



NRDC-IT Magazine

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

EX DESTINED
GLORY '04



ISAF VIII



NRF 3
END OF TOUR



FOREWORD

Dear Readers,

last January our headquarters has successfully completed its six-months tour as Land Component Command for the third rotation of NRF contributing to the achievement of the NRF Initial Operational Capability, a great experience and a great goal for all of us. But this is just a "starter" on our way as we are already begun the preparation and training for the assumption of the Corps first operational commitment: the leadership of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

We are facing a long training period and a longer tour of duty as we will cover a 9 months period in Kabul, from now on you will always find an article or more covering our activities in preparations for ISAF, we will keep you informed about how we proceed.

Finally let me inform you that we decided to change something in our magazine, linking our publication to the season, so from now on we will have a "Winter" - "Spring" and "Autumn" issue.

Have a nice reading!




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Front page:
Members of the Land unit of NRF

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Ex Destined Glory '04

By Maj M. STOCCUTO, IT-A S02 G3 OPS SYSTEM

Destined Glory '04 was a live-firing training exercise comprised of elements of the NRF 3 forces along with Maritime and Amphibious forces affiliated with STRIKFORNATO. Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States have provided high-readiness forces to the exercise, able to conduct peace support, crisis response or defense operations. The exercise represented the achievement of the NRF Initial Operational Capability (IOC) set up for 2004 by the decisions taken at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002 when the new force was launched.

Force contributions included a NATO Response Force (NRF) High Readiness Force (Maritime) (HRF(M)), a NATO Response Force (NRF) High readiness Force (Land) (HRF(L)) other high readiness expeditionary forces encompassing amphibious, carrier strike, TLAM, land, and air capabilities. The Exercise took place in the Central Mediterranean area, in the ranges and air/water space assigned by Italy, as the Host Nation (HN) of the Exercise, in the period from 30 September - 18 October 2004.

The aim of exercise DG '04 was to form, deploy, train and employ combined maritime expeditionary forces operating in a Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO) LIVEX. The forces had to show their capability of performing certain missions on their own, as well as participating in an operation as part of a larger force either operating concurrently or acting as a follow-on force.

The Exercise involved more than 10,500 personnel, over 50 ships and 50 aircraft from 11 NATO nations: Canada, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States who provided high-readiness forces to the exercise as a "Joint Capable Force," able to conduct peace support, crisis response or defense operations.



DARDO infantry vehicle moving in Capo Teulada firing range

For NRDC-IT, DG '04 aimed to verify the procedures identified for the Early Entry and RSC FWD CPs after the revisions following the previous Eagle Entry '04 Exercise conducted last February. Specific attention was focused on the testing of the Early Entry and RSC Forward Command Post Deployment; setting accordingly

to the new layouts and capability to Communicate and Exercise the Battle Rhythm and Procedures to include Reach Back Planning (monitor the NRF Bde Training and receive routine reports from NRF BDE EECF).

Beside its own modules deployment, NRDC-IT coordinated the deployment and activity of its NRF Taurinense Brigade and subordinate Units, involved in a LIVEX and called to show:

- The insertion of airborne force (IT para platoon air-drop) with the intent to demonstrate NRF rapid deployment capabilities;
 - A Mechanized manoeuvre IT Mech/Alpine Coys + GR Aslt Pl. ops with the intent to demonstrate NRF tactical capabilities & promote multinational integration;
- and in support of a Distinguished Visitors Demo Day to show their main assets in support of their specific



LTG Mauro DEL VECCHIO, NRDC-IT Commander, visiting the EE Command Post



Ex Destined Glory '04



capabilities in a static display, together with all other amphibious forces that participated in the exercise.

The overall participation of NRDC-IT and Taurinense Bde as NRF modules was realized through:

- NRDC-IT deploying two CPs with some 60 staff , 120 Signal Bde Support elements and approx. 50 vehicles, moving by air and sea and locating respectively the EECP into the Training Range area of Capo Teulada and the RSC FWD CP within the Army Airbase of Cagliari.
- Taurinense Brigade deploying its own Early Entry Command Post and related support and a regiment, the 183° para, coordinating 3 coys as initial entry forces from 3rd Alpini Rgt, 8th Bersaglieri Rgt. and its own. A Greek Platoon joined the Alpini Coy.

Referring notably to NRDC-IT activity the deployment had few Training Objectives both interfaced with STRIKEFORNATO Field Training Exercise (FTX) and some focused on the improvement of own Command and Control capability of Initial Entry Forces (IEF):

- Verify/train EE CP & RSC FWD C2 procedures in the context of the IEF mission;
- Establish the EE & RSC FWD

CPs using specific layout;

- Train/test EE CP & RSC FWD deployment procedures;
- Test strategic CIS assets (SATCOM)
- Exercise the NRDC-IT reach-back capability;
- Practise NRDC-IT EE CP interface and coordination with NRF Tau Bde EE CP
- Demonstrate NRF-3 Land element capabilities
- Exercise NRF-3 land units in a LIVEX
- Practise HQ Planning Staff in OPP related to future NRF missions.

NRDC-IT deployment was a successful test to verify procedures and functionality of the Early Entry and RSC FWD CPs and all the aforementioned were achieved.

To better understand how that CPs were conceived it is important to understand the functions NRDC-IT is called to sustain through its deployment.



The concept for NRDC-IT is to maintain an early entry command and control capability to provide the means to exercise command and control over lead elements of assigned formations and units as they arrive in the AOO. This capability is to satisfy a similar requirement also into the Joint Rear Area, where RSC is to deploy a similar asset to set con-



Ex Destined Glory '04

ditions and begin execution of reception, staging, and onward movement of the force, and sustainment of the force. EE CP and RSC FWD precede the deployment of other elements of HQs Group deploying from PHQ, from one AOO to another, or from a maritime platform. Those early entry CPs, once in theatre are to link with the respective already in place RECCE Team members, who deployed few days in advance to provide timely information critical to the mounting of the CPs, deployment and units, and completion of the theatre plan, and are to embed them to maintain as much acquired situation awareness as possible.

The NRDC-IT EE and RSC FWD Command Posts are multi-functional HQs designed to allow HQ NRDC-IT to deploy to the AOO and JRA as early as possible. The prime function of both CPs taken together is to provide rapidly deployable C2 facilities (must be air portable), capable of limited, operational level, command, control, liaison and facilitation of RSOM.

Their organization of both of them, structured the same and all assets but staff are one the mirror of the other to ease deployment and planning activities is by modules and foresees three different packages suitable to perform their function in accordance with the friendly and threat situation.



French amphibious unit landing in Capo Teulada range

This organization enables the deployment of only the necessary package to perform the mission balanced against strategic movement capabilities:

- **Level I Pack:** This provides for the basic structure enabling C2 capabilities with minimum real life support only. It is suitable for very permissive environments, especially when secured and supported by other entities.
- **Level II Pack:** This includes Level I plus organic force

protection capabilities if deploying in an unstable environment.

- **Level III Pack:** This provides Level II plus real life support equipment such as: c o o k h o u s e , showers, toilet facilities and related ancillary equipment.

The activities carried out during the fifteen days of deployment and started with the setting of the structures, according to the revised layouts, engaged the two CPs staff members in vignettes specifically structured to test response along with procedures and leaving due time for a dedicated hot wash up every evening to discuss the actions carried out during the day.

Let's say it was a kind of seminar on procedures and test on systems, which proved how the new structures are more efficient and capable of guaranteeing better situational awareness and information exchange among all staff members, boosting the problem solving requirements.

