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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

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N A T O S E C R E T

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8th January,

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To : Secretary General
cc: Deputy Secretary General
ASG, Political Affairs
From : Acting Deputy Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council held on
Wednesday, 23rd December, 1981 at 10.15 am



II. THE SITUATION IN POLAND ✓

A. SYNADINOS

cc: Archives

This document consists of: 14 pages

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ATTENDANCE

Restricted

AGENDA

Yes

MEETING PLACE

Room 1

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[REDACTED]

II. THE SITUATION IN POLAND

3. The CHAIRMAN said that he had convened the present meeting mainly to give Permanent Representatives the opportunity to exchange views on the latest developments in Poland. He went on to say that he had received from Secretary Haig a letter (also sent to all Allied Governments). He had replied that he entirely agreed with its content. He had also seen Mr. Eagleburger, who, on his way to Paris, had informed him about the conversations he had had in various capitals and who, without mentioning any specific measures that might be taken, had pointed out that a Soviet invasion was not entirely ruled out and that the Soviet leaders should know in advance what a direct intervention would cost to them. In particular, it would be the end of the Geneva talks. A NATO Ministerial Meeting taking place even without a Soviet intervention would constitute a dissuasive step. However, if such a meeting did not lead to concrete results, it would be counterproductive. He had finally underlined that there was a growing irritation in Washington and that his Government was considering specific measures; it would inform and consult its Allies in due time.

4. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE said that he had nothing new to report on the military situation in Poland. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were continuing routine training. There had been no large scale deployment. The security forces had complete control of the communications, of the borders and of the airspace.

5. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he could agree with Mr. Eagleburger's line on the convening of a NATO Ministerial Meeting. He pointed out that the range of responses to a Soviet invasion of Poland should be kept as contingency planning. If measures were taken in advance they would lose their deterrent value.

6. In Poland, he had the impression that the situation was quietening even if there were still signs of resistance. He went on to say that on 22nd December, the British Chargé d'Affairs in Warsaw had made a démarche to the Polish Government in his capacity as Representative of the Presidency of the Ten. The text of the démarche was as follows:

"The Governments of the Ten have heard with great concern the numerous reports of the suppression of trade union rights, internment, inhuman conditions of detention and even deaths in Poland in recent days. They denounce the grave violation of the human and civil rights of the Polish people which is implied in these reports. They have noted the Military Council's stated desire to return to renewal and reform, but are concerned that this stated aim seems difficult to reconcile with the actual situation.

In their Declaration of 15th December their Foreign Ministers

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made clear their views. The Ten consider that they must now express the growing concern shared by public opinion and Governments about developments in Poland.

Moreover, they consider that in Europe, where mutual trust is based on respect of the Helsinki Final Act, the current repression in Poland constitutes clear violation of the fundamental principles of this act which they cannot ignore".

7. Czyrek had replied that Poland had no diplomatic relations with the Ten and that he could therefore not accept this démarche, which in any case constituted an interference in the internal affairs of his country based on false information. He had had the impression so far that the British Government had understood the purpose of the measures which the Polish Authorities had had to take in order to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. He had then reiterated the usual justifications of the Martial Law and promises that, provided the process of normalisation would go forward successfully, it would be brought to an end.

8. As for further action, his Government had considered how the Madrid Conference might be used to deter any Soviet direct involvement in Poland. He had been instructed to bring to the Council's attention the following proposal:

"The Governments of the 16 (the 15 plus Spain) should consider instructing the Embassies of one of them in NNA capitals as soon as possible to speak to Governments on the following lines:

- (a) The extremely serious situation in Poland is highly relevant to the handling of the Madrid Conference. It represents a violation of the Final Act of unprecedented magnitude. It must affect the question of the resumption in Madrid on 9th February;
- (b) It is desirable to devise a policy which takes account both of the importance of Poland and of the importance of the CSCE process. We have very much in mind the value of the efforts contributed by the NNA to the process, including their most recent comprehensive draft;
- (c) We have been asking ourselves what courses of action are open in February. It is necessary to think ahead and be well prepared. The options we at present see are:
 - (i) request earlier resumption of Madrid Conference Experts to discuss Polish situation
 - (ii) not to return to Madrid, explaining publicly the reasons
 - (iii) to return to Madrid, make statements about Poland and then leave the Conference
 - (iv) the same, but without leaving the conference
 - (v) to return to Madrid and ask the Polish and probably the Soviet delegations a number of questions about the situation in Poland, making clear that our further activity at the Conference will be influenced by the replies

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- (vi) to return to the Conference and present some new draft documents relevant to Poland or amended versions of existing drafts.
- (vii) to resume as planned and proceed with business as usual".

