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PART I : BOOKS

PREMIERE PARTIE : LIVRES*

2000

What Next for the NPT ? = Ou va le TNP ? - Geneva : UNIDIR, 2000.

ISBN/ISSN:

iii, 75 + 85 p.; 30 cm.

(Disarmament Forum ; 1/00 = Forum du Desarmement ; 1/00)

ID number: 80016384

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00865

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):

1. Hoffman, Kerstin, ed.

2. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

'Since the unlimited extension of the NPT in 1995, the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes have been confronted by numerous challenges. Concerns about non-compliance, the tests in South Asia, political roadblocks in both the United States Senate and the Russian Duma all mean that the NPT Review Conference to be held in May will be set in very different circumstances than the 1995 Review. This issue examines questions related to the future of the NPT - how did we get to this precarious situation, is further nuclear disarmament likely, could the NPT collapse - as well as suggesting some constructive approaches to the 2000 Review Conference.'

The European Union and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - Paris :
Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 2000.

ISBN/ISSN:

x, 67 p.; 24 cm.

(Chaillot Paper ; 37)

ID number: 80016298

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00863

Author(s):

1. Grand, Camille

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--EU

Added entry(s):

1. Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (FR)

'In 1994-95, one of the first joint actions by the European Union in the framework of the CFSP concerned the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. And it was successful : during the NPT Review Conference in April-May 1995, the member countries of the Union played an essential role in ensuring the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Five years later, on the eve of the new NPT Review Conference that is to take place in Spring 2000, mobilisation of the European Union seems all the more necessary, since all of the issues connected with nuclear arms control and proliferation appear in a completely new light : the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, the nuclear ambitions of Iraq and North Korea, Russia's non-ratification of the START II accord, uncertainties over the ABM treaty and, more recently the refusal of the American Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) all contribute to bringing nuclear and non-proliferation questions back to the forefront of western and European strategic concerns. This book gives an assessment of European policy on nuclear proliferation and suggests some avenues that the CFSP might follow, a few months before the opening of the five-yearly NPT

* This list contains material received as of May 2000 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 8 mai 2000.

1. Gizewski, Peter, ed.
2. York University. Centre for International and Security Studies
(CA)

Based on papers presented at the 1997 Canadian Non-Proliferation Workshop held in Ottawa, Ont., Nov. 13-14, 1997.

1997

Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation - London : Oxford University Press, 1997.

ISBN/ISSN:0198294093

91 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X ; 313)

ID number: 80014360

Type: M

Library Location: 327 /00965

Author(s):

1. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh

Subject(s):

1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--INDIA
2. INDIA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--INDIA
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--INDIA

Added entry(s):

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)

'India's strategic and nuclear-weapon behaviour is driven by legitimate security concerns, national prestige and technical and scientific lobbies. An Indo-US strategic relationship cannot be established without addressing these issues. This paper argues that the challenge facing Washington and New Delhi is to find an innovative approach to proliferation that meets India's concerns. Security concerns could be satisfied by providing India with access to high-technology conventional weaponry or recognising New Delhi's nascent nuclear-deterrence capability as an interim measure, with abolition of nuclear weapons the ultimate objective. To address the prestige issue, nuclear capabilities could be replaced by an equally powerful symbol, such as a vibrant economy or a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. India's nuclear and missile scientists must be offered other challenging options for their professional skills if the technical lobby is to be satisfied.'

1995

1995 : A New Beginning for the NPT? - New York : Plenum Press, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:0306450011

xix, 309 p. ; 24 cm.

ID number: 80012055

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00772

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):

1. Pilat, Joseph F., ed.
2. Pendley, Robert E., ed.

Includes index.

De bom voorbij ? : de verlenging van het non-proliferatie verdrag en de toekomst van de kernbewapening - Nijmegen : Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:9071701581

xxii, 180 p. ; 24 cm.

ID number: 80012618

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00788

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):

1. Bomert, Bert, ed.
2. Jaspers, Huub, ed.
3. Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken (NL)

4. Transnational Institute (NL)
5. World Information Service on Energy (NL)
Verslag van een internationale seminarreeks, Amsterdam, voorjaar 1995.

Controlling the International Transfer of Weaponry and Related Technology -
Aldershot, UK : Dartmouth, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:1855215357

xiii, 231 p.; 23 cm.

ID number: 80012703

Type: M

Library Location: 382 /00265

Subject(s):

1. ARMS SALES
2. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
3. UNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Includes index.

'With the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War, much international attention has focused upon the transfer of weapons and related technology from North to South. The issue of control is complex, involving weapons parts and items that can be used both for military and civilian applications, as well as completed weapon systems. There is a robust proliferation of sophisticated civilian technology that can be used effectively in weapons systems. This volume addresses such issues as : when a transfer is military significant; the importance of the integration of appropriate technology into command and control structures; appropriate general strategies for control; the problems of reaching international agreement over transparency of transfers and possible controls; the experience of enforced disarmament by the international community in Iraq; and the special requirements of nuclear weapons control. This book is made up of papers drawn from a series of meetings in Italy and Germany held under the auspices of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts. Contributors come from Russia, Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the United States.'

La non-prolifération d'armes nucléaires et les contrôles internationaux - Mol
: Centre d'Etude de l'Energie Nucléaire, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:

70 p.; 30 cm.

ID number: 80011749

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00765

Author(s):

1. Carchon, Roland

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):

1. Centre d'Etude de l'Energie Nucléaire (BE)

'Cette brochure traite uniquement de la problématique des garanties. Elle examine les différents traités visant l'application pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire ainsi que les organisations internationales ayant quelque compétence en cette matière.'

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia - New York :
United Nations, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:9290451009

vi, 83 p.; 21 cm.

(Research Paper ; 33)

ID number: 80012063

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00773

Author(s):

1. Han, Yong-Sup

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--EAST ASIA
2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--EAST ASIA
3. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--EAST ASIA

Added entry(s):

1. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

'This study attempts to discover the stumbling blocks that lie in Northeast Asia which may hamper the extension of the NPT, and to find

ways to facilitate bilateral and regional co-operation regarding nuclear issues in the area. It also analyzes briefly each country's past nuclear policy.

The Impact of Nuclear Proliferation : Final Report - Alexandria, VI : Center for Naval Analyses, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:

iii, 97 p.; 28 cm.

