



NRDC-ITA



magazine



Eagle Dagger



Return from ISAF





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FOREWORD

■ by COL. (ITA A) Francesco Cosimato
Chief of the Public Affairs Office, NRDC ITA



The feedback I got from the last issue encouraged me to continue to show the NRDC ITA's life in three fields: the deployment abroad, the main exercises and events we have done and, as it is customary, a glance at our internal life.

The Exercise "Eagle Dagger" was a very interesting test of our flexibility due to the fact that NRDC ITA succeeded in setting up a complete Command Post for a Crisis Response Operation with the limited human resources not committed to ISAF.

The work we have done so far and the debate related to our internal cycle are to me clear evidence of the fact that a thorough discussion about the doctrine is needed to harmonize people's culture and experiences.

Any operation, any threat and any hotspot in the world we are likely to go to requires adjusting the details of our procedures to be consistent with the mission to accomplish.

To this extent the magazine is a suitable arena for conceptual fighters to identify the key elements to be taken into account to have a Theatre level Headquarters provided with the necessary situational awareness, wide flexibility and a proactive approach to manage complex operational pictures.

Our next main exercise will be on a warfighting scenario, but even classical scenarios are to be dealt with, with a high level of flexibility in order to correctly identify the opponent forces and to protect appropriately the communities under threat.

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EXERCISE EAGLE ENTRY 09

■ by COL (ITA A) Giuseppe Bosco

Introductory Remarks

NRDC-ITA Rear Support Command attended Ex Eagle Entry 09 in Civitavecchia from the 17th to the 24th of April 09.

The Training event was hosted by the ITA Army Simulation and Validation Centre (CE.SI.VA.) in “GIORGI” Barracks.

Due to the outcome of NRDC-ITA Functional Review 07 RSC was directed to test the new structure through a series of exercises from Ex “Eagle Recce” 08 to the last one Ex “Eagle Entry” 09.

The CORSOM¹ Package which is going to be released by NC3A and to be endorsed by NATO as the new LOGFASS 6.0 updated version was strongly required by MG GRC A Georgios Finokaliotis to be exploited to increase RSC po-

¹⁾ Coalition Reception Staging and Onward Movement

tentials both in planning and execution of RSOM Ops.

Ex “Eagle Entry” 09 was developed to meet RSC COM expectation by exploiting CORSOM SW Tool within the exercise design and planning criteria accordingly.

For that very reason the Exercise end state was to enhance the planning and execution capabilities of NRDC-ITA RSC, such as required for Reception Staging and Onward Movement (planning and execution phases of deployment operations), exploiting CORSOM.

Background

The Exercise Planning Process started with the Initial Planning Conference held in December 2008. On this occasion, the RSC presented the guidelines of the Ex and Project Officer Ltc ITA A Silvio Faietti identified contacts with external



agencies likely to be later engaged, namely: Nato Consultation Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and Italian Logistic Brigade HQs.

As a result of the IPC a two days' time technical training session on CORSOM SW was staged in Solbiate on the 20th / 21st January 09.

During this session RSC Staff was given a flavour on the CORSOM SW tool.

The Main Planning Conference on February the 12th 09 paved the way for all participants to define some training and logistic issues and to agree with accomplishing a Recce to CE.SI.VA. as the expected suitable location where the Exercise could be profitably run.

On the 12th of March 09 the Final Planning Conference took place and the overall Ex organization and MEL/MIL concept were finally designed and approved.

Predictable CORSOM Exploitation

CORSOM represents a suite of applications, which are designed to be used in both the planning and execution phases of deployment operations. It has been constructed to be compatible with strategic movement planning systems (AD-AMS) and to continue the more detailed planning required for Reception Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM). To this end CORSOM will be a valuable tool in helping to determine a valid concept of operations (CONOPS). At the operation-



al level CORSOM will assist in formulation of the theatre movement architecture and the development of appropriate networks, including main supply routes (MSRs), staging areas (SA), marshalling areas (MA) and convoy support centres (CSC). At the tactical level CORSOM will allow tactical HQs to develop planned schedules for the reception and onward movement of units within the theatre of operations.

The Exercise

This demanding Exercise was strongly encouraged by our former Commander MG Finokaliotis IOT fill gaps previously identified in the RSC Staff ability to handle LOGFASS SW Tools successfully.



MG Finokaliotis was also the Ex Director for that matter supported by the two RSC ACOSs Col ITA A Quintilio Ferri and Col ITA A Giuseppe Bosco.

Steadfast Jackpot 07 slightly modified to fit the deployment of an Italian Brigade (Aosta Bde) was the exercise approved scenario.

The first two days of the Ex were a training phase about how to use CORSOM.

During the next three days RSC was forced to play differently whether in the morning or in the afternoon as follows:

During the morning injections of a technical character were presented to

force the Staff to work on the SW and see whether they were able to use it.

In the afternoon injections designed to start the Operational Planning Process IAW NRDC-ITA SOP RSC OPSCEN Operating Procedures, were presented instead.

Both in the morning and in the afternoon NC3A subject matter experts provided the expertise to fill gaps if necessary.

The Ex Training Objectives have all been met and they were:

- Formulation of the theatre movement architecture and the development of appropriate networks;
- Development of planned schedules for the reception and onward movement of units and supply packages within the theatre of operation;
- De-confliction of onward movement;
- Allocation of routes and staging areas to national and multinational formations, units and elements;
- Allocation of convoy credits, rail paths, landing slots and other intra-theatre movement authorisations by the appropriate authority;
- Overview of the status and progress of RSOM operations;
- Contribution to the Common Recognised Operational Picture.

Outcome

The Exercise was a great success and paved the way for RSC Staff to achieve a good working knowledge on CORSOM. That may help it to better fill the new demanding roles within the new NATO Structure.

NC3A reps, on the other hand, took the opportunity to develop a possible new training module, further to be addressed for future training stages to be held on this powerful SW tool. ■



EXERCISE EAGLE DAGGER 09

■ by MAJ (GBR A) Ian Drummond

“The NRDC-ITA Core Process uses a number of Multi Disciplinary Working Groups MDGs to analyse a problem, produce a solution and deliver results in support of the Decision Making Process. This process is central (Core) to the Corps Business of this HQ and should be known by all Staff intimately. This article looks at the changes made to the process in the last 12 months and how it is being developed and tested on Ex EAGLE DAGGER 09”.

Introduction

“Washing machines” and “Corps planning” are not words usually spoken in the same sentence however since the end of last year I have heard the words ‘washing Machine’ used on many occasions by our very own DCOM, Maj Gen Capewell. This was the analogy chosen to describe the way in which we [the NRDC-ITA] conduct our Core business¹. The comparison between producing clean clothes and delivering orders to our subordinates could be interpreted as being a simple process that simply needs dirty washing (the problem or task) detergent, water (Divisions and MDGs) and a push of the button (Command). However, my wife would argue that the laundry process is not

as simple as it seems and that there are many technical and complicated and (of course!) experienced based stages that need to be completed to get the timeliest and above all, best results.

Our Core Process is no different, it seems on the face of it that the COM NRDC-ITA simply presses the NRDC start button and with a whirr, a knock and a final spin out pops a comprehensive OPOD with its associated annexes ready for our subordinate units to act on. The reality though is that there are many facets to this procedure; a web of processes and sub-processes that have all evolved in order to break down what we have been told to do, work out what has to be done, provide solutions, decide on a course of action, allocate resources, execute the mission or task and finally follow it up with an assessment of how it all went and

¹ The Core Process is defined in the 4 steps: Plan, Refine (and synchronise), Execute and Assess.




FIG. 3: Flow diagram's for each step of the Core Process (SOP 03.01.01)



events flow diagram's (seen in Fig.3) that represent each stage of the Core Process of Plan, Refine (and Synchronise), Execution and the Assessment.

New SOIs for each of the MDGs were then developed and the package was endorsed by the Commander, which concluded the initial IOCP task; the overhaul of the way in which this Headquarters conducts its Corps Business was completed and all that was left to do was to test what had been developed. Ex EAGLE DAGGER 09 was to be the testing ground.

Ex EAGLE DAGGER – The MDG Test

It was no coincidence that Ex EAGLE DAGGER was in part designed to test the findings of the IOCP WG; from its conception the aim was:

'To train non-ISAF personnel in the decision making process, practicing Headquarters plans and procedures'.

More specifically the exercise was to look in detail at the critical elements that form the core decision-making process, in particular:

- The HQ's ability to assimilate information.
- Achieve Staff coordination and interaction.
- Prioritising.
- Timeliness.
- Situational understanding.
- Flexibility.
- Outputs.

All of these areas are influenced by the work of the MDGs.

How did the MDGs function?

