




NRDC-ITA



magazine



Eagle Blade '09



NRDC-ITA



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FOREWORD

■ by MAJ GEN (GBR RN) David Capewell
Deputy Commander, NRDC ITA



As we near the end of 2009 it is worth reflecting on our achievements this year and what challenges lie ahead. The past twelve months have been a busy time for the Headquarters. We have successfully deployed a large contingent to HQ ISAF in Kabul to support operations in Afghanistan. This was a testing and demanding deployment at a pivotal moment in the campaign to deliver stability to this troubled country. Those who deployed can be rightly proud of their contribution. We have also embarked on an ambitious exercises and training schedule, aimed at developing our skills in the contemporary operating environment. At the same time we are about to embark on major structural changes within the Headquarters. So it has been a challenging year, but one that we have met head on and engaged with in a creative and professional manner. May I therefore congratulate all the personnel within, and in support of the Headquarters on their professionalism and dedication in the last year; because of you our reputation across NATO remains second to none.

Looking ahead, it will be clear to you all that we live in uncertain and perplexing times. Recent and ongoing events in Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to test us both politically and militarily. Indeed wider issues such as the global fiscal crisis, extremism, climate change and nuclear proliferation will also no doubt impact on our lives and test our resolve. With this in mind our prospective involvement in the NRF late next year will serve to focus our thinking and demand innovative solutions across a broad range of security issues. Careful transformation to meet these challenges in both the soft and hard domain are an essential feature of success in the ambiguous security environment of the future. I am therefore certain we will have ample opportunity to demonstrate our hard won prowess and capability as a force for good. I am also confident that each and every member of this Headquarters will rise to the challenges ahead and continue to demonstrate the qualities that make this headquarters what it is, professional, dynamic, multi national and multi cultural. I am certainly proud to serve within it. And I am most grateful to you and your families for the support they give us.

This magazine is a testimony to the efforts and professionalism of our personnel, the heart of any headquarters. It serves to demonstrate what we do and the professionalism with which we operate. It also recognises and celebrates the diversity of the fifteen contributing nations, their history and their culture. I commend it to you and wish you all a happy and peaceful Christmas.

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EXERCISE EAGLE TOUR 09

■ by CAPT (ITA A) Andrea CUBEDDU

The yearly NRDC-ITA Battlefield Tour was conducted during the period 28th September – 02nd October 2009 in Slovenia and Italy and was focused on study the 1st World War Battles of Caporetto (XII Battle of Isonzo) and Vittorio Veneto.

The exercise, named “EAGLE TOUR 2009”, was addressed to the NRDC-ITA key leaders (Command Group, DCOSs, ACOSs, and National Senior representatives of the 15 Contributing Nations) and aimed to prepare them for large-scale operations and train them in decision-making.

Study Day

On October 2009, 16th, a preparatory study day was run in Solbiate Olona in order to give to the Exercise participants a first flavour of the historical facts occurred during the 1st WW along the Italian and Austro-Hungarian front and an overview about the exercise key points and main admin issues. This activity, settled by the Engineer Branch, primary responsible for the whole exercise, gave the chance to the

audience to have an initial snapshot of the approaching activity.

Battle of Vittorio Veneto

On Monday, 28th, the group left the “Ugo Mara” barracks very early in the morning and reached, by plane, the airport of Treviso. Then, by coach, straight to Nervesa della Battaglia where is located the 1st WW Montello Ossuary with a very interesting museum and a good view towards the Piave valley.

Two military historians, COL (ITA-A) Antonino ZARCONE, Head of the Army Historical Office in Rome, and LTC Lajos NEGYESI, from the Hungarian Historical Department in Budapest, gave the historical background mainly focused on the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, October 1918.

After a short lunch-break in town centre, the group was conducted to the 1st WW museum, hosted in a sixteenth century palace, where two local guides illustrated the collections of field-materials, the official battle-documents and the photo gal-

lery of the relevant personalities and events of the battle.

Battle of Caporetto

On Tuesday, the morning program included the visit of the Sv. Gora (Monte Santo), which offered some very beautiful views towards the Sabotin ridge, the Bain-sjce plateau, where the VI and XI Isonzo battles took place respectively.

The next day was completely dedicated to the visit of the Isonzo valley. The personnel from the Headquarters were able to visit and see the locations where the harsh fighting occurred. First stop was in the 1st WW museum of Caporetto where the director gave a complete overview of the facts occurred in 1917 and lead the group along the very interesting and well-kept rooms of the museum.

In the afternoon the group had the opportunity to visit the Kolovrat range which offered a very good view-point towards Tolmin and the places where the German started their offensive through the Italian lines. The spot was also an open-air museum where Italian trenches have been recently restored.

At the end of the tour in the Isonzo valley, on Thursday, the visit followed in Bovec and Ravelnik, defensive positions of the Austro-Hungarian Army.

Along all the historical stands, the two historians gave personnel the narration of the historical facts during the war-campaign, which engendered useful discussion among the audience. Their lectures were mainly focused on the opposing plans, opposing commanders and tactics employed during the battles at both the tactical and operational level.

Ceremonies

Along the visit of the named historical stands, the group had the chance to pay respect to the hundred – thousands fallen during the war of both the Italian and Austro-Hungarian / German sides. Some simple wreath laying ceremonies were carried out in the largest Italian memorial and in the Austro-Hungarian cemetery in Redipuglia, then in Italian Ossuary in Ca-



poretto and in the Austro-Hungarian cemetery in Ravelnik.

SVN Units

The last day was dedicated to the visit of the 1st Infantry Brigade in Lubiana where the Brigade Commander and his staff gave some presentations depicting the structure and the capabilities of the Slovenian Army, the Brigade itself and the SVN Battle Group recently affiliated to NRDC-ITA. Afterwards a static display and a dynamic demonstration were presented under a heavy rain. They gave the opportunity to the participants to be aware of the out-standing training level reached by the named units.

Social and Cultural events

A social dinner hosted by the NRDC-ITA Commander, LTG Gian Marco CHIARINI, that saw the participation of the whole delegations and some Slovenian Army guests, was held in a Slovenian traditional restaurant on the hills of Medana, near Nova Gorica.

Furthermore a visit to caves of Postumia was settled to give the delegation the unique chance to see the huge and amazing natural beauty that the caves may offer.

Conclusions

The Exercise EAGLE TOUR 2009 has been a unique opportunity for the NRDC-ITA delegation to better understand the problems faced by the old generations of soldiers during those battles and take from them lessons to improve their professional skills. Moreover it made easy the mutual relationship among the multinational members of the Headquarters. ■



The Air Land Debate Goes On

■ by Wg CDR (GBR AF) Simon JESSETT

In 2009 the issue of air-land integration (ALI) rightly remains at the forefront of NATO thinking, but the debate is often soured by antagonistic arguments that have echoed since the inception of military flight. And whilst the air-land interface is working well at the tactical level in Afghanistan, its gears greased by several years of combat experience, the familiar tensions between components remain at the operational level. What do the lessons of the past tell us, what causes this perpetual friction, and is there anything we can do to improve our lot? Although the following article uses British experience for its examples, the universal arguments were replicated almost exactly across Europe and on both sides of the Atlantic.

Since the first aircraft tottered into the skies as artillery spotting platforms in the Great War there were differences of opinion regarding the best use of air power, and the 'post-war debrief' cemented divisions that have shown re-

markable staying power. It is no exaggeration to claim that much of the ill-informed tension between components today has its origins in the arguments of the interwar period. But by understanding the realities and avoiding the more simplistic views on offer, we can use history to steel ourselves against the temptations of parochialism.

As the two sides emerged from the Great War there was a demonstrable disparity between the ideas of air power's most enthusiastic proponents and the offensive capabilities of their aircraft. Air power had arguably proved ineffective in the strategic bombing role, its aircraft incapable of carrying many bombs or of delivering them with any accuracy, but it had been successful in tactical support to the army. Yet the interwar Royal Air Force (RAF), apparently blind to the evidence, would lean heavily towards the heavy bomber, whilst the Luftwaffe would develop a highly efficient tactical air capability. As German

‘combined arms’ forces then swept across continental Europe at the start of WW2, it is unsurprising that disagreements arose between the land and air components.

But what had driven the RAF to neglect their air support doctrine? The British electorate was sincere in its belief that war on the scale of 1914-18 could never happen again. Defence expenditure was cut dramatically as a result, engendering the familiar internecine warfare between the Services. The RAF defended itself against hostility from its sister Services by arguing that a small number of aircraft could police the colonies effectively, while strategic bombing was an attractive premise for a country seeking to avoid a repeat of the horrors of continental trench warfare. Meanwhile in Germany military thinkers were motivated by the most obvious lesson of the Great War—that victory must be achieved quickly and decisively. The restrictions of Versailles inspired the German General Staff to develop the doctrine of manoeuvre that others would christen Blitzkrieg. Perhaps most importantly the Germans were able to focus upon the air-land interface because they knew they were going to need it. As a continental power with growing ambitions, they were unencumbered by the colonial policing requirements of empire, and had a relatively small navy. Put simply, they expected to fight another continental land war whilst the British did not.

In reality however the thinking on air power in Britain and Germany in the 1930s had been very similar. Each country had its share of heavy bomber enthusiasts and supporters of tactical doctrine. The differences in force mix that were apparent by 1939 were a result of differing geo-strategic outlook and, perhaps most importantly, the shortage of funding in Britain. Although many senior British figures could see the benefits of tactical air power, strategic bombers and fighters simply came higher up the doctrinal priority list at a time of financial constraint.



The Allies would forge a successful air-land relationship in North Africa in 1943, demonstrating the enduring value of concepts such as co-located HQs and mutual trust. By the time of Overlord, however, vitriolic apportionment debates and clashing egos had soured the atmosphere. And once the war was over air and land services across the new NATO alliance would go back to their own exclusive domains, determined to protect their individual service’s interest in a difficult economic environment.

