

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Exec. Sec.

N A T O SECRET

X (81) 680

9/15
2045

.....2nd March, 1981.....

REF : PR(81)11

archives
971

To : Secretary General

c.c.: Deputy Secretary General
 ASG, Political Affairs

From : Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Private Meeting of the Council held on
Wednesday, 18th February, 1981 at 10.15 a.m.
and 3.30 p.m.

- I. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ✓
- II. CONTINGENCY PLANNING ✓

[Signature]
T. OZCERI

This document includes: 15 pages
 Annex I : 2 pages
 Annex II : 2 pages
 Annex III : 1 page
 Annex IV : 2 pages
 Annex V : 2 pages

cc: M. DG ✓

N A T O S E C R E T

ATTENDANCE : Restricted

AGENDA : No

MEETING PLACE : Room 10

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

POLAND

I. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

1. The CHAIRMAN of the MILITARY COMMITTEE stated the following:

"During the last few months there have been several national intelligence assessments and unlimited speculation in many fora regarding the amount of warning which the West might expect to receive of a Soviet or a Warsaw Pact Military intervention in Poland. As one might expect, the speculation has run riot; and at times even the assessments have appeared contradictory. This is predictable since the end result is entirely scenario-dependent and the scenarios are innumerable. They range from the unlikely case where the two Soviet divisions based in Poland act on their own, through the situation where the two divisions respond to a Polish government call to assist Polish Security forces, to the extreme cases where 5,10,15, 20 or 25 or more Warsaw Pact divisions are sent in to restore the situation. For each case of external intervention, there are three possibilities, i.e. the Polish security forces remain aloof, co-operate with, or resist the intervention forces. Each scenario will give a different answer: any answer divorced from a scenario is meaningless. What are the indisputable facts?

Military activities reported from the Soviet Union and the forward area over the last four to five months have shown that the Soviets and some of the NSWP countries, particularly the GDR and Czechoslovakia, have increased the readiness of some of their ground forces in and around Poland. This has included increased training and intensified, centralized command and control. This was especially true at the time of high tension prior to the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Moscow in December when we said that no more warning could be given apart from the actual military intervention commencing. Furthermore, the general training cycle of the Warsaw Pact forces is at an advanced stage and several elements are out of garrison.

However, it has been possible recently to discern a limited degree of relaxation in the military posture, although the basic increase in readiness is still in force, especially with regard to command and control arrangements. We therefore believe that there will continue to be available to us certain indicators heralding an intervention.

It is impossible to say whether the warning we might receive would be in hours, days or weeks. Indeed, such crystal-ball gazing is pointless, if not dangerous. What can be said with the utmost certainty is that the Soviets and their surrogates have the capability to intervene with the speed and the strength to achieve whichever objectives Moscow might set".

2. He then referred to the chart (1) which he had circulated during the meeting about Polish forces available to counter civil disorder. He pointed out that only the four first categories were regular, professional,

(1) See Annex I

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

well trained units attached to the Ministry of the Interior. Among the five others, which were under the control of the Defence Ministry category 8 (territorial defence) and category 9 (border troops) could be ignored. Category 5, 6 and 7 were the unknown factor. If high level officers could be considered as loyal to the Government, lower echelons could sympathise with people creating internal disorder.

II. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

A. COORDINATION WITH NON-NATO COUNTRIES ON POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE ALLIANCE

3. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at a previous meeting there had been general agreement that three groups of three Permanent Representatives each would get in touch with certain non-NATO countries through their Ambassadors in Brussels, which might be willing to participate in action regarding Poland by the Alliance under certain circumstances.

4. It had been agreed that:

- the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada would contact Australia and New Zealand;
- the Permanent Representatives of the United States, Germany and the Netherlands would contact Japan; and
- the Permanent Representatives of Portugal, Italy and France would contact Spain.

5. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government was very interested in the discussions with Japan, in which they would like to participate. He might have to come back to this point later on.

6. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he had already approached the Australian Ambassador and would see him again on 27th February. It was very important that a final list of possible measures should be ready at that time so that the four countries approached could have a catalogue to work on.

7. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had also met with the Japanese Ambassador who had asked for instructions from Tokyo in order to be able to pursue the talks.

8. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he had had a discussion on procedural matters with the Spanish Ambassador, who had shown great interest and had informed him since that he had received the green light from his Authorities for further contacts. He would probably meet him again on 26th February.

9. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that in view of the recent developments in Poland, his Government had been hesitant about the advisability of contacting third countries at this stage. He urged that everything should be done to avoid any leakage about these contacts in order not to create the impression that NATO considered a Soviet intervention as unavoidable or as a likely possibility.

B. LIST OF POSSIBLE MEASURES

Reference: PO/80/133

(i) General remarks

10. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Bonn's most recent assessment of the situation had confirmed the view that a Soviet intervention was not unavoidable. A stabilisation of the situation would have greater chances, he felt, if it would be possible to avoid an economic catastrophe. NATO should therefore not slow down its efforts to grant economic assistance to Poland, especially in the form of food deliveries.