Real time constraints and limitations on the exercise meant it was not possible to fully test all aspects of the Core Process, so not all MDGs were put through the wash. In addition, exercise time jumps resulted in compressed timelines and meant that some of the MDG meetings were held too close together resulting in very full days for participants with dual roles. However, the new



SOP 03.01.01 stood up to the challenge and delivered a better solution to the Core Process than previous versions. Whilst there are amendments and adjustments to be made, these are small and should be considered as fine-tuning a fully reconditioned washing machine. The SOIs for each of the MDGs also functioned effectively and only minor adjustments are necessary to “tweak” the way in which the MDGs worked.

The Way Ahead

All of the lessons identified from Ex EAGLE DAGGER are now being incorporated into a review of the SOI and SOP documents and procedures leading to the final test; Ex EAGLE BLADE 09. It is here that the process will have its final assessment as it will be put through the most demanding wash cycle yet; a full 24/7 war fighting exercise in-

volving the whole HQ and elements of our affiliated units in support.

Conclusion

The Core Process has been successfully revised and all personnel understand the new SOPs and SOIs that support the changes. The process works exceptionally well in theory, and it still requires some final adjustment. Ex EAGLE BLADE 09 will prove the ultimate test bed for the core process and it is anticipated that this final assessment will then close the review.

It is important to remember that although these procedures are a vital tool for the Staff, they are not critical to success, but if followed will enable the Staff to focus more clearly on what is really important – The Enemy. ■



EXERCISE EAGLE DAGGER 09

Logistic Organisation

■ by LTC (ITA A) Matteo Mancini

“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it”

Peace operations encompass the full spectrum of missions from peacekeeping, with its presumed high levels of local consent and impartial activity, to peace enforcement employing force, or the threat of force, to restore and maintain order, thereby protecting humanitarian assistance or facilitating efforts to reach long-term political settlements.

Logistics, anyway, is of vital importance for any military operation. Without it, operations could not be carried out and sustained. This is especially evident with NATO's out-of-area operations.

NATO, through several and significant challenges for over a decade, defines logistics as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. As a matter of fact, logistics covers the following areas of military operations:

Design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of material;

Transport of personnel;

Acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities;

Acquisition or provision of services;

Medical and health service support.

In particular, within the Ex EAGLE DAGGER 09 Scenario (Lebanon), the logistic organization was set up as follows:

LOGISTIC CONCEPT: All Service Support was based on individual Troop Contributing Countries' (TCN) Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs), as well as on the integration of all available Support (Sp) resources, both civilian and military. The deployment of additional capabilities was TCN's responsibility for all applicable support in all self-sustainment categories basis. All units were to adhere to the conditions of individual MOUs, and expected to have in the Area of Operations (AO) sufficient stocks of supply items.

CSS ORGANIZATION: A Multi Role Logistic Regiment was deployed in order to provide the overall logistic support to all units deployed in the AO. Main logistic base was co-located with the LCC Lebanon Task Force (LTF) HQ, in NAQOURA. Two Sector Forward Logistics Bases were established: one in Sector West (FLB WEST) in TIBNIN and one in Sector East (FLB EAST) in MARJAYOUN. LCC LTF G4 staff was tasked to:

- Co-ordinate the provision of Log Sp. to the units,
- Monitor the Log situation and establish a reporting system,
- Participate in contingency planning as requested,
- Draft Sp. Doc as needed or required (plans, orders, instructions, etc.)

SUSTAINMENT:

- **Class I** (water/fresh food): Drinking/bulk water was provided from wells through



LTF/Contingent treatment plants. Fresh food was provided through local contractors.

- **Class II/V** (spare parts/equipment/ammunition): National responsibility.
- **Class III** (fuel): The previous arrangement made with the UN Mission for the weekly supply of fuel was still in force.
- **Class IV** (construction material): National responsibility and local contractors, where applicable.

MOVEMENTS: Four Main Supply Roads (MSR) were identified and routinely used by the units. LCC LTF M&T was to monitor and coordinate all movements throughout the AO, in close cooperation with Eng Branch. The latter was able to provide support, in terms of bypasses, whenever the situation required. This close cooperation made it possible to avoid any delay or shortfalls in sustainment.

SPODs/APODs:

- **SPODs:** Primary SPOD was BEIRUT (LBN). The space available for the equipment enabled at least one mechanized Bn to disembark. The operational situation did require the availability of alternate ports. They were identified in TYRE (mainly used as Humanitarian Hub) and NAQOURA (useful only by smaller vessels).
- **APODs:** Primary APOD was BEIRUT Airport (LBN), able to receive all common fixed wing aircrafts. Again, as alternate facility, LARNACA (CYP) was identified.

MEDICAL SUPPORT: primary responsibility was to monitor and co-ordinate the overall medical support and ground/aero medical evacuation within the LCC AO. To this extent, a Med TF was set up, with a Role 1+ in Naqoura and a Role 2 for each Sector HQ.

In order to enhance higher medical treatment facilities, MOUs were established with local civilian hospitals (Role 3 and 4). Lebanon

civilian hospitals were high quality medical service treatment facilities. Most of them were at an University level and their standards were comparable with European standards for the most common medical services: Neurosurgery, Ophthalmology, Optometry, Maxillo-facial surgery, Gynaecology, Dermatology, Infectious disease, etc.

HOST NATION SUPPORT: Limited Host Nation Support (HNS) was available in the AO to enhance support and sustainment of forces. Government of Lebanon (GoL) made available Medical facilities, as above specified. In Country Resources (ICR) for supplies and services were provided by domestic, out domestic and international contractors.



Conclusions

This exercise highlighted quite a few fields in which logistics seems to play a key factor:

- Particular care must be taken to the level of stocks: either contractors or any third party logistic supply cannot be fully reliable. In case of a failure in their services, CSS logistics have to intervene; this implies to keep a proper level of stocks in Class I (water and MRE) and Class III (ground fuel) maintained at MLB and FLBs.
- M&T planning in such an environment (road conditions not favourable) requires a common sense approach, proper expertise, and reconnaissance.
- Without proper arrangements/agreements with HNS authorities, it wouldn't have been possible to exploit at the highest level all the local facilities, mainly Medical and wells. ■

THE TARGETING PROCESS... THIS UNKNOWN PROCESS (Part I)

■ by LTC (ITA A) Giulio Di Marzio

Preface

The level of ambitions of this serial of articles is focalised to propose to the audience a general flavour of what TARGETING is and what it could provide for supporting our accomplishment of the Mission. In particular, this first Part aim is to give the essential & basic background concepts to better understanding the entire development process.

Introduction

In the general framework of the Military Operations, the Targeting Cycle is one of the most significant and, in parallel, one of the most complex procedures we have to deal with.

Indeed it implies a massive and extremely dynamic course involving all the key elements of the HQ acting with a top-down data evaluation process.

Most of the time when we use the word Targeting, we principally are referring to all those kinetic actions taken to hit or strike a specific critical point or, more properly speaking, a well defined target itself.

In other words in our perception we immediately associate this concept with something that looks like in our eyes as an effective, destructive and lethal combination of power and strength.

This is a tricky vision of the reality indeed, since we have to assume that a target in itself is not identified – at all - by the effects we want to achieve for hitting it (both kinetic or non-kinetics as well) using the entire range of lethal means or non-lethal ones available at our level of command.

Having highlighted this misperception of ours, we do need to define clearly the real object of the targeting process: ***how a target has to be prosecuted.***

Among the many ways we could use to deal with this issue the first and the most critical distinction we have to do - speaking of the target prosecution - is defining which kind of means we want to select for achieving the desiderate effect on it.

This is the direct approaching line telling us what kind of target we are dealing with.

Consequently we will make use of ***lethal*** means when the required effect is to destroy



the target. Otherwise *non-lethal* means will be utilized when the required effect is to degrade a target, disrupt it or deny the use of it to our opponent.

This procedure, therefore, generates another misperception since it drives our way of thinking to generalise and to label – quite improperly - a target in term of *lethal target* and *non-lethal target*.

To add a furthermore semantic difficulty on this matter, we could state looking from a different perspective that the word *kinetic* mostly works with *lethal* means but is not real the vice versa at all.

In fact a target prosecuted with *lethal* means produces both *kinetic* effect and even *non kinetic* ones as well.

On the contrary, as said previously, it is not possible to say the opposite.

Therefore a *lethal* mean could even have a secondary undesired *no-kinetic* effect or unintended one. And this very last option could be even have a more massive impact than the expected desired effect on the conduct of Operations, hampering the full achievement of the Mission itself.

Nowadays our units are daily operating in different *COIN operations* and therefore an integration between *kinetic* and *non-kinetic* effects - or solutions suitable to combine both of them - are the more and the more crucial aspect and above all very more demanding than in the past. Meanwhile an increasing importance has to be attribute to all the different de-confliction processes about the means used in the execution of these specific tasks, as well.

No doubt this practise has to rely on a range of choice based on the risk assessment and effectiveness mainly.

This approach gives us the possibility to discover the non-kinetic *side of the moon*

generally known as *Info Ops* or better so called *Effect Based Operations* (EBO).

Addressing our attention to this very last aspect of the development of operation an important one EBO key aspect to mention is its *Objective based-approach*, which forms a hierarchy that drives us from a desired effect on some specific objectives to specific targets.

