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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

N A T O S E C R E T

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To: Secretary General
c.c.: Deputy Secretary General
ASG, Political Affairs
From: Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council held
on Monday, 11th January 1982 at 11.45 a.m.

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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND

T. Özçeri
T. ÖZÇERI

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ATTENDANCE:

Restricted

AGENDA:

No

MEETING PLACE:

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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND

3. Mr. HAIG (United States), after remarking on the importance of the present meeting, said that it was clear that events in Poland represented a damning comment on the inadequacy of the Soviet system. They should not be allowed also to use the occasion for unfavourable comments on the ability of the Allies to act together.

4. The Soviet Union stood to derive advantages, not only from the ongoing repression exercised over Poland, but also from what it perceived as Allied disunity. On previous occasions in Eastern Europe, such repression had been exercised at no cost to the Soviet Union and had not been reversed. It was most unfortunate that the Allies had not so far dealt effectively with these challenges.

5. The Soviet Union was showing an increasing tendency to use force, directly or through proxies, in order to solve its problems or gain advantages for itself. As far as Poland was concerned, freedom and reconciliation in that country were for this equally with the Polish Authorities. It was the Soviet Union which was insisting on repression and the Allies should endeavour to affect the conduct of the Soviet Union, not just of Poland.

6. Some gestures had recently been made by the Polish leadership, which had described them as progress. Real progress would of course be of great value, but artificial progress would have to be recognized. This was the case and this so-called progress was aimed at opinion in Western Europe and at dividing the Allies, some of them feeling that no action might be needed. Nevertheless, Poland was responding to measures taken by the United States and if feigned progress was being publicized, it should be possible to secure real progress as well.

7. The Allies should reach agreement on a shared set of objectives. The release of detainees should be a genuine one and not subject to conditions; the lifting of Martial Law would have to be genuine as well; and fundamental rights would have to be restored with real give and take among those concerned. Present events in Poland were not tolerable and the situation would have to improve if there were to be better relations with Poland and with the Soviet Union. It was quite clear that the Helsinki Final Act had been violated.

8. The United States intended to pursue arms control negotiations, but there, prospects would be affected if there was no change in the Polish situation. The Madrid Conference should be reconvened as soon as possible but under present circumstances, negotiations on a mandate for a CDE were excluded. INF discussions would resume but could advance satisfactorily only in a climate of confidence. For the present, it was not possible to maintain normal relations with the Soviet Union or with Poland. There was a need to reduce exchanges of different kinds with these two countries and to demonstrate to public opinion in both the East and the West the extent of the Allies' concern with respect to developments in Poland. On 30th January, there would be a day of solidarity with the Polish people and it was to be hoped that the Allied Governments could extend their support.

9. Economic measures represented an essential part of policy towards the two countries concerned; the United States had taken steps in this field with respect to Poland and the Soviet Union and it was to be hoped that the Allies would do so as well - or at least would not undercut measures taken by other nations. At the very least, commercial advantages gained by the Soviet Union in its exchanges with the West should be reduced to the minimum and consideration should be given to longer term East/West economic relations in the context of the security of the Allies. Any sanctions implemented should be reversible, as well as subject to modification, in the light of changes in the level of repression in Poland.

10. The declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the meeting would, Secretary Haig hoped, reflect agreement on an overall approach. Matters which could not be agreed upon during the present meeting should be the object of consultations in a Council meeting reinforced by Political and Economic Directors from capitals to be held at an early date.

11. It was essential to succeed during the day; otherwise, the result would only be to add a Western failure to an Eastern failure. Such a development would preclude gaining any respect from the Soviet Union or from the Western peoples; this was certainly true with respect to the United States people. The Allies should act together and lay the ground work for a more stable, secure and humane Europe.

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12. Mr. Haig then added that he intended to make an important speech in Brussels on the following day and already felt certain that he would be able to point to success in the present meeting. The need to take some collective action was an important political matter in the United States. Should the Allies fail to agree, the United States would act alone, but the consequences for all the Allies might well be serious.

13. The CHAIRMAN said that he had taken particular note of the point that the present disarray in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact over Poland should not be allowed to provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to foment disunity amongst the members of the Alliance.

14. LORD CARRINGTON (United Kingdom) welcomed the procedural proposals set out by Mr. Haig. He agreed that it was important not to allow the failure of the Soviet system as it had manifested itself in Poland to give rise to a crisis of confidence among the Western Allies. The present meeting had been the subject of considerable speculation by the media, and anything other than an early consensus would be interpreted as incohesion on the part of the West.