11. If the situation aggravated further, confidential warnings to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries might become necessary; they should not be made in a way which would be counterproductive for Poland and East-West relations.

12. As for decision-making, his government's position was unchanged. In all instances it should be for Foreign Ministers to determine whether the worst case had been reached and to select the measures appropriate to the situation. However, it would be for the Permanent Council to coordinate national positions and to determine the general attitude to be adopted at the United Nations, at the Madrid Conference and in the MBFR talks. It was essential that steps should be initiated immediately after an intervention.

13. The list of measures should be applicable to all Warsaw Pact countries which would have participated directly in an intervention. But the degree of western response should also depend on the degree of participation of the countries concerned. Special circumstances applying to some of them should be taken into account, especially the situation in the GDR. He suggested that these general considerations, which applied to all measures, might be included in the introduction to Part III-A. "Possible Political Actions" of a revised version of PO/80/133.

14. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE supported the German Representative's remarks which were in line with guidelines given by Ministers. He felt that in discussing and implementing measures, notably the economic ones, a factor which had to be taken into consideration should be the extent to which non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) nations might succeed in alleviating the damage caused to the Soviet Union by Allied action.

15. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the situation in Poland should be kept under constant review so that Allied governments could be in a position to react on the basis of a common evaluation.

16. As a general framework for economic measures, he felt that it should be agreed that the burden to be shared by Allied countries should be balanced and that coordination should ensure that the situation of each country could be taken into account, in a spirit of solidarity.

(ii) Possible Political Actions

17. The CHAIRMAN said that these general remarks would be summarised in the revised version of PO/80/133. He invited comments on the measures listed under III A of this document. He recalled that several delegations had already circulated working papers regarding their government's positions on some of these measures.

18. No observation was made on Action 1 - Make protest demarches where and as appropriate.

Action 2 - Call for Emergency UN Security Council meeting and, if appropriate, a meeting of the General Assembly.

19. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he would provide the International Staff with a summary of his working paper (1) to be included in the final assessment document.

20. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE supported by the DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he could agree to the procedural outline contained in the United Kingdom paper. He did not foresee any difficulty in getting nine votes against a Soviet intervention in the Security Council. In the General Assembly, however, he wondered whether it would not be more difficult than was the case after the invasion of Afghanistan, to get the support of Third World countries. They might consent that it was a matter of East/West relations. Failure of a Western initiative in the General Assembly might be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a justification of its action.

21. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the present wording seemed to imply that Action 2 could only be taken after Foreign Ministers had met. The Permanent Council and Allied delegations in NATO Headquarters should be authorised to sanction the measures agreed upon under a scenario. This remark was also valid as regards Actions 1 and 5.

22. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that it had been agreed at the December meeting that the Permanent Council should be responsible for co-ordinating Allied initiatives. He therefore fully supported the United States interpretation.

Action 4 - Recall Ambassadors from Moscow and, possibly, other Warsaw Pact capitals for consultations.

23. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE fait valoir que cette mesure présente plus d'inconvénients que d'avantages. Bien que ce soit un moyen de frapper l'opinion, il en existe beaucoup d'autres à la dispositions des gouvernements. En revanche ceux-ci se privent d'une voie de communication très utile dans une situation de crise. Par ailleurs aucune solution satisfaisante n'existe au problème du retour à leur poste des Ambassadeurs alliés. S'ils reviennent à des dates différentes, ce sera interprété comme reflétant des divergences entre les gouvernements; s'ils reviennent tous ensemble ce sera interprété comme traduisant le désir des gouvernements de reprendre des relations normales.

24. Il serait d'accord pour maintenir cette mesure à condition de préciser que les Ambassadeurs seront rappelés pour une courte période, une semaine au plus, afin d'informer leurs gouvernements et d'en recevoir des instructions.

25. Le REPRESENTANT de la TURQUIE déclare que ses instructions vont dans le même sens. Il ajoute que le rappel des Ambassadeurs est beaucoup plus gênant pour les petites Ambassades que pour les grandes qui disposent d'un personnel nombreux et peuvent assurer la bonne marche des services en l'absence de l'Ambassadeur.

26. Les REPRESENTANTS de l'ALLEMAGNE, du CANADA et de la NORVEGE déclarent partager les préoccupations du Représentant de la France. Ils accepteraient que cette mesure soit maintenue si le texte était modifié de manière à introduire une notion de limite dans le temps.

27. Le REPRESENTANT des ETATS UNIS déclare que son gouvernement attache beaucoup d'importance à cette mesure en raison de son impact sur l'opinion, à l'Est comme à l'Ouest.

28. Les REPRESENTANTS du ROYAUME UNE et des PAYS BAS sont d'avis que cette mesure est l'une de celles qui devrait être décidée par les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères lors de leur réunion extraordinaire. Cette circonstance exceptionnelle justifiera le rappel des Ambassadeurs pour faire le point de la situation et recevoir de nouvelles instructions. Une fois ces consultations terminées, les ambassadeurs devraient regagner leur poste approximativement à la même date.

(En Annex III la note du Royaume Uni concernant cette mesure.)

Action 5 - Suspend participation in the CSCE Madrid Meeting following condemnation of Soviet action on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act.