A peculiar key component for the Info Ops is the ability to perform the CA which provides feedback of the effect based strategy to task methodology and relates on what is occurring within the battle space to the intentions of the civilian leadership.

In fact it is relevant that the EBO affects a larger number of actors, have different implications PAN HQ and moreover a more significant sequence of impact at a different tier in the Public Opinion.

Last but not least I would even mention that the *targeting process* aimed to deliver such as a non-kinetic effect is quite problematic in terms of judging or assessing in the framework time the effects delivered to the target itself. Assessing is always a crucial step wherever you are, but when the cycle has to regenerate itself or if a target needs to be vetted or a new pool of effects has to be re-delivered (re-target), you understand that this is a non negotiable condition.

The Process

Now we are entering in a more detailed discussion to explain how this targeting process works.

In general terms, the purpose of targeting is aimed to develop, coordinate, integrate and synchronise both *lethal* and *non-lethal* means of fire in support of the COM's intent and plan. This has to be in accordance with High Cdr's D & G and reinforced with Subordinate Cdr's Objectives and intent.

Normally the targeting process is developed throughout five important steps. These, namely, are defined by the following *Decide, Detect, Track, Deliver* and *Assess* phases, aimed to produce a quite complete target package to be delivered to the Manoeuvres Units.

In particular each step includes a serial of actions - to be taken - relating to develop a *Capabilities Analysis*, followed by the *GO/NOGO COM Decision Briefing* and the

Target

'A target is an area, structure, object, person, organization mindset, thought process, attitude or behavioural pattern which can be suitably and effectively influence by a capability.'


Section IV – AJP 3.9

Targeting process

'The process of selecting and prioritising targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.'

Joint Targeting determines desired effects necessary to accomplish operational objectives; selects targets that achieves those effects; and selects or task the means, lethal or non-lethal, with which to take action upon those targets.'

Section IV – AJP 3.9



Force assignment & Mission planning, anticipating the Force Execution.

The entire process refers to the need to **Detect & Monitor** the target in the ultimate moments prior to the delivery of effects and it's end, after the target effects have been achieved, with the **Combat Assessment**.

Beforehand a sequence of pre-actions has to be considered in order to trigger the process (i.e the target nomination, the target validation and Prioritisation according to the Cdr's D&G).

In particular analysing the different function we can state that: **Decide** is strictly linked up with the Intel cycle and tends to define priorities on interventions against various targets. **Detect** means to provide an appropriate sharing on the different ISR Assets IAW CCIR, meanwhile **Deliver** is when the engagement takes place accordingly to right location & identification of the target. Finally **Assess** is like analysing the impact of the effect we created with the engagement.

In a conflict (war-fighting operation) normally we categorize a target in the **HVT-High Value Target & HPT-High Payoff**

Target list as a direct result of a War gaming & Mission analysis.

Practically, targeting defines even a process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them in order to achieve the desired effect or actions, depending on the various level of C2.

It consists of a core multiple discipline WG that involves in principle J3, J2, J9 PSYOPS, PAO, Legal, AOCC, SOTF, KLE, LNOs, and should involve COS and the Cdr at different stages.

Therefore a serial of Key factors are to be considered when a targeting process has to be established;

Targeting Key Factors

- Task analysis process; Process balancing sufficient assets capability, without overlapping efforts and avoiding assets/action redundancies, IOT achieve Cdr's effect in priority, intensity and duration;
- Cross boundaries coordination: Assuming that targets are not just static but are moving within and even out the AOO, a good regional coordination is foreseen;
- J2 nodal link analysis;
- CCIRM detailed plan;
- Pan HQ staff internal coordination and synchronisation;
- Unintended and undesired effect and effects interconnectivity
- Operational plan;
- Vetting of targets;
- Targeting coordination tracking;
- Threat assessment;
- Evaluation on CD when targets are nominated for a lethal attack
- Priorities and Influence and/or benefit gained;
- Intel and Info Ops profile development on the target folders;
- Credibility & timely evidence provided by collection assets;
- Resource implication to effectively collate & manage information;
- Enhanced requirement to gather detailed Intelligence.
- Fire coordination lines etc.

Those entire factors will be the fundamental bit for next article. ■

2009 NRDCS' FINANCIAL CONTROLLERS' CONFERENCE

■ by COL (ITA A) Rosario Romano

The NRDCs' Financial Controllers' Conference is a yearly event, taking place in accordance with a specific and approved schedule, aiming at gathering the Financial Controllers of all the GRFs (L) and to present the analysis of the assigned tasks, as a basis for a series of discussions in solidarity.

At the consolidated NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Senior Resources Committee Common Session hosted by NRDC-ITA on 24-27 November 2008, it was agreed to hold the 2009 Financial Controllers' Conference in Istanbul/Turkey. As a result, NRDC-T has asked HQs ARRC, GE/NL Corps, NRDC-ITA, NRDC-SP, RRC-FR, NDC-GR, MNC-NE and EUROCORPS to send the respective Financial Controller and appropriate representatives to participate in the scheduled Conference (Istanbul/Turkey 08 - 11 June 2009), with the aim of discussing all the issue related aspects, in order to find solutions, particularly on the following subjects:

a. Appropriate Accounting Software to be used by the HQs GRF (L): When dealing with financial issues the appropriate Accounting Software is of high importance. The

aim of the analysis was to find the more appropriate system, which is able to:

- present a clear vision of all the accounts;
- develop the functions in accordance with the specific procedures;
- elaborate all the financial statements, as required.
- be deployed in case of exercise.

b. Capital Equipment: purchase or hire for the exercise: The multinational budget structure doesn't include any allocation of funds for investments; hence it is impossible to buy material or other specific properties. The Framework Nation is responsible for providing the Corps with all the necessary material and equipment, but in case of exercises very often particular and urgent assets are required. In these cases only the recourse to the market gives the opportunity to find the necessary material. Obviously costs depend on the quantity, period of time and distances between the location of the Contractors and the area of the exercises.

In case the Corps conducts two or three exercises a year, and the same kind of material is

Photo Caption: ACOS G8/Financial Controller and Chiefs Section A&C, Fiscal and P&C, while analyzing the assigned tasks to be presented and discussed at the Financial Controllers' Conference in Istanbul/Turkey.

required, it is supposed that renting is more expansive than buying material or equipment.

c. Objective Based Budgeting (OBB): implementation at NATO forces structure: By applying the OBB approach, the budget structure reflects the nature of the expenses as well as identifies the category of costs and permits performance measurement. In times of resources constrains, the control of each identifiable output and priority is more than essential. The OBB is a good planning tool based on commercial practices, therefore it is expected a significant change in our way of working and presenting budget to the Senior Resources Committee.

For those reasons it was agreed that the issue requires a deep analysis in order to see if the implementation of OBB at NATO forces structure is feasible.

d. Application of the Cost Share Formula for the year when the post is flagged/unflagged: The Participant Nations will fund between them the total operating costs of the Corps according to their share of the peacetime allocation of Officers.

There is a need for a clear wording in the common Financial Administrative Procedures (FAPs) for GRF HQs, in order to have a common understanding about the commitment of the Nations, in particular for the year when the post is flagged/unflagged, or an entry or total/partial withdraw of personnel happens.

e. Cash Call Procedures and Cash Returns to Nations: On the basis of the approved multinational budget, FINCONs are allowed to ask concerned Nations to send the amount due in accordance with the Cost Share Formula. Discussions focused on:

- Which G8 Section has to be in charge for running the Cash Call procedures;
- How many Cash Calls per year to be launched;
- When to launch the Cash Calls;
- What information is necessary to be sent to the Nations;
- Which is the percentage for each Cash Call;
- Cash Call sending chain;
- Cash Returns to the Nation.

f. G8 MEL/MIL: It was noted that during the preparation of any kind of exercises a list of specific MEL/MIL could help also G8 people in developing appropriate and specific training.



The aim is to have an updated document to be shared among the authorized responsible persons.

g. G8 interpretation of Framework Nation Responsibilities, as detailed within the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU): In accordance with the MoU, the Framework Nation will provide and bear the costs of specific services and functions to the Corps, in accordance with the Framework Nation's scale of supply and existing NATO standards where applicable. The issue requires clarification since only expenditure which is not funded by the Framework Nation, by individual Participants or from NATO and which is agreed by the Participants will be shared by the Participant Nations in accordance with the Shared Formula.

As already foreseen, the outcome of the Financial Controllers' Conference will be presented for the approval of the Senior Resources Committee (Common Session), due to be hosted by RRC-FR (LILLE 23-26 November 2009).

