Old Dominion University Graduate Programs in International Studies The Future of NATO Working Paper 96.7 May 1996

Looking South: France and Regional Security in the Mediterranean by Tom Lansford Since the end of the Cold War, Europe's security agenda has been centered in the East--including such issues as the civil war in Bosnia and NATO expansion--even as the potential for instability on its southern flank has grown. In response to this "southern threat"--and at a time when the United States, which for 40 years ensured regional security, is engaged in a drawdown of its forces in the area--France has attempted to assume a leading role in the establishment of a regional security system for the western Mediterranean. Thus, beginning under the late Franois Mitterrand, and more evidently since the election of Jacques Chirac, the French government has embarked upon a number of diplomatic initiatives that place France in the role of "interlocutor" with such states as Iran, Iraq and Libya (1). In the summer of 1996, French Foreign Minister Herv de Charette shadowed American Secretary of State Warren Christopher's shuttle diplomacy in Lebanon to such an extent that France's EU partners accused Paris of "playing a solo game" to the exclusion of a common EU policy (2). To be sure, such French efforts to build "a bridge... across the Mediterranean sea," as Chirac recently put it, are hardly new. (3) But in the changed regional and global circumstances of the post-Cold War years, are these efforts more likely to succeed than in the past?

The Threats: Real and Perceived The new French initiatives, both on the security and diplomatic level, come at a time when there is an increase in the number of threats (whether real or perceived) emanating from the Mediterranean. For France, the main security threat remains the potentially explosive situation in Algeria. After the Islamic fundamentalist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991, the Algerian military canceled the second round of elections, forced the president to resign, and installed a military-controlled government. Since that time, the Algerian Army has been engaged in a counter-insurgency struggle against the FIS and the even more radical Groupe Islamique Arm (GIA). While these groups have staged stunning terrorist acts, including the assassination of prominent government figures and numerous car bombings, the military has been able thus far to keep the insurgency under control through a series of notably brutal offensives against the Islamists. Since 1994, the situation in Algeria has been a military stalemate: the Islamists are unable to topple the government, and the government is unable to stamp out the insurrection. (4) Algeria is important to French policy makers for a variety of reasons. France is home to some 800,000 Algerians, who form part of a larger Muslim community estimated at 4 million. With unemployment hovering around 12 percent, the government of President Jacques Chirac is concerned over the possibility of a flood of new immigrants at a time when a significant portion of the French population blames France's economic problems on foreign workers. (5) France, which is home to an estimated 200,000-350,000 illegal immigrants, is even now in the process of tightening immigration controls. (6) Furthermore, with the recent wave of terrorist attacks in France, it is feared that a deterioration in Algeria would lead to an escalation of terrorist attacks in response for French support of the military government in Algeria. (7) Economic Ties In addition, France still has significant economic interests in Algeria. Besides French owned or joint Franco-Algerian businesses, Algeria also is a major trading partner. French exports account for some 31 percent of Algeria's imports and 13 percent of Algeria's exports go to France, including some 30 percent of France's natural gas, as well as significant amount of oil. (8) These ties mirror the overall economic bonds that exist between Europe and its neighbors to the South. Both Spain and Italy have recently concluded agreements with Algeria to more than double their imports of Algerian natural gas. (9) The EU states are now the third largest consumers of natural gas, after the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the United States, and unlike the CIS and the United States which are not only self-sufficient in natural gas but are net exporters, Western Europe is almost wholly dependent on natural gas imports. The EU accounted for some 87 percent of Arab natural gas exports in 1992. (10) In addition, Arab oil exports to the EU accounted for 14 percent of the EU's total oil imports (see Table 1). (11) The Mediterranean and Middle East states provide tremendous trading opportunities for the EU. Trade between the EU and Middle East has doubled since 1975 (see Table 2). The EU is by far the largest supplier of products to the region, providing some 36 percent of the region total imports--compared to the 13 percent of both the United States and Japan, respectively. (12) In all the Maghreb region is the third largest trading partner of the EU with a volume of trade over $65 billion a year. Finally, there has been an increasing amount of industrial relocation of European manufacturing concerns to the region as European companies have tended to view the region as a "European Mexico." (13) In response to the expanded economic opportunities, there has been a dramatic increase in EU economic aid to the Maghreb (an increase of some 370 per cent). (14) Regional Security Threats Algeria is not the only potential source of instability in the region. At present