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PART I : BOOKS

PREMIERE PARTIE : LIVRES*

321 /00649

Democratic Mirage in the Middle East - Washington : Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.

7 p. ; 30 cm.

(Policy Brief ; 20)

Subject(s):

1. DEMOCRACY--IRAQ
2. DEMOCRACY--MIDDLE EAST
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003
4. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
5. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (US)

Notes:

<<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief20.pdf>> accessed
21/10/02.

'The increasingly popular idea in Washington that the United States, by toppling Saddam Hussein, can rapidly democratize Iraq and unleash a democratic tsunami in the Middle East is a dangerous fantasy. The US record of building democracy after invading other countries is mixed at best and the Bush administration's commitment to a massive reconstruction effort in Iraq is doubtful. The repercussions of an intervention in Iraq will be as likely to complicate the spread of democracy in the Middle East as promote it. The United States has an important role to play in fostering democracy in the region, but the task will be slow and difficult given the unpromising terrain and lack of US leverage over key governments.'

ID number: 80018240

Year: 2002

327 /01123

Iraq at the Crossroads : State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change
- Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press.

178 p. ; 24 cm.

(Adelphi papers, 0567-932X ; 354)

ISBN: 019852837X

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
3. IRAQ--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
4. IRAQ--SOCIAL CONDITIONS
5. IRAQ WAR, 2003
6. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
7. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Dodge, Toby, ed.
2. Simon, Steven, ed.
3. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)

Notes:

'A US-led assault on Iraq will have unpredictable and possibly profound effects on Iraqi society. Moreover, those effects will vary with the objectives and strategy adopted by the US and its allies as well as by the pace and scope of the collapse of

* This list contains material received as of March 22nd, 2004 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 22 mars 2004.

Iraqi resistance. Further, the reach of Washington's post-war objectives has not yet been settled. Given these multiple sources of uncertainty, understanding the relationship between Iraqi society and the Iraqi state after three decades of Ba'ath rule is all the more crucial to the success of post-war efforts to reconstruct the country and reconstitute its political system. Yet that relationship is poorly understood in the West. The Iraq of today cannot easily be mapped on to a neat diagram of sect, tribe, or party. The rentier structure of the state economy, the regime's manipulation of group identity to control the population, the emergence of a shadow state that distributes public goods to advance regime interests, and pervasive violence have transformed Iraq's socio-political landscape into dangerous and unfamiliar ground for intervention. These essays delineate the options now being debated in Washington and provide up-to-date assessments of how Iraqi state and society will respond to the impact of war and the removal of a deeply-rooted authoritarian regime.'

ID number: 80018444

Year: 2003

323 /00777

War in Iraq : What's Next for the Kurds ? - Brussels : International Crisis Group.

iv, 34 p. : ill. ; 30 cm.

(ICG Middle East Report ; 10)

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003
2. KURDISTAN (IRAQ)--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003--TURKEY

Added entry(s):

1. International Crisis Group (BE)

Notes:

<http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/middleeast/iraq_iran_gulf/reports/A400923_19032003.pdf>
accessed 16/04/03.

'Assuming the US-led military operation to topple Saddam Hussein proceeds, the threat is very great of large-scale violence, centred on Kirkuk, erupting in Northern Iraq between Kurds and Turks. If that is to be averted, the United States must urgently take three important steps : get its own forces to Kirkuk first, ensure that Turkey exercises restraint, and simultaneously persuade the Iraqi Kurds to take no action that will risk provoking Turkey.'

ID number: 80018536

Year: 2003

355.4 /01402

War in Iraq : Combat and Consequence - London : Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.

89 p. ; 23 cm.

(Whitehall Paper Series ; 59)

ISBN: 0855161760

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Added entry(s):

1. Eyal, Jonathan, ed.
2. Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (GB)

Notes:

'This in-depth study of the preliminary lessons which can be drawn from the recent war in Iraq includes essays on the strategy pursued by coalition forces, the political and economic implications of the conflict on the Middle East, the future shape of the Iraq government, and the consequences of the war for relations between Europe and the United States.'

ID number: 80018681

Year: 2003

327 /01117

War with Iraq : Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives - Cambridge, MA : American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

vii, 87 p.; 30 cm.

ISBN: 0877240361

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
3. WAR--ECONOMIC ASPECTS
4. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Added entry(s):

1. American Academy of Arts and Sciences (US)

Notes:

<http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf> accessed 11/12/02.

'The papers in this collection are an attempt to provide insight into the potential costs and consequences, over the long term, of going to war with Iraq.'

ID number: 80018366

Year: 2002

341.2 /00296

Would an Invasion of Iraq Be a 'Just War' ? - Washington : US Institute of Peace.

16 p.; 30 cm.

(Special Report)

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
3. JUST WAR DOCTRINE
4. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Added entry(s):

1. US Institute of Peace

Notes:

<<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr98.html>> accessed 07/02/03.

'To contribute to the public discussion of whether the United States and its allies should invade Iraq, the US Institute of Peace organized a symposium on December 17, 2002 to address the question 'Would and invasion of Iraq be a 'Just War' ?

ID number: 80018457

Year: 2003

341.2 /00303

Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq - Washington : United States Institute of Peace Press.

15 p.; 30 cm.

(Special Report ; 104)

Subject(s):

1. RULE OF LAW--IRAQ
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
3. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Institute of Peace (US)

Notes:

<<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr104.pdf>> accessed 28/04/03.

'The United States and its allies have taken military action to restore democracy and the rule of law in Iraq. Prior to the intervention, the United States Institute of Peace held a workshop on February 19, 2003 on 'Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq' to examine this challenge.

ID number: 80018563
Year: 2003

341.2 /00302

Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq - New York :
Council on Foreign Relations.
v, 29 p.; 30 cm.

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
2. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Council on Foreign Relations (US)

Notes:

<http://www.rice.edu/projects/baker/Pubs/workingpapers/iraq/Iraq_final.pdf>
accessed 16/04/03.

Report of an Independent Working Group Cosponsored by the Council
on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for
Public Policy of Rice University.

'This memorandum recommends that the administration adopt a
three-phased approach that distinguishes between short-term
necessities and long-term goals and objectives. In the
medium-term, the key challenge will be to devise a transitional
strategy that takes Iraq from the current situation to a more
secure and prosperous future. There should be no illusions that
the reconstruction of Iraq will be anything but difficult,
confusing, and dangerous for everyone involved. However,
segmenting the strategy into distinct phases and ensuring that
Iraqis play a major role in determining the fate of their
country will reduce the chance that one brutal strongman will
be substituted for another - reproducing historical patterns
and necessitating future interventions - and will also help
increase the likelihood that the United States is seen
internationally, in the region, and in Iraq to be working to
promote Iraqi interests as opposed to assumed US ones. Finding
the right Iraqi allies will be key to restoring Iraqi
sovereignty and making possible an early American exit.'

ID number: 80018535
Year: 2003

341.2 /00300

Iraq : The Day After - New York : Council on Foreign Relations.
59 p.; 30 cm.

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
2. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Council on Foreign Relations (US)

Notes:

<http://cfr.org/pdf/Iraq_DayAfter_TF.pdf> accessed 09/04/03.

Report of an Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.

'The Task Force made the following major points, backed with
specific recommendations : first, to urge President Bush to
publicly explain America's and the world's vital interest in
making Iraq a better and safer place. Further, the president
must explain to the American people why the United States must
be prepared to stay the course to get that job done. Without
the public commitment, Iraqis would certainly believe the
United States and others would disappear on them before their
lives were made better and safer; and American planners would
never know where they stood and their effectiveness would be
dissipated. Second, to stress that first priority on the ground
in Iraq must go to prevent lawlessness and humanitarian
suffering. Without public safety and a strong humanitarian aid
program, nothing else will work. Third, to work very hard to

involve the international community in the post-conflict transition and reconstruction effort, meaning shared responsibility and decision-making, without undercutting the unity of effort. Fourth, making sure that plans and efforts to ensure continuing administration of public affairs and Iraqi responsibilities.'

ID number: 80018529

Year: 2003

341.2 /00301

Post-War Iraq : Are We Ready ? - Washington : Center for Strategic and International Studies.

20 p.; 30 cm.

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
2. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (US)

Notes:

<<http://www.csis.org/isp/scorecard.pdf>> accessed 16/04/03.

'The Bush Administration has done considerable planning for the postwar phase in Iraq, and comprehensive preparations on many fronts have been made in advance. Nonetheless, significant gaps remain. This document sets forth a 'scorecard' of the Administration's preparations for the post-conflict reconstruction phase thus far, drawing on all available information the Administration has chosen to make public. Overall, this scorecard gives the Administration a mixed grade on its planning and preparations, which have been significant in certain areas but are still seriously lagging in others.'

ID number: 80018534

Year: 2003

321 /00648

Iraq Backgrounder : What Lies Beneath - Brussels : International Crisis Group.

47 p. : ill.; 30 cm.

(ICG Middle East Report ; 6)

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. POLITICAL PARTIES--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. International Crisis Group (BE)

Notes:

<http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/middleeast/middleeast/reports/A400786_01102002.pdf> accessed 15/10/02.

'This background report reviews the mechanisms of Saddam Hussein's rule, looks at the political dynamics that govern relations between religious and ethnic entities, and describes the various opposition groups and their potential role. It does not seek to predict the course of events in Iraq or to argue for any particular course of action.'

ID number: 80018227

Year: 2002

327.3 /00620

Iraq : A New Approach ? - Washington : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

63 p. ; 30 cm.

Subject(s):

1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ
2. WMD--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (US)

Notes:

<<http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Iraq.Report.pdf>> accessed 12/09/02.

'The papers in this collection grew out of discussions held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from late April to late July 2002. The discussions included top regional and military experts, former inspectors with dozens of man-years' experience in Iraq, and individuals with intimate knowledge of the diplomatic situation at the United Nations. They hold a range of views on how to ensure that Iraq complies with its international commitments to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction. Not all of the participants agree with all the views expressed in these papers. The majority agree, however, that the new approach presented here is worthy of the most serious consideration and public debate both in the United States and abroad.'

ID number: 80018162

Year: 2002

623 /00934

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction : The Assessment of the British Government - [s.l.] : [s.n.].

51 p. : ill. ; 30 cm.

Subject(s):

1. WMD--IRAQ

Notes:

<<http://www.fco.gov.uk>> accessed 30/09/02.

ID number: 80018191

Year: 2002

623 /00944

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction : A Net Assessment - London : International Institute for Strategic Studies.

78 p. : ill. ; 30 cm.

Subject(s):

1. WMD--IRAQ
2. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. International Institute for Strategic Studies (GB)

Notes:

Bibliography: p. 76-78.

'In addition to providing a net assessment of Iraq's WMD capabilities, this dossier includes a history of Iraq's concealment and deception techniques to thwart UN inspections and discusses the challenges that would be faced by UN inspectors should Iraq decide to resume UN inspections, after nearly a four year hiatus. A useful compilation of key United Nations Security Council Resolutions is included in annex.'

ID number: 80018422

Year: 2002

623 /00947

Disarming Iraq by Force : WMD Stakes and Scenarios - Monterey, CA :
Monterey Institute of International Studies.

15 p.; 30 cm.

Author(s):

1. Barletta, Michael

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003
2. WMD--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (US)

Notes:

<<http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/iraqwar.pdf>> accessed
16/04/03.

'This paper outlines considerations on forcibly disarming Iraq of its capabilities to develop and wield WMD, divided into four sections. First, it outlines key empirical assumptions to ground the analysis that follows. Second, it offers schematic outlines of positive and negative consequences that may ensue in the event of war, organizing these diverse possible developments in terms of their relative likelihood and benefits/costs. Third, it surveys actual and possible outcomes that have been or could be realized in disarming Iraq of WMD, and reviews measures that have been or could be undertaken to minimize WMD threats posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. Fourth, on the basis of this analysis, it concludes that while all policy options entail significant risks, the likely negative outcomes of war outweigh likely positive benefits. On balance, quashing Iraq's WMD ambitions by force is an unnecessary gamble whose probable benefits do not warrant taking the inherent risks.'

ID number: 80018537

Year: 2003

327.3 /00615

The Greatest Threat : Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis
of Global Security - New York : PublicAffairs.

xxiv, 262 p. : ill.; 25 cm.

ISBN: 1586480391

Author(s):

1. Butler, Richard

Subject(s):

1. WMD--IRAQ
2. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ

Notes:

Includes index.

'Today, more than a decade after Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein has freed himself from controls over his weapons of mass destruction. He is rebuilding his chemical and biological weapons and the nuclear weapon, almost within his grasp in 1990, is back on his drawing board. He is extending the range of these missiles to Israel, Iran, and beyond. This book tells the inside story of the UN's failed attempt to stop Saddam and explains the terrible cost of this failure.'

ID number: 80017814

Year: 2000

327.3 /00623

Iraq : What Next ? - Washington : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

21 p. ; 30 cm.

Author(s):

1. Cirincione, Joseph
2. Mathews, Jessica T.
3. Perkovich, George

Subject(s):

1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ
2. WMD--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (US)

Notes:

<<http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/Iraq/webfinalv2.pdf>>
accessed 18/02/03.

Bibliography.

'What can factually be said about the inspection process to date ?
What more needs to be known before its success or failure can
be judged, and against what measure should that judgment be
made ? What are realistic timeframes for those decisions ? How
should we understand and evaluate the claims, counterclaims and
interpretations that will follow the reports on January 27 ?'

ID number: 80018456

Year: 2003

355.4 /01386

Winning Modern Wars : Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire - New York
: PublicAffairs.

xvi, 218 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.

ISBN: 1586482181

Author(s):

1. Clark, Wesley K.

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003
2. WAR ON TERRORISM, 2001-
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
4. USA--MILITARY POLICY

Notes:

Includes index.

'The war in Iraq was the model of a modern war. Wesley Clark, a
four-star general and former commander of the US forces
overseeing the no-fly zone in Iraq, the man who defined modern
war, reveals how the battlefield war in Iraq was a triumph of
American technology and the fighting ability of the men and
women in the armed forces. They out-thought and out-fought
their adversaries to achieve a stunning military victory. But
modern wars are won not only on the battlefield but in the
television studio, in the diplomatic lobbies of international
organizations, and, perhaps most of all, in the hearts and
minds of civilian populations. Such was the power of the
battlefield success that vital mistakes in the pre- and
post-war planning, mistakes that would cost billions of dollars
and have unforeseeable repercussions, went almost unnoticed in
America. Until hard evidence proved that there was a problem :
more American troops died after the war was declared over than
during the fighting. Most flawed of all was the logic that
claimed an attack on Iraq should become the key to American
security. Clark shows that it was not. Moreover, by pursuing
Iraq, the real war against terror was subordinated and much of
the enemy allowed to regroup, re-energized by an unnecessary
campaign in one of the world's most sensitive regions. A new
approach to winning this war is in order, and urgently needed.
This book is a celebration of American military strength and a
thoughtful critique of American geo-strategy. It is a vital
contribution to the ongoing debate about the best way to secure

the future for America and a gripping narrative of events in the world's most modern theater of war.'

ID number: 80018942

Year: 2003

355.4 /01399

The Iraq War : Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons - Washington : Center for Strategic and International Studies.

xiv, 572 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

(Significant Issues Series ; vol. 25, no. 5)

ISBN: 0892064323

Author(s):

1. Cordesman, Anthony H.

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003

2. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION

3. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (US)

Notes:

'In April of 2003, a stunned world looked on as the armed forces of the United States and Britain conducted a lightning-fast military campaign against Iraq. Confounding predictions of failure, the Anglo-American victory brought down not just the Iraqi regime, but also much of the conventional wisdom about modern war. But even as US and British forces occupied Basra, Tikrit, and Mosul, the Iraqi nation slipped into anarchy - and new military and security challenges emerged. Such has been the twisted trail of dramatic events that we call the Iraq War. But like so many other conflicts, the war ultimately seemed to pose more questions than it resolved. What about the prewar political fights in Washington, Paris, and the UN ? Was victory really due to the brilliance of Anglo-American arms, or has Saddam's regime simply been too rotten to stand ? Why didn't Baghdad become a second Stalingrad ? Why weren't the occupying forces prepared to impose order ? And then there is the mother of all questions : where are Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and what went wrong with intelligence estimates ? The author provides here the first in-depth examination of the key issues swirling around the most significant US war since Vietnam. Finding answers is essential if we are to understand the United States' awesome power and its place in a new age of international terror and regional conflict. Finding answers is also essential if we are to draw the proper lessons and understand the new challenges of conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building.'

ID number: 80019151

Year: 2003

623 /00926

Proliferation in the 'Axis of Evil' : North Korea, Iran, and Iraq - Washington : Center for Strategic and International Studies.

ii, 71 p. : ill. ; 30 cm.

Author(s):

1. Cordesman, Anthony H.

Subject(s):

1. WMD--KOREA (NORTH)

2. WMD--IRAN

3. WMD--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (US)

Notes:

<http://www.csis.org/burke/proliferation_axis.pdf> accessed 18/03/02.

ID number: 80017875

Year: 2002

341.2 /00299

Reconstructing Iraq : Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario - Carlisle Barracks, PA : US Army War College.

vi, 78 p. ; 23 cm.