In conclusion, the annual Financial Controllers' Conference is a special forum where the concerned persons have the opportunity to meet each other and present the analysis of the assigned tasks. Coordinated solutions to common problems are one of the best ways for providing the Corps with the appropriate answer in terms of efficiency and flexibility. ■



PUBLIC AFFAIRS AS AN OPERATIONAL FUNCTION

How NATO doctrine has changed

■ by CAPT (ITA A) Gianluigi Arca

Many studies have concluded that with the fall of Berlin wall in 1989 a new age came into being. Ten years of international instability followed, characterized by civil wars erupting, particularly among the former states of the Soviet empire. But since 2001 things have been getting worse. The American writer Samuel Huntington talked of a “clash of civilizations”. His analysis divided the world onto 8 civilisations fighting each other for economy, nationalism, religion. However, it is the widely understood that terrorism has become the main international threat to global security. Furthermore, the world has become smaller due to the developments in technology, communications and mass media; everyone everywhere can be linked in real time to an audience on the other side of the world. Information travels faster and deeper than ever before. The Internet and modern social networks can be easily used by an adversary to spread a message, ideals or have a psychological effect.

Open communication and the relationship between the military and the public to inform people are essential to the success of modern military operations. The new NATO doctrine on Public Affairs, MC 0497/1, already effective for almost two years, has introduced fundamental changes, after considering kinds of threats to international security now and in

the future. Public information has been always considered as fundamental for the conduct of the military NATO-led operations, but since the issue of the new doctrine the trend has been for Public Affairs to become a more significant military function. This is especially true when Public Affairs is linked to the Info Ops, Psyops and CIMIC, however, it is important to realise that despite the obvious linkage Public Affairs is a completely separate issue. MC 0497/1 defines NATO Public Affairs as “the function responsible to promote NATO’s military aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the Alliance”.

This is easily demonstrated by the change that NATO Military Committee has implemented with the name of the function. We do not have Public Information any more, but Public Affairs, underlining the separation from Info Ops by name. Furthermore, in the new nomenclature there are three functions of the Public Affairs, now officially recognised as:

- The relations with the media;
- The internal communication;
- The relations with the (local) community.

Any NATO Public Affairs Office and Commanders are empowered to provide the media, the natural mouthpiece to convey the NATO

message, with positive information to reach the target audience. It is also a valuable means to spread information about professional developments and issues or service culture among the military community. However, the most notable function officially acquired by Public Affairs is the responsibility for relations with the community that hosts any NATO HQ.

The new NATO policy defines also the principles of the Public Affairs. First of all, it is willing to tell and show the NATO story, in order to introduce the Alliance to the audience and gain its favour, by displaying what has been already done and what are the actual or future aims.

But Public Affairs also has to provide accurate information in a timely manner. Information must be always accurate and updated, delivered as fresh as possible, especially considering the current 24/7 media environment.

In addition, the information provided must be consistent, complementary and coordinated. The global communication system is in fact a tangled mass of information from multiple or numerous sources, hence the necessity for commanders and Public Affairs officers to ensure the careful selection of the right message, carefully coordinating with the units involved to prevent inconsistency. Another principle is to conduct media activities respecting the appropriate operational security procedures. It means that every message must be carefully considered before its release to the media in order to prevent any adverse affect on any friendly military unit concerned. Above all, it is important to conduct these activities always being mindful of any multinational sensitivities, and respecting any regional or local environment which NATO is involved into.

The kind of approach that NATO Public Affairs follows to accomplish to its objectives in accordance with the principles above described has changed and it has been clearly stated by the new policy. Until 2007, the approach could be active, semi-active or passive: the Public Affairs had the freedom of action to adopt whichever method was appropriate according to the situation and circumstances. The former policy permitted a passive approach, which provided the option not to answer to a media question. Today is not possible to be passive any more with Public Affairs anticipating hostile media questions and meeting such a situation in a proactive manner in order to ensure that the appropriate message reaches the audience.

To be winners in media environment today it is essential to exploit the opportunities provided by new online information tools. The Internet is a helpful system to spread the mili-



tary message in real time. With the Internet we can find not only web-sites, but “blogs”, held by “citizen journalists”, and “social networks” (the most famous example is “facebook”). Whilst they are not accredited media, they are important media forums in world debate and NATO cannot avoid this community or to ignore the collective opinions expressed in social networks and blogs. Footage, imagery and information sharing on the Internet through these tools is vital to maintain the attention of the audience concerning NATO and its operations. An example of this is the possibility to have free access to the ISAF “flickr” or “photobuck” web-pages and share photos of the mission in Afghanistan (see www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia and <http://s291.photobucket.com/albums/ll313/photobatts/ISAF/>).

It is easy to understand how Public Affairs is always “on the ground”, preparing the ground before the deployment or conduct of a military campaign. For this reason it is now a very real operational function, no different to the others. It is another fundamental area of battle where it is crucial to prevent the enemy’s freedom of action and manouvre, in the same way that it is crucial to maintain positive public opinion. NATO Chiefs and commanders can achieve a great deal through the conduct of an effective media campaign before, during and after a military operation. It is a valuable means to give credibility to the troops on the ground, demonstrates NATO capability and determination to achieve mission success during a time when information travels faster than at any other time in history. ■



EXERCISE EAGLE NEST 1

The Combat Service Support Division Study Day

■ by MAJ (ITA A) Giovanni Cappello

“In war logisticians determine who will win, then the operators go forth and make it happen.”

General Erwin Rommel

Yet frequently the blame for military fiascos is laid upon logistic failures, while the successful campaigns are credited to the commander, despite any of his logistic shortcomings. For example, one hears far less about the excellent logistic arrangements made by the ever-victorious Duke of Marlborough than about Napoleon’s and Hitler’s supply breakdowns when defeated in their invasions of Russia.

Nowadays, the modern battlespace has also to deal with the dangers of asymmetrical warfare, a fighting area with no frontlines, and no clear distinction between civilians and enemy soldiers/fighters, where humanitarian aid actions often turn into full-scale urban battles in a blink of an

eye. In this type of new scenario, the scale, long distances, intensity and tempo of high-intensity conflicts will then demand a responsive, agile, and flexible logistic tool.

In a few words, logistics has more than ever become a key aspect to succeed.

It is moving from these premises that, on Tuesday 10 February 2009, exercise “EAGLE NEST 1” took place. This was the first of a series of so-called logistic “Study Days” NRDC-ITA Combat Service Support Division (CSS Div) has scheduled for 2009. The objective of such training activity is sharing information and reaching a common ground and understanding on some topic of special interest for logisticians. But not only loggies, please! Participation of personnel from other Functional Areas and Branches plays a key role in getting a common logistic picture.



Following the guidance and recommendations of BG Vincenzo PURI, DCOS CSS Div, the one-day exercise saw the participation of representatives from HQ NRDC-ITA CS and CIS Divisions, Rear Support Command (RSC), Support Brigade, and 1st RETRA (TPT regt), one of NRDC-ITA affiliated logistic units.

The full and comprehensive agenda of the exercise acted as the springboard for a stirring brainstorm, during which several logistic issues were discussed.

Personnel from nine contributing nations, bearing different cultural and professional backgrounds had a perfect chance to exchange their experience in operations overseas, and their views on the related logistic aspects.

Presentations covered the overarching framework of NATO logistic principles and doctrine, and prompted a burning debate on pivotal subjects, such as the concept of “collective responsibility” for logistic support, the need for implementing multinational logistic solutions, the difference between operational logistic support

to the manoeuvre (CSS) and real life support, and last but not least, the importance of involving the Corps affiliated logistic units in all NRDC-ITA training activities.

In short, exercise “EAGLE NEST 1” represented an excellent opportunity to involve actors from other units and Functional Areas in order to share knowledge and views on logistics, and to physically “embrace” NRDC-ITA affiliated logistic units in the broader picture portrayed by the Corps LOG concept.

There is still a long way to go, but undoubtedly for many attendees this “Study Day” paved the way to a different approach to both national and NATO logistic matters. Indeed CSS Division’s motto says, “*Knowledge is power*”. But it is to be pointed out that ... *being a logistician is a question of attitude!*

What else to be expected now? As NRDC-ITA Command Group expressed their wish to participate in the “Study Days” to come, CSS Div is looking forward to seeing logistics... rising to the highest office! ■

PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE AFGHAN THEATRE and the STRATCOM “Dynamic”

■ by MAJ (GBR A) Christopher Tom Sargent

“There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them”

Winston Churchill - April 1945

Although the description the “Global War on Terror” is now out of favour in the corridors of power in the United States, it remains an apt description when setting into context the current operational environment. It is almost eight years since the 9/11 Attacks on the United States which proved the catalyst for the opening moves in the ongoing operations being conducted in both Iraq and Afghanistan. After eight years of operations the focus for individual Governments and the US led coalitions has seen a shift from Iraq to Afghanistan. This shift has meant an increase in terms of men, materiel and finance with which it is hoped that a lasting solution may be found. As the political and military focus has shifted, so has the focus of the media. This focus in many ways adds value to the operation particularly at the strategic level. With the focus on Afghanistan and the region as a whole we can expect to see an increase in resources and finance which will allow a lasting solution to be realised. There are of course negative aspects to this shift in focus, in particu-

lar the rapid increase in numbers of media; the so called “Fourth Estate”, added to the already dynamic yet complex Afghan operating environment. The way in which we as a NATO coalition alongside Operation Enduring Freedom are able to manage and shape this media environment will be instrumental in contributing to the final outcome. The task is further hampered by the opinions and requirements of individual nations within the theatre operations. We must recognise these caveats for what they are, whilst ensuring that we approach the very real problems that we face with a dynamic and proactive approach.

