposed to foreign tourists or workers. The *EU Candidate Countries Eurobarometer* provides data only as far as Candidate countries are concerned, but they are telling all the same. Table 5, for instance, shows the degree of contact with foreign countries in the states candidate for EU membership.


There seems to be a certain correlation (although not a strict one) between the percentage of people that travel abroad and the degree of civil and political liberties in these countries (Hungary being an exception).

Further data that could be added could measure the percentage of people studying abroad and then going back to work in their own country. This percentage seemed to be high according to the people interviewed and according to the *Curriculum Vitae* of many politicians and businessmen (both usually very young) in the area.

⁴³ The data is referred to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2000/1. In March 2002, Montenegro and Serbia formed a new federation, calling the union with the names of the two republics.

⁴⁴ Data downloaded from CEORG Webpage at: http://www.ceorg-europe.org/research/2000_04.html.

Table 5: *Contacts with Foreign Countries* (from the European Commission, *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001*, p. 39, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion)



Finally, can we actually claim that this democratisation process, the opening of societies and multiplication of the occasions for international gatherings at all levels have changed the perception of security and threat in the area? It would be methodologically incorrect to draw a direct link between an ameliorated threat perception in the area with the results of the democratisation process. However, it is interesting to observe that threat assessment in most CEECs has changed during the transition process. If the rise of mutual trust is what makes a community a *security* community, there are good hopes for CEE where the available data on threat perception among the peoples have decreased in the course of the 1990s as far as military threat perceived from a neighbouring country or the presence of minorities is concerned.

If we look at opinion pools conducted in the *New Democracies Barometer* (launched in 1991 by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna), we discover that in all the countries analysed but Slovenia the percentage of people considering ethnic groups / minorities to be a threat to peace and security in the home country decreased in the period 1992-1995. The greatest

change in the perception of threat linked to minorities was registered in the countries where democratic and economic reforms were more successful. As a matter of fact in these countries the number of interviewed people fearing minorities as a threat sensibly decreased from 1992 to 1995 (in Poland: from 33% to 8%, in the Czech Republic: from 44% to 14%, in Hungary: from 26% to 15%). There was a relevant reduction of threat perception also in less better-off countries such as Belarus (from 30% to 14%), Ukraine (from 24% to 14%). Other figures for the same years (1993-1995) reported include: Bulgaria (46% to 37%), Croatia (58% to 40%), Romania (60% to 32%), Slovakia (53% to 55%). The only exception being Slovenia (13% to 20%) (v. *New Democracies Barometer* at <http://rs2.tarki.hu:90/ndb-html>).

Figures available for the year 1998 are constructed around four categories of answers (big threat / some threat / little threat / no threat) and are therefore not immediately comparable with the 1992-1995 data. However, the figure reported still show a little perception of threat coming from minorities on the territory:

Table 6. *Threat Perception from National Minorities – 1998* (Source: *New Democracies Barometer V*, in Rose & Haerpfer 1998: 64)

Country	Minorities are a Big Threat (i)	Minorities Represent Some Threat (ii)	Minorities Represent Little Threat	Minorities Represent No Threat	(i) + (ii): Minorities are a Threat (1998)	Minorities as a threat in 1992	Variation in percentage 1992-1998 ⁴⁵
Bulgaria	7%	22%	30%	41%	29%	46%	-0.17
Czech R.	7%	19%	42%	33%	26%	44%	-0.18
Slovakia	12%	31%	32%	24%	43%	53%	-0,1
Hungary	6%	13%	31%	50%	19%	26%	-0.07
Poland	4%	14%	36%	46%	18%	33%	-0.15
Romania	11%	21%	29%	38%	33%	60%	-0.27
Slovenia	2%	8%	28%	62%	10%	13%	-0.03
Croatia	11%	28%	30%	31%	39%	58%	-0.19
FRY	50%	27%	14%	10%	77%	----	----
Belarus	3%	11%	24%	61%	14%	30%	-0,16
Ukraine	3%	12%	23%	62%	15%	25%	-0.1

⁴⁵ Variation is calculated in the following way: (%1992 - % 1998) / 100. Therefore it ranges from -1 (in case the percentage passed from 0 to 100) to +1 (in case it passed from 100 to 0). Lower figures reveal therefore greater improvement in trust.