In the middle of our specific training STRIKEFORNATO had scheduled a Distinguished Visitor Day. Nato VIPs, led by Adm (US Navy) MULLEN, Ambassadors, Military attachés and Media representatives from many nations were invited to visit the LIVEX and the Static Display set up at



Ex Destined Glory '04



NRF LCC Early Entry Command Post

Capo Teulada Training Range. Adm MULLEN received an explanatory briefing by Col. SPINELLI acting COMEECP and expressed his appreciation both for the CPs NRDC-IT deployed to perform its EE C2 functions and the Taurinense Units performance.

Overall, NRDC-IT is very satisfied with attainment of our stated training objectives. The Taurinense Bde succeeded in demonstrating NRF capabilities, and we validated

the construct and systems with our newly redesigned forward command posts. We also proved that NATO CIS services can be extended from home-station NATO nodes using framework nation satellite links. As our Corps Planning Group is concerned it worked to deliver required items to support the operational planning process, proving how the reach back concept, after Allied Action '04, was completely absorbed and integrated into NRDC-IT procedures.



Greek Special Forces and S.Marco sailors reading NRDC-IT Magazine



NRF soldier during the exercise



International Security Assistance Force


By LtC R. CRISTONI, Chief PIO

NRDC-IT Designated to assume ISAF 8 Mission



NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-IT) will assume the leadership of NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from August 2005. Last November NATO

countries agreed on a schedule for commanding the Alliance-led operation between 2005 and 2007. This decision will give continuity and stability to the ISAF mission at a stage where NATO is preparing to further expand the mission to the West of the country.



NRDC-IT Headquarters will provide the Commander, Lt Gen **Mauro DEL VECCHIO**, about 1/3 of the six

hundred strong staff and around six hundred men for logistic and CIS support; the overall contribution will amount to eight hundred men for a tour of duty of nine months. ISAF mission currently numbers 8,000 troops from 37 NATO and non-NATO nations.

The appointment of the Italian-led High Readiness Forces Hq confirms the growing commitment of Italy in the fight against International terrorism and in support to Afghanistan stabilization and reconstruction. In addition this designation is part of the UK- Italy proposal to assume the leadership of the missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan in 2005 and 2006.

ISAF



NRDC-IT will replace the Nato Rapid Deployable Corps - Turkey and will operate under Joint Force Command - Brunssum, based in the Netherlands.

This is the first NRDC-IT operational commitment since its foundation in 2001, but has gained a lot of experience taking part in many international exercises and most recently it assumed the role as Land Component Command for the third rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF 3) from July 04 to Jan 05.

The overall NRDC-IT staff is more than 400 men, those that will not be deployed in Afghanistan will guarantee a reach-back capability in order to support and assist the Corps during its mission.

NATO has decided to utilize resources, capabilities and expertise already present within its force structure by rotating the six High Readiness Forces headquarters that achieved the Full Operational Capability in 2002: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in Rheindahlen, the German-Netherlands Corps in Munster, EUROCORP in Strasburg, the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Spain in Valencia, the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey in Istanbul and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Italy in Solbiate Olona.

ISAF IS STRUCTURED INTO FOUR MAIN COMPONENTS:

- **ISAF Headquarters:** commands the Kabul Multinational Brigade, co-ordinates PRT activity and conducts operational tasks in its area of responsibility. It liaises with and assists in the work of UN, the Afghan Transitional Authority, and governmental and non-governmental organizations;
- **Kabul Multinational Brigade:** ISAF's tactical headquarters, responsible for the planning and conduct of patrolling and civil-military cooperation operations on a day-to-day basis;
- **Kabul Afghan International Airport:** ISAF assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the overall operation of the airport;
- **Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs):** Teams of military personnel working in Afghanistan's northern provinces to extend the authority of the Afghan central government and to facilitate development and reconstruction.



NATO Response Force

by Maj C. SALSOTTO, SO2 Media Plans

NRF 3: Mission accomplished!



End of tour for NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-IT) as Land Component Command (LCC) for the third rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF).

On 14 January 2005 NRDC-IT handed over the NRF-LCC colours to the 1 German/Netherlands Corps during a ceremony held in Munster for the fourth rotation of the NATO Response Force, NRF 4.

The Commander of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, Lt. Gen. Norbert van Heyst (German Army) received the NRF flag out of the hands of the Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Naples, Admiral Michael G. Mullen. The outgoing LCC Commander Major General Luigi Pellegrino (Italian Army), the NRDC-IT Chief of Staff, relinquished the NRF flag and brought to a close the third iteration of the NRF.

NRF 3 rotation represented a fundamental step in the development of the NRF project as during this phase the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was achieved. A very intense training that involved all the components of the NRDC-IT in the NRF certification process for 12 months, six of those spent for the preparation phase and the remaining six in stand-by role.

NRDC-IT conducted a number of exercises in close coordination with superior Headquarters Joint Force Command Naples, that was providing the Deployable Joint Task Force staff, and mainly with the NRF Brigade and its units, namely the Alpini Taurinense Brigade based in Turin.

NRF 3 saw an increase of force strength to approximately 70% of its full strength and capabilities while the two previous rotations were mainly based on limited initial capabilities. This provide the Alliance a real "tool" able to conduct most of the NRF missions even if with some constraints related to shortfalls in the force generation.

As a staff we had a great benefit from this experience because we improved our procedure to work in a joint environment and we have now a better understanding of how maritime and air units work. The maritime and air components complete a 12-month rotation, the UK Maritime Force and a mix of assets available to the Allied Air Component Command Izmir were part of the NRF 3 and will remain activated for the NRF 4.

But this is just a step in our involvement in the NRF project due to the fact that all the High Readiness Force headquarters are taking part in the NRF rotations and we will back "on duty" in July 2009 for NRF 9.



CIMIC Conference

by Cpt V. DE BELLIS, SO3 G9 OPS

NATO CIMIC Key Leaders' Conference

The 4th NATO CIMIC Key Leaders Conference was held in Solbiate Olona on 02 and 03 Dec '04. The Conference, which is hosted on a rotational basis by one of the participating NATO HQs, represented the top level of CIMIC meetings in the Alliance.

Earlier this year, NRDC-IT ACOS G9, Col Nemeth (HU-AF), was kindly asked by J9 ACO (SHAPE) to host this CIMIC Key Leaders conference and after Chief of Staff approval, the request was of course warmly accepted.

Just before this main event on 30 Nov and 01 Dec '04 Chiefs/representatives of 5 NRDC's CIMIC

Branches took the opportunity to have a pre-meeting in order to discuss NRDC specific CIMIC issues. This event, called "NRDCs CIMIC Chief Branch meeting", anticipated the Key Leaders Conference of 02 Dec - 03 Dec '04. During this pre-meeting, five of the 6 NRDC

CIMIC Branch Chief/Reps participated; NRDC-TU was absent due to their preparation activities for ISAF VII. Chairman of this pre-meeting was NRDC-IT ACOS G9, Col Nemeth (HU-AF).

The purpose of the NATO CIMIC Key Leaders Conference on 02 Dec - 03 Dec '04 was to discuss NATO CIMIC policy and doctrine developments and CIMIC in current NATO operations. Chiefs and Representatives from

CIMIC Divisions/Branches in all major NATO Headquarters, like Brussels (BE), Naples (IT), Brunsum (NL), Norfolk (US), Lisbon (PO), and also representatives from CIMIC Group South (IT), North (NL), Civil Affairs

(US) (in total 24 persons) took part in this conference. DCOM NRDC-IT, Maj Gen Lane, opened the conference and Col Jansen, Deputy Chief CJ9 ACO (SHAPE), was the

Chairman of the two days event. Key topics in the agenda were CIMIC in NRF (by HQ GE/NL Corps), CIMIC in EBO (by HQ ARRC), CIMIC in IRAQ (by CIMIC Group North) and various updates on CIMIC activities carried out by other main NATO HQ's.