A change in administration within the United States of America was bound to herald a shift change. As the military main effort shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, so the Afghanistan theatre moved out of the shadow of the Iraq based operation in the eyes of the media. The year 2009 has been declared the pivotal year for Afghanistan, her people and their collective future. Presidential Elections, increased Troop deployment and the question of regional stability have all captured the interest of the media and despite the global recession this will remain a constant theme. As the interest and focus in Afghanistan grows, so will the demands

placed on the military's ability to prosecute an effective media campaign. Our actions within the Public Affairs domain must reflect this shift change and must evolve in order to remain a credible and effective actor within the operational structure of the coalition. Of particular relevance to this change in media focus to the Public Affairs Office in theatre has been the advent of STRATCOM and the need for a more cerebral approach to media engagement.

The past six months in Headquarters ISAF have seen an increase in media related activities. The focus of the media operations has been firmly fixed on dealing with the increase in media attention and ensuring that we are postured to contribute to the overall Information Operation Campaign. The introduction of the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Branch¹ has caused some ripples within the wider NATO community. Whilst these concerns are recognised it is important to understand that the concept itself is sound and serves only as a coordinating function. Whilst national caveats and national regulations must be strictly adhered to, we must recognise the need for a doctrine governing media and information operations to be further developed in order to reflect the Contemporary Operating Environment and the operational needs of those prosecuting the operation on the ground. Public Affairs must be postured to be proactive in their approach rather than reactive, this will only be achieved if there is integration and coordination between all those involved in messaging. Rather than dismissing the concept of STRATCOM we must embrace it, adapt it and make it work for the media component within the wider campaign plan. We are fighting a tenacious and effective enemy who have an acute understanding of the need and uses of propaganda. Although we do not recognise their actions as Public Affairs or Information operations we must recognise their ability to use these areas to further their strategic end-state. We strive to be first with the known truth; the Insurgent merely strives to be first. On the modern battlefield speed and tempo is vital to dislocating the enemy and denying him freedom of movement. Modern technology means that the war is prosecuted

¹ A coordinating function between INFO OPS, PSYOPS, KLE and PAO.

under the media spotlight where action on the field can be beamed live to a global audience. The insurgents understand this and use the media spectrum to great effect to misinform and misrepresent events. They are not trying to inform the media, they are trying to influence them in order that they may undermine political will and through it, the support for the war. Whilst we lose tempo due to our restrictions, the Insurgent gain it through achieving influence and speed in favour of accuracy and the truth. We cannot and will not mislead or use the media for propaganda purposes, but at the same time we must gain the upper hand in message dissemination through a comprehensive approach through all STRATCOM actors. This is a wicked problem and whilst addressing it physically, we must ensure that we remain true to our own laws and guidance that define who and what we are as democracies. Further development of STRATCOM both as a physical and conceptual component within our approach must be achieved if we are to maximise the effect of the information domain on the modern battlefield. This requires an understanding and an ability to implement an effective campaign within the guidelines received from higher authority.

Whilst STRATCOM provides a coordinating function that better enables and empowers ISAF PA assets to provide effective and coordinated messaging across theatre, we must also ensure that we understand who exactly we should be targeting. We live in an age where the thirst for information drives many facets of our collective societies. As a result the media environment places increased demands on our military to provide accurate and up to date information. The idea of the "Strategic Corporal"² is particularly relevant when we consider the media and their ability to influence a target audience, be it domestic or international. This in itself creates complexities that further effect the way in which PA plan and conduct their approach to the media. Currently it is the ability and influence of the international media and the effect that it can have on our own domestic audiences that drives our engagement plans rather than our own profil-

² *Small-unit leaders on the ground having to make crucial decisions which may have major impacts on not only the forces initially deployed on the mission, but to the mission as a whole.*



ing of what the media can provide in terms of wider campaign effects. The Operational Centre of Gravity remains the Afghan population; historically the only way in which a long term success can be achieved in a Counter Insurgency Campaign is by influencing this centre of gravity. STRATCOM must ensure that their efforts and energies are focused on being able to influence the Afghan population in order to demonstrate the commitment of ISAF and more importantly the effectiveness of the Afghan Government and Security Forces. In support of this the PAO must be empowered and enabled to inform the Afghan media and through it gain influence within the Afghan population. There are of course many complications that face ISAF when trying to achieve this focused engagement with the Afghan media.

The International Media is a powerful and influential body that focuses the efforts of higher commands and political leadership alike. The demand for information means that our own focus has perhaps drifted from the Operational Centre of Gravity to the point where more of our energies are focused on justifying support for the war than are given to winning it. In recent months the vast majority of media engagement has gone to an international audience rather than an Afghan one. Whilst we would be naïve to not expect to have to justify the expense of this war in terms of “blood and treasure” to our own domestic audiences, we cannot afford to do this at the expense of justifying our actions to the Afghan population. The media effort must be split evenly to ensure that that the focus for ISAF, the Afghan population, is fully demonstrated.

Despite the requirement to engage with the Afghan Media, it must be recognised that the ability to achieve tangible results is

hampered by the capability and structure of the media itself. The Afghan media environment is immature and as yet underdeveloped. Although there is a residue potential, thirty years of war and persecution has taken its toll. The ability and reach of the media required to inform and influence target audiences across Afghanistan is limited by infrastructure, literacy and the media skill set that we expect as a norm from the International media. In order to inform the Afghan population through their own media we must first enable, and then empower it. This will take reconstruction and development outside what we normally would expect to do and certainly away from the capabilities of military forces alone. If we wish our messages to be disseminated to a wider population then we must invest, not only through inclusion of Afghan journalists, but through their education and media development. We must also recognise that Key Leader Engagement must include the key opinion formers and influencers within the Afghan media environment.

The situation that confronts ISAF is dynamic and changeable across the military spectrum. The problems are all wicked in nature and we must approach them in a manner that enables and includes all actors, agencies and influencers. The demands placed upon all members of ISAF are challenging but by no means insurmountable. We must however adapt and change to meet these demands. If we are to win in the information/media domain we must be able to utilise all assets available and adopt our Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to meet the associated challenges. We must understand our environment and fight to become masters of it, only then will be able to ensure that the so called fourth estate is truly reflective of what is actually happening on the ground. As an organisation we must have the ability to look in (Afghan centric) and build, whilst at the same time looking outwards and sustaining. Within media operations all actors are important but none more so than those who we are fighting to protect.

“The support of international media will allow us to stay in the war; the support of the Afghan media will set the conditions that will allow us to win it”.

Note: Also Printed in the JWC Stavanger Journal ■

BERSAGLIERI INFANTRY

Heroes in Italian History

■ by CAPT (ITA A) Gianluigi Arca



During the first half of the XIX century the Army of the Sardinian Kingdom, like the French, British and Prussian armies, started to revise and modernise tactics on the battlefield, opening the way for a different kind of troops employment on the ground. On the 18th June 1836, Royal Grenadiers Captain Alessandro Ferrero De La Marmora proposed to King Carlo Alberto of Savoy the creation of a new Infantry Corps, called Bersaglieri.

The French Army already had special troops called Voltigeurs, with the task to attack the enemy on its sides with succession of strikes in order to create confusion and deceive the enemy as to their real intention. La Marmora took his inspiration from these troops. His idea was to have a quick and easy-to-manoeuvre Infantry force able to strike the enemy, specifically targeting commanders and other high value or sensitive targets. In addition to this Bersaglieri were used in deep strike operations, and reconnaissance to find routes or enemy formations in close cooperation with Dragoons (Cavalry troops that moved on horse but could dismount and fight as Infantry). Bersaglieri were able to picket choke points, high ground or other terrain that the Cavalry or other troops were unable to reach.

Bersaglieri were early pioneers and masters of camouflage. Their uniforms were one of the first to be designed with vegetation and background being taken into consideration. This integration of camouflage and tactics was very new in an



age where Armies still fought with bright colours, pomp and impractical uniforms. They were equipped with a dark blue uniform with dark blue gloves. The most useful and singular item of the uniform was a black hat with an internal iron cap and a large brim (to protect the head by the downward strokes with sabres) and decorated with wood grouse feathers (at the very beginning the officers were distinguished by their ostrich feathers).

