

ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

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
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To : Secretary General
cc: Deputy Secretary General
ASG, Political Affairs
From : Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council held on
Saturday, 23rd January, 1982 at 10.15 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. E. da Rin

FOLLOW-UP TO THE 11TH JANUARY MINISTERIAL MEETING
ON POLAND


T. OZCERI

This document consists of: 22 Pages

ATTENDANCE

Restricted

AGENDA

No

MEETING PLACE

Room 1

FOLLOW-UP TO THE 11TH JANUARY MINISTERIAL MEETING ON POLAND

1. The CHAIRMAN welcomed participants to the present meeting, which had been convened as part of the Alliance consultations on the attitude to be adopted in response to the situation in Poland after the imposition of Martial Law on 13th December. He recalled that the Declaration published following the extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Council on 11th January (1) provided the basis and the framework for the exchange of views which was about to take place.

2. He deplored the absence of any signs that the situation in Poland was improving. Indeed, the facts tended to show that in spite of their promises of moderation, the Polish Authorities were engaged in a brutal process of repression of the reforms undertaken in Poland since August 1980.

3. Consequently, it appeared that the West should continue to exercise pressure in every appropriate way towards the achievement of the aims contained in the 11th January Declaration and in keeping with the action programme outlined in that document. He further believed that the purpose of the present meeting should be to find the most effective ways to identify and coordinate Allied objectives in the present situation.

4. He went on to suggest that the Council should endeavour to keep the present meeting as brief as possible, since a protracted session could lead to renewed media speculation about dissension among the Allies, such as had preceded the 11th January meeting and which had been dispelled so effectively by the promptness of those proceedings.

5. Finally, he considered the present meeting as an initial stage of the on-going process of consultation, dictated by the practical requirements of coordination between Allied countries, as well as by the need for close vigilance on the developments in Poland itself.

6. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE endorsed the Chairman's call to limit as far as possible the duration of the present meeting.

7. The United States agreed that the situation in Poland had shown no improvement since the meeting of Allied Foreign Ministers on 11th January. On the contrary, there had been an increase in repression, which itself had given rise to even greater concern, not least in the Catholic Church, as exemplified by the recent statements of the Polish Episcopate. A clear indication of the Western position was thus even more necessary than ever.

8. He believed that the aim of the present meeting should be to produce progress on national economic measures to be taken against Poland and the Soviet Union as a strong signal of Allied discontent. He underlined that such measures should not be punitive in nature, but should put pressure on the Polish Authorities to return to the process of renewal and reform, and at the same time should dissuade the Soviet Union from any further interference.

9. He recalled that the 11th January Declaration had listed certain areas of possible action by the Allies. He expressed the hope that the Allies might use the present meeting to inform each other of measures which had been taken or which were under consideration in each of the capitals in implementation of the Declaration. He had in mind such political measures as restrictions on numbers and size of diplomatic missions, and suspension of programmes of cultural exchange. In the economic field, the United States also hoped that it would be possible to agree upon visible actions.

10. For its part, the United States Administration had already taken political and economic measures and hoped for comparable steps by its Allies.

11. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE marque son accord pour discuter de tous les points contenus dans la déclaration du 11 janvier dernier à l'exception du paragraphe 16 concernant les mesures économiques à long terme.

12. Le REPRESENTANT de la BELGIQUE se déclare pleinement conscient de l'importance de cette première réunion que le Conseil consacre à la mise en oeuvre de la déclaration du 11 janvier approuvée par les Ministres des affaires étrangères. Il constate que depuis cette date la situation en Pologne n'a pas évolué et qu'elle s'est même aggravée sur le plan intérieur. L'Ambassadeur de Belgique à Varsovie en visite à Bruxelles a apporté des informations précieuses sur ce qui s'est passé et sur l'évolution probable des événements. Ses conclusions sont assez sombres. Il ne croit pas à une amélioration dans les mois à venir parce que le pouvoir militaire, qui a pris un certain nombre de mesures contre Solidarité et la population, est sans aucun doute peu enclin à revenir en arrière et à admettre que ce qui avait été acquis depuis juillet 1980 puisse servir de point de départ à la reprise du dialogue. L'Ambassadeur est convaincu que le coup d'état a été préparé de longue main, sans doute depuis l'appel lancé par Walesa aux partis frères. Le fait que le Parti Communiste polonais ait été en état de désarroi (400 démissions en septembre 1981) a sans doute également joué dans la mise en marche de la dynamique de répression. Il ne doute pas que cette opération minutieusement préparée n'ait été effectuée avec le concours de l'URSS qui a exercé des pressions sur Jaruzelski. Il pense que l'aile dure du Parti, appuyée par l'URSS, a clairement indiqué ce qu'il y avait à faire pour éviter une intervention en Pologne. Mais le fait que l'intervention n'ait pas eu lieu montre à son avis que l'Union soviétique a été sensible à la réaction suscitée par l'invasion de l'Afghanistan et qu'elle a dû tenir compte de la sincérité du mouvement de liberté en Pologne. Il a enfin insisté sur le fait que la marge de manoeuvres dont Jaruzelski dispose pour assouplir le régime dépend de Moscou, d'où l'utilité des pressions à exercer sur la Pologne mais également sur l'URSS.

13. En tant que Représentant du pays qui assure actuellement la Présidence des Dix, il fait savoir que le Conseil des Ministres de la Communauté se réunira les 25 et 26 janvier afin d'examiner les propositions précises élaborées par le conseil des Représentants Permanents quant aux mesures à prendre. La déclaration du 11 janvier, et en particulier les paragraphes 13 et 14, a été prise en considération lors du travail préparatoire.

14. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the United States and Belgian Representatives that there had been no sign of any lifting of Martial Law in Poland as promised by the Authorities and that, on the contrary, repression continued unabated. The great efforts made by the Catholic Church to induce General Jaruzelski to restore civil liberties and release detainees had so far been to no avail. In this respect, the German Authorities were eagerly awaiting General Jaruzelski's statement to Parliament on the 25th January to see if this would contain positive signals for an immediate end to Martial Law.

15. In view of the situation in Poland, it was important for the Alliance to be united and remain firm in its decision to put pressure on both the Polish and Soviet Authorities to lift Martial Law and restore dialogue with both Solidarity and the Catholic Church. The German Government was certain that it would be possible for the Alliance, in line with the Ministerial Communiqué of 11th January, to agree on a certain number of measures which would influence the opinion-building process in Poland at a crucial stage in developments. These measures, however, would need to be apportioned to the objectives that NATO wished to achieve.

