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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

N A T O S E C R E T

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*Alisca*  
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To : Secretary General  
cc: Deputy Secretary General  
Acting ASG, Political Affairs  
From : Acting Deputy Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council held on  
Thursday, 31st December, 1981 at 10.30 am

Chairman: Mr. E. da Rin

I. VISIT TO BONN OF THE POLISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER



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*[Handwritten signature]*  
A. SYNADINOS

This document consists of: 9 pages

N A T O S E C R E T

N A T O      S E C R E T

-2-

PR(81)85

ATTENDANCE

Restricted

AGENDA

Yes

MEETING PLACE

Room 1

N A T O      S E C R E T

-2-

N A T O   S E C R E T

-3-

PR(81)85I.      VISIT TO BONN OF THE POLISH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

1.    The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. M. Rakowski had paid a two day visit to Bonn. He had arrived on Wednesday 30th December and had had a four hour talk with Mr. Genscher. He had also met leaders of the political parties in the Bundestag (Wischniewski for the DPC, Mischnick for the Liberals and A. Mertes for the CDU). He had left on 31st December.

2.    He went on to say that Mr. Rakowski had explained to Mr. Genscher that the situation in his country had developed in such a manner that a civil war, which would have resulted in a Soviet intervention was not excluded. In the circumstances, Martial Law was the best solution. He had taken great pain in presenting this decision as a purely national decision.

3.    As for the machinery of the military power, he had explained that all decisions were taken in a circle under General Jaruzelski, with three generals on the military side and four civilians, himself, Olszowski, Bardokovski and the Deputy Prime Minister, responsible for economic affairs.

4.    He had handed over to Mr. Genscher a letter of Olszowski approving of his visit to Bonn. He had also said that the Chancellor could expect a reply from Jaruzelski within a few days.

5.    Mr. Genscher had repeated on several occasions that the FRG moderate language should not be misunderstood. His country was extremely concerned with the fate of the Polish people and expected serious efforts to be made to return to a reform policy. What he would expect as a clear signal from the Polish leaders would be the resumption of the dialogue with the Church and Solidarity, including Walesa, the release of prisoners and the abolition of the Martial Law. He had stressed that a clear signal was expected from Warsaw before the meeting of the Ten on 4th January to discuss Polish events.

6.    Rakowski had replied that the Polish leadership was aware that it had to give such a signal. He had given assurance that the Polish Government would soon make a declaration on its intended programme. He had agreed that Martial Law was no solution to the present situation, and that Poland in the 80's could not be conceived without Solidarity. He had a positive opinion of the role of the Church which was even more important at present than on 13th December. But Walesa, whom he knew well, had not been well advised and had overestimated his possibilities. In August 1980, the Polish Communist Party had failed in its duties by arrogance; but in December 1981, Solidarity had made the same mistake. It was, he felt, a historical failure of the Poles that they always tended to go too far.

7.    He had tried to play down the role of the Soviet Union in the Polish leadership's decisions by saying that measures taken so far were of a purely Polish character. He had just once mentioned the possibility of a Soviet intervention in case of civil war. On economic prospects, he had expressed dim views, but had made no request. He had only emphasized that, should the economic and industrial links between the West and Poland be cut off, the situation in his country would become even more difficult.

8.    Finally, he had said that security forces had received strict orders not to use arms against the population. They had been used once in a coal mine and those responsible for this action which had not been authorised were being prosecuted.

N A T O   S E C R E T

9. Mr. Genscher had again stressed the three conditions put forward by the West for a normalisation of relations with Poland and also the need for a signal especially in view of the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting.

10. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that this was only a preliminary report and that his Authorities had not yet drawn conclusions from these talks. He would do his best to make a fuller report as soon as possible. For the time being, one of the major conclusions, he felt, was that the Polish leadership could not claim that it had not been warned of the serious concern and of the forthcoming meetings in the West.

11. The CHAIRMAN, supported by all subsequent speakers, expressed the Council's deep appreciation for this prompt account of the talks between Mr. Genscher and Mr. Rakowski and for the way in which Mr. Genscher had underlined the concerns and objectives of the Allied countries.

12. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he wished to raise the three following questions:

- It was the first time that he had heard of this Committee of four military and four civilians to take decisions in Poland. So far he had had the impression that the military had full control of the Administration procedures under Martial Law. This seemed to show that civilians had been brought back into the picture.
- Had Rakowski mentioned the three "Task forces" recently created in Warsaw?
- Had Mr. Genscher been able to form an opinion about Rakowski's position and future? According to the Financial Times, Rakowski, as the unofficial spokesman of the Party's reform wing, would need more than dexterity to survive the political minefield awaiting for him at home and his visit to Bonn might well be the last action of a man under fire.

13. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that it had also been the first time that his Authorities had heard about this decision making group of eight people, which seemed in charge of preparing decisions to be implemented by official organs. He went on to say that Rakowski had said nothing about task forces; they were probably related to this governmental programme to be announced shortly. As for Rakowski's personal position, he pointed out that it was not very likely that such a delicate mission in a foreign country would have been entrusted to someone almost out of power. However, he had also noted the fact that Rakowski had produced a letter from Olszowski which sponsored and authorised his mission, which seemed to indicate some rivalry for sharing power among the Polish leaders.

14. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked whether Rakowski had seen the German political leaders at his own request and whether such meetings were considered useful by the German Government. He had noted that Rakowski had made no request for economic aid. Had he made any reference to food and humanitarian aid and to the willingness of Polish Authorities to cooperate in the proper channelling of this aid?

15. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would seek clarification in Bonn about the first question. He pointed out however that it was customary practice to suggest to high ranking visitors in the FRG to meet with leading personalities of the Bundestag. Rakowski had planned to return to Warsaw on

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

N A T O   S E C R E T

-5-

PR(81)85

30th December and had stayed until the 31st, in order to have the opportunity to meet the three political leaders.

15. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he had been struck by the prominent role that Olszowski was playing. This might indicate that a certain balance of power existed in Warsaw at the moment. Olszowski, who was reported as a hardliner, seemed to show more flexibility in dealing with other sectors of the Polish society.

16. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE wondered whether the dispatch of Rakowski to Bonn could not be interpreted as a tactic from Jaurzelski, to show that he was not running the country with the sole help of his military collaborators and that for such a delicate mission he was relying on a leading member of the civilian apparatus.

17. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that so far not much had been said about the role of civilians in the new regime. He could not help feeling that Rakowski had been sent to Bonn in a "selling job" and that he had, on purpose, softened the conditions for the termination of the Martial Law. He saw some difference with what Jaruzelski had said on the same subject. Furthermore, he felt that news from Warsaw, especially from ecclesiastic sources, were not in the direction of an improved situation.

18. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that at first sight, he had not detected specific differences between the recorded statements of Rakowski in Bonn and Jaruzelski's previous statements. He recalled that Rakowski had placed a high note on the importance of the Church, that while taking issue of certain aspects of Walesa and Solidarity's policy, he had recognised that Solidarity constituted a factor to be taken into account in the balance of power, whether in the open or underground. He agreed that this signal should be taken with some reservation and that it remained to be seen whether Rakowski would take up the advice which he had received in Bonn and whether concrete steps would be made in the right direction, in the next few days. Nevertheless, it was understandable that Rakowski had been unable to react to the three conditions quoted by Mr. Genscher for the resumption of normal relations with the West without reporting to Warsaw.

19. The CHAIRMAN welcomed the fact that Mr. Genscher had set a timeframe for the Polish leadership's signal.

20. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE rappelle que les trois conditions mentionnées par M. Genscher correspondent aux vues de ses autorités. Il a été particulièrement intéressé par les précisions apportées par Rakowski en ce qui concerne les mécanismes de préparation et de prise de décisions. Il fait toutefois observer que les membres civils et militaires de ce groupe directeur appartiennent tous au Parti. Il est d'avis que Rakowski peut être considéré comme le premier des non-militaires ce qui lui confère une autorité certaine et il partage le scepticisme de l'Ambassadeur Vieck, quant aux spéculations du Financial Time.

21. Il souhaite poser trois questions:

- Rakowski a-t-il donné des précisions concernant le nombre des victimes et des emprisonnés?
- A-t-il paru comprendre la nécessité d'un signal vis-à-vis de l'Occident? En dehors de la déclaration programme du gouvernement, a-t-il mentionné un calendrier concernant la

N A T O   S E C R E T

-5-

N A T O   S E C R E T

-6-

PR(81)85

normalisation et les réactions aux demandes des Occidentaux?

- A-t-il laissé entendre que l'évolution économique au cours des dix dernières années, la disparition de l'aide occidentale rendrait la situation de la Pologne encore plus précaire? A-t-il donné des indications sur ce que les Polonais espèrent de l'Occident dans ce domaine?
22. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE replied the following:
- Rakowski had recognised that there had been seven victims, in spite of the fact that the security forces were not allowed to use fire arms.
  - He had nothing to add about the content and the timing of the signal that Mr. Genscher had asked for.
  - The economic aspect of the situation facing the Polish leadership had not been specified. The fact that Rakowski had given an account of the economic developments in the last three years, when there had been a cooperation with the West, might imply that if this cooperation was interrupted, Poland might have to look for help from the Soviet Union.

23. Le REPRESENTANT du LUXEMBOURG fait savoir que le 29 Décembre il a reçu la visite de l'Ambassadeur de Pologne à Bruxelles dont les propos ont confirmé les déclarations de Rakowski. Il lui a dit que techniquement l'opération du Général Jaruzelski était une réussite mais devait être complétée par une action politique concrète. Sur le plan économique, il a souligné que si l'aide occidentale venait à être interrompue, la Pologne se trouverait dans une situation catastrophique; par exemple l'arrêt de l'attribution de crédits d'état et de la fourniture de produits finis empêcherait l'économie polonaise de tourner.

24. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE raised the following questions:

- Had the talks given clearer indications about the role of the Communist Party in Poland? Had Rakowski mentioned purges in the Party?
- Had Rakowski seen the three German political leaders separately? Had he given them new elements compared to what he had said to Mr. Genscher? Had he referred to the Resolution adopted in the Bundestag?
- Would it be correct to interpret the fact that Olszowski had authorised the visit of Rakowski in Bonn as indicating that he was the leading personality among the four civilians in charge of decision making?

25. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE replied the following:

- The civilians involved in the decision making process were all members of a Communist Party losing prestige and in disarray. This might be the way through which the military regime was making possible for the Party to participate in the management.
- As usual, Rakowski had met each political leader separately. No

N A T O   S E C R E T

-6-

official representing the Government had been present. It would be up to the three leaders to decide on what they would tell the Government about the conversations. The fact that Rakowski had agreed to meet them in spite of the firm resolution adopted by the Bundestag had to be noted.

- It seemed obvious that there was a rivalry between Rakowski and Olszowski; but the fact that the latter had sent a letter to Mr. Genscher might only indicate that he had wanted to assert his position vis-à-vis the FRG.

26. The CHAIRMAN thanked again the German Representative for an excellent and speedy report. He felt sure that there would be a follow-up to this visit and that the Council might have to come back to some of its aspects.

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