(CRM 94-69.20)

ID number: 80012378

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00780

Author(s):

1. Hirschfeld, Thomas J.

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--USA

Added entry(s):

1. Center for Naval Analyses (US)

'This CNA-sponsored study identifies implications for nuclear possession between 1994 and 2003 in distant Third World areas. It identifies policies and programs affecting the design, organization, location and employment of future US forces. This research memorandum is the public release version of a CNA document that was issued in July 1994 for government distribution only.'

Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia - New York : United Nations, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:9290451017

xi, 265 p.; 21 cm.

ID number: 80012064

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00774

Author(s):

1. Mack, Andrew

Subject(s):

1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--EAST ASIA

2. NUCLEAR WEAPONS--EAST ASIA

Added entry(s):

1. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

'The major purpose of this volume is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the dimensions of the various nuclear problems and their interrelationships in Northeast Asia. A second purpose is to explore practical approaches to regional non-proliferation, to see how they may be strengthened and made mutually supportive of the global non-proliferation regime.'

The International Safeguarding and Management of Plutonium - Kingston, CAN : Centre for International Relations, 1995.

ISBN/ISSN:0889117101

xii, 64 p. : ill.; 23 cm.

(Martello Papers ; 10)

ID number: 80011745

Type: M

Library Location: 623 /00766

Author(s):

1. Rioux, Jean-Francois, 1958-

Subject(s):

1. PLUTONIUM

2. NUCLEAR FUELS--BREEDING

3. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):

1. Queen's University. Centre for International Relations (CA)

'The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive view of the issue of plutonium use in the nuclear fuel cycle, and to identify policies aimed at alleviating the negative effects of the 'plutonium economy' and at reinforcing the controls on the international civilian and military stockpiles of plutonium.'

PART II : MAGAZINE ARTICLES

DEUXIEME PARTIE : ARTICLES DE REVUES**

2000

- Cirincione, Joseph
The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain.
FOREIGN POLICY, no. 118, Spring 2000, p. 120-136.

In their zeal to build Fortress America behind missile defenses, some US politicians are tearing down the fragile political lattice of arms control agreements. But as faith in arms control weakens, several Asian nations are beginning to reconsider their self-imposed moratoriums on nuclear-weapons development. And if Asia goes nuclear, it could mean a new global arms race and a war that could engulf the world.

1999

- Carter, Luther J.
Pigford, Thomas H.
The World's Growing Inventory of Civil Spent Fuel.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 29, no. 1, January - February 1999, p. 8-14.

The rapid and already large accumulation of spent fuel generated by civil nuclear power reactors around the world represents a significant but neglected problem for the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as for the nuclear industry and an environmentally concerned public.

- Davis, Zachary S.
NPT 2000 : Is the Treaty in Trouble?
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 29, no. 8, December 1999, p. 10-14.

- Duval, Marcel
L' Europe est-elle menacée par la prolifération ?
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 55eme année, no. 7, juillet 1999, p. 45-59.

- Gizewski, Peter
Managed Proliferation in South Asia : Six Alternative Futures.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, vol. 54, no. 2, Spring 1999, p. 279-291.

Analysis of the nature and consequences of a managed approach yields a mixed assessment - both for security on the subcontinent and for non-proliferation norms generally. Yet current trends suggest that available alternatives may prove even less feasible and desirable. In fact, while managed proliferation is hardly the ideal approach to the south Asian nuclear dilemma, it may nevertheless offer the most realistic response to a difficult situation. Accordingly, greater thought should be devoted to its logic and requirements. Indeed, while ongoing non-proliferation efforts may ultimately prevail, policy-makers must consider the development of realistic alternatives in the event that they do not.

- Herrmann, Wilfried A.
Raketenproliferation in Asien.
OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 37. Jg., Heft 1, Jänner - Februar 1999, S. 37-43.
- Johnson, Rebecca
Divisions and Doubts At the Third NPT PrepCom.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 29, no. 3, April - May 1999, p. 10-16.

** This list contains material received as of May 2000 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 8 mai 2000.

- Krause, Joachim
Nukleare Nichtverbreitung im 21. Jahrhundert : die Notwendigkeit einer neuen Agenda.
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, 54. Jahr, Nr. 10, Oktober 1999, S. 1-11.

Das Thema Nichtverbreitungspolitik hat bei den meisten europäischen Staaten keine Priorität. Die USA agieren unilateral, und immer mehr 'problematische' Länder bauen ihr eigenes Nuklearwaffenprogramm aus. Nach Meinung des Autors ist es dringend notwendig, eine neue Agenda für das Nichtverbreitungsregime zu entwickeln, um einer drohenden Handlungsunfähigkeit Europas entgegenzuwirken.

- Labbe, Marie-Helene
Vingt ans de prolifération nucléaire.
POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE, 64e année, no. 3, automne 1999, p. 679-692.

Le processus de prolifération nucléaire a été beaucoup plus lent que prévu au cours des 20 dernières années. L'auteur analyse ici les raisons de cette évolution en s'interrogeant sur le rôle respectif des États et du régime international de non-prolifération, avec ses trois piliers qui sont le TNP, l'AIEA et le club de Londres. L'année 1995 semble pourtant marquer un tournant, les 'Principes et objectifs pour la non-prolifération et le désarmement nucléaires', adoptés lors de la conférence d'extension du TNP, n'ayant pas encore été mis en œuvre. Les pays asiatiques, notamment l'Inde et le Pakistan, constitueraient-ils une menace pour le régime de non-prolifération ?

- Müller, Harald
Rechtsinstrumente zur Nichtverbreitung : die Wirksamkeit multilateraler Verträge.
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, 54. Jahr, Nr. 10, Oktober 1999, S. 31-37.

Als vor mehr als 30 Jahren der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag für Kernwaffen verabschiedet wurde, konnte niemand einschätzen, ob sich dadurch die Weiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen wirksam kontrollieren lassen würde. Harald Müller von der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung führt in seinem Beitrag aus, wie wirksam dieser Vertrag gegenwärtig ist und welche Risiken weiterhin bestehen bleiben.

- Oxenstierna, Maria Teresa
Revisiting the Global Response to Non-proliferation Violations in Iraq : Tracing the Historical Political Roots.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 20, no. 2, August 1999, p. 77-108.