16. With regard to the specific measures either already taken or contemplated by the German Authorities, he said that Chancellor Schmidt would participate in the Solidarity Day on January 30th by making a statement to the German media. Political and Trade Union rallies would be organized and considerable television time would be devoted to the situation in Poland. The German Foreign Minister would attend the opening session of the reconvened CSCE on the 9th February and would use this occasion to condemn the violation of the Helsinki Final Act in Poland. In particular, he would make clear to the Warsaw Pact nations that the imposition of Martial Law in Poland gravely undermined the moves towards cooperation between East and West under the Helsinki accords. The German Authorities had already expressed their concern to the Polish Authorities and would continue to press the Warsaw Pact capitals in this respect. He supported the proposal by the Director General of the International Labour Organization for a fact finding mission to be sent to Poland and Germany intended to raise the Polish question at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, in February. The Deutsche Welle and Deutsche Rundfunk had increased the transmission times for their services to Poland and the Soviet Union and were providing up-to-date information on developments in Poland.

17. The German Authorities considered that the Ministerial guidelines of 11th January constituted a serious warning to the Polish and Soviet Authorities and, on the basis of these guidelines, the German Cabinet was considering a number of actions for implementation in the near future. These included curbs on the freedom of movement of Soviet diplomatic personnel within West Germany, a refusal to accredit any more diplomatic personnel from the Soviet Union, restrictions on entry visas, especially where these were for political purposes, restrictions on the duration of visas and on their validity for certain areas, the cancellation of an official visits to the Soviet Union and the suspension of Parliamentary contacts (although he emphasised, in this respect, that dialogue with the Soviet Union would continue), the refusal for the time being of a Soviet application to open in Munich a second Consulate General and, finally restrictions on bi-lateral public meetings of a nature to promote the Soviet position.

18. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he was under instruction to stress the importance which the United Kingdom Government attached to carrying through promptly, effectively and in unison the joint endeavour agreed upon Ministers on 11th January. Both as a demonstration of Allied unity and as a clear and unequivocal signal of Allied intentions towards Poland and Soviet Union, it was essential that the Council should agree on immediate practical measures as soon as possible. He believed that this was what public opinion was looking for and what the situation in Poland required.

19. He went on to list the areas in which his Authorities could contemplate contributing to a wider NATO package, in the context of the intentions of their Allies and the achievement of an agreed and acceptable definition of the obligation in paragraph 15 of the Declaration of 11th January.

20. As far as Poland was concerned, the United Kingdom would be prepared to implement the measures set out in Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the NATO Declaration of 11th January. Specifically, his Authorities would be prepared to restrict members of the Polish Embassy and certain other official organizations to travel without notification within a radius of 25 miles of the centres of London and Glasgow. The BBC's Polish service broadcasts had already been increased. The quality of relations with the military regime had been restricted and the United Kingdom Authorities were currently considering as a matter of urgency the problem of Polish citizens stranded abroad. In the economic field, the United Kingdom had placed commercial credits in abeyance, other than for contracts already legally

concluded, and had also agreed, with its partners in the Western Creditors Group, to hold in suspense negotiations about the payment due in 1982 on official debt. The United Kingdom Authorities favoured an increase in humanitarian assistance to the Polish people.

21. Turning to the Soviet Union, he confirmed that the United Kingdom was prepared to reduce the travel free area for Soviet officials. The United Kingdom was also prepared to reduce activities under the Anglo/Soviet technical cooperation agreements and would look at the possibility of non-renewal termination. The United Kingdom Government would be represented at Ministerial level when the Madrid Review Conference reconvened. Demarches were already being undertaken in a number of Third World and other Capitals in order to put across the Western view of events in Poland and make clear who was responsible for them.

22. On the economic side, in the context of the achievement of an agreed and acceptable definition of the obligation in paragraph 15 of the Declaration of 11th January, the United Kingdom would be prepared to consider measures to be taken both by the European Community and nationally. Community measures might extend to further restrictions on imports from the Soviet Union either by increased tariffs or by tighter quantitative restrictions. In the United Kingdom view, the Community might well consider proposing upgrading the Soviet Union from the OECD "intermediate" category to the "relatively rich" category for export credits. On a national basis, the United Kingdom would be prepared to consider action in the maritime field in concert with others, including possible termination of the Anglo/Soviet Treaty on Merchant Navigation. Restrictions on Soviet fish factory ships would also be considered.

23. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that as he shared the analysis of the Polish situation made by previous speakers, he did not wish to comment on recent events, but believed it useful to point out that NATO should avoid taking unduly drastic action over Poland despite Allied nations' understandable impatience with regard to the lifting of Martial Law in that country. The West should avoid taking sanctions that hurt the Polish people more than the régime and, in doing so, cost the West the sympathy that it currently enjoyed in Poland. This might induce a siege mentality among the Polish population. Therefore, he recommended that the Council consider sanctions carefully and approach this question on a step-by-step basis in line with political developments in Poland.

24. Le REPRESENTANT de l'ITALIE souscrit sans réserve à ce que le Président et d'autres ont dit à propos de l'évolution de la situation en Pologne. Il constate que les réponses du gouvernement polonais aux trois conditions en fonction desquelles les Alliés ont déclaré qu'ils fonderaient leur jugement sur l'évolution de la situation sont pour le moins peu satisfaisantes. Les arrestations massives se poursuivent et si les dirigeants polonais se déclarent prêts à libérer certains prisonniers, ils excluent de cette mesure les éléments antisocialistes, c'est-à-dire tous ceux qui s'étaient engagés sur la voie du renouveau. Ce qu'ils appellent dialogue n'est en fait qu'un essai pour récupérer le mouvement ouvrier et lui donner une orientation favorable à Moscou. Cette situation, qui ne fait qu'empirer, rendent légitimes les mesures envisagées sur les plans politique et économique surtout vis-à-vis de Moscou.

25. Compte tenu de cette situation, il considère la présente réunion comme une première étape dans l'élaboration d'une action commune à long terme. Cette action devrait être conçue dans un esprit de détermination et de solidarité et se traduire par les mesures les plus propres à influencer l'évolution économique et à peser sur l'Union soviétique dans ses relations avec le régime polonais.

26. Il apporte ensuite des précisions concernant les mesures prises par son gouvernement en application des paragraphes 9, 10 et 11 de la Déclaration du 11 janvier.