The enduring lessons are compelling. Which of us today can claim to come from a nation whose military funding matches its strategic aspirations? Entrenched parochial views and intense resource pressure are continuing features of the defence landscape, distorting doctrine and force structures now as they did in the 1920s and 1930s, and potentially condemning us to another vicious circle of mutual mistrust and internecine squabbling. Sage voices urge the abandonment of ‘Cold War anachronisms’ such as destroyers and stealthy fighter aircraft, focussing on today’s COIN campaign just as the commentators of the



1930s focussed on colonial policing and the strategic bomber. As we concentrate on ALI today, other roles and capabilities are starved of resources and shrivel on the intellectual back-burner. We must be mindful that once we have disengaged from Afghanistan we will have to work very hard to regain the skills required for more conventional operations, whilst seeking to avoid a repeat of the cycle that sees hard-won lessons about ALI being lost all over again.

Debate between the components regarding the apportionment of assets is no bad thing. There are justifiable arguments both for and against indirect air operations that target the enemy beyond the range of land forces, just as there are compelling reasons to advocate more direct air support to the troops at the frontline. The key is that the debate should take place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust, in which each component uses its expertise in concert with the other to produce the most effective joint campaign. Sadly in Afghanistan today the air and land components continue to generate friction at the op-

erational level as they manoeuvre for institutional advantage.

Imperfections along the fault lines between joint forces will always exist, caused by a raft of considerations, both military and political, a situation exacerbated when individual services are forced to fight for their own slice of an inadequate financial cake. What is important is that we should understand the forces at play, and give ourselves the best chance of overcoming the inherent friction. Only by seeing the broader picture, and by avoiding less than objective assessments that simply castigate one side or the other, will we be able to create an interface in which air and land forces are 'so knitted that the two together form one entity. If you do that, the resultant military effort will be so great that nothing will be able to stand against it...'¹

Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author. They do not reflect the official view or policy of HQ NRDC Italy or the British MoD. ■

¹ General Bernard Law Montgomery reflecting on Air Support in North Africa in 1943.

NRDC-ITA Information Operations seminar

Ex ACTIVE EAGLE 2009

■ by COL (FRA A) Jacques PARENTY

Among all nations and inside military coalitions and organizations, Communication and Information in military affairs become a real and central topic, related to current operations as well as long term strategies. Torn between NATO doctrine, national regulations and changes in the structures, NATO tactical level units and HQs may meet difficulties in keeping up to date with this ever evolving subject.

The annual NRDC-ITA Information Operations Seminar, was held in Solbiate Olona (13-15 October 2009), and was designed to assist all NRDC and CRR HQs and related functions to their part within the INFO OPS dynamic and to share their experiences and subject matter understanding.

Although the objectives of the seminar were aimed at tactical operations, the briefings and discussions focused on our main concern: how is it possible to gain real coordination amongst all components of military affairs and what is the place of Info Ops and related capabilities in this process, particularly at the tactical level?

When we are talking about coordination, Info Ops staffs feel at ease, since they drive a coordinating function. But this coordination is functionally limited to specific capabilities: PsyOps, KLE, OPSEC, EW, PPP¹ and deception. Public Affairs (PA) and CIMIC are still related but separated functions.


Moreover, all these functions are still considered in support of the overall aim of military "attrition" operations and military diplomacy at the tactical level, instead of being fully integrated in both early planning and assessment. An example of this was shown by LTC A. Dirksen, from JFCN IO, in a briefing about the new JF HQ structure. To enhance participation and improve coordination, the PE review set 3 Joint branches for the Planning, Execution and Assessment phases of the operational cycle inside the Operations Directorate; despite this Info Ops is still considered apart of these in a Joint Effect Management branch. If this is the case, how does this coordination work?

¹ Presence, Posture and Profile related to own forces on the ground.

Though, the necessity of synchronisation of Deeds, Words and Images around a given objective is universally recognised and new military concepts all support that evidence, the idiom "Comprehensive Approach"² clearly shows the need to encompass all tools of military power in our processes.

The concept of Knowledge Development, presented by LTC M. Stocuto from NRDC-ITA IO Branch, was linked to both EBEO and Comprehensive Approach. It relies on PEMSII³ analysis in order to set coordinated DIME⁴ objectives and lines of operation. Joint Force level HQs already provide for a Knowledge Directorate in their new PE structure, and even if they are still undermanned and not trained to cover all these domains, no doubt it will increase the coordination capability and enhance the operational interest in these HQs.

One of the questions is "what about the tactical level?" Do we have to try to mirror this structure, knowing that we already lack many staff trained officers in our current organisations? It seems to be a much too distant objective and the solution must be in improved integration, information sharing and knowledge between the different military levels of responsibility and domain of expertise. Above all, we must establish links with the much more developed civilian capabilities, namely the universities and the national scientific research centers.



² Comprehensive Approach is still not doctrinally defined in NATO.

³ Political, Economical, Military, Social, Information, Infrastructure.

⁴ Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy.

Col D. Anderson, ARRC Info Ops chief, presented the INFLUENCE way of thinking recently established in ARRC HQ. Starting from a full integration perspective, as with US STRATCOM concept, Influence becomes the HQ philosophy, the way to understand and to connect between all military activities. In this sense, there is no specific “Influence operation” or “Influence campaign”, there is one campaign organized around Influence effects. As Col Anderson stated, in this concept, “Influence is a combination of Coercion, persuasion and Reassurance, underpinned by/to achieve communication”. All military activities are considered as Influence Tools, and they are coordinated in this respect.


Questions arose regarding the place of NATO STRATCOM in this way of thinking. This is still a challenge for ARRC, but we understood that each level of coordination would fit into the next level of command, rather like a Russian doll. If Info Ops coordinates its capabilities, STRATCOM then coordinates Info Ops and PA in relation with military support to public diplomacy, and finally the Influence cycle coordinates all tools and actors together.

The necessity of coordination between Communication and Information, between PA and Info ops, is still an issue at the tactical level. Even if NATO STRATCOM concepts and structures (in SHAPE, JFC and ISAF HQs) are already running, the process and the doctrine are not as yet agreed upon amongst nations and HQs. ISAF experience shows that it is not enough to write SOPs and SOIs, there must be the will from all parties. There is no magical solution, each area is trying to manage coordination within its own capabilities; the Communication Executive Board, set in the NRDC-ITA core process, sets coordination at command group level without adding any resources to the process. Maj A. d’Ambrosio, from NATO CIMIC Group South, showed that this issue of coordination with Info Ops is still not well understood nor accepted. It is very clear that there must be coherence between CIMIC projects and messages to the population, and messages and words must be the same from the Key Leader Engagement (KLE) to face-to-face talks at low levels.

French RRC (LTC U. Biasotto) and NRDC-Spain (Cap J. Garcia Trejo) briefed us about their understanding and organization of the KLE process. It was surprising to see how the understanding of KLE and how it is implemented differ from one HQ to another. We agreed that it is a commander’s prerogative to stress or not the process in different circumstances; but it becomes harder when, for ex-

ample, KLE is extended to public speeches from key leaders by some nations and limited only to face-to-face with highest level key leader by others. This lack of consistency, highlighted after handovers of HQs on operations, may endanger the continuity of the process, and by association, the process in itself. During the syndicate works around KLE, it was also clear that the perception of a same problem completely differs from an HQ to another.

For all these reasons, it seemed important to achieve harmonization about NATO functions and principles, mainly around the processes themselves, so that we all talk the same language. It will be different for the structures, because of different historical organizations or lack of trained personnel.



A very good example of this agreed position about principles was provided by Prof Trevisani, an Italian external consultant, about intercultural communication. In a fascinating lecture, he presented the 4 personal distances of cross communication⁵, and highlighted the risks of incommunicability if we are not able to identify and then enter in our counterpart speaker’s “communication boundaries”. ISAF, Tchadian or Somalian experiences have shown how it is important to grasp all cultural, historical and psychological characters of our target audiences, and how difficult it is to communicate with them if we don’t share the same communication spaces.

The challenge now is to set these right processes in order to prepare for the next NATO operational commitment in the best conditions for us all. At the same time we must share our experiences amongst the tactical Info Ops community. ■


⁵ *Self distance, semiolinguistic distance, ideological and value distance, personal referential distance.*

The MEL/MIL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

■ by LTC (ITA A) Giulio DI MARZIO

Introduction

The purpose of the serial of these two articles on Mel/Mil Development is to inform & educate Staff on aspects that are not always standardising at HQ level but, at the same time, are mirroring each one concern during executive phase exercise. This piece of writing will mainly focus on explaining the general items related to the basic definitions and concepts tools and then to delineate the structure is in charge to manage the entire process. Later, in the next article we will face the entire process and meetings required to achieve the final production of the MEL/MIL for an exercise.



Background

In fact the main event list/master incident development is the foundation of each HQs delivered exercises. In essence, MEL/MIL scripting is the content of the exercise along all phases (mainly execution) and it is intended to create training effects/outcomes. The scripting organised hierarchy starts with Storyline, Event, Incident and ends with the final product the Inject. Its development is dynamic and continuous controlled processes where some external expertises are required at certain stages.

IOT shape the final products. Generally speaking we consider two different functional types of MEL/MIL; the **pre-scripted ones**, developed during canonical MEL/MIL writing weeks, essential to play certain functional areas and vital in achieving the ex aim and training objectives and the **dynamic ones** which are mainly based on PTA response and created by EXCON in the course of the Exercise, to sustain, increase or change the direction of the play.