This article examines in detail the Nuclear Suppliers Group's negotiating efforts to address nuclear dual-use technology and full-scope safeguards. In outlining the regime's reform, it argues that the recent NSG successes resulted from sustained US leadership preceding the negotiations, bolstered by post-Gulf War UN inspections in Iraq. However, the new evidence presented here traces back to the 1970s the US governmental efforts in the creation of these non-proliferation initiatives. Most literature on the subject draws the conclusion that the world responded collectively to Iraq's intransigence almost immediately, within two years of Iraq's military defeat. Whilst true, the genesis of the non-proliferation successes merits closer scrutiny, as several decades of quiet yet consistent American-led policy and technical deliberations laid the foundations for a swift conclusion to the Nuclear Suppliers Group negotiations after the Gulf War.

- Talbott, Strobe
Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 78, no. 2, March - April 1999, p. 110-122.

India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests last May were a double setback : for security on the subcontinent and worldwide nonproliferation efforts. US attempts to forge warmer relations with both countries were also casualties of the blasts. The tests could spark a chain of withdrawals from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, undermining the international consensus against the spread of nuclear arms. Cold War brinkmanship is no

model for diplomacy. For their sake as well as the world's, India and Pakistan need to stabilize their nuclear rivalry at the lower possible level, ban further tests, and embrace frequent, high-level bilateral talks to ease tensions.

- Thakur, Ramesh
South Asia and the Politics of Non-Proliferation.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, vol. 54, no. 3, Summer 1999, p. 404-417.
- Weiss, Kenneth G.
Danger and Opportunity : The United States, Nonproliferation and South Asia.
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 18, no. 2, 1999, p. 137-151.

To contain the fallout from the South Asia nuclear tests, the United States needs to address the issue both in terms of collective security and balance of power politics. The US government needs to maintain its sanctions commitment because US credibility depends on its willingness to impose penalties on proliferators even the penalties that harm US interests. Stronger efforts must be made to engage Russia and China in developing a coordinated nonproliferation approach. This might involve an international conference of the five established nuclear powers, plus India and Pakistan.

1998

- Culture and Security : Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 19, no. 1, April 1998, Whole Issue.
- Ben-Dor, Gabriel
Regional Culture and the NACD in the Middle East.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 19, no. 1, April 1998, p. 189-218.

The NACD talks, like all other problem-solving talks between Israel and the Arabs, are stymied by misunderstandings arising from : a) cultural differences between the Arabs and Israelis; b) negative stereotypes attaching to either party; and c) an overall culture-based opposition to the NACD process itself. However, cultural values are not static. Western values are penetrating into the Middle East. This may, in time, create cultural norms that will promote the strategic dialogue. Of more immediate significance is the fact that Arab and Israeli political leaders, the effective decision-makers, are in constant contact with and consequently influenced by Western values. They are absorbing a kind of common, global culture which is bound to facilitate problem-solving negotiations. Therein lies our hope for progress towards peace in the Middle East.

- Dalton, Toby F.
Toward Nuclear Rollback in South Asia.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 97, no. 623, December 1998, p. 412-417.

Induce India and Pakistan to renounce their nuclear weapons programs ?
Not easy, but the cases of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa show that it can be done.

- Delpech, Therese
Les consequences strategiques des essais indiens et pakistanais.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 63e annee, no. 3, automne 1998, p. 477-487.

L'auteur etudie ici les consequences des essais indiens et pakistanais tant sur le regime de non-proliferation que sur la situation strategique de l'Asie. Ces essais se sont produits a un mauvais moment dans les deux cas : le regime de non-proliferation traverse une crise liee notamment a la non-ratification de START II par la Douma russe et l'Asie doit faire face a de profonds bouleversements financiers, mais aussi sociaux et politiques. Ils peuvent avoir des effets strategiques importants du Moyen-Orient jusqu'a l'Extreme-Orient, en passant par l'Asie du Sud-Est

et l'Asie centrale - deux arcs de crise potentielle. L'une des principales clefs de la crise, selon l'auteur, se trouve en Chine.

- Duval, Marcel

L' arme nucleaire dans le monde : 'etat des lieux'.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 54eme annee, no. 1, janvier 1998, p. 59-77.

- Garrido Rebolledo, Vicente

India, Pakistan y el regimen de no proliferacion nuclear.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 12, no. 64, julio - agosto 1998, p. 99-117.

The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have not only altered the nuclear balance in South Asia; they mean the failure of the nonproliferation regime sponsored by the United States. To fully understand the domestic and international implications of the tests it is also necessary to review the two countries' nuclear history and positions vis-a-vis nonproliferation. India can not be treated as a minor league player.

- Graham, Thomas

South Asia and the Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 28, no. 4, May 1998, p. 3-6.

The recent nuclear tests in South Asia have dealt a serious blow to international efforts to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. In declaring themselves nuclear-weapon states, India and Pakistan have openly challenged the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in which the international community agreed that there should be no more nuclear-weapon states beyond the five that had tested prior to 1967 : the United States, the Soviet Union (now Russia), Britain, France and China. Unless concerted actions are undertaken promptly to begin to reverse this situation, these developments could seriously undercut the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

- Jabko, Nicolas

Weber, Steven
A Certain Idea of Nuclear Weapons : France's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in Theoretical Perspective.
SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 8, no. 1, Autumn 1998, p. 108-150.

When France agreed in 1992 to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), many came to assume that a country known for insisting on pursuing its own course in international affairs, finally came to share the American perspective on the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation. The authors argue that this interpretation is incorrect, and offer an alternative interpretation of French behavior. Their explanation of French behavior does not stress a convergence of perspectives, but rather a persistence of French national institutions and ideas about nonproliferation. The similar nonproliferation policies the United States and France currently pursue reflect a contingent overlap which is based on particular historical circumstances and which could easily change. This lack of a more profound convergence has significant implications for policy. The article is important for both scholarship and policy. It balances out globalization-style thinking in security issues with a careful assessment of the persistence of national trajectories of ideas and institutions that continue to generate different underlying interests and state preferences in the area of nuclear nonproliferation policy. Globalization-style thinking is attractive, both from an intellectual perspective (because it satisfies the theoretical pull of parsimony) and from a practical standpoint (because it legitimizes the development of a nonproliferation expertise from which to work forward on technical fixes). Yet, in the area of nonproliferation, the pursuit of an absolute best or rational policy to shortcut or bypass the politically complex interaction of different national institutional logics, may very well be counterproductive. The authors' argument suggests that such an approach is likely to fail as a way to sustain international cooperation, and could therefore backfire as a way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

- Keeny, Spurgeon M.
Bailey, Kathleen C.
The CTBT Treaty and Nuclear Non-Proliferation : The Debate Continues.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 28, no. 2, March 1998, p. 7-11.