15. As far as the general situation was concerned, he agreed with Mr. Haig that the repressive measures resorted to by the Polish Authorities represented a grave infringement of individual liberties, in which the extent of Soviet complicity was evident. Faced with this situation, the West must continue to insist upon the lifting of Martial Law and a return to the process of reform, while impressing upon the Polish Authorities that a return to "business as usual" would only be possible once detainees had been released and a dialogue re-established. At the same time, there was a need to make it abundantly clear that any further involvement by the Soviet Union would have serious consequences for East/West relations.

16. Introducing the United Kingdom's draft amendment to paragraph 11 of the Communiqué, he said that, in his view, there was a need for the Communiqué to mention actions to be taken in the context of the Madrid Conference, as well as possible retaliation in the economic field and restrictions on the movements of diplomats. He did not believe that uniform actions were essential, but by their joint declaration the Allies must demonstrate their intention to take sensible but effective measures if the situation did not improve. He suggested that while details could be elaborated later, a statement of the agreed position of the Allies was required without further delay.

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17. Finally, he welcomed the amendments proposed to paragraphs 12-16 by the United States as a strengthening of the original text. However, he would suggest that the last sentence of paragraph 16 be deleted.

18. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the prospects for an early re-convening of the Madrid meeting had been discussed by Permanent Representatives a week earlier, when it had been concluded that it was unlikely that a consensus in favour of re-opening the meeting before the scheduled date would be found.

19. Nevertheless, he agreed that the West would do well to request officially that the meeting be re-convened early, and that in any event, the Allies should be represented as far as possible at the level of Ministers.

20. Mr. GONCALVES PEREIRA (Portugal) said that Portugal accepted the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States. He pointed out that Portugal had already decided to take retaliatory measures of the kind described in the United Kingdom draft, mainly with regard to restrictions on numbers of Soviet and Polish Embassy personnel.

21. He went on to regret that, since the declaration of Martial Law on 13th December, there had been some divergence in the views expressed by Allied Governments and this had led to a certain amount of public misunderstanding. A particularly disturbing development had been the continued speculation that there might be a meeting between the Heads of State of the United States and the Soviet Union, in view of the consequences which such a meeting might have on the sanctions to be applied.

22. The CHAIRMAN said that while a meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Brezhnev could not be ruled out in the light of the gravity of the situation, it was unlikely to take place before the summer of 1982.

23. Mr. HAIG said that while the United States recognized the need to maintain a dialogue in times of crisis and tension, a summit meeting to discuss the Polish situation was regarded by Washington as a quite separate problem. In the Administration's view, such a meeting would not be appropriate at this time, particularly since he himself was due to meet Mr. Gromyko on 26th/27th January.

24. M. TINDEMANS (Belgique) considère que la situation en Pologne reste aussi peu satisfaisante que possible; les droits de l'homme, les libertés individuelles et syndicales, continuent

d'être violés; les dispositions de l'Acte Final et les clauses de la Convention de Vienne ne sont pas respectées. Mais ce serait, à son avis, une erreur que d'y voir la seule influence néfaste d'un pays totalitaire; il s'agit davantage du poids de tout un système incapable d'évolution.

25. Il souligne que la Belgique est très attachée aux principes de la non-ingérence dans les affaires des états, mais à condition qu'il s'agisse d'affaires intérieures, ce qui n'est pas le cas en Pologne. Une politique de non-intervention n'implique pas l'indifférence à l'égard d'un peuple et de justes protestations ne peuvent être taxées d'ingérence, comme le fait actuellement l'URSS, sans doute pour cacher sa propre intervention dans les affaires polonaises. Quelle que soit la difficulté de porter un jugement sur la position exacte du Général Jaruzelski vis-à-vis de l'URSS, il lui paraît clair que celle-ci porte une lourde responsabilité dans la répression qui s'est instaurée en Pologne depuis le 13 décembre et qu'elle peut être légitimement mise en cause.