Definitions


Therefore a more clear definitions about the elements which composed the word MEL/MIL is strictly required, so we will speak in terms of:

- 1) Event:** A major occurrence or sequence of related incidents. Events should be targeted at achieving the **Exercise Aims and Objectives**.
- 2) Incident:** Actions or situations that provide greater clarity to an Event. Incidents should be targeted at achieving the prioritised **Training Objectives**.
- 3) Inject:** The way of bringing an Incident to the attention of the players within the Primary Training Audience (PTA) for whom it was created – to be “injected” using doctrinal communication means, formats and media.
- 4) Storylines/Storyboard:** The Storylines/Storyboard is an overall depiction of Events and Incidents (may even be so detailed as to include key Injects) as they relate in time through the duration of the exercise Execution.
An effective MEL/MIL is developed using the **Operational Planning Process (OPP)** model. Planning begins with a detailed Mission Analysis of the exercise, considering factors such as

Exercise Aims and Exercise and Training Objectives and planning guidance – including the Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP), the Exercise Specification (EXSPEC), Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) guidance, and Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) level of ambition. Training Objectives are critical to laying the framework for the MEL/MIL development and they have to be projected in the way to cover all the phased of the **Core Planning process** (Planning, Refining, Execute and Assess). Besides the training Objectives should be general and engineered as portraying a Primary Task, the conditions to support that task and the supporting and enabling task to guarantee that T.O. is achievable. They have to be **prioritized** by Divisions IAW their Divisions aims. Generally speaking the Training Division will provide the PTA with a generic list of objectives, developed by the Core Planning Team (CPT), allowing the PTA to determine areas it wishes to focus on – these objectives must be agreed to no later than the Initial Planning Conference (IPC). In conjunction with the Scenario, the MEL/MIL must also incorporate main societal security dimensions (e.g. geographical, political, information, military, and economic factors) to fulfill the aims of the Exercise. Finally, in line with the OPP model, It have to be developed the **“Events”** as Lines of Operation, with Decisive Points represented as Milestone Incidents successful accomplishment of which ultimately contribute to the overall accomplishment of the Exercise and Training Objectives.

Structure

To engineer & design all the Mel/Mil storyboard a consolidated structure at corps level is required. Generally speaking we will have the Chief MEL/MIL who is the supervisor and final responsible of the team, he develops, manages and coordinates the MEL/MIL process from development through Execution. Then, his right arm, the Event Manager who takes ownership of their



respective Events and is responsible for the development, coherence, synchronisation and quality control of all of the Incidents and Injects that fall therein. Besides we have COMSITFOR the represents all opposing, neutral or other forces, whether military, paramilitary, rebel factions or otherwise. He develops mind-sets/strategies for the various entities that he/she represents and must continually keep in mind that the goal of the SITFOR is not to defeat the PTA, but to provide situations and an environment that facilitate the achievement of the Exercise and Training Objectives. Then there is the **MEL/MIL Manager** who is the principal project manager with respect to MEL/MIL issues he focuses on the *tools, mechanisms and support processes* surrounding MEL/MIL development and delivery, while Chief MEL/MIL focuses on the *content* of the MEL/MIL. Later **MEL/MIL Analyst** assists in the MEL/MIL development with a particular focus on *effects* and finally we have the **CAX Manager** who ensures optimum integration of CAX simulation into the exercise. Then to refine & deliver this process there is a requirement to allocate a cross-Divisional HQ team to conduct the process. So that every Branch could at the same time contribute to the Mel/Mil Writing Weeks and be informed about the process development. This aspect will imply that those members will not be appointed in the PTA during the exercise play.

As mentioned above next article will cover the core process where the “injections” are developed. ■



BACK TO BASICS FOR HQ PLANNING STAFF

■ by MAJ (GBR A) Richard ORVIS

“A logical sequence of cognitive processes and associated procedures undertaken by commanders and staffs to analyse a situation, deduce mission requirements and determine the best method for accomplishing assigned tasks and a desired military end-state.”

(The Operational Planning Process, SHAPE GOP Jun 2005)

On a crisp autumnal morning in October, the beating heart of the headquarters' Operational Planning Group (OPG) eagerly convened; forty multi-national staff officers, all with a wealth of experience and each with particular expertise in the oft considered 'black art' of Operational Planning. With pencils sharpened and notebooks under arms, so began the first day of a two week Operational Planning Course (OPC) which was planned and organized by G5 NRDC-ITA and facilitated by a Mobile Education and Training Team (METT) from the NATO School in Oberammergau. Under the watchful eye of the senior mentor Lieutenant General Oerding who recently retired from the Germany Army, the OPC aimed to "... prepare operational plan-

ners for roles as members of the JOPG... within a NATO military headquarters.”

As ACOS G5, Colonel Maurizio Riccò, explained, "The OPP is the fundamental headquarters activity. Irrespective of an individual's experience, it is essential to seize every opportunity to improve ones individual and collective professional skills. This is to be achieved by means of a common understanding on how NATO as such plan its operations".

Despite the OPG having so recently conducted a full cycle of planning in September for Exercise EAGLE BLADE 09, the OPC was to afford another vital opportunity to practice the logic of the planning process and cement its framework in the mind. Many officers were called upon to work outside their comfort zone for the first time and tackle areas of



the Military Estimate beyond their immediate realm of knowledge. This was to prove a steep learning curve.

The course was set in the context of a thorough and extremely plausible fictional crisis in the North Zoran Sea region: a political power play between two of the dominant state actors in the Zoran Sea region (Aquila and Vulpecula) showed signs of spilling over into newly independent neighbouring republics of Auriga and Perseus; two states geographically situated between the aggressors. As regional tensions flared, and the failing Aurigan state looked as if it may leave a destabilising power vacuum, the United Nations intervened in an attempt to avert conflict.



Such was the richness of this scenario that all aspects of the Operational Planning Process (OPP) would soon be comprehensively tested. The pressure to deliver began to quickly build. Syndicates were formed and work allocated. Timelines were drafted and deadlines set. Before long, there was a frenzy of activity



amidst a hubbub of heated discussion. Planning products began to appear on the syndicate classroom walls: abstract depictions of thought processes and the accompanying logic. The teaching staff and SMEs guided, prompted and cajoled the syndicates to meet their deadlines and “accept the 80% solution on time” rather than let “perfection be the enemy of the good.” Never more was this axiom difficult to adhere to than when briefing the senior mentor.

“Fortune favours the prepared mind.”

(Louis Pasteur)

General Oerding presided over the syndicate set piece presentations and naturally acted as the Joint Force Commander; a role he fulfilled in the real world during his time as Commander II (GE/US) Corps and Response Forces Operational Command during the period 2004 - 2008. Rarely can a Corps HQ staff call upon the expertise and experience of a three star general for such an extended period of time, moreover in an environment where learning through mistakes is encouraged. It proved to be an invaluable learning experience for all.

“Bitter experience in war has taught the maxim that the art of war is the art of the logistically feasible.”

(ADM Hyman Rickover, USN, 2008)

As the OPP developed, the complexity of deploying a NATO force into a hostile theatre became all too evident. Chief amongst factors affecting the development of a feasible plan was *logistics*. The simplest of force deployments soon be-



came untenable in the light of what was logistically feasible to support. Yet no respite was offered once the intricacies of logistics were embraced. Time lines got longer, reconnaissance times earlier, whilst the need for strategic lift increased exponentially. Every course of action (CoA) seemed to teeter on a knife edge where factors as simple as tidal swells could cause critical delays to an entire Carrier Group, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

It was not long before syndicates brought all the elements of mission analysis, factor analysis, operational art and design together to test their plans in a war-game; a platform for syndicate leaders to lay bare their plans before an arena of their peers. Whilst a valuable opportunity to test the theory underpinning a course of action, the war game process feels to many like trial by jury. By midway through the second week of the course, the intellectual rigours of the war game had taken its toll. Yet somewhere amidst the confusion and confron-

tation emerged a plan: a meticulously researched, ruthlessly analysed and rigorously tested plan that could be delivered to the Commander for approval and development.

The Operational Plans Process is fundamental to the core business of HQ NRDC Italy. As a vehicle to present this, the NATO School's two week Operational Planning Course brought to life the complexity of multi-national, joint combined, geo-political interventions, thereby giving the OPG an invaluable opportunity to further hone its skills in anticipation of Exercise EAGLE BLADE in late November 2009 and ultimately our reaction force commitments.

Success on operations is built on the moral, physical and conceptual components of fighting power and as such the Operational Planning Course has ensured that HQ NRDC Italy is conceptually well prepared for whatever the future holds.

Ubique. Celere. ■

THE TARGETING PROCESS

(Part II)

■ by LTC (ITA A) Giulio DI MARZIO

Preface

This second article discusses deeper on the four-step process and its products. First we need to focus our attention on the meeting rationale itself and then move to analyse how this process is developed & synchronise within the Core Process functions along planning of future operations.

Targeting meeting

Targeting meetings are not just a single function conference. They consist of a synchronized sequence of meetings which properly conducted are the most effective method of focusing and synchronizing the CC/TF's combat power to determine and attack targets essential to the success of the mission. What is really essential & required is the full integration and participation of all joint & combined battlefield operating systems to ensure that the right target chosen is attacked by the most effective, accurate and valuable asset at the time we decided.

Since the targeting process is designed to integrate, synchronize and focus the combat power of the Sub-units, it must be effectively integrated into the HQ Core process & part of the daily battle rhythm. The staff has to be organised IOT determine first essential topics as:

- Define, IAW Cdr D&G, what enemy targets have to be attacked;
- Define and prioritize the assets (even at strategic level) to identify where the targets are, keep monitoring & track them with a real time view;
- Coordinate all the available kinetic & no-kinetic means IOT choose the most effective way to attack the nominated targets optimising our assets and avoiding or limiting CD to the essential;
- Be able to assess the results of the attack in terms of performances and the impact given even to the third parties and to the environment. This has to foreseen a medium and long perspective view.

