

Corps Transformation

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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps it is a truism, but for all that still worth restating, that especially in the post Cold War operating environment, those military organisations that do not evolve to meet current and future threats will become increasingly irrelevant, unusable and ultimately will atrophy as resources dry up. HQ NRDC-ITA is now an established Corps HQ, with a reputation for capability in the contemporary operating environment, but with little thought about how it might evolve to meet the challenges of tomorrow. But things are changing, and we need to take account of these changes if we are to ensure that the HQ remains relevant.

Specifically the following four influences are of relevance:

- NATO Command Structure Review - *Comment*, the process appears to be bogged down by politics and will probably not deliver anything substantive when finally it does report.
- The last HQ NRDC-ITA Plenary made some fairly radical recommendations concerning the future structure of the HQ -*Comment*, I understand that the ITA General Staff has told HQ NRDC-ITA not to implement any changes, even to test options, before end 2009, to allow the current unchanged structure time to work.
- Doctrinal changes that are planned, for example, the DJSE and EBAO.
- Over the forth coming ISAF period the HQ 'Rear' party will probably have little of substance to do and so this will be an ideal time to develop ideas about the future operating capability of the HQ.

For these reasons the time is probably right for the HQ to take the initiative, review its whole operating ethos, and identify how it should begin to shape itself and its operating ability to better meet current and potential future operating contexts.

AIM

The aim of this think piece is to explore potential areas for further development so that HQ NRDC-ITA can transform itself in a manner appropriate to wider and future operating developments.






CURRENT SITUATION

HQ NRDC-ITA is directed, and constrained, in its collective thinking by two main issues as follows:

a. **Mission.** The HQ mission is:

Commander NRDC-ITA is to contribute to deterrence of aggression against NATO through establishment and maintenance of a capability to deploy in support of NAC approved operations. He shall be prepared to conduct defensive, offensive, peace support, humanitarian support and other operations throughout NA TO territory and beyond NATO's AOR as directed by the appropriate NATO commander. He shall train exercise and operate his headquarters, affiliated forces and other forces assigned using NA TO procedures.



While at first glance this mission appears comprehensive, it gives very little real guidance other than that the HQ needs to be prepared for anything that might come its way. As such it is not really helpful in identifying the type and nature of operations that the HQ might be required to undertake.

b. **Experience.** Since its inception HQ NRDC-ITA has undertaken 2 major activities that have helped to shape its understanding of Corps level operations. These are ISAF and the NRF roster (twice).

CURRENT CAPABILITIES

As a result of higher authority direction and guidance (primarily given in its mission statement) and from its experience, HQ NRDC-ITA is solidly established as a war fighting HQ that is able to run contemporary peace support operations at Corps level, within the context of a unified and (relatively) rigid NATO command structure. What the HQ does not appear to be able to do is undertake the

following:

- Rapid deployment (in current and future operating contexts)
- Achieve graduated readiness
- Modularity
- Flexibility to work at all levels (tactical, operational and strategic)
- Flexibility to address all potential future threats (eg eco terrorism, cyber attack)
- Operate in all environments (cold weather, mountainous etc)
- Working in a less well defined or non NATO command structure (such as a coalition of the willing)
- Operate across the complete spectrum (including disaster relief)



FUTURE CAPABILITIES

Perhaps the most robust way of reviewing the Corps is to identify the future operating environment, and then design the Corps to operate within that. However, basing the Corps on a predicted (and not real) future is both expensive (in terms of transformation costs) and inherently risky (as we might design the Corps to meet a future that never materialises). It might therefore be better to base the redesign on basic military principles and judgement. One military principles method of redefining the way that the Corps operates is to review the Corps'





purpose - in other word, its mission statement. Although the Mission Statement is normal driven by higher authority it would be unrealistic to expect a dramatic change in our Mission Statement in the near future as the methods of operation of NATO are unlikely to change much in that time. Therefore, as an expedient, it is instructive to craft a more comprehensive, although general, statement as a starting point in analysing how the HQ should change to meet the exigencies of future operations.

Proposed Mission. *Working within the NATO or other designated command structure develop a modular, déployable HQ capable of multinational and joint operations at all levels of tactical, operational and strategic, at appropriate graduated readiness across the complete spectrum of current and future operations.*

GAP ANALYSIS

Assuming, for the purposes of this Paper, the above proposed Mission Statement is accepted, then it is possible to start to identify the gap that exists between current Corps and future Corps capabilities. While ideally we should look

at the gap in terms of holistic effects such an analysis is not easily undertaken in any meaningful way. Therefore, this paper adopts a reductionist approach based on discrete factor analysis, these factors being derived directly from the Mission Statement itself. The following bullets assess these factors in general terms.

a. Deployable. The Corps should be able to deploy in all terrains, climates (with or without host nation support), by air, sea, and land, to both hostile and permissive environments. *Primary Implications:* Equipment

b. Modular. The Corps should be of modular design to allow a pick and mix approach to the design of the HQ element to be deployed. *Primary Implications:* Equipment, procedures, structure.

c. Multinational. The Corps should be able to work in NATO and non NATO structures, and command both NATO and non NATO formations. *Primary Implications:* Procedures.

d. Joint. The Corps should be able to work closely with other components at all levels (under command, level and commanding). *Primary Implications:* Procedures, structure.

e. Comprehensive Approach. The Corps should be able to work with a wide range of other agencies such as

governments, police, 10, NGO etc. *Primary Implications:* Procedures, structure.

f. Strategic/Operational/Tactical Level. The Corps should be able to command at all levels, or when the levels are blurred (eg tactical command with strategic implications). *Primary Implications:* Procedures.

g. Response Times. The Corps should be able to respond to a situation in a time frame consistent with the mission. *Primary Implications:* Equipment, procedure, structure.

h. Graduated Readiness. The Corps should have a clear process that delivers HQ capability in a graduated manner that is consistent with mission requirements. *Primary Implications:* Equipment, procedures, structure.

i. Spectrum of Operation. The Corps should be able to operate over the complete current operations spectrum, but taking into account key developments in each area (eg cyber space, eco terrorism etc). *Primary Implications:* Procedures, training, structure.

j. Robust. The Corps should be able to withstand shock (in all forms, such as physical, psychological etc). *Primary Implications:* Training, equipment, procedures.

k. Current and Future Operations. The Corps should be able to identify potential and future operations and develop and adapt to meet the requirements of each. *Primary Implications:* procedure, training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The above analysis would suggest that some substantial changes would need to be made to the HQ in the areas of equipment, procedures, structure and training so that the HQ will be better able to meet the challenges of future operating environments. However, it is recognised that the analysis is somewhat superficial. Therefore, the key recommendation of the paper is:

During the imminent ISAF deployment and in depth study be undertaken by the rear party to review the HQ operating ethos in order to better prepare for future operating environments.