Paragraphe 9

Le Ministre des affaires étrangères d'Italie participera à la reprise des travaux à la Conférence de Madrid et il dénoncera les violations de l'Acte Final que constituent les événements de Pologne.

Paragraphe 10

L'Italie participe à l'action de la CEE. Elle participera aux travaux de la Commission des Droits de l'Homme qui va se réunir à Genève. Elle appuie la mission en Pologne du Directeur général de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail.

Paragraphe 11

(a) URSS : Les citoyens soviétiques, quelles que soient les raisons pour lesquelles ils résident en Italie, font déjà l'objet de restrictions dans leurs déplacements. En effet, le territoire italien est divisé en trois zones:

- Zone A: liberté de mouvement sans aucune formalité;
- Zone B: une notification préalable, au moins 48 heures à l'avance, est exigée pour l'entrée dans cette zone;
- Zone C: une autorisation officielle préalable du Ministère des affaires étrangères est exigée pour l'entrée dans cette zone.

Le Gouvernement italien envisage la possibilité de rendre les mesures d'accès aux zones C et B encore plus strictes. En prenant les mesures suivantes:

- l'autorisation d'accès à la Zone C sera limitée à des cas précis bien motivés; les déplacements devront se faire uniquement par transports publics.
- le passage de la Zone C à la Zone B ne se fera que par transports ferroviaires ou aériens.
- dans certains cas, l'accès de la Zone B sera interdite sur simple notification à l'ambassade concernée et sans aucune justification.

Pologne : pour le moment les déplacements des citoyens polonais ne font l'objet d'aucune restriction. (De même que ceux des Albanais, des Tchèques, des Hongrois et des Allemands de l'Est). Les citoyens polonais pourraient se voir appliquer le règlement en vigueur pour les Bulgares et les Roumains, à savoir: Zone A: accès libre; Zone B: accès sous réserve d'une autorisation officielle préalable

(b) Activités scientifiques et techniquesURSS

Le Gouvernement italien a déjà décidé d'ajourner un certain nombre d'échanges culturels avec l'URSS prévus pour les deux années à venir conformément à un protocole signé en octobre 1981:

- échanges de délégations culturelles;
- échanges entre l'Union des écrivains soviétiques et les organisations italiennes correspondantes;
- expositions de livres;
- semaines du cinéma et projection de films.

D'autre part, l'Ambassade d'Italie à Moscou a déjà reçu pour instruction de ne pas organiser la troisième session technico-scientifique du groupe de travail sur l'agriculture qui devait se tenir prochainement.

Enfin tout en maintenant l'échange de bourses pour les chercheurs, les conférenciers et les experts, le Gouvernement italien contrôlera étroitement l'octroi de ces bourses dans les secteurs de haute technologie.

Pologne

Le Gouvernement italien a déjà proposé l'ajournement d'une réunion de la Commission conjointe chargée du renouvellement du Protocole de coopération culturelle et scientifique qui devait se tenir en février. L'Ambassade d'Italie à Varsovie a informé les autorités polonaises que la prolongation de ce protocole serait soumise aux conditions suivantes:

- abolition de toutes les restrictions aux activités de l'Institut culturel italien de Varsovie;
- application par les autorités polonaises de critères objectifs et non discriminatoires dans le choix des candidats polonais aux stages et missions scientifiques en Italie.

La réunion de la Sous-commission chargée d'octroyer les bourses d'été, qui devaient se tenir le 26 janvier, est reportée jusqu'à ce que l'Institut Culturel italien de Varsovie ait été autorisé à reprendre normalement ses activités.

27. En résumé, sans suspendre ses relations culturelles avec la Pologne, le Gouvernement italien limitera l'échange de boursiers, de chercheurs et de conférenciers.

28. Dans le domaine scientifique, un accroissement des activités des navires soviétiques de recherche océanographique ou scientifique en Méditerranée a été constaté dans le courant de 1981 (le nombre des navires soviétiques est passé de 25 en 1980 à 33 en 1981). L'attention des autres pays méditerranéens a été attirée de sorte qu'ils envisagent d'adopter les mesures appropriées afin de limiter l'accès de ces navires dans les ports méditerranéens des pays de la CEE, par exemple, augmenter le temps de préavis pour l'obtention des autorisations nécessaires.

29. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities welcomed the useful opportunity which the present meeting afforded to consult upon implementation of the decisions taken on 11th January. Several of his colleagues had already given an evaluation of the current situation in Poland and he fully shared their assessment that the situation was deteriorating.

30. As had been stated on 11th January, the Hague was convinced that possible retaliatory measures should be examined by the Allies as soon as possible. The 11th January Declaration on Poland itself, as well as the role of the Soviet Union in the Polish crisis, rendered this inevitable. However, it was of the utmost importance that practical measures should be clearly seen to support the political action agreed upon by Foreign Ministers at their meeting.

31. He went on to inform the Council that the Netherlands Government had already decided to extend the implementation of the "no exception" clause of the COCOM Agreement to Poland, and to suspend new credits. The Netherlands were in favour of continuing food aid to the Polish people.

32. The Netherlands Government attached great importance to the maintenance of political pressure upon the Polish and Soviet Authorities in order to underline Western concerns at developments in Poland. For this reason, the Netherlands Foreign Minister would be attending the opening meeting of the next CSCE session on 12th February. The Netherlands were amongst those countries who believed that it was essential that the Western nations should deplore the violation of human rights which had taken place in Poland. The Netherlands also supported efforts being undertaken by the ILO to obtain permission to visit Poland.

33. In addition, the Netherlands Government was considering measures to restrict the movements of Polish diplomatic personnel, similar to those which had already been taken for Soviet Embassy staff.

34. He went on to say that in considering economic measures to be taken against Poland and the Soviet Union, his Authorities believed that the Allies should be guided by the following criteria:

- (i) it was not necessary for the Western nations to apply identical sanctions, but each country should determine the measures it was to adopt in accordance with its own situation and national legislation;
- (ii) as far as possible, the Allies should share the burden of sanctions, so as to limit damage to their own economies;
- (iii) such measures should provide a clear signal of Allied discontent to the East and should be of an ad hoc nature so as to avoid any long-term damage to the Polish economy;
- (iv) while uniformity of action was not necessary, it must be realised that common actions had a much greater effect.