- Klepak, Hal
Cross-Cultural Dimensions of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
Dialogue in Latin America.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 19, no. 1, April 1998, p. 159-188.

This paper seeks to assess to what degree cultural factors in Latin America affect the attitudes of the countries of the region towards the dialogue on non-proliferation and arms control issues. This is done through a brief discussion of what is meant by Latin America, a look at its historic security picture and the heritage this left in the security field, an overview of recent changes, and an assessment of the degree to which there are differences within Latin America in regard to cultural impacts in the security field. The subsequent main sections of the paper then deal with styles and attributes of Latin American societies which have an impact on attitudes towards non-proliferation and arms control affairs, and look at key issue areas to see if one can give examples of how this 'culture' affects specific matters of discussion within the non-proliferation and arms control agenda.

- Krause, Keith
Latham, Andrew
Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control : the Norms of Western Practice.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 19, no. 1, April 1998, p. 23-54.

This essay seeks to highlight the ways in which a specific Western 'security culture' has powerfully shaped the NACD policies and practices of states, and helped to define what it means for states to pursue their national interests. It argues that, within broad parameters, the security-building practices of the West are rooted in powerfully resonating beliefs, or basic mental images, regarding threat and danger as well as appropriate responses. These images resonate not because of their descriptive accuracy, predictive power of prescriptive effectiveness, but because of their 'fit' within existing cultural structures. In turn, these culturally inflected images determine not only how the world is understood and interpreted, but the definition of what constitutes 'interests' and how they should be pursued. Significant policy shifts thus reflect significant shifts in interpretive frameworks. To the extent that this is true, a research focus on 'objective' interests and threats will provide little insight into the logic of contemporary Western NACD policy. What is needed instead is a research programme that highlights the shared images providing the structures of meaning within which Western diplomats and policy-makers operate.

- Labbe, Marie-Helene
Les essais nucleaires indiens et pakistanais et la non-proliferation.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 63e annee, no. 3, automne 1998, p. 531-547.

L'auteur explique ici en quoi les essais nucleaires de mai 1998 effectues par l'Inde et le Pakistan peuvent avoir une incidence sur le regime de non-proliferation et s'interroge sur ce que les Etats soucieux de contenir la proliferation nucleaire peuvent faire pour proteger ce regime. Pour elle, ces essais tendent certes a le fragiliser et a favoriser une situation ou le risque d'une guerre nucleaire en Asie du Sud n'est pas a ecarter. Cependant, elle considere que le regime de non-proliferation n'est pas mort. Les Etats dotes d'armes nucleaires ont un role important a jouer. Ils doivent, en particulier, inciter l'Inde et le Pakistan a signer le CTBT et amener la Chine a developper une politique moins 'proliferante'.

- Latham, Andrew
Constructing National Security : Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Practice.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 19, no. 1, April 1998, p. 129-158.

The goal of this study is to redress some of the weaknesses inherent in the dominant realist literature dealing with Indian international security policy by outlining the various ways in which culture (understood in terms of enduring and widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols) and identity (understood in terms of the self-representation of the nation and its 'proper' role in regional and global politics) inform Indian approaches to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues. A fundamental assumption adopted here is that political and military elites socialized in different cultural contexts may behave in different ways and make different choices, even when placed in similar situations. Members of different societies understand security and security-building issues in very different ways because their assumptions about the world and themselves vary greatly. Cultural values, in sometimes very subtle ways, exercise a powerful influence on these assumptions, shaping not only perceptions of interest and threat (what might be called substantive issues) but also beliefs regarding form and method (what might be called stylistic issues). As a consequence, in order to grasp fully a state's approach to international security it is necessary to examine the often hidden cultural premises upon which that policy rests. This essay presents a preliminary assessment of the role of culture and identity in Indian international security policy, paying particular attention to the self-representation, symbols, myths, icons and archetypes that structure Indian approaches to international security.

- Martel, William C.
Is Ukraine a Universal Example of Non-proliferation ?
DEFENSE ANALYSIS, vol. 14, no. 3, December 1998, p. 309-322.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Ukraine's decision in 1994 to relinquish the nuclear arms that it inherited from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) from the perspective of competing incentives and disincentives. More importantly, that decision represents a critical test of the motivations of states to possess nuclear weapons.

- Turner, Stansfield
The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation.
SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 29, no. 3, September 1998, p. 293-301.

The world is not sufficiently concerned today about the slow pace of nuclear arms control. We need to acknowledge that the outlook for meaningful progress on nuclear arms reductions and controls through what is being done today is slim. If we can shake off the remnants of Cold War thinking, we open three avenues for supplementing the arms control process : placing weapons at lower states of readiness to help avoid accidents, downgrading the role of these weapons in our military strategy, and working toward the goal of permanently ridding the world of nuclear weapons. In succession these steps are de-alerting, devaluing, and disarming nuclear weapons. We neither can, nor need to, resolve the case for disarmament soon. What we should resolve is to supplement the traditional arms control process with de-alerting and devaluing, so as to be in position to evaluate whether disarmament is feasible.

- Yuan, Jing-Dong
Culture Matters : Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 19, no. 1, April 1998, p. 85-128.

This piece examines the strategic cultural dimensions of contemporary Chinese security policy and the specific approaches to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. It seeks to demonstrate how Chinese perceptions of threats and security have over the millenniums been influenced by two distinct yet closely related strategic cultural paradigms : the Confucian-Mencian belief in morality and non-violence, and the parbellum, realpolitik emphasis on the use of force. These

general perspectives provide the broader context within which specific strategies, tactics, and negotiating styles inform and shape both the contours and content of Chinese NACD policies. It is argued that the way in which China's national security interests are conceptualized, defined, and constructed has been influenced by its unique cultural/historical experiences (Sino-centrism and recent humiliation). This may explain the post-Cold War Chinese realpolitik thinking and much of the rationale behind its arms control and disarmament policies.

1997

- Benoit, Loick
L' Union europeenne face aux risques nucleaires de la CEI.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 53eme annee, decembre 1997, p. 80-88.

Cet article analyse l'influence de l'UE dans la denuclearisation des Etats de la CEI et examine les reactions des Quinze face aux nouveaux facteurs de proliferation.

- Cupitt, Richard T.
Khripunov, Igor
New Strategies for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 16, no. 3, 1997, p. 305-315.

Membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group has grown rapidly in the past decade. If continued, this rate of growth threatens to condemn the NSG to years of stalemate and stagnation as it includes states with significantly divergent interests. In contrast, cooperation between NSG members and nonmember states could increase substantially without threatening the working of the NSG itself. The authors argue that keeping the NSG as an effective tool in the effort to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends on the ability to differentiate between three types of states : (1) states unwilling or unable to cooperate with NSG members on nonproliferation issues, including export controls; (2) states able and willing to cooperate with NSG members on such issues; and (3) states able and willing to coordinate their nonproliferation export control policies with NSG members. The authors argue that NSG members should work with the latter two types of states, but that different strategies are required for each. As illustrative examples, the authors consider the guidelines for such strategies and apply them to two important cases; the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

- Feaver, Peter D.
Neoptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation.
SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 6, no. 4, Summer 1997, p. 93-125.

- Joeck, Neil
Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Reversal in South Asia.
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 16, no. 3, 1997, p. 263-273.

This article assesses prospects for nuclear proliferation reversal in India and Pakistan by examining previous case studies of nuclear reversal (South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Argentina, Brazil) and drawing comparisons with the positions of the two South Asian powers. In the six cases of nuclear reversal change became possible when national leaders became convinced that the security threats to the nation did not require a nuclear deterrent and when there were economic incentives for abandoning nuclear weapons. Neither of these conditions applies to India or Pakistan. However, both countries have a shared history of negotiation and compromise that can lead to agreement on smaller issues, thereby building trust.

- Karl, David J.
Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996 - 1997, p. 87-119.

This article offers a critique of the most recent wave of pessimistic literature to appear in the scholarly discussion on proliferation. The author argues that these claims need to specify better why and how the spread of nuclear weapons is likely to have deleterious consequences, particularly between entrenched regional rivals. In the following section he presents an overview of optimistic and pessimistic thinking, outlines the innovations contained in the newest work by pessimists, and sketches the areas of contention between this group of pessimists and their optimistic counterparts. The next two sections examine in greater detail the pessimistic claims concerning the dangers of preventive war, crisis instability, and accidental use, and he offers specific criticisms of these claims in light of the behavior of regional nuclear powers. He then challenges the pessimistic assumption that the opaque arsenals possessed by the newest generation of nuclear states are intrinsically detrimental to deterrence stability. His critique is based on the argument that the analogies that pessimists draw from Cold War nuclear history are misleading and thus mischaracterize the context in which new nuclear states emerge and act. Relying too closely on a singular, ungeneralizable example, the deductive model offered by the new pessimists is unlikely to generate much insight into the pathways by which unwanted nuclear conflict could arise between proliferators.

- Labbe, Marie-Helene
Y a-t-il une politique europeenne de non-proliferation nucleaire ?
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 62e annee, no. 3, automne 1997, p. 307-319.

Les pays membres de l'UE disposent des statuts differents pour ce qui concerne les armes nucleaires et possedent des industries concurrentes. Pourtant, une politique europeenne de non-proliferation a emerge devant la necessite d'eviter la cacophonie lors des grandes negociations sur la non-proliferation. Largement reactive par rapport a la politique americaine et souvent guidee par des preoccupations economiques, cette politique risque de voir ses ambiguïtes revelees lors des negociations a venir.

- Mey, Leo M. van der
India tussen kernstopverdrag en bom.
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 51, nr. 1, januari 1997, p. 30-35.

The author explains why India played the maverick and said 'No' to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (which was finalized in August 1996 and signed by a majority of members of the General Assembly of the United Nations in September last year). India's obstruction is not a case of lost innocence. It results from its consistent opposition to any perceived discriminatory elements in nuclear non-proliferation regimes. Though some of India's criticisms were not altogether out of place and not unique as an example of the discrepancy between declaratory and actual policies of nation-states, and though tactical mistakes have been made by other parties in the negotiation process, India's hypercritical position may be questioned because it denies the positive contribution of CTBT to the control of horizontal as well as vertical nuclear proliferation.

- Preston, Thomas
'From Lambs to Lions' : Nuclear Proliferation's Grand Reshuffling of Interstate Security Relationships.
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, vol. 32, no. 1, March 1997, p. 79-117.

This article argues that increasingly widespread proliferation of nuclear and delivery system capabilities to smaller states represents a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system away from Great Power dominance - forever altering the traditional 'power politics' relationship between states first described by Thucydides. Building upon the broader security studies literature, the rapidly evolving nuclear security relationships between states in the international system are

discussed and a new theoretical framework for explaining them is proposed. This new framework outlines in detail several factors critical to shaping interstate security relationships : (1) the nuclear capabilities of the state (i.e., size, differentiation, range, and interceptibility of force structure); (2) the survivability of its arsenal (i.e., redundancy, mobility, site defense, subterfuge characteristics of forces); and (3) the credibility of its nuclear threat to the decision-makers in the target nation (i.e., perception by target of opponent's capability, survivability, control over situation, and threat to central/peripheral state interest). These characteristics combine to create a variety of nuclear security relationships between states (realpolitik, nascent/local, regional, and great power) which affect the deterrent ability, crisis stability, and available nuclear strategies of small nuclear states. Finally, both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf War are discussed in order to underscore the continuing evolution of Great Power-small state nuclear security relationships. In particular, the Gulf War is argued to provide strong support for the argument that future small nuclear states will be able to deter Great Power threats because of four critical lessons demonstrated by that conflict : (1) the effectiveness and survivability of covert nuclear weapons programs; (2) the effectiveness and survivability of small state delivery systems; (3) the ineffectiveness of strategic defense systems in intercepting potential attacks; and (4) the fact that

- Rodier, Philippe
Le traite d' interdiction des essais nucleaires est-il obligatoire ?
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 53eme annee, avril 1997, p. 89-96.

- Sagan, Scott D.
The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 96, no. 609, April 1997, p. 151-156.

- Sagan, Scott D.
Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons ? : Three Models in Search of a Bomb.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996 - 1997, p. 54-86.

The central purpose of this article is to challenge the conventional wisdom about nuclear proliferation. The author argues that the consensus view, focusing on national security considerations as the cause of proliferation, is dangerously inadequate because nuclear weapons programs also serve other, more parochial and less obvious objectives. The body of the article examines three alternative theoretical frameworks about why states decide to build or refrain from developing nuclear weapons : the 'security model', according to which states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats; the 'domestic politics model', which envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests; and the 'norms model', under which nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a states modernity and identity. The article concludes with an outline of a research agenda for future proliferation studies and an examination of the policy dilemmas produced by the existence of these three proliferation models.