territorial disputes continue in Morocco, Libya, and in several states in the eastern Mediterranean. (15) States that are presently islands of stability in the region, including Morocco and Tunisia, face potential instability over questions of succession and the possible rise of militant Islam. (16) Egypt, a critical state for maintaining stability in the region and an important actor in the Arab-Israeli peace process, has been engaged in a struggle against Islamic radicals for some time and domestic problems would only seem to exacerbate this struggle. (17) Thus far, the regime of President Hosni Mubarak has been able to contain the insurrection through repeated military offensives against rebel groups such as the Takfir and Higra groups, but it has not been able to completely crush the insurgents. (18) If the Mubarak regime were to fall, the consequences could be extremely damaging to peace in the region. In addition, Libya's sponsorship of terrorism, its aggressive arms program, and its adventurism in Chad also make it a source of deep concern for European, and especially French, policy makers. The possibility of another Libyan intervention in Chad was particularly worrisome for the French who have some 800 troops in Chad. France also has a bilateral defense treaty and stations 1,500 troops and an air unit in the Central African Republic directly to the south of Chad, besides the numerous other military missions in the Francophone states of central Africa. (19) Hence, containment of Libya is a major concern for the French. The EU states must also concern themselves with other conflicts in the region including the Kurdish problem and the question of Cyprus. WEU assets were used in the humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq, and a small contingent remains under the auspices of the UN. Furthermore, Turkey, a full member of NATO and an associate member of the WEU, brings its ongoing war with Kurdish separatists into the forum of both institutions. The WEU Assembly cited Turkey's actions in eastern Anatolia against the Kurds in 1995, as one of factors limiting Turkey's ability to be "integrated into Europe's intergovernmental and supranational structures." (20) This is in addition to Turkey's excursions into Iraq which create further complications for the EU, especially at a time when the French and Germans are pressing hard for a constructive engagement with Iraq. The Cyprus question carries the problem of ethnic strife between two Alliance partners, Turkey and Greece, into considerations over the future of the region. At present the European powers are pressuring Turkey to withdraw its troops in exchange for the deployment of a UN sponsored peace-keeping force. (21) The Militarization of the Region France is not alone in its concern over the potential for instability in the Mediterranean. All of the southern European nations have grave concerns over the militarization of the region. There have been significant increases in the defense budgets of most of the Maghreb states and Egypt. (22) Most alarmingly, these increases have been spent on the acquisition of advanced military hardware, including missiles capable of reaching Europe. (23) Algeria now possesses ten SU-24 strike bombers, 2 Soviet Kilo-class submarines, and 18 launching pads for its FROG-7 and FROG-4 tactical missiles. Meanwhile both Egypt's and Libya's arsenal includes SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles. (24) Furthermore, the European states are particularly concerned with the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in the region. This concern is especially relevant know that several countries, including Algeria and Libya, have the afore-mentioned delivery systems. In 1989, Algeria built a nuclear research reactor at Quera, and a second, larger reactor is under construction, with Chinese collaboration. Although a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard agreements are not in place yet. More alarming in the immediate sense is Libya. Colonel Muammar Kadhafi has publicly called for an "Islamic bomb," and has attempted to obtain a nuclear weapon for years. Libya presently has a Soviet-built nuclear reactor at Tajora, and construction has begun a larger reactor. In addition, Libya embarked on a massive campaign to develop chemical weapons (CWs) in 1985 with the construction of CW plant at Rabta. After discovery of this plant, most of Libya's CW research seems to have been transferred to a partially constructed plant at Tarhuna. It is estimated that Libya spends several hundred million dollars a year on its CW program, besides its $960 million defense budget. (25) French Proposals for Regional Security In response to the potential for threats emanating from the southern Mediterranean, French representatives proposed the organization of a trilateral (France, Italy and Spain) air and naval force at the November, 1992 WEU ministerial meeting in Rome. This proposal was later expanded to include a ground component and at a WEU ministerial on May 15, 1995, the three nations signed agreements which created a trilateral naval force (EUROMARFOR) and a joint rapid reaction ground force (EUROFOR). Soon after this signing, Portugal made a request, which was quickly approved, to participate in these structures. (26) EUROFOR was designed to be a division size rapid reaction force, made up of pre-assigned units from the participating nations. Although EUROFOR does not have permanent units attached to it, it does have a permanent headquarters command, stationed in Florence. When deployed, EUROFOR is designed to have a strength of approximately 10,000 