The staff must conduct detailed analysis to select the targets and determine the best mix of sensor and attack systems essential to the success of the mission. Where, as "success of the Mission" we intend to achieve the desire effects we foreseen in the planning phase, undermining the undesired and unintended one and looking always on having the less impact on the external environment. So that this process, from one side, needs to be well trained, it requires, because of its sensitivity, the dedicated personal time, energy, and attention of the Commander.

For that reason, it is imperative for the commander to understand and really become involve of if, firstly of the process itself but more deeper on all the possible implications that this targeting could create in the battlefield. Commander emphasis makes a difference. The difference is articulating a clear vision of what needs to be accomplished throughout the targeting process. This vision combines and synchronizes the art and science of each battlefield operating system and brings a focused winning effort to when the attack in due, whatever lethal or no-lethal mean is used . Successful targeting requires that commanders and their staffs possess:

- An understanding of the all functions associated with the targeting process.
- Knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of organic and supporting target acquisition and attack systems.

Targeting methodology

As seen in the previous article, targeting is a dynamic cycle process; it must keep up with the changing face of the battlefield. There is two different tier of conducting a targeting process. In fact in the planning phase the Staff is more focusing on developing the decide products that are essential for conducting an effective execution targeting phase later. Therefore in this planning phase the staff carry on the developing of all required (decide) products that allows Cdr to take decisions:

Step 1. Decide. The staff, lead by G2, start to develop the following documents helpful to provide the overall focus and sets priorities for intelligence collection effort and final attack/influence planning. These phase is designed to restore pace within the battlefield. It translates the Commander's intent into a plan. It helps the commander to decide what targets to engage/influence, how to acquire those targets, in what priority should targets be attacked or influenced and when and where those targets are likely to be found, how to attack them in a way that meets his intent. It also provides the first feedback necessary to ascertain whether his Direction & Guidance has been met. Note that this methodology is developed from Bn and Brigade Level up to Corp level synchronising effort with the others CCs. This implies an integration of the single Core Level process whatever is the level of the unit. The decide function is vital to produce the following documents:

- **Hight Value Target List (HVTL);**
- **High Payoff Target List (HPTL);**
- **Target Selection standards matrix (TSS);**
- **The attack guidance Matrix (AGM);**
- **The combination of those above three matrix is the final document** that allow rapid engagement decisions during current operations. This is the final step of the DECISE Function.

Step 2. Detect. This process determines accurate, identifiable, and timely requirements for the collection systems. The intelligence collection plan or reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan result from the detect phase as well as the refinement of the TSS. The detect phase analyse:

- Identifies target locations, its nature and determines if it is dynamic or static;
- Determines which assets could better perform the task to locate, monitor and track the targets;
- Specifies accuracy of target location required to attack the target;
- Estimates duration of targeting time once acquired;
- Time constraints;
- BDA Assets and criteria.

Step 3. Deliver. Refine the Attack/Influence Guidance Matrix and the selection of an attack/Influence system (or combination of systems, i.e.

Land, Air and Navy and/or by using no-lethal means). Besides the staff produces the schemes of manoeuvre and fire plans. These products answer the following tactical and technical questions:

• **Tactical Questions:**

- When should the target be attacked? Or what is the most effective time to attack it?
- What is the desired effect to achieve and what is the desirable degree of damage , or both?
- What attack system (lethal or non lethal) could be more effective in achieving the DE ,undermining the undesired and unintended effect & the degree of damage and what is the level of achievement that could be met the DE foreseen e.g., percentage of casualties or destroyed elements, or impact on enemy operations in terms of time, allocation or application of assets; e.g., percentage of casualties or destroyed elements, or impact on enemy operations in terms of time, allocation or application of assets;?

• **Technical Questions:**

- What unit will conduct the attack?
- Whenever used lethal means, number and type of munitions to be employed? This imply an assessment on the impact on the target & the BDA;
- What is the response time of the attacking unit?

Step 4. Assess. This aspect is quite challenging to determine, especially for the no-kinetic effects. Often it is based on an estimate approach which not always reply to the Commander request. Battle damage assessment (BDA) is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or no lethal, against a target. It is an appraisal of the effects of attacks/influence on targets designated by the Commander. BDA serves the following purposes:

- provides Commander with timely and accurate snapshots of their effectiveness on the enemy ;
- provides an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness, capabilities and intentions.
- helps to determine if a re-target process IOT re-attack is necessary.

In the next article we will see how to prepare & execute a Targeting Meeting. ■

The comprehensive operations planning directive

■ by LTC (HUN A) Geza SIMON
MAJ (TUR A) Muzaffer DUZENLI

Introduction

Certainly there is a change in how we do things, different terminology, better organisation in our planning processes and stressing the need for collaboration between all involved in a crisis but, the basics of operational art and human thought/input for example are as relevant today as they ever have been in the past.

As known, we followed the “Guidelines for Operational Planning” also known as GOP (2005) over the entire course of the last NATO Operational Planning Course organized by G5 Plans at the HQ NRDC-ITA. For a number of reasons including comprehensive approach, effects based thinking and the need for guidance on planning at the strategic and operational level, the GOP is being replaced and the operations planning process is still evolving. The result of this evolution is the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).

G5 Plans, as the core branch for all operational planning activity within HQ NRDC – ITA, assess that the COPD would have an impact on the OPG planning efforts from the next year onward. Therefore, G5 Plans, through this article, aims to give the planners an overall idea on the guiding principles for the COPD, the content of it, and the new planning process the Directive puts forth.

Evolution, why?

Modern crises are characterized by complex interdependencies; conflicts are underpinned by a combination of histori-

cal, political, military social, cultural and economic issues. The environment called engagement space, in which the Alliance decides to engage and in which the interaction of different actors creates conditions that may be acceptable or unacceptable to the Alliance in terms of its end-state, is different any more. Understanding the engagement space requires a comprehensive view of all systems relevant to the crisis.

NATO recognizes six domains within an engagement space, which are political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information. Through systems analysis of the goals, strength, weaknesses and interdependencies of the main actors within these six domains, knowledge is developed about the behaviour of the main actors within the engagement space. That knowledge is then used by decision makers at all levels, to gain a thorough understanding of the behaviour and capabilities of different actors and their interactions in order to determine how they might be influenced in ways that achieve the Alliance’s strategic objectives and end-state, thereby contributing to the international community aims.

NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach represents the recognition that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. There is a need for more deliberate and inclusive planning and action through established crisis management procedures that allow for both military and non-military resources and efforts to be marshalled with a greater unity of purpose. Adopting such a “Comprehensive Approach” to operations begins with inculcating a culture of active

collaboration and transparency among those involved in crisis management.

The aforesaid changing environment brings about the need for evolution of the GOP in order to prepare for and conduct complex and multidimensional operations. This is necessary to develop comprehensive operations plans addressing all relevant factors for the efficient and successful conduct of an operation.

What's new?

The COPD covers in detail effects based planning principles, doctrine and processes. It is the repository of planning knowledge and therefore details and explains each step of operations planning at the military strategic and operational levels of command in ACO. A number of newly developed publications will complement the COPD most notably the

Knowledge Development handbook and Assessment handbook.

The COPD consists of eight chapters and improve linkage between strategic and operational level.

Ch 1 - Operational Art

Ch 2 - Knowledge Development (*new*)

Ch 3 - Strategic Level (*with Force Generation*) - including templates (*new*).

Ch 4 - Operational Level - including templates. (*Operational planning revised, no major changes but greater clarity on links to the strategic level.*)

Ch 5 - Assessment

Ch 6 - Formats and Administration

Ch 7 - Glossary of Terms

Ch 8 - Abbreviations

Some significant changes and new topics given detailed explanation in the COPD are summarized below:

Strategic Level	Operational Level
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic Operations Planning Group. - Process synchronised with HQ NATO's. - Comprehensive Approach. - Effects based planning. - Knowledge Development. - Assessment. - Collaborative Planning across all levels. - Updated terminology and processes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Situation Awareness (Inc. Knowledge Development). - Effects – Desired effects. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) – Measures of Performance (MoP) - Comprehensive Approach and better liaison with IOs. - Planning in close collaboration with strategic level. - A few new terms. - Focus on Mission Command.

Although the COPD has 350 – 400 pages, it brings together, in place, theory and practice – process and products. The COPD is NATO Unclassified for distribution as widely as possible within the international military community to offer a set of common principles and an approach to operations planning and training.

The new planning process

The process comprises seven stages which are closely aligned with the NATO Crisis Management Process to harmo-

nise the interface between different levels as described below.

The seven stages of the strategic process are designed to develop comprehensive strategic products for consideration by NATO military and political authorities in deciding the strategic direction for NATO in response to a crisis. The seven stages of the strategic level process as shown below are specifically designed to develop the strategic level assessments, comprehensive planning products, directives and orders required by the political-military and operational

levels. The key issue is collaborative planning between the various levels.

While the COPD is applicable to all operations planning activities at the strategic and operational levels of command within the NATO Command Structure, it may also be adapted to the component/tactical level in the HQ NRDC-ITA in order to enhance collaborative planning activity through OPG led by G5 Plans.

Broadly speaking, as it can be noticed on the right of the diagram above, there is no significant change at the operational level planning process.

The figure below, of the aforementioned Directive, demonstrates the proposed framework of Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) interaction between the levels of command from strategic to tactical. As illustrated, the tactical level (Component Commands)

receives missions, objectives, effects, actions and tasks from the operational level (JFCs). It processes those inputs and delivers missions and tasks to its subordinate tactical units. This conversion from EBAO language to tactical language is the NRDC-ITA's function within the NATO command hierarchy thus bridging the gap between the operational and tactical levels.