1996

- Auber, Maxime
L' Agence internationale de l' energie atomique et la non-proliferation nucleaire.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 52e annee, decembre 1996, p. 29-35.

- Bailey, Emily
Howlett, Darryl
Simpson, John
1997 and All That : Multinational Diplomacy and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 17, no. 3, December 1996, p.
321-346.

As a result of the decisions taken in 1995, NPT parties will assemble in New York in April 1997 for the first of a series of meetings of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the NPT Review Conference in the year 2000. The significance of the April 1997 PrepCom is that due to decisions taken in association with the 1995 extension decision, these meeting should now become an integral part of a revised process for reviewing the substantive implementation of the Treaty.

- Bryan, Ian
Nuclear Forces in Regional Contingencies.
STRATEGIC REVIEW, vol. 24, no. 3, Summer 1996, p. 32-40.

Over the past few years an increasing number of analysts have argued that the United States should deploy a new arsenal of very small nuclear weapons for use against developing world adversaries. Although this inducive approach to defense policy might address a tactical need, it imperils the broader US foreign policy goal of stemming nuclear proliferation. The United States should forgo developing or fielding these new nuclear weapons; instead, it should develop the conventional capabilities and doctrine necessary to defend American interests in the face of a nuclear-armed, developing world opponent.

- Cochran, Edwin S.
Deliberate Ambiguity : An Analysis of Israel's Nuclear Strategy.
JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, vol. 19, no. 3, September 1996, p.
321-342.

This article presents an analysis of the elements which constitute Israel's nuclear strategy. It first describes the concept of opaque nuclear proliferation in order to establish a framework for analysis. Second, it applies this analytical framework to Israel's nuclear strategy of deliberate ambiguity. Finally, it draws conclusions regarding the usefulness of deliberate ambiguity as an analytical model and the probable concepts of nuclear weapons held by Israel leaders and their role in Israel's security doctrine as a whole.

- Elbaradei, Mohammed
On Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations.
SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1996, p. 17-26.

Most states still find it hard to reconcile the concept of sovereignty with the idea of international oversight. After an analysis of the complex issues relevant to compliance and recent proposals to enhance the system, a number of points are emphasized : (1) Assurance of compliance with international non-proliferation obligations is still embryonic. (2) Preventive measures should be looked upon as the most effective non-proliferation tool. (3) Universality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the key to enhanced compliance and to strengthening its political and legal foundation. (4) Verification is the key to assuring compliance. (5) Transparency in the process of gauging the extent of compliance with non-proliferation obligations should be pursued with vigour. (6) Assessment of compliance has both technical and political components, each of which is mutually reinforcing. And finally : the role of the Security Council in the entire process of compliance with non-proliferation obligations needs to be considered carefully.

- Gere, Francois

La politique française au lendemain de la reconduction du TNP.
TRIMESTRE DU MONDE, no. 33, 1er trimestre 1996, p. 201-213.

The author provides the account of a decisive period, the watershed from the end of the Cold War to the beginning of a period of relative peace in the Western World. Between 1991 and 1994, there has been a massive reduction in vertical proliferation (the increase of nuclear weapons in a particular State) and a high risk of horizontal proliferation (the increase in the number of nuclear States). Today, a vertical reduction encounters serious problems, while horizontal proliferation has not proven as catastrophic as some observers still predict.

- Gill, Bates

Stephenson, Matthew
Searching for Common Ground : Breaking the Sino-US Non-Proliferation Stalemate.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 26, no. 7, September 1996, p. 15-20.

- Herron, Kerry G.

Antiproliferation for the 21st Century.
STRATEGIC REVIEW, vol. 24, no. 3, Summer 1996, p. 22-31.

Full-spectrum antiproliferation is proposed as an alternative concept to both nonproliferation and systemic deterrence. It calls for a policy framework that integrates : 1) preventive policies designed to slow and limit the number of nuclear weapons states; 2) proactive policies intended to reduce nuclear dangers among proliferants by promoting nuclear deterrence, nuclear surety (safety, security and use control), and responsible management of nuclear materials while reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism; and 3) reactive capabilities and policies for reducing risks associated with nuclear crises that are not deterred or otherwise prevented.

- Karl, David J.

Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996 - 1997, p. 87-119.

This article offers a critique of the most recent wave of pessimistic literature to appear in the scholarly discussion on proliferation. The author argues that these claims need to specify better why and how the spread of nuclear weapons is likely to have deleterious consequences, particularly between entrenched regional rivals. In the following section he presents an overview of optimistic and pessimistic thinking, outlines the innovations contained in the newest work by pessimists, and sketches the areas of contention between this group of pessimists and their optimistic counterparts. The next two sections examine in greater detail the pessimistic claims concerning the dangers of preventive war, crisis instability, and accidental use, and he offers specific criticisms of these claims in light of the behavior of regional nuclear powers. He then challenges the pessimistic assumption that the opaque arsenals possessed by the newest generation of nuclear states are intrinsically detrimental to deterrence stability. His critique is based on the argument that the analogies that pessimists draw from Cold War nuclear history are misleading and thus mischaracterize the context in which new nuclear states emerge and act. Relying too closely on a singular, ungeneralizable example, the deductive model offered by the new pessimists is unlikely to generate much insight into the pathways by which unwanted nuclear conflict could arise between proliferators.

- Kelley, Robert E.

The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs : The Importance of Management.
SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1996, p. 27-38.

Iraq and South Africa have both recently been involved in significant clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. The programme in South Africa was relatively low key, and funded at a low level. It was also very successful. The Iraqi programme consumed vast resources, built huge

factories and infrastructure - and was a spectacular failure. The reason for these differences lies in the management oversight of the programmes. Modest goals and careful management can lead to a successful weapons programme. The Iraqi programme was involuntarily disclosed as a result of the Gulf War. Iraq might well have continued to eventual success, had the war not intervened. Inspectors were able to penetrate the Iraqi programme to an unprecedented depth, which has been extremely useful in determining what is known and not known to prospective proliferators. South Africa voluntarily abandoned its programme when the white minority government saw the end of apartheid approaching. This article explores the differences in approach by the two countries. Included are a review of the results each country achieved and an assessment of future non-proliferation prospects. The difference in management approach is another indicator of potential success for the determined proliferator.