The data provided here already gives evidence of a changed climate in most of the regions. Clearly, the huge amount of work done by local authorities and most of all by some international organisations like the Council of Europe in the framing of a legislation that protects national minorities has depicted a completely different scenario of threat assessment in comparison with the very early 1990s, when the primary risk seemed to be linked to problems of minorities (cfr. Kipp 1993; v. Annex 3 for ethnic minorities in the area). In this respect, as we have already seen, an important initial role was also played by the “Stability Pact” of 1993, which led to more than 100 bilateral agreements for the protection of national minorities.

A second set of relevant data assesses threat perception from a neighbouring country. Here again the perception of threat to peace and security represented by a neighbouring country has decreased.

Threat perception with regard to neighbours is particularly telling because it is precisely on this level that the development of a security community should work better (interstate conflicts). Mutual trust among peoples is as - if not more - important than mutual trust among political elites. Data confirms a substantial rise in mutual trust.

Data for Bulgaria reveals that trust in neighbours passed from 39% in 1993 to 70% in 1995 (the percentage is relative to the number of people claiming that they do not fear their neighbours as a threat to peace and security for their own country/society). Even in Croatia, neighbour of a warring country (Bosnia) the percentage of trust rose from 40% to 46%. In the Czech Republic from 64% to 86%, in Hungary from 36% to 53%, in Poland from 37% to 85% in Romania from 33% to 66%. Other figures: Slovakia from 54% to 64% (v. *New Democracies Barometer* at <http://rs2.tarki.hu:90/ndb-html>)⁴⁶.

Data on threat perception in 1998, in comparison with 1993, confirm this tendency (Cf. Table 7).

The data in tables 6 and 7 are purely indicative and aims only to give a rough idea of the fact that a transition to democratic institutions and norms has started in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (although with different results in the different areas and individual countries) and that, at the same time, a “securitisation” of most of the area *has* taken place. However, the degree of realisation of each of the three conditions for a democratic security community – democratic institutions, shared democratic norms and values, many-sided

⁴⁶ Slovenia was searched only in 1992 (40%). The high degree of self-confidence in Ukraine (90% / 91%) and Belarus (80% / 89%) is interesting.

relations among the states and their societies) ranges in different countries, *de facto* distinguishing areas of greater or minor degree of tightness and maturity the *grosso modo* overlap with the different success of the democratisation process.

Table 7. *Threat Perception from Neighbouring Countries (NCs) – 1998* (Source: *New Democracies Barometer V*, in Rose & Haerpfer 1998: 64)

Country	NCs are a Big Threat (i)	NCs Represent Some Threat (ii)	NCs Represent Little Threat	NCe Represent No Threat	(i) + (ii): NCs are a Threat (1998)	NCs as a threat in 1992	Variation in percentage 1992-1998 ⁴⁷
Bulgaria	5%	14%	31%	50%	19%	61%	-0.42
Czech R.	1%	7%	50%	41%	8%	36%	-0,28
Slovakia	4%	26%	38%	33%	30%	46%	-0.16
Hungary	4%	19%	42%	35%	23%	64%	-0.41
Poland	4%	16%	37%	43%	20%	62%	-0.42
Romania	7%	20%	26%	46%	27%	67%	-0.4
Slovenia	3%	8%	37%	51%	11%	60%	-0.49
Croatia	11%	20%	34%	36%	31%	60%	-0.29
FRY	19%	40%	23%	17%	59%	----	----
Belarus	2%	11%	24%	64%	13%	20%	-0.07
Ukraine	1%	7%	20%	72%	8%	10%	-0.02

Clearly, the area in which both democracy and the development of elements of a security community remain weaker is the Western Balkans (former Yugoslavia, except Slovenia, plus Albania) where two protectorates – Bosnia and Kosovo – *de facto* froze an unresolved conflict and where another potential area of violent conflict, Macedonia, has not completely overcome its problems but is kept under international observation. Outside the international protectorates, the area is one that only recently started its transition. Here support to democratisation has to go hand in hand with short-term crisis management and use of military deterrence as it is currently happening in Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and even Albania as far

⁴⁷ Variation is calculated in the following way: (%1992 - % 1998) / 100. Therefore it ranges from -1 (in case the percentage passed from 0 to 100) to +1 (in case it passed from 100 to 0). Lower figures reveal therefore greater improvement in trust.

as control of illegal trafficking and persons is concerned. The prospect of these countries entering the invisible security community dealt with in this paper is far more remote but the road to that end has been traced, particularly by the SAP and the recent decision to monitor security developments together with developments in the democratisation of the countries. If the track is kept (and consistently “nourished” by the EU) and Serbia starts to play the role of the regional driving force it has not been able to play so far, then we might depict a far less gloomy situation in the area in the years to come.