The implications of this framework are clear for NRDC-ITA: As a LCC, the headquarters will receive missions, objectives, effects, actions, and tasks; Acting as a Corps, it will receive missions and tasks. In both cases the primary function is to convert these inputs to missions and tasks for subordinate units while enabling a clear understanding of the ultimate endstate and the effects the higher levels of command need to achieve and avoid.


NATO Level	Receive	Issue
Strategic Political Level NAC		Single NATO End- State Strategic Objectives Strategic Effects
Strategic Military Level SACEUR	Single NATO End- State Strategic Objectives Strategic Effects	Mission Military Objectives Effects Actions
Operational Level JFC	Mission Military Objectives Effects Actions	Mission Objectives Effects Actions Tasks
Tactical Level Components	Mission Objectives Effects Actions Tasks	Mission Tasks

The COPD implementation timeline

The implementation timeline for the COPD is described below which will have an impact on the OPG planning efforts from the next March onwards in the HQ NRDC-ITA.

Feb 09	Strategic and Operational process validated.
May 09	COPD agreed by EBAO WG.

Jun 09	COPD to OPWG for approval.
Sep 09	Final Draft Revised COPD issued to planners for comment.
Nov 09	Comments integrated in COPD, Bi-SC KD and Bi-SC Assessment Handbooks.
01 Mar 10	COPD published under ACO signature.
Mar 10	COPD/TOPFAS Training implementation.
Jun 10	Revised MC133, NATO OPP, Revised MCM 0052?



To sum, the revision of the NATO Strategic Concept, MCC 133, NATO Crisis Response Force Manual, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, Assessment Handbook, Knowledge Development Handbook will be finalized by the second half of the next year. G5 Plans will continue to follow and provide the OPG with the innovations on these documents, as it has happened so far.

Conclusion

G5 Plans assess that the aforementioned Directive provides a common framework for collaborative operations planning when defining NATO's contribution in a Comprehensive Approach.

The Commander and staff at a high tactical headquarters, such as the NRDC-ITA, must fully understand the EBAO process, on which the COPD dwells sufficiently, at the operational

level because it will receive inputs in the form of a mission, objectives, effects, actions, and tasks which must be understood two levels above. At the tactical level, the traditional commander's intent portion of orders is the most appropriate forum to continue the effects thread of continuity. By writing the intent in terms of the effects the commander desires to create or avoid, the commander is specifically able to describe his vision and enable his subordinates to autonomously operate within his intent in the absence of further guidance.



Design, planning and execution are human matters where commanders lead and staff support. Intuition, experience and military judgement remain paramount and this Directive provides the processes and tools to enable commanders' decision making, it is not an end in itself. ■

TOPFAS

Tools for Operational Planning Functional Area Service: what is this?

■ by LTC (ITA A) Sergio TAMAI

A short history and a small explanation on this software that G5 and the Operational Planning Group (OPG) at HQ NRDC-ITA will implement and start to use next year.



What is TOPFAS

TOPFAS is an acronym that stands for “Tools for Operational Planning Functional Area Service”, and those are the data and planning support tools for NATO operational planning.

The objective of the TOPFAS is to provide NATO operations planners with software tools to support their operations planning and assessment activities.

These tools will provide the capabilities required to support the preparation and evaluation of planning products and to conduct concurrent collaborative and distributed operations planning by multiple HQs and staffs from different functional areas.


The overall intent is to enhance information sharing; improve the availability, quality and timeliness of information exchange; and to achieve a common situational awareness and a better planning synergy and synchronization (abstract

from SHAPE SHJ5PLANS/7750-73/09 – 207589 dated 23 September 2009 concerning TOPFAS implementation).

Short history of TOPFAS

The concept to provide NATO with a computer based functionality for a tool to support the NATO Operational Planning Process started in 1998 as part of the SHAPE Scientific Program of Work and continued until 2003 when the program passed to ACT that continued the development of the software through NC3A, to arrive to this year when the so called “industrialization” started after several field test conducted during various exercises (STRONG RESOLVE and ARRCADÉ FUSION), NATO experiments and on real operations (ISAF).

Now, according to a SHAPE Directive, TOPFAS will be implemented through the NATO HQs and became a fundamen-



tal support and package of tools for the operational level planning and not only.

What can TOPFAS provide us

TOPFAS provide us an integrated system analysis, planning and assessment capability where via a Web based information sharing all information created by analysts, planners and assessors can be made available to those who need it.

One of the TOPFAS capabilities is then to have this information available and to easily transform them into briefings (MS PowerPoint) and formatted documents (MS Word) in order to let planners, analysts and assessors to concentrate on the substance.


A short digression

As we learned during the last NATO Operational Planning Course organized by G5 at HQ NRDC-ITA from a Mobile Team of the NATO School from Oberammergau, to plan an operation, we follow the “Guidelines for Operational Planning” also known as GOP.

There are now new development in those guidelines that will be shortly implemented throughout NATO with the distribution of the new “Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive” (COPD) that will include relevant aspects of emerging concepts such as Comprehensive Operations Planning and Execution Capabilities (also known as Effects Based Approach to Operations – EBAO) and the Comprehensive Approach (CA).

In few words, in the new planning guidelines, the well known 5 stages of planning will pass to 7 and will include a “comprehensive approach” (“a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors” – where the actor is: “a person or organization, including state and non-state entities, within the international system that uses its power to influence others in pursuit of its interests and objectives”, so including also us), the study of the “Engagement Space” that encompasses the air, land, sea, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure [PMESII], legal, and others), which are relevant to the crisis, Effects base planning and assessment.

The question is, TOPFAS: will this software support this new planning guidelines? The answer is yes, tools are available inside the software in order to support both, the so called “traditional” OPP and the new COPD.



What do we have inside TOPFAS


TOPFAS is divided into 3 main sets of tools:

- System Analysis Tool (SAT): it can describe the “Engagement Space” as a system with system design and influence relationship diagrams. System elements can be ranked according to their centrality using network analysis techniques.

This tool supports the initial estimate of the situation and is able to produce an accurate initial understanding and assessment of the environment (Operational Area/Joint Operational Area/Area of Interest).

- Operations Planning Tool (OPT): a campaign planning tool that helps answering, what, where, when, who in a campaign planning.

With this tool the revision of the Higher Command guidance and the process of factor/deduction/conclusion of the Factors analysis, Centres of Gravity, Military end-state etc. are simple “drag and drop” from the tool itself to create the own lists.




Task analysis and Mission essential tasks folders are prepared and the Operational design with its decisive Points, lines of operations and objectives are linked up in a logical sequence to each objective and finally to the desired end-state which creates the basis for the realisation of the Operational Design Timings and Synchronization Matrix (all those data are presented in MS Excel).

A database with available units is available in order to conduct the initial Force Estimate and then the units to be tasked.

Moreover, this part of the software is providing the tool for the creation of a series Courses of Action (COAs) and the tool for the comparison according to what is required from the GOP/COPD.

Finally when the selection of the COA is concluded, there is the possibility to



transform the selected COA in a plan (in MS Word).

- Campaign Analysis Tool (CAT): This tool supports the analysis of the planned end-state through the Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) and Measure of performances (MoP). It allows assessment planning, metric data collection and reporting as well as statistical data analysis including casualty and trend analysis. Those data will and can be used by Operational Analysts in order to prepare the Campaign Assessment.
- MARIA MAPS: this is a set of multilayer maps that give the possibility to the user to insert data, graphics and units on a map according to the requirements.

Conclusion

TOPFAS is a software that supporting the planning at strategic, operational and tactical level that according to the last SHAPE directive is going to be implemented throughout NATO in the very near future.

Sharing information and knowledge at all levels of command, will allow G5 and the OPG members to speed up the planning process because all needed information will be already available on the net and, if not at least the software should support to speed up the planning process allowing the user to produce from the tools directly the requested briefings and documents.

A challenge for HQ NRDC-ITA that will start next year, TOPFAS will be implemented starting March 1st 2010..... and G5 will be supporting along with OPG members this revolution. ■



PLENARY 2009 - THE WAY AHEAD

■ by LTC (ITA A) Mauro SINDONI

On 15th October, the Plenary Conference for 2009 was held in SOLBIATE OLONA. This annual event is the most important meeting as far as the G1 Branch is concerned. This is the occasion when all National representatives are given the opportunity to share the options for changes identified during the last year's internal review and the last step in attaining the final endorsement for the layout of NRDC-ITA Staff for the year ahead.

The current Peacetime structure of the HQ was discussed during the last year due to serious concerns on its relevance to the basic requirement to keep a Rapid Deployable Corps (High Readiness) as lean and responsive as possible and the need to cope with new operational challenges for a High Readiness Corps in the Contemporary Operating Environment. Consequently the NRDC-ITA Commander's initial guidance was to keep the Staff as lean as possible in order to achieve a more coherent relationship between the PE and CE status of our HQ. In general, the most important effort was to balance the Divisional Chiefs' op-

erational expectations for their respective Division and the capabilities expressed by each contributing Nation for the sake of the NRDC-ITA HQ, within NATO's perspective.

Studies, briefings, meetings, emails, diplomatic approaches conducted at Corps and MoD level started after last Conference held one year ago with increasing pace, in order to define new capabilities within Branches, revise each Job Description, move functions across Divisions, and delete/ implement operational functions. It has not been an easy job, when considering the need to balance diplomatic efforts, National "footprints" within the Staff and paying attention to keeping the overall number of positions and costs as low as possible.