The hat is called “cappello piumato” (“feathered hat”), or, more commonly it is known as a “Vajra”, from the name of the first Bersagliero soldier, Sergeant Vajra. There is a story too as to the reason why Bersagliero wear their Vajras at a slanting angle. Whilst Captain La Marmora was issuing Sergeant Vajra the items of Bersagliero uniform, he launched the hat at



him, but the Sergeant was so quick that with a jump directly caught the hat with his head. The hat remained across on his head, standing obliquely on the right side. Captain La Marmora was impressed by Sergeant Vajra and the way the hat landed on his head, so he told Vajra to keep it like that “to demonstrate boldness and disregard of danger”. The tradition of the quickness of Bersagliero is still represented by the running march, always practiced by Bersagliero units when parading.

Since 1836 Bersagliero participated almost to every important Italian military campaign. In 1855 they were deployed abroad for the first time to the Crimea, to fight against the Russian empire. After this campaign they inherited from the French-Algerian Zouaves the typical field hat, the Islamic “fez”, still used today in place of the beret by the soldiers. Since the Crimean campaign, the officers’ and NCOs’ sword hilt displays the lion, symbol of Sebastopol, strongly defended by Bersagliero together with the Zouaves.

The “fiamme cremisi” (“crimson flames”), how Bersagliero are also known by the colour of their jacket collar badges, were largely employed between 1848 and 1866, during the three Italian independence wars. It is worth mentioning the battle of Magenta (4th June 1859): on this occasion the Sardinian and the French Army fought off the Austro-Hungarian Army and opened the way to free Milan and the north of Italy. The Kingdom of Italy was finally founded in 1861. But only on the 20th September 1870, after the 1st Bersagliero Regiment entered the Vatican through a breach opened in the boundary



walls of Rome (Porta Pia breach), Rome was annexed to Italy to become its capital.

After that Bersaglieri have been involved in the African adventure of Italy in Eritrea and Ethiopia (last two decades of the XIX century and 1935) and again in China during the “Boxer rebellion” (1900 - 1905). Then in the Italian-Turkish war in Libya (1911 - 1913) and in the 1st and the 2nd World Wars.

To enhance their original tactical reason of employment, in 1898 it was decided to create Bersaglieri units equipped with bicycles, the so-called “carriole” (“wheelbarrows”, rustic and solid, not inflatable, wheel bicycles), under a Captain Natali’s proposal. After the 1st WW Bersaglieri units were assigned motorcycles.

During the second half of the XX century Bersaglieri were involved in the progressive reconstruction of the Italian

Army, and since 1982, with the UN-led operation in Lebanon they have been deployed to almost every operation of the last twenty years involving Italian military personnel: Albania, BiH, FYROM, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan.

The Italian Army has the Bersaglieri Brigade “Garibaldi”, currently commanded by Bde Gen. Giuseppenicola TOTA. It is stationed in Caserta and based on two Bersaglieri Regiments as combat-manoeuve units: the 1st and the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment, each of them on AIFV “Dardo” OTO-MELARA. These two Regiments, with the 11th Bersaglieri Regiment of the Armoured Brigade “Ariete” are the core of the modern heavy Italian Armoured Infantry.

It is worth noting that the 1st Bersaglieri Regiment stationed in Cosenza is the most decorated unit of the Italian Armed Forces. On the 4th May 2009 it received its last decoration, “The Military Order of Italy”, the top Italian military decoration, for the conduct of the operations during the last mission in Iraq in 2006.

Anyway, Bersaglieri have always distinguished themselves not only for their value in battle, but also for their proud spirit of light heartedness, impudence and love for life. They penetrated the Italian culture, in a manner that their name, their uniform and their running march are normally associated to courage, boldness and Italian unselfishness. An old adage says: “Bersaglieri wear the colours of the death but they are the most beautiful expression of the life”. ■



NRDC-ITA THE 63rd ANNIVERSARY OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC

■ by CAPT (ITA A) Gianluigi Arca & SGT (GBR A) Joanne Hammick

The 2nd of June of 1946, after more than twenty years of a fascist dictatorship and a war that had affected almost all the aspects of the Italian society, Italian people chose the Parliamentary Republic as government to form the Country. To pay tribute various NATO members, International Military Organizations, friend nations and Italian Troops have been invited to parade in Rome, this year to celebrate the 63rd anniversary of the Italian Republic.

The Italian President, Giorgio Napolitano, the Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, and other dignitaries (Italian political and military authorities and Military Attachés from NATO and friend Countries) attended the parade. NRDC ITA was invited to attend the parade as a flag party consisting of 4 personnel. This was lead by the Italian Captain Gianluigi Arca (PAO), the US Sergeant Daniel Barr (G3) acting as flag bearer, and 2 escorts, a Hungarian Warrant Officer Balasz Farkas (G5) and a British Sergeant Joanne Hammick (RSC).

The parade was scaled down this year in order to donate the saved money to the reconstruction of buildings, facilities and various infrastructures damaged by the earthquake that affected the central Italian region of Abruzzo last April. 6500 troops, 492 horses and numerous vehicles attended the parade.

Rehearsals took shape on the military airfield of Guidonia, outside of Rome, and began for some participants 2 weeks before the parade but for NRDC ITA 6 days before the event. The activity was conducted with a huge logistical coordination, which was very successful. There was also a nighttime rehearsal on the actual parade route, which was around the Coliseum down the main route that runs along the “Fori Imperiali” past the “Vittoriano”, a big monument situated in Venice Square and dedicated to Vittorio Emanuele II of Savoia, first King of Italy.

This obviously took a massive amount of coordination and manpower to close down the roads to all civilian traffic and public transport. Troops were very patient while this process was being carried out and entertainment was sought in the form of a sing off led by the Band of the Sassari Bde and Troop,

spirit and moral was very high and a feeling of proudness engulfed the parade.

There was a rest day before the parade and a little time to take in the sights of Rome. The weather unfortunately decided to rain rather heavy for 24hrs prior to the parade, the morning of the parade and it was still a down pour by the time participants arrived in Rome and began to take up positions the sun was breaking through and continued to shine down on this wonderful occasion. ■



THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC DAY IN KABUL

■ by WO1 (ITA A) Cosimo Argentieri

Afghanistan – Kabul: 2nd June 2009, To mark the occasion of 63rd anniversary of the Italian Republic's birth, members of the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Italy participated in a ceremony in front of the HQ ISAF in the Afghan capital. With the raising of the Italian national flag the Italian national anthem, "Fratelli d'Italia" was sung by all Italian personnel present.

The Republic Day, Festa della Repubblica, marks the overthrow of the monarchy by a popular referendum in 1946. The colours on the Italian flag have two meanings - green for the countryside, white for the snow capped mountains and red for the blood shed in the fight for independence; or green for hope, white for faith and red for charity. The birth of the Italian Republic (officially on June 2, 1946) is a key event in Italian contemporary history. Until 1946, Italy was officially a monarchy, ruled by the House of Savoy, kings of Italy since the Risorgimento (and previously of Sardinia). However, Benito Mussolini, enjoying the support of the monarchy, imposed fascism after the October 28, 1922 march on Rome, which eventually led to engaging Italy in World War II alongside Nazi Germany. In 1946, Italy became a republic after the results of a popular referendum. Monarchists advanced suspicions of fraud that were nev-

er proved and at the same time a Constituent assembly was elected.

The ISAF Chief of Staff, General Marco Bertolini, gave a speech thanking the ambassador, His Excellency, Fernando Gentilini (SCR) and Senior NATO Civilian Representative in Afghanistan and those ISAF officers and the 45 national representatives for being present at the ceremony.

The COS ISAF and Italian Senior national representative said that "We are proud to operate side by side with the Afghans and the colleagues of many participating nations in the quest for the security and the development of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan" he added "we will remember these days and remember the example of courage and generosity that those who have lost their lives serving here in Afghanistan, we share with them the hopes and the dreams for an Afghanistan that is free and peaceful".

The NRDC-ITA contingent of 158 among of Officers, NCOs and Troops along with 42 other nations have been serving with the International Security Assistant Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan since the middle of this January and will end their tour at the end of July. A job well done. ■



ANZAC Day in Afghanistan

Allies Gather to Remember

■ by MAJ (GBR A) Christopher Tom Sargent

The stories of the bravery of the ANZAC troops in Gallipoli are legion and over the years have passed down the generations. ANZAC Day to Australia is sacred, and seen by many Australians to be the day that marks their birth as a nation. The day marks the anniversary of the first major military action fought by Australian and New Zealand forces during the First World War on the beaches and cliffs of the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915.

To this day the celebration continues long after the last veteran has passed away, it is a day to celebrate, a day to reflect and a day to remember those who have died in war in service of Australia and New Zealand. It is also a day when old enemies come together to remember but at the same time to forgive.

Every year on the 25th April the ANZAC Day Remembrance Service takes place at dawn. Despite a busy day on another operation thousands of miles and 95 years away from the original battlefield, members of the NRDC-ITA personnel currently deployed in Afghanistan joined their Australian and New Zealand colleagues and representatives from 42 different nations to mark the occasion. Time is a great healer and those who were enemies once, on and above the Gallipoli coastline stood together to remember.