These CIMIC conferences have been considered by all participants as an important step forward to enhance the unity of the CIMIC effort and the under-

standing of NATO CIMIC at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

These conferences also strengthen relationships among all key CIMIC positions of the NATO HQs. They enforce a common view on the development of CIMIC

publications, doctrine and procedures, setting new goals and steps for the future. Attendees left Italy with a robust awareness of the results achieved and a positive impression about the warm and well-settled hospitality provided during the Conference. At the end of the day it represented a big effort for the entire HQ and particularly for the G9 Branch Project Team: they have a feather in their cap.

EURO Corps in Strasbourg will host the next conference, in September next year.



CIMIC Key Leaders group photo



International staff attending one of the presentations



NATO Public Information Course

By LtC R. CRISTONI, IT Army, Chief PIO

"Interacting with media around the world"

What do you expect from a Public Information Course? Learning how to deal with media and maybe some magic formula for releasing a perfect interview.

Well the course run by the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany, provided a flavor of all of this, but basically a better understanding of the media role in military affairs.

The two week course was divided between didactic sessions and practical exercises that covered various topics including working with Arab nations, the relationship between media and terrorism, the internet relevancy and interview technique. First of all it was presented how NATO does business during operations and exercises, what is the relationship with Information Operations and Psychological Operations and how difficult it may become. Lecturers were renowned public affairs practitioners with international experience in real operations at tactical, operational and strategic level such as Mr Mark Laity, Special Advisor on Strategic Communication to SACEUR that stressed the growing impact of Media in Military Mission or ISAF Chief PIO covering the challenges of the Afghanistan operation. The students had the opportunity to hear real experience and real feedback, mistakes and lessons learned and to analyze and compare them to their own PI policy approach and cultural background.

The course is offered three times a year and the November course was attended by twenty-six students from 19 countries including NATO members as well as Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries such as Finland,



A spokesman holding a press conference during an exercise



Sweden, Macedonia, Croatia, Armenia and Austria and the Mediterranean Dialogue program represented by Israel and Morocco. A very special

forum where all the students presented their own organization, how they approach PI policy and media management; for example how Israeli Army promote itself or how simple is the relationship between Media and institutions in Nordic countries, and the different approach of eastern Europe NATO members compared to western ones.

But the course was just not briefings and lectures as we had the chance to pay a visit to a very important German broadcasting corporation - the Bayerischer Rundfunk - in Munich and having an "hard talk" with the director of foreign policy department and some senior reporters on how they see the military and how they believe we should behave with media in an operation: discussing "operational security vs transparency", "accuracy of information vs time constraints". This visit was a significant step in our info process because only if we have a better knowledge of the media needs, their working process, constraints and pressure we, as PIOs, may find

The Journalists

What do military people think about them?	What do they think about us?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The info they disclose may jeopardize the success and the security of our troops • Not always supportive • Know little about military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretive • Bureaucracy • Disciplined • Incline



This is not an exercise...



NATO Public Information Course

a better way to work together. Understanding what makes news, the different type of media and the info environment will teach us what kind of PI structure will cope better with media requirements. In this respect the knowledge of the environment we could work is vital to our performance and the lecture we received on working in Arab countries was extremely useful and provided the students real practical advices and rules.

How do we effectively verify the quality of the information we release? Only if we check what media print or broadcast, so only when we are able to conduct **Media analysis**. What is Media analysis? There are different points of view but the most simple is "the screening, analyzing and monitoring of the Media landscape identifying issues and the media trend". This activity requires dedicated and specialized staff able to research open sources in order to "enable our superiors to assess how activities, policies and messages are getting across to the public opinion, through media perception, so that they can take remedial action if deemed necessary." This activity may become routine in peace time but is fundamental during an operation as each single event or action could become strategically relevant. So we need a structure capable of working in different scenarios and environments with some basic requirements: handle the journalists, conduct press conferences, monitor the media and plan future lines; this means a **Press Information Center (PIC)**. Thanks to the experience gained in the operations in the Balkans in the last 10 years, NATO has clearly defined what a basic PIC structure should be and the tasks and responsibilities of its cells. Mr Franco VELTRI, Deputy Chief PIO of the Joint Force Command Naples, in charge of the Balkans operations, provided us a close look at PIC structures, manning and functions adopted by NATO in the operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, FYROM and Albania. The clearest and most exhaustive definition I can remember was "a facility where information can easily reach the media".



Familiarizing with the camera

The second part of the course was dedicated to individual training and the organization and conduct of a Press Conference; the training was run by Major Marc Theriault, Canadian Army Public Affairs Officer, who talked about how to communicate successfully with the public and described the problems related to the release of information and its legal implications; while LtC Robert Gould, US Air Force Reserve PAO and Manager Corporate Communications of a big company talked about some basic rules on how to communicate successfully to the public. We undertook TV training session as well as radio, print and non verbal communication; this part of the course was very much appreciated by everybody and gave us the chance to challenge ourselves in front of a camera, but also to have some fun and to smile for some terrific performances. Finally everything was put into practice in two days exercise organizing, setting up and conducting Press conferences.

Everybody was able to take away something new, such as a better understanding of the media, how NATO PI works or the new PI vision of the Austrian Army, but for sure what was clear in our minds was that media play a crucial role in everything we do and we always have to take this into consideration.



PIO Course attendees



Press conference in progress during an exercise



Engineer Intelligence

By Maj A. ORTOLANI, SO2 ENGR INT

The Engineer Intelligence products and the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

In any Army unit, the focus of intelligence efforts always depends on METT-T, (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available). The situation driven by METT-T influences the commander and the G2 in determining the intelligence support required for mission success.

How does one determine the type of intelligence support required? Several factors are important, but perhaps the most important is the type of operation. In today's post cold war environment an operation may range from war to one of the many environments covered by operations other than war (OOTW). Whatever the type or scale of the operation it is almost certain to include some engineer requirements and thus a need for engineer intelligence.

Other significant contributing factors are the unit's mission, the assets available to the engineer commander and the threat. Units today must not only contend with possible military opponents, but they are also frequently faced with the threats associated with the OOTW environment. While these threats drive the need for intelligence requirements for all the analysts, they pose some additional requirements for the engineer intelligence analyst because engineers have a critical role in performing a wide variety of stability and support operations.

To be successful all G2 analysts must be well acquainted with the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process, which is the cornerstone of fulfilling intelligence requirements. The Engineer Intelligence Officers are familiar with the IPB process but they normally focus primarily on the terrain analysis portion (the first two steps). This is with good reason: Who knows the terrain better than those who move it, shape it and modify it? The Engineer Intelligence Officer is facing other important issues that can influence the mission accomplishment: the terrorist activities and capabilities to prepare and to improve the Improvised Explosive Devices attacks that are very frequent in the current operational environment.

However an analyst must apply all four steps of the IPB process:


- Define the battlefield environment
- Describe the battlefield effects

- Evaluate the threat
- Determine threat course of action

This process can be applied both in a classic war and terrorism environment.

The G2 analysts must apply each of the IPB processes in as much or as little detail as required to support the commander and his mission. After these steps are integrated and applied to the situation, the G2 branch develops and produces some standard IPB products. These products include modified combined obstacle overlays, various enemy situation overlays and weather analysis matrices (Decision Support Overlay, Decision Points, Named Areas of Interest, Target Areas of Interest).

Providing appropriate intelligence support for diverse engineer missions and performing a specific engineer IPB is a challenge for the Engineer Intelligence Officer. Because the book solution often does not work, the G2 branch must tailor his intelligence support to align with the commander's needs, the units assets and capabilities, and the mission. In providing this support the Engineer Intelligence analyst will prepare some additional IPB products that are especially relevant to the entire mission.