35. As an illustration of his last point, he quoted the sharpening of COCOM conditions for credit financing to the Soviet Union in 1981, and the recent maritime negotiations with the Soviet Union, where the Western insistence on confronting Moscow with the consequences of its international behaviour had led to Soviet acceptance of a considerable reduction in their market share to their own disadvantage and to the benefit of the West.

36. In considering further retaliatory measures, he would urge the Allies to bear this lesson in Alliance cohesion in mind.

37. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities welcomed the discussion of the Alliance's reaction to the Polish situation and agreed with previous speakers that measures had to be adjusted to specific developments as part of a Western approach that would remain generally flexible and responsive to signals from the East.

38. Mr. VRAALSEN, (Norway) said that the Ministerial guidelines of January 11th represented a good foundation for further measures and the contents of this Ministerial Declaration had been noted by the Warsaw Pact Authorities, as evidenced in the strong reaction that the document had provoked. He agreed with previous speakers to the effect that the Polish situation had deteriorated rather than improved and that no optimistic developments were currently in sight. The Alliance would need to induce General Jaruzelski to keep to his pledge to lift Martial Law and introduce political and economic reform. With regard to sanctions, the Alliance would need to define, first and foremost, the objectives it wished to achieve and, in this respect, he believed that the Council would need to distinguish between short-term and long-term ends. Short-term ends involved the lifting of Martial Law, the release of detainees and the re-establishment of dialogue between the Authorities, Solidarity and the Catholic Church. Long-term ends, on the other hand, involved a respect for the Helsinki Accords and a more stable Poland as part of a more reliable basis for European security and stability.

39. In devising sanctions against the Polish and Soviet Authorities, each of the Allies had to consider its individual situation, and Norway's strategic position and common boundary with the Soviet Union, together with a number of unsolved problems, made it the Alliance's interest to keep the North a low-tension area. To this effect, Norway had adopted a joint policy of defence and restraint with a view to maintaining manageable bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Consequently, Norway could not take the lead in expressing criticism of the Soviet Union over Poland, though it had recently come close to doing so. The Norwegian Government had acted from the outset by making diplomatic representations and by postponing three visits by official Norwegian delegations to Moscow; these were a Parliamentary delegation led by the President of the Norwegian Parliament, a Trade Union delegation led by the leader of the Norwegian Trade Unions and a Press Federation delegation. The Norwegian reaction had initially been stronger than that of other Allies and had been interpreted by the Soviet Union as a clear expression of the Norwegian view. Norway would participate in the international Solidarity Day during which the Norwegian Prime Minister would make televised statements and rallies and demonstrations would be organized, with one to be addressed by the Trade Unions leader. The Norwegian Foreign Minister would go to Madrid on February 9th to attend the opening session at the resumption of the CSCE. At the same time, the Norwegian Authorities were considering ways of receiving Polish refugees both from Austria and other countries.

40. With regard to Norway's economic relations with Poland, the Norwegian Government had decided that all remaining export credits would be suspended and a recent request from the Polish Authorities for further credits had been rejected. Norway would also comply with the decision of Western bankers made recently in Paris to refuse any rescheduling of repayments of the Polish debt for 1982. As a result of these measures, Norway believed that it had made a strong response to the Polish situation and he believed that it was essential for the Allies to consult on additional measures and possible collective action. He concluded by assuring the Alliance that Norway would not undermine any national measures taken by other countries.

41. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE said that like all of the Allies, the Icelandic Government was following the situation in Poland with grave concern. Noting with regret that there had been no improvement in the situation since NATO Foreign Ministers had met on 11th January, he recalled the position taken by the Icelandic Minister at the meeting, when he had expressed Reykjavik's approval of the joint Declaration and had underlined the special position of Iceland in its trade relations with the Soviet Union and Poland.

42. On the political level, Iceland intended to use the Madrid meeting to condemn in no uncertain terms the violation by the Polish Authorities of the CSCE Final Act. At this stage, he was not in a position to say at what level Iceland would be represented.

43. The Icelandic Government would also be making démarches in Reykjavik and Moscow during the coming week. He pointed out that Iceland did not have an Embassy in Warsaw or any other Warsaw Pact countries except the Soviet Union.

44. In addition, the Icelandic Foreign Minister had made a strongly-worded statement to the Hungarian Foreign Minister on the Polish crisis during the latter's recent visit to Reykjavik.

45. Finally, he was able to inform the Council that the Icelandic Prime Minister would also be participating in the television programme to commemorate the proclaimed day of solidarity with Poland at the end of January.

46. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE recalled that Portugal's position on the adoption of measures against the Soviet Union had been expressed by the Portuguese Foreign Minister on 11th January, when he had stated that "within the limits of our possibilities, we are prepared to support any measures adopted against the Soviet Union and Poland".

47. Consequently, Portugal recognised the need to take measures which would be perceived as a political warning to the Soviet Union and as a sign of solidarity within the Alliance. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, Lisbon had already adopted several cultural and political measures, including most recently the decision to postpone Sine Die the meeting of the Luso-Polish Commission on Cultural Affairs scheduled for the 15th January, as well as the expulsion on 22nd January of two more Soviet diplomats as a result of their activities in violation of their diplomatic status.

48. Furthermore, the Portuguese Authorities were studying ways to limit the excessive numbers of Soviet diplomatic and non-diplomatic personnel and to restrict their movements. On the proclaimed day of solidarity with Poland, the Portuguese Prime Minister would also be making a statement and appearing personally on television networks.

49. Turning to Portugal's economic relations with the Warsaw Pact countries, he could assure the Council that, while not possessing sophisticated technology or equipment, Portugal would do all within her power to prevent her limited exports from contributing to the military capacity of the East. No military equipment produced in Portugal was or had been exported to the Eastern bloc countries and the Portuguese Authorities would ensure that the multilateral embargo was vigorously implemented. He recalled that this position had recently been restated during the COCOM meeting. Portugal had also prohibited the transit of equipment through her territory if its destination was a Warsaw Pact country.

50. In the field of strictly commercial relations, he underlined the reduced level of exchanges between Portugal and the East, which were limited to goods and equipment not capable of being used in military or military-related areas. Contacts between Portugal and the Soviet Union regarding a projected fisheries agreement had been suspended at Portugal's initiative shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

51. Finally, he wished to reaffirm the full support of his Authorities to any decision which the Alliance might take in order to minimise the contribution of Western equipment or technology to the build-up in the Soviet military threat to Allied security.

52. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE welcomed the valuable opportunity which the present meeting afforded to exchange views on ways in which the Allies could demonstrate their cohesion and resolve in the face of the deplorable developments in Poland.

53. As far as political measures were concerned, he pointed out that due to the already small numbers of Soviet Embassy staff in Ankara, there would appear to be very little scope for further limitations.

54. In the field of economic relations, the Turkish Foreign Minister had already underlined at the meeting of 11th January that Turkey was not in a position to inflict any serious damage upon the Soviet economy by depriving the Soviet Union of technology or finished products. The economic relationship between Turkey and Poland was such that the latter was in Turkey's debt and this reduced the scope of commercial exchanges between the two countries for the foreseeable future.

55. With regard to humanitarian aid to the Polish people, Turkey was prepared to consider contributing to a programme of such assistance to the extent of her capabilities, should such action be agreed by the rest of the Allies.

56. Finally, the Turkish Foreign Minister would be present in Madrid on 9th February and would be taking the floor at the CSCE meeting.

57. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE agreed with remarks made by the Danish and Norwegian Representatives as to the importance of discussions within the Alliance in order to ensure that sanctions were proportional to objectives and that expectations of early results would not be unduly high. Sanctions should be carefully modulated to the pattern of events in Poland and the West should respond as soon as there was any sign of an easing in Martial Law. As Poland was of vital strategic interest to the Soviet Union, the Alliance should not expect the Soviet attitude to change rapidly; sanctions should therefore reflect what the Alliance could reasonably hope to achieve.

58. Mr. TOUCHETTE (Canada) said that Canada had not yet made a detailed study of the measures it could take against Poland the Soviet Union. Canada would participate in the international Solidarity Day and had agreed to undertake diplomatic démarches in Madrid and at the United Nations Human Rights Commission. It was most likely that Canada would support in both these fora any resolution condemning the imposition of Martial Law in Poland.

Canada equally supported the efforts of the Director General of the International Labour Organization to send a fact finding mission to Poland. The Canadian Foreign Minister intended to go to Madrid on 9th February in order to make a statement on the human dimensions of the Polish crisis at the CSCE. The Canadian Authorities had postponed RM39 although this could be reactivated if there were any positive developments in Poland in the near future.

59. With regard to restrictions on the movements of Soviet and Polish diplomatic personnel within Canada, he said that Canada already had an exceptionally restrictive system and no additional steps were planned at present. However, Canada might consider tightening up the restrictions with regard to Polish diplomatic personnel if the Polish Authorities continued to impose restrictions on Canadian diplomatic personnel within Poland.

60. In the field of cultural and scientific exchanges, Canada had already imposed sanctions by refusing to fix a date for negotiations with the Soviet Union on a new programme of activities and by imposing a more selective approach to exchanges in the future. Only minimal exchanges would be allowed with Poland for the time being. Canada was proposing to increase its broadcasting time to Poland and the Soviet Union by 50% and to resettle in Canada up to 6,000 Polish refugees currently in Austria. The Canadian Authorities would like to see an International re-settlement programme for these refugees to which all the NATO nations would subscribe. He concluded by saying that, with regard to the rescheduling of the Polish debt repayments, Canada would subscribe to the decision taken by Western bankers in Paris.

61. Le REPRESENTANT du LUXEMBOURG précise pour ce qui concerne la mise en oeuvre des paragraphes 9, 10 et 11 de la Déclaration du 11 janvier, que le Ministre des affaires étrangères participera à la reprise des travaux à la Conférence de Madrid et appuiera les initiatives alliées dans différentes enceintes internationales mentionnées au paragraphe 10. Pour ce qui concerne le paragraphe 11, il fait savoir que la représentation diplomatique de l'Union soviétique au Luxembourg a été limitée au son niveau actuel mais que vu l'exiguïté du territoire national, aucune réduction supplémentaire n'est envisagée concernant les déplacements des diplomates. Les autorités luxembourgeoises se borneront à appliquer à la lettre un règlement déjà assez restrictif. Dans le domaine culturel son gouvernement n'a pas modifié la ligne adoptée depuis l'Afghanistan. Il décourage les initiatives par trop spectaculaires. Enfin il limite la présence de ses représentants aux manifestations et aux réceptions soviétiques.

62. Pour ce qui concerne les réfugiés, il fait savoir que le Luxembourg vient d'accueillir 75 polonais en provenance d'Autriche en plus de ceux qui se sont déjà adressés directement à lui.

63. Le REPRESENTANT de la BELGIQUE passant en revue les mesures prises conformément aux paragraphes 9, 10 et 11 de la Déclaration du 11 janvier précise ce qui suit:

Paragraphe 9

64. Monsieur Tindemans se rendra à Madrid. Il parlera en tant que Président des Dix, puis en tant que représentant de la Belgique. Il a demandé aux ambassadeurs de Belgique auprès des pays neutres et non-alignés en Europe d'insister pour que ces gouvernements soient représentés à la CSCE au niveau du Ministre des affaires étrangères.

Paragraphe 10

65. La Belgique participera activement aux travaux de la Commission des Droits de l'Homme qui doit se réunir dans les prochains jours à Genève. Il est à noter que les Polonais sont très sensibles à leur isolement diplomatique dont ils sont pleinement conscients malgré la censure.

Paragraphe 11

66. Pour ce qui concerne les déplacements des ressortissants des pays de l'Est, la situation en Belgique est à peu près la même qu'au Luxembourg. Son gouvernement n'envisage donc pas d'autres mesures que celles déjà très restrictives qu'il avait adoptées après l'invasion de l'Afghanistan.

67. Sur le plan culturel et scientifique, l'accord existant est très largement réduit. Aucune manifestation n'est envisagée dans les mois à venir.

68. Il conclut en insistant sur l'importance des actions engagées sur le plan international et sur la nécessité pour les pays de l'Alliance de procéder régulièrement à un examen de ce qui pouvait encore être fait, comme cela a été le cas après l'invasion de l'Afghanistan. Il est convaincu que cette politique a porté ses fruits et qu'elle explique peut-être que l'Union soviétique ne soit pas intervenue militairement en Pologne.

69. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the Greek position had been clearly explained at the meeting of 11th January. With regard to sanctions, he wished to reiterate that Greece considered restrictive measures or sanctions against Poland and the other Eastern countries would not help to resolve the crisis; on the contrary, they might well lead to undesirable developments and undermine attempts to achieve détente and disarmament. He was thinking in particular of the Geneva negotiations.