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

It has been claimed here that both NATO and the EU have contributed to the creation of the conditions for the expansion of the Western European democratic security community: (i) the development of shared identities and meanings around shared liberal-democratic values; (ii) the establishment of many-sided and direct relations amongst the states and their societies; (iii) the establishment of democratic institutions of government. However, they have had a different role in the realisation of each of these individual conditions and have adopted different instruments and styles.

Starting from the latter condition for a democratic security community – the existence of democratic institutions of government – probably neither NATO nor the EU has had the role that other actors have had – domestic or international – but both have contributed to the way in which institutions were developed in CEECs. NATO’s military cooperation, for example, has already shown concrete results in the area of the democratic control of the armed forces. The EU’s role has been wider, but an area of immediate attention and success (for the EU together with the OSCE in particular), has been the realisation of the minimal electoral democracy, other areas are connected with the EU requirements concerning the respect of human rights and the protection of minorities.

However, I claimed at the beginning of this paper that the most important condition for the formation of a security community based on liberal-democratic norms is not procedural democracy but the diffusion of liberal-democratic norms that give full sense to the institutional machinery and provide the basis for an area of democratic peace.

The diffusion of norms can take place in different manners and actual change in beliefs can take place or not according to the way in which norm-compliance takes place. In this respect, I claimed here that the first, fundamental contribution of the two organisations was an indirect

effect of their own redefinition in the post-Cold War system. Had the two organisations not existed or had they reinterpreted their international identity in a different way after bipolarism, Central and Eastern Europe would have missed a strong point of reference and incentive for democratisation.

The second, relevant contribution to the spread of liberal-democratic norms was a result of the two organisations' policies and practices in the area. Both have adopted policies and practices formally aimed at enhancing compliance with liberal-democratic norms, but the different interactive style of the two organisations has created different conditions for compliance with the norms the two aimed to "export". Contrary to expectations, the more horizontal and flexible style adopted by NATO has sometimes induced social learning amongst the local elites which *then* produced institutional adaptation. In the case of the EU, on the contrary, the vertical, rigid type of communication and conditionality has not created the conditions for a similar type of communication and norm-compliance. In this communicative context, social learning by the elites has definitely been encouraged far less than strategic adaptation. This clearly does not exclude the possibility of subsequent social learning and redefinition of the belief system.

Socialisation of the elites may have been more effective in the case of NATO, but the EU has been particularly active in socialisation of the civic society and in the development of the third, fundamental condition for the creation of a democratic security community, namely the creation of multiple links amongst the states and their societies.

In other words, both organisations have contributed, although in a different way, to the creation of all the necessary conditions for the realisation of the expansion of the Western security community; but has this succeeded? Can we actually see signs of a Security community of the type claimed here? This paper did not attempt to answer this question and in a sense took a positive answer for granted. However, some elements have been shown that point in the direction of the development of a system of liberal-democratic security communities with a different level of tightness and maturity.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 - TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.
 Tables from Freedom House, 2001, *Freedom in the World. The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties 2000-2001*, New York (NY), Freedom House, pp. 25-29.