26. Quant aux actions à envisager dans les circonstances présentes, il rappelle que lors de leur réunion du 4 janvier, les Dix se sont déclarés d'accord dans leur analyse de la situation et sur les trois objectifs à atteindre, que Lord Carrington vient de rappeler: la libération des détenus, la reprise du dialogue entre le gouvernement, Solidarité et l'Eglise, la levée de loi martiale. Jusqu'à ce que ces trois conditions soient remplies, aucun nouvel engagement d'aide financière ne devra être souscrit vis-à-vis de la Pologne et l'aide économique devra sans doute subir le même traitement. En revanche, il est favorable au maintien de l'aide alimentaire et de l'aide humanitaire, qui devraient être distribuées suivant les vœux des donateurs et à condition que des garanties suffisantes aient été obtenues quant à sa distribution.

27. Vis-à-vis de l'URSS, c'est la politique commerciale qui lui paraît l'instrument le plus efficace. Pour ce qui concerne les Dix, cette politique s'exercera dans le cadre de la Communauté Européenne. D'autres mesures économiques pourraient également être envisagées par les pays membres dans le cadre de leur législation nationale.

28. Sur le plan international, il pense que c'est d'abord la Conférence de la CSCE à Madrid qui doit être saisie des violations contre l'acte Final d'Helsinki. Il faut que l'URSS comprenne que cet Acte est un tout dont l'équilibre ne peut être maintenu si toutes ses dispositions ne sont pas respectées. Il faut aussi qu'elle comprenne que si l'évolution actuelle se poursuivait, l'opinion publique ne pourrait comprendre et accepter que la Conférence de Madrid débouche sur des résultats positifs, qui seraient alors

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dépourvus de crédibilité. Il pense que l'on doit également agir aux Nations-Unies et dans leurs organismes spécialisés, tels que l'Organisation Internationale du Travail et l'UNESCO. Pour ce qui concerne les violations de la Convention de Vienne, il suggère d'appliquer aux ambassades de Pologne dans les pays de l'Alliance un traitement de réciprocité.

29. Il y paraît enfin essentiel de veiller à ce que ce qui est visiblement une crise du système totalitaire de l'Est ne se transforme pas en une crise au sein de l'Alliance. Les différences qui existent dans l'attitude adoptée par chacun de ses membres ne doivent pas porter atteinte à sa cohésion. Son pays souscrit pleinement à l'idée que, dans le cadre de la consultation, chacun s'efforce d'éviter toute action qui puisse compromettre l'action de ses partenaires. Il ajoute que les possibilités d'un dialogue avec l'Union Soviétique et les autres pays du Pacte de Varsovie doivent être maintenues dans la mesure où elles serviront les objectifs alliés. Dans cet esprit il souscrit pleinement au texte proposé par le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis pour le Communiqué.

30. Mr. TURKMEN (Turkey) agreed with those of his colleagues who had pointed to the obvious nature of the connivance of the Soviet Union. He could also agree that there was at present a need for an effective demonstration of unity and solidarity. He was able to support the draft texts for paragraphs 11-16 of the declaration, as presented by his United Kingdom and United States colleagues, but said that he wished to call attention to the special position of Turkey. Turkey was a developing nation in the economic sense and would therefore be unable to undertake measures which could harm the Soviet Union. A further consideration was that his country had a long common frontier with the Soviet Union and had to maintain a certain degree of stability in its relations with Moscow. Turkey would, however, comply with common measures in so far as they were compatible with these considerations.

31. There was a further problem for Turkey with respect to public opinion. Some Allies had quite irrelevantly drawn comparisons between the situations in Turkey and in Poland and had even disregarded recent announcements made in Ankara as to the declared schedule for a return to parliamentary democracy. Some of the Allies even extended assistance to Poland but had withdrawn aid to Turkey. Such attitudes represented a serious constraint on the public position which the Turkish Government could adopt on the Polish situation.

32. The CHAIRMAN agreed that there did seem to be an element of contradiction in some of the positions adopted.

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33. Mr. COLOMBO (Italy) said that his Government's judgement on the situation in Poland was similar to those presented earlier by his colleagues. The situation was regarded as particularly serious because of the clear violations of the Final Act. Some means would have to be found for securing a response to the requirements for the lifting of Martial Law, the freeing of detainees, the resumption of basic rights - particularly Trade Union rights - and the resumption of a dialogue in Poland involving the Government, the Unions and the Church.

34. It was impossible not to stress the share of Soviet responsibility in recent events. The Allies should make quite clear their awareness of this connection and should call attention to the impact which the present situation could have on East/West relations as a whole. Accordingly, he would hope that the declaration to be issued after the meeting would refer to the possible deleterious effect on present negotiations.