9. He hoped that the Council could agree to discuss these various possibilities at a further meeting to be held the coming week.

10. Turning to food aid, he said that the United Kingdom would take its share of the measures decided by the Ten, in particular the delivery of 8000 tons of beef. Deliveries would proceed but no convention would be signed and the United Kingdom Embassy in Warsaw would seek assurances that the meat would reach its destination and would not fall into the hands of the military authorities.

11. On economic aid he recalled a previous statement to the effect that for the time being no decision had been taken by the British Government, which had no intention to invoke the cancellation clause of the Fifteen Countries Agreement about the rescheduling of loans.

12. On refugees, he said that he was not able to quote any figure about the number of Poles at present in the United Kingdom. Anyone coming to England as a visitor would receive a two month visa and each case would be settled on its merits.

13. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that, as was the case with the Chairman of the Military Committee, he had nothing really new to report. Amongst the information collected by the Danish Embassy in Warsaw, he had noted that according to a Polish Professor, there had been 50,000 people arrested and amongst them ten Generals and some soldiers. According to the same source 60 people had been killed. The locally recruited staff of the Australian Embassy had been approached by the police at their private address and had been asked to sign a declaration of cooperation and loyalty; all had refused. From an ecclesiastical source, it appeared that the military leaders were more and more concerned about the developments and would like to negotiate with Walesa and those Solidarity leaders not yet arrested. The role of the Soviet Union in the declaration of emergency had been confirmed, but it was also felt that Jaruzelski would be able to find a solution if only he had the possibility of doing so in all independence.

14. His Authorities greatly appreciated the consultations carried out in the various capitals of the Alliance. His Foreign Minister had read with great interest Secretary Haig's letter and agreed that in the present situation, Allied Governments should avoid giving the impression of passive acceptance but also taking any steps which could justify a Soviet intervention. This applied in particular to the economic measures which might have a negative influence on the situation and on the condition of the Polish people. Although it was difficult to judge whether or not Jaruzelski would have the possibility of finding an acceptable solution, it was worth trying to make him hold his promises of resuming the dialogue with the parties.

15. His Government would continue its economic and humanitarian assistance and would make available a further 2,000,000 Kroners as emergency relief, to the Danish Red Cross, to be used for delivery of food, medicine and blankets.

It had also endorsed the EEC decision to deliver 8000 tons of beef, provided there would be guarantees of safe distribution to those in most urgent need. It would still be ready to give export credits but had suspended any decision on new Government loans.

16. As for the CSCE process, although he agreed that what had happened in Poland was a violation of the Final Act, he would have to consult his Authorities before he could comment on the United Kingdom's proposal.

17. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government continued to attach great importance to close consultation about the developments in Poland, in order that Allied Governments could coordinate their action as much as possible. He also suggested that something should be done through national means to convince public opinion that what it considered as an absence of reaction from NATO was justified and that in the present circumstances it was preferable that the Alliance was not in the foreground.

18. He circulated a Resolution adopted on 18th December by the Bundestag at almost unanimity stressing its concern and solidarity with the suffering Polish people and appealing to the Polish Government to prove its credibility by releasing those who had been arrested and by restoring the liberties. It invited the German Government to keep the question of governmental aid open as long as repression continued. However, aid measures already agreed should be implemented.