troops, although it can be expanded to 15,000. (27) EUROFOR will be primarily light infantry, but can include special operations units and light armor. EUROMARFOR has neither permanent units assigned to it nor a permanent headquarters. Command of the force is rotated between the naval commands of the participating nations. In operations, EUROMARFOR is to be centered around a French aircraft carrier and supported by an amphibious landing group, complete with deployable amphibious units (marine contingents from the various countries). The unit will be supplemented with warships assigned from WEU assets as needed. (28) Both forces are designed to be used as rapid or crisis reaction forces. As such, their principal tasks would include humanitarian operations, evacuations, and peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations. Both organizations are forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) and with the Eurocorps, form the principal military assets available to the WEU. The Permanent Council of the WEU has yet to clearly delineate the relationship between EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR and NATO, but the United Kingdom, supported by Italy, won approval from the other WEU states to make these forces available to NATO and to ensure that NATO would have priority over these assets in the event of an Article V violation. (29) While Italy has supported the British emphasis on NATO structures, France has attempted to establish a more permanent military structure for FAWEU. This structure would be a multinational and multiservice European general staff. The WEU has yet to act on the French proposal, pending the outcome of the ongoing Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). Even though EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR have not been deployed outside of Europe, their assets have been used in a number of joint exercises to improve cooperation and coordination among the national components of the structures. Four joint exercises--Farfadet 92, Ardente 93, Tramontana 94 and Mistral 95--have been conducted with troop levels of up to 10,000 men and participation by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal as well as other WEU states. (30) All of these exercises have simulated humanitarian operations, including civilian search and evacuation operations, and have allowed EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR to develop procedures for "the build-up and transfer of a combined multinational force in an out-of-area operation, command and control in overseas operations, the use of special forces and electronic warfare for intelligence gathering, organization and conduct of search-and-evacuation operations, the study of rules of engagement." (31) These exercises have allowed EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR to make significant progress towards establishing practical guidelines for subsequent operations. In the future, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR would be tasked with such duties as the WEU's 1991 actions in coordinating the military actions taken to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurdish population of northern Iraq. (32) In addition, it is probable that EUROFOR troops would be tasked by the UN to oversee a Turkish withdrawal from Cyprus. The Flank States The Cyprus question brings into focus French attempts to bring the flank states of Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey into the broader framework of a European security regime for the Mediterranean. Greece has been invited to participate fully in EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, and Turkey has been invited to participate in the structures as an associate member. There are also efforts underway to open a dialogue with Malta and Cyprus. (33) If these efforts are successful, the inclusion of these four states would give the WEU an "operational presence" throughout the Mediterranean and ensure participation of relevant states within the framework of a broad, regional security system for the area. (34) France has also made diplomatic efforts to open channels with states that were previously bypassed by Paris. For instance, France has renewed defense ties with Israel, with whom France had severed military relations after the 1967 Six Day War. In addition, the Chirac government advocated, and the WEU's Council of Ministers eventually accepted, the inclusion of Israel in the WEU's Mediterranean dialogue. France has also attempted to mediate the ongoing crisis in Lebanon and in the new Palestinian areas. These renewed ties offer France an ability to purchase advanced Israeli electronic surveillance equipment, while selling products such as helicopters. France has even invited Israel to bid on subcontracts for the NH90 helicopter, presently being built as a joint European venture. (35) Links Between Africa and the Mediterranean The government of Chirac is also pursuing a parallel strategy of developing a mechanism for European security structures to deal with both Northern and Central African states. For France, a division between the northern Maghreb states and the central Francophone states is essentially meaning-less. Past experiences (the aforementioned Chad-Libyan conflict) have demonstrated the potential for instability in the Mediterranean states to spill over into the Francophone states and this possibility remains a primary concern for French security planners. Hence, just as the French have been the driving force behind the development of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR as the WEU's reaction