Engineer Intelligence special product concerning a specific road analysis about possible choke areas during EX ALLIED ACTION 04

Engineer's specific IPB products are developed as the G2 anticipates the commander's needs. These products include bridging and fording site analyses and



Engineer Intelligence


matrices, line of communication overlays, hydrologic overlays, various obstacle lists and overlays, and analysis/list of enemy/terrorist engineer assets and capabilities (improvised explosive devices, remote controlled explosive devices trends and analyses).

Bridge and fording site analysis. If the unit has the mission to perform bridging and fording operations, a thorough analysis of the rivers is required. Line of communication and hydrologic overlays are available in the commercial and military geo agencies. These overlays used with 1:100,000 scale maps and friendly force plan graphics assist the G2 conducting the analysis. "Tunnel vision" can cause the downfall of many good analysts. While the primary bridging and crossing sites must be identified, don't fixate on the obvious. Rivers are not the only areas that may require bridging. The Engineer Intelligence Officer must carefully analyse all the terrain for possible alternative routes as well as less obvious "wad-dies", ditches, or other gaps that may impede troop movement.

Bridging matrix. Since the quantity of information acquired in a reconnaissance can get overwhelming, it is helpful to develop a bridging matrix. By listing all of the bridges along the main supply routes and alternate supply routes and their critical characteristics the Engineer Intelligence Officer develops a quick reference for each potential route. This matrix also facilitates analysis of the detailed information concerning the characteristics of the bridges as spans, length, and overhead, possible bypass, MLC, construction material used.

Lines of Communication Overlay. The LOC overlay shows the locations of bridging and fording sites and the known length and bypass conditions of the bridges. By identifying the MSR that the units are most likely to use the Engineer analyst can determine which bridges and fording sites may require engineer assistance to facilitate troop movement. Through the LOC overlay the engineer analyst provides to the engineer commander and staff a graphic picture of:

- Bridges designated as impassable or difficult bypass
- Destroyed bridges along specific LOC
- Status of LOCs and the bridges indicating the MLC
- Specific road and bridge analysis (choke points, dangerous areas or elevation areas based on the threat, possible "wad-dies"....)



Lines of Communication Overlay during EX LIGHT SHIP 02



Ex ALLIED ACTION 04 line of communications overlay

Hydrologic Overlay. The LOC overlay showing the destroyed, impassable, and difficult bypass is used in conjunction with the hydrologic overlay to assist the G2 in analysing river characteristics. The hydrologic overlay provides information on a river width, depth, velocity, bottom composition and bank slopes. It allows the G2 to recommend to the engineer commander potential sites for concentrating the unit's bridging and/or fording efforts. The initial map reconnaissance allows the unit to focus on a general area of bridging operations. Once tasked the unit will conduct a ground reconnaissance to find suitable crossing sites.



Engineer Intelligence

REF NUMBER	LOCATION	TYPE	DATA/TIPE/GROUP REPORTED BY	REMARKS
XMB01	32TQQ918625	AT minefield with breach	081830ZDEC02 3 ENGR REGT	ROUTE STRAIGHT RIGHT 03
XMB02	32TPQ 918 625	AT minefield with breach	081900ZDEC02 3 ENGR REGT	
XCB 03	32TPQ 913 732	ENEMY PLANNED DEMOLITION ON BONDENO ROUTE BRIDGE	081915ZDEC02 3 ENGR REGT	ROUTE STRAIGHT RIGHT 01 CLEARED BY EOD TEAMS

Obstacle list matrix. The SO Eng Intelligence closely tracks the location and status of the threat emplaced mines, obstacle belts, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) types and analysis, bridges and other obstacles prepped with demolitions or destroyed. As information regarding obstacles flows in from the battlefield, the Engineer Intelligence Cell assigns a reference number to each of them. (See table above)


Units must inform the SO Engineer Intelligence when the status of an obstacle changes. The Engineer Intelligence cell disseminates obstacle information to the units. At the minimum the SO Engineer Intelligence disseminates the obstacle list matrix and overlays every 12 hours and when significant changes area reported. Obstacles also are posted on the engineer intelligence situation overlay, using the assigned reference number to assist with tracking them.

Engineer Intelligence Situation Files and Overlays. The Engineer Intelligence cell collects and analyses the activities of the threat engineer units, IEDs terrorist capabilities and terrorist hazardous material used. In addition the Engineer Intelligence also records pertinent data in the theatre of operations such as:


- Construction materials;
- Water supply points location and analysis;
- Threat depots/dumps analysis;
- APODs and SPODs capabilities and vulnerabilities;
- Threat minefields;
- Pits and quarries;
- Host Nation Engineer assets.

Threat Engineer Assets and Capabilities (including terrorist capabilities). A list of specific capabilities of threat engineer assets and terrorist groups may be required to support the G2 effort. The list of capabilities includes equipments, explosive capabilities, techniques, tactics and procedures used by terrorist groups, enemy minelayers, bridging assets, rafts and trenching assets. These are essential for the G2 situation analysis.

In the current operational environment Engineer Intelligence provides specific products to G2 branch in order to analyse the possible effects on the infrastructures caused by a terrorist attack.



The Engineer Intelligence special assessments can provide specific analysis (trends and patterns) on the terrorist capabilities to use mines, arty shells and explosives in general to prepare IEDs against coalition troops like in Afghanistan.



Improvised land mine used in Afghanistan



Engineer Intelligence

The last step of the IPB against terrorism gives specific indications on possible terrorist courses of action. By analysing the terrorist capabilities and the threat the Engineer Intelligence Officer provides useful

material to close the terrorist target development cycle in order to improve the force protection measures in the theatre of operations.



The Engineer Intelligence Officer must ensure that Intelligence needs are identified and integrated into collection plans, information requirements and priority information requirements. Analysing the enemy/terrorist data collected, defines specific types of trends and patterns of the enemy/terrorist attacks and it is possible to finalize the IPB and the possible future targets.

The Engineer Intelligence contribution is essential for the mission success as well as the planning process. The Engineer Intelligence products are a primary tool for the entire G2 assessment and recommendations and last but not least, the information gathered and the numerous analyses and assessments can influence the commander's decision making.



Intelligence staff analyze a report



Eagle Sailing

by CF A. ZAGO, Navy Advisor

In September HQ NRDC-IT found itself engaged in an unusual pursuit for a Land headquarters: Exercise Sail Adventure, a week of adventure training with the aim of familiarizing participants with small sailing craft of class Comet, Sun and Sprint.

The 8-day exercise was conducted on the Lake Maggiore with the involvement of numerous services and nationalities and served,

through the close confines of the 4-10 man boats and the pressure of time added to the practical challenges of sailing, to contribute to team building within the HQ.


Day 1 and after a short course introduction and crew training, the exercise was underway. The difference in experience was immediately evident, from the experienced to the landlubbers, but these differences would fade in the span of the next few days.



After the initial shock of this environment of moving floors, confined space, awkward sails and a new language to learn, from bowlines and booms to spinnaker and sloops, the sailing proceeded well. On return to solid land, this first day the adventurers found themselves reflecting the beauty of the lake and the efforts of sailing, with a little snooze on the coach home; albeit raring to go the next day.

And so the exercise continued. In such a stunning area, all appreciated the lake, marveling at its shores, the castle of Cannero, Maccagno, Laveno, Luino, Stresa Pallanza, the Boromean Islands, in particular Isola Bella with its typical Italian garden and in contrast Isola Madre and its English garden. All learned to tie that intriguing knot, to raise and lower the sails, to handle the sheets, to jib and tack, and the culmination of the course was the chance to pit their sailing against each other in a regatta. At the end of the exercise, the boats brought safely home, all had learnt important lessons of sharing the workload, working as a team, and living the adage "many hands make light work".

Eventually everyone managed, with the help of the instructor, to ready their vessels, splice the main brace and set sail! The instructors began to speak in an entirely different language; sheets not made of beds, port not for drinking, and some of those now trapped on board found themselves in a different world!