The conference itself was chaired by BG PRIMICERJ from the Italian Army General Staff (IAGS) and conducted by Col. CANAVESE NRDC-ITA ACOS G1, the main body of the members was provided by the national representatives. This was



the time when the bulk of the supporting paperwork became a real commitment from the Nations to fill posts, to implement functions and to discuss future possibilities. This was the moment in which the proposals given, became an operational reality. A glance, an impression, approval smiles or puzzled expressions, all were experienced but in the end cast iron and concrete decisions were made that will effect the future of the Headquarters for the better. It was also the occasion in which to meet each other and to realise that solving problems with people you already are in contact with, is significantly easier than trying to do the same hidden behind paper or by email.



All this was achieved in a relaxed but also committed atmosphere that started the previous day with an informal ice-breaker. This event allowed the participants to start the conference in a frame of mind conducive to meaningful and relevant debate. Everyone was given the possibility to properly represent his own Nation and get in touch with his respective counterparts and colleagues, thus realising and sharing the same difficulties and perspectives.



As a result the Plenary produced useful and positive results. A significant number of changes were proposed in line with the Commander's guidance, the major changes were the deletion of two Divisions and the consequent framework readjustments from seven to five, the implementation of Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) as a new operational function and the development of the Operational Analysis as a planning tool becoming more and more important in the forthcoming period. All this without exceeding in the overall balance of manning!



Although some solutions had been trailed during previous exercises, the restructuring phase will be completed in March 2010, when the Corps will train and operate with the new layout. Before that, new thoughts, new plans, new needs and priorities will be identified, and the planning phase for a new structure will continue to evolve. The Plenary allowed for a "living structure", it is therefore proof of a continuous stream of that involve all Staff members in search of a common goal for the better shaping of the Corps in order to meet the upcoming challenges during the year ahead and beyond. ■

The Charge of the Light Brigade

■ by MAJ (GBR A) Rupert JACKSON



On the 22nd October 2009 the UK contingent celebrated the Charge of the Light Brigade, which was a charge of British **cavalry** led by Lord Cardigan against Russian forces during the Battle of Balaclava on 25 October 1854 during the Crimean War. The charge of the Light Brigade continues to be studied by modern military historians and students as an example of what can go wrong when accurate military intelligence is lacking and orders are unclear. Sir Winston Churchill, who was a keen military historian and a former cavalryman, insisted on taking time out during the Yalta Conference in 1945 to see the battlefield for himself.

The charge was made by the Light Brigade of the British cavalry, consisting of the 4th and 13th Light Dragoons, 17th Lancers, and the 8th and 11th Hussars, under the command of Major General the Earl of Cardigan. Overall command of the cavalry resided with Lieutenant General the Earl of Lucan. Cardigan and Lucan were brothers-in-law who disliked each other intensely. Lucan received an order from the army commander Lord Raglan stating, in appalling handwriting, that “Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate.” In fact, Raglan had wanted the cavalry to prevent the Russians taking away some naval guns from the redoubts that they had captured on the reverse side of the Causeway Heights, the hill forming the left side of the valley (from the point of view of the cavalry).


Raglan could see what was happening from his high vantage-point on the west of the valley, but Lucan and the cavalry were unaware of what was going on owing to the lie of the land where they were drawn up.

The order was drafted by Brigadier Airey and was carried by Captain Louis Edward Nolan, who carried the further oral instruction that the cavalry was to attack immediately. When Lucan asked what guns were referred to, Nolan is said to have indicated, by a wide sweep of his arm, not the Causeway redoubts but the mass of Russian guns in a redoubt at the end of the valley, around a mile away. His reasons for the misdirection is unclear, as he was killed in the ensuing battle.

In response to the order, Lucan instructed Cardigan to lead 673 cavalry men straight into the valley between the Fedyukhine Heights and the Causeway Heights, famously dubbed the “Valley of Death” by the poet Tennyson. The opposing Russian forces were commanded by Pavel Liprandi and included approximately 20 battalions of infantry supported by over fifty artillery pieces. These forces were deployed on both sides and at the opposite end of the valley. Lucan himself was to follow with the Heavy Brigade.

The Light Brigade set off down the valley, with Cardigan out in front leading the charge. Almost at once Nolan was seen to rush across the front, passing in front of Cardigan. It may be that he had then realized the charge was aimed at the wrong target and was attempting to stop or turn the brigade, but he was killed by an artillery shell and the cavalry continued on its course. Despite a withering fire from three sides that devastated their force on the ride, the Light Brigade was able to engage the Russian forces at the end of the valley and force them back from the redoubt, but suffered heavy casualties and was soon forced to retire. The surviving Russian artillerymen returned to their guns and opened fire once again, with grape and canister, indiscriminately at the *mêlée* of friend and foe before them.

Lucan failed to provide any support for Cardigan, and it was speculated that he was motivated by an enmity for his brother-in-law that had lasted some 30 years and had been intensified during the campaign up to that point. The troops of the Heavy Brigade entered the mouth of the valley but did not advance further: Lucan's subsequent explanation was that he saw no point in having a second brigade mown down and that he was best positioned where he was to render assistance to Light Brigade survivors returning from the charge. The French cavalry, the Chasseurs d'Afrique, were more effective in that they broke the Russian line on the Fedyukhin Heights and later provided cover for the remaining elements of the Light Brigade as they withdrew. War correspondent William Russell, who witnessed the battle, declared "our Light Brigade was annihilated by their own rashness, and by the brutality of a ferocious enemy".



Cardigan survived the battle. Although stories circulated afterwards that he was not actually present he led the charge from the front and, never looking back, did not see what was happening to the troops behind him. He reached the Russian guns, took part in the fight and then returned alone up the valley without bothering to rally or even find out what had happened to the survivors. He afterwards said all he could think about was his rage against Captain Nolan, who he thought had tried to take over the leadership of the charge from him. After riding back up the valley he considered he had done all that he could and then, with astonishing *sang-froid*, left the field and went on board his yacht in Balaclava harbour, where he ate a champagne dinner.

The brigade was not completely destroyed, but did suffer terribly, with 118 men killed, 127 wounded. After regrouping, only 195 men were still with horses. The futility of the

action and its reckless bravery prompted the French Marshal Pierre Bosquet to state "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre." ("It is magnificent, but it is not war.") He continued, in a rarely quoted phrase: "C'est de la folie" — "it is madness." The Russian commanders are said to have initially believed that the British soldiers must have been drunk, and the reputation of the British cavalry was significantly enhanced as a result of the charge, though the same cannot be said for their commanders.

Slow communications meant that news of the disaster did not reach the British public until three weeks after the action. The British commanders' dispatches from the front were published in an extraordinary edition of the *London Gazette* of 12 November 1854. Raglan blamed Lucan for the charge, claiming that "from some misconception of the order to advance, the Lieutenant-General (Lucan) considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Major-General the Earl of Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade." Lucan was furious at being made a scapegoat. Raglan claimed he should have exercised his discretion, but throughout the campaign up to that date Lucan considered Raglan had allowed him no independence at all and required that his orders be followed to the letter. Cardigan, who had merely obeyed orders, blamed Lucan for giving those orders. He returned home a hero and was promoted to Inspector General of the Cavalry.

Lucan attempted to publish a letter refuting point by point Raglan's *London Gazette* dispatch, but his criticism of his superior was not tolerated and in March 1855, Lucan was recalled to England. The Charge of the Light Brigade became a subject of considerable controversy and public dispute on his return. He strongly rejected Raglan's version of events, calling it "an imputation reflecting seriously on my professional character". In an exchange of public correspondence printed in the pages of *The Times*, Lucan blamed Raglan and his deceased aide-de-camp Captain Nolan, who had been the actual deliverer of the disputed order. Lucan evidently escaped blame for the charge, as he was made a member of the Order of the Bath in July of that same year. Although he never again saw active duty, he reached the rank of General in 1865 and was made a Field Marshal in the year before his death. ■

THE ROYAL MARINES

(per Mare per Terram)

■ by CAPT (GBR RN) Andy MALLOWS



The Royal Marines, the infantry land fighting element of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy, was formed as part of the Naval Service in 1755. The Royal Marines can trace their origins back as far as 1664, when English soldiers first went to sea to fight the Dutch. The Royal Marines are

therefore not only soldiers but also seamen, who were and are still today part of the complement of Royal Navy warships as well as fighting men in their own right within the land component. For almost 350 years the Royal Marines have been an integral part of Great Britain's Armed Forces and today can be found serving across the globe both on land and sea.

The Royal Marines have a proud history and unique traditions. Their colours do not carry individual battle honours in the manner of the regiments of the British Army but rather the

“globe itself” as the symbol of the Corps. The badge of the Royal Marines is designed to commemorate the history of the Corps. The Lion and Crown denotes a Royal regiment. King George III conferred this honour in 1802 “in consideration of the very meritorious services of the Marines in the late war.” The “Great Globe itself” surrounded by laurels was chosen by King George IV as a symbol of the Marines' successes in every quarter of the world. The laurels are believed to honour the gallantry they displayed during the investment and capture of Belle Isle, off Lorient, in April–June 1761. The word “Gibraltar” refers to the Siege of Gibraltar in 1704. It was awarded in 1827 by George IV as a special distinction for the services of four of the old Army Marine regiments (Queen's Own Marines, 1st Marines, 2nd Marines, 3rd Marines). All other honours gained by the Royal Marines are represented by the “Great Globe”. As a consequence, there are no battle honours displayed on the colours of the four battalion sized units in the corps. The fouled anchor, incorporated into the emblem in 1747, is the badge of the Lord High Admiral and shows that the Corps is part

of the Royal Navy. The motto of the Royal Marines: *Per Mare Per Terram* ("By Sea, By Land"), is believed to have been used for the first time in 1775 and reflects the dual role of the Corps that is still prevalent today.