forces to Mediterranean crises, they are attempting to develop an African reaction force along the same lines. Unlike the WEU's Mediterranean forces, when reviewing the development of an African reaction force, the French have stressed the "importance of the mobility factor and of the prepositioning of equipment and the need to have appropriate infrastructure available at strategic points." (36) This would of course mean tying such a force into the network of French military bases in Central Africa. France's central partner in the development of an African reaction force is the United Kingdom which, like France, has maintained significant interests in the region. (37) In addition, the force is envisioned by the WEU's Planning Cell mainly as a humanitarian force that would focus on missions such as evacuations, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. (38) Such a force would provide the WEU with assets to support UN humanitarian operations like the Rwandan crisis or famine relief in the Sudan or Somalia. (39) The French Emphasis On Independent Capabilities Declining arms sales and increasingly tight defense budgets among the West European states have led to attempts to lessen European reliance on American high-tech military equipment. France has taken the lead in this regard on a wide range of joint and collaborative projects. For instance, increased ties with Israel means that Israel can provide advanced air-defense, electronic and radar systems and airborne surveillance that is among the best in the world, and thereby, allow the French and more broadly the WEU to ease their reliance upon American assets. In addition to purchasing non-American goods, the French have attempted to develop an independent defense capability within the framework of Europe. (40) In this regard, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) serves as the clearing house to coordinate and plan joint ventures and collaborative projects among the WEU states. Besides joint ventures to develop various weapons systems, the French have also attempted to forge joint projects to end the European dependency on the United States for satellite resources. Launched in July 1995, the French-built Helios 1A military reconnaissance satellite was built as a cooperative effort between France, Italy, and Spain and further demonstrates the defense ties among the three nations and the emphasis placed by these states on air surveillance and defense. (41) In order to support its fledgling satellite program, the WEU established the WEU Satellite Center in Torrej, Spain. This center is in addition to the WEU's Space Group which has been engaged in improving the organization's competence in satellite imagery. These resources are designed to provide a foundation for the recently established WEU Situation Center and Intelligence Section of the Union's Planning Cell. In overall terms, these measures are reflective of the WEU's attempt to develop an autonomous, though complimentary, intelligence capability as set out by the WEU's ministers at the May 1995, Lisbon Conference. (42) These efforts come against the backdrop of the ongoing French drive to develop a broad, autonomous European defense industry. The FLA, the Helios satellite, and other projects, when combined with the development of WEU infrastructure, both in terms of facilities and joint military commands (EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR), are all consistent with the by now traditional French push for the establishment of a capable and effective European Defense Identity (EDI). French efforts to establish a regional security system for the Mediterranean have been expressed at the political level (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean [CSCM]), the diplomatic level (French initiatives in Lebanon or with the Maghreb), and the military level (EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR), and these efforts have come as part of a broader pattern in French foreign and security policy which both stresses the role of France as a global power and a broad lessening of heretofore European military reliance on the capabilities of the United States. Furthermore, the maturation of a EDI would provide France with the means to conduct the renewed, assertive foreign policy espoused by the Chirac government. Prospects for the Success of a Mediterranean Security Regime French actions are not a threat to American interests, and for the most part, the French drive for a regional security system has in fact been supported by the United States. In this way, a broad Mediterranean security regime fulfills most of the major prerequisites necessary for the formation of a security regime: that the great powers want it; that the main actors perceive other actors as also seeking mutual security and cooperation; and that war and the "individualistic" approach to security is perceived as costly. (43) Nevertheless, the renewed assertiveness of Chirac's policies focuses attention on the French attempt to eclipse the United States as the primary power in the Mediterranean. In many ways, this might be viewed simply as a return to the early 1970s, a time when the United States was perceived to be in a period of decline. Peter M. Haas, writing about the environmental regime, the Mediterranean Action Plan, points out that "France was the regionally predominant power. It controlled a large proportion of trade which would be affected by environmental regulations, had the most highly developed marine science capability, had a strong reputation for diplomacy, and regarded the Mediterranean as a region in which French foreign policy