Shooting

by Col R. DONATI, Deputy AOCC Chief

On the Target



Col R. DONATI: the winner!

Last September 26th, at the shooting range UITS (Italian Union Shooting) of Somma Lombardo, took place the third stage of the Military Gold Medals Trophy organized by the Unuci Sections of Busto Arsizio, Legnano and Gallarate, the Parachutist Association of Legnano and NRDC-IT HQ.

The sport contest concerned shooting with the regular assigned rifle (Beretta AR 70 and similar) at a distance of 200 metres. During the pleasant September day, 74 participants and 21 teams attended the competition. A very good result for the organizing committee, with a large participation of public. Many shooters came along with the whole family and relatives and had the chance to enjoy both the wide green areas located around the shooting range and the delicious meals prepared for the occasion.

The competition went on very smoothly and it ended in late afternoon after more than 1.500 rounds shot. The classification in the two different categories (individual and team) was led by the participants of the NRDC-IT HQ that won the big part of the trophies. Going into details, the NRDC-IT team won the first position with two competitors, Col. Riccardo Donati and Lcpl Ivan Trotta, who got the first and second prize in the individual competition. Dulcis in fundo, also the Air Force Depot team of Gallarate hit the third place in the team competition and the third and fourth individual position with the WOs Stefano

Stellacci and Stefano Murtas. The Parachutist Association of Legnano got the only positions left and the 5th and 7th individual places got by Mr Renzo Marcora and Mr Elio Nicolosi.

NATO HQ is for sure not new in these performances, due to the fact that in the last November it won, at the shooting range of Busto Arsizio, the Armed Forces Trophy, and once again in May 2004 in the "sniper" competition getting the second place in the team competition and on the highest step of the podium in the individual with Col. Riccardo Donati. The training



and the hard work done were so openly successfully for the NATO HQ representative. So far, these guys have been invited, last May, from the Beretta Holding (well known weapons factory in the vicinity of Brescia) to participate to the exclusive Beretta Defense Cup: an international competition dedicated only to military and police units. Even in this occasion, nevertheless it was the first experience of this kind, the Col. Donati's

men behaved well against well known and experienced representatives, with long traditions in this competition since the very beginning.

Well done so to everybody: organizers, marksmen and relatives (that fully supported their beloved during all competitions). And a big greeting to everybody in Busto.



by LtC NL J. OUWERLING, SO2 G9 Plans



Ryden Cup Winning Team

On 28 September 2004 the second annual NRDC-IT Ryder Cup Golf tournament was played on the Golf course Le Robinie, just in front of Ugo Mara Barracks. The NRDC-IT Ryder cup Golf tournament is a copy of the professional Ryder Cup event played between world's best golf players from Europe against US. Like its namesake, the NRDC-IT Ryder Cup Golf tournament is played by 6 selected US Golf players against 6 selected European Golf players from the HQ Staff.



The Ryder Cup is played during one day with a team (2 US versus 2 European) round of golf in the morning and an individual (1 US versus 1 European) match in the afternoon. Thus there are 9 points available: 3 in the team matches in the morning and 6 in

the individual matches in the afternoon. The team with the most points wins the Ryder Cup. Last year Europe won the first NRDC-IT Ryder Cup Golf tournament convincingly, so this year the US team was eager to restore their pride. US players were seen on the course already weeks before, training and getting familiar with the beautiful Golf course Le Robinie. On 28 September, a beautiful day, we started at 08:00 with a briefing by this year's organiser Sgt Fouth (US) and at 08:45 the first team teed off. Already in the morning competition it was clear that Europe would have a challenge to retain the Cup. Indeed one of the morning team matches was so close that it was decided on the the 18th and last hole of the course. After the morning round US took the lead 2 to 1. After a delicious spaghetti lunch and with new energy we started the afternoon with the individual matches. The team captain of the European team, LTC Jos OUWERLING, tried to inspire the European team with some last tips and tricks and it was amazing to see how well again both teams played this afternoon. A lot of pars and even 2 birdies were played during the afternoon matches. At the end of the afternoon it was all clear; in spite of all European tips and tricks, the US had won 4 of the 6 individual matches. This afternoon result made a final score for the Ryder Cup 2004: US 6 points and Europe 3 points, a deserved and resounding victory for our North American colleagues. Congratulations. Hopefully we will have next year the third version of the NRDC-IT Ryder Cup Golf tournament.



Tournament

Ugo Mara Barracks International Golf Tournament (UMBIGT) is an annual individual golf competition. After already 4 very successful and pleasant NRDC-IT Golf Tournaments, on **14th December 2004**, the **5th UMBIGT** was played locally at the Golf Club "Le Robinie" with players from the NRDC-IT HQs Staff representing five countries. It was an unseasonably warm, sunny day that assisted in producing a heated competition. Using a handicap scoring system, a novice player, Maj IT Corrado CARLINI won the tournament. Although he deserves our congratulations for his outstanding performance, the most important result of the "Golf's

entertainment", was the fine spirit of the players during the tournament. It was hard-fought contest in keeping with golf's highest traditions. All participants hope that additional NRDC-IT golf players will participate in future golfing events in the coming year.

FINAL RESULTS OF NRDC-IT 5th UMBIGT 2004:

Ser.	Rank / Name
1 st place	MAJ Corrado CARLINI (IT)
2 nd place	WO2 Carl MAGIN (UK)
3 rd place	COL Hans Peter GRUNEBACH (GE)



UMBIGT Winner



Thoughts... in writing

By LtC R. E. A. SAMPAIO DE OLIVEIRA, LTC PO Army SNR



NRF soldiers in a static display

Introductory Note

With this issue's first writings we'll intend to start a series of articles aimed to fill a gap that, in our opinion, persists in the content of our Magazine: a space dedicated to the expression, exchange and debate of ideas, concepts, doctrines and procedures that inexorably set the pace of the day to day's life of **soldering**.

Articles that will try to provide different perspectives and opinions on "**hot subjects**" faithful to the motto **liberta di pensiero**, so dear to those that have to provide advise and counselling to the decision makers – no more no less than what an experienced and mature Staff is supposed to guarantee

With these articles we'll try to encourage the participation of our readers in debating their content and provide their own views on the same subject. We deeply believe that by doing so we will enrich our professional knowledge and skills as well as our organizational culture. And it is also our inner conviction, having such a multitude of different experiences and levels of expertise within our HQ that we could not afford to loose this opportunity to decisively promote a small contribute to the growing process of our professionals ... in an unpretentiously way.

This is our "provocative" challenge ...

Let's talk NRF ...

Today's thoughts will be on the so-called "**NRF Concept**" now in fashion among the NATO community.

Upon the political and military decision of NATO to adopt and implement the NATO Response Force Concept none of us in the military and specifically none of those that work within the NATO environment have remained indifferent to it.



Signal personnell setting up an antenna



Thoughts... in writing

And there are a couple of good reasons to remain seized on this subject: firstly, the analysis of the concept in itself (what's behind the curtain, how new is it in our way of doing business?) and secondly what type of impact would its implementation have on NATO's structural organization (would it implicate something similar to the so called "Revolution in Military Affairs"?!)¹.

Lets try to dissect our doubts and provide our views and answers to these interrogations.

What's the rational behind it?

The NRF concept seats on the basic but audacious/challenging idea of having a permanent available force capable of doing "**anything, anywhere, anytime**"².

The push to have as soon as possible a force able to provide such capability has undoubtedly its origin and roots in two major events that have dictated a change in the international environment: the unpredictable supersonic collapse (call it implosion if you want) not only of the old USSR but of the majority of the satellite countries and regimes under the socialist/communist tutelage; and linked to it the increasing complexity and multitude of the challenges, risks and threats (where the 9/11 plays a decisive role) that the *new international order* actors face in terms of security and defence on their way to achieve a comfortable international balance of power.