Table A: Nations in Transit 2001 Rating and Score Summary

COUNTRY	PP	CS	IM	GPA	DEM	CLJF	CO	ROL	PR	MA	MI	ECON
Albania	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.13	4.50	5.50	5.00	3.75	4.50	4.25	4.17
Armenia	5.50	3.50	4.75	4.50	4.56	5.00	5.75	5.38	3.25	3.50	4.00	3.58
Azerbaijan	5.75	4.50	5.75	6.25	5.56	5.25	6.25	5.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	4.92
Belarus	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.25	6.56	6.75	5.25	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.25
Bosnia	4.75	4.50	4.50	6.00	4.94	5.50	5.75	5.63	5.00	5.50	6.00	5.50
Bulgaria	2.00	3.50	3.25	3.50	3.06	3.50	4.75	4.13	3.50	3.25	3.75	3.50
Croatia	3.25	2.75	3.50	3.50	3.25	3.75	4.50	4.13	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.58
Czech Rep.	1.75	1.50	2.00	2.00	1.81	2.50	3.75	3.13	1.75	2.25	2.00	2.00
Estonia	1.75	2.25	1.75	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.75	2.38	1.75	2.00	2.00	1.92
Georgia	4.50	4.00	3.50	4.75	4.19	4.00	5.25	4.63	3.25	4.00	4.00	3.75
Hungary	1.25	1.25	2.25	3.00	1.94	2.00	3.00	2.50	1.50	2.25	2.00	1.92
Kazakhstan	6.25	5.00	6.00	5.00	5.56	5.75	6.25	6.00	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.50
Kyrgyz Rep.	5.75	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.13	5.25	6.00	5.63	4.50	3.75	3.75	4.00
Latvia	1.75	2.00	1.75	2.25	1.94	2.00	3.50	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Lithuania	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.50	1.94	1.75	3.75	2.75	2.50	3.00	2.75	2.75
Macedonia	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.25	5.00	4.63	4.00	4.75	5.00	4.58
Moldova	3.25	3.75	4.25	4.50	3.94	4.00	6.00	5.00	3.50	4.25	4.25	4.00
Poland	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.75	1.44	1.50	2.25	1.88	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.67
Romania	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.75	3.31	4.25	4.50	4.38	3.75	3.75	4.50	4.00
Russia	4.25	4.00	5.25	5.00	4.63	4.50	6.25	5.38	3.75	4.25	4.50	4.17
Slovakia	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.75	2.25	2.25	3.75	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.50	3.25
Slovenia	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.50	1.94	1.50	2.00	1.75	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.08
Tajikistan	5.25	5.00	5.50	6.00	5.44	5.75	6.00	5.88	5.75	5.50	5.25	5.50
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.75	6.94	7.00	6.25	6.63	6.75	6.25	6.50	6.50
Ukraine	4.00	3.75	5.25	4.75	4.44	4.50	6.00	5.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.33
Uzbekistan	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.00	6.50	6.50	6.00	6.25	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.17
Yugoslavia	4.75	4.00	4.50	5.25	4.63	5.50	6.25	5.88	5.00	5.50	5.50	5.33
Median	4.00	3.75	4.25	4.50	4.13	4.25	5.25	5.00	3.75	4.00	4.25	4.00
Average	3.85	3.60	3.99	4.22	3.92	4.11	4.90	4.50	3.77	3.97	4.08	3.94

Notes:

Democratization Score (DEM) = average of Political Process (PP), Civil Society (CS), Independent Media (IM), and Governance and Public Administration (GPA) ratings

Rule of Law Score (ROL) = average of Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework (CLJF) and Corruption (CO) ratings

Economic Liberalization Score (ECON) = average of Privatization (PR), Macroeconomic Policy (MA), and Microeconomic Policy (MI) ratings

Ratings and scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 representing the lowest level of democratic development. The 2001 scores and ratings reflect the period July 1, 1999, through October 31, 2000.

Table B: Nations in Transit 2001 Political and Economic Classifications


DEMOCRACY RANKINGS			ECONOMY RANKINGS		
	DEM SCORE	ECON SCORE		ECON SCORE	DEM SCORE
CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACIES			CONSOLIDATED MARKET		
Poland	1.44	1.67	Poland	1.67	1.44
Czech Rep.	1.81	2.00	Hungary	1.92	1.94
Hungary	1.94	1.92	Estonia	1.92	2.00
Slovenia	1.94	2.08	Czech Rep.	2.00	1.81
Latvia	1.94	2.50	Slovenia	2.08	1.94
Lithuania	1.94	2.75	Latvia	2.50	1.94
Estonia	2.00	1.92	Lithuania	2.75	1.94
Slovakia	2.25	3.25	Slovakia	3.25	2.25
Bulgaria	3.06	3.50			
Croatia	3.25	3.58			
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS			TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES		
Romania	3.31	4.00	Bulgaria	3.50	3.06
Macedonia	3.75	4.58	Croatia	3.58	3.25
Moldova	3.94	4.00	Armenia	3.58	4.56
Albania	4.13	4.17	Georgia	3.75	4.19
Georgia	4.19	3.75	Romania	4.00	3.31
Ukraine	4.44	4.33	Moldova	4.00	3.94
Armenia	4.56	3.58	Kyrgyz Rep.	4.00	5.13
Russia	4.63	4.17	Albania	4.17	4.13
Yugoslavia	4.63	5.33	Russia	4.17	4.63
Bosnia	4.94	5.50	Ukraine	4.33	4.44
Kyrgyz Rep.	5.13	4.00	Kazakhstan	4.50	5.56
Tajikistan	5.44	5.50	Macedonia	4.58	3.75
Kazakhstan	5.56	4.50	Azerbaijan	4.92	5.56
Azerbaijan	5.56	4.92	Yugoslavia	5.33	4.63
			Bosnia	5.50	4.94
			Tajikistan	5.50	5.44
CONSOLIDATED AUTOCRACIES			CONSOLIDATED STATIST		
Uzbekistan	6.50	6.17	Uzbekistan	6.17	6.50
Belarus	6.56	6.25	Belarus	6.25	6.56
Turkmenistan	6.94	6.50	Turkmenistan	6.50	6.94