should hold sway." (44) Present French actions also fall into the broader pattern of Gaullist security policy which has long advocated a French lead in the broad spectrum of European security. (45) Yet France is far from being able to supplant the United States as the primary or hegemonic power in the Mediterranean. American Primacy For the near term, American security primacy in the region will continue unabated. While it is clear that the United States is not the hegemon it was immediately after World War II, it does retain clear primacy in several areas--especially in the security field. The United States has a unique advantage in overall military as compared with the regional powers in the Mediterranean. First, the United States has tremendous over the horizon capabilities. The United States has an ability to deploy forces around the globe that is unmatched in either size or scope. This is partially due to the lead that the United States has in military technology and capability, and partially due to the military resources that the United States has at its disposal. (46) Accordingly, an American draw-down of forces in a particular region does not necessarily equate to an erosion of American security presence. The American troop reductions in Europe and Asia after the Cold War did not seriously interfere with the ability of the United States to conduct operations during the Gulf War or react to crisis points in Bosnia or Taiwan. The Bosnian Crisis is especially illustrative for it demonstrates the legitimacy that American involvement can confer. American diplomatic pressure, combined with a small American troop presence, was able to implement essentially the same settlement in Bosnia that the European powers had been unable to. Even in Algeria, the United States has been able to maintain a dialogue with both sides of the conflict, a feat that France, because of its perceived ties to the present regime, has not been able to do. (47) None of this is to suggest that a regional security regime for the Mediterranean will not emerge, but such a system will continue to involve the United States as a pivotal actor. American assets, in terms of intelligence, communications systems, and even strategic lift will continue to be vital to the success of WEU operations. Hence, the United States has carried burden-sharing to new levels. Through the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the United States can provide its considerable assets to the WEU for use in operations that it wishes to avoid committing troops; yet at the same time, because of the European states reliance on American assets, the United States retains a veto over operations it wishes to prevent. (48) As recent experiences in Bosnia and the Middle East demonstrate, American leadership is often necessary for the implementation of security operations and credible diplomatic initiatives. Conclusion In the end, the combination of American capabilities and assets necessitate meaningful American involvement in the formation of a legitimate Mediterranean security regime. Only the United States has the requisite coercive power necessary to ensure the stability of the region. Furthermore, any significant military operations undertaken by the WEU still require the sharing of American assets such as intelligence and communications resources. Any effort to supplant the United States is unlikely to succeed, especially in the light of American actions which, on the surface, appear to grant greater freedom and autonomy (i.e., the CJTF concept), but in reality are simply means to continue American primacy by lessening the direct costs and the need for direct American involvement in security missions. While President Chirac and Prime Minister Michel Jupp have attempted to assert France's position as a great power through a combination of diplomatic initiatives, resource development, and institution building they have failed to generate the prerequisite power and resources to offer France or a French-dominated WEU as a credible alternative to American security primacy. Consequently, rather than being a declining hegemon, the United States will continue, at least in the specific area of security, to be the primary power in both Western Europe and the Mediterranean. Yet, Washington's actions in the establishment of such new structures as the CJTF have demonstrated a willingness and even desire on the part of the United States to engage in burdensharing, and allow the development of a European defense pillar to bolster the Alliance. The prosperity and stability provided by American primacy have largely ameliorated security concerns among Alliance members so that relative gains among member states are not viewed with alarm by other states. This has resulted in the disappearance of the traditional obstacle to international cooperation as states have found that even the absolute gains of a fellow member state augment national security for all members rather than undermining the stability of the system by spurring security dilemmas. (49) Hence, just as Washington has seen the strengthening of the European pillar as an American interests, the formalization of a security regime involving the Mediterranean region is also an American interest. Through actions such as the appointment of a European to command NATO's southern forces and through the further evolution of the WEU and the CJTF concept, the United States can maintain its security primacy even as France is able to utilize NATO resources and prestige to retain its status as a global power and increase its influence over the future of Europe's security architecture.