At the Headquarters of the ISAF mission in Kabul, 200 members of the Headquarters met at 0430hrs to remember those who had given their lives at Gallipoli and on other battlefields in the years since. Looking across the sea of faces in the early morning light one could see all nations represented, the differences in nation, language and culture put aside and all joined to remember.

The service of remembrance started with an introduction from both countries explaining the importance of the day. Prayers and readings were said and the last post played. As the sun rose over the mountains surrounding Kabul it was difficult not to wonder how the ANZACS who gave their lives in the trenches of Gallipoli would view their ancestors now fighting a very different war in Afghanistan. The nature of warfare has changed but the people who fight them are very similar in mind, in body and in ethos.

Once the service was over, all those who had attended were invited to an “Aussie style Brekker” in the cookhouse accompanied by the notorious but strangely edible Anzac biscuits. “It was a privilege to be a part of the Australian Contingents act of Remembrance”, said Colonel Steve Williamson the NRDC-Italy’s Senior UK Officer in Kabul. “It is a very moving ceremony and very similar to our own Remembrance Day back home. What struck me as I watched the parade and service was the diversity of those who attended; former enemies who not so long ago faced each other at Gallipoli, now serving together in pursuit of success out here in Afghanistan. That is progress and that demonstrates a common bond that ties us all so closely together in our endeavours”.

The day ended with the reading of Laurence Binyon’s poem For the Fallen, well known to all soldiers, world over and especially in these turbulent times in which we now exist.

“They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old; Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn. At the going down of the sun and in the morning. We will remember them”. ■



■ by LTC (ITA A) Michele Ionata

Internal Life

Cycling is not only a sport but also an opportunity for team building and good social enhancement. Many NRDC-ITA members joined the NRDC-ITA cycling team to be part of a group with common interests and based on clear and sound sports values.

Riding our bicycles on the road has the following meaning: "NRDC Italy is among the community". This is our way to show the flag and to prove that we are fully part of the local environment.

As in all sports, there are some cyclists stronger than others but in our case the most important part is that we always move as a group showing that together we can reach the same objective. This is something strictly linked to our military way of doing things. We join, we gather, we work, we suffer together and we interact with other people to reach our common objectives (team results and unity of effort).

Everyone has his own personal challenges, but, as a group, we reach our unity of effort by taking part to organised cycling activities. Riding long distances or climbing mountains with our bicycles is not an easy mission, but in doing this the team's cooperation always lend us a hand in not giving up.

This is the same feeling we experienced in our military patrols many times, that emotion which helped us in reinforcing our character and our team spirit.

Waiting for the others at the finish line and sit at the same table for a lunch, deserved after a long ride, is our example of comradeship and team building attitude.

Sometimes during your journey, we might meet professional and very strong cyclists and we could realise that, despite the level of training, the common enthusiasm on this exciting and challenging sport is something that remove differences and make you feel as part of a big team.

In any case, when the cycling activity is over you feel that something remains from that experience which helps you in facing the daily challenges with the right attitude.

The NRDC-ITA cycling team can assist you in finding the right dimension and your limitations. We have already taken part to some competition and organised events in Lombardia and Piemonte regions, to show our flag in the region, out of the "Ugo Mara" fences.

Some brave members joined the cycling events organised in Cassano Magnago (VA) by the ASD San Pietro and in Gallarate (VA) by ASD Ciclistica AVIS both of approximately 100 Km riding distance.

The first one started from Cassano Magnago and crossed some of the peaks in Varese area before reaching Brinzio and moving back to the starting location.

The second event took place in a circuit around the Lake Maggiore. We rode along the lake, crossed it by boat and reached the opposite side for moving back to Gallarate.

Surely the most challenging event was the Granfondo Prealpi Biellesi in Sordevolo (BI). The NRDC-ITA participants (only 4 due to leave absences) completed 120 Km with a 2300 m climbing distance in more than 4 hours. But what is important is that we all reached the finish line. It appears that in the area there are only hills because we have been climbing and riding down for many hours barely finding flat terrains. The first hill of 7 Km was just the warm up. We reached after 60 Km (and more climbing) the big challenge, a 18 Km distance that from 450 m led us to the 1500 m of the top. After a long and difficult descent at an average of more than 50 Km/h we realised that it was not over. A demanding series of ups and downs put our legs at stake but we never gave up, even where the gradient reached 15-18%.

The finish line appeared after 120 Km: task accomplished!

Our families were waiting for us at the finish line in a very supportive mode; this is where logistics play a key role for allowing a tired athlete to quickly recover from the effort. A well deserved "pasta party" with a team chat completed the event and this superb cycling day.

Obviously cycling is much more than that: MTB events and competitions, participation to activities with other teams and many others. The NRDC-ITA team organises every week at 1700 hrs a "Tuesday-cycling-all-together event" open to all standards, rendez-vous point outside the "Ugo Mara" barracks.

Therefore, cycling is not only a sport; it is an incredible experience, rewarding and enjoyable passion that gives the opportunity to discover your limitations and helps you in finding your new dimension. ■

NRDC-ITA AND SOLBIATE OLONA BASKET SCHOOL

Together in the Name of Sport

■ by MAJ (ITA A) Giovanni Boggeri

The co-operation with the civilian environment surrounding Ugo Mara Barracks is one of the goals that HQ NRDC-ITA has constantly achieved since its foundation. HQ NRDC-ITA personnel have integrated very well into the Olona Valley area and on many occasions the local authorities have witnessed a positive relationship between the local population and the NATO multinational community.

At the same time a capstone of the daily life within our HQ is represented by sporting activities, not only as part of the individual training requirements which allow us to be ready to deploy, but also as a set of positive values that are ideally connected with the military way of life; robust daily training, personal involvement, mutual support, the fight for victory and respecting the adversary.

A good example of the military and civilian integration in the name of sport is represented by the link between HQ NRDC-ITA and Solbiate Olona Basket School, which is the name of the basketball team in the village where NRDC-ITA HQ is located. In the past HQ NRDC-ITA personnel have played as part of the team and some still play with them to this day. Furthermore individuals from NRDC-ITA are always present giving support during each domestic game, which take place at the Gymnasium of the Solbiate Olona Secondary School.

Basketball is a sort of institution in the entire Lombardia region and in particular in the Varese province, with the Varese team is regarded as one of the most famous and successful basketball teams not only in Italy but also throughout Europe. Behind this there can be seen are a vast quantity of clubs at a lower level which is displayed in the almost each village, town or city in the province having a basketball team.

Solbiate Olona Basket School was founded in 1999 by a group of friends 'addicted' to basketball who started playing in the Varese Province 2nd Division championship. In 2001 the team achieved promoted to the 1st Division, where it successfully remains to this day.

The relationship between HQ NRDC-ITA and Basket School began in 2003 when two members of the NATO force here, an Italian Captain and a Greek Sergeant, joined the team as players. With



them the team finished runner-up in both the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 championships, missing out on the title by just a few points.

The 2008-2009 championship has recently finished and the Basket School finished in third place with a member of the HQ part of the team helping to achieve this fine result.

Another illustration of the partnership between HQ NRDC-ITA and Basket School are the tournaments, which are organised by the team at Solbiate Olona. These tournaments often see members of our HQ involved not only as players or spectators but also directly engaged in organising and supporting these events. A couple of examples of this are the event of the '1000 points game' organised in 2008 to collect money for a humanitarian organization helping the children of Congo, and also during the annual '3 v 3' Solbiate Olona tournament in June this year.

The coach of the team, Mr. Luca Besani, emphasised the importance of the link between his team and our HQ by saying, "Solbiate is a small village and it is not so easy to find basketball players who want to sacrifice their time at the end of the working day playing for free in a not-professional team. It is this reason why it is essential for us to receive players from HQ NRDC-ITA whose technical and physical preparation is not only appreciated but also their strong motivation, which can be seen as an example to all of us. Unfortunately on occasion we are forced to lose them when they have to deploy for an operation abroad and the team can be a little bit worried when they are involved in this kind of activity, but when they are back and ready to play, our spirit and our friendship become stronger. We hope that this relationship will be strengthened year after year and that HQ NRDC-ITA continues to be manned with good basketball players available to be part of our team."

In reality we all know that everyone in the Basket School team has a dream - To be joined by a fantastic American player arriving from HQ NRDC-ITA..

Who knows if this 'NBA' dream could be realised... ■

“STRAMILANO 09” The NRDC-ITA running team in the Budapest half marathon

■ by WO1 (ITA A) Giovanni Papa



the Commander. The athletes kept up a very high spirit and honoured the NRDC-ITA even abroad (half marathon in Budapest, Hungary, 2008).

Even this year the participation to the “STRAMILANO” half marathon has been great. Athletic and physically prepared personnel compose the group portrayed in the photo above. Considering their high average age, they demonstrated to be very professional and passionate.

In the early morning of last 5th April, Milan changed its aspect, thousands of people started running downtown together with the ones participating to the “STRAMILANINA”. It was a big event, and it is not usual to see 50.000 people holding balloons in their hands and, at the same moment of the start, setting them free. The sky was suddenly coloured of red, creating a flamboyant choreography.