Table C: Trends in Reform, Nations in Transit Scores from 1997 to 2001

	1997	1998	1999- 2000	2001		1999- 2000	2001		1997	1998	1999- 2000	2001	
	DEM score					ROL score				ECON score			
CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACIES													
Poland	1.50	1.45	1.44	1.44		1.88	1.88		2.00	1.92	1.67	1.67	
Czech Rep.	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.81		2.75	3.13	↓↓	1.88	2.00	1.92	2.00	
Hungary	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.94		2.13	2.50	↓↓	1.63	1.67	1.75	1.92	
Latvia	2.15	2.15	2.06	1.94		2.75	2.75		2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	
Lithuania	2.15	1.95	2.00	1.94		2.88	2.75		2.50	2.58	2.83	2.75	
Slovenia	2.00	1.95	1.94	1.94		1.75	1.75		2.38	2.17	2.08	2.08	
Estonia	2.10	2.05	2.06	2.00		2.63	2.38	↑↑	2.13	2.00	1.92	1.92	
Slovakia	3.80	3.65	2.50	2.25	↑↑	3.13	3.00		3.38	3.58	3.25	3.25	
Bulgaria	3.90	3.55	3.31	3.06	↑↑	4.13	4.13		5.38	4.08	3.75	3.50	↑↑
Croatia	4.20	4.25	4.19	3.25	↑↑	5.00	4.13	↑↑	3.88	3.83	3.67	3.58	
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENTS													
Romania	3.95	3.85	3.19	3.31		4.25	4.38		4.63	4.50	4.17	4.00	
Macedonia	3.90	3.95	3.44	3.75	↓↓	4.63	4.63		4.50	4.67	4.58	4.58	
Moldova	3.90	4.00	3.88	3.94		5.00	5.00		4.00	4.17	4.00	4.00	
Albania	4.55	4.75	4.38	4.13	↑↑	5.50	5.00	↑↑	4.00	4.50	4.50	4.17	↑↑
Georgia	4.70	4.55	4.00	4.19		4.50	4.63		4.13	4.00	3.67	3.75	
Ukraine	4.00	4.25	4.31	4.44		5.25	5.25		4.25	4.75	4.58	4.33	↑↑
Armenia	4.70	4.80	4.50	4.56		5.38	5.38		4.00	4.08	3.58	3.58	
Russia	3.80	4.10	4.25	4.63	↓↓	5.25	5.38		3.50	3.92	4.33	4.17	
Yugoslavia	na	4.90	5.50	4.63	↑↑	6.00	5.88		na	4.83	5.33	5.33	
Bosnia	na	5.35	5.13	4.94		6.00	5.63	↑↑	na	5.67	5.58	5.50	
Kyrgyz Rep.	4.65	4.70	4.88	5.13	↓↓	5.50	5.63		3.75	3.75	3.83	4.00	
Tajikistan	6.20	5.95	5.69	5.44	↑↑	5.88	5.88		6.13	6.13	6.00	5.50	↑↑
Azerbaijan	5.60	5.55	5.50	5.56		5.75	5.75		5.13	5.00	5.00	4.92	
Kazakhstan	5.30	5.35	5.38	5.56		5.75	6.00	↓↓	4.38	4.50	4.50	4.50	
CONSOLIDATED AUTOCRACIES													
Uzbekistan	6.35	6.45	6.44	6.50		6.25	6.25		6.25	6.25	6.25	6.17	
Belarus	5.90	6.20	6.44	6.56		5.88	6.00		6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	
Turkmenistan	6.90	6.90	6.94	6.94		6.38	6.63	↓↓	6.38	6.42	6.42	6.50	
Median	3.95	4.25	4.19	4.13		5.00	5.00		4.00	4.08	4.00	4.00	
Average	3.97	4.06	3.96	3.92		4.53	4.51		3.95	4.06	4.00	3.94	



NOTES: DATA SORTED BY 2001 DEMOCRATIZATION SCORE
 ↓↓ AND ↑↑ INDICATE CHANGES IN SCORES OF .25 OR MORE

Chart 1: Nations in Transit 2001 Scores



Note: Scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 representing the lowest level of democratic development. The 2001 scores reflect the period July 1, 1999, through October 31, 2000.