19. He also circulated a report on a meeting, held on 19th December, between Mr. Genscher and the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Bonn. Mr. Genscher had wished to hand him over the Bundestag's Resolution. The Chargé d'Affaires had turned down the Resolution which he saw as an interference in his country's internal affairs. Mr. Genscher had rejected this argument and had once again emphasised his interest in receiving convincing information as to the way in which the policy of reform, national conciliation and renewal was to be continued. He had also expressed his interest in knowing about the prospects of a meeting between General Jaruzelski, Archbishop Glemp and Walesa and suggested that it would be beneficial if Representatives of the International Federation of Free Trade Unions were allowed to see Walesa. The Chargé d'Affaires, while turning down the Bundestag's Resolution, repeated that his Authorities were prepared to continue reforms and to cooperate with Solidarity but not with extremists elements and were equally prepared to cooperate with the Church.

20. He went on to say that his Government would find it useful that Allied countries undertook high level démarches in Warsaw in order to increase pressure on Polish Authorities. Similar démarches might be made in Moscow and in other Warsaw Pact countries. Attempts should also be made to rally support from the Neutral and Non Aligned countries.

21. For the time being, he was hesitant about the opportunity of taking any action about the future of the Madrid Conference. He felt that before taking a rigid attitude, Allied Governments should first contact NNA participants and Spain and wait for the results of the visit in Poland of the special emissary of the Pope, Mgr. Poggi.

22. As regards the economic aid, he was of the opinion that at the present juncture, it would not be advisable to invoke the cancellation clause contained in the Fifteen Countries Agreement for the rescheduling of credits for 1981. Given the circumstances, his Government which would have been prepared to discuss with the Poles the rescheduling of their debt in 1982, had decided to leave the question open.

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23. On food aid, he recalled that the FRG would contribute to EEC programmes, provided the Polish Authorities could give the necessary assurance about the recipients.

24. He finally touched on the problem of Polish refugees whose number was increasing. There were at present 80,000 Poles under tourist visas in the FRG, most of them in West Berlin. He could not say how many would seek permanent residence.

25. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed his Authorities appreciation for the on going consultation on developments in Poland and on the most appropriate course of action on the part of the countries of the Alliance. He recalled that the situation in Poland had determined in Italy great concern and unanimous feelings shared by all sections of public opinion and political parties. A full debate had taken place in the Italian Parliament. A resolution had been overwhelmingly approved advocating the resumption of an orderly evolution in that country. It was already clear that the Martial Law would not resolve Poland's enormous political, social and economical problems. On the contrary those problems could become more intractable and difficult. The only way to avoid further deterioration was to restore the reform process through negotiation and reconciliation.

26. His Authorities considered that the feelings and points of view of public opinion and Governments must be made clear to the Polish Authorities and that their willingness to cooperate in several areas, mainly in economic assistance, would depend on the moderation and on the willingness of those Authorities to resume internal dialogue. However any step which might, a posteriori, be construed as an element fit to justify a direct intervention from the Soviet Union was to be carefully avoided. At the same time he agreed to consider whether some initiative on their part directed towards the Soviet Union could be timely and appropriate and what should be its nature and limits.

27. The action of his Government in connection with the Polish crisis had been basically inspired by the requirement of giving expression to the deep feelings and emotions of the Italian public opinion. However the developments in Poland could no longer be considered as a purely internal matter; they had to be placed in the framework of the Final Act of Helsinki.

28. First of all his Authorities considered that the time had come to express and reiterate to the Polish Authorities in Poland, the Alliance's views. On December 22nd the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw had presented a note to the Polish Foreign Ministry to deplore the current repression in Poland. He had drawn the attention of the Polish Authorities to the deep concern of the Italian Government and people for the serious violations of human and political rights as outlined by the Helsinki Final Act. He had then expressed hope for a return to political methods through a resumption of the dialogue with the popular forces.

29. On the economic side, Italy would continue its assistance in providing food stuffs and humanitarian aid, provided that this assistance reached those it was intended for. Since these programmes were from Government to Government, it was not possible to consider channelling them through private organizations such as Caritas. However the possibility of finding some other appropriate channels was under careful consideration.

30. As far as financial assistance, the prevailing orientation had been to wait and see. His Authorities were agreeable in principle to a

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a suspension of such financial assistance in case the situation in Poland did not show any signs of early improvement. The suspension of western financial assistance to Poland must also represent a signal and an additional burden for the Soviet Union.