ISBN: 1584871121

Author(s):

1. Crane, Conrad C.
2. Terrill, W. Andrew

Subject(s):

1. USA--ARMED FORCES--OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
2. DEMOCRACY--IRAQ
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
4. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:

'In October 2002, the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The final report of the project consists of three parts : a discussion of historical insights from 20th century postwar occupations and post-conflict operations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq will present for an occupying power; and a mission matrix that lists 135 specific tasks that must be performed to build and sustain a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across four phases of occupation and designates whether coalition military forces or civilian agencies should perform them. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded.'

ID number: 80018504

Year: 2003

327.3 /00618

Disarming Iraq : Monitoring Power and Resistance - Westport, CT : Praeger.

viii, 151 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.

ISBN: 0275972615

Author(s):

1. Deaver, Michael V.

Subject(s):

1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ
2. WMD--IRAQ
3. UNITED NATIONS--IRAQ

Notes:

Bibliography: p. 141-146. Includes index.

'The implementation of disarmament requirements imposed by the Security Council after the Second Gulf War established a strong and unequal power relationship between the United Nations and Iraq. Although the ensuing struggle over imposed disarmament has been a major issue in world politics, international relations theorists continue to ignore it. Deaver argues that this case has important theoretical implications. Using sociological insights and a behavioural approach, he examines the power relationship as well as Iraqi resistance from 1991 to 1998. Theorists are likely to find these analytical tools useful since they provide a ready means of studying the micro-foundations of power relations in generalised terms.'

ID number: 80017954

Year: 2001

623 /00963

After Non-Detection, What ? What Iraq's Unfound WMD Mean for the Future of Non-Proliferation - Geneva : UNIDIR.

vii, 23 p.; 21 cm.

(UNIDIR/2003/38)

Author(s):

1. Friend, Michael

Subject(s):

1. WMD--IRAQ
2. WMD NONPROLIFERATION

Added entry(s):

1. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

ID number: 80019092

Year: 2003

327 /01116

Iraq : The Transatlantic Debate - Paris : European Union Institute for Security Studies.

22 p.; 30 cm.

(Occasional Papers ; 39)

Author(s):

1. Gordon, Philip H., 1962-

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE
3. WMD--IRAQ
4. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ
5. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
6. EUROPE--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
7. IRAQ WAR, 2003
8. IRAQ WAR, 2003--EUROPE

Added entry(s):

1. European Union Institute for Security Studies (FR)

Notes:

'Most Americans see the regime of Saddam Hussein as a major threat to regional and international security that must be thwarted, even if that means threatening or even using military force. Europeans do not deny that the Iraqi regime is a threat, but they question whether that threat is so pressing that the international community should run the risk of invading an Arab country in the heart of the Middle East. It will not be easy to overcome these differences in perspective - which result from a range of deeply rooted historical, cultural, strategic and domestic political factors. But it should not be impossible either. This paper proposes a common US-European strategy : joining together to demand, under the threat of an invasion that would change the Baghdad regime, Iraq's full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions calling for an end to its weapons of mass destruction programmes. If Iraq failed to comply with a new UNSC resolution reiterating these demands and setting forth a new verification regime, the United States and Europe would together overthrow Saddam Hussein and undertake a major reconstruction and peacekeeping effort in Iraq. If, on the other hand, Saddam did give up his weapons of mass destruction under the credible threat of military force, the United States would forgo plans for invading Iraq so long as Baghdad complied with existing and new UNSC resolutions.'

ID number: 80018365

Year: 2002

327 /01164

Transatlantic Rift : How to Bring the Two Sides Together - London :
Centre for European Reform.

119 p.; 21 cm.

ISBN: 1901229467

Author(s):

1. Grant, Charles

Subject(s):

1. EUROPE--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Added entry(s):

1. Centre for European Reform (GB)

Notes:

'The Iraq conflict divided the West into two hostile camps. The author shows how human error and longer-term economic, political and military changes have undermined western unity. He argues that Europeans and Americans can heal the wounds by working together on common problems such as Iran, Iraq, the Middle East peace process, weapons of mass destruction and the principles of military intervention. He concludes with a plan for restoring the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France.'

ID number: 80018948

Year: 2003

623 /00949

US Chemical 'Non-Lethal' Weapons in Iraq : A Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention ? - [s.l.] : British American Security Information Council.

5 p.; 30 cm.

(BASIC Paper ; 42)

Author(s):

1. Isenberg, David

Subject(s):

1. NONLETHAL WEAPONS
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003
3. CWC

Added entry(s):

1. British American Security Information Council (GB)

Notes:

<<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP44.htm>> accessed 29/04/03.

ID number: 80018569

Year: 2003

327 /01145

The War over Iraq : Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission - San Francisco : Encounter Books.

x, 153 p.; 24 cm.

ISBN: 1893554694

Author(s):

1. Kaplan, Lawrence F., 1969-
2. Kristol, William

Subject(s):

1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
2. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. IRAQ--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
4. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS
5. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Notes:

Includes index.

'The authors take a hard look at Saddam Hussein. And they see the face of evil : someone who embraced a cruel blend of socialism, fascism and pan-Arab nationalism when young, and later became a coup plotter and a member of the Iraqi equivalent of Hitler's Brown Shirts. Once in power, Saddam methodically created a

terror state where thousands of citizens have been made to disappear, and where the wives of government officials are raped by secret policemen to extort loyalty from the officials or their colleagues. Saddam's brutality has targeted Iraq's ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Shiites and Kurds, whom he subdued with poison gas. The same genocidal techniques he used against his own people also characterized Saddam's war on Iran, where he ordered artillery barrages of nerve gas and cyanide shells. But the authors argue that to understand the choice we face in dealing with Saddam, it is necessary to go beyond the details of his weapons of mass destruction, his violence against his own people and others, and his flouting of UN resolutions. They believe the choice is whether the twenty-first century will see a world of civilized norms that is congenial to America, or a world where dictators feel no constraints against developing terror weapons and no compunction about using them at home and abroad in support of terrorism. The authors analyze how the three post-Cold War presidencies have dealt with Saddam. President George W. Bush, the authors show, does not intend merely to contain or even disarm Iraq, as his precedssors did. Instead, he plans to liberate this benighted country and bring democracy to a land that for decades has known only dictatorship. The authors provide a definitive analysis of the Bush Doctrine and its shaping of a foreign policy that projects American influence on behalf of American interests and human freedom. They show that by enshrining in official policy the strategy of military preemption, regime change and a vision of American power that is fully engaged on behalf of American principles, the Bush administration plans not only to liberate Iraq but to set a new course for American policy in the twenty-first century. This book looks back at how a sadistic dictator was allowed to acquire so much power on the world stage. But it also offers a roadmap for a more hopeful future.'

ID number: 80018640

Year: 2003

327 /01079

Iraq : Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy - [s.l.] : Congressional Research Service.

15 p.; 30 cm.

(CRS Issue Brief for Congress)

Author(s):

1. Katzman, Kenneth

Subject(s):

1. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
2. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
3. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS--IRAQ
4. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ
5. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Added entry(s):

1. Congressional Research Service (US)

Notes:

<<http://www.uspolicybe/Issues/Foreignpolicy/IB92117.pdf>> accessed 11/03/02.

'In recent years, the United States has been unable to maintain an international consensus for strict enforcement of all applicable UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, but it has largely succeeded in preventing Iraq from reemerging as an immediate strategic threat to the region. There is US concern about the long-term threat posed by Iraq, and, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration has said it will prevent Iraq from re-emerging as a significant threat to US security. The exact form of that Administration stance has not yet been announced, whether it be through international sanctions and diplomacy, military action, or covert action.'

ID number: 80017857
Year: 2002

327.3 /00625

The United Nations and Iraq : Defanging the Viper - Westport, CT :
Praeger.

xii, 238 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

ISBN: 0275978389

Author(s):

1. Krasno, Jean E.
2. Sutterlin, James S.

Subject(s):

1. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT--VERIFICATION--IRAQ
2. WMD--IRAQ

Notes:

Bibliography: p. 229-230. Includes index.

'Following the Gulf War from 1991 to 1998, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was created to unveil and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction through inspections. This study describes how UNSCOM was designed to maintain its independence and authority, detailing the dramatic events that occurred as UNSCOM attempted to deal with an intransigent Iraq. The authors outline the special intelligence skills that UNSCOM developed over the years in response to Iraqi tactics. They also provide an accounting of UNSCOM achievements and analyze remaining concerns. Along with documentary research, much of the information in this book was obtained through a series of interviews with key players, including the Executive Directors, several UNSCOM inspectors, and a number of ambassadors to the United Nations who were directly involved. Concerns about Iraq's remaining weapons capabilities, particularly its biological and chemical weapons, have become increasingly relevant since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the ensuing anthrax threat. This study provides insight about the disarming of Iraq, as well as what lessons can be learned from the UNSCOM experiment.'

ID number: 80018531

Year: 2003

323 /00757

Iraq : 'The Day After' - Moscow : Carnegie Moscow Center.

5 p. ; 30 cm

(Briefing Papers ; vol. 4, issue 9, September 2002)

Author(s):

1. Malashenko, Alexei

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
2. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS
3. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Added entry(s):

1. Carnegie Moscow Center (SU)

Notes:

<<http://pubs.carnegie.ru/english/briefings/2002/issue02-09.asp>>
accessed 29/10/02.

'The Saddam Hussein regime is hanging by a thread. True, it has been in such a state for almost a year. This fall, President Bush told the world how he was going to cut the thread. Predictions about when and how Saddam will fall are the favorite subject of both political analysts and politicians. They give little thought, however, to what might happen to Iraq itself and how 'Desert Storm II' might affect Iraq's neighbors as well as some other nations that are not exactly its neighbors. Meanwhile, considering such possibilities could be quite exciting ...'.

ID number: 80018264

Year: 2002

327 /01121

Iraq : A European Point of View - Paris : European Union Institute for Security Studies.

30 p.; 30 cm.

(Occasional Papers ; 40)

Author(s):

1. Ortega, Martin

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE
2. EUROPE--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
4. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
5. EUROPE--FOREIGN RELATIONS--MIDDLE EAST
6. MIDDLE EAST--FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE
7. IRAQ WAR, 2003
8. IRAQ WAR, 2003--EUROPE

Added entry(s):

1. European Union Institute for Security Studies (FR)

Notes:

'In the last few months, European governments have responded in different ways to the American desire to exercise 'pre-emptive action' against the Iraqi threat and to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime. However, the Europeans share a sceptical attitude towards the initiative, since they perceive that a military solution might have unexpected negative consequences. Therefore, most Europeans believe that coercive action should not be taken hastily and that diplomatic means, especially through UNSC-sponsored inspections and destruction of Iraqi WMD, should be exhausted first. This paper suggests that Europeans are sceptical because they think that the United States underestimates the difficulties of post-Saddam state-building in what is a delicate regional environment. Also, Europeans fear that occupation of Iraq might lead to an escalation of terrorist activities in the West. Some voices in the US have indicated that creating a democratic Iraq would be the first step in the establishment of a new regional order in the Middle East, while Europeans are unconvinced about the possibility of 'importing' democracy into the region overnight by the use of force. Any stable 'new' regional order, the Europeans contend, should include a lasting and equitable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, most Europeans believe that the international administration of postwar Iraq would have to deal not only with state-building but also with resources management. It remains to be seen whether this aspect of foreign administration would be accepted by the Iraqi population. In addition, lower oil prices would foster increased global oil consumption in the long term and, consequently, a worsening of the global environment, which is against the declared European policy of determined action against global warming.'

ID number: 80018420

Year: 2002

327 /01135

The Threatening Storm : The Case for Invading Iraq - New York : Random House.

xxx, 494 p. : ill.; 25 cm.

ISBN: 0375509283

Author(s):

1. Pollack, Kenneth M.

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
2. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ

3. IRAQ--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

4. WMD--IRAQ

5. IRAQ WAR, 2003

Notes:

Includes index.

'The author examines the state of Iraq today - its economy, its armed forces, its political system, the status of its weapons of mass destruction as best we understand them, and Saddam's terrifying security apparatus. Pollack also analyzes the last twenty years of relations between the United States and Iraq to explain how the two countries reached the present crisis. He then assesses the full range of US policy options toward Iraq. Finally, he explores the promise and hazard of rebuilding Iraq after Saddam.'

ID number: 80018552

Year: 2002

32.019 /00081

Weapons of Mass Deception : The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq
- London : Robinson.

viii, 248 p.; 20 cm.

ISBN: 1841198374

Author(s):

1. Rampton, Sheldon
2. Stauber, John C.

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003--PROPAGANDA
2. PROPAGANDA, AMERICAN

Notes:

Includes index.

'As coalition forces continue to exchange gunfire with a grateful Iraqi people, maybe it's time to ask why so many of us believed that Saddam was an ally of Al Qaeda and that Iraq was minutes away from launching a WMD strike. The authors describe in chilling detail the successful execution of what Anatol Lieven has called 'a propaganda program which for systematic mendacity has few parallels in peacetime democracies'. For the first time we can trace the history of a mass deception from the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to a celebration in Baghdad that wasn't quite what it appeared. This is the story of the first, devastating battle in the invasion of Iraq - the White House's propaganda assault on its own people.'

ID number: 80018911

Year: 2003

327 /01118

Iraq : Consequences of a War - Oxford, UK : Oxford Research Group.

19 p.; 30 cm.

(Briefing Paper)

Author(s):

1. Rogers, Paul

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
3. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. Oxford Research Group (GB)

Notes:

<<http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Iraqbriefing.pdf>> accessed 11/12/02.

'The commitment of the Bush administration to regime termination in Iraq is so strong that a war with Iraq early in 2003 is now highly likely. Regime termination is thought necessary, in part, because of Iraq's likely development of weapons of mass destruction, but the control of the region's oil resources is

also a major factor. Although the regime is weaker than eleven years ago, it is probable that most of its elite forces will resist attack. The regime will seek to draw foreign forces into a war in the greater Baghdad region, US war plans are expected to focus on destroying Iraq's military and administrative infrastructures, denying the regime access to its energy supplies and drawing out the elite forces so that they can be subject to intensive air attack. Evidence from the 1991 war indicates that it is highly likely that the regime will use all available military means, including chemical and biological weapons, if its very survival is threatened. In such circumstances, and especially if high casualties result, there is a possibility of a nuclear response. The British Government, in particular, has been candid in conceding this as a potential response to CBW use by Iraq. The United States has sufficient forces to ensure regime destruction but the regime's replacement by occupying forces or by a client regime, even if the war is not greatly destructive, should be expected to increase regional opposition to the US presence. It is likely, in particular, to increase support for organisations such as al-Qaida and to prove counter-productive to peace and stability in the region. Given these major consequences of a war - high civilian casualties, risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction and post-war regional instability - alternatives to war should be sought as a matter of urgency.'

ID number: 80018367

Year: 2002

323 /00791

Nationalism, Sectarianism, and the Future of the U.S. Presence in post-Saddam Iraq - Carlisle Barracks, PA : US Army War College. vi, 44 p.; 23 cm.

ISBN: 1584871296

Author(s):

1. Terrill, W. Andrew

Subject(s):

1. NATIONALISM--IRAQ
2. IRAQ WAR, 2003--RECONSTRUCTION
3. IRAQ--POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
4. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS--IRAQ
5. IRAQ--FOREIGN RELATIONS--USA
6. POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION--IRAQ

Added entry(s):

1. US Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute (US)

Notes:

'The ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq has led to a variety of new and important questions about the evolution of Iraqi society and national identity. These questions concerning how Iraqis view themselves have serious implications for the US military presence in Iraq which remains in the aftermath of Saddam's removal. A new Iraqi nationalism or sectarian chauvinism may feed anti-US efforts and actions, endangering US troops and disrupting Iraqi reconstruction. It is correspondingly vital that Iraqi nationalism does not begin to define itself with anti-Americanism as a major component. This monograph addresses the critical questions involved in understanding the background of Iraqi national identity and the ways in which it may evolve in the future to either the favor or detriment of the United States. The monograph also provides particular attention to the issue of Iraqi sectarianism and the emerging role of the Shi'ite Muslims, noting the power of an emerging but fractionalized clergy. The result is a thoughtful and probing report including policy recommendations for US military and civilian decisionmakers that helps to illuminate the complex subjects of Iraqi nationalism and sectarianism and their relevance to the US presence in Iraq.'

ID number: 80018770
Year: 2003

327 /01137

Axis of Anarchy : Britain, America and The New World Order after Iraq -
London : Foreign Policy Centre.

20 p. ; 30 cm.

Author(s):

1. Tyrie, Andrew

Subject(s):

1. IRAQ WAR, 2003
2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
3. USA--FOREIGN RELATIONS
4. GREAT BRITAIN--FOREIGN RELATIONS

Added entry(s):

1. Foreign Policy Centre (GB)
2. Bow Group (GB)

Notes:

<<http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/80.pdf>> accessed 28/04/03.