70. Moreover, he believed that such measures or sanctions could seriously affect the economies of the European countries, which already faced a period of immense difficulty, particularly in the case of small countries such as Greece.

71. Mr. KIMBERG (Denmark) said that the Danish Government believed that the Ministerial Declaration of 11th January had made a clear NATO stand to both the Soviet Union and Poland which needed to be followed by a continuation of pressure upon these two countries. The Danish Foreign Minister would also go to the CSCE in Madrid on 9th February and make a statement on Poland. At the same time, Denmark gave full support to Western efforts within the framework of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and intended, for its own part, to raise this matter at the Commission's forthcoming session. Denmark would also apply pressure on the Polish regime to allow both the International Labour Organization's fact-finding tour and a Red Cross mission to enter the country.

72. With regard to restrictions on diplomatic personnel, he said that he Danish Foreign Minister had already stated that no restrictions had been applied in the past, nor would be imposed in the present as Denmark was an open society. However, relations with Poland had been downgraded and Denmark would take every opportunity to make its condemnation of Martial Law clear.

73. The Danish Foreign Minister had recently received a Solidarity Representative from Stockholm as it believed that it was important for the West to maintain close contacts with the Free Trade Union Movement in Poland. Denmark had already organized its own Solidarity Day during which a whole evening's television time would be devoted to the situation in Poland including a statement by the Danish Prime Minister.

74. With regard to economic sanctions, Denmark would act in line with the decisions of the EEC Council of Ministers and had refused to extend an export credit to Poland of D.Kr. 500 million that had been originally granted in 1980. In this respect, Denmark fully supported the decision of the Western bankers in Paris.

75. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE déclare que les mesures que son gouvernement a prises ou envisage de prendre dans la perspective de la déclaration du 11 janvier dernier s'inspire des principes suivants:

- dénoncer la situation créée en Pologne à l'égard de l'Acte Final d'Helsinki;
- maintenir sur les autorités polonaises une pression permanente, afin qu'elles respectent les libertés démocratiques et syndicales;
- poursuivre l'aide alimentaire et humanitaire en s'assurant qu'elle parvient bien aux destinataires;
- exiger le respect des obligations souscrites par les Polonais dans les organisations internationales, par exemple le respect de la Convention de Vienne;
- mettre en cause tous les responsables du drame polonais dans sa genèse comme dans son déroulement, c'est-à-dire d'abord l'Union soviétique;

- ne pas perdre le contact avec les autorités polonaises au niveau les plus appropriés.

76. Dans cet esprit, son gouvernement a pris les décisions suivantes sur le plan politique. Des restrictions provisoires ont été imposées à la circulation des attachés militaires. Un bulletin d'information en polonais est diffusé trois fois par jour par la radio française. Les démarches de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail, la visite de son directeur général à Varsovie, les activités de la Commission des Droits de l'Homme reçoivent un plein appui de la part de la France. Vis-à-vis des réfugiés polonais, la délivrance des visas d'entrée a été assouplie et une aide financière leur est accordée ainsi qu'un titre de travail à ceux qui ont trouvé un emploi.

77. Sur le plan de l'aide humanitaire, les envois de médicaments et de petit matériel se poursuivent. Il en est de même des produits alimentaires dont la distribution est assurée par des organisations charitables non gouvernementales.

78. Indépendamment de cette action individuelle, la France a participé à l'action politique des Dix et aux démarches qu'ils ont faites à Varsovie. A la CSCE, elle sera représentée au niveau ministériel.

79. Pour ce qui concerne le ré-échelonnement de la dette polonaise, la France qui a participé aux réunions des seize créanciers de la Pologne, a fait savoir au gouvernement polonais qu'elle envisageait la mise en oeuvre de la clause de circonstance exceptionnelle. Les négociations concernant le ré-échelonnement de la dette en 1982 ont été suspendues.

80. A court terme, son gouvernement n'exclut pas la possibilité de réexaminer les avantages préférentiels accordés à la Pologne, à l'Union soviétique et à certains pays du Pacte de Varsovie en matière de crédits à l'exportation. D'une manière générale, il poursuit un travail de réflexion en gardant à l'esprit que l'efficacité des mesures dépend de leur application unanime par les pays alliés et amis et que les décisions prises ne doivent pas provoquer des manœuvres de concurrence.

81. Il ne souhaite pas remettre en cause les accords commerciaux déjà conclus. Pour ce qui concerne la clause de non-contournement, il souhaiterait des précisions sur les conditions de sa mise en oeuvre et les résultats obtenus par d'autres gouvernements notamment dans le domaine des transports maritimes et des accords céréaliers. Il est d'accord pour éviter tout ce qui serait de nature à compromettre les mesures prises par d'autres pays alliés.

82. Se référant au paragraphe 15 de la Déclaration du 11 janvier, il exprime le voeu que la consultation entre alliés permette de déterminer l'étendue, les principes et les critères de la mise en oeuvre des actions individuelles afin d'éviter que certaines mesures entraînent un profit pour un pays au détriment des autres.

83. Il termine en soulignant que la Déclaration du 11 janvier a été incontestablement un succès politique dans la mesure où elle a manifesté aux yeux de l'opinion publique l'union des membres de l'Alliance. Pour conserver l'impact de cette résolution, il souhaite que dans les travaux à venir chacun garde à l'esprit la nécessité de maintenir cette cohésion, d'éviter tout signe de découragement, toute marque d'hésitation ou de division aux quels l'opinion ne manquerait pas de réagir. Ceci dit, il estime que le catalogue des mesures à prendre dans le domaine pratique doit être établi dans un souci d'efficacité mais sans trop d'ambition.

84. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities had been giving assistance to Polish refugees and visitors for some time. It had extended visas to enable Polish visitors to remain indefinitely in West Germany and the number of non-resident Poles currently living in the Federal Republic had been estimated at 200,000. 100,000 Poles had applied for asylum in recent months, particularly following the imposition of Martial Law in December. 100,000 had received a visa for an indefinite stay and 500,000 visas had been issued by the German Consulate in Warsaw in 1981. Therefore, the Federal Republic was deeply involved in the handling of Polish refugees and in the granting of asylum but, in this connection, he wished to point out that Germany now had only limited means to receive additional numbers of refugees from other countries.