35. With respect to economic and diplomatic measures, Mr. Colombo said that he could support the drafts circulated by the United Kingdom and the United States for paragraphs 11-16 of the declaration. If all his colleagues wished to delete the last sentence of paragraph 16 of the draft, he would not object.

36. A point of particular importance was the need for rapid action and for providing accurate information to the public through the unity of the Allied position. The greatest advantage at the disposal of the Soviet Union was a perception of a lack of Allied unity and this should be dispelled.

37. Mr. OLESEN (Denmark) reiterated the adherence of the Danish Government to the conclusion of EEC Foreign Ministers that the aim of the West should be to further a political solution whereby Solidarity, the Catholic Church and the Polish Government should establish a dialogue with the aim of continuing the policy of reform which had been so abruptly stopped by the declaration of Martial Law.

38. He recalled that in deploring the situation in Poland, Western countries had used various arguments, invoking the Helsinki Final Act and the principles of freedom and democracy.

39. However, it should be remembered that such arguments, although justified in the case of the military régime in Poland, could well be used against all military régimes. In order to be true to their ideals, the Allies could ill-afford to give the appearance of maintaining double standards in dealing with military régimes and in deploring violations of human rights.

40. He fully agreed that the Alliance should emerge from the present meeting with a cohesive and united position on the Polish situation. He believed that the West should maintain, and even increase its pressure on Poland and the Soviet Union, since it was evident that Moscow bore a very heavy responsibility in the present situation. He believed that it was equally important to intensify Allied consultations on this subject and to endeavour to find practical means to adapt them, if necessary, to the changing situation.

41. Mr. SVENN STRAY (Norway) said it was evident that the Soviet Union's rôle in the Polish crisis and Moscow's responsibility for what was happening in Poland could not be ignored. At the same time, the Polish Authorities themselves were far from free to blame, but it was clear that the course of events would have been very different had the Polish people been allowed to decide their future for themselves.

42. Faced with this situation, the West could not maintain normal relations with Poland and the Soviet Union as if nothing had happened. We believed that all of the Allies agreed on the need to work for the release of detainees, the lifting of Martial Law and the re-opening of a dialogue between the parties concerned. The Allies must demonstrate their willingness to pursue those objectives by various political and economic means.

43. The United States would take the lead in applying sanctions, and their Allies should acknowledge that fact with appreciation. However, he assumed that the United States Government would agree that in many respects it was in a better position to act in retaliation than its European Allies, particularly from the point of view of avoiding damaging its own interests. In considering measures to be taken against the Polish and Soviet Governments in the weeks to come, the Allies should remember that sanctions could only be effective if they harmed the Soviet system more than the Allies themselves.

44. A first step would be to exercise political pressure by issuing individual or collective declarations of condemnation. In this respect, he believed that it was important to agree on a statement at the present meeting clarifying Western concerns and warnings to the Soviet Union against further intervention.

45. Secondly, the Allies should undertake demarches in Moscow and other East European capitals. In this context, he reported that a Norwegian protest note already delivered to Moscow had been ill received by the Soviet Vice Foreign Minister who had claimed that Norway was "as usual, two horse lengths ahead of the United States".

46. Thirdly, Western countries should use all appropriate international fora to make their views known. The most immediate opportunity was afforded by the reconvening of the CSCE Madrid Conference. He recognized that an early meeting was unlikely to be agreed, but believed that it was important that the Allies should agree to be represented by their Foreign Ministers at the opening scheduled in February, so as to set out clearly their views of the consequences of the Polish situation.

47. In the field of economic measures, he believed that the proposals contained in the United States draft were generally acceptable.

48. With regard to the United Kingdom proposal, he had certain doubts as to the measures proposed under sub-paragraph 11 (a) but was prepared to accept the proposed text if there was a majority in its favour.

49. Finally, he disagreed with the implication in his Danish colleague's statement that all military régimes should be treated in the same way. Indeed, he did not believe that it would be productive to enter into that discussion at the present meeting, but suggested that the Allies should rather review their own records on human rights so as to ensure that none of them could ever be accused of not honouring the Helsinki Final Act.