29. There was a general agreement on the United Kingdom input (1) which recommended that implementation of this measure should be left to Allied delegations in Madrid, on the basis of agreed guidelines to ensure a coordinated approach.

30. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE suggested that Allied delegations should consult with Spain and also with Neutral and Non-Alligned countries which might have difficulty in agreeing to a suspension of the meeting.

31. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that any leakage in Madrid about consultations in the Council would be very dangerous. This should be kept in mind by Allied negotiators in their contacts with third countries.

32. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported by the DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his government attached great importance to the fact that the Madrid Meeting should only be "suspended". It would be regrettable to give the impression that the CSCE process was definitely interrupted.

Action 6 and 7 - Suspend participation in arms control and disarmament negotiations such as MBFR, CTB, CD, CDE, and Review with the United States SALT and LRTNF negotiations.

33. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported by the GERMAN, NORWEGIAN, DANISH and BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVES said that each negotiation should be considered separately. In general, he felt that it would not be in the interest of the West that these negotiations would be interrupted or suspended for too long. As for LRTNF, he suggested that any action should be weighed with due regard to the interests of the Alliance and that progress achieved so far should not be completely lost.

(1) Annex IV

34. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he reserved his position as regards SALT and LRTNF until the new administration had completed its review of United States' policies.

35. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE was of the opinion that a distinction should be made between negotiations in the framework of East-West relations and those in international fora. In the first case, he felt that public opinion in the West and in Poland would understand that these negotiations could not go on. In the second case, such as C.D. he pointed out that Western delegations alone could not suspend the proceedings. Furthermore, if they decided to leave, this would mean that delegations of the Third World would have to face the Soviet Union without any support and that decisions affecting western interests could be taken in their absence.

Action 8 - Impose additional restrictions on Soviet and, possibly other Warsaw Pact embassies, including limits on travel and staff at all levels.

36. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE suggested that consideration should also be given to measures which could be taken at a later stage of a crisis, as a possible reaction against counter-measures taken by the Warsaw Pact countries. In his view, Action 8 belonged to this category.

37. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE introduced an input (1) which his authorities had prepared dealing with various aspects of this measure.

38. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that arrangements concerning Warsaw Pact embassy personnel were entered into on a basis of reciprocity. Therefore, each allied government would have to consider before taking any action whether the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union and its allies would outweigh what western nations could suffer from retaliatory measures from the other side. Special bilateral relationships would also have to be taken into account.

39. Under the assumption that it would be for Ministers to consider the timing and the extent of such measures the Council approved a list of possible restrictions to be incorporated into PO/80/133(Revised).

Action 9 - Suspend all exchanges of high level visits with Warsaw Pact states participating in the intervention.

40. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that this action should not be too restrictive, since some lines of communication should be kept open.

41. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE supported this remark. He felt that the possibility of exchange of visits of high level experts for crisis management purposes should not be excluded.

42. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities would prefer that no ceiling be imposed on short-term visits of ancillary organizations. The United States were building a new embassy in Moscow, which implied that numerous temporary employees would have to be sent there in the months to come. Any restriction imposed on the Soviets in the United States would entail reciprocal treatment. He added that a ban had already been placed on establishment of new Soviet firms in the United States after the Afghanistan crisis.

(1) Annex V

Action 10 - Suspend major cultural, academic, scientific and athletic exchanges and, if applicable, the execution of cultural agreements.

43. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that in many cases such exchanges took place under the auspices of private organizations on which governments had a limited authority, as had been shown by the same participation in the Moscow Olympic Games.

44. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE added that it might be difficult to terminate bilateral agreements which made no provisions for cancellations of that kind. Although he agreed that "major" events having a great impact on the public should be cancelled, he felt that it would serve no purpose to put an end to exchange of teachers and to fellowship programmes.

45. The UNITED KINGDOM, BELGIAN and GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES supported this remark. They stressed the fact that in cultural agreements with most of the Warsaw Pact countries there was no provision for a premature termination and that it was in the interest of the West to keep intact networks which had developed over the years in the cultural and scientific fields.

46. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that since Afghanistan there had been no major cultural exchange between his country and the Soviet Union. No cultural agreement had been signed since 1971. The academic exchanges of 30 scholars of each country every year should be continued, because of the access it gave to Soviet society. Budgetary cuts were likely to limit further cultural exchanges.

47. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that after Afghanistan all cultural, scientific, academic and sportive exchanges that Canada had with the Soviet Union had been suspended and still were.

C. POSSIBLE ECONOMIC ACTIONS

General remarks

48. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE constate que les mesures envisagées dans sept domaines d'action son d'une efficacité et d'un intérêt inégaux. Certaines peuvent difficilement être appliquées par tous les alliés pour des raisons d'ordre juridique et pratique. C'est pourquoi son gouvernement souhaiterait un accord à quinze qui préserverait les éléments essentiels de portée générale du dispositif envisagé tout en laissant à chaque gouvernement la possibilité de décider de prendre telle où mesure, selon ses moyens d'action.