Footnotes Dominique Mosi, "The Allure of Gaullism," Financial Times (April 19, 1996), p. 12. David Buchan, "France Presses on With Peace Efforts," The Financial Times (April 21, 1996), p. 3. Quoted in Mosi, p. 12. While the conflict is essentially in a military stalemate, it continues to take its toll on the population, both pro- and anti-Islamist. Casualties are estimated to be between 30,000 and 40,000 over the past three years; IISS, The Military Balance, 1995/96 (London: Oxford, 1995), p. 124. Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt, "Algeria's War on Itself," Foreign Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 138-40. Andrew Jack, "French Planning Tougher Curbs on Immigration," The Financial Times (April 21, 1996), p. 2. During a three month period in the late summer and fall of 1995, the GIA carried out eight bombings in France which killed seven and wounded over 160, and then demanded that Chirac convert to Islam. All of which led the French to deploy an additional 12,000 police and troops in major metropolitan areas; Fred Coleman, "Toujours la guerre: Algerian Fanatics Unleash a Terrorist Wave in France that could Escalate," U.S. News and World Reports (30 October, 1995), pp. 44-47. Pierre, pp. 131-32. Andrs Ortega, "Relations with the Maghreb," in John W. Holmes, Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges of the Mediterranean (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 1995), p. 35. OAPEC, Secretary General's Twentieth Annual Report: 1993 (Safat, Kuwait: OAPEC, 1994), p. 30. Commission of the European Communities (CEC), European Economy: The European Community as a World Trade Partner, 1993 (Brussels: CEC, 1993), p. 88. Ibid.; for a comparison of EU versus American exports, see Table 2. Ortega, p. 35. Ortega, p. 53; for a detailed examination of the economic policies of the EU towards the Maghreb see, Enzo Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993). Antonio Milani, interview, "The Mediterranean Dimension of NATO's Strategic Concept," International Defense Review: Defense '95 (February 1995), p. 80. William H. Lewis identifies three major challenges which could undermine the stability of the region: "the question of leadership" as Morocco's King Hassan nears seventy; the tremendous population growth which is straining the economic and social systems of the region; and the "networking" of revolutionary Islamic groups which seek to overthrow secular regimes in the region; see William H. Lewis, "Algeria at 35: The Politics of Violence," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 3 (Summer 1996), p. 4. On the various potential sources for domestic unrest in Egypt, such as a growing urban poor and a population surge, see Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no., 1 (January 1996), pp. 40-41. During the latest crackdown, the Egyptian Army captured some 245 suspected insurgents in 17 different provinces; "Crackdown on Islamic Militants," Financial Times (April 11, 1996), p. 4. IISS, pp. 238-39; France, Ministry of Defense, White Paper on Defense, 1994 (Paris: SIRPA, 1994), pp. 64-65. Assembly of the WEU, Recommendation 580 (May 1995). Ibid. For instance, Algeria's defense budget increased by 48% to $1.3 billion, while Egypt's defense spending increased by $200 million a year since 1993 to an estimated $2 billion a year in 1995; IISS, p. 127. Algeria, Libya and Iran are actively pursuing negotiations with China and Iran to purchase missile systems with ranges that exceed 1,000 kilometers--which would put them well within range of southern Europe; Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 67. Mark Stenhouse, "The Maghreb: The Rediscovered Region," International Defense Review: Defense '95 (February 1995), p. 86; WEU, 1485; IISS, p 129. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon's List of Threats," Washington Post (April 12, 1996) p. A32; on the Libyan defense budget, see IISS, p. 140. WEU, "European Armed Forces," WEU document 1468 (June 12, 1995). IISS, p. 34. WEU, 1468; IISS, p. 34. WEU, 1468; the United Kingdom has staunchly advocated that any WEU forces must be equally available to NATO, and that the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) be accomplished in a manner that created a "separable European defense capability within NATO" and thus preserves the transatlantic link; United Kingdom, Ministry of Defense, Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1994 (London: HMSO, 1994), p. 15. Besides forces from the four contributing states, these exercises have also included the Netherlands, Greece and units of the Eurocorps. Ardente 93 was in fact the first true WEU exercise; WEU, 1468. WEU, 1468, 28. Assembly of the WEU, Parliamentary Co-Operation in the Mediterranean, WEU document 1485 (November 6, 1995). A formal dialogue between the WEU and Cyprus and Malta was initiated in June of 1995; Jose Cutileiro, "WEU's Operational Development and its Relationship to NATO," NATO Review, vol. 43, no. 5 (September 1995), p. 6. Assembly of the WEU, 1485. "Israel and France Renew Defense Links," International Defense Review, no. 6 (June 1994), p. 5. Assembly of the WEU, Military Airlift--Prospects for Europe, WEU Document 1484 (November 6, 1995). Jacques Lanxade, "Stepping into the Breach: France's Global Role," International Defense Review, vol 28, no. 4 (April 1995), p. 26. Cutileiro, p. 6. WEU, 1484. The French emphasis on a unified European defense market is, of course, also based on domestic concerns over the future of French arms manufacturers; see Pierre Sparaco, "Europeans Advocate Unified Defense Market, Aviation Week and Space Technology (25 July, 1994), p. 54. IISS, p. 34; Fuller, p. 63. Cutileiro, p. 6. On the four requirements for the formation of a security regime, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1988). Peter M. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Environmental Co-operation," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford, 1993), p. 196. For an overview of the continuity in French foreign and security policy see Anand Menon, "Explaining Defence Policy: The Mitterrand Years," Review of International Studies, vol. 21, no. 3 (July 1995): 279-300. Eliot Cohen argues that, in fact, the United States is leading the "revolution" in modern warfare; see Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March 1996), pp. 37-54; see also, "Defense Technology," The Economist (10 June, 1995). This technological lead is bolstered by American leads in resources. For instance, the American Navy, with some 381 vessels, outnumbers the combined naval units of all of the WEU states. See IISS, Balance; U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Almanac, 95, no. 5 (1995). Pierre, p. 146. These assets include "strategic lift, communications, logistics, and intelligence;" Barbara Conry, "The Western European Union As NATO's Successor," Policy Analysis, no. 239 (September 1995), p. 20. Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment," Review of International Studies, vol. 15, no. 2 (April 1989), p. 196. TABLE 1 US/West European Energy Dependency (In millions of dollars and as a percentage of total Arab exports) United States Western Europe Total Imports of Arab Oil 2139.8 5031.6 Percent of Total Arab Oil Exports 13.5 31.9 United States Western Europe Total Imports of Arab Natural Gas 21 563 Percent of Total Arab Natural Gas Exports 3.0 86.7 Source: OAPEC, Secretary General's Twentieth Annual Report, 1993 (Safat, Kuwait: OAPEC, 1994). TABLE 2 Monthly Trade Exports to the Middle East* (In millions of dollars) Exporter 1975 1984 1993 European Union 1278.3 2351.1 2639 United States 450.1 730.8 841 Source: OECD, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade (various issues). *Excludes Israel.