31. In essence, his Governments' present orientation towards Poland could be summarized as follows: to exert political pressure, bilaterally, but to consider positively also a coordinated action. On the economic field to avoid action which could cause damage to the Polish population in such a hard winter, and to indicate both to Poland and to the Soviet Union that a negative evolution in the Polish situation might also represent a high price in terms of relations with the West.

32. He went on to say that NATO had considered three possible scenarios: internal repression, external military intervention and internal repression supported by the Soviet Union. The third and last of the three scenarios which had become reality was also the one to which the Alliance had given only limited attention. As a consequence, the West had never warned the Soviet Union that its external support to an internal repression would be considered tantamount to an outright intervention as he saw it.

33. The problem at present was basically political, to decide whether or not to equate external Soviet support to a military intervention. If the answer was in the affirmative, Allied Governments should adopt the measures contained in the contingency catalogue. Otherwise, they should study what kind of political pressure was to be applied on the Soviet Union.

34. His Government thought that underlining the political interference by the Soviet Union was appropriate, because it was this interference that had in large measure prompted Jaruzelski's initiative. It could be appropriate, in this situation, to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, asking it not to prevent but, on the contrary, to foster the resumption of the political dialogue in Poland. In this connection, the military repression should in the first place be terminated.

35. Among the instruments available to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, his Government would hesitate for the time being to have recourse to economic measures. It would prefer to try to convince Moscow that the Polish events might have a negative impact on two basic elements of the East/West dialogue: the Geneva negotiations and the Madrid Conference.

36. In sum, his Government was of the opinion that a political approach by the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was for the time being preferable, if only to avoid giving pretexts or incentives for a military Soviet intervention which would certainly seal the end of the dialogue for many years ahead.

37. Le REPRESENTANT de la BELGIQUE déclare que le premier acte du nouveau Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a été de faire une déclaration énergique au Parlement et de convoquer l'Ambassadeur de Pologne à Bruxelles pour lui exprimer l'émotion de l'opinion et du Parlement face à la répression. Il lui a rappelé que la Belgique, qui a accueilli de nombreux Polonais à divers moments de son histoire, éprouve une profonde sympathie pour la Pologne et s'intéresse vivement à l'évolution de la situation. Il a exprimé le voeu que les Polonais puissent régler leurs problèmes entre eux dans le respect des principes de l'Acte Final. Il a également exprimé ses regrets de ce que les autorités polonaises, en violation de la Convention de Vienne, mettent le gouvernement belge dans l'incapacité de communiquer avec son ambassade à Varsovie et limitent les

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déplacements des diplomates belges. L'Ambassadeur de Pologne a tenté de justifier ces mesures par les nécessités de la situation présente et a donné l'assurance qu'elles seraient temporaires. Il a précisé que les syndicats n'avaient pas été mis hors la loi mais simplement suspendus et que le gouvernement souhaitait reprendre au plus tôt le dialogue avec l'ensemble des forces sociales, y compris Solidarité.

38. Il est d'accord sur l'utilité des démarches proposées par le Représentant de l'Allemagne. Quant à l'aide à la Pologne, il rappelle que l'aide gouvernementale passe par le canal de la CEE et que l'aide privée se poursuit dans le domaine alimentaire mais que le gouvernement a demandé aux diverses associations de prendre toutes les garanties possibles quant aux destinataires. Sur le plan médical, c'est la Croix Rouge qui sert d'intermédiaire et elle n'a rencontré jusqu'ici aucune difficulté. Sur le plan financier, aucune décision ne doit être prise avant le 14 Février 1982.

39. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed his appreciation for the efforts made by the United States Government to inform their Allies. His Authorities had noted with interest the balanced approach in Secretary Haig's letter. They were favourable to intensified Allied consultation before announcing any measures. This would demonstrate to the public opinion and to other Governments the efficiency of the Alliance.

40. He went on to say that the present Canadian approach to the situation in Poland took as its starting point recognition of the tragic character of what had been happening in that country. However, this understandable emotion should not blind Governments to the realities being the geopolitical situation of the Poles.

41. Given these realities, it was the Canadian policy as reiterated by the Prime Minister on December 18th, that the Poles should be left to resolve their own problems without outside interference. His Government maintained the hope, that with restraint and good judgement by all concerned in Poland, this would be possible without triggering overt Soviet intervention. It deeply regretted that the process of internal reconciliation had been interrupted by the imposition of Martial Law, and hoped that there would be an early return to dialogue between the principal parties.