49. A titre d'élément central commun aux quinze, il propose un embargo général sur toutes les exportations faisant l'objet de nouveaux contrats après l'entrée de troupes soviétiques en Pologne. Cet embargo ne porterait pas atteinte aux accords et engagements intergouvernementaux afin de ne pas donner aux Soviétiques un prétexte pour revenir sur des accords souscrits.

50. Si cette disposition était acceptée, il serait à son avis négligeable de ne pas être en mesure de se mettre d'accord sur certaines mesures dans tel ou tel domaine.

51. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE agreed that a complete embargo on new export contracts would cover almost all detailed measures. The major difficulty, he felt, would be the interpretation of existing export

contracts; it would therefore be useful to have a clear definition of such contracts. He felt that whatever action allied countries would take it should be on a coordinated basis, unanimous and likely to involve as many of them as possible. Finally, the embargo should not equally apply to all Warsaw Pact countries.

52. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that there should be an introduction to the list of possible economic actions setting out the general considerations to be taken into account in the implementation of the measures.

- The first requirement would be to improve the economic situation of Poland; the proposed aid for 1981 did not seem adequate.
- In order to ensure the greatest possible effect, of any sanction, all Allied countries should be involved.
- The disadvantage of measures taken should be greater for the East than for the West.
- The burden should be shared more or less equally between all Western countries concerned and bilateral relationships should be taken into account.
- Care should be taken that any differentiation made among the Warsaw Pact countries would not result in the circumvention of the economic measures.
- The contractual basis of relations with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries should be preserved and no pretext should be given to them to break agreements essential to the West.

53. Concerning the embargo, he felt that, as it had been done with Iran, the imports and exports of goods from and to the Soviet Union, as well as service contracts with that country, should be made subject to governmental agreement by the introduction of foreign trade and payment ordinances. He could agree to an embargo on new contracts provided that it would comply with agreed criteria and that it would be of general application in order to avoid circumvention.

54. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had examined the problem of economic actions on the basis of the following assumptions:

- (1) Any actions to be taken should be agreed upon by all the Allies unanimously. We would of course welcome participation by other industrialized countries.
- (2) They should be part of a package of measures - political, diplomatic, cultural and economic - as envisaged in this document.
- (3) The responsibility for the economic measures should rest with the national authorities and not be left to individual enterprises.
- (4) The economic actions should be of as general and encompassing a nature as possible, and not be directed at special branches of enterprise or individual companies.

(5) The measures should harm Soviet interests more than our own.

55. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE was in favour of a package of a limited number of measures to be implemented together.

56. Le REPRESENTANT de la TURQUIE déclare que dans les domaines économiques et techniques les relations avec les pays de l'Est sont au bénéfice presque exclusif de la Turquie. Les très grands projets sont presque achevés ou terminés mais à moderniser. Compte-tenu de cette situation particulière son pays est prêt à prendre part à une action dans le domaine économique, à la mesure de ses moyens.

57. Le REPRESENTANT du LUXEMBOURG considère qu'en raison des difficultés juridiques et pratiques qu'il y aurait à rompre les contrats en cour, la notion d'un embargo sur les nouveaux contrats est intéressante mais que les conditions d'application devront en être précisées avant que le Conseil soit en mesure de prendre une décision.

58. Le REPRESENTANT de l'ITALIE estime qu'il est difficile de discuter dans l'abstrait d'une liste de mesures dont l'application dépend évidemment des circonstances dans lesquelles une crise s'ouvrirait. Il préférerait que le Conseil se mette d'accord sur des critères et des directives générales. Il rappelle que pour son gouvernement il est essentiel que le fardeau soit réparti de façon équilibrée, équitable et coordonnée, compte-tenu des structures et de la situation économiques de chaque pays.

59. Le REPRESENTANT de la BELGIQUE rappelle que l'invasion de la Pologne ne suspendrait pas l'application des règles du Droit international pour ce qui concerne les contrats en vigueur. Par ailleurs dans certains cas une décision unanime de la CEE serait nécessaire. La proposition française lui paraît logique et constructive à condition de préciser l'étendue de l'embargo, notamment dans le cas des matériels stratégiques figurant sur les listes du COCOM.

60. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his government attached great importance to a common understanding on general criteria for the implementation of the list of measures. He agreed that the embargo would raise other problems such as the definition of contracts and the damage to Allied countries of retaliatory measures. He felt that to be in a position to discuss specific measures, the Council would need a study of feasibility.

61. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE was of the opinion that the French proposal should be further explored. His authorities were in favour of a package of measures which all Allied countries could apply, it being understood that the possibility of taking account of different economic conditions should be left open. For instance, Norway would not be in a position to apply measures on fisheries, due to the damage to be expected from retaliatory measures.

62. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE supported the previous statements. He added that some of the proposed measures would require the abrogation of international agreements and of legislation in each country.

63. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the embargo would only subsume part of the proposed measures; for instance export of COCOM items would not be covered. Should the Allies decide on a complete embargo, it could be applied in the United States with no difficulty, provided there was a clear definition of contracts.

64. The GERMAN, UNITED KINGDOM and NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVES said that they could agree to study the French proposal together with other restrictive measures which could apply in cases where the embargo would be feasible.

