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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

N A T O S E C R E T

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To : Secretary General


cc: Deputy Secretary General
Acting ASG, Political Affairs

From : Acting Deputy Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Restricted Meeting of the Council held on
Wednesday, 30th December, 1981 at 3 p.m.

Chairmen: Mr. M.A.H. Luns
Mr. E. da Rin

THE SITUATION IN POLAND ✓



A. SYNADINOS

This document consists of: 10 pages

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N A T O S E C R E T

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PR(81)84

ATTENDANCE

Restricted

AGENDA

Yes

MEETING PLACE

Room 1

N A T O S E C R E T

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THE SITUATION IN POLAND

1. The CHAIRMAN said that, as had been agreed by the Council on 23rd December, the primary purpose of the present meeting was to carry forward an exchange of views on concrete Allied responses to the situation in Poland. These responses might be grouped into three general categories: economic and broadly related measures; actions within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and, finally, diplomatic initiatives, including demarches in Warsaw Pact and other capitals. Some governments, most notably that of the United States, had taken a number of specific steps in the economic field.

2. As regards CSCE, he recalled that the United Kingdom's Chargé d'Affaires had circulated on Wednesday 23rd, a paper outlining a range of options for consideration within the context of the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting. In so doing, he had emphasized that, as pointed out in the UK paper, the Allies should strive for an early consensus on how to manage the Polish issue at Madrid. He would only add that the fifth paragraph of the 11th December Communiqué of NATO Foreign Ministers had highlighted the relevance of the Helsinki Final Act to developments in Poland.

3. On the subject of diplomatic demarches, the German Ambassador had taken the lead in stressing the need for consultation on what the Allies could, and should, be saying in Warsaw, Moscow, and, possibly in other Warsaw Pact and in selected neutral and non-aligned capitals about the Polish situation. Subsequently, he had circulated by letter of 29th December further German ideas in this connection. He hoped that the Council would be in a position today to reach some definite conclusions on all these matters. At the end of its deliberations, the Council would likely want to consider carefully what should be said to the press given the great public interest in how the Alliance was reacting to developments in Poland.

A. - Recent developments

4. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that on behalf of the Ten, the British Ambassador in Rome had had, on the 24th and 29th December, two conversations with Mgr Salvestrini, speaking on account of Mgr Dabrowski. Salvestrini had said that in these difficult days the suspension of western humanitarian aid would be a major set-back for the population in Poland and would help hardliners to get the country under the Soviet Union. He had said that conversations were still going on between the Church and the Polish Authorities. Mr. Glemp had suggested that the release of Walesa would be a precondition for the opening of negotiations, for which he had offered the Church's good offices. On the other hand Walesa, who did not seem to be badly treated, would only agree to enter into talks with the Polish authorities if his closest advisers were also released. He had added that the Church had so far not been very much affected by the repression. It was able to carry out its humanitarian duties, and priests who had been arrested because of their contacts with Solidarity had soon been released.

5. Referring to the decisions of the Ten, he had said that the Vatican had acknowledged the fact that there was at present no dialogue with the military government. The best way to proceed and to resume the dialogue would be through bilateral demarches or to continue to show firmness and flexibility towards essential objectives. Finally, he had said that Mgr Poggi was of the opinion that Jaruzelski was still holding the same line, minimising the casualties, promising a progressive release of prisoners, wishing that irreconcilable elements of Solidarity would leave the country. He had been irritated by the messages of

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President Reagan and of the French Government.

6. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE turned to the political statement agreed upon by the Ten. He recalled that on 23rd December the British Chargé d'Affaires had announced a gift, to Poland, of 8,000 tons of beef. The contract had been prepared and the British Embassy in Warsaw had sought the necessary assurances about distribution. However, there were still some difficulties about who was going to represent the Community for distribution.