50. M. CHEYSSON (France) rappelle que dès le 13 décembre, la crise polonaise a soulevé dans l'opinion française une émotion à la mesure de l'espoir qu'avaient éveillé les réformes intervenues depuis juillet 1980. Chacun a compris qu'il s'agissait d'une évolution grave et fondamentale affectant l'homme dans sa possibilité de dominer les systèmes. Il souscrit pleinement à tout ce qui a été dit concernant l'impossibilité d'accepter sans réagir les violations des droits de l'homme qui se poursuivent en Pologne. Il reconnaît également la nécessité de définir clairement les préalables qu'il conviendra de mettre à la reprise d'une coopération avec ce pays. Ces préalables ont été définis par les Dix: levée de l'état de siège, libération des prisonniers, retour aux libertés et en particulier aux libertés syndicales. Il voudrait d'ailleurs que la mention des libertés syndicales apparaisse dans le Communiqué. De même la manière dont le paragraphe 13 proposé par les Etats-Unis traite des relations économiques avec la Pologne lui paraît la plus appropriée.

51. Il considère que c'est le système de l'Union Soviétique qui, par sa logique même, a provoqué ces réactions et qu'il doit être condamné de façon catégorique. C'est pourquoi il souhaite que la reprise de la Conférence de Madrid soit une occasion de le faire et que des délégations occidentales soient représentées au niveau

ministériel. Ainsi, les opinions publiques pourront mieux comprendre les fondements de la position occidentale, et en particulier de la politique de défense de l'Alliance qui correspond à la situation présente. Il est également d'accord pour mentionner les mesures à prendre afin que les négociations sur le contrôle des armements soient possibles et fructueuses. Par ailleurs, vis-à-vis des autres pays de l'Est, il lui paraît intéressant que le texte proposé par les Etats-Unis note que chaque pays agira suivant sa situation propre et que les mesures à long terme devront faire l'objet de réflexion.

52. Ceci dit, il ne voit pas la nécessité de la dernière phrase du paragraphe 16 proposé par les Etats-Unis, qui parle de "nouvelles mesures". Enfin, en ce qui concerne la proposition des Etats-Unis concernant une réunion du Conseil assisté par les Directeurs des affaires économiques des pays membres, il fait observer que de par ses attributions jusqu'ici le Conseil n'a pas eu à discuter de problèmes spécifiquement économiques. Il comprend que la composition des délégations est à la discrétion des autorités nationales; mais il ne lui paraît pas souhaitable que l'émotion justifiée suscitée par la crise polonaise entraîne une extension des compétences du Conseil. Il ajoute que dans la semaine envisagée pour cette réunion renforcée, les Directeurs des affaires économiques seront très occupés par une réunion du Comité Exécutif de l'OCDE et par une réunion du COCOM.

53. Le PRESIDENT reconnaît que des mesures concrètes à prendre dans le domaine économique devront être discutées dans d'autres enceintes. Il tient toutefois à rappeler qu'aux termes de l'article 2 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, le Conseil a certaines compétences en matière économique.

54. Lord CARRINGTON speaking on behalf of the Chairmanship of the Group of NATO Ambassadors in Warsaw, said that the Ambassadors had met earlier in the day to decide whether they should attend the Polish President's New Year Party. All except the Italian Ambassador - who had been unable to be present - had agreed that they should not go to this ceremony, nor should they be represented. The Ambassadors had asked for the Ministers' views of this decision.

55. The CHAIRMAN added that there would also be receptions given by Polish Embassies in other capitals and the Allies' reaction should be the same everywhere. No doubt the Council would support the stand recommended by the Ambassadors in Warsaw.

56. Mr. COLOMBO extended his support to the decision taken by the Ambassadors.

57. Mr. HARALAMBOPOULOS (Greece) pointed out that each Government should decide for itself whether it would be represented at celebrations of this kind.

58. Madame FLESCHE (Luxembourg) s'associe à tout ce qui a été dit concernant la gravité de la situation en Pologne et les possibilités d'action. Elle approuve en particulier l'idée que lors de la reprise des travaux à la Conférence de Madrid les délégations alliées soient représentées au niveau ministériel. Elle est d'accord pour une réunion renforcée du Conseil de l'OTAN afin d'examiner les mesures à prendre dans le domaine économique, étant entendu que chaque délégation sera composée comme l'entendront les autorités nationales.