List of economic measures

- It was agreed to have, as action 1, a general embargo on all exports stemming from new contracts.

- SELECTIVE TRADE RESTRICTIONS

65. Le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE fait les remarques suivantes

- (a) Produits agricoles -

Il serait souhaitable de coordonner une action alliée non seulement avec l'Australie et le Nouvelle Zélande mais aussi avec l'Espagne, le Brésil et l'Argentine;

- (b) crédits à l'exportation -

Ils ne pourront être refusés pour les opérations déjà conclues. Un embargo général, pour être efficace, devrait également être appliqué par les pays tiers;

- (c) Ajustement des règles du consensus -

Les pays qui réviseraient les termes des contrats en cours courraient le risque de voir ces contrats passer à d'autres pays. Un embargo général serait la meilleure solution;

- (d) Problèmes liés aux projets industriels -

Il faudrait veiller à ce que l'URSS ne tourne pas les mesures d'interdiction portant sur de grands projets en morcelant les contrats.

66. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE said that the Soviet Union was an important export market for fish products from Iceland and its main supplier of oil products. He would therefore have to reserve his position on 1(a) Trade in foodstuffs and on 4(i) Closure of ports.

67. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that it would be possible to withdraw credit guarantee and insurance but that without a general embargo, this would be disadvantageous for countries having low credit rates to which the Soviet Union might be able to shift its export contracts.

68. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that to cut off exports credits would have a great impact on the Soviet Union, provided it included all forms of national support of exports to the Soviet Union.

As for the lines of credit, he said that they had been prohibited in the United States since 1975. He was of the opinion that Allied countries should refrain from negotiating new agreements or extending existing/credit lines.

69. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that there were no government loans or subsidies and that no further guarantee would be extended. He added that most of the exports to the Soviet Union were durable capital goods usually sold on credits backed by guarantees. The removal of this cover would be tantamount to an embargo. However, the Soviet Union would be able to switch to cash transactions.

70. He went on to say that any violation of the principle of non use of force would justify the suspension of existing economic agreements with the Soviet Union. It would be better to ensure a uniform conduct of Western countries through coordination in the OECD.

71. As regards the lines of credits, he pointed out that an interruption of existing contracts would be tantamount to expropriation and subject to compensation. This might be more harmful for the West than for the Soviet Union.

72. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his country had extended no new line of credits to the Soviet Union and had given very little guarantee. In his view, any action to be efficient should be closely co-ordinated and an embargo on future contracts would be more effective than any credit arrangement.

73. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that under Danish regulations it would be possible to cut off exports credits; that any adjustment of the rules of consensus would require prior agreement among the Ten and that restrictions on industrial projects would raise difficulties in his country as regards agro-industry and computers which would suffer from retaliatory measures.

- COCOM and TECHNOLOGY

74. Le REPRESENTANT des ETATS UNIS ayant suggéré d'envisager la possibilité de lever les exceptions concernant les matériels stratégiques afin de pouvoir appliquer des mesures qui ont un caractère très spectaculaire, le REPRESENTANT de la FRANCE rappelle que les discussions concernant la révision des listes du COCOM et le durcissement des règles vis à vis de l'URSS se poursuivent depuis un an sans succès. S'il admet la nécessité d'adapter les dispositions du COCOM à l'évolution de la technologie, il ne croit pas que cet exercice doive se faire dans l'optique de sanctions; le COCOM doit assurer la sécurité de l'Occident en dehors de toute considération momentanée.

- AIR TRAFFIC

75. There was a general agreement that although restrictions on air traffic would constitute a very serious signal, it would raise difficulties which made them not very profitable for the West;

- In most cases, bilateral agreements with the USSR could be terminated subject to 12 months notice and in the case of Turkey termination would be compatible with the Montreaux Convention;

- Cancellation of regular flights would raise legal problems and there was the question of their resumption;

- Stopping charter flights, although legally feasible and rather easy in countries such as the FRG and the United States, would hardly be possible in the United Kingdom.

- SHIPPING and TRANSPORT

76. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that the 1968 Maritime Agreement which afforded to Soviet merchant vessels the same treatment as afforded to British vessels in respect to free access to ports was subject to 12 months notice for cancellation. Such a measure which would pave the way to more direct action such as closing ports to Soviet vessels would provoke retaliation. The United Kingdom would not be willing to apply it alone.

77. As for land transport, he pointed out that the Trans Siberian Railway took 25% of the surface traffic to Japan. If stopped, it would deprive the Soviet Union of foreign exchange; but this measure, which would greatly benefit the West, would require the cooperation of Japan.

78. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that in most cases sanctions in this field would require the abrogation of a treaty with the Soviet Union and should only be considered in extreme situations.

79. The GERMAN and DANISH REPRESENTATIVES said that they were in the same position.

80. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the termination of maritime agreements would have a durable effect on the Soviet Union and would demonstrate Allied unity. He added that since Afghanistan the traffic with the Soviet Union had practically ceased in American ports off the West coast. It would not be necessary for the United States to close their ports formally to Soviet merchant ships. They could terminate their maritime agreement with the Soviet Union and make the entry into ports subject to governmental authorisation. They would also favour a restriction on the use of Soviet surface transportation and as a minimum a coordinated Allied commitment not to use those services.

81. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his government could consider procedures for making access to sea ports more difficult as well as an amendment to the Maritime Act which would provide the possibility of restricting river transports.

- FISHING

82. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE recalled that there was no fishing agreement between the EEC and the Soviet Union. In the Baltic, fishing was subject to the Gdansk-multilateral Convention and to national regulations. Although the Convention might be abrogated unilaterally, this measure did not seem appropriate. It would require the cooperation of other signatories, including Federal Germany and would involve extremely difficult problems for Denmark, especially in the grey zone between Denmark and Poland.

83. As for the Faroe Islands, Denmark had signed a fishing

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

agreement with the Soviet Union of 10 years duration, which would not easily be terminated since the Faroes were dependent on fish exports to the Soviet Union.

84. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that it would be difficult to prevent Soviet factory ships from buying large quantities of fish from British fishermen.

- ENERGY

85. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that his government's refusal of guarantees for the Siberian gaz pipeline project would suffice to cancel the transaction; under these conditions, firms would probably stop negotiations. However, except in the worst case situation, it would be worth examining whether it was in the interest of the West to stop this project which would allow it to diversify sources of supply. There would be the danger of the Soviet Union taking greater interest also in Middle East oil which was the biggest source of energy supply for Allied countries.

- FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROBLEMS

86. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE supported by the FRENCH and GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES said that the four measures listed under action 7 in the Unofficial Annex to PO/80/133 did not seem legally applicable. Furthermore any interference in the western banking system might deter more countries than the Soviet Union to use it.

87. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that although legal authority existed to take these four measures in his country, he shared the doubts expressed on their efficiency. The recent experience with Iran had shown that they could also be dangerous.

88. The Council agreed that while those four measures would prove to be impracticable, they should nevertheless be retained in the list for eventual decision by Ministers.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

AIDE MEMOIRE

POLISH FORCES AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT TO COUNTER CIVIL DISORDER

Serial	Force Name	Description	Strength	Remarks
1	Factory/Works Guards	Local (Civilian) Building and Works Guards	Unknown	Not trained or equipped for other than routine physical security
2	Local Police (1)	Municipal and Locality Police	Unknown	Not trained or equipped for other than normal police duties (includes civil disorder mission)
3	Gendarmerie (1)	National police - Highway and Rural Police	Unknown	Trained/equipped as Light Infantry - Civil Disorder Mission
4	Zomo (Alert Police (1)	Mobile Counter-Riot/Disorder Force	25.000 (approx)	Regular force. Specially trained and equipped for civil disorder mission
5	WOW (Internal Defence) (2)	Military units organized for territorial defence/civil disorder	11.000 (approx)	Conscript force. Employed in 1970 riots (unsuccessfully). Reorganised in 1975

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Serial	Force Name	Description	Strength	Remarks
6 & 7	Ground Forces (2) Helicopter (2)	Conventional military forces - 8 Motor Rifle Divisions, 5 Tank Divisions; 1 ABN Division; 1 Sea Landing Division (3) Rotary Wing Aircraft Units	216.625 (approx) 5.145 (approx)	Conscript forces. Could be employed to counter civil disorder
8	OTK (Territorial Defence)(4)	Construction and Engineering Units	55.000 (approx)	Conscript Force. Lightly armed; only basic military training
9	WOP (Border Troops) (1) (4)	Normal border security mission	20.000 (approx)	Normal border security. Conscript Force. Light Infantry Equipment

- NOTES:
- (1) Subordinate to Interior Ministry
 - (2) Subordinate to Defence Ministry
 - (3) Naval Force (Marine/Naval Infantry)
 - (4) To be used in civil disorder mission only as a last resort

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

MEASURE A2: CALL FOR EMERGENCY UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND IF APPROPRIATE,
A MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

Objectives

1. The general Western objective will be to secure the most effective response the UN can be persuaded to make. Specific objectives and tactics will have to be adapted to the situation in New York. At the least, we should work for the condemnation, by as large a number of UN members as possible, of the Soviet (or Warsaw Pact) intervention, and a call for the immediate withdrawal of invading forces and for respect for the principles of the UN Charter governing the conduct of international relations. Measures to maintain pressure to this effect should be considered subsequently.

Security Council

2. It would be appropriate to go first to the Security Council, as the body with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is unlikely that the Secretary General will take the initiative, under Article 99 of the Charter, to summon a meeting of the Security Council. Western states, both Council members and others, should therefore be ready to request the President of the Council (February: France; March: GDR; April: Ireland) to summon an urgent meeting. It will be important to persuade some Third World states to support this request.

3. Western members of the Council should, if possible with non-aligned support, co-sponsor a resolution reflecting the points in paragraph 1 above. The West can probably count on 7 votes (France, UK, USA, China, Japan, Ireland and Spain). 9 positive votes are required for a resolution to be adopted or to force the Russians to veto. A major effort should therefore be made to secure positive votes from Third World Council members (a full list of Security Council members is attached).