42. Realistically, however, Allies must recognise that under the present circumstances choice did not lie between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse. Worst of all would be civil war and overt Soviet intervention. Their main effort, therefore, should be exerted to preventing this eventuality. They should base themselves for the time being on the assumption that there was still a possibility of a moderate outcome, and they should do their best to discourage continuance of the repressive regime.

43. He felt sure that none of them were naive enough to think there was no Soviet complicity in the events in Poland; but such complicity was an unavoidable fact of life in Eastern Europe. However, if they tried to make the Soviet Union pay a price for its intervention before it actually did so directly, they would have used up their leverage and the Russians would have little to lose. So it was important to maintain a distinction between the way the Polish and Soviet Authorities were treated at the present time.

44. In light of these considerations, his Authorities were of the opinion that at the present juncture the following steps might be considered:

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- (a) to maintain food aid to the Poles in the interest of short-term stability
- (b) to continue to fulfil existing contractual commitments for longer-term economic aid for the time being, but to undertake no new initiatives under current circumstances
- (c) to consider what package of positive economic measures would be appropriate in conditions where the Poles repeal Martial Law, release prisoners, permit the re-establishment of Solidarity, and begin reconciliation talks.
- (d) to take no economic measures against the USSR for the time being
- (e) to make high-level démarches in Warsaw expressing concern over the situation, urging the Polish authorities to exercise restraint and to seek a broad national consensus, and asking them how they intend to fulfil their promises and to solve the crisis in a manner consistent with the financial and human rights commitments Poland has entered into
- (f) to make further high-level démarches in Moscow to reiterate the principle of non-interference and to warn of the grave consequences of intervention, and
- (g) to keep a close watch on developments in Poland, including particular efforts of the Catholic church to restore a dialogue and withholding any plans for an emergency NATO Ministerial Meeting for the time being.

45. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE souhaiterait obtenir des Autorités Militaires des précisions concernant le délai de préavis dont elles pensent pouvoir disposer pour le cas où une intervention soviétique serait sur le point de se produire. Il a été frappé par le fait que des avions soviétiques aient récemment pu atterrir à Varsovie sans que les services de renseignement les aient décelés. Il est apparu par la suite que ce n'étaient que des avions de transport. Mais que ce serait-il passé s'ils avaient transporté des troupes d'invasion?

46. Son gouvernement doit régler son attitude dans la crise polonaise en tenant compte des positions des pays de l'Est, notamment de l'URSS; mais aussi des réactions de l'opinion française qui est particulièrement sensible à tout ce qui touche à la Pologne.

47. Il soumettra à l'attention de ses autorités la proposition du Royaume Uni concernant la CSCE. Il pense que même s'il n'y a pas d'intervention soviétique en Pologne, on ne peut envisager que la Conférence de Madrid reprenne son cours comme si rien ne s'était passé pendant l'interruption des travaux et que l'on doit envisager diverses perspectives. Un sondage auprès des Neutres et Non Alignés lui paraît très souhaitable.

48. Pour ce qui concerne les démarches diplomatiques suggérées par le Représentant de l'Allemagne, il rappelle que son gouvernement en a déjà effectué un certain nombre en se fondant sur les déclarations du Président de la République et du Premier Ministre.

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49. Sur le plan de l'aide, il précise que l'aide alimentaire et humanitaire fournie par la France se poursuit par l'intermédiaire de diverses associations, la Croix Rouge en particulier. Mais son gouvernement n'a pas pris de décision concernant l'attribution de nouveaux crédits ou le rééchelonnement des dettes antérieures. Il se pose la question de savoir si l'administration militaire peut être considérée comme un interlocuteur valable et si toute nouvelle aide doit être conditionnelle à une évolution politique favorable.