'Will a war in Iraq lead to a new world order, or provoke anarchy ? This question has dominated political discourse and fractured traditional alliances. The author's thoughtful, searching and powerful essay on the tone of western foreign policy and the post-11 September re-ordering of the world makes an important contribution to these debates. The conservative position he stakes out - arguing that both the Blair and Bush doctrines of foreign policy are potentially destabilising in the longer term whatever the outcome of a possible conflict in Iraq - is a powerful one.'

ID number: 80018564

Year: 2003

PART II : JOURNAL ARTICLES

DEUXIEME PARTIE : ARTICLES DE REVUES**

- La crise irakienne : positions et reactions dans les pays de la CEI et d' Europe centrale et orientale.
COURRIER DES PAYS DE L' EST, no. 1033, mars 2003, p. 48-59.

- Disarming Iraq : The Case Against Saddam Hussein.
CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, December 2002, p. 289-320.
The Bush Administration and its supporters argue that a campaign to oust Saddam Hussein may be the only way to compel Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions, eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, and prevent its support of international terrorism. They point out that Saddam has defied at least 16 Security Council resolutions since 1990, making it clear that he will never accept weapons inspections. Not to use force, they contend, would pose the greater risk, by allowing Saddam to acquire nuclear weapons that will give him control over much of the region and make it even more dangerous for America to protect our interests there. Those opposed to the resolution maintain that the President has not made a convincing case for military action, and that an unprovoked US invasion of Iraq could precipitate serious turmoil in the Middle East and hinder the broader war on terrorism and diplomatic efforts needed to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They warn that war with Iraq could also lead to numerous US casualties and a long-term presence in that country.

- From Victory to Success : Afterwar Policy in Iraq.
FOREIGN POLICY, no. 137, July - August 2003, p. 49-72.
Did the war on Iraq curb terrorism, intimidate dictators, and set a precedent for dealing with weapons of mass destruction ? Or just the opposite ? A wide-ranging special report on 12 of the most pressing postwar issues by the associates of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

- Iraq : A Chronology of UN Inspections and an Assessment of Their Accomplishments.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 32, no. 8, October 2002, p. 13-23, 29.
<http://www.armscontrol.org>
This is a year-by-year summary of major events in Iraq and an assessment of what arms inspectors accomplished and what remains undone in Iraq.

- 'Iraqi Freedom' : The First Ten Days.
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, vol. 27, no. 4, 2003, p. 12-23.

- Making Inspections Work in Iraq.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 32, no. 9, November 2002, p. 12-18.
<http://www.armscontrol.org>
On October 7, the Arms Control Association held a press conference to discuss the capability of United Nations inspections to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Panelists spoke on the successes and difficulties of previous inspections, which ended in 1998, and offered suggestions for strengthening future inspections. The briefing came amid debate in the UN Security Council and the United States regarding potential US-led military action against Iraq.

** This list contains material received as of March 22nd, 2004 – Cette liste est arrêtée au 22 mars 2004.

- Ajami, Fouad
Iraq and the Arabs' Future.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 1, January - February 2003, p. 2-18.
The driving motivation behind a new US endeavor in Iraq should be modernizing the Arab world. Most Arabs will see such an expedition as an imperial reach into their world. But in this case a reforming foreign power's guidelines offer a better way than the region's age-old prohibitions, defects, and phobias. No apologies ought to be made for America's 'unilateralism'.

- Al-Rekaby, Abdulamir
Radiographie de l' opposition irakienne.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 96, ete 2002, p. 113-120.
While American airstrikes in Iraq seem an increasingly likely prospect, it should be noted that an 'Afghan-style' scenario is unlikely to ever materialize in that country. Unlike in Afghanistan, the United States will not be able to count on strong local support on the ground. The Iraqi opposition is riddled with divisions and has no credible contacts in the country. Neither the Kurdish parties, nor the communists nor the London-based National Iraqi Council has sufficient legitimacy to take control after Saddam Hussein is toppled. Unless the American decide to occupy Iraq for a number of years, themselves who take control of their own destiny. The 1991 uprising that followed the Gulf War demonstrated that they are capable of it.

- Alterman, Jon B.
Not in My Backyard : Iraq's Neighbors' Interests.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 149-160.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Iraq's neighbors find the declared US vision for the future of Iraq and the region deeply threatening, and they have the means to keep that vision from coming to pass. Moreover, the United States undermines its own goals by talking about them so much.

- Aristegui, Gustavo de
Tercera guerra del Golfo ?
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 92, marzo - abril 2003, p. 99-111.
La amenaza iraquí requiere una firme respuesta de la comunidad internacional. La violación reiterada de las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas no puede tolerarse por mas tiempo.

- Arnaud de Foiard, Paul
Irak : urgences d' apres-guerre.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 7, juillet 2003, p. 21-28.
Après avoir évoqué les causes de la guerre en Irak, l'auteur tire les conséquences, une fois la victoire acquise. L'ONU ne peut être tenue à l'écart du rééquilibrage du Proche-Orient, ou elle doit être fortement impliquée. L'Union européenne, insignifiante dans ce conflit, doit se doter des moyens de puissance - dont l'arme nucléaire, et acquérir son indépendance d'action internationale. Il convient, enfin, de tout faire pour combler le fossé entre riches et pauvres, qui, plus que l'islam proprement dit, menace l'ensemble des nations occidentales.

- Avineri, Shlomo
The Middle East after Saddam Hussein.
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 4, no. 4, Winter 2003, p. 67-71.
Whatever else the defeat of Saddam Hussein has done or not done, it has certainly improved Israel's security. Israelis no longer need to fear a sudden strike by a missile loaded with chemical weapons. Nor does Iran need to arm itself with nuclear weapons to deter an Iraqi attack. And by the way, don't Kurds have as much rights as Palestinians to self-determination ?

- Ayooob, Mohammed
The War against Iraq : Normative and Strategic Implications.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, vol. 10, no. 2, Summer 2003, p. 27-39.
<http://www.swetswise.com>

- Bahgat, Gawdat
The Iraqi Quagmire : What is Next ?
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, vol. 23, no. 2, August 2002, p. 135-148.
Since the 11 September terrorist attacks President Bush has repeatedly and strongly confirmed his determination to 'deal with' the Iraqi threat. Specifically, any US military action to topple Saddam Hussein will have to address two significant challenges - the threats of Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction and the potential for regime change. This study examines these two issues. It argues that more than a decade after the Gulf War, the United States has yet to articulate a cohesive strategy to neutralise the Iraqi threat.

- Bahgat, Gawdat
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction : Iraq and Iran.
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, vol. 28, no. 4, Winter 2003, p. 423-449.
For most of the 1990s and the early 2000s the international community was concerned about finding and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 the focus has shifted to the neighboring Iran. This essay examines the acquisition of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the missiles that deliver them in both countries. It discusses each country's motives for seeking such capabilities and attempts a history of their arsenals. Finally, the paper analyzes American efforts to prevent, or at least slow, the proliferation of WMD in Iran in the aftermath of the 2003 war.

- Bahgat, Gawdat
The United States, Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction.
DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, vol. 19, no. 1, March 2003, p. 5-14.
<http://www.ingentaselect.com>
This study examines the international efforts, led by the United States, to rid Iraq of WMD since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. The following section discusses Washington's assessment of Baghdad's chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities in the early 2000s. Finally, the article analyzes the impediments that should be taken into consideration in deciding any US military action against Iraq. The main argument is that despite continuing and mounting distrust in Hussein's regime, the United States has not developed a clear strategy to oust the Iraqi leader and replace him with a friendlier regime. More than a decade after the Gulf War, the Iraqi quagmire seems as messy as it has always been.

- Bailey, Kathleen
Iraq's Asymmetric Threat to the United States and US Allies.
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, vol. 21, no. 3, 2002, p. 161-177.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Iraq poses an extremely serious threat to the United States and to US allies not only because of its continued possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also the increased likelihood that it will use such weapons in any future military conflict. This study examines Iraqi WMD capabilities as well as the Iraqi leadership's values and perceptions that will influence potential use of those weapons. Additionally, the possible impact of Iraq's WMD capabilities on US behavior is addressed.

- Bali, Asli
Washington-Bagdad : le dessous des cartes.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 91, printemps 2001, p. 161-174.
One of the first challenges the new American administration faces is establishing an Iraq policy. Based on the first few months of Bush Jr.'s presidency, the new White House program seems to call on three strategies : retightened sanctions, the maintenance of aerial exclusion zones (including possible changes to these zones), and an enhanced support of Iraqi opposition groups. The primary goal of the new Iraqi policy is still to be decided : whether to contain Baghdad's chances of causing harm (preferred by Secretary of State Colin Powell), or to work on overturning Saddam Hussein (the hard line embodied by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld). What is certain is that President Bush should, above all, seek to establish a consensus regarding his policy. Because the flaws in the current system of sanctions show that the US is becoming increasingly isolated in its crusade against Iraq.

- Baran, David
L'adversaire irakien.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 1, printemps 2003, p. 59-75.
Après sa cuisante défaite dans la guerre du Golfe de 1990-1991 et dix années d'embargo qui ont profondément isolé le pays, Saddam Hussein n'en a pas moins continué d'adapter et de perfectionner un dispositif militaire et de sécurité qui ne repose plus que marginalement sur des capacités classiques. Les frappes diverses et autres incursions étrangères lui ont appris à escamoter ses cibles les plus vitales, à savoir la personne physique des hauts responsables, les missiles sol-air de la Défense aérienne et d'éventuelles armes de destruction massive, ainsi que quantité d'autres cibles plus ordinaires. Elles lui ont également montré les limites et les failles des méthodes de surveillance occidentale. Le leader baasiste compte enfin sur la grande dispersion de son personnel militaire et la complexité de l'organisation sécuritaire qu'il a édifiée pour le protéger, maintenir la population irakienne dans l'inertie, et peut-être mener des opérations de guérilla contre les forces, américaines ou autres, qui se risqueraient à l'intérieur du pays.

- Baran, David
La guerre d'Irak, la stratégie du faible face à la puissance américaine.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 2, été 2003, p. 395-408.
Le conflit qui s'est achevé en Irak a laissé une perception trouble de son déroulement réel et de l'adversaire irakien. Objet d'une forte désinformation politico-médiatique de la part des Etats-Unis, qui ont accrédité l'image d'une guerre de libération éclair, la résistance irakienne a cependant développé une stratégie subtile (victimisation du régime, conciliation de la population, organisation d'une résistance armée ...), mais en définitive inefficace. La dissymétrie des forces a suscité dans la population irakienne un fort sentiment d'impuissance qui est venu renforcer son apathie et l'incohérence de ses réactions : des poches de résistance civile faisaient face à l'offensive américaine tandis qu'une ultime vague de défiance vis-à-vis du régime provoquait la trahison des militaires. L'Irak n'a pas cru à sa victoire, il n'a pas cru non plus à une 'libération' salvatrice, tant les déclarations officielles assimilaient le conflit à une guerre pour le pétrole et contre l'islam; aujourd'hui, il compte pourtant sur les forces d'occupation pour reprendre à ses attentes.

- Barnett, Jon
Eggleston, Beth
Webber, Michael
Peace and Development in Post-war Iraq.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, vol. 10, no. 3, Fall 2003, p. 22-32.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
This paper discusses some of the larger political and economic challenges in reconstructing Iraq in order to foster domestic peace and development. It does not speculate about the motives for, or the legality of, the US-led invasion of Iraq, nor does it consider the regional security implications of developments in Iraq. The author's concern is broadly to consider the capacity of a US-imposed reconstruction to promote peace and sustainable development in Iraq, and the problems that must be resolved.

- Barry, Michael
Moyen-Orient : vers une seconde guerre de cent ans ?
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 100, etc 2003, p. 97-122.
Just a few weeks after the resounding success of the US military campaign in Iraq, it is clear that, far from sowing the seeds of hoped-for democracy, the conflict has plunged the region into confusion. As Afghanistan slides back into chaos, efforts to achieve progress in Baghdad have been hampered by a chronic lack of preparation. Links between Washington and Ankara have become strained, and Saudi Arabia, up to now a key ally, is increasingly being seen as a potential enemy. Terrorists, many of them Saudi-funded, are not disarming, a stark reminder to the US that Iraq was not a priority target in this respect. As for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, meanwhile, despite recent peace overtures, it will take time to convince Arab opinion that the Bush administration's intentions are genuine. Republican neo-conservatives have struck up an alliance with Ariel Sharon's Likud party, raising the religious and ideological stakes to new levels in a region already suffering under the effects of these twin scourges. With such a high-risk strategy, there is always the chance that Islamic extremism may emerge as the only winner.

- Barton, Fredericj D.
Crocker, Bathsheba
Winning the Peace in Iraq.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 2, Spring 2003, p. 7-22.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Recent experience in Haiti, the Balkans, East Timor, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has demonstrated that winning the peace is often harder than fighting the war. The United States and the United Nations should take 10 steps now to prepare for any postconflict challenges in Iraq.

- Benchenane, Mustapha
Etats Unis et Irak.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59eme annee, no. 3, mars 2003, p. 15-23.
Apres avoir demontre les 'preuves' americaines et britanniques, rien ne saurait justifier une intervention militaire contre l'Irak. Rappelant que l'abstention d'un seul des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de securite, et non un veto, suffit a empecher l'adoption d'une resolution du recours a la force, la legitimisation de l'ONU apparait difficile. C'est donc bien au mepris du droit international que se met en place la politique de puissance americaine, en fonction de ses propres interets.

- Ben-Meir, Alon
The Price of Unilateralism.
MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 14, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 78-85.
<http://www.swetswise.com>

- Bessmertnykh, A.
The Iraq War and Its Implications.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Minneapolis), vol. 49, no. 4, 2003, p. 24-36.
<http://home.eastview.com/epubs.shtml>

- Betts, Richard K.
Suicide from Fear of Death ?
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 1, January - February 2003, p. 34-43.
President Bush's case for war on Iraq overlooks a very real danger : if pushed to the wall, Saddam Hussein may resort to using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. Such a strike may not be likely, or may not succeed, but attacking Saddam is the best way to guarantee that it will happen. And Washington has done far too little to prepare for it.

- Bleier, Ronald
Invading Iraq : The Road to Perpetual War.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, vol. 9, no. 4, December 2002, p. 35-42.
<http://www.swetswise.com>

- Boot, Max
The New American Way of War.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 4, July - August 2003, p. 41-58.
'The American way of war' refers to the grinding strategy of attrition that US generals traditionally employed to prevail in combat. But that was then. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the new American way of war relies on speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. This approach was put on display in the invasion of Iraq and should reshape what the military looks like.

- Bosch, Olivia
Disarmament of Iraq : Dark Period Ending.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 5, May 2003, p. 12-13.
Although military force succeeded in ending the Saddam Hussein regime, and with it the dire threat it posed, many challenges lie ahead in completing another primary objective - the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. But why were such weapons not used and so difficult to find during the military campaign ?

- Bozarslan, Hamit
La Turquie : puissance regionale et forteresse assiegee ?
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 1, printemps 2003, p. 93-102.
La crise irakienne place la Turquie devant un dilemme. Il lui faut montrer son soutien aux Etats-Unis, dont elle est l'un des principaux allies, et a l'Occident, dont elle espere se rapprocher encore en rejoignant l'Union europeenne. Mais elle redoute fortement que la guerre menee contre Saddam Hussein et son regime ne remette en cause les structures etatiques et les frontieres nees de la Premiere Guerre mondiale, en particulier en donnant aux Kurdes la possibilite de creer leur propre Etat souverain. Le nouveau gouvernement turc, issu de la mouvance nationale islamiste, doit donc naviguer entre plusieurs ecueils, d'autant que tout laisse a penser que la tendance nationaliste en Turquie, qui s'exprime par un discours de plus en plus anti-occidental, voire 'eurasiste' militant, dispose de positions solides dans l'armee et l'establishment civil.

- Bremer, L. Paul
 Por que Irak ? Por que ahora ?
 POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 16, no. 90, noviembre - diciembre 2002, p. 67-75.
 La amenaza terrorista y el nuevo entorno geopolitico demandan una estrategia que se anticipe a los posibles riesgos. Esa es la razon por la que hay que reaccionar al peligro que representa Irak. Un cambio de regimen facilitara la estabilidad politica de la region.

- Brovkin, Vladimir
 Who Is With Whom : The United States, the European Union, and Russia on the Eve of War in Iraq.
 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, vol. 11, no. 2, Spring 2003, p. 212-222.
 The United States has entered a period of unilateral decision making and self-confident assertion of its military might, disregarding the views of its allies if they are opposed to its chosen course. The United States does not need NATO, Russia, or the UN, as the latest pronouncements show. The United States can handle it all alone. The question here is not whether America can disregard friend and foe alike, but why it is in the mood to do so. The system of international relations is going through a period of dissolution and reconstitution. What is the cause of the deep crisis in America's relations with France, Germany, and Russia ? How serious is the damage ? Will NATO, the UN, and the EU survive this crisis ?