7. He went on to say that on 28th December, it had been decided that the signing of the contract could go ahead and that the Polish Embassy in Brussels would be given the details of the deliveries and distributions, in exchange of the formal assurance that the meat would go to the civilian population. This formal assurance had been received. It was very likely that the military authorities would not risk diverting this food for other purposes. Cross checks would be done on the spot by the United Kingdom up to the 1st January and by Belgium afterwards.

8. Finally, he asked the Chairman of the Military Committee to clarify the assessment given in paragraph 4.A of document IM(81)224:

"Although reports from Poland are fragmentary and largely contradictory, the situation appears to have calmed, and to be under control of military authorities.

There has been no indication of preparations amongst Soviet and WP forces for an intervention in Poland. However, a somewhat higher than normal state of readiness by some of these forces has been observed."

9. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE confirmed the first part of the statement, i.e. there were at present no indications that an invasion of Poland was being prepared. The higher state of readiness had to do with the communications element of the Soviet forces. There was no change in the military readiness in the Soviet Union proper, nor in the groups of Soviet forces in Poland, nor in the Polish Army. The normal training cycle was going on.

10. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE circulated three situation reports issued on 29th and 30th December.

11. He then referred to the reply by Brezhnev to President Reagan's letter of 23rd December. In this reply, sent on 26th December, Brezhnev was complaining about the United States "overt and covert interference in the internal affairs of Poland" which had been underway for a long time. He had further remarked that "by citing the Soviet CP Central Committee of 5th June, 1981 as evidence of Soviet interference in Poland, the United States was itself interfering in normal relations between the USSR and PZPR." He had expressed the view that by calling for overthrow of existing state systems in Poland, President Reagan was himself interfering in the internal affairs of another sovereign state, that no one should interfere with what the Polish Authorities were doing in their own home, that the social order in Poland had been chosen by the Poles themselves and that no one could direct the Polish leadership on how to conduct its affairs or on which methods to be used to stabilize the situation in the country. Such attempts grossly violated the international law and were thoroughly abnormal. He had rejected that military manoeuvres near Poland could be interpreted as connected with the situation in this country. He had concluded by stressing that the United States, and not the Soviet Union, would bear the responsibility of any further deterioration in US/Soviet relations.

12. In reply, President Reagan had issued the following statement:

"The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear through non-public letters to the Polish leadership, military manoeuvres, and other forms of intimidation. They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued.

Last week I announced that I had sent a letter to President Brezhnev urging him to permit the restoration of basic human rights in Poland as provided for in the Helsinki Final Act. I also informed him that, if the repression continued, the United States would have no choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship.

The repression in Poland continues, and President Brezhnev has responded in a manner which makes it clear the Soviet Union does not understand the seriousness of our concern, and its obligations under both the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter. I have, therefore, decided to take the following immediate measures with regard to the Soviet Union.

- All Aeroflot services to the United States will be suspended;
- The Soviet Purchasing Commission is being closed;
- The issuance or renewal of licenses for the export to the USSR of electronic equipment, computers and other high-technology materials is being suspended;
- Negotiations on a new long-term grains agreement are being postponed;
- Negotiations on a new US/Soviet maritime agreement are being suspended, and a new regime of port-access controls will be put into effect for all Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on December 31st;
- Licenses will be required for export to the Soviet Union an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of such licenses will be suspended. This includes pipelayers;
- US/Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near future, including the agreements on energy and science and technology, will not be renewed. There will be a complete review of all other US/Soviet exchange agreements.

The United States wants a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. We intend to maintain a high-level dialogue. But we are prepared to proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union decides upon - towards greater mutual restraint and cooperation, or further down a harsh and less rewarding path. We will watch events in Poland closely in coming days and weeks. Further steps may be necessary and I will be prepared to take them. American decisions will be determined by Soviet actions.

Secretary Haig has been in communication with our friends and Allies about the measures we are taking and explained why we believe such steps are essential at this time.

Once again I call upon the Soviet Union to recognize the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for a process of national reconciliation, renewal and reform."