General Assembly

4. We must expect the Soviet Union to veto a Security Council resolution on these lines. It will therefore be for consideration whether to call for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, which could be convened within 24 hours if there is a request from the Security Council or from a majority of the 154 UN member states. The Security Council route is the obvious and quickest one: 9 positive votes would be needed in the Council, and a resolution calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly would be a procedural one which could not be vetoed. Resolutions in the General Assembly concerning peace and security would constitute 'important questions' and would require a two-thirds majority to be adopted.

Enlistment of Third World Support

5. The non-permanent members of the Security Council will be obvious targets for lobbying. Advice should be sought from Permanent Representatives in New York on other Third World states to whom we should pay special attention. We should be ready to agree quickly on which Western country/countries should take the lead in lobbying particular countries.

Arguments for use in Security Council/General Assembly

6. It will be essential to bring home to Third World member states that intervention in Poland is not only a European or East/West issue but, particularly following the invasion of Afghanistan, of direct and major concern to the world community. A stable world order is impossible without respect for the Charter principles, universally accepted, which govern relations between states. If aggression, lack of respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, and interference in the internal affairs of states are regularly perpetrated by certain UN member states (the history of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan should be rehearsed) while the UN fails to condemn such action, confidence in the security offered by the UN Charter is misplaced.

Elements of a Security Council Resolution

7. The draft resolution to be tabled in the Council should be brief and straightforward. It should follow closely the terms of draft resolutions tabled in analogous situations (especially Hungary and Czechoslovakia).

Scenarios

8. The foregoing assumes the worst case scenario. Lesser cases, which may not involve a clear-cut breach of the Charter, will make it much harder to mobilise Third World support. Decisions will have to be taken in the light of circumstances, and we should be careful not to embark on a UN operation which may misfire and present the Soviet Union with something of a propaganda victory.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ABOUT POLAND

MEASURE A4: RECALL AMBASSADORS FROM MOSCOW, AND POSSIBLY, OTHER WARSAW PACT
CAPITALS FOR CONSULTATIONS

1. Withdrawal of Ambassadors, especially on a concerted basis, would have considerable public impact. On the other hand the advice of Ambassadors on the spot in Moscow could be greatly needed in the especially difficult period in East/West relations which would follow an intervention in Poland.
2. Moreover, the political impact of withdrawing Ambassadors for a relatively long period has to be weighed against the fact that their subsequent return to post might be seen as evidence of a return to business as usual.
3. But the recall of an Ambassador for consultations and new instructions may be desirable. It could be made clear at the time of recall that the Ambassador was returning to take part in a policy review and would go back to post afterwards. It would be desirable for all the Allies to act similarly in this matter, to avoid an appearance of disunity.
4. The policy adopted with regard to Ambassadors in Moscow could also be applied to Ambassadors in other Warsaw Pact countries participating in an intervention.
5. Ambassadors in Warsaw should be withdrawn if the USSR installed a puppet leadership. In other situations Western policy would depend on the circumstances. It would be important to avoid appearing to express disapproval of Polish efforts to resist Soviet forces, and there would be a particular need for Ambassadors' advice from Warsaw in a period of flux.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ABOUT POLAND

MEASURE A5: SUSPEND PARTICIPATION IN THE CSCE MADRID MEETING FOLLOWING
CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT

1. There has so far been no attempt in Western coordination meetings to work out how this measure might best be implemented. Details will have to be left to delegations on the spot, as the procedures will have to take account of the stage the meeting has reached and the programme of plenary meetings; but it would be useful to offer some general guidelines:

(i) Contingency planning in Madrid would be bound to leak, and to give the impression that we regarded intervention as inevitable. It should not therefore be put in hand until instructions have been given from capitals.

(ii) If there is an intervention, Heads of Delegation should not attend meetings of the 35 pending such instructions. Lower level Western participation at scheduled meetings should be kept to the minimum required to prevent harmful decisions from being taken. We should be careful not to give an impression of 'business as usual'.

(iii) When so instructed, Western delegations would concert their implementation of the agreed measures.

(iv) There might be advantage in limiting the number of condemnatory speeches, where it is possible for one delegation to speak on behalf of a number of others. Too many speeches could cause procedural difficulties (only a certain number of plenary sessions are on the agreed programme, which can be changed only/consensus); and might tend to focus attention on differences of nuance rather than on the substance of the message.

(v) It is possible that strongly expressed criticism will provoke a Soviet walk-out. This would provide a satisfactory basis on which to suspend the Conference, and we should be ready to take advantage of it. (We should, however, recognise that a Soviet walk-out would not be an unmixed blessing in the longer term. Pressure would develop to re-launch the CSCE process, and a Soviet Union sulking in its tent would be in a good position to try to improve conditions - eg. on 'non-interference' - before agreeing to a further meeting.)

(vi) If the Soviet Union decides not to walk out at the outset, it is very unlikely that it will do so in response to a longer exposure to Western criticism (eg. as occasion arises in the various working groups of the Conference). It is more likely then to sit it out, and to put the West in a position of having either to take the onus for suspending the meeting or to risk a gradual return to business as usual.