- Byman, Daniel
 Constructing a Democratic Iraq : Challenges and Opportunities.
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 28, no. 1, Summer 2003, p. 47-78.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
 This article focuses on the feasibility of installing a democratic government in Iraq now that Saddam is gone and suggests ways to increase the chances that pluralism will take root. It seeks to answer the following questions : what problems are inherent to democratization in divided societies such as Iraq ? What are the strengths and limits of a federal solution to Iraq's problems ? What risks are likely during Iraq's transition to democracy ? What challenges specific to Iraq will further complicate matters ? How can (and should) the United States and other intervening powers influence democratization ? These concerns - though of immediate policy interest - are in essence social science problems, and existing scholarship can shed considerable light on them. This article concludes that, if Iraq does not receive massive help from the United States and other powers, a range of problems will make democracy hard to establish. Challenges that may arise include a weak government that engenders security fears, a lack of a cohesive identity to unify Iraq's different communities, a risk of meddling from Iran and Turkey, bellicose elites who pursue adventurism abroad and whip up tension at home, a poorly organized political leadership, and a lack of a history of democracy.

- Byman, Daniel
 Iraq after Saddam.
 WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 151-162.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
 The removal of Saddam Hussein from power is, correctly, one of the U.S. government's primary regional goals. Yet removing Saddam is not a panacea for Iraq's woes. The greatest benefits would come from a change in Iraq's elites, not just Saddam's fall.

- Byman, Daniel L.
Building the New Iraq : The Role of Intervening Forces.
SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, p. 57-71.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Occupying Iraq will be more difficult than conquering it. Intervening forces face a gamut of daunting tasks : ensuring order, ending Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes, helping Iraqis build a power-sharing system, reforming Iraq's military and transforming the regional security environment. Even if all goes well, Iraq's many problems will take years to resolve. Coalition forces must prepare to keep a large (and expensive) troop presence in the country for many years. Success will require both the careful application of force and diplomacy. Most importantly, Iraqis must play a role to minimise charges of imperialism. Although the burden of occupation is heavy, shirking it will lead to disaster.

- Byman, Daniel L.
Pollack, Kenneth M.
Democracy in Iraq ?
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 119-136.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Critics raise five primary objections to the feasibility of democracy in Iraq. Yet, these arguments exaggerate the impediments and ignore the potential impact that a determined United States could have. Failure to make democracy in Iraq work would be disastrous.

- Cable, Vincent
Sting in the Tail.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 2, February 2003, p. 12-14.
President Saddam Hussein of Iraq may have another weapon of mass destruction in his armoury - the economic effects of war. Changes in oil prices and the cost of conflict might just produce regime change in Saudi Arabia and recession for us all.

- Carrere d' Encausse
Le duo Moscou/Washington a l' heure irakienne.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 100, ete 2003, p. 273-287.
How did the Iraq crisis affect relations between Washington and Moscow ? What should we make of Vladimir Putin's decision to join Paris and Berlin in the so-called 'peace bloc', particularly in light of the Russian president's efforts to cozy up to the US since he came to power in 2000 ? In fact, Putin's opposition to allied intervention in Iraq must be seen as a response to domestic issues. Bitterness at Russia's geopolitical, demographic and military collapse has fueled anti-American sentiment among powerful elite groups within Russian society, as well as in some sections of the general public, while the Kremlin also had to take account of opposition among the country's sizeable Muslim population. The US understood what was at stake, and did not hold it against Mr. Putin. Russia's future at both national and international level depends on its ability to forge stronger links with Washington. Such links will, ultimately, not have been weakened by the brief spat over Iraq.

- Chaigneau, Pascal
Apres l' Irak, quel avenir pour l' ONU ?
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 6, juin 2003, p. 129-138.
Alors que la gestion de l'apres-guerre est confiee en Irak a Paul Bremer et Jay Garner, on peut legitiment s'interroger sur la marge d'action possible des Nations Unies sur le terrain. Plus structurellement, la guerre d'Irak a ouvert une crise majeure pour le systeme onusien. Si cette crise n'est pas la premiere, son ampleur fait qu'elle est deja lourde de consequences sur les rapports de force internationaux.

- Chaigneau, Pascal
Irak : le syndrome du delenda carthago.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 4, avril 2003, p. 89-98.
L'Irak constitue l'epicentre du nouvel USCentCom americain, commandement strategique qui s'etend du Kazakhstan au Soudan et qui n'a d'autre facteur de coherence que le petrole. L'Irak forme la tete de pont a partir de laquelle Washington planifie une recomposition geopolitique regionale. Dans cette perspective, la guerre programmee doit permettre l'implantation durable des Etats-Unis et la reconfiguration du prepositionnement de leurs forces. Les Americains vont y jouer leur credibilite tandis que l'etat de l'Afghanistan nous autorise a leur rappeler qu'apres la guerre, il s'agit de savoir gagner la paix.

- Chaigneau, Pascal
L' Irak apres la seconde chute de Saddam.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 60e annee, no. 2, fevrier 2004, p. 93-99.
Les Americains seraient-ils en train de gagner leur pari ? Apres l'arrestation de Saddam Hussein, l'Iran a declare accepter de signer le protocole additionnel du TNP, et la Libye de se placer sous le controle de l'agence de Vienne. La situation sur le terrain impose cependant une reelle circonspection. Quant a l'analyse des buts de guerre face aux resultats actuels, elle contraint l'observateur a etre, pour le moins, reserve sur l'avenir.

- Cirincione, Joseph
How Will the Iraq War Change Global Nonproliferation Strategies ?
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 3, April 2003, p. 3-6.
<http://www.armscontrol.org>
The focus has shifted from eliminating weapons to eliminating certain regimes that have those weapons. It is a strategy of picking and choosing good guys and bad guys.

- Clarke, Michael
D-Day or Delay ?
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 2, February 2003, p. 4-7.
There are two main strategies for how to run a war against Iraq. But political problems may make it difficult to give either an early go ahead. There is a third way, and a decision not to decide for now could achieve everyone's objectives. February 15 is much talked about as the day for military action to begin. If so, some fancy political footwork will be necessary.

- Clement, Rolf
Amerikas Ziele im Nahen Osten.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 4, April 2003, S. 50-51.

- Clement, Rolf
Erste Lehren aus dem Irak-Krieg.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 5, Mai 2003, S. 7-8.

- Cleminson, Frank Ronald
What Happened to Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction ?
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 33, no. 7, September 2003, p. 3-6.
<http://www.armscontrol.org>
There is a good reason why troops haven't found WMD or proscribed missiles - the bulk of them and their associated facilities were almost certainly destroyed by the United Nations or Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

- Codner, Michael
 High Noon for British Grand Strategy.
 RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 147, no. 5, October 2002, p. 10-14.
 The author provides a compelling round-up of UK military options and the implications of Britain's likely military contribution in what might be a lonely coalition with the United States in a war on Iraq.

- Cole, Juan
 The United States and Shi'ite Religious Factions in Postwar Iraq.
 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, vol. 57, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 543-566.
 In post-Saddam Husayn Iraq, Shi'ite militias rapidly established their authority in East Baghdad and other urban neighborhoods of the south. Among the various groups which emerged, the Sadr Movement stands out as militant and cohesive. The sectarian, anti-American Sadrist wish to impose a puritanical, Khomeinist vision on Iraq. Their political influence is potentially much greater than their numbers. Incorporating them into a democratic Iraq while ensuring that they do not come to dominate it poses a severe challenge to the US Administration.

- Collins, Steven
 Mind Games.
 NATO REVIEW, Summer 2003, 4 p., accessed 05/09/03.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art4> pr.html
 Both Operation Iraqi Freedom and NATO's own experiences in the Balkans have shown the importance of so-called 'Perception Management', especially that is Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Despite revamping its public diplomacy capabilities since 9/11, the United States failed to achieve much in this field prior to the military campaign. Changing ingrained attitudes takes sustained effort over an extremely long time. During the campaign, the Coalition attempted to shape the world-wide perception of the conflict by a variety of measures, including that of 'embedding' reporters with military units. One factor undermining efforts to have an effect on world opinion today is the proliferation of news sources. The employment of PSYOPS within Iraq - the use of mass media like radio, leaflets, and targeted media like e-mails against key decision-makers, and loudspeakers during ground operations - seems to have been more successful. The problem, as with all PSYOPS actions, is the difficulty in determining the causal link of an action during a war. Since there is often an informational gap to be filled at the end of a campaign, PSYOPS can make a great difference at this point. Strangely, the Iraqi Freedom military planners gave little thought to developing a post-conflict PSYOPS capability in advance.

- Cortright, David
 Lopex, George A.
 Disarming Iraq : Nonmilitary Strategies and Options.
 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, vol. 32, no. 7, September 2002, p. 3-7.
<http://www.armscontrol.org>
 The uncertainty regarding Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, which has increased since United Nations weapons inspectors left Iraq almost four years ago, appears to be approaching a crisis point. Concerned that Baghdad is rebuilding its programs to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the Bush administration has strengthened its call for regime change in Iraq and spurred an increasingly vocal debate about the possibility of forcibly overthrowing the Iraqi dictator.

- Cuche, Pascal
 Irak : et si la France s' etait trompee ?
 POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 2, ete 2003, p. 409-422.
 En s'opposant aux Etats-Unis dans l'affaire irakienne, la France a fait le pari des Nations Unies. Et elle l'a perdu. Elle sort affaiblie de la crise, tandis que la victoire militaire des Etats-Unis semble donner une credibilite accrue aux partisans de la force comme principal instrument des relations internationales. Dans un monde percu outre-Atlantique, depuis le 11 septembre 2001, comme le foyer d'un danger permanent susceptible d'atteindre leur territoire, les Etats-Unis ne font plus confiance aux mecanismes de securite collective pour assurer leur securite. Ils ont fait le choix de la puissance militaire, revenant a une conception plus traditionnelle de la force qu'au cours de la decennie ecoulee. La France, en perdant son pari, a entraine l'Union europeenne dans son affaiblissement. Celle-ci sort de la crise plus divisee que jamais, a la fois au sein des Quinze, et vis-a-vis des nouveaux membres, ce qui risque de compliquer non seulement la reussite de l'elargissement, mais aussi la construction effective d'une Europe politique, si cruellement absente.

- Culverwell, Malaika
 Newton, Andrew
 Business in Post-War Iraq.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 10, October 2003, p. 10-13.
 International donors meet this month to decide how they might help reconstruct Iraq. Business is already debating the complexity of companies playing a part. To succeed, firms need legitimacy, which can be earned by proving to local partners that they have inclusive, transparent and accountable policies. In Iraq the wrong approach - perhaps even association with the interim administration - could wreck reputations and prospects.

- Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja
 Gulf War : The German Resistance.
 SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 99-116.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
 As it became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January 2003, Germany stepped up its opposition to war with Iraq. The stage was set for a repeat of Germany's uncomfortable position during the 1991 Gulf War. At that time, as most of Germany's allies rallied behind Washington, Germany made only financial contributions, and hundreds of thousands of Germans took to the streets to protest against the war. Yet, since 1991, Germany had come a long way in its attitudes towards military force. From a policy of complete abstention from military deployments beyond NATO's area (so-called 'out-of-area' missions), Berlin had moved to participation in a range of operations in the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan. The new crisis over Iraq threatened to undo this progress. Thus, it is worth examining the limits to, and possibilities of, reunified Germany's willingness to use military force abroad.

- Dawisha, Adeed
 Dawisha, Karen
 How to Build a Democratic Iraq.
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 3, May - June 2003, p. 36-50.
 What follows the war in Iraq will be at least as important as the war itself. Nurturing democracy there after Saddam won't be easy. But it may not be impossible either. Iraq has several assets going for it, including an educated middle class and a history of political pluralism under an earlier monarchy.

- Day, Graham
Freeman, Christopher
Policekeeping is the Key : Rebuilding the Internal Security
Architecture of Postwar Iraq.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 79, no. 2, March 2003, p. 299-313.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
The main problem following a US-led international intervention in Iraq will be re-establishing widespread and sustainable governance. It is probable that with the removal of repressive political authority, state control will falter and crime rates boom. This can be countered through an international civil administration with law and order as a guiding mandating principle. Order could be ensured by 'policekeeping', via a large 'blue force' of primarily Muslim gendarmerie from surrounding nations. Reliance on military peacekeeping is precarious because of the political sensitivities in the case of Iraq. The blue force would form the foundation of the new internal security architecture in Iraq, and would act to prevent fragmentation and civil war. The role of policekeeping is to preempt and combat ethnic, religious, and political violence, economic crime and the establishment of shadow networks, as well as policing regular crime including those of property and public order. A further vital task would be the development of domestic judicial and policing capacity, which provide an exit strategy for the international mission and the beginnings of a representative and regionally devolved governance structure. These tasks could be financed through a modification of the current oil for food programme, finally transferring this wealth back into Iraqi society. The goal would be to construct a self-sustaining democratic and economically functional state governed by the rule of law, one that can serve as a political beacon for the region.

- Day, John
Air Power and Combat Operations : The Recent War in Iraq.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 3, June 2003, p. 32-37.

- Delpech, Therese
Bagdad : trois lecons pour une crise.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 100, etc 2003, p. 185-202.
The war in Iraq highlighted fault lines in the Western Alliance, not just between Europe and the US, but also within Europe itself. Whatever the reason - a decline in Europe's power, an upsurge in pacifism, and the elimination of the Soviet threat have all been suggested - advocates of a 'multipolar world' should be aware that this would mean more power for Russia and China, two countries whose democratic credentials are not yet fully established. The United States and Europe are the world's only islands of peace, prosperity and democracy, and only they are capable of mitigating the potentially devastating effects of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and inequalities in development. If the US and the EU don't live up to their responsibilities in terms of international security, who will ? This is the question they should be asking themselves, instead of focusing their energy on paybacks and points-scoring.

- Desportes, Vincent
Iraki Freedom, rupture ou continuité ?
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e année, no. 6, juin 2003, p. 116-128.
S'il est encore trop tôt pour se prononcer sur son résultat final au niveau stratégique, la 'guerre de trois semaines' conduite par les forces armées américaines a été brillamment victorieuse au niveau opérationnel. Ce succès conduit à en examiner les différentes dimensions. À côté des enseignements techniques, la question se pose de savoir si les théories traditionnelles, les principes de la guerre, se trouvent confirmés par cette première guerre 'classique' du IIIe millénaire ou si, au contraire, la technologie et les doctrines émergentes utilisées les modifient. Au regard de ces modalités, Iraki Freedom marque sans conteste une évolution forte par rapport aux précédents conflits de haute intensité. En revanche, en première approche, en ce qui concerne la nature de la guerre et ses principes fondamentaux, c'est plutôt de continuité dont il conviendrait de parler.

- Djalili, Mohammad-Reza
L'après-Saddam : espoirs et incertitudes iraniennes.
POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE, 68e année, no. 3 - 4, automne - hiver 2003, p. 567-582.
Pour l'Iran, les conséquences de l'intervention américaine en Irak sont extrêmement paradoxales. Range des janvier 2002 dans l' 'axe du mal' par George W. Bush, ce pays se trouve désormais 'encerclé' par les forces américaines - déjà présentes en Afghanistan, dans le Golfe, en Asie centrale, en Géorgie et en Turquie - ; en même temps, les États-Unis ont débarrassé l'Iran de l'un de ses pires ennemis, Saddam Hussein. Par ailleurs, la fin du régime baassiste en Irak ouvre de nouvelles possibilités d'action pour Téhéran dans ce pays. En effet, compte tenu des liens étroits qui unissent les clergés chiites iraniens et irakiens, l'Iran peut espérer jouer un rôle important dans le nouvel Irak. Cependant, et c'est un autre paradoxe, le chiisme irakien, appelé un jour ou l'autre à occuper le devant de la scène politique irakienne, n'a pas intérêt à s'inspirer du modèle iranien. Aussi le pragmatisme des leaders politico-religieux de l'Irak et le penchant des grands centres chiites irakiens pour une approche plus traditionnelle de la religion pourraient-ils créer, à terme, de nouveaux problèmes pour la théocratie iranienne, déjà contestée en interne.

- Dobbins, James F.
America's Role in Nation-building : From Germany to Iraq.
SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 87-109.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Since the end of the Cold War the United States has led six major nation-building operations - that is to say, the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin a transition to democracy. In Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq, the US has renewed with varying success a form of activity upon which it had embarked in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Study of these past missions suggests a host of lessons applicable today in Iraq, and raises the question of why, in light of its substantial and recent experience, the US government's learning curve appears so flat.

- Dodge, Toby
Iraq and the 'Bush Doctrine' : Storming the Desert.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 4, April 2002, p. 4-6.
Despite the increase in United States casualties in the renewed campaign against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Washington appears determined to tackle the problem of Iraq and its possession of weapons of mass destruction. It is now not a question of whether military action is to be taken against Baghdad in the next stage of its 'war' against terrorism, but when and how.

- Dodge, Toby
Iraq's Defence Forces In the Service of Saddam.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 11, November 2002, p. 4-7.
A US led invasion of Iraq looks almost certain. President George Bush and his advisors have committed themselves to regime change in Baghdad too often and too publicly to risk the political humiliation of last minute diplomatic compromise. By early next year American and British troops, with or without a UN mandate, will be advancing on Iraq's capital from their bases in Kuwait and Turkey. But the forces ranged against them should not be underestimated. This is unlikely to be quick, easy or without pain.