13. He went on to say that there was no difference between the attitude of the United States and of the Ten as regards food aid. It had not been discontinued but deliveries would be made through specialised organizations such as Caritas with the necessary guarantees. But he did not see any reason to be soft with the Polish regime. If there was no improvement in the present conditions, further aid measures might have to be deferred.

14. As for the Soviet Union, his government was not seeking confrontation, or trying to influence its attitude in order to find a compromise. It had felt that the Soviet constant violation of the Helsinki Final Act, the fact that Soviet leaders were trying to use the Polish crisis as an instrument to divide the Allies deserved a strong response. It had taken steps in conformity with NATO Contingency papers, in order not to lose its credibility. Additional steps might have to be taken. The United States' highest priority was the solidarity of NATO.

15. In this spirit, his Government wished that NATO be the framework of any further action to put pressure on Polish military authorities so that they would restore the dialogue with Solidarity and the process of renewal in Poland. It was his firm belief that a concerted action of Allied countries would be the best way to reach this aim. Therefore, it attached great importance to a Ministerial Meeting to be held in NATO at the beginning of January.

16. Secretary Haig was also in favour of an early emergency meeting of the Madrid Conference at Ministerial level to discuss the Polish situation. He had no illusion that the East would agree to this proposal. But this would demonstrate that it was not possible to use the Helsinki process for its stated purposes.

17. He was aware that there were differences of opinion about how much leverage the West had and should use. His Authorities felt strongly that Allies should not be seen as sitting without making a response. The United States' response had so far been measured; his Government would see what kind of response subsequent events would call for.

B. - Session Ministérielle

18. Les REPRESENTANTS du ROYAUME UNI, de la BELGIQUE, du DANEMARK, de l'ITALIE, de l'ALLEMAGNE, de la FRANCE, du PORTUGAL et de la TURQUIE se déclarent favorables à une réunion des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de l'Alliance, qui se tiendrait dans la première quinzaine de Janvier, afin de procéder à une évaluation de la situation en Pologne et d'envisager des mesures concrètes.

19. Le REPRESENTANT du CANADA se rallie à cette proposition; il souhaite toutefois qu'elle puisse servir à démontrer l'unité de l'Alliance. Quant à la date, le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Relations Extérieures ne pourra être libre que pendant les première et troisième semaines de Janvier.

20. Le REPRESENTANT des PAYS BAS fait savoir que ses autorités considèrent que cette réunion serait prématurée. Elles ne s'opposent pas toutefois aux vues de la majorité. Son Ministre qui sera en visite officielle en Afrique jusqu'au 12 Janvier, ne pourrait être présent qu'à partir du 13.

21. Le REPRESENTANT de la NORVEGE n'a pas reçu d'instructions de ses autorités. Il pense qu'elles se rallieront à la majorité. Il lui paraît toutefois indispensable que cette réunion soit bien préparée, afin de manifester la cohésion de l'Alliance; sinon elle serait plus nuisible qu'utile.

22. Le REPRESENTANTS du LUXEMBOURG, de l'ISLANDE et de la GRECE n'ont pas encore reçu d'instructions. Ils demandent qu'une date soit fixée afin qu'ils puissent obtenir l'accord de leurs gouvernements respectifs.

23. Le PRESIDENT propose le Jeudi 14 Janvier.

C. - Action to be taken in the CSCE Madrid Conference

24. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE referred to the British suggestion, and to the opportunity of requesting a special meeting of the Madrid Conference. He pointed out that work was due to resume on 9th February in Madrid. Since then, he did not think that the situation in Poland would have changed significantly. He would therefore find it premature for the West to take a decision on the attitude to be adopted at the time. For the same reason, he did not deem it advisable to approach the Neutrals and Non Aligned. In his view, the most realistic option would be as one suggested in paragraph (c)(iv) of the British paper, to return to Madrid, make statements about Poland and then continue the Conference.

25. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities had some hesitation in deciding at present on steps to be taken. If a consensus developed in the Council on one step or the other, they would certainly not stand in the way.

26. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he could support the idea of an early resumption of the Madrid Conference, put forward by the United States. He thought that it was important to focus public opinion attention on the failure by Poland and the Soviet Union to abide by the principles of the Final Act. This meeting could better take place immediately after the NATO Ministerial Meeting. He pointed out that the fact that Poland would be in the Chair at the resumption of the Madrid Conference had to be taken into account.

27. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that there was every reason to think that widespread repression would continue in Poland in the weeks to come and that there was no sign that the Soviet Union might be responsive to demarches regarding the violations of the Final Act. He was therefore strongly supporting the idea of a special meeting of the Madrid Conference in the first week of January.

28. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no objections to an early reconvening of the Madrid Meeting but that he had doubts about the possibility of getting a consensus among the participants on such a proposal. The best that could be hoped, he felt, was that this idea was shared by a majority of participants, which implied that the Neutrals and Non Aligned had agreed to it. He therefore suggested that each NATO country should get in touch with one or two NNA countries, using the British proposal as a framework for these demarches and for instructions to Delegations in Madrid. Italy would gladly contact Yugoslavia and the Vatican.

29. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would have to report the United States' proposal to his Authorities. For the time being, his position was very similar to the Danish one.

30. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities were still in favour of the resumption of the Madrid Conference on 9th February, as foreseen. Then Western Delegations could reopen the implementation discussions and speak about the measures taken by the military government in Poland and of the involvement of the Soviet Union in the preparation of the state of emergency in Poland prior to 13th December. He could agree to sub-paragraphs (c)(iv) and (v) of the British proposal.

31. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE could support the idea of a special meeting in Madrid. However, he felt that there were numerous procedural problems to be clarified.

32. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he could go along with the United States proposal of a special meeting in Madrid in the first week of January.

33. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE could have approved sub-paragraphs (c)(iv) of the British paper (to return to Madrid, to make statements but not to leave the Conference). He would report on the United States last proposal.

34. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE pense que les violations de l'Acte Final commises pendant l'interruption des travaux devront être vigoureusement dénoncées dès la reprise de la Conférence de Madrid et que les Occidentaux doivent coordonner leur attitude en tenant compte des vues des Neutres et Non Alignés, afin de définir des positions fermes qui soient acceptées par le plus grand nombre. Il suggère que des contacts bilatéraux soient pris en premier lieu avec les Neutres et Non Alignés et que leurs résultats soient mis en commun.

35. Il rappelle qu'au moment où la Conférence s'est ajournée, la délégation française avait tenté de plaider pour une reprise dès le début de Janvier; mais que cette idée n'avait pas prévalu. Il a des doutes quant à la possibilité de la reprendre avec des chances de succès. Il pourrait néanmoins s'associer à une démarche commune. Mais, comme le Représentant de l'Italie, il pense que l'essentiel est de convaincre d'abord les Neutres et Non Alignés.

36. Les REPRESENTANTS de la TURQUIE et du LUXEMBOURG se déclarent prêts à appuyer la proposition des Etats Unis, en dépit des difficultés prévisibles.

37. Le PRESIDENT propose de suivre les suggestions du Représentant de la France. Chacun des pays membres de l'Alliance prendra contact avec un ou plusieurs pays neutres et non alignés et informera ses partenaires des résultats de ses efforts.

38. Les REPRESENTANTS des PAYS BAS, de la GRECE, de la NORVEGE et du DANEMARK déclarent ne pouvoir accepter cette suggestion sans consulter leurs autorités.

39. Le PRESIDENT leur demande de faire tout ce qui sera possible pour que le Conseil puisse prendre une décision à une prochaine réunion.

D. - Diplomatic demarches

40. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE introduced a paper to be used by

member countries as guidelines for their demarches in Warsaw, in Moscow and with Third World Countries.

41. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE recorded the positive reaction of his Authorities to what they considered as a good working basis.

42. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities had also welcomed the guidelines contained in the German paper. He suggested to mention under Paragraphs I, II and III, the Allied proposal for an early special meeting of the CSCE Conference in Madrid. He also suggested to insert a new paragraph IV "Demarches with those countries participating in the CSCE Madrid Conference".

43. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that he had so far received no instructions but expected a positive reaction from his Authorities. He felt that time had come to consult those countries whose position were close to the Alliance's views on possible actions against the Soviet Union. It might be useful in this respect to reactivate the "Trio machinery".

44. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE supported the last Canadian suggestion. He had already been approached by the Ambassadors of Australia, New Zealand and Spain.

45. Le REPRESENTANT de la BELGIQUE marque son accord avec les directives proposées dans le document de la République Fédérale. Il est également d'accord avec la dernière suggestion du Représentant du Canada. Il ajoutera simplement que l'accent devrait être mis sur le rôle de l'Eglise dans la reprise du dialogue.

46. Le REPRESENTANT de l'ITALIE se fait l'écho des réactions très favorables suscitées en Italie par l'initiative du gouvernement fédéral, notamment pour ce qui concerne l'appel au Tiers Monde.

47. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Minister was in general agreement with the German guidelines. He wished to point out however that demarches by member countries in Moscow should preferably be made bilaterally or in the framework of the Ten but not as members of NATO. He supported the idea of gaining support of Neutrals and Non Aligned and inducing them to make similar demarches. As for the Trio machinery, he recalled the role of the Netherlands Ambassador vis-a-vis Australia.

48. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he welcomed the German initiative. His Authorities had already made demarches along this line in Warsaw and with the Polish Ambassador in Oslo. He also agreed on the opportunity of demarches in Moscow. However he had doubts about the wisdom of the second sentence in Paragraph II(2) of the German guidelines: "Hint to Soviet involvement and influence on Polish leadership". As regards the Third World countries, he wondered whether demarches would be appropriate in view of their reluctance to be involved in what they perceived as an East/West conflict.

49. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE rappelle que son gouvernement a déjà effectué plusieurs démarches à Moscou et dans d'autres pays de l'Est. Dans un certain nombre de pays du Tiers Monde, les Ambassadeurs de France ont également effectué des démarches afin d'exposer les sentiments du gouvernement français vis à vis de la crise polonaise. Dans l'ensemble, ces démarches ont été accueillies de façon positive, car la situation en Pologne est de nature à inquiéter le Tiers Monde. C'est dire qu'il est d'accord sur tous les points évoqués dans le document de la République Fédérale.

50. Le REPRESENTANT du LUXEMBOURG appuie l'initiative de la République Fédérale. Il met toutefois en garde contre le danger de donner à ces démarches la forme de procès d'intention.

51. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he welcomed the German initiative and could in general approve the paper before the Council. His Authorities were of the opinion, that the Soviet involvement in Poland was obvious and should be stressed in particular with the Third World countries. He agreed however that these countries were usually sensitive with regard to their independence. He felt that the guidelines should be applied according to national policies.

52. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he fully supported the German initiative. He recalled that his Authorities had already made two demarches to the Polish Ambassador in Lisbon, since they had no contact with their Embassy in Warsaw.

53. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had been gratified by the positive reactions to his proposals. He felt that demarches should be made as soon as possible. He agreed that they should be made bilaterally, provided that all replies received by individual countries be conveyed to the others. As for the Neutrals and Non Aligned, he suggested the "Trio countries" should come together to discuss on the best way to approach them. He would circulate a revised version of his document, taking into account comments made in discussion, in time for the next Council meeting.

54. The CHAIRMAN noted that the discussion of the revised version would take place on the following day. He asked whether the Council could agree that the Secretary General make a statement to the press on his own capacity to say that the process of ongoing consultations about the situation in Poland continued.

55. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no objection to a press statement by the Secretary General provided it would be made clear that it was not linked to the Council's discussions and was not made on behalf of NATO.

56. This was generally agreed.