(vii) The West has in fact nothing to lose by suspending the meeting in circumstances where this will be fully understood by public opinion, including public opinion in the most important neutral and non-aligned countries. On the other hand, our position would be weakened by lengthy procedural wrangling which would serve to obfuscate the issue of substance.

(viii) The best solution might be for Western Heads of Delegation to be recalled for consultations once condemnation of the intervention had been expressed. Western delegations would not in the meantime attend meetings of the Conference (though it might prove necessary to send one or two watchdogs, who could if necessary act to prevent consensus on decisions); and we should explain to the Spaniards that we did not think it right in the circumstances for the Conference to proceed.

(ix) We would have to explain our policy very clearly to the neutrals and non-aligned. Provided that they are kept closely informed, it is highly unlikely that they would wish to sit on after a Western withdrawal in circumstances which would suggest an ambivalent attitude to the intervention.

(x) One can envisage circumstances where the Polish delegation, at least at the outset, joined in criticism of the Soviet action. This would be welcome, but would not require us to change the policy suggested above. Neither would we wish to change it if the Polish delegation were to take the Soviet side.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON POLAND

MEASURE A8: IMPOSE ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET AND POSSIBLY OTHER WARSAW PACT EMBASSIES, INCLUDING LIMITS ON TRAVEL AND STAFF AT ALL LEVELS

ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

1. There is a wide range of possible measures which fall into three categories.

A. Tighter Travel Restrictions

2. We should consider:-

(a) Reduction of the area around the capital, within which Soviet officials may now travel freely and without notification, to more closely match the Moscow free travel zone which totals 1150 square miles (a circle of 25 miles radius but including large areas which are out of bounds).

(b) Elimination of any exceptions now enjoyed by the Russians to the travel notification requirement.

(c) Bringing all official Soviet visitors to the Embassy, Trade Delegation and ancillary organizations within the travel restrictions and travel notification procedures: this could be effected by requiring travel outside the capital to be included on visa applications.

B. Expulsions and Lower Residual Ceilings

3. The basic for expulsions could either be categories (eg commercial or scientific staff) or individuals. The category approach would allow the measure to be presented as a logical accompaniment to other measures taken in the economic field. It would be reasonable to require the Russians to reduce their commercial representation, perhaps by 50%, if trade sanctions are imposed which would have the effect of significantly reducing the amount of business to be transacted. This approach would not, however, succeed in removing many of the Soviet diplomatic and non-diplomatic officers who have been identified as intelligence officers.

4. The individual approach would permit the removal of selected identified or suspected intelligence officers with a consequent benefit for Western security. Were this approach adopted it would be right to embrace all known or suspected intelligence personnel, wherever in the Embassy or trade delegation they work. Service attaches, labour attaches, scientific and technical representatives would be obvious targets.

5. Soviet retaliation would be inevitable, particularly if the individual approach were followed. The category approach, if concentrated on areas where Western countries might in any case wish to reduce their own staffs as a result of the economic measures which are under consideration, would offer less scope for harmful retaliation. Effective retaliation would in any case be less if a large number of Western countries acted together, and concerted action would therefore be desirable.

6. Expulsions of Soviet journalists could also be considered. But here too, retaliation must be expected.

7. The ceilings on Soviet officials which would result from expulsions could be made either temporary or permanent. If it were decided to adopt the category approach, linked to other economic measures, there would be a case for making residual ceilings temporary, to last so long as the trade sanctions were maintained. If the individual approach were adopted, it would be logical to make the residual ceilings permanent.

C. Other Steps to Impede Soviet Intelligence Activities

8. These could include:

(a) the imposition of ceilings for short term visitors, whether to the Soviet Embassy, Trade Delegation or ancillary organizations.

(b) freezing the number of Russians employed in ancillary organizations (eg joint companies) outside the capital. This would restrict the opportunities for Soviet intelligence activity from these bases.

(c) a ban on new Soviet firms or offices outside the capital (thus preventing a diversion of personnel to new locations) and the closure of some existing offices, whether in the capital or outside it. This could be presented as a consequence of economic sanctions.

(d) imposition of controls on visiting Soviet seamen to parallel those on Western seamen visiting the Soviet Union. This could take the form of surrender of passport and completion of a landing card stipulating that landing for a specified number of hours only was permitted. Some identified Russians might be refused permission to land. Extra resources might be required.

(e) closure of certain port to Soviet merchant vessels; this would reduce the number of ports at which controls would be needed.

(f) requirement that all port calls by Soviet vessels be notified in advance by eg. 48 hours.

The legal implications of the last three measures would need to be considered where bilateral maritime agreements with the Soviet Union exist.

ACTION AGAINST OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES

9. The introduction of restrictions on numbers of, and travel by, NSWP representatives could be expected to lead to imposition of similar restrictions in the NSWP states. In addition, the imposition of travel restrictions on NSWP representatives would not be a response to restrictions placed on Western personnel: it would thus weaken a sound presentational case.

10. The measures outlined in this paper are still under consideration by my authorities and at this stage reflect provisional conclusions only.