- Klarenbeek, Joost A.

Het Non-Proliferatieverdrag na 1995.

INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 50, nr. 4, april 1996, p. 208-212.

The author discusses the implications of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, together with two other decisions of the Conference, was the fulfilment of a necessary condition for strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and for nuclear disarmament. The author concludes that the outcome of the Conference should strengthen the international commitment to horizontal and vertical non-proliferation alike. This is both an opportunity and a necessity for the future.

- Pickell, Gregory A.

Strength in an Unsettled World : The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Deterrence.

COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 15, no. 1, 1996, p. 81-90.

- Sagan, Scott D.

Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons ? : Three Models in Search of a Bomb.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996 - 1997, p. 54-86.

The central purpose of this article is to challenge the conventional wisdom about nuclear proliferation. The author argues that the consensus view, focusing on national security considerations as the cause of proliferation, is dangerously inadequate because nuclear weapons programs also serve other, more parochial and less obvious objectives. The body of the article examines three alternative theoretical frameworks about why states decide to build or refrain from developing nuclear weapons : the 'security model', according to which states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats; the 'domestic politics model', which envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests; and the 'norms model', under which nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state's modernity and identity. The article concludes with an outline of a research agenda for future proliferation studies and an examination of the policy dilemmas produced by the existence of these three proliferation models.

- Simon, Jacqueline

US Non-Proliferation Policy and Iran : Constraints and Opportunities.

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 17, no. 3, December 1996, p. 365-394.

The United States has undertaken a number of unilateral measures to deal with Iran's perceived nuclear ambitions. There are two issues raised by this strategy. First, Washington's decision to take unilateral action on this issue seems to undermine the potential for an increased UN role and to replace the prospect of multilateral enforcement with US unilateralism. Second, this strategy is questionable given the changing landscape of the international system in the post-Cold War and the

constraints and opportunities this poses for US policy in general and non-proliferation policy in particular. The purpose of this article is to examine the effect of these constraints and opportunities upon US policy toward Iran. The first section provides a brief overview of US non-proliferation instruments applicable to Iran and the constraints upon them. Next, the paper sets forth, insofar as this is possible, the impetus of US policy by examining Iran's nuclear programme. The analysis then turns to the two primary obstacles facing unilateral US initiatives - Iran's motivations and the constraints of international and domestic cooperation - followed by an examination of the policy implications these present.

- Stumpf, Waldo
South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program : From Deterrence to Dismantlement.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 10, December 1995 - January 1996, p. 3-8.

1995

- Dissuasion et non-proliferation apres la conference du TNP.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 60e annee, no. 3, automne 1995, numero entier.
- Baleras, Roger
La proliferation nucleaire : qu' en est-il exactement ?
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 51e annee, no. 8-9, aout - septembre 1995, p. 41-51.
- Blechman, Barry M.
Fisher, Cathleen S.
Phase Out the Bomb.
FOREIGN POLICY, no. 97, Winter 1994 - 1995, p. 79-95.
- Blix, Hans
Contre la dissemination des armes nucleaires : le systeme de garanties de l' Agence internationale de l' energie atomique.
REVUE DE L' OTAN, vol. 43, no. 5, septembre 1995, p. 12-17.

Le role de l'AIEA consistant a verifier que les programmes nucleaires d'un Etat poursuivent exclusivement des fins pacifiques est un element essentiel du regime de non-proliferation. Les mesures de verification - ou garanties - accroissent la confiance entre les Etats et peuvent apaiser les preoccupations susceptibles de faire naitre la motivation politique incitant a acquerir des armes nucleaires. Dans une perspective d'avenir, l'experience et les competences de l'AIEA pourraient servir dans la verification d'une interdiction complete des essais nucleaires, d'un arret agree de la production de matieres nucleaires a des fins militaires, ou pour verifier que celles provenant d'armes demantelees ne sont pas reutilisees dans de nouvelles armes nucleaires.

- Bunn, George
Rhineland, John B.
Extending the NPT : What are the Options ?
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 2, March 1995, p. 8-10.
- Cirincione, Joseph
The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Balance.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 94, no. 592, May 1995, p. 201-206.
- Cohen, Avner
The Nuclear Issue in the Middle East in a New World Order.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 16, no. 1, April 1995, p. 49-69.
- Daalder, Ivo H.
What Vision for the Nuclear Future ?
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 18, no. 2, Spring 1995, p. 127-142.

- Doren, Charles N. Van
Key NPT Conference Issues.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 2, March 1995, p. 17-21.
- Dunn, Lewis A.
High Noon for the NPT.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 6, July - August 1995, p. 3-9.
- Freedman, Lawrence
Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons.
SURVIVAL, vol. 36, no. 4, Winter 1994 - 1995, p. 35-52.

The nuclear arsenals of the United States, the United Kingdom and France help to sustain the Western security community, but a restrictive definition of vital interests discourages attempts to extend this community. Any risk of nuclear war in a particular region adds to the pressures for Western disengagement, and this has reinforced existing tendencies for the great powers to play a reduced role in the international system. Nuclear proliferation thus threatens to enable more parts of the world to move beyond the effective influence of the former great powers. The paradox of nuclear weapons remains that they reinforce the autonomy of states while, at the same time, providing the most profound reflection of their ultimate interdependence.

- Garnett, Sherman W.
Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 1, January - February 1995, p. 7-12.
- Hoffmann, Nathalie
Les pays d'Asie et la prorogation du TNP.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 51e annee, decembre 1995, p. 23-30.
- Keeny, Spurgeon M.
The NPT : A Global Success Story.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 2, March 1995, p. 3-7.
- Kelle, Alexander
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime After the NPT Extension Conference : The Tasks Ahead.
INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 30, no. 4, October - December 1995, p. 31-51.
- Labbe, Marie-Helene
L'extension du traite de non-proliferation.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 51e annee, no. 5, mai 1995, p. 103-110.
- Lieber, Robert J.
American Hegemony, Regional Security and Proliferation in the post-Cold War International System.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 16, no. 1, April 1995, p. 1-13.

Three elements shaping the prospects for harmonization of arms transfer policies in the EU are described. First, national arms transfer policies of the major arms exporting states in Western Europe are discussed. Then efforts to provide a framework for the arms industrial integration at the Western European level are described. The next section summarizes recent negotiations about better harmonization of arms exports and exports of dual-use goods from the EU. The paper ends with a look at the prospects for arms transfers from Western Europe to the Middle East.

