

# Ex Sharp Dagger 2003

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Exercise "SHARP DAGGER 2003" was the main training event of the year for the NRDC-IT HQ and it took place at the German Army Simulation Center in Wildflecken (24 April - 02 May).

The aim was to exercise NRDC-IT HQ to plan and conduct from Asymmetric Operations up to Warfighting Operation using a simulation system.

The exercise Main Training Objectives were:

- To develop operational and logistics procedure in order to improve the capability of NRDC IT HQs to plan and conduct a War Fighting Operation (WFO), in accordance to the results issued by the simulation system, after a inter-regional deployment;
- To verify NRDC-IT HQs Structure and procedures in accordance to TACSOPs AND TACSOIs.

The German Army Simulation Center, know as GUPPIS, provided general support and SIMOF software, that covered the Corps needs and allowed low manning for EXCON (about 100 PAX).

Exercise participations were:

- MAIN HQ NRDC-IT (216 PAX);
- HICON ( HQ NRDC-IT, RSC) (125 PAX);
- LOCON (Response Cell from 1st IT DIV; 3rd UK DIV; IT ENG BDE; IT SIGNAL BDE; IT ISTAR BDE; IT AIRMOBILE "FRIULI" BDE).

## EXERCISE SCENARIO

The exercise scenario foresaw the HQ NRDC-IT intervention, as Land Component Command, in MOUNTANIA, a large country of North Africa, torn by ethnic tension between the minor ethnicities of SKYERS and GREENERS, living inside the mixed provinces of SKY-



LAND and GREENLAND, and the major ethnicity of YELLOWS. In MOUNTANIA, SKYERS and GREENERS suffered badly under the weak and corrupt government and army



A view of the Main CP Operational Centre

dominated by YELLOWS.

The YELLOW predominance in the government forced SKYERS and GREENERS to develop two aggressive and effective revolutionary groups, the SKYER Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the GREENER Independent Movement (GIM).

The long-neglected MOUNTANIAN Army, consisting mainly of YELLOWS, suffered of poor discipline, old equipment and inadequate training. Local command-

ers failed to coordinate their actions and to achieve the goal. They fought against determined SKYER and GREENER revolutionaries while at the same time they wanted to control the corrupted governors. The army offensive against the SPM and GIM was irregular, frequently confused but characterized by atrocities and human right violations on both sides that led to a worldwide clamour for a cease-fire.

As MOUNTANIAN Army crossed the border to "restore order and protect the lives and property of the citizens.", the international community condemned the deployment although Military Commander

announced their limited objective of occupying only the mixed areas. Immediately SKYLAND and GREENLAND appealed to the UN for intervention that was anctioned by a UN Security Council resolution demanding the withdrawal of the Army from the mixed areas and the cessation of hostilities by the governments as a prerequisite for consideration of UN intervention.

The UN established a United Nations Mission to MOUNTANIA (UNMM) for an initial period of 12 months for monitoring the cessation of hostilities and coordinating humanitarian activities. Following the establishment of the UNMM, the UN Secretary-General requested that the NATO Secretary General considered a NATO - led peace support operation (PSO) in MOUNT-



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NIA. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) accepted the UN request and UNSCR was passed authorizing deployment of a PSO under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The NAC directed

SHAPE to form a Combined Joint Task Force with NRDC-IT as CJFLCC .

## EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS EMERGING FROM EXERCISE DEVELOPMENT

The exercise objectives can be summed as follows:

- to practise selected aspects of the deployment of the HQ NRDC-IT Group;
- to practise HQ NRDC-IT tactics, techniques and procedures during the transition from asymmetric threat to war fighting;
- to confirm that lessons learned from previous exercises have been addressed;
- to plan/train in a desert environment;
- to test the effectiveness of the "JOINT EFFECTS CENTRE" (JEC) composed by FCOORD, G3 AIR, INFO OPS, LEGAL representatives.

The learning process of the Corps foresees that at the end of each training activities all the branches and divisions submit their feedback and observations. The key elements are the "Hot Wash up" and the Lessons Learned cycle. The following are the main concerns/problems which emerged from that process:

- JEC not yet tested sufficiently to make a bold statement. Additional "testing" of concept is necessary during future training exercises to provide "proof of concept". A Working Group has been established in order to review functionality of JEC & OPSCEN to deconflict common responsibilities and a better allocation of functions. Considerations should be made to divide responsibilities between the two in terms of time-space rather than distance-space;



*International Staff at work*

- the limited CIMIC assets were located in the OPSCEN, JEC, CPG and the CIMIC Branch of the MAIN CP (and also in the RAS and the RSC when deployed). Because of this it is sometimes difficult to streamline all CIMIC efforts in our HQ. The recommended action is to study a more effective way of integrating CIMIC in the different cells and CPs in our HQ, keeping the CIMIC Branch more together to ensure a consistent and effective CIMIC output and support to the mission;
- passage of information, coordination. There is still room for improvement in order to have events timely an adequately passed through the HQ NRDC-IT Chain of Command. An incorrect flow of critical information could affect subsequent and timely decisions to be taken by the Commander.



HQ NRDC-IT's Staff Process still needs more refinement. Lack of adequate internal coordination and proper staffing of problems has a direct impact in not providing best advice to the Commander and a better guidance to HQ NRDC-IT's subordinate formations. Problems should be better thought through and more calmly resolved and when required brainstormed in order to find the best approach for its resolution, rather than having a single officer trying to solve it, where many times he will be overloaded with other issues as well.

The rule of "who else needs to know" should be a must for everyone of the HQ Staff, particularly when involved in the resolution of new problems.

The solution is to revise Staff procedures and in particular OPSCEN procedures to achieve, regardless of the type of exercise (PSO or Warfighting), an efficient and effective flow of information throughout HQ NRDC-IT's Chain of Command,

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a better internal coordination and a better team work for problem resolution. A Study Period type exercise (1 or 2 days) with the participation of all HQ NRDC-IT Staff Officers should be organized. Subjects to include could be: 1) Flow of information up and down – Principles; 2) Internal coordination; 3) Mission Command; 4) Advise to the Commander, when and how; 5) Guidance to subordinate formations, when and how;



*Commander's update*

Kaserne. The Tactical and Logistic Support Regiment was in charge of all the real life aspects in order to improve the training of its personnel in supporting the Corps staff while on exercise or operation. In particular the Spt Rgt took care of organizing the deployment of the staff in close coordination with the Org & Coord Branch, the reception and all the arrangement for accommodations; but the best performance was the organi-

zation and management of the mess. All the staff appreciated that special taste of Italian food even if we were in the center of Germany, nevertheless after duty hours we enjoyed very much the local beer and specialties.

## REAL LIFE ASPECTS

WTA is the ideal base to organize and run such a complex training activity, due to the amount of facilities (buildings, briefing rooms, firing range, cinema, Officers and NCO clubs) and services within the RHÖN