50. Le REPRESENTANT du LUXEMBOURG déclare que son gouvernement a favorablement accueilli la lettre de M. Haig et qu'il est d'accord avec son analyse. Ses autorités ont déjà adressé un message au Général Jaruzelski pour lui faire part de la profonde émotion de l'opinion luxembourgeoise. Si une démarche devait être faite auprès de l'Union Soviétique, il faudrait, lui semble-t-il, prendre garde à ne pas lui faire un procès d'intention et peser soigneusement le contenu du message.

51. Son gouvernement est en principe favorable à l'accueil de réfugiés polonais sur le territoire du Luxembourg. Son aide à la Pologne se fait dans le cadre de la CEE et par l'intermédiaire d'associations privées.

52. Pour de qui concerne la CSCE, son gouvernement ne souhaite pas quitter la Conférence de Madrid. Il lui paraît souhaitable que les travaux reprennent et que les Occidentaux élèvent une protestation contre l'action du gouvernement polonais.

53. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE circulated two documents, one on the situation in Poland, the other on the treatment of refugees in the United States.

54. He pointed out that the West was facing a critical juncture which would determine the future of East/West relations. He felt that due to the loss of credibility of Jaruzelski's regime, it could not be excluded that more violence would lead to a further worsening of the situation, while the machinery for Soviet intervention was ready on the spot.

55. He went on to say that even if there had been so far no direct Soviet intervention, its knowledge and support of the imposition of the Martial Law was evident and his Government felt strongly that the Soviet Union should be warned that even if it was not a direct instrument in the repression, it would have to pay the price for its involvement. It was an Alliance responsibility to prevent any further deterioration which could lead to direct Soviet intervention. Time had come, he felt, that Allied Governments should consider specific measures which they would apply at the appropriate time to exert pressure on Polish and Soviet Authorities, as well as yardsticks to measure the various developments.

56. As regards specific measures, he recalled those which his Government had already taken (request to US Banks not to loan new credits to Poland; suspension of shipping or surplus dairy products to Poland; suspension of the import/export arrangements etc). Further measures were under consideration in Washington. As for the yardsticks, they would be the reconciliation between the Government, Solidarity and the Church, the restoration of syndical rights and the release of detainees.

57. He had welcomed the United Kingdom's suggestion on CSCE. He hoped that at its next meeting the Council would agree on how to take contacts with the Neutrals and Non Aligned and with Spain. The United States were prepared to approach Spain. He also welcomed the German suggestion on démarches

to be made to various Governments. He welcomed the idea of approaching Free Trade Unions. This would show to public opinion that they were on the same side as NATO and might ease the way for a better understanding of defence needs among the workers in member countries. He felt sure that his Government would join in any protest action against the violation of the Vienna Convention and would welcome more information on problems incurred by Allied missions in Warsaw.

58. In conclusion, he emphasized that his Government considered that the present situation was of the utmost gravity and the Alliance's ability to influence developments would depend on its ability to react rapidly and by appropriate means. He suggested a further consultation at the next Council meeting on measures to be taken.

59. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities greatly appreciated the way in which the consultation on the situation in Poland was taking place. This process, he felt, would be even more fruitful if the Neutrals and Non Aligned were included. They should preferably be approached by individual members so that the démarche had less of a NATO label. He welcomed the United Kingdom suggestion on the Madrid Conference. His Authorities would study the various possibilities. They were also studying the various United States signals, which were in general of a moderate character. They were not in favour of a Ministerial Meeting prior to a Soviet intervention. They would find it helpful if the role of the Soviet Union and General Jaruzelski's decisions could be clarified further. Could it be proved that he was in the hands of the Soviet leaders, it would then be easier to decide on an action against the Soviet Union, whether political or economical.

60. Le REPRESENTANT de la TURQUIE déclare la cause polonaise suscite beaucoup de sympathie dans son pays. Néanmoins l'opinion a un certain sentiment d'impuissance quant à ce que l'Alliance pourrait faire. Son gouvernement est d'accord sur la nécessité d'une action pourvu qu'elle soit prudente et réaliste. Avant d'envisager des mesures, il faut, lui semble-t-il - répondre à la question suivante: Qu'est-ce que les gouvernements alliés seraient capables de faire si le pire arrivait? Dans les circonstances présentes, il reconnaît l'importance du rôle que le Vatican et l'Eglise polonaise peuvent jouer.