A Royal Marine or "Royal" as they are sometimes referred to; is identifiable by his coveted Green Beret (awarded after some of the World's most grueling military training) and the Commando dagger illustrated on a shoulder flash. The Commando Dagger designed by two serving Royal Marines was standard issue in the

Second World War. The Fairburn Sykes Knife (named after the designers) now indicates that the wearer is a member of 3 Commando Brigade, the lead component of the United Kingdom's Amphibious Forces.

The Green Beret with the Globe and Laurel Cap Badge is presented to an individual who has passed the arduous Commando Test. The Commando Test itself consists of a series of tests conducted in full fighting order of 32 lb (14.5 kg) of equipment taken on consecutive days and all four tests must be successfully completed within a seven day period; they include: a nine mile (14.5 km) speed march. The Endurance course, a six mile (9.65 km) course across rough moorland and woodland terrain followed by a marksmanship test. The Tarzan Assault Course, an assault course combined with an aerial confidence test. It starts with a death slide and ends with a rope climb up a thirty foot near-vertical wall in full fighting order, completed in 13 minutes. And finally, the 30 miler, a 30 mile (48 km) march across upland Dartmoor, completed within eight hours for recruits and seven hours for Royal Marine officers.

Completing the Commando course successfully entitles the recruit or officer to wear the coveted Green Beret but does not mean that the Royal Marine has finished his training. That decision will be made by the troop or batch train-

ing team and will depend on the recruit's or young officer's overall performance. Furthermore, officer training still consists of many more months.



Over the years the Royal Marines have been awarded numerous Battle Honours. From the American War of Independence to the Battle of Trafalgar; the Boxer Rebellion to the Boer War, World War and World War II. More recently Marines have fought in the Falklands

Conflict, the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. These Battle Honours are reflected in the Globe and Laurel cap badge indicating the global nature of the campaigns in which the Royal Marines have fought.

What marks out a Royal Marine Commando is the sense of spirit and ethos; defined simply ethos is what a group does and how it does it. The ethos of the Royal Marines refers to their role and the way they fulfil it. Since the Second World War, the Royal Marines have developed a specific function as commandos and amphibious forces, undertaking operations in harsh environments be they mountain, jungle, cold weather or desert. This ethos of commitment, teamwork and loyalty, combined with the Commando Spirit is indicative of the modern marine. The four elements of Commando Spirit; courage, determination, unselfishness, and cheerfulness in the face of adversity, are well known to all recruits by the time they complete Commando training. It is the individual characteristics of the modern commando allied to the commando spirit that makes the Marines who they are.

Today the Royal Marines continue their traditions in accordance with the Ethos and Commando spirit that defines who they are. They are the cold weather specialists within the United Kingdom Armed Forces and can be found operating in the Arctic, the Jungle, and the Deserts across the globe. They were the first into Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, since then they have served on numerous tours in both theatres and continue to live up to their motto, *Per Mare, Per Terram*.

"I never knew an appeal to them for honour, courage or loyalty that they did not realise more than my expectations. If ever the hour of real danger should come to England, they will be found the country's sheet anchor".

Sir John Jervis, Earl of St Vincent on the role of the Royal Marines 1805 ■



The Day of German Reunification

■ by COL (DEU A) Peter UFFELMANN

This Year the German contingent celebrated the 19th anniversary of German reunification with a party held in the Summer Garden on Monday 5th October.

Addressing the participants before the national anthem of Germany, the German Senior National Representative, Colonel Peter Uffelmann welcomed the guests including the Chief of Staff NRDC-ITA and reminded everyone of the background and historical meaning of the 3rd October 1990, the occasion of the “German Reunification Day”.

Although the 20th anniversary of this very date will be only next year there are the 20th anniversaries of some events, which lead finally to German reunification about one year later.

Most probably the start was in May 1989: On 2nd May the breakdown of the Hungarian border barriers to Austria began, immediately leading to a massive increase in East German visitors to Hungary hoping to find there some possibility to cross this border. On the other hand the already existing and rising dissatisfaction with the overall situation in East Germany, namely in the economical area, but also caused by the obvious incapability of political reforms, was even more increased by the faked results of the local elections in East Germany on 7th May.

Meanwhile ten thousands of East Germans had went to Hungary and hundreds had fled to West German embassies in Prague and Warszawa.

On 4th September the first mass demonstration took place in Leipzig followed by weekly “Monday Demonstrations” with increasing participation up to 300.000 by end of October.

From 11th September Hungary officially allowed the East German refugees to cross the border to Austria leading to 18.000 border crossings in the first three days. From 30th September 17.000 overall were brought by train from Prague via

East to West Germany, however leading to again massive conflicts between demonstrators and security forces on 4th October in Dresden while the trains were passing. With violence already the “Monday Demonstration” in Leipzig on 2nd October had ended and violence again was the only resort of the security forces on 7th October, the 40th anniversary of East Germany, when ten thousands protested in Berlin against the costly celebrations and demonstrated for political reforms.

On 9th and 16th October the local party leaders did not pass the orders for feared and actually armed countermeasures against the weekly “Monday Demonstrations” in Leipzig to the security forces.

Being this already a first indication of internal disagreement within the East German regime the split became obvious on 18th October, when Honecker was forced to resign from all his functions. Even this however did not stop the ever increasing wave of refugees to West Germany: Precondition for any political reform therefore was the question of free travel between East and West Germany leading finally to the unplanned and uncoordinated opening of the border to West Berlin and West Germany in the night of 9th November 1989.

But also free travel between East and West Germany could not stop the Political process calling also for political reforms, which now even got reinforced. While in October the motto of the demonstrators still was “We are the people”, it soon changed into “We are one people”. German reunification became only a question of time and the details and was achieved on 3rd October 1990.

Finally Colonel Uffelmann thanked all for their attendance and participation in celebrating the Day of German Reunification.

The party ended with Bavarian beer and food and many interesting talks. ■



*In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.
We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved, and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.
Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.*

Lt.-Col. John McCrae
(1872 – 1918)

REMEMBERANCE DAY

■ by LTC (GBR A) Simon THOMSETT

Henry Gunther was an American soldier killed during the Great War in France, only one of millions of casualties that occurred between 1914 and 1918. Four years of war which cost the lives of countless millions of people and caused untold human suffering. There is nothing extraordinary about Gunther or his death, he is sadly just another one of the faceless millions who paid the ultimate price, nothing extraordinary accept for the time and date of his death: 1059hrs, 11th November 1918. Gunther is commonly regarded as the last soldier to die during the First World War, little is known about him, but his lasting legacy will be the infamy of being the last to die of so many. His death in some strange way is almost more tragic given its proximity to what we now know as Remembrance Day, the Eleventh Hour of the Eleventh Day of the Eleventh month.

Remembrance Day – also known as Poppy Day, Armistice Day or Veterans Day – is a day to commemorate the sacrifices of members of the armed forces and of civilians in times of war, specifically since the First World War. It is observed on 11 November to recall the end of World War I on that date in 1918 with the German signing of the Armistice. The day was dedicated by King George V, on 7 November 1919, in respect of members of the armed forces who were killed during war. It now serves as a tribute and memorial to all who have died in war, past and present and is observed across the world.

In Great Britain, although two minutes of silence are observed on 11 November itself, the main ceremony is on the second Sunday of November, Remembrance Sunday. Ceremonies are held at local war memorials across the country,

the commonwealth and the world. Typically, poppy wreaths are laid by representatives of the Crown, the armed forces, and politicians, as well as members of the Public. The start and end of the silence is often marked by the firing of a cannon. On the stroke of 1100hrs (when the armistice came into force) a two minutes silence is held where people stop to reflect and to remember the sacrifices that have been made during time of war. The First Two Minute Silence in London (11th November 1919) was reported in the Manchester Guardian on 12th November 1919:

The first stroke of eleven produced a magical effect. The tram cars glided into stillness, motors ceased to cough and fume, and stopped dead, and the mighty-limbed dray horses hunched back upon their loads and stopped also, seeming to do it of their own volition. Someone took off his hat, and with a nervous hesitancy the rest of the men bowed their heads also. Here and there an old soldier could be detected slipping unconsciously into the posture of 'attention'. An elderly woman, not far away, wiped her eyes, and the man beside her looked white and stern. Everyone stood very still... The hush deepened. It had spread over the whole city and become so pronounced as to impress one with a sense of audibility. It was a silence which was almost pain ... And the spirit of memory brooded over it all.

The main national commemoration is held at Whitehall, in Central London, for dignitaries, the public, and ceremonial detachments from the armed forces and civilian uniformed services such as the Merchant Navy. Members of the British Royal Family walk through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office towards the Cenotaph, assembling to the right of the monument to wait for Big Ben to strike

11:00 am, and for the King's Troop, Royal Horse Artillery at Horse Guards Parade, to fire the cannon marking the commencement of the two minutes of silence. Following this, "Last Post" is sounded by the buglers of the Royal Marines. "The Rouse" is then sounded by the trumpeters of the Royal Air Force, after which wreaths are laid by the Queen and senior members of the Royal Family and then, attendees including Politicians, Commonwealth High Commissioners to London, on behalf of their respective nations, the Foreign Secretary, on behalf of the British Dependencies; the First Sea Lord; the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff.

After the service, veterans from World War II, the Falklands, Kosovo, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, other past conflicts, and the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq take part in a march past Her Majesty the Queen at the Cenotaph. This year marked the first year since the first Remembrance Day that there were no World War 1 veterans present, the last having died in August.

The poppy's significance to Remembrance Day is a result of Canadian military physician John McCrae's poem *In Flanders Fields*. The poppy emblem was chosen because of the poppies that bloomed across some of the worst battlefields of Flanders in World War I, their red colour an appropriate symbol for the bloodshed of trench warfare. Poppies are worn in the weeks proceeding Remembrance Sunday in order to serve as a reminder of those who have given their lives in time of war.