59. Pour ce qui concerne le Communiqué final, elle peut sans difficulté approuver les textes proposés par le Royaume-Uni et les Etats-Unis pour les paragraphes 11 à 16. Le projet de paragraphe 13, en particulier lui paraît habile et utile. Elle exprime sa satisfaction de ce que le paragraphe 14 reconnaisse que chacun des alliés agira selon sa situation et sa législation propre. Néanmoins tout en reconnaissant la nécessité de laisser à chaque Etat toute latitude d'agir dans le cadre des procédures qui lui sont propres, elle souhaite que l'unité de vues indispensable de l'Alliance soit pleinement reconnue.

60. Mr. VAN DER STOEL (Netherlands) remarked that events in Poland had caused considerable emotion in the Netherlands. The Allies would have to keep up their insistence on the three basic requirements which had already been outlined.

61. There had been a good deal of speculation about possible dissension between the United States and the Western European Allies, but statements made by his colleagues showed that it had been exaggerated. It was true that evaluations differed in some respects, but all the Allies condemned the events in Poland and agreed on the part played by the Soviet Union, particularly in the case of Soviet pressure. Nevertheless, he did not think that General Jaruzelski should be regarded as simply a Soviet puppet.

62. Arms control negotiations should be continued, albeit in a necessarily less favourable climate. He would recall that these negotiations were not intended to provide advantages to the Soviet Union - they were, on the contrary, in the interests of the West. As for the CSCE, it seemed unlikely that a special meeting would be held or that the scheduled meeting would be brought forward, but Ministers could nevertheless go to Madrid on the scheduled date and explain their positions. He himself would favour such action. It was clear that there had been evident and grave violations of the Helsinki Final Act in Poland. At the same time, he wished to support the remark made by his Danish colleague to the effect that statements made in this context would have a greater impact if all the Allies ensured that their records of implementation of the Final Act were impeccable.

63. As for the declaration, the attitude of the Netherlands Government had been best illustrated in paragraph 10 of the Communiqué issued after the recent meeting of the Ten. Apart from steps which would be taken in the United Nations and its specialized Agencies, the Netherlands would consider other possible measures in the light of the developing situation in Poland. If that situation improved, the Netherlands reaction would be different from what it would be if the situation remained unchanged or deteriorated. In fact, recent events gave little hope for early improvement.

64. Mr. HARALAMBOPOULOS recalled that the position of his Government had been stated at the beginning of the Polish crisis and it had not changed: it represented an attitude of caution and a wish to wait for the situation to be clarified. In the meantime, harsh steps should not be taken; if they were, this might direct events towards an outcome which would prove to be undesirable. Great caution should be exercised, failing which steps taken might only make the situation worse.

65. The Greek Government had already publicly condemned developments in Poland, in particular the institution of Martial Law, the restriction on human rights and on trade union freedoms, the mass arrests and the suspension of dialogue. Greece had also made clear its understanding that Soviet pressure had been involved and that the Soviet Union had been kept fully informed of developments, but it should be pointed out that, so far, there had been no direct Soviet intervention in the legal sense. Greece firmly supported the principles set out in the Helsinki Final Act and opposed their violation. In particular, Greece could not countenance any direct intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

66. There were some hopes and indications that the situation would improve, even if it could not be said that the process of normalization had begun. The military régime in Poland had given some undertakings and it therefore seemed unlikely that restrictive measures against Poland or other Eastern countries would help to resolve the situation. On the contrary, they might well undermine efforts being made towards disarmament and détente, in particular the Geneva negotiations.

67. It was with appreciation that he had heard several previous speakers stress the need for each nation to consider possible action in the light of its own circumstances. For Greece, for example, the economic situation meant that any economic measures would have to be considered with the greatest care. Indeed, these internal difficulties represented a reason in themselves for excluding adoption of sanctions or economic measures. However - and although the decision had been a hard one to reach - Greece would not undermine measures adopted by other Allies.

68. As for the declaration, although the draft texts circulated were generally acceptable, Greece could not support two aspects. The first of these was the criticism of political systems, which was not appropriate; the second was the question of sanctions. As far as the first point was concerned, it should not be forgotten that the political system in question was a widespread and well known one.

69. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the draft paragraph 11 of the declaration made it quite clear that each nation could decide individually on what steps it would take. A similar point had been made in the draft paragraph 14 presented by the United States.