85. The CHAIRMAN said that, from this preliminary round of views, it had emerged that all nations agreed that the situation in Poland had deteriorated and required the Alliance to exert continuous pressure on both the Soviet and Polish Authorities. Nations had taken individual measures in line with paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Ministerial guidelines of 11th January and had agreed to use the forum of the CSCE to condemn Martial Law further. In the spirit of the 11th January Communiqué a wide range of sanctions and measures had already been adopted and he proposed that these broad categories should be given to the Press in the Secretary General's declaration after the meeting.

86. Mr. MATTHIAS (Germany) said that the guidelines circulated by the German Representative also pertained to the economic field. Germany was determined to join its Allies in sending a clear signal of Western concern to the Soviet Union by means of joint measures, including those of an economic nature.

87. With this objective in mind, Germany was prepared to introduce a number of measures aimed at the Soviet Union, but was proceeding on the assumption that all of the Allies were prepared to act in the same way. The United Kingdom Representative had mentioned the concept of a NATO package, and he agreed that this merited consideration. At the same time, the German Authorities were prepared to participate in consultations on any other proposals which their partners might wish to table. The Belgian Representative had already referred to the on-going consultations on this subject in the framework of the EEC.

88. Like his French, Netherlands and United Kingdom colleagues, he wished to put forward certain general considerations which he believed should be borne in mind in determining the nature of the measures to be taken:

- As far as burden-sharing was concerned, he agreed entirely with the view put forward by his Netherlands colleague.
- Secondly, it was essential to bear in mind the attitude which Third World countries would take, as suggested by France.
- Thirdly, one should endeavour to preclude the possibility of measures decided upon by the Allies being undermined or exploited by others.

89. He went on to say that the German Government fully supported the measures which had already been taken against Poland in accordance with the Declaration of 11th January, notably the suspension of debt rescheduling and the suspension of the negotiations on further credits.

90. Turning to the 11th January Declaration itself, he said that with regard to Paragraph 15, Germany attached great importance to the fact that retaliatory measures should not be undermined. In this context, he fully shared the views put forward by his United Kingdom colleague in reference to the possibility of a NATO "package". While he did not believe that Paragraph 15 should apply to long-standing bilateral projects, he fully supported measures pertaining to the postponement of negotiations between Poland and the West scheduled in such areas as navigation, and on a more restrictive interpretation of existing agreements.

91. Finally, with reference to his United Kingdom colleague's suggestion on the tightening of credit agreements, Germany agreed that the subject merited careful consideration and proposed that it be discussed in another forum.

92. Monsieur ATTOLICO (Italie) ne peut que confirmer l'accord de son pays concernant le paragraphe 12 de la Déclaration du 11 janvier. Pour ce qui concerne le paragraphe 13, il fait savoir que son pays a respecté les engagements pris en décidant de ne pas accorder les nouveaux crédits commerciaux à la Pologne et d'interrompre les lignes de crédit existantes. Il précise qu'avant les événements du 13 décembre, l'Italie avait conclu avec la Pologne un accord (qui avait été paraphé) prévoyant en particulier une avance de cinquante millions de dollars que le gouvernement polonais aurait utilisé pour effectuer des paiements anticipés à valoir sur la ligne des crédits existante. Cet accord lui aurait permis d'engager un montant de trois cent cinquante à trois cent quatre vingt millions de dollars. Le gouvernement italien a décidé de ne pas le signer aussi longtemps que la situation présente durera.

93. Par ailleurs l'Italie participe aux négociations concernant le financement de la dette publique polonaise et a les mêmes positions que les pays alliés engagés dans les discussions de Paris.

94. En matière d'aide humanitaire et alimentaire, l'Italie aligne sa position sur celle de la CEE. Sur le plan bilatéral, elle poursuit une aide humanitaire par l'intermédiaire d'organismes non gouvernementaux sous réserve de garanties quant à la distribution de cette aide aux destinataires.

95. Pour ce qui concerne le paragraphe 14, ses autorités reconnaissent que l'adoption de certaines mesures à l'égard de la Pologne et de l'Union soviétique sont nécessaires à ce stade à condition qu'elles fassent l'objet d'un accord unanime entre les alliés et qu'une distinction soit faite entre l'Union soviétique et la Pologne. Quant à la limitation des importations en provenance de l'Union soviétique, son pays est prêt à en discuter mais considère que ces importations portant essentiellement sur des matières premières, leur interruption lui serait plus préjudiciable qu'à l'Union soviétique. Il est toutefois prêt à tenir compte de la liste des importations soviétiques rédigée par la CEE et à suspendre celles qui ne sont indispensables pour l'économie italienne et qui représentent pour l'Union soviétique une source importante de devises.

96. En ce qui concerne les accords maritimes et aériens, la différence entre la Pologne et l'Union soviétique est importante. A ce stade une action contre la Pologne dans ce domaine ne serait pas efficace. Il n'en est pas de même vis-à-vis de l'Union soviétique. L'Italie a signé avec elle en 1972 un accord de navigation qui comporte une clause de dénonciation avec un préavis d'un an. Dans le domaine du trafic aérien, la situation n'est pas très favorable à l'Italie. L'accord en vigueur prévoit une dénonciation avec préavis de six mois. Son gouvernement est néanmoins prêt à examiner des mesures permettant de limiter l'application de ces accords.

97. Le problème des missions commerciales ne se pose pas en ce qui concerne la Pologne. Le gouvernement italien est prêt à envisager des moyens de réduire les missions commerciales soviétiques.

98. En matière de crédit à l'exportation, son gouvernement est prêt à discuter d'une politique restrictive vis-à-vis de l'URSS. Mais pour être efficace cette arme doit être utilisée unanimement non seulement par tous les pays alliés, mais aussi par quelques uns des principaux pays qui entretiennent des relations commerciales importantes avec l'URSS dans la catégorie I pour ce qui concerne l'octroi des prêts, des périodes de remboursement plus courts et la mise en oeuvre d'un régime plus strict qui ne permettrait pas d'échappatoire. Il espère qu'un consensus pourra être réalisé entre les pays occidentaux dans le cadre qui paraîtra le plus approprié.

99. Il confirme enfin l'intention de son gouvernement de se conformer aux dispositions du paragraphe 15 mais en lui donnant une interprétation plus large. En effet un accord unanime sur les principes ou sur l'application des mesures retenues lui paraît indispensable.

100. Le PRESIDENT rappelle que cette première réunion est essentiellement destinée à clarifier les positions des gouvernements alliés à l'égard de certaines mesures. Il note que le gouvernement italien serait prêt à examiner les mesures concrètes sur la base de principes unanimement respectés. Cette position lui paraît rejoindre celle des Pays-Bas et de l'Allemagne qui ont parlé d'un partage équitable du fardeau.

