


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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
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To : Secretary General
cc : Deputy Secretary General
ASG for Political Affairs
ASG for Defence Planning & Policy
ASG for Infrastructure, Logistics
& Council Operations
From: Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the
Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session
on 9th and 10th December, 1980

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN THE DEFENCE FIELD IN
RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND

T. ÖZÇERI

This document contains: 7 pages

N A T O S E C R E T

ATTENDANCE : Restricted

AGENDA : No

MEETING PLACE : Conference Room 1

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PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES IN THE DEFENCE FIELD IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that two questions required urgent decision by Ministers:

- (i) whether or not STANAVFORLANT should be disbanded but kept in such a state of readiness that it could be reassembled quickly if anything happened in Poland;
- (ii) the five measures(1) for which SACEUR had requested pre-delegated authority.

2. As for STANAVFORLANT he pointed out that the Soviet build-up around Poland called for some measures of surveillance and that there were reasons for not disbanding the Force.

3. Admiral TRAIN pointed out that the decision to be taken with regard to STANAVFORLANT was one for the political leadership of the Alliance alone. There was no pressure from the military side that STANAVFORLANT would or would not sail to the Baltic. However, if required this capability did exist.

4. Mr. APPEL said that he regretted the press and information policy of some countries and the fact that the press had obtained certain information. As Chairman of the EUROGROUP the press had put questions about STANAVFORLANT but he had preferred to remain silent on this issue. The Soviet Union had now completed their preparations and although he doubted they would act, the possibility nevertheless still existed. Every care would have to be taken not to give the Soviet Union any argument to justify a military intervention. If NATO was perceived to be preparing to send warships to the Baltic this could be used for propaganda purposes by the Soviets.

5. He was not opposed as such to maintaining STANAVFORLANT but he would not accept any decision which could create even the slightest impression that STANAVFORLANT might go to the Baltic. He could therefore agree on condition that it be explicitly stated that use of STANAVFORLANT in the Baltic was excluded.

6. Mr. BROWN agreed that no decision should be taken at the present time to send STANAVFORLANT to the Baltic. However, should a massive Soviet invasion occur and the refugees fleeing across the Baltic be attacked by Soviet forces then these changed

(1) See paragraph 4 of PR(80)70, dated 5th December, 1980

circumstances might call for a different decision. He believed that to disband STANAVFORLANT at a time when the Soviets might invade any day would give the impression that the Alliance was not aware of the dangers of such a military build-up.

7. Turning to consider how NATO should respond to the Soviet potential threat, he pointed out that the Soviet Union had mobilized a large number of divisions in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia and that had the Polish problem not existed, the first seven days of mobilization could have been assessed to be in the direction of Central Europe. However, the Polish problem did exist and given the call-up of reservists in the Western Military Districts affecting some 80% of personnel and the setting up of extensive command and control facilities this did not in his mind represent an elaborate charade to cover up a possible attack on NATO. The minimum requirement here was for SHAPE to be manned on a 24-hour basis.

8. Mr. SØGAARD agreed with previous speakers that STANAVFORLANT should not be sent to the Baltic unless a unanimous political decision had been taken to that effect.

9. Mr. KRIEPS said that he recognised the special situation of both Germany and Denmark with regard to Poland and therefore had no difficulty in agreeing that STANAVFORLANT should not be sent to the Baltic. Moreover, he believed that the situation in Poland offered NATO the opportunity to demonstrate its vigilance through the proper preparation of contingency plans.

10. Mr. APEL agreed that the situation in Poland was preoccupying especially since the Soviets were prepared to resolve an internal problem in a manner which above all else went against the procedures agreed to in the framework of the CSCE. The real problem here was one of political judgement and whether NATO would create the right circumstances for the Soviet Union to take action. Extensive press coverage before such a decision had been taken went little way to help in this matter. He could accept the proposal to maintain STANAVFORLANT at a low state of readiness so long as it was understood that STANAVFORLANT would not be sent to the Baltic and that in the future before any plan was implemented to this effect this should only be done after due consultation by those nations participating in STANAVFORLANT.

11. Mr. DE GEUS pointed out that this NATO squadron in the Atlantic was there first and foremost for political reasons. It threatened no one and represented rather a symbol of solidarity and readiness. He believed it would be awkward to disband this

squadron at the present time and therefore supported the proposal to keep STANAVFORLANT at a low state of readiness. To do otherwise could be used by the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes. As long as STANAVFORLANT was kept out of the Baltic area he found no difficulty with this proposal.

12. Mr. LAMONTAGNE said that he felt somewhat worried about NATO's credibility in the public opinion if STANAVFORLANT was kept together in a state of preparedness but did not react to the situation in Poland.

13. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that STANAVFORLANT was not at sea but at home ports in Europe. The United States and Canadian Ships were at Portsmouth. The squadron would only go to sea if there was sufficient reason to do so. The only question being discussed was whether crews should be kept on standby. He believed it was enough that the crews informed their Commanders of their whereabouts over the Christmas period. As far as press guidance was concerned, he proposed to confirm to the press that these ships were indeed on-call but to make no reference to the Baltic.

14. He then went on to ask Ministers' opinions on the five measures being requested by SACEUR. Consensus had been reached on the first three measures and six of the eight measures of military vigilance contained in measure four. As far as measure five was concerned, a consensus had not yet developed. These measures had originally been intended for implementation following an invasion but after due examination of the situation it had been agreed that a decision should be taken on these five measures at the present time giving SACEUR authority to implement them at a time of his choosing.

15. Mr. STOLTENBERG stated that in the interest of achieving a broad and genuine consensus he had no difficulty in agreeing to those measures on which agreement had been reached the previous day. As far as the other items outstanding were concerned, he believed that these could be approved but only after an invasion had occurred which was as SACEUR had originally requested. He could not agree to pre-delegate such authority on an open-ended basis.

16. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE pointed out that the two measures of military vigilance which SACEUR had given as examples on which agreement had not been reached related to the preparation for the control of electro-magnetic radiations and the implementation of electronic warfare support measures. He added that these eight items would not exceed the covert level of implementation. The six measures already agreed to within measure four went in some cases no lower than

Major Principal Subordinate Commander level but in any event would be no lower than corps level.

17. Mr. APEL agreed that in order to respond quickly to any aggression it was necessary to pre-delegate a certain amount of responsibility to SACEUR at the present time. However, while his government believed in the necessity of being prepared it was still too early to take a decision on measure five, air defence, at this time. This category of measure was highly political in nature and could give a wrong signal to the other side. However, he had noted this request and would transmit it to his authorities and added that if and when the time came to take such a decision the German government's response would be both quick and positive if SACEUR deemed the measure to be necessary.

18. General ROGERS stated that no announcement would be made with regard to the deployment of AWACS to ACE but that should press leaks occur then this would be referred to as exercise activity.

19. The CHAIRMAN noted that, pending agreement by Denmark, Ministers could agree to pre-delegate authority to SACEUR for measures one, two and three prior to an invasion and that with regard to measure four, the first six sub-items were approved. As far as AWACS was concerned, SACEUR was already authorized to ask the US authorities to send the aircraft to Europe.

20. Mr. SØGAARD stated that the Danish government was still considering measures four and five.

21. Mr. BROWN, referring to measure five, stated that actions within Poland did not constitute a basis for pre-delegating increased air defence activities. On the other hand, actions with regard to NATO territory which were perceived as posing an immediate and increased threat to NATO did equal a basis for taking such actions.

22. General ROGERS pointed out that according to the Rules of Engagement for peacetime, a defecting Warsaw Pact aircraft over Allied territorial waters such as the Baltic could only be shadowed. However, should another aircraft be in hot pursuit of a Warsaw Pact aircraft defecting over NATO territory and should a hostile act be created then under the Rules of Engagement for peacetime NATO could react to such a hostile act.

23. As far as AWACS was concerned, he had today asked the United States to provide a concept of operations to cover operational control of the aircraft by SACEUR. He anticipated

four aircraft would be sent and should an immediate decision be taken by the United States to this effect, the first aircraft could arrive on station some 30 hours later. Under optimum conditions the first mission could take place in two days time.

24. The CHAIRMAN advised Ministers with regard to press statements to state simply that SACEUR was aware of the situation and would not take measures beyond those purely and exclusively routine and precautionary in nature.

25. Further on, during the discussion, Mr. APEL said that he had discussed the precautionary steps under measure 4 with his Authorities in Bonn the previous day. Their implementation could mean the moving out of garrison of some 7000 German trucks, the provision of special telephone networks, and the taking of other steps which could not fail to attract public attention. The German military authorities had contacted General Rogers to explain that Germany could not approve the taking of such steps in view of the situation in Poland.

26. General ROGERS reiterated that he would produce specific instructions on how these measures would remain covert. He had no intention at that stage of implementing increased levels of manning below corps level, or of taking any further steps affecting the levels of manning of War Headquarters and Situation Centres: in sum, there would be no heightening of the level of alert. The taking of individual measures would be subject to his own verification, and he would authorise only those steps indicated in the Council guidance.

27. Mr. APEL said that he was satisfied with these explanations and did not question the decisions mentioned by the Chairman in paragraph 19.