Today, across the world, wherever the British Armed Forces are serving, the Two minutes silence will be observed and soldiers, sailors and airman will remember those that have gone before.

***They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old.
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them". ■***



INTERNATIONAL DAY 2009

An Entertaining Celebration

■ by MAJ (ROU-AF) Marian PREDOAICA

The annual NRDC-ITA International Day is designed to be a celebration of the unique and diverse culture that makes up the headquarters. It represents a chance for the staff, their families and the local population to discover and sample the delights of this multicultural headquarters first hand and to demonstrate their national identities.

For the past six years this celebration was held, during the summer, when the weather was generally generous and favored the event with beautiful sunshine. This year, the decision concerning the time for holding the celebration was difficult to take because a large contingent of NRDC-ITA was deployed to HQ ISAF in Kabul to support operations in Afghanistan during a demanding and pivotal moment of the campaign. As a result, the International Day was scheduled to be held on 17th of October when most of the personnel who participated to the challenging ISAF mission had already returned to work after an extended and well-deserved summer vacation.

Notwithstanding all the worries that the bad weather would spoil the festivity, it was proven that the choice of holding the celebration on 17th of October was a very lucky one. Despite the autumn's capricious weather, during that day the sun generously offered its light and warmth for the joy of all the participants.

The entertainments included in the programme of the event were at least as enjoyable as any of the other amusements of the previous International Day editions. Parades, dancers, music and entertainments kept the audience pleasantly busy for more than 5 hours. Enthusiastic musicians of Slovenian brass band, British pipes and drums band, Hungar-

ian folk music group and Italian music group competed to prove that the traditional songs from their homes are among the most beautiful songs in the world.

When not mesmerized by the performance of the bands, the audience was delighted by the harmonious and gracious moves of the skillful dancers from Hungary, Italy, Spain and Turkey.

The music and the dances were not the only attractions of the day. The members of each of the 15 contributing nations demonstrated their passion in providing colorful, extravagant and entertaining stands from which to uphold their rich and refined customs and traditions.

One of the most delightful opportunities offered during the festivity to all the participants eager to enjoy themselves was to go on a delicious and seemingly endless traditional gastronomic tour of 15 countries, washed down with good quality wine, sangria and famous brands of beer.

An historic car rally, a gun salute, bouncy castles and slides were the attractions that made especially happy all the children participating to the celebration.

The series of events ended around 19.00 leaving all the participants with the feeling that they would have carried on enjoying themselves until late into the night.

The International Day proved to be again a very successful celebration that offered an unique and pleasant opportunity to further enhance the international cooperation within the headquarters, to bring all the staff and their families closer together and to illustrate the character of NRDC-ITA, one of diversity yet underpinned by unity. ■

NEWCOMERS

NR	NATO RANK	SURNAME	NAME	NAT	DATE OF ARRIVAL
1	OF2	BENENATI	Francesco	ITA	30.11.09
2	OF2	GIACOMETTI	Marco	ITA	10.09.09
3	OF2	LO GIUDICE	Pietro	ITA	23.09.09
4	OF2	EQUIZI	Marco	ITA	21.09.09
5	OF3	SILVESTRI	Fabio	ITA	19.10.09
6	OF3	BELOGI	Marco	ITA	5.10.09
7	OF3	CALDAROLA	Domenico	ITA	25.09.09
8	OF3	GUBAR	Attila	HUN	8.09.09
9	OF4	INCISA DI CAMERANA	Uberto	ITA	12.10.09
10	OF4	SECHI	Mario	ITA	30.11.09
11	OF4	MORITTU	Giovanni	ITA	30.11.09
12	OF4	NABAIS	Joao	PRT	31.08.09
13	OF4	VERGANO	Aldo Maria	ITA	14.09.09
14	OF4	PATANE'	Maurizio	ITA	19.10.09
15	OF4	MARI	Andrea	ITA	4.09.09
16	OF4	CARLINI	Corrado	ITA	28.09.09
17	OF4	LOLI	Vittorio	ITA	2.10.09
18	OF4	CORCIONE	Maurizio	ITA	14.09.09
19	OF4	MELIANDE ALBERGO	Michele	ITA	5.11.09
20	OF4	CARTA	Beniamino	ITA	5.10.09
21	OF4	TEMPESTA	Giuseppe	ITA	21.09.09
22	OF4	MEJBOOM	Oscar	NLD	01.09.09
23	OF4	MIGLIACCIO	Giuseppe	ITA	7.09.09
24	OF4	POLLI	Flavio	ITA	1.09.09
25	OF4	INFANTE	Agostino	ITA	7.09.09
26	OF4	SCHIRINZI	Marco	ITA	30.11.09
27	OF4	MOTTI	Ettore	ITA	30.11.09
28	OF4	TOMASIELLO	Domenico Antonio	ITA	30.11.09
29	OF5	DI LAURO	Vito	ITA	2.11.09
30	OF6	PERRETTI	Roberto	ITA	26.11.09
31	OR4	CECI	Pasquale	ITA	9.11.09
32	OR4	MAIO	Giuseppina	ITA	19.11.09
33	OR4	NAPPA	Valerio	ITA	9.11.09
34	OR6	PEARSALL	James	GBR	01.09.09
35	OR6	HUDSON	Felicia Faye	USA	1.11.09
36	OR8	ROMANI	Claudio	ITA	14.09.09

DEPARTURES

NR	NATO RANK	SURNAME	NAME	NAT	SERVICE	DATE OF DEPARTURE
1	OR9	GIULIANI	Giuseppe	ITA	ARMY	29 Aug 09
2	OF4	CAMPOSTRINI	Paolo	ITA	ARMY	30 Aug 09
3	OF4	PEIXEIRO	Hilario	PRT	ARMY	03 Sept 09
4	OF5	SULIG	Maurizio	ITA	ARMY	06 Sept 09
5	OF4	LIPARI	Vittorio	ITA	ARMY	06 Sept 09
6	OF4	FALESSI	G. Luca	ITA	ARMY	06 Sept 09
7	OF4	RAUSA	Michelino	ITA	ARMY	06 Sept 09
8	OF3	BUZZONI	Emilio	ITA	ARMY	10 Sept 09
9	OF3	DI GIROLAMO	Mario	ITA	ARMY	10 Sept 09
10	OF3	TAFFURI	Maurizio	ITA	ARMY	10 Sept 09
11	OF3	DI PIETRO	Massimo	ITA	ARMY	10 Sept 09
12	OF3	ROMANO	Claudio	ITA	ARMY	10 Sept 09
13	OF3	PATALANO	Emanuele	ITA	ARMY	10 Sept 09
14	OF4	POLYAK	Tamas	HUN	ARMY	11 Sept 09
15	OF5	ANNECCHINI	Franco	ITA	ARMY	13 Sept 09
16	OF4	IACUZIO	Nicola	ITA	ARMY	13 Sept 09
17	OF4	DE MAIO	Gennaro	ITA	ARMY	13 Sept 09
18	OF3	LICCIARDELLO	Salvatore	ITA	ARMY	13 Sept 09
19	OF4	ROLLO	Luca	ITA	ARMY	13 Sept 09
20	OR5	GOBIE	Lee	ITA	ARMY	18 Sept 09
21	OR6	FOUTS	Daniel	USA	ARMY	18 Sept 09
22	OF4	COSTA	Pier Luigi	ITA	ARMY	20 Sept 09
23	OF4	NUZZOLO	Teodoro	ITA	ARMY	20 Sept 09
24	OF4	ORTOLANI	Alessandro	ITA	ARMY	20 Sept 09
25	OF5	LIA	Daniele	ITA	ARMY	27 Sept 09
26	OF4	TOLLIS	Emilio	ITA	ARMY	27 Sept 09
27	OF4	IONATA	Michele	ITA	ARMY	27 Sept 09
28	OF5	ROMANO	Rosario	ITA	ARMY	30 Sept 09
29	OF4	PELLEGRINO	Bert	NLD	ARMY	01 Oct 09
30	OF4	BORREANI	Fabrizio	ITA	ARMY	04 Oct 09
31	OF4	CALI'	Marco M.	ITA	ARMY	04 Oct 09
32	OF3	SIMEONE	Raffaele	ITA	ARMY	04 Oct 09
33	OF3	TESSARIN	Andrea	ITA	ARMY	11 Oct 09
34	OF2	MIOROTTI	Stefano	ITA	ARMY	11 Oct 09
35	OR9	RAZA	Walter	ITA	ARMY	11 Oct 09
36	OF2	BOCHICCHIO	Pierluigi	ITA	ARMY	18.10.09
37	OF4	GUANI	Lorenzo	ITA	ARMY	18.10.09
38	OF4	WILLIAMS	John Conway	GBR	ARMY	18.10.09
39	OF4	PORCILE	Carmelo	ITA	ARMY	25 Oct 09
40	OF4	AQUILINO	Antonello	ITA	ARMY	31 Oct 09
41	OF4	ZONA	Marco	ITA	ARMY	01-nov-09
42	OR5	KRAMER	M. Thomas	USA	ARMY	03-nov-09
43	OF4	LAZARO ESTRADA	Javier	ESP	ARMY	04-nov-09
44	OR4	MIGGIANO	Emanuele	ITA	ARMY	08-nov-09
45	OR5	RAMMARO	Luigi	ITA	ARMY	08-nov-09
46	OF4	SORDI	Massimo	ITA	ARMY	15-nov-09
47	OR6	FRANKLIN	Kareem	USA	ARMY	09 Dec 09



**NCO
of the
HQ**

**WO2 (ITA A)
Sandro
MARRONE**

(July - December 2009)



**Soldier
of the
HQ**

**CPL (ITA A)
Massimiliano
CITERA**

(July - December 2009)