- Liping, Xia
Maintaining Stability in the Presence of Nuclear Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region.
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 14, no. 3, 1995, p. 277-286.

- Mandelbaum, Michael
Lessons of the Next Nuclear War.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 74, no. 2, March - April 1995, p. 22-37.
- Mazarr, Michael J.
Going Just a Little Nuclear : Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 20, no. 2, Fall 1995, p. 92-122.

In this essay, the author offers a brief history of the North Korean nuclear program and the US-led effort to stop it. He then turns to the lessons of the North Korean case for future nonproliferation efforts in three major categories : the motives of proliferants; the US and allied definition of success in nonproliferation; and the practice of nonproliferation itself - the means used to convince states to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. He offers an assessment of the October 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework in the context of these lessons, and concludes with a brief reconsideration of nonproliferation in light of the Korean case.

- Meier, Ernst-Christoph
Ein Meilenstein nuklearer Nichtverbreitungspolitik.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 44. Jg., Nr. 12, Dezember 1995, S. 15-18.
- Mendelsohn, Jack
Lockwood, Dunbar
The Nuclear-Weapon States and Article VI of the NPT.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 2, March 1995, p. 11-16.
- Muller, Harald
La propagation du TNP, pierre angulaire de l' ordre mondial.
REVUE DE L' OTAN, vol. 43, no. 5, septembre 1995, p. 21-26.
- Petersen, Charles C.
Moscow, Washington and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 16, no. 2, August 1995, p. 44-71.
- Rathjens, George
Rethinking Nuclear Proliferation.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 1995, p. 181-193.
- Redick, John R.
Carasales, Julio C.
Wrobel, Paulo S.
Nuclear Rapprochement : Argentina, Brazil and the Nonproliferation Regime.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 1995, p. 107-122.
- Reiss, Mitchell
Nuclear Rollback Decisions : Future Lessons ?
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 6, July - August 1995, p. 10-15.

At one time or another, nine countries other than the five nuclear-weapon states have had nuclear weapon programs or harbored nuclear aspirations, thought otherwise about it, and have slowed, halted or even reversed their activities. Understanding how each of these states came to restrain or abandon its nuclear ambitions is valuable because the nuclear decisions taken by all of them have one or more common factors that can inform future non-proliferation policies.

- Roberts, Brad
1995 and the End of the Post-Cold War Era.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 1995, p. 5-25.
- Schilling, Walter
Proliferation nuklearer Waffen : politische und militarstrategische Konsequenzen.
OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 33. Jg., Heft 2, Marz - April 1995, S. 157-162.

- Schilling, Walter
Putting Nuclear Nonproliferation Control to the Test.
AUSSENPOLITIK, vol. 46, no. 1, 1995, p. 61-70.

Walter Schilling examines here the current NP configuration and assesses the prospects for the success of the forthcoming review conference. He comes to the conclusion that absolute success is unlikely and points to the need for the creation of essential preconditions in the field of international politics as a whole, especially through a solution of the problems which have accumulated in crisis regions.

- Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu
Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation.
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 14, no. 2, 1995, p. 149-172.

This article analyzes Turkish perceptions of its evolving security environment in the post-cold war era as it impacts Turkish interests and policies, with particular reference to the implications for Turkish security of the existing nuclear weapons and potential proliferation in regions and countries that are located near its borders.

- Shoumikhin, Andrei
The Weapon Stockpiles.
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 14, no. 2, 1995, p. 211-217.

The huge stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons in Russia have serious sociopolitical, economic and military implications. The military-industrial complex is now playing a much larger role in Russian politics. For this reason, it can be expected that Russia will be a growing source of problems related to weapons and weapons proliferation in the future.

- Simpson, John
The Birth of a New Era ? : The 1995 NPT Conference and the Politics of Nuclear Disarmament.
SECURITY DIALOGUE, vol. 26, no. 3, September 1995, p. 247-256.

The author reviews the conference and argues that it was neither a victory for the nuclear-weapon states nor a defeat for the Non-aligned Movement : rather it marks the point at which the global disarmament debate is starting to move beyond the sterile and polarized international rhetoric that has dominated it.

- Spector, Leonard S.
Neo-Nonproliferation.
SURVIVAL, vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 1995, p. 66-85.

Many US strategists have asserted that the threat of nuclear proliferation is getting worse and will not be contained by traditional non-proliferation diplomacy. They urge that US policy must, therefore, focus increasingly on addressing proliferation after it has taken place, particularly through military counter-measures. This flourishing school of thought deserves its own label : 'neo-nonproliferation'.

- Steinberg, Gerald M.
Israel and the Changing Global Non-Proliferation Regime : The NPT Extension, CTBT and Fissile Cut-Off.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 16, no. 1, April 1995, p. 70-83.

- Stumpf, Waldo
South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program : From Deterrence to Dismantlement.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 25, no. 10, December 1995 - January 1996, p. 3-8.

- Thayer, Bradley A.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.

SECURITY STUDIES, vol. 4, no. 3, Spring 1995, p. 463-519.

This article addresses three fundamental questions. The first question is, do the NPT specifically, and the nuclear nonproliferation regime generally, do what they principally are intended to do, that is do the NPT and the nonproliferation regime stop or mitigate nuclear proliferation. The second question is what value or benefit does the nuclear nonproliferation regime provide the United States, for example, does it further the interests of the United States; and the interests of the international system, that is, does it promote international stability. The third question is, what are the costs of the nuclear nonproliferation regime to the United States and to the international system.

PART III : FURTHER READING

TROISIEME PARTIE : LECTURES COMPLEMENTAIRES

DOCUMENTS

Title: Conference de 1995 des Parties au Traite sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires chargée d'examiner le Traite et la question de sa prorogation
Date signed: 11/05/1995 Place signed: USA, New York
Location: DocActInt,#23,1995,p.787-789

Title: Third Preparatory Committee Meeting (PrepCom) for the 2000 NPT Review Conference
Date signed: 21/05/1999 Place signed: USA, New York
Location: <<http://www.basicint.org/prepcom99.htm>>

Title: 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCom). Official statements and documents
Date signed: 00/00/2000 Place signed: USA, New York
Location: <<http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/revcon2000>>
<<http://www.acronym.org.uk>>

CHRONOLOGY AND HISTORY OF THE NPT AND ITS REVIEW CONFERENCES

Title: The Arms Control Reporter (subsequent years)
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