ANNEX 2 - Tables on public satisfaction with life and democratic institutions in the CEECs
 (from the European Commission, *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001*, p.14 and 24,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion)



ANNEX 3

ETHNIC GROUPS IN CENTRAL, EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALKANS (Source: Freedom in the World, 2001)

ALBANIA

Tirana

Pop: 3.4 million

Ethnic groups: Albanian (95%), Greeks (3%), others, including Roma, Serbs and Bulgarians (2%)

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Sarajevo

Pop. 3.8 millions

Ethnic groups: Serbian (31%), Muslim (44%), Croatian (17%), other (8%)

BULGARIA

Sofia

Pop: 8.2 million

Ethnic groups: Bulgarian (85%), Turkish (9%), Macedonian (3%), Gypsy (3%)

CROATIA

Zagreb

Pop: 4.6 million

Ethnic groups: Croatian (78%), Serbian 12%), Muslim (1%), other (9%)

CZECH REPUBLIC

Prague

Pop: 12.4 million

Ethnic groups: Czech (94%), Slovak (3%), other, including Polish (3%)

ESTONIA

Tallinn

Pop: 1.4 million

Ethnic groups: Estonian (65%), Russian (28%), other (7%)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (until 2002)

Pop: 10.7 million

Ethnic groups: Serbian (63%), Albanian (14%), Montenegrin (5%), Hungarian (4%), other (11%)

HUNGARY

Budapest

Pop. 10 millions

Ethnic groups: Hungarian (90%), Roma (4%), German (3%), other (3%)

LATVIA

Riga

Pop: 2.4 million

Ethnic groups: Latvia (57%), Russian (30%), Belorussian (4%), Ukrainian (3%), Polish (3%), other (3%).

LITHUANIA

Vilnius

Pop: 3.7 million

Ethnic groups: Lithuanian (80%), Russian (9%), Polish (7%), Belorussian (2%), other (2%).

MACEDONIA

Skopje

Pop: 2 million

Ethnic groups: Macedonian (65%), Albanian (22%), Turkish (4%), Roma (3%), Serb (2%), other (4%).

POLAND

Warsaw

Pop: 38.6 million

Ethnic groups: Polish (98%), German (1%), Ukrainian and Belorussian (1%).

ROMANIA

Bucharest

Pop: 22.4 million

Ethnic groups: Romanian (90%), Hungarian (7%), other, including German and Roma (3%).

SLOVAKIA

Bratislava

Pop: 5.4 million

Ethnic groups: Slovak (86%), Hungarian (11%), Roma (2%), Czech (1%).

SLOVENIA

Ljubiana

Pop. 2 millions

Ethnic groups: Slovene (91%), Croat (3%), Serb (2%), Muslim (1%), other (3%).

ANNEX 4

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED⁴⁸

Politicians /military /practitioners

Ralitsa Netetchva AGAINE (Bulgaria), Member of Parliament, Member of the Committee on Foreign Policy, Defence and Security (May 2002).

Robert BARIC (Croatia), Assistant Advisor for Defence and Military Affairs, Office of the President.

Brian GUSS (US), Country Officer for Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo, State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs/Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Washington DC. (April 2002).

Gediminas KIRKILAS (Lithuania), Member of Parliament, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee and Committee on European Affairs (May 2002)

Zaneta OZOLINA (Latvia), Associate Professor University of Latvia; Former Press and Information Officer, European Delegation in Latvia (April 2002)

Arto Tuomas RATY (Finland), Colonel of Finnish Army, Brigade Commander; Commander of Finnish Battalion in Kosovo 2000; Deputy Chief International Division of Defence Staff 1997-2000; Liaison Officer NATO HQ, SHAPE and PCC 1994-1997.

Antonio TANCA (EU), Principal Administrator, General Secretariat of the European Council, Defence and Security Policy.

Rafal SENIUCH (Poland), Acting Director, Department of International Security, Ministry of National Defense.

Rare Admiral KAHRE, Admiral ALVES, Admiral MARTIN - SACLANT Command, Norfolk, VA, USA (May 2002)

Academics / Security Analysts

Rosa BALFOUR Researcher on European Affairs, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI) – Rome

Knud Erik JØRGENSEN, Professor, Aarhus University – Aarhus (Denmark)

Roberto MENOTTI, Deputy Director - Transatlantic Studies, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI) – Rome

⁴⁸ The type of interview differed a lot in terms of length of the interview, quantity and type of questions asked.