One hour before the start of this international sporting event the atmosphere was surreal, the adrenaline rush was flowing through the athletes; they were all warming up their muscles like racehorses. The head of the race was made of running stars, some of the best marathoners in the world. It was very emotional for us no-professional athletes to run side by side with the best in the world.

Piazza Castello was crowded just with people waiting for the starting cannon shot. We could



feel the challenge to make better times. After the start at 10:45, everyone tried to get a good position going ahead as much as possible, even though the front-runners were like ghosts (the first finished the 21 km in just 1 hour and a bit).

After the first 10 km the selection began. Even our group started breaking up; the younger guys just kept on going, but even though this happened the older guys held their positions pretty well. In the last 4 / 5 km it was easy to meet someone slowing down for various reasons, without giving it up. The tiredness was starting to take its toll, but we tried to distract, thinking about the last kilometre sign. At that moment it was just a psychological challenge to go ahead and finish the run with any effort. Then the last oxygen breath and finally we started to hear the speakers in the background commenting the arrival.

There were a lot of persons cheering on you behind the barriers since the entrance of the park till the Arena Civica (arrival). We thought they were cheering on some important runner, but we suddenly realised that the clapping was for us. It was very rewarding, and for someone of us it was a big happiness to have his family waiting at the arrival. At that moment the tiredness seemed to go away, the arena was full of people clapping. There were also stands to refresh and support the athletes after the run.

And now we can say “We were there too!”.

The running team would like to thank NRDC-ITA HQ that has given us this opportunity. A special thank also to all those who organised the event and to the municipality of Milan. ■





Visit of Italian Minister of Defense



NRDC-ITA's Media Training



UK Queen's Birthday Celebration



Visit of US Consular General



French National Day Celebration



NRDC-ITA's Barbecue



Farewell to Major General Antonio Satta



Visit of Commander ARRC



Visit of Commander 3rd UK Division

NEWCOMERS

NR	DIV	BRANCH	NATO RANK	SURNAME	NAME	NAT	SERVICE	DATE OF ARRIVAL
1	TRADOC	CDD	OF2	PECOLLO	Carlo	ITA	ARMY	15-apr-09
2	COMD GP	COS	OF7	SERRA	Paolo	ITA	ARMY	17-apr-09
3	COMD GP	DCOM'S OFFICE	OF2	MALLOWS	James Andrew	GBR	ARMY	18-apr-09
4	CIS	DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK	OR5	WILLERSCHIED	Andreas	DEU	ARMY	20 Apr 09
5	RSC	COM RSC	OF6	THEODOROU	Demetrios	GRC	ARMY	23-apr-09
6	OPS DIV	G3 OPS	OF4	WILSON	Stephen	USA	ARMY	8 May 09
7	OPS DIV	DCOS OPS	OF3	TASSI	Aurelio	ITA	ARMY	29 Jun 09
8	CS DIV	FCOORD	OF3	MANCA	Giovanni	ITA	ARMY	29 Jun 09
9	CSS DIV	G4 PLANS	OF3	STRAGAPEDE	Michele	ITA	ARMY	29 Jun 09
10	OPS DIV	OAB	OF4	TAMAI	Sergio	ITA	ARMY	1 Jul 09
11	CS DIV	G9	OF4	BOGDOS	Ioanis	GRC	ARMY	8 Jul 09
12	CENTRAL STAFF	PROTOCOL	OF2	SAGI	Szilvia	HUN	ARMY	9 Jul 09
13	OPS DIV	G5	OR9	NAGY	Laslo	HUN	ARMY	9 Jul 09
14	OPS DIV	G5	OF4	SIMON	Geza	HUN	ARMY	9 Jul 09
15	CS DIV	DCOS CS	OR7	ZSIROS	Tamas Ferenc	HUN	ARMY	9 Jul 09
16	CSS DIV	G8 BUDFIN	OR7	PORKOLAB	Aniko	HUN	ARMY	9 Jul 09
17	RSC	RSC OPS/PLANS	OF4	KAJARI	Ferenc	HUN	ARMY	9 Jul 09
18	CS DIV	G3 AIR	OF4	TESSITORE	Francesco	ITA	ARMY	13 Jul 09
19	RSC	RSC LOG/MOV	OF3	ARIAGNO	Simone	ITA	ARMY	13 Jul 09
20	CSS DIV	G4 PLANS	OF4	GELATO	Vincenzo	ITA	ARMY	15 Jun 09
21	OPS DIV	G2	OR7	FOTOGLOU	Michail	GRC	ARMY	27 Jul 09
22	CSS DIV	G4 PLANS	OF3	YALCIN	Murat	TUR	ARMY	28 Jul 09
23	CSS DIV	G4 OPS	OF4	TAGLIATA	Salvatore	ITA	ARMY	3 aug 09

DEPARTURES

NR	DIV	BRANCH	NATO RANK	SURNAME	NAME	NAT	SERVICE	DATE OF ARRIVAL
1	CSS	G4 PLANS	OF3	CAPPELLO	Giovanni	ITA	ARMY	14-apr-09
2	TRADOC	CDD	OF5	ROUSE	John	GBR	ARMY	20-apr-09
3	CIS	CIS	OF4	ROSENSTEIN	Mark	USA	ARMY	28-apr-09
4	RSC	RSC	OF7	FINOKALITIS	Georgis	GRC	ARMY	04 May 09
5	CMD GP	DCOM	OF2	SCOTT	Thomas	GBR	ARMY	05 May 09
6	TRADOC	CDD	OF4	MATTURRO	Davide	ITA	ARMY	31 May 09
7	CSS	G4 PLANS	OF4	CONTE	Sergio	ITA	ARMY	7 Jun 09
8	OPS	G5	OR9	FARKAS	Balazs	HUN	ARMY	12 Jun 09
9	OPS	G3	OF4	WRIGHT	John	USA	ARMY	12 Jun 09
10	OPS	G2	OF4	CORAGLIA	Alessandro	ITA	ARMY	15 Jun 2009
11	OPS	DCOS	OF4	GORGOLIONE	Nicola	ITA	ARMY	5 Jul 09
12	TRADOC	CDD	OF5	CICCIARELLA	Luca Maria	ITA	ARMY	5 Jul 09
13	CS	G9	OF4	MOTSAKOS	Ioannis	GRC	ARMY	10 Jul 09
14	RSC	RSC	OF4	LOVASZ	Zsolt	HUN	ARMY	15 Jul 09
15	OPS	G5	OF4	KOVAGO	Pal	HUN	ARMY	15 Jul 09
16	DOSO	PROTOCOL	OF3	KABAI	Tamas	HUN	ARMY	15 Jul 09
17	CSS	G8	OR9	CZERNA	Janos	HUN	ARMY	15 Jul 09
18	CS	DCOS	OR8	PASZTERCSAK	Laszlo	HUN	ARMY	15 Jul 09
19	RSC	RSC	OF3	FEDI	Fabrizio	ITA	ARMY	19 Jul 09
20	CSS	G4 OPS	OF4	VIGGIANO	Michele	ITA	ARMY	19 Jul 09
21	CENTRAL STAFF	ORG & COORD	OR9	GILIO	Luigi	ITA	ARMY	28 Jul 09
22	OPS	G2	OR7	MICHALIS	Andreas	GRC	ARMY	29 Jul 09
23	CENTRAL STAFF	DOSO	OR9	QUARTIERI	Giovanni	ITA	ARMY	29 Jul 09
24	AOCC	AOCC	OF4	MANTEGAZZA	Mauro	ITA	AIR FORCE	31 Jul 09
25	CS	ENG	OR9	TOMASSI	Silvio	ITA	ARMY	03 Aug 09
26	OPS DIV	G2	OR9	TESONE	M. Franco	ITA	ARMY	03 Aug 09
27	CSS	G4 PLANS	OF3	ERGUN	Mehmet	TUR	ARMY	07 Aug 09
28	CMD GP	DCOM	OF3	LESLIE	Paul	GBR	ARMY	10 Aug 09
29	OPS DIV	G2	OR9	CORNO	Massimiliano	ITA	ARMY	16 Aug 09
30	TRADOC DIV	CDD	OF3	PIERRO	Giuseppe	ITA	ARMY	16 Aug 09
31	CS	INFO OPS	OF2	PONTIROLI	Ettore	ITA	ARMY	23 Aug 09
32	CENTRAL STAFF	SPOA	OF4	PASCARELLA	Antonio	ITA	CARABINIERI	24 Aug 09
33	COMD GP	COS'S OFFICE	OR9	GIULIANI	Giuseppe	ITA	ARMY	29 Aug 09



NCO of the Quarter

WO1 (ITA A)
Giuseppe Rizzi

(January - June 2009)



Soldier of the Quarter

CPL (ITA A)
Francesco Rizzuti

(January - June 2009)

AFGHANISTAN PLANNING MAP



AFGHANISTAN PLANNING MAP