- Dodge, Toby
US Intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures.
SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 3, Autumn 2003, p. 103-122.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Saddam Hussein ruled through the 'shadow state' a network of patronage and violence that transformed Iraqi society. For the United States to successfully break the shadow state and build a stable government, it has to change how it interacts with the Iraqi population. This would involve the move from despotic power, the deployment of military force to facilitate the state's survival, to infrastructural power, and the creation of legal rational and legitimate state institutions that rule by consent. The only way to do this administratively and politically is to adopt a 'micro-management' approach. This would mean building state capacity and democratic institutions locally, from the ground up. By doing this, resentment and nationalist anger among the population could be reduced.

- Domenach, Jean-Luc
Pekin et l' Irak.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 100, ete 2003, p. 305-316.
During the diplomatic crisis that preceded the war in Iraq, China adopted a novel stance which marks an important milestone in the history of the People's Republic. While discreetly disapproving of the US position, Beijing made conciliatory noises toward all of the key players : Iraq and its neighbors were offered warm words that were sufficiently vague to avoid antagonizing Israel; war skeptics France, Germany and Russia received declarations of support that stopped short of a threat to exercise China's veto on the UN Security Council; and the US was bombarded with a mix of principled condemnation and protestations of friendship, delicately spiced up with pressure on North Korea to come back to the negotiating table. This array of tactics enabled Beijing to maintain a credible discourse while staying on good terms with all parties. But such a balancing act cannot be sustained indefinitely. China will eventually be asked to clarify its objectives and play a more active role in shaping the world scene.

- Donnelly, Tom
Rethinking NATO.
NATO REVIEW, Summer 2003, 4 p., accessed 05/09/03.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art2> pr.html
In the aftermath of the Iraq war, Washington is beginning to understand that even the world's sole super power needs help. Geopolitical differences and the widening gap in military capabilities between NATO forces have created a crack in the core of what was, through five decades of Cold War, a central pillar of US national security strategy. But it is in US interests to adapt NATO to fit new strategic circumstances. Even as NATO struggles to reshape its decision-making processes to make it a more nimble coalition capable of tackling the security challenges of our time, its immediate military future is in its role as a force provider. The Alliance's 'Atlantic community' is now not one defined by geographic boundaries but by the propensity to structure, train and equip forces capable of interoperability with US forces and a willingness to join an institutional 'coalition of the willing'.

- Doran, Michael Scott
Palestine, Iraq, and American Strategy.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 1, January - February 2003, p. 19-33.
Many critics argue that the Bush administration should put off a showdown with Saddam Hussein and focus instead on achieving a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But they fail to understand that although Palestine is central to the symbolism of Arab politics, it is actually marginal to its substance. Now, as in 1991, if a road to a calmer situation in Palestine does in fact exist, it runs through Baghdad.

- Dowd, Alan W.
Thirteen Years : The Causes and Consequences of the War in Iraq.
PARAMETERS, vol. 33, no. 3, Autumn 2003, p. 46-60.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters>
The author examines the aftermath of war and the challenges it presents. He warns that America's military leaders and policymakers should prepare themselves for a 'colder, harsher strain of conflict'. He reminds the reader that it took 13 years for America to arrive at the crossroads presently embodied in postwar Iraq, and it may take another 13 years to move beyond it.

- Droz-Vincent, Philippe
Les dilemmes des regimes arabes apres l' intervention americaine en Irak.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 3 - 4, automne - hiver 2003, p. 553-566.
Durant l'annee 2003, le monde arabe s'est trouve au coeur des preoccupations de l'hyperpuissance americaine et d'une Administration desireuse de deployer sa force pour defendre les 'interets nationaux' du pays. L'annee 2002 avait deja montre que la reflexion americaine sur le devenir du monde arabe etait intense et que la mefiance touchait, par-dela l'Irak, et autour des thematiques de transformation (ou de democratisation) de la region, jusqu'aux allies traditionnels des Etats-Unis. Depuis deux ans, les regimes politiques arabes sont ainsi critiques non seulement pour leur autoritarisme, mais aussi et surtout pour leur responsabilite dans la montee de l'antiamericanisme, qui aurait rendu possible les attentats. Parallelement, ils sont confrontes a leurs societies, qui reagissent aux evenements regionaux en mettant en cause l'incurie et la lachete des dirigeants.

- Dufourcq, Jean
Campagne d' Irak 2003 : quelques considerations militaires.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 7, juillet 2003, p. 5-16.
Sur cette guerre annoncee, conduite et commentee in vitro, tout est deja dit, en temps reel, a moins que tout ne reste encore a dire, si suffisamment de temps nous est donne pour decortiquer un episode deja en passe d'etre chasse par le suivant, le remodelage strategique du Proche-Orient ou plus prosaiquement, par le Tour de France et autres divertissements d'ete bien gaulois ... En prenant un peu de recul, et pour combattre quelques idees recues, on peut avancer que cette guerre inevitable, inegale est restee incertaine, qu'elle est passee a cote d'un optimum strategique et qu'il faut se garder d'en tirer trop de lecons en matiere de technologie, de coalition et d'emploi de la force au XXIe siecle.

- Dunn, David Hastings

Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations' : The Bush Administration and Iraq.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 79, no. 2, March 2003, p. 279-297.

<http://www.swetswise.com>

This article explores the myths and motivations behind US foreign policy towards Iraq in America's 'war on terrorism'. It argues that the foreign policy of the Bush administration is widely misunderstood and that much of the debate about Iraq policy that has taken place has been conducted at an unhelpful level of analysis. It addresses arguments that the Bush administration is motivated by oil, revenge or hubris as well as the more mainstream arguments that an attack on Iraq would provoke instability through the entire Middle East, as well as encouraging further acts of and support for murderous terrorism; that there is no urgency to act against Iraq as containment and deterrence remain adequate means to manage this threat; and that Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North Korea. It does this by analysing the development of American foreign policy thinking on the war on terrorism, what motivates it, and why it rejects the arguments of its critics. The article explains the intellectual process by which the US decided upon this course of action and how Europe's failure to understand this process added to its incomprehension of American policy. It does not argue that European's opposition would have been swept aside had they better understood the Bush administration, the central disagreement about the necessity and prudence of military action versus containment remains, but that such an understanding would have allowed for a better and more focused level of debate than the one which has got us to this point. Nor does it argue that the Bush administration approach is necessarily persuasive or justified, merely that its case is reasoned and explicable in terms of America's foreign policy traditions.

- Dunne, Michael

The United States, the United Nations and Iraq : 'Multilateralism of a Kind'.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 79, no. 2, March 2003, p. 257-277.

<http://www.swetswise.com>

Much is made of the need for any second war against Iraq (following Desert Storm of 1991) to be sanctioned by a resolution of the UN Security Council, approved necessarily by all five Permanent Members. Yet only two of the five, the USA and the UK, show any enthusiasm for renewed war in the Persian Gulf; and British policy is undeniably following rather than leading American actions on the diplomatic and military fronts. What are the sources of this American policy ? Some critics say oil; the latest arguments of proponents invoke humanitarian concerns; somewhere between the two are those who desire 'regime change' to create the economic and political conditions in which so-called western political, economic and social values can flourish. To understand the present crisis and its likely evolution this article examines American relations with Iraq in particular, the Persian Gulf more generally and the Middle East as a region since the Second World War. A study of these international relations combined with a critical approach to the history of American actions and attitudes towards the United Nations shows that the United States continues to pursue a diplomacy blending, as occasion suits, the traditional binaries of multilateralism and unilateralism - yet in the new world-wide 'war on terrorism'. The question remains whether the chosen means of fighting this war will inevitably lead to a pyrrhic victory for the United States and its ad hoc allies in the looming confrontation with Iraq.

- Dutton, Jim
Waldhauser, Tom
Operation Iraqi Freedom : US/UK Operations.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 6, December 2003, p. 8-14.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and 15 MEU (SOC) United States Marines Corps operated together for four days of combat operations. The authors provide a brief background and description of their joint operation, explanations of why it proved so successful, and finally some conclusions on interoperability and integration that can be drawn from their experience in combat.

- Eder, Philipp
Hofbauer, Bruno Gunter
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 41. Jg., Heft 4, Juli - August 2003, S. 476-486.

- Eder, Philipp
Hofbauer, Bruno Gunter
Operative F hrung der Alliierten im Krieg gegen den Irak 2003.
OESTERREICHISCHE MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 41. Jg., Heft 5, September - Oktober 2003, S. 571-582.

- Ehteshami, Anoushiravan
Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 4, Autumn 2003, p. 115-129.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Iran's leaders will struggle to balance the adventurous tendencies in Iran that desire to take advantage of the confusion in Iraq with the cautious instincts of the majority who wish to avoid danger.

- Encel, Frederic
Guez, Olivier
Le couple Washington-Moscou et la crise irakienne.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 99, printemps 2003, p. 171-183.
Despite reservations from within political and military ranks, right from the start of his rule Vladimir Putin has decided that Russia must side with the rich, 'civilized' countries of the West. His immediate and unambiguous reaction to September 11 has enabled him to overcome almost all the obstacles on his path. And yet Russia has not been able to support US policy on 'rogue states', due to its numerous economic and commercial interests in Iraq. In aligning itself with Washington, Russia has risked being seen as a mid-ranking power. But once the Iraq crisis is over, the fight against terrorism should be the cornerstone of the new US-Russian partnership for years to come. This will, no doubt, be an unfortunate development for the Chechens ...

- Everts, Philip
Wat vinden de mensen nu echt van een oorlog tegen Irak ?
VREDE EN VEILIGHEID, jg. 31, nr. 3, 2002, p. 273-292.
Dit artikel geeft een overzicht van de resultaten van het recente Amerikaanse en Europese publieke-opinieonderzoek inzake de kwestie-Irak. Het gaat vooral in op een in juni 2002 in de Verenigde Staten en zes Europese landen verricht onderzoek door de Chicago Council on Foreign Relations en het German Marshall Fund of the United States. Uit de resultaten van dit en ander onderzoek blijkt dat de publieke opinie zeer gevoelig is voor de wijze waarop de kwestie-Irak in onderzoeksvragen wordt voorgelegd en voor de omstandigheden waaronder geweld zou worden gebruikt. Ook blijkt de kloof tussen de opvattingen in de Verenigde Staten en Europa in vele opzichten minder diep dan vaak wordt betoogd. Met betrekking tot een oorlog tegen Irak bestaan echter wel grote verschillen, die neerkomen op een 'ja, mits' in de Verenigde Staten en

een 'nee, tenzij' in Europa. Voor de publieke opinie aan weerszijden van de Atlantische Oceaan geldt echter dat een expliciet VN-mandaat en steun van de belangrijkste bondgenoten beslissende voorwaarden voor instemming met militaire actie zijn. De regering-Bush is niet alleen geïsoleerd van de publieke opinie in Europa, maar ook van die in de Verenigde Staten.

- Eyal, Jonathan
Battle of the Atlantic.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 3, March 2003, p. 6-8.
Regardless of how the Iraq episode ultimately concludes, one thing is certain : both Europe and the United States will try to paper over their bitter dispute. The US needs Europe, especially in its quest to maintain a new Middle East stability, while Europeans have little to gain from prolonging the spat. France has accomplished what it always wanted - raising serious questions about the very survival of NATO. And the Germans, who have achieved a similar result by accident rather than design, will do their best to restore their link with Washington.

- Fischer, Klemens H.
UNO - EU - USA - Irak : die Zeit danach.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 5, Mai 2003, S. 9-11.

- Forget, Michel
Premieres reflexions sur une guerre atypique.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 6, juin 2003, p. 105-116.
Cet article a ete redige au lendemain meme de la chute de Bagdad. Il porte essentiellement sur les aspects militaires de cette guerre. Il retrace les grandes lignes des operations telles qu'elles ont pu etre alors perçues, et evoque les questions qui se posent sur l'etat reel de l'armee irakienne et la nature meme de certaines actions conduites par les coalises. Tout en mettant l'accent sur l'énorme puissance de feu dont ont dispose les forces attaquantes, l'auteur met également en evidence les caracteristiques originales des operations qui contrastent quelque peu avec celles relevees jusqu'ici chez les Americains : simultaneite, par exemple, de l'engagement des forces aeriennes et terrestres, nombre relativement reduit de divisions engages et style meme de leurs actions.

- Garden, Timothy
Iraq : The Military Campaign.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 79, no. 4, July 2003, p. 701-718.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
This article draws together early military implications of a campaign where intensive operations lasted barely a month. The deeper insights will need much more time for the post operations reports to be written, detailed battle assessments to be made, and the key decision-makers to record their thinking. As far as is possible, the article deals with the purely military aspects of the campaign. The promise of a decade of development of high technology air power was expected by some to show a new way of fighting wars. The evidence from the campaign appears to give a more mixed message. Certainly, a higher proportion of air weapons was guided in this conflict than in any previous war. Strategic intelligence appears to have been less accurate than had been expected. The unexpected initial resistance by Iraqi forces, followed by later capitulation, required flexible coalition operations. The spectre of the use of chemical and biological weapons proved unfounded. The effectiveness of special operations will be one area for deeper study. The media strategy will need reviewing for future operations. At this stage, the article does no more than record the sequence of events, make broad judgements about the strategic and tactical approaches of both the Coalition and Iraqi forces, and highlights areas where further investigation may be useful to draw firmer conclusions.

- Garden, Timothy
 Rebuilding Relationships.
 NATO REVIEW, Summer 2003, 3 p., accessed 05/09/03.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art1 pr.html>
 Rapid victory in Iraq has left a wider reconstruction task than simply that of rebuilding the country. Deep divisions have emerged between old allies. In looking for paths to renewed cooperation, the European Union, NATO and the United Nations all have critical roles to play. The near unanimous agreement by the Security Council on UNSCR 1483 on 22 May is perhaps the first sign that the international community is ready to move forward together. EU optimists hope that the crisis over Iraq will promote a greater push towards coherent European foreign policy positions. EU pessimists point to the lack of progress in providing the military capabilities which Europe needs. Divisions among Allies led to NATO's virtual paralysis in the run-up to the war. While injured feelings will doubtless heal with time, Iraq reinforced questions about the Alliance's future. In the absence of serious strategic thinking by the European Union and NATO, a division of labour may emerge by which Europe effectively finds itself cleaning up in the wake of US interventions.

- George, Alan
 Feeling Vulnerable.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 6, June 2003, p. 9-10.
 The demise of Saddam Hussein has propelled Syria into a role it neither expected nor wanted. It is now the last bastion of secular Arab nationalism in the region and as such a thorn in the west's side. How far it will go in resisting the United States's dominating impulses in the Middle East will be a key question in coming months.

- Goldsworthy, Eleanor
 Warfare in Context.
 RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 3, June 2003, p. 16-19.
 In terms of the history of warfare, the most significant point about the war with Iraq is perhaps the fact that soldiers are accountable as in no other age for the war that they fight. Not just for winning the war, which is all that mattered in centuries past, but for every action that takes place on the battlefield. The war with Iraq could be just as effectively defined for the limitations that are now placed on the military, as for what has been made possible with new technology.

- Gordon, Philip
 O'Hanlon, Michael
 Les defis de l' apres-Saddam.
 POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 96, ete 2002, p. 89-100.
 Over the past few months, a possible U.S military intervention in Iraq to overthrow Saddam has taken shape. In Washington, the question is no longer whether the U.S should act, but when and how. Before committing itself, however, the United States must realize that this exercise will be anything but easy. Apart from the logistical and strategic problems, the Americans will have to prepare the diplomatic terrain very carefully. If the U.S wishes to count on the goodwill of Arab countries, it will have to ensure that the intervention will not cause a public outcry that would threaten the stability of these nations. To do this, it will have to prove its goodwill to the Arab world by bringing peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The second priority is to convince its European allies and countries neighbouring Iraq that military action is necessary. Once Saddam is out of the equation, the toughest job is still to come : ensure that Iraq is never again allowed to destabilize the Middle East.

- Gormley, Dennis M.
Missile Defence Myopia : Lessons from the Iraq War.
SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 61-86.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
The American-led coalition's 21-day march to Baghdad confirmed the extraordinary capacity of tightly integrated and carefully orchestrated offensive forces to achieve rapid success. American missile defences performed less impressively, however. While Patriot batteries intercepted nine threatening Iraq ballistic missiles, they were not so successful against Iraqi cruise missiles and other low-flying threats. Iraq's use of non-ballistic missiles also contributed to a series of friendly fire accidents and the loss of two coalition aircraft and three crew members. America's adversaries will likely absorb these lessons and accelerate their acquisition of non-ballistic missiles. Without a degree of joint-service integration comparable to that which has transformed its offensive forces, American missile defences could become increasingly vulnerable to adversaries who combine ballistic and cruise missile attacks with flights of unmanned air vehicles. And if these delivery vehicles are armed with weapons of mass destruction, this vulnerability could be catastrophic.

- Hartley, Keith
The Costs of War.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 147, no. 5, October 2002, p. 16-19.
Wars are costly. Yet the government has marginalized discussions about the costs of a possible war on Iraq. Such a war will invariably involve substantial 'hidden' costs and use of scarce resources which have alternative uses, especially for social welfare programmes (e.g., schools, hospitals, and care for the elderly). Professor Keith Hartley examines the possible economic costs, both during and post-conflict, of UK involvement in a war on Iraq.