To provide an adequate response to the above concerns and challenges the existing NATO forces and structure revealed themselves inadequate for such purpose since they were generically considered as being too much "reactive" by nature and concept.

The lessons learned from recent events in Central/Eastern Europe and the fear of a world wide "*balkanisation*" of conflicts in line with the predictable type of future engagements³ have decisively accelerated the whole process of NATO's transformation and consequently the adoption of a new Strategic Concept, a new Command Structure and a new Forces Structure from where the concept in discussion derives.

The NRF Concept ... How new is new?

Our first question has its roots on the previous perspective. With so many changes carried out already within the Alliance (where it seems that each piece of paper has incorporated the "new" word before every



IFV DARDO during Ex Destined Glory '04

statement) we may still ask a valid question: is it in fact a new concept or is it just "*a late arrival to the scene*" of previous experiences now subdued for NATO's fostering?

Our view is definitely in line with the second possibility. In pure theoretical terms we may say that since imme-



Setting up the Command Post

- 1 Very briefly an RMA can be defined as a complete transformation not just in technological terms but also essentially in conceptual, doctrinal and organizational ones of existing military structures/institutions.
- 2 Conceptually we can expect this type of Force to conduct any type of mission within the framework of Non-Art 5 Crisis Response Operations, overtime, able to be employed out of area (out of NATO's normal AOR) in a short timeframe.
- 3 Non Art 5 Crisis Response Operations rather than Art 5 - conventional warfare type of confrontation

Thoughts... in writing

morial times, nations, countries, organized political groups/entities have had forces at **high readiness** capable of intervening anywhere, anytime and of doing anything to defend their strategic interests when threatened. Certainly, the **anywhere**, the **anytime** and also the **anything** capabilities have evolved in accordance with new political, strategic and operational thinking and in line with new available technologies and technological developments. But the concept in essence has remained the same: to have a "watch dog" ready to go...

To substantiate this assertion it will be worth to remember that particularly within the Air and Navy environments NATO has always had quick response forces acting on a 24/365(6) basis. In land terms, the lately deceased AMF(L) ⁴ had been so far the NATO's closest embryo to this concept although relying on a very "squared framework arrangement" meaning with little tailoring flexibility.

However, even though the concept cannot be considered new it undoubtedly constitutes a certain "novelty" in terms of NATO, specially because its implementation calls for a joint force to be ready in very short NTM ⁵ timings and during an extended period of time, which will implicate major changes in the Alliance's decision making and planning processes especially at political-strategic level. The CJTF/HRF ⁶ Concepts had set the pace for it but they provided lets say a more comfortable timeline for decision makers to deal with. With the NRF Concept this comfort has vanished "de per si" implicating (if we're talking success) a tremendous acceleration in the whole process. In simple terms we cannot have a "proactive force" without having also "proactive" political decisions and military planning. And these will definitely set the pace...



IFV DARDO ready for action!

Is NATO's leadership ready to change?

Following our previous thoughts and rational the answer to this question relies on the effective capability of NATO leadership to overcome the "reactivity syndrome" that has conditioned NATO's activity in the past and tends to restrain NATO's interventions in the future if no changes at top level are accommodated. This means that NATO key leaders will have to change their mindset in order to meet the goals themselves have set. A quick and effective decision making process needs to replace the old slow and sometimes ineffective one ⁷ in order not to let the Alliance portray the "patient suffering of an incurable disease" that sooner or later will end up in death...

But will they accept to do it in the short term? To that question, time and specifically the next two years, will provide the answer. Nevertheless, it will be worth to remember that the word "consensus" is still the main word in the lexicon of the Alliance's decision making process and a 26 consensual decision will not be an easy goal to achieve...

What about our forces? Are they ready to face the challenge?

One of the major concerns every level of Command faces (besides the accomplishment of short timelines for deployment) is to know if their forces can meet the readiness requirements, meaning: are they properly tailored, trained, equipped and available when and where needed? Do they really meet the standards to perform the **full spectrum** of NRF missions?

Lets try to rationalize about these questions. If we take into account the demanding spectrum of **possible missions** ⁸ that can be assigned to a force within the NRF concept we may well understand that properly tailoring a force **in advance** for every possible scenario and Theatre of Operations it is not an easy task in military terms ⁹...

4 ACE Mobile Force (Land)

5 Notice to Move

6 Combined Joint Task Force / High Readiness Force

7 The decision to follow the "coalitions of will" road instead of a broader "consensual highway" is a good symptom of NATO's ineffectiveness in achieving common goals in a timely and consensual manner.

8 Due to NRF possible missions common knowledge we have decided not to elaborate on this issue.

9 In political terms our inner feeling is that this issue is viewed as a "minor" one" ..or maybe not if considered as a "blank check" offered by nations for NATO to use at its own will...



Thoughts... in writing

Adding to that, one of the major shortfalls of this concept resides exactly on the fact that it is almost **mission impossible** to have a "**multirole/multimode force**" that can be successfully engaged in any type of crisis or conflict. Specifically if we think of a scenario where an asymmetric type of conflict is likely to emerge and a non-conventional threat ¹⁰ is the one to face.

So far, in our opinion, our forces have not been properly tailored to face this type of challenge. On the land side we have to be fair admitting that the typology of forces made available has not been the most adequate one to fulfil fundamental requirements: forces that are adequately tailored and prepared to "**fight**" the **same type of conflict** a non-conventional threat is ready to conduct, forces that have the ability to perform in the **same conditions** and that are **entitled to act** ¹¹ accordingly to the military needs dictated by the operational scenario. In line with this, we also believe that we will never succeed fighting a non-conventional type of warfare with pure conventional means, nor will we succeed without using "**equivalent**" ¹² means and techniques in our engagement.

In fact our forces have been assembled having much more in consideration political and economical factors rather than having in account the social/cultural/military conditions in Theatre. A "**politically correct**" force is not necessarily the most effective one. Good for diplomacy ... bad for military achievements... Bottom line: you cannot successfully win a "**dirty conflict**" with a "**tidy force**"...

And its certainly fair to say that the major paradigmatic contradiction (nearly touching paroxysm) the military face in this type of conflicts is between, the "**zero casualties policy**" every government is looking for to appease national public opinions linked with the

already mentioned conduct **of a clean fight** ¹³ and the need to succeed **no mater what** ¹⁴ ...

However, we cannot forget or discount that this is "a fact of life" and that soldiering is about achieving political/strategic objectives using (or threatening to use) the military force (using a clausewitzian expression, we are to perform the continuation of politics by other means) in combination with other lines of action/operations that have little to do with our way of doing business but that are normally setting the pace for the intended end state ¹⁵. Soft Power prevails and will prevail in most (if not all) circumstances...



This contradiction is probably the leitmotiv why forces tend to be over protected, over equipped, over careful and as a result, unfortunately, improperly tailored, equipped and trained which certainly are key factors for a successful or unsuccessful performance of a military force.

- 10 We've decided to use this terminology in order not to allude to a specific type of threat (guerrilla, terrorism, etc..) since we believe that the unpreparedness of our forces at this moment is similar to each one you may consider.
- 11 ROE sufficiently strong to cope with the existing threat and not with the political perceptions of the conflict.
- 12 The expression equivalent refers to the necessary adequacy/adaptability to the threat/environment in order to succeed.
- 13 That imprisons forces activities and turns Cdrs on the ground hostages of political/diplomatic decisions
- 14 Using an humoristic expression I would say that Cdrs on the ground may feel like a surgeon that was given a fork and a knife to perform open heart surgery ... he may succeed but...
- 15 We're talking about mainly of political, diplomatic and economic initiatives that tend to cohort what would be considered the most effective way of conducting the military side of the overall strategy



Thoughts... in writing

This means, in our opinion that our forces are not ready yet to meet "any kind of engagement – our anything" as required and expected. Will they ever be?....