70. Mr. GENSCHER (Germany) welcomed the fact that the draft Communiqué, as amended by the United Kingdom and United States proposals, now represented a more resolute expression of Alliance objectives and highlighted in no uncertain terms the causes of recent events in Poland. There was little doubt that the roots of the present situation were to be found in a crisis of confidence in the Communist system. Whatever the outcome of the present situation, he regretted that this would not be the last case of its kind. It was a fact that one of the greatest threats to stability in Europe was the increasing conflict between the desire for self-determination among the peoples of Eastern Europe and the harsh realities of Soviet ideology. He believed that this factor must be taken into account in Alliance assessments of developments in Poland and should be reflected in the text of the Communiqué. Similarly, there should be a joint declaration on the part of the Allies underlining the heavy responsibility borne by the Soviet Union in the present crisis.

71. He went on to recall that Germany had always been amongst those who were opposed to any interruption in the CSCE process because of events in Poland. Germany believed that the gravity of the problem necessitated even more than ever the continuation of a dialogue, and therefore was of the view that the Madrid meeting should be reconvened as soon as possible at Ministerial level. He personally intended to be present in Madrid and he did not believe that there would be any disadvantage for NATO if all of the Allies were represented at the Ministerial level, if the Warsaw Pact was not. Any decision on Western participation at Ministerial level should be taken irrespective of the position adopted by the Warsaw Pact.

72. It was clear that the Allies were agreed that their aims should be to secure the lifting of Martial Law, the release of prisoners and the resumption of a dialogue. The decisions announced

on the previous day by the Polish régime with regard to the re-establishment of telecommunications and a limited relaxation of censorship had no doubt been taken to influence the present meeting, but none of them responded to the points which the West believed to be essential.

73. He recalled that the German Government had always attached great importance to the statements of the Catholic Church on its assessment of the situation. It was evident that the concern of Church representatives had grown because the behaviour of the Polish Authorities gave grounds to assume that the present situation was not temporary but represented a complete revocation of everything which had been achieved before 13th December. It would remain to be seen whether recent Soviet economic aid to Poland had been made dependant on the maintenance of Warsaw's present hard line policy. He believed that the statements by the Pope on 6th and 10th January showed that the situation continued to deteriorate.

74. He went on to say that Germany would welcome inclusion in the Communiqué of a commitment to the pursuit of INF arms control negotiations, which were regarded as a special area, as President Reagan himself had said. The retaliatory measures to be adopted by the Western Allies should be decided upon according to the effect which they would have upon the predicament of the Polish people.

75. He believed that the Alliance had not only a right, but a duty to attempt to influence events in Poland. He based this position firstly on the fact that Poland was a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act, and secondly on the undertakings by the Polish leadership, not only to its own population but also to EEC Ambassadors, to return to the policy of renewal and reform when the crisis was over. The Polish Authorities should not be allowed to forget this commitment.

76. At the same time, the Western Allies owed it themselves to prevent the failure of the Communist system in Poland from producing an artificial crisis in the Alliance, which would provide an easy target for those who would pretend that disunity existed between the Allies, and would divert attention from the dire situation of the Polish people.

77. Turning to the text of the amendment proposed by the United States, he suggested that the first sentence of paragraph 14 be deleted, since his country had at no time offered the Soviet Union advantages in bilateral trade, and any nations who had done so should take note of this observation for their own purposes.

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78. Finally, he endorsed the call by his United Kingdom colleague for early approval of the Communiqué as a demonstration of Alliance cohesion and unity in the face of the critical Polish situation.

79. Mr. HALSTEAD (Canada), after apologizing for the absence of his Minister owing to the bad weather, said that he could support those who had expressed the view that the Allies should concentrate on reaching agreement on their objectives - the first of which was Alliance solidarity - although perceptions of the situation might sometimes differ. The maintenance of this solidarity, which did not imply uniformity of action, was dependent on the intensity of the consultations which took place and on their timing: whenever possible, they should be ensured before national decisions were taken.

80. The second objective should be to assist the resumption of the conciliation process in Poland, in accordance with the principles governing human rights. This suggested that a "carrot and stick" approach should be adopted in order to secure implementation of the three requirements which had been mentioned and in particular, it implied maintaining the maximum degree of deterrence against Soviet armed intervention.

81. A further point was the need to avoid undermining measures which had already been taken and Canada, for its part, had already given bilateral assurances to that effect to the United States. Further measures would have to be considered on a continuous basis but for the time being, he did not think that there was any need for the Allies to reach a common decision on sanctions. The Allies should, however, clearly recognize the Soviet share in the responsibility for events in Poland and should do nothing which might increase the rôle played by Moscow.