101. Mr. HORMATS (United States) said that he had been encouraged by the extensive list of measures given by the nations. With regard to export credits, it was clear that the Soviet Union had been mistakenly included in the "intermediate" category and should, in the light of the current political context, be transferred to the highest category. This would raise the interests rates payable by the Soviet Union and would represent a substantial step in applying pressure on that country. As such, this measure should be implemented as a matter of urgency. The United States had never accorded the Soviet Union most favoured nation status and the Soviet Union was charged a high tariff for import of Soviet goods into the United States. He suggested that the Western European Allies could also raise their tariffs for the Soviet Union. The Alliance should also consider which sanctions it might apply in the areas of shipping and aviation.

102. He had been impressed by the way in which nations had taken action without waiting for others to follow suit. In this respect, he believed that it would be wrong for nations to insist on total unanimity within the Alliance prior to taking sanctions as this would take too long a time. Nations should establish what they were in a position to do and act accordingly.

103. Monsieur CASSIERS (Belgique) déclare que sur le plan des principes, il rejoint ce qu'ont dit les représentants de l'Allemagne, de la France et de l'Italie. Il lui semble que vis-à-vis de la Pologne la mesure qui a le plus grand effet pratique a déjà prise, il s'agit de ré-échelonnement de sa dette et de la suppression des crédits commerciaux autres que ceux destinés aux achats de denrées alimentaires. Son pays participe à l'action de la CEE en vue de rechercher les moyens de faire parvenir son aide alimentaire directement à la population polonaise. Les 25 et 26 janvier les Ministres de la CEE examineront ces problèmes afin d'élaborer des procédures efficaces.

104. Pour ce qui est de la restriction des importations en provenance de l'Union soviétique, son pays aborde le problème dans un esprit constructif mais ne pense pas pouvoir limiter ses importations de matières premières. Si un consensus se dégageait pour faire passer l'Union soviétique dans la catégorie I en matière d'octroi de crédits, la Belgique pourrait s'y rallier.

105. Le PRESIDENT constate que les pays membres sont en général disposés à examiner les mesures à prendre dans les différents secteurs cités dans la Déclaration du 11 janvier dans la mesure où leur situation respective leur permettra de les appliquer. Il constate aussi que ces mesures devront être harmonisées afin de ne pas causer des dommages à un pays par rapport aux autres et d'assurer un partage équitable du fardeau. Entre temps, il ne faut pas, lui semble-t-il rechercher une stricte unanimité; chacun doit pouvoir conserver une certaine liberté d'action.

106. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE souligne que le premier objectif de son gouvernement est d'aboutir à une action commune. En d'autres termes, si chacun doit agir selon ses moyens, il ne doit pas perdre de vue la nécessité d'élaborer une action de l'Alliance à 15. Pour ce qui concerne le long terme évoqué dans le paragraphe 16, il ne remet pas en question la nécessité d'une consultation à ce sujet, mais elle lui paraît pour le moment prématurée.

107. Mr. HORMATS said that the Alliance should not lose sight of paragraph 16 of the Ministerial Communiqué, despite the fact that it was a long-term consideration. It was essential for nations to reflect on the longer term economic relations between East and West. Ministers had included this paragraph precisely because they considered it to be of utmost importance. Therefore, the Council should return to it as soon as possible.

108. Mr. EVANS (United Kingdom) said that as far as long-term measures were concerned, the United Kingdom was of the view that the Allies should live up to the undertaking contained in paragraph 16. Here, it was conceded that certain aspects were already under discussion, for example in the COCOM context, and that discussion of long-term measures should not inhibit consideration of the kind of actions which had been the subject of the earlier discussion. Subject to this position, the United Kingdom Authorities believed that the paragraph was valid and were prepared to discuss such measures on this basis.

109. Mr. HORMATS said that all were agreed that the present meeting was the first in a series of Alliance consultations designed to follow up the meeting of 11th January.

110. He proposed that the next meeting of the Council on this subject should be held on 4th February, and expressed the hope that at that meeting it would be possible to announce some specific measures. He underlined that as the situation in Poland continued to deteriorate, the time had come for the Allies to take concrete actions and to build on the solid framework of measures already announced.

111. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that while he had no firm views as to the date of the next meeting on this subject, he did not believe that it should preclude the possibility of nations announcing their own measures in the meantime.

112. Secondly, while the Allies were generally agreed that nations should be represented at the level of Foreign Ministers at the CSCE Follow Up Meeting, so as to underline the importance of this subject, there still appeared to be a divergence of views on how to deal with the problem following that meeting. He recalled the admirable cohesion which the Western Allies had demonstrated in recent months in Madrid, and expressed the view that a "reinforced" meeting of the Council to discuss future CSCE strategy should be held before 9th February.

113. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that while he was opposed to a meeting on 4th February, he agreed with his Canadian colleague that this should not preclude the announcement of further measures before that date. He recalled that on behalf of the EEC nations, Belgium would be giving an account on 27th January of measures to be agreed at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on 25th and 26th January.

114. Moreover, nothing should prevent the Council from using every opportunity to review the developments in the situation.

115. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE observed that at the present meeting most nations had indicated measures which they had already taken or were considering. He suggested that the International Staff might prepare a resumé of such measures in time for the next meeting.

116. He believed that there was considerable merit in the suggestion of his Canadian colleague that the Council should meet with Heads of Delegations to the CSCE meeting, but pointed out that this subject would also have to be considered at the meeting of the Council scheduled for 27th January.

117. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE underlined that it was the prerogative of each nation to be represented in the Council at the level which it deemed appropriate.

118. Moreover, in view of the fact that a meeting of the Council on this subject was scheduled for 27th January, he saw no reason why it should not be used for this purpose.

119. Similarly, since a meeting of the Council was scheduled for 3rd February, he failed to see the need for a meeting on 4th February as proposed by his United States colleague.

120. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the problem was not so much one of dates, but more a question of devoting an entire meeting to this important subject. The Council was due to discuss the CSCE implications alone of the Polish situation at its meeting of 27th January, and other matters discussed at the present meeting would be dealt with at the Council meeting scheduled for 3rd February.

121. The COUNCIL went on to approve guidelines for a statement to the Press by the Chairman on the present meeting and the measures which had been announced.

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