- Hawkins, William R.
Iraq : Heavy Forces and Decisive Warfare.
PARAMETERS, vol. 33, no. 3, Autumn 2003, p. 61-67.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters>
The author views the rapid ground advance on Baghdad as the real 'shock and awe' of the war, and calls for the maintenance of America's heavy force advantage.

- Hepburn, Donald F.
Is It a War for Oil ?
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, vol. 10, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 29-34.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Despite the claims of anti-war activists worldwide, there is no validity in the allegation that oil is the prime US motivation, or even a major factor, in a US decision to invade Iraq.

- Hess, Sigurd
Über See, aus der Luft und am Boden.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 7, Juli 2003, S. 14-17.
The careful evaluation of Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' will take some more time. Much longer, however, will the discussion continue as to which conclusions have to be drawn for the planning process in the defense ministries. But this analysis is imperative, particularly for the Bundeswehr. Taking a look at Operation Telic, i.e. the employment of the British forces in Iraq, may be helpful here as the German and British armed forces are rather comparable with regard to size and structure and also in respect to their alliance capability.

- Hippel, Karin von
Iraq : Policing and Rebuilding : Share the Burden.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 10, October 2003, p. 7-8.
By the beginning of September, Iraq appeared on the verge of imploding. Coalition soldiers were being cherry-picked on a daily basis, critical infrastructure destroyed, and large car bombs killed hundreds at the UN compound, the Jordanian Embassy and a mosque in Najaf. The loss of life in all these attacks has been devastating, with some of the best and brightest Iraqis, international civil servants and soldiers murdered. President George Bush is keen for help to defeat those he calls the 'enemies of freedom'. But who should help - the United Nations or even NATO ?

- Hollander, Lutz
Europaisches Peacekeeping im Irak.
EUROPAISCHE SICHERHEIT, 52. Jg., Nr. 8, August 2003, S. 7-9.
The collapse of the public order in Baghdad and Basra which followed the breakdown of the regime of Saddam Hussein shows the difficulties the belligerent coalition has to face after the end of the heaviest combat actions. The restraint of the coalition forces, which are insufficiently sized for robust peacekeeping, to take regulative action here can partly be explained with the military priorities according to which Baghdad is still regarded as a combat area. It was first necessary to liberate it from hostile forces before the protection of friendly forces can be slackened in favor of maintaining public order and security. But this restraint is also an expression of a basic problem of the American armed forces whose capabilities for peacekeeping fall, as a result of their conception of themselves, behind the need of trained troops capable of establishing and building up public order. The United States will therefore have to rely on the help of partners - in this case on NATO - both in Iraq and in future conflicts.

- Hollis, Rosemary
Getting Out of the Iraq Trap.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, vol. 79, no. 1, January 2003, p. 23-35.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
The Iraq crisis has been variously defined as a problem of local leadership, regional security, culture clash, arms control, neo-imperialism, transatlantic relations and international legitimacy. The competing definitions reflect the worldviews of different actors with a stake in the outcome of the crisis. Each perspective has validity for its proponent and none of them can be expected to triumph to the exclusion of the others. Consequently, it is argued here, whatever the goals of UN and/or military intervention in Iraq, at the receiving end, the experience will be at odds with what is meant or sought by such intervention. A way to understand the problem and thence to address it is ventured which combines local, regional and international perspectives and calls for a multitiered, multilateral approach to rethinking Iraq and the region. The intention is to take on 'the hawks' who claim that the United States can deliver democracy to client states, challenge their logic and propose an alternative vision that would require all parties, international and local, to take shared responsibility not only for Iraq but for Palestine too.

- Hollis, Rosemary
Iraq : Regime Change, Regional Change.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 10, October 2002, p. 4-6.
'Despite Iraq's sudden invitation to renew UN weapons inspections, American hardliners will keep up the pressure for war. Regime change might be achieved under cover of disarming Baghdad. But without a serious debate on the objective of force, there will be no opportunity to consider what could go wrong or how to handle the competing interests.'

- Hollis, Rosemary
Opening Options.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 3, March 2003, p. 9-11.
Among the various arguments for and against war on Iraq, four require reconciliation if the UN and international legitimacy are to be preserved and a better future delivered for Iraqis. These arguments are represented by the French and British governments and two schools of thought within the US administration : the traditional 'realists' including Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the ideologues, or neo-conservatives, championed by Richard Pearle, head of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board.

- Immarigeon, Jean-Philippe
L' intuition du declin.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 4, avril 2003, p. 60-70.
Quelle que soit l'issue de la crise irakienne, le president George W. Bush a conduit son pays dans un piege : d'une part, parce que la rhétorique guerrière des doctrinaires qui l'entourent dresse le monde contre les Etats-Unis; d'autre part, parce que l'Amerique, qui se voulait bienveillante, est considerée désormais comme une nuisance. Il n'est pas déraisonnable de penser qu'elle mettra un terme à l'ère des empires, dont elle pourrait bien être le dernier avatar moderne. L'Europe, qui a échoué par le passé à devenir un empire, peut légitimement y voir une chance à saisir et parier sur le declin des Etats-Unis, à condition de ne pas se tromper elle-meme de projet.

- Isherwood, Michael W.
US Strategic Options for Iraq : Easier Said than Done.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 25, no. 2, Spring 2002, p. 145-159.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
A US Air Force lieutenant colonel examines the tools and means required to fulfill the objectives of three options for US policy toward Iraq. The conclusion ? The US lacks the means to confront Iraq more forcibly and simultaneously battle terrorism worldwide.

- Jabar, Faleh A.
Four-headed Dragon.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 3, March 2003, p. 11-12.
The imprudent, casual spirit that permeates official American papers on the future of Iraq after conflict sends shock waves through those less complacent about reality there. Four 'isms' will overshadow the day after war. Each is a monster in its own right, but little attention is paid to them.

- Katz, Mark N.
Losing Balance : Russian Foreign Policy toward Iraq and Iran.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 666, October 2003, p. 341-345.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Moscow covets energy contracts in Iraq and Iran. It also wants a closer relationship with the United States. By pursuing both goals, it risks achieving neither.

- Katz, Mark N.
Playing the Angles : Russian Diplomacy Before and During the War in Iraq.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, vol. 10, no. 3, Fall 2003, p. 43-55.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
What did the Putin administration gain from all its frenetic activity over Iraq ? The short answer : not much. While the leaders of France and Germany welcomed Putin's support, they have not been willing to offer Russia any special concession as a result. They have not even toned down their criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya - something Moscow considers a vital interest but is only a peripheral concern for Europe. While the Russian-American 'partnership' has not disappeared, it is clearer than ever that this is not pact between equals, as Moscow had hoped. Despite Russia's desire to secure a role in Iraq's post-sanctions oil industry, this is now very much in doubt, and is years away if it occurs at all.

- Kent, Randolph
The UN, Iraq and Beyond : Limits of Empire.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 10, October 2003, p. 9-10.
The United Nations has been in search of a role. The United States and to a lesser extent Britain believed that it had established what that role should be. And all the while a majority of UN member states appeared dismayed at the organisations seeming acquiescence to US imperial tendencies and apparent indifference to the niceties of multilateralism. This was the situation presented by events leading up to the April occupation of Iraq, and which the deaths of sixteen UN staff members in Baghdad this August may now play some role in altering.

- Klare, Michael T.
For Oil and Empire ? Rethinking War with Iraq.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 662, March 2003, p. 129-135.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
The author examines the motives behind America's decision to make Iraq a central objective in the war on terrorism. If concerns about weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the export of democracy do not explain the administration's determination to oust Saddam Hussein, what does ? The answer can be found in the pursuit of oil and the preservation of America's status as the paramount world power.

- Knights, Michael
Sparing Civilians.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 4, April 2003, p. 4-6.
Hundreds of western volunteers have entered Iraq intending to serve as human shields to prevent the targeting of power stations, water purification facilities, hospitals and other non-military facilities. One group camped in the conference room of the South Baghdad Power Plant, some fifty yards from the main generator hall - a prime target for air attack if ever there was one, some might think. This says a lot about this group of people. Firstly, it underlines their commitment to displaying the courage of their convictions. But it also shows how out of touch they are with the realities of modern western military thinking. The power station, like the vast majority of such Iraqi infrastructure, will not be bombed, because American military planners - following an evolving decade-long policy - struck it off the target list long ago.

- Konovalov, A.
Iraq : Postwar Landscape.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Minneapolis), vol. 49, no. 4, 2003, p. 50-59.
<http://home.eastview.com/epubs.shtml>

- Kooij, Daniel

Waar was Europa ? Zoektocht naar buitenlands beleid in crisistijd.
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 57, nr. 6, juni 2003, p. 282-287.
The author analyses the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union in the Iraq crisis prior to and during the start of the recent war. The CFSP appeared to have a very low profile throughout this period; however this image is not entirely justified. Up until Resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council and even some months afterwards the performance of the CFSP by the EU Member States was quite acceptable. Several decisions were taken by, inter alia, the Council (in so-called Council conclusions). Only when the question of military intervention cropped up, agreement in the Council indeed appeared to be no longer possible. From that moment on, Member States took rather rigid unilateral positions; not only internally, but in other multilateral fora as well. The EU Presidency most probably performed well in the long prologue to the conflict, but lacked leadership in the short run-up to the war. The paper offers a brief overview of the achievements within the framework of the CFSP and finally argues that there is still a future for a European foreign policy. Changes in the decision-making process or in the allocation of tasks will however not prevent a crisis such as occurred during the early months of 2003 from happening again. Therefore, a change of attitude towards the CFSP by policy-makers and leaders in the European Union is required.

- Korteweg, Rem

Europa en de preventieve oorlogvoering : marginalisering tegenover de Amerikaanse hegemoon.
INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR, jg. 57, nr. 5, mei 2003, p. 234-240.
The author discusses the division within the European Union that has arisen during the Iraq crisis prior to the start of the war. From the outset, EU member states had similar mindsets with respect to dealing with the United States' Iraq policy, yet the end result demonstrated a significant divergence of opinions. The central aspects in the analysis are the doctrine of preventive warfare as adopted by the United States, the state of international relations following '9/11', and the regard for the international legal system. By analysing these factors in conjunction with the European response within and outside of the UN Security Council during the crisis, the author reaches the following conclusions. The EU has failed as an international political actor, and in so doing it has accomplished the exact opposite of what it set out to achieve. Due to the lack of a coherent Community policy, the individual EU member states have contributed to setting a precedent for preventive warfare. Besides, by failing to understand that for countering a superpower a credible form of counterbalancing is required, the EU member states have marginalised themselves.

- Kramer, Steven Philip

Blair's Britain After Iraq.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 4, July - August 2003, p. 90-104.
The recent war in Iraq changed the dynamics not only between continental Europe, the UK and the US, but also between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Labour Party. To survive politically and ensure the UK is a vital player in the European Union, Blair must affirm his country's European identity.

- Langenheim, William S.
Give Peace a Chance : First, Try Coercive Diplomacy.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 55, no. 4, Autumn 2002, p. 49-71.
<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/frontpage/products.htm>
'Coercive diplomacy' - a range of nonmilitary options for increasing the pressure on a recalcitrant state, with credible force in the wings - is at this juncture a better option for the United States than a focus on unilateral intervention to topple the Iraqi regime. It may achieve the same ends, and even if it does not, the substantial attempt should elicit allied and regional support for whatever steps then become necessary.

- Larres, Klaus
Mutual Incomprehension : US-German Value Gaps beyond Iraq.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 2, Spring 2003, p. 23-42.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Differences over Iraq policy have revealed deep US-German value gaps over multilateralism, nationalism, and the role of force in international relations. Cooperation in four areas of mutual importance can help compensate for them.

- Laurenti, Jeffrey
Iraqi Threats : What Common Cause Across the Atlantic ?
INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 37, no. 3, July - September 2002, p. 57-67.
The case of Iraq is analysed against the background of European criticism of the US doctrine of preventive war. The author notes that there is a fundamental divergence in this regard since conflict prevention is still thought of in Europe in terms of preventive diplomacy rather than preventive military action. The author also examines the three major schools of thought in Washington concerning the action to be taken towards Baghdad and the policy options that the Europeans should consider in responding to US insistence on the need for military action. He underlines that the military option against Iraq emerged in the US as a result of the international community's waning determination to compel Iraq to disarm and the prospect that fraying UN sanctions would soon collapse altogether. This implies that if Europe insists on multilateralism it must then ensure that this approach is effective rather than just lamenting US unilateralism. European cohesiveness and unity of purpose is essential, according to Laurenti, for achieving a commonly shared Western approach towards an issue that is of central strategic importance.

- Le Borgne, Claude
La guerre 'postheroique'.
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 7, juillet 2003, p. 17-20.
Difficile de s'elever au-dessus de l'intoxication mediatique, a propos de la guerre d'Irak ! C'est ce qu'on tente ici, autour de quatre themes : le 'postheroisme' americain, la dissymetrie des adversaires, l'intelligence des armes, les rapports de la force et du droit.

- Leibstone, Marvin
America Takes on Iraq.
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, vol. 26, no. 9, 2002, p. 8-14.
The US President and Secretary of State have, in the months since 9/11 2001 until late August 2002, used up nearly all of their diplomatic coinage hoping to prevent the need of US 'unilateral' military power being applied to unseat Iraq's tyrannical, unstable and nuclear weapon-seeking boss.

- Litwak, Robert S.
Non-Proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change.
SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 7-31.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
The Iraq war was unprecedented in at least one respect : it was the first case in which forcible regime change was the means employed to achieve non-proliferation ends. In addressing the current proliferation crises with North Korea and Iran, however, the Bush administration confronts major constraints on both the use of force and the US ability to bring about regime change. This has prompted a shift in strategy to the alternative combination of deterrence and reassurance. Implementing a strategy of deterrence and reassurance requires effective policy coordination to ensure that the two components are in sync. Military moves for purposes of deterrence should not undercut the message of political reassurance and thereby provide further incentive for either country to cross the nuclear threshold.

- Livingston, Robert Gerald
Patching Up German-American Relations.
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 4, no. 3, Fall 2003, p. 49-55.
A year after the feud between Washington and Berlin over Chancellor Schroder's rejection of war in Iraq in the German election campaign, Bush may finally be ready to end his ostracism of Schroder and even invite him to the US, if not necessarily to Texas. The reason is that the US has run into trouble in postwar Iraq and needs the help of NATO, the Germans, and other Europeans. Will Bush accept a major UN role in Iraq as the price for help ?

- Loescher, Gil
Be Prepared.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 2, February 2003, p. 7-9.
The pitiful sight of many thousands of Iraqi refugees moving into the mountains of the Turkish border after the 1991 Gulf war touched prime ministers and presidents worldwide. The policy of safe havens was born. But planning for any new refugee crisis is woefully inadequate.

- Lukin, A.
Russia, US, China and the Iraqi Conflict.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Minneapolis), vol. 49, no. 3, 2003, p. 9-22.
<http://home.eastview.com/epubs.shtml>
The war of the United States and its allies cannot but affect the nature of international relations. It is for the first time that the leading world power undertook a large-scale military action in open disregard of the UN. How will the new situation affect Russia's relations with two other leading Security Council members - the US and China ? Will the war-created changes become irreversible or will the status quo gradually restore ?

- MacGinty, Michael
That Was The War That Was : International Law, Pre-emption and the Invasion of Iraq.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 3, June 2003, p. 20-25.

- Mackinlay, John
Global Counterinsurgency : Without Strategy.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 60, no. 2, February 2004, p. 7-9.
Successes like the capture of Saddam Hussein are morale boosters for security forces in Iraq and may help to ensure victory for President George Bush in his re-election bid. Hopefully they will also demonstrate to the Iraqi people that the coalition is gradually progressing at a tactical level. However, this flush of success also encourages the coalition to continue to operate without a campaign plan. On both sides of the Atlantic, leaders have failed to reveal a genuine counter-insurgent strategy for Iraq or, on a global scale, for the threat of radical Islamic activism. The two are linked and the absence of a strategic concept in Iraq is a microcosm of a larger global failure.

- MacLane, Brendan R.
Reporting from the Sandstorm : An Appraisal of Embedding.
PARAMETERS, vol. 34, no. 1, Spring 2004, p. 77-88.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters>
The author evaluates the US recent success at embedding representatives of the media with military units during the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He determines here that this success is the outgrowth of a continuing trend toward greater media-military cooperation. The author is quick to point out, however, that the future of such relationships is yet to be determined. He concludes that the trend for greater military-media cooperation and information transparency is a harbinger of the necessary next step : including media representatives in the operational planning and execution phases of the next war.

- Mack, David L.
Avoiding Grave Harm.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 1, January 2002, p. 13-15.
At issue now is the likely development of US policy toward Iraq. Will we take reckless measures? Or by failure to act forcefully as well as prudently, will we be reckless by omission? The Middle East can greatly benefit from the re-entry of Iraq into the international community under a new leadership. The United States should take the lead in making this happen.