82. Mr. Halstead then went on to point out that Canada was Poland's sixth largest creditor, represented an important source of food imports to Poland and was a common destination for Polish emigrants.

83. With respect to diplomatic measures, Canadian policy was to join with the Allies in measures taken with respect to the CSCE and in the International Labour Organization. As for economic measures, Canada would consider these but could not yet adopt any. Finally, Canada would play its full part in helping to solve any problem which might arise with refugees from Poland.

84. The CHAIRMAN repeated that the declaration included no obligation for any Ally to adopt any particular measure.

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85. Mr. HELGASON (Iceland), after conveying his Minister's regrets at being unable to attend the meeting, said that he could agree with the views of previous speakers with respect to events in Poland and to the responsibility which had to be borne for them. He was able to accept the draft texts for the declaration, together with the amendments which had been proposed.

86. He would, however, invite the Council to take note of the special position of Iceland with regard to economic measures. This was due to the pattern of trade between Iceland and the Soviet Union.

87. Mr. HARALAMBOPOULOS, referring to both paragraphs 11 and 12 of the drafts proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States respectively, stated that Greece was opposed to economic sanctions being taken against the Soviet Union for its rôle with regard to Poland. His Government felt that such a policy might only serve to make the situation even more difficult and possibly lead to a confrontation between the two super powers. Consequently, he could not agree to the present wording of the text and would have to place a reservation on both paragraphs.

88. The CHAIRMAN stated that paragraph 11 merely identified possibilities for the Allies for further action. It would be left to nations to take a decision on any measures or sanctions they deemed appropriate. In this connection, he added that the United States had proposed to hold a meeting the following week with experts from capitals to define further fields for possible sanctions as outlined in paragraph 11.

89. MINISTERS then went on to discuss the final draft of the Communiqué in its entirety.

90. Mr. GENSCHER, referring to the penultimate sentence in paragraph 3 on which the Greek Delegation wished to place a reservation, stated that he felt this sentence should not only be retained but slightly modified. Neither Poland nor Czechoslovakia formed part of Eastern Europe but were in Central Europe. He therefore felt "Eastern European régimes" should as a minimum be changed to read "Warsaw Pact régimes".

91. Turning to paragraph 4, and the proposed Greek amendment to the final sentence, he felt that it was important that the Council, as a semi-public body, should not show any dissent which might be misunderstood by the public. The fact that the Soviet Union did not have the right to determine the political and social development of Poland was not open to debate. He therefore appealed to his Greek colleague to accept the text as it stood particularly as the proposed formulation reflected agreed Alliance policy of some time standing.

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92. Mr. HARALAMBOPOULOS replied that this amendment had been proposed since paragraph 6 already covered the essence of the final sentence in paragraph 4. However, he could accept the text as proposed provided the words "of intimidation and threats" in the first sentence were deleted; which was accepted by the Council.

93. Mr. HAIG stated that the preference expressed by the Netherlands to refer to military intervention rather than interference in paragraph 8 ran the risk of appearing more threatening than had originally been intended. He therefore felt that some compromise formula was preferable to a rigid formula on arms control particularly as nations had reaffirmed their commitment to the arms control process. Such an approach would not only convince the Soviet Union that as long as they continued their present course of action with regard to Poland, arms control negotiations would not be effective but also that, should they intervene in Poland, arms control talks would be terminated.

94. Mr. GENSCHER stated that he had a great deal of sympathy with the Netherlands position. He agreed that arms control was a specific matter and one on which the Alliance should take a clear stand. The United States maintained that the present behaviour by the Soviets in Poland did not affect arms control negotiations and even military intervention in Poland would not necessarily cause these talks to be terminated. Arms control was therefore a matter of mutual understanding. Germany had always maintained that these negotiations did not constitute a gift to the East but should be balanced and reciprocal. His Government could therefore accept both versions of the text as proposed.

95. Mr. HAIG stated that he fully recognized that arms control was viewed as a special category of negotiations and one which only the most unusual circumstances could influence. However, he reiterated that this end would be better served by ambiguous language in the Communiqué. If the events in Poland and particularly any military intervention were directly linked to arms control negotiations then the psychological and political pressure on the Soviet Union would consequently be weakened. He would therefore propose instead of interference "its actions with regard to Poland".

96. Following this exchange of views MINISTERS approved the text of a declaration circulated under reference M-1(82)1, subject to the reservations expressed by Greece, relating to paragraphs 3, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16.