Are we ready to do it anywhere?

Despite of the fact that we cannot assume to be ready to do "anything" we certainly detain the capability to act in certain types of crisis scenarios where the operational demands (threats/risks/challenges/objectives) can be considered of medium to low intensity. Therefore, we may say that we are now ready to at least engage in some type of conflicts and successfully accomplish certain types of missions.

But can we assume that we can do it anywhere? In pure theoretical terms yes. In practical terms ... our answer is no. Why? Because from a military standpoint, and among other reasons, one the major understood and agreed NATO shortfall leys on the inexistence of "an autonomous strategic lift capability" that is crucial to achieve this desiderate. This means



that the Alliance is relying on the "good will" of a nation or nations that will turn or not (in line with their own interests) this capability available ¹⁶. Also, because at this moment the NATO CIS equipment available for NATO operations is so "stretched" that is reasonable to assume that only the "decay" of some missions will turn other missions possible which in military terms is an "easy to say" not an "easy to do" thing...

Last but not the least... the political constraints/restraints. No matter Nations have made forces available for the NRF CJSOR they will only make them effectively available if, and only if, it is of their strategic interest to do so! Adding to that, we have the conviction that in the future the Alliance will only promote an intervention where international legitimacy is perceived even if legality has been ab initio conceded. The legitimacy aspect will be of the utmost importance for a cohesive and non-defied Alliance's intervention in the future. Otherwise, it will be voted, sooner or later to a major crash. The Alliance's centre of gravity will be inexorably hit if that happens...let's not forget that the Organization has recently stepped out of a major crisis and that we're still leaking the wounds...

Nevertheless, the maintenance of the Transatlantic Link is absolutely essential for the survivability of NATO not only as a Military Alliance but also, and above all, as a Security Alliance (in which it has transformed itself lately...). ¹⁷

Can we do it anytime?

We purposively left our thoughts on this question to answer last since we believe the answer to this que-

¹⁶ The US are the one and only to have this capability at hand; if we consider the worldwide operational demands/engagements the US are currently facing we're led to admit that it will be very difficult for NATO to rely on the permanent availability of US means for Alliance's purposes.

¹⁷ In our opinion the survivability of the Alliance rests on the capability and ability of political leaders to overcome the different perceptions on the conduct of international affairs and world policy that both sides of the Atlantic have which recently caused major fractures among allies. The balance to attain, between national interests and multilateral interests is paramount and will become the key factor for success in NATO's future decisions. If this common understanding is not achieved two extremely dangerous outcomes are possible: An Alliance just in nomine that has no effective and decisive intervention in the resolution of worldwide security and defence problems (opening the way to unilateral interventions with unforeseeable consequences) or an Alliance that will only rely on the so called European Pillar leaving NATO dependent on the scarce military resources Europe can provide. In both cases the fading and collapse of the Alliance will be inevitable...





CIS personnell setting a satellite link

stion derives in great part from the previous ones. The political, strategic and military constraints we've talked about earlier will have a decisive role on our capability to perform anytime. However, if we narrow our universe of analysis, and just relate our rational to the existing limited capability to act (not everything, nor everywhere) we're led to admit that within certain limits we can do it anytime. But can we actually do it? Technically, we tend to believe that the "reduced" size of the force in equation against the overall available forces within the Alliance, will allow, as planned, an easy-going rotation among NRF packages without major bumps on the road. However, that will also depend on the capability of Nations to regenerate their own forces and to commit funds not only to allow missions to proceed but also to improve the quality of Units made available. And a positive or negative response by Nations to these demands will certainly dictate our capability to engage anytime.

The other remote possibility is to have a sort of "NRF Countries' Club" where the burden of missions would rely on a restricted number of nations, which in the long run would prove not to be a long lasting solution due to evident political and economical reasons.

Concluding

The remaining overall interrogation relates to the consequences this process may have, considering its future impact within the Alliance: can these changes be considered a real Revolution in Military Affairs for NATO? Our prospective answer is that, it will certainly have an impact not only on NATO's overall approach and future decisions and developments but also at National level where Countries will be "forced" to adhere to new political / military goals if they do not

want to be left "out of the loop or dumped in the last seats of the train".

However, it will be a parallel process conducted at different paces (Nations will do it at own will) which means that looking at the overall long term concurrence that NATO aims to achieve, the desired outcome cannot be foreseen in the next few years. And let's not elude ourselves with the so-called NRF full operational capability (FOC) in 2006, which can only be understood and accepted under the context, limitations, constraints and restraints above exposed. We'll still have by then shortfalls to deal with, troops not fully prepared to engage any type of mission, equipment that is not fully adequate, etc. ... Have no doubts about it! ¹⁸ Thus, it will become not an RMA but rather an Evolution in Military Affairs (EMA)

For our own benefit ...

The actual situation recommends prudence and use of military common sense judgement on our "mission analysis". A thorough account of the available capabilities and existing limitations is the only way to remain focused on effective mission accomplishment within the NRF concept as it is. Otherwise an overoptimistic acceptance of missions/tasks and excessive risks may lead us to be overrun by events and incapable of coping with some mission requirements: its not advisable to do steps bigger than the size of your legs; doing it it's half way through to a major fall... ¹⁹

Most of our readers are probably asking by now why were we so "pessimistic" in our evaluation of these subjects. To them our answer is ... we do not think we're being pessimistic nor optimistic...we're just trying to be pragmatic and realistic ...

But we do sincerely hope that the majority of our analysis, perspectives and prospective is wrong for the benefit of the Alliance we all try to serve the best we can.

See you next time, fellow readers...

¹⁸ Our conviction is based on the delays that similar initiatives have been subject. As an example refer to the CJTF implementation process ...

¹⁹ We certainly cannot afford failure. That would be the beginning of the end...

Santa Barbara Day

By Col B. BUCCI, Chief Fire Coord

NRDC-IT: "St. Barbara Celebration"



On the evening of the 1st December 2004, the NRDC-IT celebrated the St. Barbara Day, patron saint of artillery, at the "Perrucchetti" barracks in Milan, the main headquarters of the 1st Horse Arty Regiment.

Col. Bonaldi (1st Horse Arty Rgt's Commander) and his Staff hosted all NRDC-IT guests in a superb manner. The warm hospitality and social event were very much appreciated by all Artillery Officers and NCOs and their wives who attended it and provided the atmosphere and stimulus necessary to sustain enthusiasm.

The visit to 1st Arty Rgt's Museum, gave the NRDC-IT guests an excellent opportunity to know the military tradition and the history of the Italian Horse Arty

Regiment. The participants during the cocktail and buffet in the Officers' Club have expressed a particular judgment for the fine presentation and good quality of the food and wines... "nobody went away thirsty!!!" The event strongly supported by NRDC-IT FCOORD Branch was an outstanding success. As the final Celebration, the Artillery Senior Col. USA D. Hyde made a toast to St. Barbara. Furthermore it has been a unique occasion for the families of NRDC-IT Staff to stay together and improve their military and civil mutual knowledge and friendship, and having been a great success, we hope it becomes an annual event for this Headquarters.



1st HORSE ARTY REGIMENT




Medical News

by Lt G. BUONAIUTO, PIO Branch

Preventing is better than cure, better safe than sorry

Last October 2004, Medical Branch of RSC Division started a positive and interesting initiative, distributing to all the Staff a monthly medical bulletin.

This well-received product, supported by explanatory pictures in handling and treating the wounded, allows a practical and simple explanation of medical problems.



The Project Officer is Lt Col (MD) IT A Francesco GAETA, an NRDC-IT medical officer with 12 years military medical experience, who started collecting advices and instructions about the most common medical problems affecting military personnel.