- Manrique, Luis Esteban Gonzalez
Guerras, mentiras y armas de destruccion masiva.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 96, noviembre - diciembre 2003, p. 123-135.
Fueron manipulados los informes de los servicios secretos britanicos sobre Irak ? La investigacion del juez Hutton has sacado a la luz publica algunas de las claves del proceso que condujo a la guerra, desatando las especulaciones sobre los motivos del primer ministro, Tony Blair.

- Marcel, Valerie
Middle East Oil : Oily Business.
WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 11, November 2002, p. 8-9.
There is much speculation that a campaign against Saddam Hussein is really about oil. But years of effort and investment would be needed to make the oil flow. Iraq's traditional trading partners are there for the long haul and that may bring their military support too.

- Marchat, Philippe
De l' Irak ...
DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 1, janvier 2003, p. 98-112.
Les laborieuses negociations menees depuis plusieurs mois sur l'Irak, l'un des pays de 'l'axe du mal' pour le president Bush, ont abouti, fin novembre 2002, a l'acceptation par Saddam Hussein de la resolution 1441 du Conseil de securite qui permet le retour des inspecteurs de l'ONU. Ce qui ne signifie pas forcement que 'la guerre de l'Irak n'aura pas lieu'. Apres avoir engage et perdu deux guerres, contre l'Iran, puis le Koweit, Saddam Hussein entretient depuis deux decennies des relations tendues avec l'occident et l'ONU qui le soupconnent, depuis le terme qu'il a mis en 1988 aux controles effectues, de continuer a s'equiper en armes non conventionnelles. Leur elimination, comme celle de l'equipe dirigeante, ainsi que l'eventuelle substitution de l'Irak a l'Arabie Saoudite comme leur premier fournisseur de petrole, sont pour les Etats-Unis autant de raisons d'une intervention, dont certains experts estiment pouvoir definir le schema general. Tel n'est pas le cas, en revanche, pour ce que sera 'l'apres-Saddam', en raison des multiples inconnues qui decoulent d'une situation politique interieure tres complexe, et de la diversite des eventuelles reactions de plusieurs Etats arabes et musulmans.

- Marin, Manuel
Espana y la crisis de Irak.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 93, mayo - junio 2003, p. 105-117.
El gobierno espanol ha abandonado la politica exterior elaborada desde la transicion, basada en un amplio consenso politico y social sobre sus bases europeistas. Nos equivocamos la mayoria ?

- Marr, Phebe
Iraq 'the Day After' : Internal Dynamics in Post-Saddam Iraq.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, vol. 56, no. 1, Winter 2003, p. 13-29.
<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/frontpage/products.htm>
The major problem with exile groups lies in the fact that they would have to be put in power by the United States and probably maintained there by American forces if they are to survive until a new constitutional regime can be established. With the exception of the Kurds, who cannot take over Baghdad on their own, the opposition's leadership and organization is outside Iraq.

- Martikke, Susanne
Regime Change Revisited.
ORBIS, vol. 47, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 433-446.
The author assesses the prospects for Iraq's postwar reconstruction, arguing for an effort to achieve consensus among the nations of the region, who have a significant stake in how Iraq is handled. The author also looks back on 1441 and assesses the difficulties that America encountered in trying to move the Security Council toward enforcement. America's rise from superpower to hyperpower status is itself an obstacle to consensus.

- Mason, John G.
Gulliver en proces : la guerre en Irak et ses retombees aux Etats-Unis.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 3 - 4, automne - hiver 2003, p. 523-538.
L'annee 2003 marquera peut-etre un tournant pour l'Administration Bush. Pensee la rapide victoire du printemps en Irak, le president et la faction neo-conservatrice se sont trouves en difficulte des l'ete, apres avoir mise le destin de la presidence sur une defaite rapide et decisive du terrorisme international. L'ambition avouee etait qu'une demonstration de force militaire servirait de base a une refondation du systeme international. Cette strategie semble aujourd'hui dans l'impasse, que ce soit en Afghanistan ou en Irak. Non seulement la conquete de Bagdad a fortement ebranle l'allie privilegie, Tony Blair, mais elle a egalement

lamine le partenariat de securite transatlantique qui unissait l'Amerique et l'Europe depuis cinquante ans. Aux Etats-Unis, la 'guerre apres la guerre' a defait le front patriotique bipartisan qui s'etait constitue apres le 11 septembre 2001. Ainsi, l'Irak aura peut-etre compromis a la fois les chances de Bush pour un second mandat et l'avenir de la revolution neo-conservatrice americaine en matiere de politique etrangere.

- Mearsheimer, John J.
Walt, Stephen M.
An Unnecessary War.
FOREIGN POLICY, no. 134, January - February 2003, p. 50-59.
In the full-court press for war with Iraq, the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the hawks say. But scrutiny of his past dealings with the world shows that Saddam, though cruel and calculating, is eminently deterrable.

- Medina, Guillermo
La ONU despues de Irak.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 95, septiembre - octubre 2003, p. 113-127.
Al pasar por encima del Consejo de Seguridad, Washington y sus coaligados le vaciaron de influencia y poder. Concluida la guerra y con el orden y la seguridad aun por restablecer en Irak, sera posible devolver a la ONU su credibilidad y protagonismo o se convertira en una gran agencia humanitaria sin nervio politico ? Hasta donde puede EE UU prescindir de la ONU ?

- Metz, Steven
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 27, no. 1, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 25-36.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
The United States faces an intractable dilemma in Iraq : insurgency if its stays or instability if it leaves. The sooner that a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, based on six principles, can be implemented, the better the chances to forestall the threat.

- Moreau Defarges, Philippe
La UE frente a la crisis iraquí.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 92, marzo - abril 2003, p. 77-84.
La debilidad de la UE como actor politico internacional se manifiesta cada vez que se produce una nueva crisis. Irak es el ultimo ejemplo. Sabran reaccionar los lideres del continente ?

- Moreno, Fernando Diez
La reconstrucción de Irak.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 96, noviembre - diciembre 2003, p. 93-106.
No sera posible la reconstrucción de Irak si el pais no recupera la seguridad y la estabilidad necesarias para generar la confianza que ampare dicha reconstrucción. Espana participa en todos los ambitos con la aportacion de expertos, recursos economicos y experiencia empresarial.

- Munoz, Gema Martin
Irak : la impostura de la ocupacion.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 96, noviembre - diciembre 2003, p. 109-122.
EE UU ha cometido un gran error al querer reconstruir Irak a su imagen y semejanza. La situacion del pais solo podria enderezarse si Washngton transfiriese la responsabilidad y la transicion politica a las Naciones Unidas con un mandato dirigido a restaurar lo antes posible la soberania iraqui.

- Nakash, Yitzhak
The Shi'ites and the Future of Iraq.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 4, July - August 2003, p. 17-26.
In the wake of war, important questions about Iraq remain. Will the newly energized Shi'ite majority seek an Islamic government modeled after Iran's, or will its members agree to share power with other communities ? And will the United States succeed in establishing itself as a credible broker, especially in Shi'ite eyes ? The future of Iraq may well depend on the answers.

- Neep, Daniel
The Impact of War in Iraq : Democratization or Destabilization of the Middle East ?
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 2, April 2003, p. 10-15.

- Nordhaus, William D.
Consecuencias economicas de la guerra contra Irak.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 91, enero - febrero 2003, p. 67-81.
EE UU centra su politica exterior en Irak. La obsesion de Bush distrae a la opinion publica de otros asuntos como Oriente Proximo o Corea del Norte. La ralentizacion del crecimiento, la crisis de las empresas y los crecientes problemas de la sanidad ponen en peligro la economia del pais.

- Novosseloff, Alexandra
L' ONU apres la crise irakienne.
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 3 - 4, automne - hiver 2003, p. 701-714.
L'Histoire dira si la crise irakienne a constitue un moment de remise en cause des Nations unies, de leur role et de leur utilite au sein du systeme international. L'ONU a, en effet, montre a la fois sa resistance aux evenements et sa capacite a durer comme fondement du systeme international. Neanmoins, en raison des pratiques unilateralistes de certains Etats, en particulier du premier d'entre eux, et du fait de l'inertie d'un systeme qui peine a se reformer en profondeur, la question de sa legitimite et de son autorite a ete posee de facon ouverte, sinon brutale, tout au long de l'annee. Pour autant, il n'est pas sur que le temps d'une reforme en profondeur de l'ensemble des composantes du systeme onusien soit encore venu.

- O'Hanlon, Michael
Estimating Casualties in a War to Overthrow Saddam.
ORBIS, vol. 47, no. 1, Winter 2003, p. 21-40.
The author contributes a significant piece on estimating, with existing methodologies, the casualty rates to expect in the kind of conflict likely to ensue in Iraq and elsewhere. The casualty costs are invariably going to be weighed against the benefits when entertaining the idea of a 'regime change'. Questions about casualties have become a permanent factor in strategy making. While precision is not possible, even defining a range of possible outcomes highlights the tactical and strategic choices Americans face. Among the important implications of O'Hanlon's conclusions is the question what will happen if US forces meet a severe tactical reversal. Will the draft be reinstated ?

- O'Hanlon, Michael
 Albuquerque, Adriana Lin de
 Scoring the Iraq Aftermath.
 NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 74, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 31-36.
 How can we tell if we are making progress in Iraq or not ? If you already know what answer you want, it is easy to find someone to provide it. If you oppose the war, locate a prominent Democrat; if you prefer good news, find a Bush Administration official. In both cases, you are likely to hear accurate but, alas, highly selective and incomplete data. How do we move beyond the war of competing factoids to assess progress and to know when policies need to be adjusted ?

- Oppenheimer, Andy
 Dirty Bombs for the Taking.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 7, July 2003, p. 10-11.
 In Iraq's post-war chaos, looting of its main nuclear site - the al-Tuwaitha research centre thirty miles south of Baghdad - and at least six other locations has produced the worst nuclear security crisis since the fall of the Soviet Union. The potential is great for material to be sold on by looters to terror groups seeking to make radiological dispersal devices - so-called dirty bombs. More locally, people in nearby villages are already suffering from radiation sickness. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, who returned last month, are restricted to securing a small area within the plant.

- Ottaway, Marina
 US Nation-building Policy in the Greater Middle East.
 INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 38, no. 4, October - December 2003, p. 21-32.
 The author gives a critical assessment of the US' attempts at nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the author points out, the main reason for the lack of progress is the failure to empower local government. In the case of Afghanistan, the government exists but does not receive the necessary funding whereas substantial financial means continue to be in the hands of warlords. In Iraq, the US is caught between the imperative to hand over real power to the Iraqi people as soon as possible and the need to maintain a forceful occupation to maximise the possibility of turning the country into a stable and reasonable democracy.

- Park, Bill
 Turkey and Iraq : Bridgehead or Bridge ?
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 58, no. 10, October 2002, p. 7-9.
 'The prospect of a US led attack on Iraq comes at a bad time for Turkey, which is reeling from an economic crisis and facing imminent elections. The future of Cyprus and its own European Union membership prospects are also on the line. Turkey's geostrategic location makes it central to Washington's deliberations, but it fears that an unravelling of the Kurdish issue, regional isolation and sever economic consequences might follow. Its response could be the seek greater control through active participation. But Ankara must once again be ruling the country's prime strategic location, which it has so often tried to turn to its advantage.'

- Park, Bill
 Turkey, Europe and America : Not In Our Backyard.
 WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 5, May 2003, p. 23-24.
 Turkey has not had a 'good' war. Its diplomatic march westwards has stalled, and conditions do not look good for reviving it. Events in the predominantly Kurdish areas of northern Iraq have not yet completed their cycle, the Cyprus issue has emerged as a major obstacle to European Union entry, and Washington's strategic sponsorship of Turkey is under review.

- Partrick, Neil
Weapons of Mass Destruction : The Threat to the Gulf.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 146, no. 5, October 2001, p. 50-55.

- Pavlov, N.
After the War : Nine Foreign Policy Conclusions.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Minneapolis), vol. 49, no. 3, 2003, p. 1-8.
<http://home.eastview.com/epubs.shtml>
The war against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq has been won. The world community was mainly concerned with the price in blood and lives of the victory over the recalcitrant dictator. It turned out that victory was prompt and nearly bloodless. Yet the very fact of a 'preventive', or an aggressive, war launched without international sanctions and the background against which it was unfolding suggest several conclusions based on an analysis of the main political trends in the world Russian diplomacy can use in the nearest future.

- Peck, Edward
Doing It All Wrong in the Middle East : Iraq.
MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 12, no. 4, Fall 2001, p. 13-26.
<http://www.swetswise.com>

- Pedde, Nicola
The Making of a New World Energy Order.
INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 37, no. 4, October - December 2002, p. 27-33.
The author assesses the oil production potential of a hypothetical post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and the role that the country and the Middle East as a whole can play in the future world energy market. According to Pedde, the United States' efforts to re-establish a higher degree of strategic control over the Middle East by bringing Iraq back into its sphere of influence is motivated by, among other things, the desire to create a second - politically stable - regional fulcrum of oil production which would allow it to reduce its strong dependence on the increasingly problematic Saudi Arabia. Expanding his analysis to the wider international context, Pedde also maintains that, while available global energy resources have grown, the divergence of interests between different groups of oil-producing countries remains a factor of instability, further highlighting Iraq's strategic importance.

- Perthes, Volker
Guerre en Irak : vers un nouvel ordre regional ?
POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 68e annee, no. 3 - 4, automne - hiver 2003, p. 539-552.
Si les effets politiques et psychologiques de la guerre en Irak sur les societes du Moyen-Orient n'ont pas encore ete mesures, le conflit a deja eu un impact majeur sur les donnees geopolitiques de cette region. Pourtant, ses repercussions sur la politique interieure et exterieure des Etats concernes dependront fortement de deux elements : le succes - ou l'echec - des Etats-Unis dans l'etablissement d'un ordre politique acceptable en Irak, et l'evolution du conflit israelo-palestinien. L'interet bien compris de l'Union europeenne est que la stabilisation politique et economique de l'Irak reussisse. Pour que celle-ci soit possible a une echeance raisonnable, l'occupation doit ceder la place a la reconstruction, sous controle international. Mais il est egalement indispensable que l'Europe, au lieu de se contenter de suivre ou de contester les Etats-Unis, definisse enfin sa propre politique au Moyen-Orient.

- Perthes, Volker
 Postwar Scenarios in Iraq and Regional Re-ordering.
 INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, vol. 37, no. 4, October - December 2002, p. 21-26.
 The author examines the war scenarios in Iraq and their possible short- and long-term implications for the regional context. He argues that, while the US-led military action will probably meet with weak Iraqi resistance, it is likely to become an additional factor of regional instability and, in particular, cause a further intensification of the already intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The author notes that following the occupation of Iraqi territory, the US will face formidable challenges such as humanitarian assistance, management of refugees flows and internal policing, for which it seems ill-prepared. Recalling the past record of conflict in the Middle East, he underlines that the US's ability to influence the main regional actors and enforce a postwar regional order has serious limits. Hence, the Bush administration's expectation that an Iraqi defeat will generate a positive 'domino effect' in the region seems to be overly optimistic.

- Pollack, Kenneth M.
 Next Stop Baghdad ?
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 81, no. 2, March - April 2002, p. 32-47.
 What should the United States do about Iraq ? Hawks are wrong to think the problem is desperately urgent or connected to terrorism, but right to see the prospect of a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein as so worrisome that it requires drastic action. Doves are right about Iraq's not being a good candidate for an Afghan-style war, but wrong to think that inspections and deterrence alone can contain Saddam. The United States has no choice left but to invade Iraq itself and eliminate the current regime.

- Pond, Elizabeth
 European Shock and Awe.
 WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 191-203.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
 Europe is worried that the United States is trying to play God in the volatile Middle East. Even more serious is European suspicion of the secular version of missionary zeal they see in the vast social and political engineering project of democratizing the Muslim world.

- Pond, Elizabeth
 The Greek Tragedy of NATO.
 INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 1-10.
 The present NATO crisis has loomed ever since the first act, when the Bush administration shocked its partners by saying it will now pick and choose ad hoc coalitions and not be swayed by permanent allies. But the present transatlantic row over an Iraq war has accelerated the denouement. So has the tragic flaw of hubris - the arrogance of power and the arrogance of impotence. In the end, only the hegemon that created NATO can kill the alliance - if it decides it is strong enough to manage a globalized world on its own.

- Porch, Douglas
 Occupational Hazards.
 NATIONAL INTEREST, no. 72, Summer 2003, p. 35-47.
 Many Americans, including some of senior rank, appear to hold candy-coated views of the post-World War II US occupations of Germany and Japan. Dealing with Iraq will be hard enough without enshrouding ourselves in myth.

- Posch, Walter
Die irakischen Schiiten nach dem Fall Saddam Husseins.
OESTERREICHISCHE MILITÄERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT, 41. Jg., Heft 6, November -
Dezember 2003, S. 721-732.