61. Il rappelle que dans un déclaration à l'Assemblée constituante, son premier ministre a souligné que la paix et la stabilité doivent être considérées dans une perspective globale, qu'il a exprimé ses vives préoccupations face à la situation politique, économique et sociale en Pologne, mais qu'il a insisté sur le droit absolu des Polonais de trouver eux-mêmes les solutions. Il a exprimé l'espoir que la stabilité en Europe et les relations Est/Ouest n'en souffriraient pas trop. Il termine en s'associant à ceux qui ont recommandé que les consultations se poursuivent.

62. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said his Authorities were of the opinion that Allied Governments should continue to exert pressure so that the dialogue could resume between all concerned in Poland and that Human Rights be respected. They would continue their humanitarian assistance to the Poles, so far as they had received the assurance that it would reach the recipients. They would act in consultation with organisations concerned. They felt that it was important that no statement made by Allied Authorities as regards this humanitarian assistance could provide reasons to the Soviets to pretend that this was an interference in Polish affairs.

63. As for economic aid, he said that his Government had granted Poland 33 million Kr. in 1981 for food deliveries but had taken no decision as regards the credits for 1982. The question of the appropriation of 42 million Kr.

in 1982 was under consideration. The Norwegian Parliament had authorised the transfer to 1982 of 30 million Kr. for exports not spent in 1981.

64. As for the refugees, they would be received according to the regulations in force in his country. Various practical measures to welcome them were under study.

65. Le REPRESENTANT du PORTUGAL rappelle que dès le début de la crise son gouvernement a adopté une ligne très claire et n'a cessé d'exprimer ses préoccupations à l'Ambassadeur de Pologne à Lisbonne, puisque les communications avec l'Ambassade de Portugal à Varsovie sont totalement interrompues et n'ont pas encore été rétablies malgré trois vigoureuses protestations. Il pense que le moment où la crise polonaise était purement intérieure est dépassé et qu'il faut envisager des mesures concrètes.

66. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government, guided by a deep sense of sympathy for the Polish people, was following with grave concern the state of emergency measures in Poland and had expressed its deep sorrow over the recent dramatic events. Greece, together with other European countries, expected that the states which had signed the Final Act of Helsinki would abstain from any form of interference in Poland's internal affairs. His Government believed that Poland must solve its problems alone and without the use of force, in order that the process of reform and renewal might continue.

67. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE said that the Government, the Parliament and the public opinion in his country were deeply concerned and indignant about what was happening in Poland. Efforts were being made to give humanitarian aid to the Polish people.

68. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Council meet again on Wednesday 30th December in order to review the United Kingdom proposal on the Madrid CSCE Conference and the German proposal on démarches to be made in Warsaw Pact countries and in some other capitals, on the basis of reactions from national authorities. The Council could also discuss any concrete proposal that individual member Governments were planning to take in order to exert pressure on Poland and on the Soviet Union.

69. In view of recent developments, he wondered whether the time had not come for him to make a statement to the press, under his own responsibility, in which he would express the Council's growing concern.

70. This suggestion, having been supported by several Permanent Representatives, he proposed the following statement:

"The North Atlantic Council continued its on-going series of close consultations on the Polish situation.

In particular, the Allies strongly condemned the use of force which has characterised the current state of Martial Law.

The Allies noted the nearly universal reprobation, for the many actions taken by Polish Authorities in violation of human rights in general and the Helsinki Final Act in particular; for example, the suppression of Trade Unions and extensive press censorship.

The Allies recall the promises made by the Polish Government concerning renewal of the internal dialogue, temporary nature of

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Martial Law and the commitment to continue the reform process, and express their firm hope that these promises will indeed be fulfilled.

The Council also expressed strong concern over the many violations of the Vienna Convention, which had served to isolate foreign embassies in Warsaw and to restrict the flow of information."

71. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that this might be interpreted as reflecting the Council's unanimous position; this was not the case, since governments had not been consulted.

72. After an exchange of views, the LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE put forward the following statement which was accepted:

"The North Atlantic Council today continued its close consultation on the situation in Poland.

"It reviewed with great concern the most recent developments in that country.

"The North Atlantic Council will be meeting again shortly to continue these discussions."

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