The main feature of the Bulletin is to provide a general overview of medical topics such as epidemiological assessment, first aid, neurological and psychological matters spreading basic information addressed to non medical personnel. In particular, the last issue covered the following topics:

- management of burns;
- extract of ISAF VI weekly epidemiological assessment (a serial column);
- medical information: Rabies.

Each subject is dealt in a deep and analytic manner supported by pictures and practical layout in order to make the subject simple and simpler.

This basic medical training is useful for all HQ personnel not only for the deployment in operation but also for its own medical culture in daily life.

In the end, we praise this venture although the common hope is never being forced to remind these useful advices in the future.

Thanks Doc



Visits and Events



16st September 2004
International Day



09th November 2004
Visit of the Italian Joint High Staff College (ISSMI)



5th October 2004
Visit of the "bersaglieri" National Association



10th November 2004
Celebration of the Remembrance Day



27th October 2004
Visit of MG Bruno NEVEUX, Commander of the
EMIAFE - Training Joint Forces General Staff



11th November 2004
Celebration of the Polish National Day



Visits and Events



15th November 2004
Halloween Celebration



06th December 2004
MG Chris BROWN, ARRC Chief of Staff



18th November 2004
Visit of the Colonel Shoichi SHIBATA, Instructor of the Joint Staff Collge, Japanese Defence Agency



16th December 2004
Visit of the HE Ettore SEQUI,
Italian Ambassador to Afghanistan



25th November 2004
Plenary Meeting



27th January 2005
MG Jason KAMIYA, SETAF Commander



by Ltc B. PELLEGRINO, SO I Med Plans

DUTCH CUISINE

To start with I would like to give you a short description of the way we serve our meals in the Netherlands. Typical of the Dutch cuisine is the serving of just one hot meal a day. Breakfast consists of slices of white, whole wheat and dark rye bread, sometimes also with rusks, served with cheese and assorted cold cuts, jam, chocolat sprinkles and peanut butter. Up until the sixties the hot meal was nearly always served at noon time. A traditional Dutch hot meal starts with soup, followed by potatoes, meat and vegetables with a dairy product as dessert. Since more and more people started owning cars and work often took them

further away from home, the custom of serving a hot meal in the middle of the day disappeared. Nowadays the hot meal is served around 18.00 hours and lunch is more or less a copy of breakfast. Dutch people are so fond of their chocolate sprinkles and peanut butter that they even take it with them on their trips abroad.

The traditional Dutch cuisine more or less existed until the second World War. Just like in a lot of other countries

For one of the more authentic Dutch recipes we have to go back to the Middle Ages. In The Netherlands, as well as in the rest of Europe, people cooked mush type dishes, prepared in one pot because cooking took place on an open fire. Not till the middle of the nineteenth century did stoves (with ovens) appear. The mush mainly consisted of grains and vegetables with meat or fish added when available. It was a rather thick substance which served to fill the stomach to make the long hours of arduous physical labour possible. Sometimes the mush was deluted with milk, wine or beer. (Water wasn't pure

Nasi Goreng

Ingredients:

- 1-2 onions
- 2 cloves garlic
- 1 tbsp sambal (hot pepper sauce) or to taste
- 1/2 tbsp trassi (shrimp paste)
- 300 g cooked meat (e.g. ham, chicken, pork)
- 4 tbsp oil
- 500 g cooked rice
- 2 tbsp ketjap (Indonesian soy sauce)

Method:

- ◆ Peel onions and garlic and puree in food processor or liquidiser with sambal and trassi. Cube the meat. Heat the oil in a wok and fry the puree and spice mix a few minutes. Mix in the meat and fry shortly. Little by little add the rice and fry till hot. Add ketjap to taste. If wanted garnish with an omelett of 2 eggs.

people relied on products from the land or water around them. Big differences were to be found between provinces and cities. Meals consisted of products cultivated in private (vegetable) gardens and bought in local markets. Then as well as now, the Dutch were known for their fine vegetables and dairy products. I only have to refer to the wonderful cheese that was served during our last International Day. After World War II, transport became more readily available and thus trade across the country borders. Next to that a lot of Dutch people returned to the Netherlands from the former colonies like Indonesia intro-

ducing a lot of exotic recipes like Nasi Goreng (baked rice dishes) or rice tables (rice with several small side dishes like baked banana, meat, fish, etc.) There's only one peculiarity...in the Netherlands we use Nasi Goreng as a main dish of our hot meal but in Indonesia its a breakfast dish made of left overs from the night before. These dishes are so embedded in Dutch cooking that for example every foreigner thinks that it belongs to the Dutch cuisine.

enough, so people never drank water in the Middle Ages. Lots of beer was drunk in stead.) Mainly during the winter season Dutch families still prepare hotchpotch or "stampot" derived from the mush: potatoes,vegetables and meat mixed together and cooked in one pot.

Another common ingredient on the Dutch menu is fish, more specifically herring. The Dutch have been fishing the North Sea for herring since centuries. The herring was cleaned on board and brought ashore by fast sailing ships. Around 1800 these ships were flat bottomed so they





Boerenkool met rookworst/ Kale with Dutch smoked sausage



Method:

- ◆ Pre-cook the kale 10 minutes with a little water. Peel the potatoes and put them in a large pan. Add the kale and place the sausage on top. Cook approx. 30 minutes till done. Remove the sausage from the pan and pour off the cooking liquid. Mash the kale and potatoes with milk, butter and mustard and season with salt. Slice the sausage and serve with the hotchpotch.

Ingredients:

- 600 g finely diced kale
- 1 kg potatoes
- 1 fresh smoked Dutch sausage ("rookworst")
- salt
- 1 1/2 dl milk approx.
- 35 g butter
- 1 tbsp "Zaanse" mustard

could land easily on the beaches of Noordwijk, Katwijk, Zandvoort, Egmond and Scheveningen. To be able to keep the herring it was salted on board after cleaning or "kaken": removal of the gills, gut and throat. This way the herring could be eaten all winter. In the sixties this mode of conserving disappeared with arrival of deepfreezers. The herring still is cleaned on board, lightly salted and kept in kegs for 24 hours to ripe. They then are repacked in kegs of 6 kg and frozen. Tradition dictates the drinking of "korenwijn" the very best of Dutch genever with herring. White beer with its light and subtle herb aroma of coriander and orange also goes well with herring.

Boterkoek/Butter cake



Ingredients:

- 375 g flour
- 300 g soft white sugar
- 2 sachets of vanilla sugar
- pinch salt
- 300 g butter
- 1 small egg

Method:

- ◆ Sift the flour with the sugar and mix in vanilla sugar and salt. Cut the butter into the flour. Beat the egg, keep half of it for garnish and add the other half to the flour and butter mixture. Knead a soft dough. Fill a special butter cake tin with the dough and flatten the top. Use a knife to decorate the top with diamond squares and brush with the remaining egg. Bake at 200 degrees Celsius for approx. 20 minutes till golden brown.

VARIATIONS:

Citroenboterkoek/ Lemon butter cake

Ingredients:

Mix the dough with the grated rind of 1/2 lemon

Gemberboterkoek/ Ginger butter cake

Ingredients:

Mix the dough with 8-10 diced preserved gingerballs and approx. 3 tbsp. Gingersyrup. Use 250 g butter instead of 300 g.

Haringssalade/ Herring salad

Ingredients:

- 2-3 cleaned herrings
- 250 g boiled potatoes
- 2 boiled beets
- 2 medium tart apples
- pearl onions and gherkins
- 4 tbsp mayonaise



Method:

- ◆ Cut herrings, potatoes and beets in bite size pieces. Peel, core and chop the apples. Leave the pearl onions whole and finely dice the gherkins. Mix two thirds of the potatoes, beets, herrings, apple, pearl onions and gherkins with the mayonaise. Place the salad in the middle of a serving plate and arrange the remaining vegetables and fish around it.