- Pranger, Robert J.
The Iraq Problem Will Remain with Us.
MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 14, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 25-33.
<http://www.swetswise.com>

- Quiggin, Tom
Marching To War : The Invasion of Iraq - A Plan Fourteen Years in the
Making.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 5, October 2003, p. 60-66.
The war in Iraq was prosecuted to satisfy the ideological aspirations of
a relatively narrow group of individuals. It was a policy carried out not
because of the war on terrorism, but the war on terrorism was seized upon
as an opportunity to launch it. The invasion and occupation of Iraq will
in fact worsen the overall international situation with regards to
terrorism. Those who have advocated this policy have done so for more
than a decade as a means of ensuring American domination of the
international security and trade systems. Given that the reasons advanced
in public for the war were false, the consequences of the war will be
severe.

- Rachid, Loulouwa al
Du bon usage du chiisme irakien.
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 101, automne 2003, p. 95-111.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraq's Shiites have finally
transformed their numerical superiority into political representation.
They hold a majority in the transitional governing council set up by the
coalition. This new power is disquieting to numerous observers who fear
that the active return of religion to the Iraqi political landscape might
push the country - which has barely been freed from the Baathist
dictatorship - into an Iranian-style Islamist regime. Aren't the demands
for a distinct identity and the rediscovered fervor of the Shiites
obstacles to the emergence of democracy ? The author addresses all these
concerns. Drawing on an in-depth analysis of the very diverse Shiite
society, she concludes that what is most important is restoring order and
transferring power to the Iraqi people. Most of them are not at all
tempted by the Iranian model, but the longer chaos reigns, the more
ground the radicals will gain.

- Record, Jeffrey
The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq.
PARAMETERS, vol. 33, no. 1, Spring 2003, p. 4-21.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters>
The author examines the major tenets of the current Administration's
security strategy and its approach to the use of force, the Bush
Doctrine. He presents an enlightening assessment of the doctrine's
strengths and weaknesses within the context of a prospective war with
Iraq. He analyzes the Administration's case against Iraq. He then
presents five observations on the validity of the Bush Doctrine,
concluding that the Administration suffers from a case of strategic
myopia and that no matter how convincing the case is made for an attack
on Iraq, preemption as a declaratory doctrine when used generically
invites catastrophe.

- Reich, Bernard
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the New Middle East.
MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 14, no. 4, Fall 2003, p. 116-138.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
The war in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and the termination of Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime have had wide-ranging effects worldwide, but nowhere have they been more immediate than in the Middle East itself, where they have affected all existing issues and all the major states.

- Rifkind, Malcolm
Where is the Axis of Freedom ?
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 147, no. 3, June 2002, p. 15-19.

- Rivkin, David B.
Bartram, Darin R.
Military Occupation : Legally Ensuring a Lasting Peace.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 26, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 87-103.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
International law prescribes and regulates military occupation, but does not make it illegal. Arguments to the contrary are either misinformed about historical precedent and doctrine or are employed as pseudolegalistic assertions to object to a war opposed for other reasons.

- Roth, Kenneth
Humanitarian Intervention and Iraq : On Target ?
WORLD TODAY, vol. 60, no. 2, February 2004, p. 10-11.
As evidence of Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction and pre-war ties to terrorism remains elusive, Washington and London increasingly point to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's brutal government to justify the invasion. At least people have been freed from one of the world's most ruthless tyrants, they note. This humanitarian intervention argument was only occasionally mentioned before the war and was clearly not a dominant motivation for the invasion. Now that it has emerged as perhaps the strongest remaining justification, it is worth examining seriously.

- Rubin, James P.
Stumbling Into War.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 82, no. 5, September - October 2003, p. 46-66.
Why did most of the world abandon Washington when it went after Saddam Hussein ? The war in Iraq could never have been an easy sell, but nor should it have been such a difficult one. The Bush administration badly botched the prewar maneuvering, presenting a textbook study in how not to wage a diplomatic campaign.

- Russell, Richard L.
War and the Iraq Dilemma : Facing Harsh Realities.
PARAMETERS, vol. 32, no. 3, Autumn 2002, p. 46-61.
<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters>
The author warns that the events of 11 September 2001 should serve as a wake-up call for America with regard to others who would follow al Qaeda's lead. His investigation into those who could (or would) harm America with weapons of mass destruction leads to President Bush's 'axis of evil', and specifically to Iraq. Russell advocates waging a war against Iraq 'on its own merits', however, not simply as part of a war against terror. He sees such a war as a continuation of business unfinished in the Gulf War. The author presents the reader with a campaign plan to destroy Saddam's regime while still maintaining a balance of power in the region. Russell concludes by asserting Machiavelli's dictum - a nation is safer if it is more feared than loved - in determining that now is the time for war against Iraq, regardless of world opinion.

- Salmoni, Barak A.
America's Iraq Strategy : Democratic Chimeras, Regional Realities.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 669, January 2004, p. 17-20.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
When US policy makers discuss the democratization of Iraq and the Middle East, have they set out concrete criteria for what that means ? Have they put together the indicators for when it is time to go home ? Have they established, in short, what is enough democracy, and who decides ?

- Santayana, Jose Pardo de
Habra intifada en Irak ?
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 18, no. 97, enero - febrero 2004, p. 111-124.
Si EE UU pierde el control, el nuevo escenario es un Irak libanizado. Las previsiones mas optimistas, para las que suprimir el regimen de Sadam era suficiente, han demostrado ser erroneas.

- Schell, Jonathan
The Case Against the War.
NATION, vol. 276, no. 9, 2003, p. 11-23.
<http://www.uspolicy.be/aa/aamar203.htm>
The days of the double standard are over. We cannot preserve it and we should not want to. The struggle to maintain it by force, anachronistically represented by Bush's proposed war on Iraq, in which the United States threatens pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons to stop another country merely from getting them, can only worsen the global problem it seeks to solve. One way or another, the world is on its way to a single standard. Only two in the long run are available : universal permission to possess weapons of mass destruction or their universal prohibition.

- Schmitt, Michael N.
International Law and the Use of Force : Attacking Iraq.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 1, February 2003, p. 12-15.
As the sabre rattling quickens following allegations of Iraqi deception in its December 2002 report to the United Nations on the status of its WMD capabilities, there has been strikingly little discourse outside the narrow international law community on the precise legal basis for military action against Iraq. Instead, discussion has centred on whether force should be used against Iraq, rather than whether it may be used. Professor Michael Schmitt warns of serious and far-reaching consequences for international stability should international law be ignored in decisions over Iraq.

- Snyder, Robert S.
The Myth of Preemption : More Than a War Against Iraq.
ORBIS, vol. 47, no. 4, Fall 2003, p. 653-660.
The Bush administration failed to make the case for war against Iraq in large part because it did not admit the true basis of the war, which was about more than Iraq. The administration may have been inhibited by its own intellectual confusion. In any case, focusing on an Iraqi threat, the Bush administration failed to advance the best arguments for war - which seem implicit if not obvious in hindsight. This paper discusses both the weaknesses in the administration's stated arguments for war and the flaws in the critics' alternative explanations. It then lays out the argument for concluding that three wider goals constituted the real basis for the war.

- Sorensen, Alan
The Reluctant Nation Builders.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 668, December 2003, p. 407-410.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
America has shown itself ill-prepared for reconstruction in Iraq. Multilateral institutions could do a better job of nation building, especially in regions where states crumble and terrorists find haven.

- Stansfield, Gareth
Farce or Future ?
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 4, April 2003, p. 7-9.
Washington's ultimate prize of changing the leadership of Iraq may be tantalisingly close. But the only policies which are coordinated and focused are those of its present President Saddam Hussein. The international community is fragmented and the Iraqi opposition in disarray. Indeed, the tensions between those ranged against Saddam are mounting in a manner perhaps more appropriate to a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta than a conflict which will arguably influence the political future of the Middle East. So what forces will be unleashed on the 'day after' ?

- Stansfield, Gareth
Who's Boss Around Here Anyway ?
WORLD TODAY, vol. 59, no. 7, July 2003, p. 6-8.
Regime change by force was the easy bit. Now comes the difficult task of finding a regime to govern Iraq. A kaleidoscope of forces has been unleashed with the end of Saddam Hussein's repression. They seem united in just one thing - opposition to American occupation.

- Stavrou, Nikolaos, A.
Reflections on an Elective War : Are We Safer Now ?
MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 14, no. 4, Fall 2003, p. 68-75.
<http://www.swetswise.com>

- Steinbach, Udo
The Iraqi Fata Morgana.
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, vol. 4, no. 3, Fall 2003, p. 75-80.
Optimists point to democratic elements in Turkey, Indonesia, and Iran to suggest that America's grand project of democratizing Iraq and the Middle East can succeed. Skeptics point to the dearth in Iraq of such democratic preconditions as a civil society and parties that represent anything more than traditional clan and tribal loyalties - and to the absence so far in Arab lands of the protodemocratic characteristics to be found in some non-Arab Islamic lands.

- Taheri, Amir
Demain l' Irak ...
POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 98, hiver 2002 - 2003, p. 291-299.
What exactly will happen after the fall of Saddam Hussein ? Since US military intervention in Iraq appears ineluctable, the question of succession following the removal of the dictator in Baghdad figures at the heart of every conversation in Washington. The Pentagon does not exclude an interim administration directly controlled by a US military governor, as was the case in Japan following the Second World War. The Pentagon is also considering a coalition government headed by Ahmad Chalabi, a veteran Shiite leader. The State Department and the CIA would prefer another candidate, general Majib al-Salhi, who heads the Iraqi 'Free Officers Movement'. All these solutions ignore the lessons of history, however. To mark a definitive break with a military regime, the first step is to ban uniforms. And to put an end to a dictatorship, it is essential to create conditions propitious to a true democracy as rapidly as possible.

- Taheri, Amir
 Irak : reponse aux anti-guerre.
 POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 101, automne 2003, p. 129-150.
 The liberation of Iraq sparked countless scandalized outcries from the self-proclaimed 'peace camp'. The problem is that a quick survey shows that this camp in fact comprises a diverse array of groups and individuals whose motivations are above all political and have little to do with Iraq. Having completed his census, the author identifies the 20 main arguments against the intervention by the US-British coalition, countering them one by one. Throughout his demonstration he contests all arguments of those who denigrated the war : the 'illegality' of the war, the 'hidden motivations' of the United States, the 'absence of proof' that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, etc. He concludes quite simply that Washington was completely justified in taking action. Better still, he has no qualms in stating that the fall of Saddam Hussein was a blessing for Iraq, for the region and for the entire world.

- Taheri, Amir
 Saddam ou comment s' en debarrasser.
 POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, no. 91, printemps 2001, p. 113-127.
 The UN embargo against Iraq has gradually lost steam over the years, so that today it only concerns the importation of weapons of mass destruction. For everything else, and especially for oil, Baghdad is free to export as much as it likes. The only limitations come from OPEC quotas. But to the great annoyance of Iraqi leaders, the UN still reserves the right to investigate the use of oil revenues. This explains the existence of the clandestine export circuits which allow Saddam Hussein to feed his secret coffers. As for the military sanctions, without observers on site no one can say if Saddam is reconstructing his war machine. So what good is it to maintain these relatively ineffective sanctions ? Should Saddam Hussein's liberty be restored, at the risk of destabilizing the region ? Or should a way be sought to eliminate Hussein ? Neither. The most reasonable solution is to maintain the status quo, even if it means a more effective application of the sanctions.

- Theros, Patrick
 Ruining the Neighborhood : War with Iraq and the Neighbors.
 MEDITERRANEAN QUARTERLY, vol. 14, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 12-24.
<http://www.swetswise.com>

- Touchard, Georges-Eric
 L' intervention en Irak : un faux debat pour de vraies questions ?
 DEFENSE NATIONALE, 59e annee, no. 4, avril 2003, p. 71-88.
 Au-dela de ses aspects conjoncturels et largement commentes, la crise actuelle autour de l' intervention en Irak exprime des donnees profondes qui sont rarement evoquees et que le present article recense et analyse avec un grand souci d'objectivite. Quelle qu'en soit l' issue, il est probable que cette crise fasse apparaitre un certain nombre de facteurs, nouveaux et importants, qui peseront desormais sur la gestion des crises et l' organisation future des relations internationales. L'auteur s'efforce de recenser et d' analyser ces donnees nouvelles.

- Tripp, Charles
 After Saddam.
 SURVIVAL, vol. 44, no. 4, Winter 2002 - 2003, p. 23-37.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
 If Saddam Hussein is overthrown by an internal coup, his regime could be succeeded by something similar, albeit with softer edges. A US-led invasion, however, could cause the United States to embark on an ambitious plan for 'state reconstruction'. In doing so, the stamina of the United States will be severely tested by the resistance of the 'shadow state', the lure of communal politics, the indispensability of the security forces and the temptations of massive oil revenues. Faced by

regional states determined to play a 'spoiler' role, the United States may reduce its exposure and accept much of the status quo in Iraq. Saddam would have gone, but the Iraqis would be left a government little more representative than they have at present.

- Ullman, Harlan
Shock and Awe Revisited.
RUSI JOURNAL, vol. 148, no. 3, June 2003, p. 10-14.
Shock and awe was a central ingredient in the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Did they work and did Saddam Hussein's leadership collapse largely due to those factors ? Or was 'shock and awe' merely a slogan designed to intimidate and panic the Iraqi leadership rather than actually defeat them ? And, in the future, aside from the obvious application of shock and awe in war, are there viable strategies and other means to apply those mechanisms in order to defeat an enemy rapidly and decisively and with minimum cost or are those unachievable outcomes ?

- Wimmer, Andreas
Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq.
SURVIVAL, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 111-133.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
When civil society in undeveloped, and when the state is too weak and poor to treat all citizens equally, democratisation may stir up rather than alleviate ethnic conflicts. Iraq had both of these disadvantages when it gained independence in 1932, and its political history since then has been characterised by increasing fragmentation and conflict along ethnic lines. There are institutional designs that may help in a democratic Iraq to prevent escalation of these conflicts : an electoral system that favours vote pooling across ethnic lines; federalism on a non-ethnic basis with a strong component of fiscal decentralisation; a strong regime of minority rights; and a judiciary apparatus capable of enforcing the rule of law. The UN is better suited than a US administration to provide outside support for the process of institutional transformation.

- Wither, James K.
British Bulldog or Bush's Poodle ? Anglo-American Relations and the Iraq War.
PARAMETERS, vol. 33, no. 4, Winter 2003 - 2004, p. 67-82.
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters>
The author reviews the 'special relationship' that exists between the United States and Britain, the habit of security cooperation between the two countries, Britain's perception of its world role, and the Blair government's genuine appraisal of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime - all bolstering Blair to stand firm against the outside forces (NATO and the greater Europe) which are exerting tremendous pressures on the United Kingdom and its Prime Minister. These pressures have the potential to destroy Prime Minister Blair's vision for the United Kingdom as a pivotal player in the future of the continent and its continuing relationship with the United States.

- Yaphe, Judith
Reinventing Iraq : The Regional Impact of US Military Action.
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, vol. 9, no. 4, December 2002, p. 25-34.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
As the United States prepares for a military confrontation with Iraq, several key questions emerge regarding how we build support for that effort and sustain it through the difficult period after Saddam and his regime are 'changed'.

- Yaphe, Judith S.
Iraq Before and After Saddam.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 660, January 2003, p. 7-12.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Iraq had a violent and unstable political culture before Saddam, and a stability bolstered by repression, fear, and wealth under Saddam. Could history repeat itself in Iraq ? Could the country produce another Saddam-like figure by replicating the conditions and circumstances that propelled him to power ? What historical factors shaped Saddam's thinking - and could shape his successor's as well ?

- Yaphe, Judith S.
Iraq : The Exception to the Rule.
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter 2001, p. 125-137.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Iraq may be a unique case. No president can afford to advocate a major change in Iraq policy. Washington needs policies now for the time when change comes to Iraq, for it will come unannounced and undeterred by outside events.

- Yaphe, Judith S.
Reclaiming Iraq from the Baathists.
CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 102, no. 669, January 2004, p. 11-16.
<http://www.swetswise.com>
Civil authorities need to figure out, and soon, how to purge the country of Saddam Hussein's brutal party without losing the technocrats, professionals, and army officers needed for reconstruction.

- Zaldivar, Carlos Alonso
Invasion de Irak, escenarios negros.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 17, no. 92, marzo - abril 2003, p. 41-60.
La incertidumbre que rodea un ataque armado contra Irak obliga a elaborar el mayor numero de escenarios posibles a fin de estimar las consecuencias de unas y otras variables.

- Zaldivar, Carlos Alonso
Irak, cronica de una guerra anunciada.
POLITICA EXTERIOR, vol. 16, no. 90, noviembre - diciembre 2002, p. 77-88.
No todo lo que hoy sucede en el mundo comenzo el-11-S. Cuando Bush llego a la Casa Blanca ya estaba convencido de que la influencia de su pais se habia debilitado. Su discurso en la ONU mostro las verdaderas intenciones del posible ataque a Irak.

- Zizek, Slavoj
Iraq's False Promises.
FOREIGN POLICY, no. 140, January - February 2004, p. 42-49.
If you want to know why the Bush administration invaded Iraq, read Freud's 'Interpretation of Dreams', not the National Security Strategy of the United States. Only the twisted logic of dreams can explain why the United States thinks the aggressive pursuit of contradictory goals - promoting democracy, affirming US hegemony, and ensuring stable energy supplies - will produce success.

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